ML20205E345
| ML20205E345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dow Chemical Company |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1978 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Langner R DOW CHEMICAL CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205E202 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-259 NUDOCS 8510170270 | |
| Download: ML20205E345 (11) | |
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JAN 131978 pjy s. Y ;
Docket No. 50-264 Dow Chemical Company ATTN:
Dr. Ralph Langner Chairman, Radiation Safety Committee Building 1S03 liidland, MI 48640 Gentic=en:
As a result of an inspection conducted on January 10-12, 1978, certain matters of concern were discussed during a telephone conversation on January 13, 1978, between Mr. O. Anders of your staff and Messrs. J. F. Donahue, T. J. Madeda and J. J. Dunleavy of this office relating to positive access controls for the Low TRIGA Reactor facility.
Based on that conversation, it is our understanding that as of January 13, 1978:
(1) All exterior building doors
'will b'e Tsormally locked or otherwise
,securedtoprevent'unauthorizedentry.f
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In addition, (2) Allexteriordoorstothef
] vill be normally locked or otheruise secured to prevent unautho-rized entry. Access will be controlled by authorized in-dividuals. All doors leading into the(y vill be normally locked or otherwise secured to prevent unauthorized entry. Keys to this area will be limited to authorized personnel.
(3) Identification, registration, and badging of,311 visitors,_,
and of all Dow employees not assigned to the
~~
will be accomplished by the receptionist at t'he main cntrance to the h
~ ~ ~
8510170270 851004 PDR FOIA Copy d of 2 copies KOHN85-259 PDR 9
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T111S FOCUMENT IS NOT TO BF Rt.Fn0auw.u"*.0 TIIOUT SPECIF1C APP.ROVAI._DFJ IIT i
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l Dow Chemical Company )gg If your understanding of these matters is not in accordance with that described above, please contact this office immediately.
Upon completion of our review of the results of the January 10-12, 1978 inspection, you may expect to receive enforcement correspon-donce regarding the inspection findir.2s.
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Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director cc: Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b U. P. Ellis, FCSEB Lena Cobb, Plans and Analyses i
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m ( ( u) OYrsik e i ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY .THAT RAISED SEVERAL GENERIC ISSUES Incident: Inspector gained undetected and unchallenged access to / the reactor room of a nonpower ree: tor. f. ~ \\. Issues: 1. Is there concern for theft or sabotage? 2. Is there concer'n for public health and safety? 3. If there is no concern for theft or sabotage, can the NRC require a security plan? 4. Can the Statement of Considerations be used to interpret a requirement? 5. Can the licensee's correspondence to the NRC be used to interpret a vague commitment and thus be used in determining an item of noncompliance? Discussion: Issue il 10 CFR 73.40, the only physical security rule applicable to nonpower reactors, requires that each licensee pr ocect against industrial sabotage and theft. Based upon precedent,
9 2 \\ ll " Industrial g - sabotage" is defined by 10 CFR 73.2(p)=as a deliberate = ~ act which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety. The issue of whether an act of sabotage at the facility could endanger the public health and safety is under study by NRR and IE. (LASL has been supporting NRR's efforts). Based upon preliminary data, the staff concluded that an act of industrial sabotage was not credible because a Part 100 release can not be achieved under realistic conditions. (It is noted that 4 Part 100 is a siting criteria and not necessarily a public health and safety standard - See discussion at Issue #2). The conclusions were based _ in part, on tests, experiments and studies that have been or are being conducted as follows: One example, is a series of experiments conducted by General Atomics in the 1960's relating to the Space Nuclear Auxiliary Reactor Program (SNAP) reactors that were to be used to provide power for space applications. b G I O m 2-8 y,_r- _, __., y _n,w.., ,,-.-_,y,-,--,_r- ,.....-,.v-4 --,y-y+c, ,,-.,9y
Some of the experiments (SNAPTRAN) involved assembling a near critical mass (in air) and then dropping this assembly into water. The increased moderation caused the core to go prompt-super-critical which melted the core and generated a steam bubble. As a result of this transient, 2% of the noble gases were released. Fragments and iodine releases were neglible. These experiments appear to support the claim that fission product releases from an act of sabotage would not exceed the Part 100 limit within the reactor room. Therefore, it has been concluded that such an event would not cause a hazard to public health and safety outside of the facility. Data provided by the LASL team studying sabotage at research reactors indicates that fission product releases in excess of Part 100 limits will not occur at a 1 Mw Triga reactor (larger than the facility in question) if (1) the core is disrupted by an explosive but the ccolant pool remains intact or (2) the core remains intact upon complete loss of coolant. However, it is remotely possible that a' mul,ti-step sabotage such as a loss of coolant followed by destruction of the core could result in a release 4 a
of gaseous fission products that might be hazardous to public health and safety in the reactor room, pro-vided that the temperature of the fuel can be elevated to cause out-sasing. It is believed that, even under conditions where fuel cladding is ruptured, a significant temperature (in the order of 4000C) would have to be achieved to <ause the fuel to out-gas; this does not appear to be credible. Since the reactor pool in question is below ground, the loss of coolant also ~~ does not appear to be credible. ELD has concluded that removal of an irradiated element from the pool could endanger the public health and safety (see discussion at Issue #2) and constitutes a deliberate act within the meaning of industrial sabotage. Issue #2 1 '^ From the standpoint of fabricating a nuclear explosive device or causing a radioactive release via an explosive (eit'her with the fuel in the pool or after being removed from the pool) the answer to this issue is clearly no. The issue then must concentrate on whether public health and safety could be endangered by the theft or misuse of the fuel, e.g. the fuel elements could be illicitly v ~ ~
i . ~ I removed from the core. The handling to.ol is secured in a locked cabinet, however, the lock could be defeated. Assuming that a handling tool is available and a would be thief has expertise in its use, it would take'l-2 minutes to remove each element. As soon as one element was removed from the pool, the radiation alarms in the reactor room would be triggered (unless deactivated). A radiation level of more than 100 R/hr (near the fuel element) would result from the removal of only one element, which could then be removed from the facility. The individual taking the fuel could expose himself to a cons'iderable radiation hazard unless he took precautions. This.is the only possible hazard to public health and safety identified for this case. ~ . During normal operation of the reactor, up to 1 mrem /hr may be encountered within the reactor room, and 5 mrem /hr at the surface of the water above the core. Neither level 1 is considered a hazard to public health and safety. Based upon a long standing interpretation of a jurisdictional finding for demonstrating' that the public. health and safety was endangered, the term "public" includes everyone that i could be in the reactor room, including visitors, operators and other employees. Also, based upon a long standing legal
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interpretation, a hazard to public health and safety exists if any incident causes or threatens to cause a condition described in 10 CFR 20.403(b)(1) or (2). For simplicit,y, whole body exposure of 5 rems or more is the standard used to determine if public health and safety has bee 6 endangered. Since the "public" could be exposed to a whole body dose of more than 5 rems, it is concluded that there is a potential hazard to public health and safety. Issues #3 & 4 Since there was no theft or industrical sabotage deemed possible within the meaning of Part 73 prior to ELD determination that removal of an fuel element from the core constituted a deliberate act within the meaning of industrial sabotagey # question was raised concerning 4-whether the NRC could require a security plan if there was no concern for theft or industrial sabotage. 10 CFR ^ 50.34(c) requires all licensees to have a security plan ~ and to comply with applicable requirements of Part 73. 10 CFR 73.40 requires a licensee to provide and follow a security plan. e ~~ y a m
An obvious inconsistency in Part 73 is that Section 73.6 exempts material from minimum or specified levels of l physical protection if it has a radiation level in ~ excess of 100, rems per hour because it is deemed to be 1 self protecting (i.e., it is deemed dangerous and difficult to steal or use to fabricate a bomb).
- However, SNM or other. material with such a radiation level poses a threat to public health and safety as a radiation source or for use in a dispersal device.
10 CFR 73.40 requires protection against industrial sabotage, and industrial sabotage requires a deliberate act (more than just walking int'o a radiation area). However, the Statement of Consideration published (38 FR 30537) with 10 CFR 73.40 describes the purpose of the rule as protecting the public health and safety. This is'a much' broader description of the objective and ~ doesn't require a deliberate act to cause the hazard. It is, therefore, concluded that the NRC can require a security plan under 10'CFR 73.40 to protect health and safety in addition to the more limited objective, which 3f is stated in the rule, of protecting against theft and industrial sabotage. 4
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8-Issue #5 The licensee's security plan states that access to the reactor room,is " gained" through certain portals. In response to a previous Notice of Violation, the licensee clarified thes5 words to mean that the portals are " controlled eccesses". 'In this instance, ELD concurred in the use of the subsequent correspondence in the basis for the citation. G 9 . g .e 6 9 e. g t k e b. W-p ',e
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