IR 05000264/1978001

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Insp Rept 50-264/78-01 on 780110-12.Noncompliance Noted Re Security Organization & Access Controls.Portions Deleted (Ref 10CFR2.790).Written Statement in Reply to Notice of Violation Encl
ML20205E593
Person / Time
Site: Dow Chemical Company
Issue date: 07/11/1978
From: Dunleavy J, Hind J, Madeda T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205E202 List:
References
FOIA-85-259 50-264-78-01, 50-264-78-1, NUDOCS 8510170334
Download: ML20205E593 (14)
v • d • e


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGU1ATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENTORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-264/78-01 i

Docket No. 50-264 License No. R-108

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Licensee: Dow Chemical Company ( 1 Building 2030 Midland, MI 43640 f

Tacility Name: Dow TRIGA Research Reactor Facility  !

Inspection at: Dow TRIGA Research Reactor Facility Site, Midland, MI Inspection conducted: January 10-12 and February 7, 1978

$4%y f hodsh 7,////7, Inspectors: T. J. Mad /da / ,

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. J. Dunleavy , 7/7/ 7[ ;

Approved by-( t nd, Chief

. /!"/ 8 Safeguards Branch Inspection Su==ary Inspecti n on January 10-12, 1978 (Report No. 50-264/78-01)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the approved security plan and its implementation relative to the protection of SNM; security organization; access control; alarm systems; key, Ipcks, and hardware; communications; surveillance; procedures; security program review; and protection against radiological sabotag Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action relative to two items of noncompliance identified during the physical protection inspection coaducted January 15 and 16, 197 The inspection involved 30 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspector Results: Of the twelve areas inspected, no apparent item of noncom-pliance were identified in nine areas; three items of noncompliarce ,

i 8510170334 851004 PDR FOIA KOHN85-259 PDR L

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i were identified in two areas (Security Organization - Paragraph 5; i I

and Access Controls - Paragraph 6.a and Two items are con- '

sidered to be infractions and one item is considered to be a deficienc Detafis (Part 2.790(d) Information)

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S-T3-78-12 Copy 4 of I copies

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, 7 Page THIS DOCUtiENT IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF RIII (

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DETAILS

.- Persons Contacted

  • R. Westover, Research Manager, Analytical Laboratories, Dow

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Chemical l * Anders, Reactor Supervisor, Dow TRIGA Research Reactor Pacility J

  • Kelyman, Manager, Security and Plant Protection, Dow Chemical i

.- * Numbyrd, Assistant Manager, Security and Plant Protection.

  • Dow Chemical
  • D. Barsten, Health Physicist, Dow Chemical
  • T. Quinn, Senior Reactor Operator, Dow TRIGA Research Reactor

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Pacility V. Turkelson, Research Chemist, Dow Chemical K. Kelly, Research Chemist Dow Chemical I

- Peaster, Of fice Assistant. Dow TRICA Research Reactor Tacility I H. Spillers, Journeyman, Refrigeration, Dow Chemical  ;

L. McJames, Captain, Security and Plant Protection, Dow Chemical J. Thompson, Special Services Supervisor, Security and Plant ,

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Protection, Dow Chemical I

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V. Banaszan, Lock and Key Supervisor, Security and Plant Protection, j

Dow Chemical '

K. Compton, Security Officer Security and Plant Protection, Dow Chenical

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J. Reed, Dispatcher Security and Plant Protection, Dow Chemical D. Langner, Health Physicist Dow Chemical

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R. Smith, Captain, Security and Plant Protection, Dow Chemical i

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  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

4 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings .

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(C16 sed) Noncompliance (050-264/76-01): Pailure of the Security and Plant Protection Department to maintain r'

By way of response the licensee submitted a revised security pfFn to NRR reflecting actual security practices at the i site relative to this ites. The revised security plan was approved l on April 2,1976 and is considered, therefore, corrective actio '

(Refer to Paragraph 9) Region III bas no further questions on this ite !

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(Closed) Noncompliance (050-264/76-01):, The entire ""

is not of controlled access during the{ inthat the

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Part 2,753(6) Inforentles

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By way of

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Tesponse the licensee submitteo a revised secur ty plan to NRR reflecting actual security practices at the site relative to this ite The revised security plan was approved by NRR on April 2, 1976 and is considered, therefore, corrective action. (Refer to Paragraths 6.a and 6.b) Region III has no further questions on this ite .

The following itec, which is not an item of noncompliance, was

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identified during a previous physical protection inspection (050-264/76-01) as a significant weakness in the security syste (Closed)Asforcibleentrythroughthel a modification,to the security plan, to include the under alare protection, should be mad l Even though NRR accepted the justification of fered,)y the licensee

,Jand subsequently for not requiring the ^

approved on Aoril 2. 1976 the revised security. plan, the licensee

]RegionIIIhasnofurtherquestions has[isite on th Security Plan The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the Ifcensee's revisedThe security plan which was approved by NRR on April 2,197 inspectors determined that no change to the approved security The inspectors also

+ plan has been made subsequent to that date.

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reviewed the licensee's security areas and essential equipment to assure that they are properly designated in the approved security pla No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Protection of SNM The inspectors determined that the SNM actually possessed by the licensee for the Dow TRIGA Research Reactor is below the thres-hold quantities outlined in 10 CTR 73.1(b). -.

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Part 2.793ld) Inforestion

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No items of noncompliance or deviatio'ns were identifie . Security organization The inspectors determined that the licensee is conforming to commitments stated in the approved security plan concerning the overall structure and functional responsibilities of the security organization. This was determined through interviews with super-visory and operational staffs of the Dow TRIGA Research Reactor and the Security and Plant Protection Departeent and by review of pertinent record It was revealed through personnel interviews with members of the Security and Plant Protection Department, and confirmed by the Supervisor of the Health Physics Department, that fifteen officers of the security and plant protection force are not requalified on a semiannual basis through review sessions supervised by Health Physics en the use of radiation monitoring equipment and on the following of procedures in effect perteining to radioactivity and guarding the Dow TRIGA Research Reacto Such requalification was found to be on an annual basis only.

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These findings represent apparent noncompliance with Section

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3.2.5(5) of the approved Security Plan for the Dow TRIGA Reactor Pacility which states in part: " Fifteen officers of the plant protection and security force have received instruction in health physics to use r,adiation monitoring equipment and follow the procedures in ef fect pertaining to radioactivity and guarding the Dow TRIGA Research Reacto They are requalified on a semiannual

  • basis through review sessions supervised by Health Physics."

6. Access Control

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/ Evaluation of the access control system in effeet at Dow Chemical was based on visual observation, personnel interviews, and physical testin a. * Testing of the licensee's access control procedures gov-

,3rning admittance to the limited access area to include the a ~,as detailed in the approved security plan, revealed that the inspectors were able to gain undetected l

and unchallented access into the limited access area to

.. include the Specifically, the inspectors enteredthe{ st the perimeter of the limite(

access area at 2:au p.m.-bn January 10, 1978, and proceeded unchallenged and apparently unobserved by the receptionist

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Part 2.790(4) Icforetthn through the ~ into the interior of the limited access area. Further, the inspectors were able to proceed

acrogs the interior of the fene,ed-in city block and enter JDespitebeingobservedin

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the the luilding by no fewer than five authorised individuals, j two of whom were near the reactor control room, the inspec-tors accomplished vnchallenged access to the reactor control i room and to the reactor roog itself. Approximately ten [

zinutes after entering the and experiencing i - unlimited access, the inspectors reporte'd their presence to ,

an authorised individual working near the reactor control I

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room, t

It should be noted that the NRC inspectors were refused  ;

' adeittance into the limited access area by a member of the plant protection force when the inspectors initially sought entry into the limited accgss area through the guard con-l trolledgatenorthofth{ ,

These findings represent apparent noncompliance with Section 3.3.7(b) of the approved Security Plan for the Dow TRIGA [

Reactor Tacility which states in part: "The enclosed plan  ;

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' drawings and sketches - - - of the facility depict the l'

i limited access area consisting of the fenced-in city block

! hptdered by - - - Austin, Pershing, Barth, and Washingt h ccess is gained through the doors of the buildings in*TFre limited access area, including \ and a guarded i

gate." "1he front entrance of the ' is of

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controlled access. Other access to the building is through the above limited access area."

) During a review of access control procedures, it was observed i

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by the inspectors that a Dow esployee other than a perman-

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employee was p riorming as,in- .

tenance on refrigeration equipment in the I

} lt was revealed through an interview with the~1ndividual that i he had not signed-in and he was not carrying his Dow photo identity badme, both of which are required for access to the It should be noted that the sign-in procedure u  ;

atther4tcept'ionist'sdeskatthefrontentranc,etotheSerma-is the accepted method for other than

l nently h signed employees to identify themselveT. "The  ;

receptionist was unaware that the worker was in the building.

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Part 2,793(4) Inforestlet These f(ndings represent apparent noncompliance with Section 3.3.7(C)(1) of the approved Security plan for the Dow TRICA

Reactor Facility which states in part: "Other Dov employees entering the building are also required to carry identifi-cation badges with photographs and must identify themselves -

as Dow employees when entering the tuilding."

. Alare System f

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DuringatestofthealarmsystemgpJanuary11,12J8,itwas in the revealed that the intrusion alarm Reactor Room did not effectively operate in sn=6 46 failed to i

detect the, presence of the igypector during a series of test Only afterg by the inspector did the intrusion alarc effectively operat Aithough the alarm was activated, it was rendered effectively inoperable by its high sensitivity

' threshold. The licensee advised that corrective action would be promptly initiate ~ Reys, Locks, and Hardware The inspectors reviewed lock and key procedures, as they pertain

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to the licensee's security plan, by visual observations and personnel interviews. Dyring interviews with staff and oper-stional representativps, it was confirmed that security plan commitments for the It was turther observed that

]aremaneredt are aTequately controlled to reduce the probability of i such compromisas No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ,

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie .- 1 Surveillance The inspectors determined that the licensee is conforming to comr.itments stated in the approved security plan. The licensee's conformance was so determined through visual observation, per-sonnel interviews, and review of associated records and tape No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Procedures The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the reactor security pro-cedures outlined in the approved security plan which pertain to the (1) response to unauthorized intrusions of security areas; (2) bomb threats; and (3) acts of civil disorder. By review of operating procedures and through interviews with operating, supervisory, and security personnel responsible for the initial and/or any backup response in such situations, the inspectors determined that procedures have been implemented and are in effec No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Security Program Reviev

' The inspectors determined through a review of related corre-spondence, an evaluation of internal procedures, and through interviews with the reactor supervisor that the security program of the f acility, as committed to in the approved security pro-gram, has been an itee for review and discussion by the reactor supervisor at the meeting of the Reactor Operations' Committee I during the past two year No items of noncompliance or deviations were identiate . Protection Against Radiological Sabotage During the inspection of the Dow TRIGA Research Reactor, the inspectors determined that access to the reactor rabbit tubes-8-

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Part 2.790(4) Inforestion is limited to those individuals authorized to be in the ,_

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further limited to individuals who have been duly authorized. The l

actual operation of the rabbit tubes is performed by the contro)

l room only upon written authorization.

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1 Exit Interview ~

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.1 The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 12, i

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197 The inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the j

inspection and the findings. * The inspectors expressly reempha-sized the seriousness of the concern felt over the apparent breakdown in effectiveness of the access control procedures RIII would employed by the Ifcensee and advised the The licensee licensee that representatives be in contact with ther on this ite stated that the receptionists monitoring access into the buildings ,

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forming the perimeter of the limited access area are under the control and supervision of the respective building managers and l are not centrally controlled or supervised by the Security and Plant Protection Department. There was, however, no substantive

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l rebuttal to the apparent items of noncompliance. The Ifeensee ,

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il representatives advised that they would begin corrective action immediately.

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1 An Enforcement Conference to further discuss the findings of the l January 10-12, 1978 inspection was held on February 7,1978 by j

C. Norelius, Assistant to the Director, J. Donahue, Chief, Security

' and Investigation Section, Safeguards Branch, and J. Dunleavy, Physical Security Specialist, Region III and C. Kochanny, Jr.,

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Research Manager Dow TRICA Research Reactor, W. Lee, Manager, l Health, Safety, and Security, L. Nute, Attorney, and J. Dix,  ;

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Attorney, Dow Chemical Company. There was no substantive rebuttal

' to the apparent items of noncompliance. The licensee represen-tatives outlined the scope of corrective action and advised that

auch action had been initf ated. During a tour of the Dow Research l Reactor Facility at the conclusion of the Enforcement Conference

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and further discussions, the RIII representatives confirmed that appropriate corrective action had been taken by the licensee.

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The corrective action on each ites was completely in accord with the specific measures outlined in RIII's January 13, 1978 Immediate Action Letter to the license t I

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WRITTEN STATEMENT IN REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

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DOCKET NO. 50-264 ISSUED TO THE DOW CHEMICAL COfLPANY l BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGION III Pursuant to Section 2.201 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, The Dow Chemical Company losues the following statement in reply to the above Notice of Violation. Three items of noncompliance were cited in the above notic For item 1, which reads as follows: Contrary to Section 3.3.7(B) of the revised Security Plan for the Dow TRIGA Reactor Facility which was

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approved April 2, 1976, access to 'was not controlled on January 10, 1978, in that NRC inspectors gained undetected and unchallenged access o

e Corrective Action taken and the results achieve Security in the limited access area, defined in the revised security plan, has been considerably strength-ene .

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  • L age 'Inis D0ctfEllT IS NOT TO BE PART 2.790(d) INTCRl',710f y it,cyx D WITHOW SPECITIC AP?T.0*;l.L OF RIII

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PART 2.790(d) INTor.ATION

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Sinca tha cbova correctiva ac, tion was taken, no unauthorized entries to the 'have been

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detected. The system has been challenged / times

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without failur Ccrrective Action to be taken to avoid further non- .

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complianc It is believed that continuation of the above program will avoid further noncompliance. This program will continue in effect until or unless a revised or amended security plan is filed and approved by the proper NRC offic The date when full compliance will be achieve The above program has been in operation since January 20, 197 Since that time, no unauthorized entries to the have been detecte Thus, it is felt that full complia'nce was achieved on January 20, 197 .

D. For item 2, which reads as follows: Contrary to Section 3.3.7 (C) (1) of the revised Security Plan for the Dow TRIGA Research Reactor Facility which was approved April 2, 1976, it was observed on January 10, 1978 that a ,

Dow employee in the other than a permanent

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employee, was not carrying or displaying his Dow photo identity badge and had not identified himself as a Dow employee by signing in as he entered the buildin Corrective Action taken and the results received The policy of Dow employees carrying or displaying a Dow photo identity badge and signing the register upon entering the

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jhas been re-emphasized to those employees charged with this responsibility.,

Employees, other than employees who work in the

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larerequiredtopresentthisbadgeinorder to gain' entry to the building, sign the log and then either carry or display the badg No violations of this policy have been detected since

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this policy was institute . Corrective Action to be taken to avoid further non-compliance All employees who are authorized to admit persons to

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lhavebeenadvised,ofthispolic This policy will be reviewed with'

4per-sonnel at least quarterly, or sooner, it arregularities are detecte Insistence on conformance to this entry policy will be emphasized. In addition, signs have been posted to remind employees of this responsibility, The date when full compliance will be achieve >

January 20, 1978 (see A.1.c. above). For item 3, which reads as follows: Contrary to Section 3.2.5(5) of the revised Security Plan for the Dow TRIGA Reactor Facility which was approved April 2, 1976, according to information available in training records and obtained through interviews, officers of the plant protection and security force have attended requalifi-cation sessions only on an annual basi Corrective Action taken and results achieve This item of noncompliance stems from an inconsistency between the revised Security Plan for the reactor and ,

the Supplemented Emergency Pla Since the Supplemented Emergency Plan post dates the revised Security Plan,

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employees have been following the former which requires requalification on an annual basi Dow Health Pl.ysics personnel have determined that requalification on an annual basis is adequate, since the training is not complex in natur '

b. Corrective Action'to be taken to avoid further non- l compliance The revised Security Plan will be modified to be con-sistent with the Supplemented Emergency Pla s c. The date when full compliance will be achieve

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 ?? Within 90 days, a revised security plan will be sub-mitted to the proper NCR office for approva This will insure sufficient time for all appropriate Dow personnel to review and approve the revised ~ security ,

pla .

July 26, 1978 .

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March 29, 1978 DOCKET No. 50-264 PE.MORANDUM FOR: Norman M. Haller, Director, Division of Safeguards Inspection, IE FROM: James G. Keppler, Director SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ABNORMAL, OCCURRENCE - D0k' CHEMICAL COMPAhT In accordance with Manual Chapter 1110, enclosed for your review and handling is the subject potential abnormal occurrence. We view this incident as indicative of a substantial breakdown of physical security that significantly weakened the protection against sabotage as outlined in Appendix A of MC 1110. I. h.9.2M

[/ James G. Kepp er Director Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ attachments:

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. . POTENTIAL ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE BREACH OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM Date and Place On January 10, 1978 at the Dow Chemical Company TRIGA Research Reactor Facility, Midland, Michigan, two NRC inspectors fained entry into the reactor building and had access to the reactor undetected and unchallenged by the site security syste Nature and Probable Consequences At approximately 1:40 p.m. on January 10, 1978, two Region III (Chicago)

inspectors gained entry into the reactor building and had access to the reactor without apparent detection or security challenge contrary to the facility's existing security program. The inspectors passed through a receptionist-manned control point in a building on the site perimeter and then into the limited access area undetected and unchallenged, proceeded across the interior of the limited access area to the reactor building, and then accomplished access to the reactor and reactor controls through an unlocked and unattended door of the reactor buildin The potential consequences could have been an act of sabotage by a salevolent intruder who could have similarly gained entry to the reactor building and

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had necess to the TRIGA research reacto Cause of Causes I

The principal cause of the breach of the site security system was the failure of a receptionist on duty at an access checkpoint to comply with site security procedures for the control of entry into the limited access area. Once entry to the limited access area was gained, ingress into the reactor building could be achieved through the unlocked and unattended door of the facilit Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence Licensee - Procedure revisions and physical modifications to ensure positive access control to the site limited area, to the reactor building, and to the reactor were promptly instituted. Additionally, steps were taken to ensure that various building receptionists monitoring entry to the limited accesa area through those buildings are familiar with site procedure t

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. . . -2-NRC - NRC expressed its concern about the serious nature of this type of security breakdown and identified the actions deered necessary to correct the situation in an Inunediate Action '

Letter dated January 13, 1978, as well as at a special management meeting held on February 7,1978 in Midland, Michigan. Verification of adequate corrective action taken by the Ifeensee was also accomplished during the February 7, 1978 meeting. Escalated enforcement action is under consideratio (Closed)

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7 tty it'ilet M F.AY 191978

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FE10RA M I FOR: Janes G. Keppler, Director Region III FR0!: E. hbrris Howard, Director Division of Safeguards Inspection, IE ,

SUBJECT: DOW OBilCAL CGIPAhT - RECG!MED CIVIL PENA 111Y This is in response to your memorandtn of )! arch 2,1978 in which you re-comended that a civil penalty be imposed on the DOW Chemical Cocpany for failure to properly protect their TRIGA Reactor on January 10, 197 The recomended civil penalty raised generic issues concerning public health and safety and NRC security requirements at non-power reactor Correspondence which identified and analyzed these issues was provided J. Hind on April 14, 1978. NRR's fomal written position is attache .

The issues which primarily focused on the potential threat to public health and safety from other than " radiological" sabotage were no: I addressed by NRR. We will continue our efforts to cicarly resolve these remaining issue We have determined that irposition of a civil penalty on DON Chemical Conpany, as recomended, is now inappropriate. Based upon NRR's fomal position, it would appear that noncompliance with physical security re-quirements at non-power reactors of this size and smaller (based on S2!

inventory and power level) can be classified no higher than an Infractio Although this seriously weakens our ability to enforce and therefore ensure compliance, we must continue to inspect and report our finding As stated above, we hope to resolve the issues in the next few months, CONTACT: L. L. Bush (492-8080)

, IfilY 241978 O r s

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J. G. Keppler - 2-either in conjunction with the current development of 73.xx (proposed rule for the physical protection of non-power reactors), or separatel ,

. YV 4 E. M. Howard, Director Division of Safeguards Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclosure:

As Stated cc: Boyce Grier, Region I James O'Reilly, Region II Glenn hhdsen, Region IV Robert Engelken, Region V John Davis, IE Noman Moseley, IE Harold Thornburg, IE Leo Higginbotham, IE Edward Jordan, IE Leonard Cobb, IE Victor Stello, NRR James Fliller, NRR

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Morris Howard, Director Division of Safeguards Inspection. IE FROM:

Victor 5tello, Director Division of Operating Reactors, NRR SUBJECT: SECURITY AT THE DOW RESEARCH REACTOR (DOCKET NO. 50-264) .

In response to Nom Haller's memorandum of April 7,1978, concerning the recent security breakdown at the Dow Research Reactor. I offer the following:

The security plan developed and approved for this' facility is based on " interim guidance" provided by the staff in 1974 at a means of l implementing the re'quirements of 5550.34 and 73.40. I l

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the approved security plan requires con rol oWcssi to and sun,eillance of the gactor and reactor con-trols. It is obvious that protection was not provided during the Januar p , 1978 inspectiR .

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There are obvious hazards associated with the operation of any reactor and many other problems can result from the mere existence of such a facility. As part of the_ current NRR review of non-power reactors it is our intent to reassess the need and authority of the NRC to require a security plan (s50.34[c]) under the Commission's mandate to protect the public from dangers associated with radiation where these dangers are less than those provided for in Parts 20 and 10 M% y Victor Stello, Jr., Direct Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: E. G. Case J. R. Miller -

R. A. Clark W. J. Ross L. Bush

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