ML20205L885

New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution Response to Board Order of 870227:statement of Contentions & Standing.* Affidavits of Ja Christie,Ew Christie,Eh Hall & J Berstein Authorizing Representation & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20205L885
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	03/30/1987
From:	Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:
References
CON-#287-2949 OLA, NUDOCS 8704020214
Download: ML20205L885 (15)

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DOCHETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION . . , . _ .

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boa

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In the Ma tter of ) f' C 2 ' ' ' ' '"'

)

Vern.ont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Corporation ) Docket No. 5 0-271-O LA

)

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Station) )

)

NEW ENGLAND CCALITICN ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S RESPONSE TO BOARD ORDER OF FEBRUARY 27, 1987: STATEMENT OF CONTENTICNS AND STANDING' By order dated February 27, 1987, the Board directed the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") to provide its contentions and additional inf ormation on standing by Ma rch 30, 1987.

Standino The following members of FECNP, all of whom live within ten (10) miles of the plant, have authorized NECNP to represent their interests in this proceeding:

John A. Christie Elizabeth W. Christie River Road, Green River Jacksonville Stage Guilford, Vermont Elizabeth H. Be ll 335 West Gill Road Gill, Ma ssachuse tts John Be rnstein R.R. 3 Brattleboro, Vermont

( 8704020214 870330 PDR ADOCK 05000271 G PDR Q3

2-Affidavits establishing their authorization are attached.

Contentions As noted in NECNP's letter to the Board of March 16, 1987, neither the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) nor the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") related docwnents have yet been issued by the NRC staf f. These contentions are therefore neces-sarily subject to change and supplementation and NECNP reserves its right to do so within a reasonable period after receipt of the basic NEC review documents.

Contention 1 The proposed expansion of the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool would pose undue risk to public health and safety by greatly increasing the potential consequences of reactor accidents.

Easis NRC's most recent risk estimate for General Electric Mark I plants is that the containment is as likely as not to fail in a severe accident. (See NUREG-1150, Peactor Risk Reference Docu-ment, Draft for Comment, Fe b. , 1987, at 4 4-39.) This con-ditional containment failure probability is substantially greater than for other plant designs. The special vulnerability of the Mark I design has been described as follows:

. . .the Ma rk I containment is vulnerable to severe accident containment loads. Unless mitigative actions are taken a Mark I containment has the potential to fail a short time (a few hours) af ter the reactor vessel f ails. If containment failure occurs in the drywell any fission products in the drywell atmosphere could pass to the reactor building without the benefit of suppression pool scrubbing. Because of this vulnerability the predicted offsite consequences 4 were relatively insensitive to the accident sequence defini- I tion. -

Prevention and Mitigation of Severe Accidents In a 'BWR-4 With a '

Mark I Containment, Technical Report A-3825R, Brookhaven national La bora to ry; Intermountain Technologies, Inc.,' prepared for U.S.

NRC, draf t, October, 1986, S 1.2.

The spent fuel pool is located inside the reactor building.

Neither the reactor building, which supports the spent fuel pool, nor the spent fuel pool itself, is designed to withstand the pressure and temperature loads that could be generated inside the reactor building by a severe accident.1 Moreover, the spent fuel pool cooling systers which are also in the reactor building, are not designed for the environmental conditions associated with severe accidents. Such an accident would threaten the spent fuel

! pool cooling system and/or the structural integrity of the pool,

) while simultaneously preventing access to the building for repairs or accident nitigation activites.2 1

3 Calculations on the Peach Bottom Plant indicate that following j primary containment failure, steam and hydrogen will be 4 released to the reactor building wheree the hydrogen can burn j or detonate. This will result in pressure and temperature loads which the reactor building is unlikely to withstand.

j NUREG/CR-4624, Vol. 1, at 4 4-62.

2 Radiation levels in the reactor building would be very high under some accident sequences. For example, calculations for the Peach Bottom plant, which is also a BWR-4 with a Mark I containment, indicate that at least for some sequences, sub-stantial fractions (one to thirty percent) of the core inventory of certain radionuclude groups (i.e. tellurium, s t ron tium , lanthanide group, cesium, barium) would be deposited in the reactor building. NUREG/CR-4 6 24, Vol. 1,

Denning, et al. , "Radionuclide Release Calculations for Selected Severe Accident Scenarios

BWR, Ma rk I De sign" Ba t-l telle Columbus Division, July 1986 at 5-55, 5-58, 5-65. Such i l a level of contamination would create an intense gamma radia-tion field that would either prohibit or severely limit access i 3 to the reactor building.

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Even in an accident which involves substantial fuel damage without full core melt, if hydrogen leaks to the reactor build-ing, it could similarly threaten the spent fuel pool and associa-ted cooling systems. NPC recently concluded that hydrogen deflagration and detonation " represent a threat to the survival of the ... [ Mark I] reactor building." N UREG- 1150, supra, at 4-34 & 4-35.

By increasing the amount of fuel stored by 40% (and approxi-mately quintupling the amount authorized in the original operat-1 ing license), the potential consequences of a reactor accident are greatly increased. Cf particular concern is the inventory of l

i cesium and strontium, to which are attributable the major share j of the long-term health consequences arid land contamination caused by the Chernobyl accident. NUREC-1250, "Peport on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station," (Craf t) , USNRC,

! Fe b. , 1987, at 8-9.

! Given what is now known about the special vulnerability of the small Ma rk I containment, increasing the spent fuel pool storage capacity would pose undue risk to the public health and

! safety.

) contention 2 The proposed expansion of the spent fuel pool is contrary to I

the Commission's policy statement on Govero Reactor Accidents and 1 should therefore be disapproved.

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Basis The basis for Contention 1 is incorporated herein. In promulgating the Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants, 50 Fed. Fec .

32,138, August 8,1985, the Commission stated:

A fundamental objective of the Commission's severe accident policy is that the Commission intends to take all reasonable steps to reduce the chances of occurrence of a severe acci-dent involving substantial damage to the reactor core and to mitigate the consequences of such an accident should one occur.

Id. a t 3 2,13 9, Co l. 1 -2.

Ilhi-le the policy statement reaches the general conclusion that contec-poraneous information showed that severe accident risk was not so great as to require generic "backfitting" to reduce risk, (Id. at 32,143, Co l . 3 ) , this proposed amendment would increase risk. Mo r eove r , the Commission enphasized repeatedly that significant new safety information could change even the generic backfitting conclusion (e.g. Id . at 3 2,14 4, Co ls. 1-2) and also, that the generalized conclusion as to the safety of the nuclear industry as a whole would be subject to design - specific consideration through an ongoing PRA program. The Conniission stated:

Should significant new safety information develop, from whatever source, which brings into question the Commission's conclusion that existing plants pose no undue risk, then at that time the specific technical issues suggesting undue vulnerability will undergo close examination and be handled by the NBC under existing procedures for issue resolution.

Id. at 3 2,14 4, Co ls. 1-2.

The Commission is currently considering the recommendation of its top safety of ficials, made in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, that certain measures be required to reduce the prob-l ability of breach of containment at G.E. Mark I reactors to a i level consistent with other plant designs. ACRS Meeting, Subcom-mittee on containment Performance, Sept. 23, 1986, presentation by Ro ber t M. Bernero. Whether or not some such measures are ultimately required, it is manifestly inconsistent with the i

j intent of the policy statement, in light of what is now under-

! stood about this plant design, to permit a spent fuel pool expan-1 sion that would greatly increase the potential consequences of j such an accident.

l Contention 3 1

The spent fuel pool expansion amendment should be denied because it violates the single failure criterion.

.i i Basis 1

] Should this amendment be approved, it would be necessary l under certain conditions to use one train of the reactor's i residual heat removal system (RHR) in addition to the spent fuel

! pool cooling system in order to maintain the pool water within the design limits of 150'F. (See Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel i

Storage Rack Peplacement Report, Ap r il, 1986, at 56-59 and I

, Lesponse to Request for Additional Information-Proposed Change No . 13 3, Spent Fuel Pool Expansion, November 24, 1986, responses 1

to questions 16 and 17). The heat load in the pool after a l

! normal fuel discharge is roughly 50% greater than the design

l capacity of both trains of the spent fuel cooling system._ While Applicants assert that the two pumps in one RHR train are single active failure proof, they have not demonstrated that there is no single failure in the RHR system components and power supplies 4

that would not disable the single train of RHR.

Moreover, under conditions where one RHR train is needed for spent fuel pool cooling, there is only one train available for decay heat removal from the core. Applicants have not estab-

). lished that this leaves a single failure proof method of cooling i

the core.

. t i In summary, Applicants have not established that their pro-3

) posed method of spent fuel pool cooling ensures that both the

fuel pool cooling system and the reactor cooling system are i

single failure proof.

Contention 4 The proposed expancion of the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool capacity would pose undue risk to public health and safety by reducing the safety margin and increasing the probability of a

, radioactive release from the pool. ,

}

Dasis i

j The bases for Contentions 1-3 are reasserted. As a result i

j of increasing the heat load in the pool to the degree that the spent fuel pool cooling system is insufficient by itself to keep f the pool water below 150*F, adequate cooling requires the use of one train of reactor RHR. Since a single failure in the one train of RHR can lead to inadequate cooling, this system is i

i

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! inherently less reliable and more likely to f ail than < the current system where the spent fuel pool cooling. system is itself ade-quate to remove all decay heat.3 Contention 5

- The NRC has not complied with the provisions of the National i

l Environmental Policy Act nor of its own rules in 10 C.F.R. Part j 51.

l i Basis

The bases for Contentions 1-4 are reasserted herein. The

}

t National Environmental Policy Act requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement detailing, inter alia, the environnental inpact of the proposal and considering alterna-

] tives, for any " major federal action significantly affecting the >

j quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. S 4332(C) . The

] proposed amendment, which would substantially increase the risk i

j to public health and safety associated with operation of the Ver-I I

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i 3

' Without the spent fuel pool expansion proposed by Applicants, the normal spent fuel cooling system is available to cool the i pool. Cne train of RHR is also available as a backup, thus providing redundancy andfdiversity of decay heat removal mechanisms. Applicants' proposal would render the normal spent fuel pool cooling system unable to provide adequate

! cooling, necessitating reliance on one train of RHR. Thus, with the proposed expansion, reliability of spent fuel cooling i

! goes down to lowest common denominator -- i.e. the single i

train of RHR.

I If one train of RHR is needed for the reactor vessel and one I train for the spent fuel pool, then neither one has a backup.

} Loss of either train could cause a spent fuel pool accident by

forcing the operators to choose between cooling the spent fuel pool or cooling the core.

I

mont Yankee plant, is such an action. NRC has not prepared an environmental impact statement, as required by law and by 10 C . F . R. 51. 2 0.

NRC r ules (10 C.F.R. 51.21) require the preparation of an environmental assessment for all licensing and regulatory actions except those identified as requiring an impact statement (listed in 10 C .F.R. 51.20( b) or categorically excluded in S 51.22(c) ).

] This proposed amendment is listed in neither section and thus

) requires at a minimum the preparation of an environmental assess-i i ment. That document has not been prepared.

i While NECNP expects to change this contention at such time that NEPA - related documents are issued by NRC, it can state J

preliminarily that two areas of specific concern to it are the j consideration of alternatives to the proposed action and consid-

eration of the increased risk to public health and safety. In particular, serious consideration should be given to the alterna-tives of dry cask storage and independent pool storage, both of 1

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which provide obvious safety advantages over the instant pro- -'

posal. On July 2, 1986, the NRC licensed an independent spent i

fuel storage installation using dry casks for the two Surry l plants in Virginia.

Respect ully submitted, .

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\v\,L - (gg j Ellyn R.

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Harnon & Weiss 2001 S Street, N.W.

Suite 430 hashington, D.C. 20009 (202) 328-3500 Ma rch 30,1987 I

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Jacksonville Stage j Guilford, VT 05301 l February 28, 1987 l Ellyn Weiss liarmond & Weiss 2001 S Street, NW Suite 430 Washington, DC 20009 AFFADAVIT of J0!!N A. CllRISTIE I, John A. Christic, of River Road, Green River, Guilford, VT, make my affadavit as follows:

I live approximat aly five miles f rom Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

I am a member of the New EnglandCoalition on Nuclear Pollution and I authorize the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution to represent ny interests in the proceeding in regard to the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool expansion reques,t. p.

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River Road, Green River Jacksonville Stage Guilford, VT 05301 February 28, 1987 Ellyn Weiss Harmond & Weiss 2001 S Street, NW Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 AFFADAVIT of ELIZABETil W. CHRISTIE I, Elizabeth W. Christie, of River Road, Green River, Guilford, VT, make my affadivit as follows:

I live approximately five miles from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

I am a member of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution and I nuthorize the New England Calition on Nuclear Pollution to represent my interests in the proceeding in regard to the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool expansion request.

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. s AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BERNSTEIN I, John Bernstein, of R.R 3 Box 251, Biattleboro, VT, 05301, hereby make my affidavit as folloVs: I live approximately seven miles from the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, I am a member of the New Eng'iand Coalition on Nucicar Pollution, and I authorize the New Er. gland Coalition on Nuclear Pollution to ' represent my ' interests in the proceeding in regard to'the Vermont Yankoo spent ,

fuel pool expansion request.

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Jahr Bernstein .

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STATE OF Verront SS.

CCUNIY OF Windham -

on this 2nd day of March,1987, befr:co me personally apoeared John Bernstein to no known to be the person who executed the foregoing instrument, and he thereupon duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same to bu rds free act and deed. .

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., o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETED i USNHC l In the Matter of )

)- 1R MR 31 P4 :38

, Vermont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Corporation ) Docket No. 50-271-OLA

) FFicE J: 6. e t in Y E

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear ) hShch Power Station) )

_____________________________________)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i The undersigned certifies that on March 30, 1987, "NECNP Response to Board Order of February 27, 1987: Statement of Con-

,i tentions and Standing" was served on the folowing parties to this case by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class:

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Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman George Dean, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Attorney General Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commonwealth of Massachusetts l Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Department of the Attorney General l One Ashburton Place 4

Glenn O. Bright Boston, MA 02108 Atomic Safety and Licensing i Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Daniel J. Mullett, Esq.

I Regulatory Commission Vermont Department of Public l Washington, D.C. 20555 Service 120 State Street

. Montpelier, VT 05602 i Dr. James H. Carpenter Atomic Safety and Licensing Ann Hodgdon, Esq.

Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Office of the General Counsel

.i Regulatory Commission Bethesda U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Secretary of the Commission Diana Sidebotham

• Attn: Docketing and Service R.F.D. #2 i Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Putney, Vermont 05346 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i

• original and 2 copies

j. John A. Ritscher, Esq.

Ropes & Gray <

225 Franklin Street l ,q Boston, MA 02110 /

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,U //lbl h pp*>

1 yn R. Weiss l

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