ML20203N935
| ML20203N935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1986 |
| From: | Deutsch H GEORGIANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#486-1089 OL, NUDOCS 8610200122 | |
| Download: ML20203N935 (24) | |
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, l C))~ff DXKETEP USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N E 15 P1 :24 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOAAD 7 PANEL ,gg 00ChlllNu !. Si4 WCL In the Matter of ) BRANCH
)
GEORGIA POWER CO., et al. ) Docket #s. 50-424 and 50-425
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(Vogtle Electric Generating )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
APPEAL, BRIEF AND PROPOSED FINDINGS CONCERNING LICENSING BOARD DECISIONS This appeal is filed by Intervenor Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (hereinafter "Intervenor") to challenge decisions by the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board (hereinafter "the Board")
dismissing consideration of serious contentions relating to the licensing of the Plant Vogtle nuclear generating project in the above-cited docket. Procedural improprieties abound in the Lf.consing Board's actions during this proceeding, but.
Intervenor's concern is with public health and safety. Allowing Plant Vogtle to operate without correction of a variety of safety problems raised by Intervenor':s contentions will seriously (and needlessly) threaten the public health and safety, including that of Intervenor's members who live around the facility.
Intervenor is eligible to file this appeal because it has members living in the area surrounding Plant Vogtle. Intervenor has heretofore been unable to challenge these decisions because no final decision had been reached by the Board in regard to the kicensing; appeals from interlocutory orders must await the initial decision rendered by the Board at the end of the case.
8610200122 861000 1 DR ADOCK05000g4 0
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Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (william H. Zimmer Station), ALAB-633, 13 NRC 94 (1981), Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Station, Unit 2), ALAB-269, 1 NRC 411 (1975). Although no final ruling has been issued, the Board stated in its " Partial Initial Decision,"
dated August 27, 1986, that the decision "does resolve a major segment of the case and is therefore appealable at this time."
Intervenor';s members will be threatened by the unsafe operation of Plant Vogtle if it is allowed to operate without correction of the problems identified by many of Intervenor's contentions and dismissed by the Board at various stages of the licensing proceeding. Intervenor actively participated in public hearings concerning one contention and two subcontentions, following improper and illegal dismissal by the Board of other, very serious contentions without hearing.
It is not in dispute th'at Intervenor timely filed its intervention, met all the requirements therefor, and similarly timely filed all its contentions.
Intervenor herein presents the contentions in the order in which Intervenor presented them to the Board in its " Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing,"
dated April 11, 1984. Intervenor does not appeal all of the contentions, but only those as noted.
Intervenor Contention 1: Applicants fail to assess the potential releases of radionuclides from Plant Vogtle during normal transient and accident conditions, nor the somatic, teratogenic and genetic effects of the ionizing radiation, in violation of 10 2
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3 CFR 50.34, 50.36, 20.103, 20.203 and Appendix I of Part 50 and underestimates the human cost of the project in the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR 51.21, 51.20(b) and (c) and 51.23(a).
The Board dismissed this contention on the grounds that Intervenor had failed to prove its point. Intervenor contends that the burden is on Applicants to prove they have met the requirements cited in this contention. Intervenor therefore requests an order by the Appeals Board Panel vacating and reversing the Board on Contention 1.
Intervenor Contention 2: Applicants fail to assess the environmental and public health effects of the addition of Plant Vogtle within 20 miles of the Savannah River Plant in violation of 10 CFR 20.103,. 50.34(a)(4), 51.21, 51. 23 ( b ), 104, 105, 106 and 201.
The Board rules this contention inadmissable due to the Board's lack of jurisdiction over Department of Energy facilities. This ignores the contention and the bases for it.
The problem cited in the contention is the addition of Plant Vogtle to an already existing problem of concentration of radioactive materials. Thus, the question for the Board relates 1 n the impacts of Plant Vogtle, over which the Board has authority (though it acts like it doesn't). The Board erred in its dismissal and GANE hereby requests vacation of the dismissal and conduct of a hearing on Contention 2.
Intervenor Contention 3: Applicant fails to show that the fear caused by living adjacent to a nuclear facility will not threaten the security and well-being of the community.
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The Board claims that it cannot consider this issue under requirements imposed on it from above. If this is the case, Intervenor is similarly constrained and does not appeal this dismissal (though Intervenor strongly disagrees with it).
Intervenor Contention 4: The Applicants underestimate the danger to lives and health of humans, livestock and plants exposed to the electromagnetic radiation of the proposed 500 KV transmission lines from Plant Vogtle in violation of 10 CFR 51.20 & 51.21 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC 4321 et s'eq.
The Board dismissed this contention on the grounds of inadequate basis. This is preposterous. In fact, Intervenor provided extensive documentation of its concerns in this area, and the Board's dismissal is apparently the result of a predetermination with no real consideration of Intervenor's information. The Board erred, and Intervenor requests that this dismissal be vacated and that Contention 4 be set down for hearing.
Intervenor Contention 5: The Applicant failed to design Plant Vogtle to adequately withstand an earthquake the magnitude of which might reasonably be expected to occur at the project site.
Intervenor's filing related to two areas of concern raised by the U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS). In 1982, the USGS had postulated the existence of a fault (the Millett fault) about 7 miles from Plant Vogtle. The Board dismissed consideration of the Millett fault "on the grounds that its existence is only 4
speculative, and that the extent of overlying, undisturbed sediments provides reason for not considering it to be a capable
. f ault." Neither of these grounds has a basis: that the USGS a
postulates the existence of the fault makes the " speculative" nature credible indeed. The overlying sediments are of little reassurance, particularly in view of the USGS':s failure to identify a source for the Charleston earthquake.
USGS has failed to pinpoint the massive Charleston Earthquake of 1886 and has explicitly stated that there were no reason to anticipate less likelihood of a comparable earthquake at other similar areas. On July 26, 1984, Intervenor provided information relating to why the seismic information was
" substantial new information" (" Response to Licensing Board Inquiry Concerning Seismic Contention"). In its September 1984 order, the Board found merit in Intervenor's concern and delayed ruling on this contention until further study by the NRC staff.
! In 1985, the Board ruled, inexplicably and incorrectly, that the concern had been adequately addressed and would not be further considered. Intervenor hereby appeals that ruling and the i
dismissal of consideration of the Millett Fault and . respectfully l
l requests that the Appeals Board Panel carefully consider the written words of a Charlestonian who survived the earthquake there in 1886:
"It was upon such a scene of calm and silence that that
- shock of the great earthquake fell, with the suddenness of a l thousand thunderbolts launched from the starlit skies; with the might of ten thousand thunderbolts falling together; with a force so f ar surpassing all other forces knownh to men that no similtude can truly be found for it. The firm foundation upon which every home had been built in 5
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e unquestioning faith in its stability for all time was giving way...For a few moments all the inhabitants of the city stood together in the presence of death, in its most terrible form...[Within one minute] every home in the city had been broken or shattered--and beneath the ruins lay the lifeless or bruised and bleeding bodies of men, women and children, who had been stricken down in the midst of such security as may be felt by him who reads these lines at any remote distance of time or space."
The Charlestonian describes " death, in its most terrible form;"
we, in a " remote distance of time," face the potential for death in an even more terrible form. Yet the Licensing Board refused even to hear the contention. Will the Appeals Board?
Intervenor Contention 6: The Applicant has not adequately addressed concerns relating to thermal shock effects on irradiated reactor vessels as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendices A, G and H.
The Board dismissed this contention following the prehearing conference "on the grounds that it lacks a sufficiently particularized basis." The Board apparently ignored Intervenor's original filing of the contention, which specifically pointed out (among other points) that (1) the rate of vessel weakening is accelerated by impurities in the steel and welds ; (2) the reactor vessel at Plant Vogtle contains impurities including copper and phospherous; (3) the Applicants do not consider the effect of varied fuel rod geometrics on pressure vessel embrittlement; and (4) the Applicants do not consider the confounding effect of operator error.
Intervenor Contention 7: The Applicants failed to provide adequate protection of the groundwater from contamination.
The Board, in its September 1984 ruling, allowed 6
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consideration of this concern to continue because Intervenors had demonstrated that the Tuscaloosa Aquifer "may not be as isolated from the surface as Applicants would have us believe." Following extensive discovery by all parties, including Deposition of Intervenor witness William Lawless by the Applicants, the Board allowed this contention to go to hearing. It was indisputably
, clear in the hearing that the Applicants had provided a route for contamination of the Aquifer by drilling wells through the marl beneath the site and into the aquifer. The Board's ruling has absolutely no basis in the evidence, is clearly in error in regards to its description of the record and must as a matter of l law be vacated and reversed by the Appeal Board Panel.
Intervenor hereby cites the transcript of the hearings as a clear basis for its appeal. Most of the four days of hearings was taken with this issue, and the Board':s ruling makes one wonder if the ruling was written by someone other than the Board, someone not present at the hearings. For example, the Board said it " examined the qualifications statements of [ Applicants']
witnesses and find that they are well qualified geologists and/or hydrogeologists" although the witnesses admitted under cross-examination that they had testified on matters in which they were not expert (see Transcript, March 14). The Board incredibly misrepresents the qualifications of Intervenors' expert, William Lawless: "we are able to assess his qualifications from the cross-examination of the witness at the hearing...he ahd some experience reviewing reports and managing research projects 7
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. i dealing, at least in part, with ground water [ sic] hydrogeology. l He has had no training in geology or hydrology, however; his formal training has been in mathematics. We find him to have a general familiarity with the scientific method and to bc conversant in the area of ground water [ sic] hydrology, but his professional qualifications are in the area of mathematics, not ground water [ sic] hydrology." This description totally (and one can only conclude intentionally) misrepresents Mr. Lawless's qualifications. As is clearly stated in the record: his degree is in engineering (not mathematics); his training is in nuclear 1
waste management (not mathematics); he has extensive experience in groundwater analysis, including direction of studies and analysis of the Tuscaloosa Aquifer and the possible impacts thereon of nuclear facilities within several miles of the Vogtle site (at the Savannah River Plant). As Black's Law Dictionary and others have pointed out, expertise relates both to education and to experience. It is clear from the record that Mr. Lawless
! is f ar more expert in these areas than are the witnesses for the Applicants or the Staff.
Repeatedly in its Partial Initial Decision, the Board i misrepresents the record. For example, the Board states that j
" witness Lawless testified that breaching the marl...may have
- resulted in the creation of flow pathways through the marl. The I
witness cited not data or other source of information to support l
l this statement, however. The suggestion apparently is pure speculation." On the contrary, the " suggestion" is based on a similar assumption at the Savannah River Plant where Mr. Lawless, 8
senior project engineer in charge of nuclear waste facilities, determined that in fact the marl was not protecting the Aquifer and that test wells may have been the route for contamination of the Aquifer. Similarly, the Board misrepresents the record when it " finds the evidence shows that the grout columns under the building at VEGP will not move at a different rate than the marl, should there be additional settlement." The only " evidence" to 4 support this is the testimony of witnesses who admitted under oath that they are not expert in this area. The only admissable evidence presented on this concern was the testimony of Mr.
Lawless which clearly demonstrates that the grout columns will move at a different rate than the marl.
In summary, the. Board misrepresents the evidence which beyond dispute proves Intervenor's contention. The Appeal Board Panel must rule with the Intervenor and vacate the Board's order concerning groundwater protection.
Intervenor Contention 8: Applicants' Quality Control / Quality Assurance program (QA/QC) is inadequate to assure safe construction and operation of Plant Vogtle.
This is the contention on which the Board most clearly ..
demonstrates its arrogant disregard for the public health and safety.
When GANE intervened in this proceeding, we recognized that I
the Board would likely grant the license, since no operating license has ever actually been permanently denied. Nevertheless, we expected that the Licensing Board would genuinoly listen to l
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our safety concerns and would do its best, within the constraints of assuring the licensing of the plant, to assuure that safety concerns are fully investigated and problems corrected. The Board's actions, particularly in regard to the QA/QC contention, were therefore shocking.
Our original contention concerning QA/QC was based entirely on documents in the public record. We mentioned to the Board that we had received anonymous calls from individuals claiming to work at Plant Vogtle alleging quality problems, but the Board would not consider these calls since they were unverified and unverifiable. Our contention was based on the fact that a huge volume of QA/QC breakdowns had occurred, as evidenced by the public record.
The Intervenors described a number of the QA/QC breakdowns and pointed out that it indicated a pattern of inadequacy for the entire program. The Applicants responded that they either had corrected or would correct each specific instance we cited, but the Board agreed with the Interven' ors that the concern was with the overall program, not the specific instances cited, stating in
- its September 1984 order
"Despite the representations of Applicants and Staff, the Board is concerned about the possible impact upon the operation safety of the Vogtle plant in view of the many instances of noncompliance that have been cited."
i The Board asked all parties to provide clarifying language to bring the contention into sharper focus, which was done. The contention was admitted for review.
During the summer of 1985, Intervenors began receiving many 10
4 more calls from workers at Plant Vogtle, many willing to identify themselves, alleging QA/QC breakdowns. These whistleblowers alleged problems far more serious than those disclosed in the public documents. The workers included quality control personnel responsible for maintaining the QA/QC. They alleged, among other problems, that Georgia Power and its contractors had persistently ordered them to ignore faulty workmanship, some of it crucial to plant safety, and to cover up the faulty workmanship through falsification of documentation of the work. Those objecting were '
harassed by transfers, demotions, suspensions and firings.
Some of the workers came to Intervenors in groups, others l approached us individually. Each expressed the same sentiment:
while personally pronuclear, they were shocked by the activities 2
at Plant Vogtle and did not believe the plant to De safe as built. Although they were very hesitant about approaching us (several commented that they expected us to have horns and a i pitchfork the way ta had been described by Georgia Power), but l
l their complaints within the Company met with harassment and their complaints to the NRC met with apathy or hostility. For example, NRC staffer Bruno Uric, responsible for investigating wcrker concerns in Region II, told workers who called that the NRC lacks sufficient resources to investigate worker complaints. When he met with some of the whistleblowers, promising them confidentiality, their complaints were repeated back to them by co-workers who asked, "Why'd you rat on us?"
These workers were extremely hesitant to speak with us, leading us to believe that the concerns were quite widespread at 11 l
d the plant.
Intervenors notified the Board of these dramatic developments. Although we hud told the Board of previous contacts by individuals claiming to work at Vogtle, those workers feared for their careers and would not identify themselves, rendering their validity unverifiable. Now, however, there were whistleblowers who were willing to testify before the Board, even at risk to their careers, if it might lead to correction of the problems. Intervenors described what the whistleblowers had told us in hearings before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, with copies to the Board. Intervenors also directly notified the Board that the whistleblowers would be willing to testify and would do so on our behalf at the hearings.
The problems described by the whistleblowers included uneven settlement of the auxiliary building and the containment buildings, between which pipes carrying cooling water run; such 1 uneven settlement could rupture the pipes, causing a loss of coolant accident and subsequent meltdown. Documentation of this problem had been falsified, according to the whistleblower (who was willing to testify under oath at the hearings). Other problems included air pocketing and trash in the containment walls, and a general attitude of " productivity before safety,"
l speeding up construction of the plant to the detriment of quality and safety.
In short, the QA/QC problems were far more serious than we or the Board had realized. We anticipated that the Board would 12
be similarly concerned and would instruct the NRC staff to fully investigate the problems. The extent of the scandal would be discovered during the hearings.
We were shocked with the Board's response to these dramatic developments, dated October 3, 1985. Rather than responding with alarm and insisting that the problems be corrected, the Board ignored the new developments and claimed that it had suddenly realized that the QA/QC program was acceptable. After all, the Board reasoned, each of the breakdowns we had described in our initial filing either had been or would be corrected by the Applicants. Because. there was no sworn testimony from the whistleblowers, the Board said it would not consider our charges related to these concerns.
Inte: venors filed an extensively documented request for reconsideration (which is hereby incorporated by reference into this appeal) and offered to provide affidavits from the whistleblowers. The Board said it was too late to provide the affidavits and dismissed the contention.
In short, when the concern about QA/QC became much stronger, when the evidence against the Applicants was strengthened, the Board closed off the only proceeding in which we could directly i
j raise the concern. Intervenors immediately contacted attorneys concerning a court appeal, but were told we had to wait until completion of the licensing proceeding (the Partial Initial Decision) before we could appeal.
The whistleblowers (all but three who had already been fired by the Applicants for raising their concerns) then said they 13
9 would not testify at the hearings, since their testimony would be as public witnesses and therefore not part of the official record. Why threaten their careers when the Board was nothing more than a rubber stamp for the Applicants anyway?
! The Board's action on this matter is incomprehensible. Why did they refuse to allow the whistleblowers to testify in the official record?
The Board members must live with their individual consciences on this matter. But the people of Georgia and South Carolina must live with consequences of the Board's irresponsible actions and reckless disregard for the public health and safety.
As the Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia told the Board at the opening of the hearings, if a major accident occurs at Plant Vogtle, perhaps they will regret their actions. Perhaps they already do but are under pressures which have led to this pattern of irresponsibility. Regardless, the Board's actions were reckless and illegal and the Appeals Board Panel must vacate the order and romand it for hearings. In view of the Board's prior actions on this matter, Intervenor respectfully requests that a new Licensing Board be. formed for the purpose of hearing l
whistleblowers concerns on this matter.
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Intervenor appeals to the Appeals Board Panel not only as a 4
matter of law, not only on the evidence, but also as human beings. Please, for the sake of the people who live here, at least hear out the workers who have raised these concerns. When dealing with nuclear technology, caution is in order. There is 14 4
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absolutely no reasonable rationale for not hearing out the workers concerns. If the concerns are not significant, then what has been lost by affording the Applicants an opportunity to demonstrate that the workers are wrong? If, on the other hand, the concerns are legitimate, do you want to know in your conscience (and with this appeal and other information in the record) that you ignored the concerns? Do you want a catastrophe in Georgia?
Intervenor Contention 9: Applicants failed to submit adequate discussion of' novel design features in its preliminary and final safety analysis reports as required by 10 CFR 50.34.
Applicants responded that the information was proprietary.
Upon agreement of confidentiality, Intervenors were provided with the information. Basically put (in a manner not
- jeopardizing the confidentiality of the information), the information says that the plant has been made safer by the
- removal of.certain safety equipment. This is preposterous. The i
Board, however, agreed and dismissed the-contention. Intervenor challenges this decision, and requests that the Appeals Board I
Panel vacate the dismissal and order the Applicants to install l the equipment in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Intervenor Contention 10: Applicants f ail to assure that safety-
- related electrical and mechanical equipment and components will be environmentally qualified at the onset of operations and throughout the life of the plant as required by General Design i Criteria 1, 2 and 4 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
Intervenors cited numerous examples of this problem. The 15 i
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4 Board chose to separate out these individual examples into subcontentions rather than addressing the issue as a pattern demonstrating generally an overall failure of environmental qualification testing. Intervenors do not appeal the separation of this contention into subcontentions, but instead address the rulings concerning the subcontentions individually as follows.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.1: Applicants' testing methods are inadequate because the Applicants only use high levels of radiation or integrated dose, and greater damage may result from lower dose rates.
Intervenor does not appeal the Board's dismissal of this subcontention.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.2: Applicants fail to consider synergistic effects of radiation, heat and oxygen combination.
Although the NRC staff did not object to admitting this subcontention, the Board dismissed it in its September, 1984 order. Intervenor agrees with the staff that this subcontention shculd have been heard and hereby appeals its dismissal.
l Intervenor Subcontention 10.3: Applicants only tested EPR cable l
material in single conductor configurations although Sandia tests j had shown the cable to perform substantially worse in multiconductor configurations.
The Board initially accepted this subcontention (in its l
September 1984 order), but later summarily dismissed it ( August 21, 1985). Intervenors had submitted sufficient documentation to bring this issue to hearing and Intervenor hereby appeals the 16
-dismissal of this subcontention.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.4: This subcontention related to thermal blocks and was withdrawn by Intervenor. It is not appealed.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.5: Relating to solenoid valves, this subcontention is still in litigation before the Board; because no decision has been reached, it is not part of this appeal.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.6: Limitorque motor operators, to be used at Vogtle, failed upon exposure to steam spray.
The Board dismissed Contention 10.6 (Limitorque Motor Operators) as being without basis, despite numerous cases of failure of these motor operators. Noted in the original contention were several IE notices in which these problems were clearly shown. Westinghouse own testing concluded that "the present motor design will not successfully pass Westinghouse specified test parameters". Since that time a history of continuing problems with these motor operators has been shown in the following IE notices: 86-71, August 19, 1986,"Recent Identified Problems with Limitorque Motor Operators"; 86-03, January 14, 1986, " Potential Deficiencies in Environmental l Qualification of Limitorque Motor Operator Wiring"; 86-02, l
[ January 6, 1986, " Failure of Valve Operator Motor During EQ i
Testing"; 85-20, March 12, 1985, " Motor-Operatored Valve Failures Due t'o Hammering Effect"; in addition in " Items of interest, Week Ending January 18, 1985", the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (NRC) noted numerous motor operated valve failures (47 cases in 1983 and early 1984). These notices should 17
be considered new evidence, and demonstrate the continuing pattern of serious problem encountered with these motor operators. The latest, 86-71, is specif1c for plant Votgle and indicates that most of the Limitorque Motor Operators installed there have defective internal wiring. This is considered to be a generic problem with this equipment. A violation of 10 CFR Part 21 has been issued to Limitorque for failure to report and for failure to evaluate defects discovered in their motor operators.
Licensees were reminded of there responsibility that require that purchased materials, equipment, and services conform to the requirements of the procurement documents. Based on this new evidence, consideration of subcontention lis.O should be reopened and the Board should be required to hear it. Intervenor hereby requests that the Appeal Board Panel consider this new information (unavailable to Intervenor prior to the Board's dismiasal of the subcontention) and so order.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.'7: The hydrogen recombiners to be used at Plant Vogtle have not been adequately qualified.
The Board initially agreed to consider this subcontention (September, 1984 order) but summarily dismissed it (November 5, 1985). The production model has never been tested. The Board clearly erred in its dismissal and Intervenor appeals this l dismissal and requests that the Appeals Board Panel vacate the I
dismissal and order a hearing on the issue Intervenor Subcontention 10.8: Applicants f ailed to show that in i
the event of a fire, Plant Vogtle can safely be shut down, in 18 l
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violation of 10 CFR 50.48.
Intervenors, constrained by the regulations, do not appeal this ruling.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.9: Plant Vogtle has not undergone reassessment of its seismic qualification despite new design criteria and methods for seismic qualification.
The Applicant failed to provide any such reassessment and the Board clearly erred in its dismissal. Intervenor appeals the dismissal and requests that the Applicants be ordered to conduct the reassessment, with opportunity for the Intervenors and the Staff to raise new contentions based on the reassessment.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.10: Qualification methodologies for the testing of safety equipment at Plant Vogtle are inadequate.
Intervenor does not appeal this dismissal.
Intervenor Subcontention 10.11: Accident parameters and post-
. accident functionality requirement times for Plant Vogtle safety features have not been given proper consideration.
Intervenor does not appeal this dismissal.
Intervenor Contention 11: Applicants' failure to consider defects in the Vogtle steam generator system consitutes an undue risk to public health and safety in violation of 10 CFR 50.34 (b) and 20 CFR 50 Appendices A and B.
Intervenors presented evidence showing clearly that stress corrosion cracking is a serious problem; the Board failed to I
l consider Intervenors' information. .The Board erred in its l dismissal of this contention, and Intervenor appeals the dismissal, requests vacation of the dismissal and requests a 19
hearing on it.
Intervenor Contention 12: Applicants have not properly assessed the amount of salt and chlorine release from the cooling towers and its potential consequent agricultural and environmental damage in the area surrounding Plant Vogtle.
Intervenor does-not appeal this ruling.
Intervenor Contention 13: Applicant's emergency response plans are inadequate and violate 10 CFR 50.33, 50.47, 50.54 and I
Appendix E to Part 50.
The Applicants agreed with the Intervenors and withdrew its emergency response plan, submitting a new and improved version many months later. Intervenors also objected to that plan, outlining a number of serious shortcomings therein. The Board accepted many of the emergency response contentions for review.
However, it dismissed these at various times, the final one being
! dismissed July 17, 1986. Intervenor appeals the Board's rulings l on emergency response, requests that the rulings be vacated and l
the emergency response be remanded to the Botrd for hearing.
Intervenor Contention 14: There is no reasonable assurance that the emergency diesel generators manaufactured by TDI to be used at Plant Vogtle will provide a reliable and independent source of on-site power as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A General Design Criteria #17, in that adequate design, manufacture and QA/QC have resulqed in substandard engines which are subject to common mode failures.
The concern with emergency generator reliability is a 20
crucial one to plant safety. Intervenors provided extensive documentation as to the widespread problems with TDI (Transamerica Delavel Inc.) generators of the type to be used at Plant Vogtle. The Board admitted it as a litigable contention in its order of September.1984.
During discovery, Intervenor obtained thousands of pages of documents demonstrating even more strongly the inadequacy of the TDI generators. Applicants countered that the individual providing Intervenor's information was not an expert on diesel generators (which he never claimed to be) and pointed to the volume of documents as evidence that-it had adequately addressed the problem.
That a problem is serious enough to lead Applicants to accumulated thousands of pagerelating to it does not--or should not--lead one to conclude that the Applicants have adequately addressed it. The Board accepted Applicants' motion to dismiss it despite Intervenors' clear demonst' ration (in their response to the motion for summary dismissal) that the problem has not been rectified. (Indeed, Applicants' own testing has subsequently demonstrated that the generators are unreliable, although the Applicants are continuing to use them).
Intervenor hereby incorporates by reference Intervenors' response to the Applicants' motion for summary dismiccal of l
Contention 14.
The Board erred as a matter of law and the Appeals Board Panel must vacate and reverse the dismissal of this contention.
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In summary, Intervenor proposes that the Appeal Board Panel find as f act and conclude as law that the Licensing Board erred in its dismissal of Intervenor contentions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14 and in its dismissal of Intervenor subcontentions 10.2, 10.3, 10. 6, 10.7 and 10.9. Intervenor proposes that the Licensing Board's decisions on those contentions and subcontentions be vacated. Intervenor further proposes that the Licensing Board's decisions on contentions (and subcontentions) 2, 4, 6, 10.2, 10.3, 10.7, 10.9 and 13 be remanded to the Board for hearing. Intervenor proposes that 10.6 be reopened for hearing based on new information.
Intervonor further proposes that the Board be reversed and the Intervenor upheld on contentions 1, 5, 7, 9 and 14, and that a new Board be appointed to hear whistleblowers' concerns relating to Contention 8.
Respectfully submitted thic, the 8th day of October, 1986.
M6 A'V 5' Howard Deutsch, Ph.D.
765 Myrtle St. NE i
Atlanta, GA 30308 for Intervenor Georgians Against Nuclear Energy l
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f y s.
6' DCt hE TE[c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING' APPEAL BOARD A *b In the Matter of ) 0FFlLE Og ;t. 3
) 00CXE TjNG ,, ";[./gy GEORGIA POWER CO., et al. ) Docket #s. 50-424 and !Id425
)
(Vogtle Electric Generating )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE g SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served all parties on the following service list with copies of the enclosed " Supplemental Information" relating to ASCO solenoid valves and the enclosed
" Appeal, Brief and Proposed Finds Concerning Licensing Board Decisions," this, the 8th day of October, 1986.
I'241TL1 L &
Howard Deutsch, Ph.D.
g SERVICE LIST Morton B. Margulies, Chair Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Docketing & Service Section Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Bernard M. Bordenick, esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director Washington, D.C. 20555 Ur.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Ruble A. Thomas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Southern Company Services, Inc.
Washington, D.C. 20555 PO Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 George F. Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr. James E. Joiner David R. Lewis Sumner C. Rosenberg Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Hugh Davenport 1800 M Street, N.W. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman Washington, D.C. 20036 The Candler Bldg., Ste.1400 127 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Tim Johnson Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia 1083 Austin Avenue Brad Jones, esq.
Atlanta, Georgia 30307 Regional Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ste. 3100, 101 Marietta St.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 bk_ J