ML20203K820

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Rev 0 to Training Lesson Plan LO-LP-39207-00, Instrumentation 3/4.3
ML20203K820
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/08/1986
From: Brown R, Missig N
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20203K798 List:
References
LO-LP-39207, LO-LP-39207-00, NUDOCS 8608210358
Download: ML20203K820 (17)
v • d • e


Text

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POWE2 GENERATaON DEPl.'.TMENT j

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TRAINING LESSON PLAN; ^ ,

TITLE: INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3 NUMBER: LO-LP-39207-00 l

PROGRAM: LICENSED OPERATOR TRAININc REVISION- 0 l AUTHOR: N. MISSI DATE: 8/7/86 APPROVED:

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LO-LP-39207-00

l. PURPOSE STATEMENT:

TO TEACH THE STUDENT THE APPLICABILITY AND ACTIONS OF LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SECTION 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION.

II. LIST OF OBJECTIVES:

1. The student will be able to determine if in violation of an LCO if given a list of equipment and a given applicability condition.
2. The student will be able to give the required action statement from memory if the time limit for action is one hour or less.
3. The student will be able to look up the required action if given the applicable LCO if action required in more than one hour.

Optional for SRO

4. The student will be able to explain the bases for each of the LCO's.

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REFERENCES:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 9

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s LO-LP-39207-00 ll1. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES A. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

1. Consists of LCO statement and 3 tables
a. Read section 3/4.3.1 reactor trip system instrumentation
b. Table 3-3.1
1) Functional Units - trip signals and interlocks
2) Total number of channels
3) Number of channels to trip
4) Minimum channels operable a) Addressed in action statements
5) Applicable modes a) Many are superscripted or asterisked
6) Action - listed following table
7) Read through each functional unit including actions and table notation a) Note: Source and Intermediate range

, changed to 1/2 minimum for startup.

c. Table 3-3.2
1) Lists response times for each unit a) From time parameter exceeds value b) To completion of required protection
d. Table 4.3-1 Surveillance Requirements
1) Channel checks a) Many done by operator, daily and See Definitions Shift Surveillance logs. section for these items.
2) Calibration a) Heat balance by operator for Pwr Other calibrations Range NIS. check by Instrument Group.

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LO-LP-39207-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

3) Analog Channel Operation Test a) Verification of alate, trip and interlock setpoints b) Done by operations on NIS
4) Trip actuating device operational test 14702, 14701, 14700 a) Relays B. ESF Actuation System Instrumentation
1. Consists of LCO statement and 4 tables
a. Read section 3/4.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation
b. Table 3.3-3
1) Same categories as 3.3-1
2) Read through functional units a) Safety injection including what it does* .

b) Containment spray c) Containment isolation

, d) Steam line isolation e) Turbine trip and feedwater isolation f) Auxiliary feedwater g) Semi-auto swapover to recire.

h) Start diesel generator

1) ESFAS interlocks P-4 and P-11 j) Control room isolation
c. Table 3.3-4
1) Trip setpoints and allowable values 5

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LO-LP-39207-00 l11. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

d. Table 3.3-5
1) Response times
e. Table 4.3-2
1) Surveillance requirements C. bases for Reactor Trip and ESFAS Instrumentation
1. Operability of these systems ensures
a. Action / Trip initiates when parameter exceeds setpoint
b. Specified coincidence logic is maintained
c. Sufficient redundancy
1) A channel can be out for maintenance or testing.
d. Functional capability from diverse parameters
1) Not relying on one parameter for action
2. This reliability, redundancy and diversity
a. Was assumed in design of facility

, b. For mitigation of transients and accidents

3. Consistent with assumptions in accident analysis
4. Surveillance requirements
a. Ensure capability maintained compareble to original design
5. Response times
a. Ensure action completed within time assumed in accident analysis
b. No credit in analysis for those marked NA.
c. May be tested with sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements l
1) Provided they test total channel response time 1

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LO-LP-39207-00 lli.

LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

6. Interlocks
a. F Reactor tripped
1) Actuates turbine trip
2) Closes main feedwater valves on Lo T,y,
3) Prevents opening feedwater valves if closed by:

a) Safety Injection b) High S/G water level

4) Allows SI block
5) Not P prevents manual block of SI
b. P-11 on decreasing pressure '
1) Allows block of low Pzr and low SG pressure SI
2) Reinstates s' team line isolation on high rate D. Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4.3.3
1. Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Table 3.3-6 lists rad monitors required to be operable and the applicable modes for each.
b. Bases Note: rad monitor

( is inoperable if l 1) Operability ensures setpoint too high, a) Rad levels continually measured in the areas served b) Alarm or action initiated at i setpoint I

2. Movable Incore Detectors l a. LCO requires 75% of thimbles with 2/ quadrant Only applicable when and sufficient equipment to map these thimbles required to use l

Incore System for j b. Bases ExcoreCalgbration, j QPTR or F H, Fn(2) l 1) Ensures measurements accurately represent and Fxy measurement l spatial neutron flux distribution of core 7

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LO-LP-39207-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

2) Full Incore Flux Map a) Fq (Z) or F elta H
3) Quarter core maps a) Recalibrating Excores
4) Full incore or symmetric thimbles a) QPTR with NIS power range inoperable
3. Seismic Instrumentation
a. Table 3.3-7 lists required instruments which must be operable at all times
b. Action - with any instrument inoperable for more than 30 days submit a report
c. Bases
1) Promptly determine magnitude of seismic ovent ,
2) Determine if shutdown required App. A 10CFR100
4. Meteorological Instrumentation
a. Table 3.3-8 list instruments which are

. required in all modes

b. With any out for more than 7 days submit a report
c. Bases
1) For estimating potential radiation doses to public
2) During both routine and accidental release
3) Required to evaluate need for corrective measure to protect public
5. Remote Shutdown Instrumentation
a. Table 3.3-9 list RMS instruments which are required in Modes 1, 2. 3 8

LO-LP-39207-00 lil. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

b. With less than minimum operable have 7 days to restore then 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to Hot Shutdown.

Also applies to transfer switches and control circuits.

c. Bases
1) Permit shutdown and maintenance of hot standby from outside control room.

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2) In the event control room habitability lost.
3) Parameters selected ensure that a) Condition of reactor is known b) Conditions of RCS are known c) S/G's are available for residual heat removal
4) Fire in control room a) Only PSDB will be utilized b) All other cases both PSDA and PSDB
6. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

, a. Table 3.3-10 lists AMS instruments which are Actions shown in required in Modes 1, 2 and 3 table also

b. Bases
1) Ensure sufficient information available on selected plant parameters
2) Monitor and assess following accident
7. Chlorine Detection Systems
a. Two CBCR chlorine detectors required in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also in Modes 5 and 6 during irradiated fuel movement or load movemeste over irradiated fuel.

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LO-LP-39207-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES

b. Actions
1) With one inoperable - 7 days to restore then 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to initiate CBCR emergency ventilation system
2) With two inoperable - one hour to initiate CBCR emergency ventilation C. Bases
1) To promptly detect and initiate protective action a) In the event of chlorine leak
2) Protection for control room habitability
8. Loose Part Detection Instrumentation
a. Must be operable in Modes 1 and 2
b. D_igital M,etal Impact M_onitoring System
c. Action - any chanhel 00S for more than 30 days then submit a report
d. Bases
1) To detect loose parts in primary system

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a) Avoid / mitigate damage to primary components

9. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumenta-tion
a. Table 3.3-12 lists the channels which must be operable at all times.
1) Operability includes having Alarm / Trip .

setpoints properly adjusted in OFFSITE DOSE accordance with the ODCM. CALCULATION MANUAL

b. Action requires that any monitor having Alarm / Trip setpoint less conservative than ODCM either immediately suspend any release of effluents monitored by that channel or declare it inoperable.

l 1) For inoperable channels the actions I are specified in Table.

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LO-LP-39207-00  ;

lli. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

c. Bases
1) Monitor and control radioactive liquid releases
2) Alarm / trip setpoints set according to ODCM a) Less than 10CFR20 limits
10. Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumenta-

. tion

a. LCO and Actions are listed in Table 3.3-13 and are basically the same as for liquids.
b. Bases - same as liquid E. High Energy Line Break Isolation Sensors.
1. Table 3.3-13 lists all of the sensora, Minimum Channels, and applicable modes.
a. All sensors are inpairs with at least one required to be operable. ,
b. Electric steam boiler line sensors consist Terperature instru-of Temperature sensors and flow sensors and metres are in rooms are required any time the b. oiler (s) operate. through which the High energy lines
1) Have 7 days to restore to minimum or pass.

. shutdown boiler.

c. Steam Generator blowdown sensors consist of Temperature and Flow instruments in each blowdown line which are required in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
1) Have 7 days to rentore to minimum then 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to Hot Standby then 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to Cold Shutdown,
d. Letdown line sensors consist of Temperature and Pressure instruments required in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
1) Actions same as SGBD lines.

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2. Surveillance requires Analog Channel Operational Test every 18 months.

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LO-LP-39207-00 l l

lli. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

3. Bases
a. Capability to promptly detect and isolate high energy line breaks to pr+ vent damage to safety related equipment in Aux 131ary Building.

F. Turbine Overspeed Protection

1. Requires that at least one Turbine overspeed system shall be operable in Mode 1 and Modes 2 and 3 if all steam paths to turbine are not isolated.
a. Includes having all MSV's, CV's, ISV's and IV's operabic
2. With one MSV or CV per steam line or one IV or ISV inoperable have 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore or close one valve in affected line,
a. After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> have 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to isolate all steam to Turbine
b. With overspeed protection circuits inoperable have 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to isolate steam supply to Turbine
3. Surveillance
a. Weekly surveillances stroke the MSV's, IV's 14220 and ISV's and test trip circuitry. 14286
b. Monthly stroke MSV's, CV's, IV's and ISV's 14540
c. Annually do actual testing of Overspeed and 14785 Backup overspeed devices.
4. Bases
a. Generation of potencia.' ly da . aging missiles
1) Could damage safety related components, equipment or structures G. Industry Events
1. Most reportable events are result of equipment failures, or personnel error during testing.
a. Often the operators do not recognize that an instrument has failed when the failure is not in the electronics but in the mechanical ,

portions of the sensing equipmeat.

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lli. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

b. Before releasing an instrument channel for testing the operator must verify that all other like channels have been returned to service.
2. Refer to Attached LER's. Review events with students allowing students to determine which LCO violated and why.

H. Summary

1. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
2. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
3. Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Radiation Monitoring
b. Movable Incore Detectors
c. Seismic Instrumen'tation
d. Meteorclogical Instrumentation
e. Remote Shutdown Instrumentation

, f. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

g. Chlorine Detection Systems
h. Fire Detection Instrumentation
1. Loose Part Detection Instrumentation l

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j. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring l Instrumentation i
k. Radioactive Caseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation
4. Turbine Overspeed Protection 13 1

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LO-LP-39207-00 j IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES -

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l ATTACHMENT I

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[ 22] BEAVER VALLEY 1 DOCKET 50-334 LER 83-024 SUSC00 LING MONITOR READS ERR 0NEOUSLY.

EVENT DATE: 091883 REPORT DATE: 100783 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: OTHER INST SYS REQD FOR SAFETY COMPONENT: ELECTRICAL CONDUCTORS (NSIC 186221) ON 9/18/83, DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE CORE SUBC00 LING MONITOR TO CHECK CHANNEL BEHAVIOR, THE MONITOR WAS FOUND TO BE READING ERRONEOUSLY. AITER CROSS-CHECKING THE MONITOR WITH THE COMPUTER AND THE INCORE .

THERMOCOUPLES, THE MONITOR WAS FOUND READING APPROXIMATELY 300 DEGREES LOW. THE MONITOR WAS THEN DECLARED INOPERABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.3.3.8. THERE WERE NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS AS REDUNDANT METHODS OF MEASURING SUBC00 LING MARGIN WERE AVAILABLE. THE CAUSE FOR THE CORE SUBC00 LING MONITOR FAILURE HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO A LOOSE CONNECTOR WITHIN THE UNIT. THIS CONNECTOR WAS REPAIRED. A SUBSEQUENT SURVEILLANCE TEST PERFORMED AFTER MAINTENANCE WAS COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY ON 9/21/83. THE OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT GROUP HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL DEPARTMENT DEVELOP A PERIODIC INSPECTION AND CLEANING AWAITING A FIELD CHANGE KIT FROM WESTINGHOUSE TO CORRECT A GENERIC PROBLEM WHICH EXISTS WITH THE UNIT. THIS KIT IS ALSO EXPECTED TO IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE UNIT.

[ 24] BEAVER VALLEY 1 DCCKET 50-334 LER 83-038 RATE TRIP TIME CONSTANT DRIFTS TOO LOW FOR POWER RANGE TRIP.

EVENT DATE: 112583 REPORT DATE: 122383 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS COMPONENT: INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS VENDOR: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

(NSIC 188433) WHILE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE 2.04, (POWER RANGE N-N142 QUARTERLY CALIBRATION) ON 11/25/83, THE RATE TRIP TIME CONSTANT WAS FOUND TO BE 1.94 SECONDS. THIS WAS BELOW THE TECH SPEC 2.2.1 REQUIREMENT OF A MINIMUM TIME CONSTANT OF 2 SECONDS. THE OTHER 3 REDUNDANT CHANNELS REMAINED OPERABLE. THIS IS THE SECOND INCIDENT INVOLVING A POWER RANGE TRIP TIME CONSTANT BEING BELOW ITS TECH SPEC VALUE. THE NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO INSTRUMENT DRIFT. THE TIME CONSTANT WAS ADJUSTED TO 2.2 SECONDS AND THE CHANNEL WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 1100 HOURS ON 11/25/83.

[ 25] BEAVER VALLEY 1 DOCKET 50-334 LER 83-039 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CHANNEL FAILS TEST.

EVENT DATE: 112683 REPORT DATE: 122383 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS COMPONENTS: VALVES VENDOR: WHITNEY COMPANY d

(NSIC 188434) ON 11/26/83 AT 1700 HOURS, DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A CHANNEL CHECK ON THE PRESSURIZER LEVELS CHANNELS, LEVEL CHANNEL L-RC460 FAILED ITS CHANNEL CHECK ( 4% DEVIATION BETWEEN LEVEL CHANNELS). L-RC460 WAS THEN DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE AND THE ASSOCIATED BISTABLE WAS PLACED IN THE TRIPPED CONDITION WITHIN ONE HOUR. REDUNDANT LEVEL CHANNELS WERE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY THE MINIMUM LOGIC NEEDED TO INITIATE ANY HIGH LEVEL TRIP

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. THE CAUSE FOR THE ERRONEOUS LEVEL INDICATION WAS DUE TO A PACKING LEAK ON AN INSTRUMENT VALVE, ALLOWING THE UNSEALED PORTION OF THE SEALED LEVEL TRANSMITTER REFERENCE LEG TO DRAIN. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN WAS TO REPLACE THE INTERNALS OF THE l INSTRUMENT VALVE AND REFILL THE REFERENCE LEG. THE INSTRUMENT VALVE IS A 1/2-INCH GLOBE VALVE SUPPLIED BY WHITEY CO.

I LO-LP-39207-00 IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES ATTACHMENT II

[157] SALEM 1 DOCKET 50-272 LER 84-010 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - RTD BYPASS LINE VALVE FAILURES.

EVENT DATE: 040184 REPORT DATE: 050184 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR OTHER UNITS INVOLVED: SALEM 2 (PWR)

VENDOR: ROCKWELL-INTERNATIONAL (NSIC 189514) LER 83-077/03L DOCUMENTED AN ISOLATED EVENT (OCCURRING ON JAN 29, 1983)

INVOLVING, WHAT WAS ASSUMED TO BE CORROSION PRODUCTS RESTRICTING FLOW IN NO. 14 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP RTD BYPASS LINE. AS A RESULT OF THAT LER, THE NRC ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICE 83-65 TO ALL UTILITIES, DESCRIBING THAT EVENT AN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE RTD BYPASS IINE FLOW SENSORS AND ASSOCIATED ALARM. ON OCT 19, 1983, PSE&G RECEIVED A NOTICE FROM ANOTHER UTILITY, DESCRIBING A SIMILAR EVENT THAT THEY HAD EXPERIENCED; ALTHOUGH, THEIR PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY A STEM-TO-DISK SEPARATION OF A BYPASS LINE ISOLATION VALVE. THE Y EXPLAINED THAT THE VALVE DISI HAD FALLEN, RESULTING IN RESTRICTION OF THE FLOW; AND, THE VALVE DISK COULD LIFT REESTABLISHING FLOW. SINCE THIS TYPE OF FATLURE COULD EASILY BE MISTAKEN FOR AN OBSTRUCTION CAUSED BY CRUD, IT WAS DECIDED TO RADIOGRAPH ALL RTD BYPASS LINE VALVES. IN JAN 1984, RADIOGRAPHY RESULTS OF UNIT 2 VALVES REVEALED STEM-TO-DISK SEPARATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TWO VALVES. UNIT 2 LER 84-001-00 DOCUMENTED THESE FINDINGS AND ALERTED THE COMMISSION TO POSSIBLE GENERIC PROBLEMS. ON APR 1, 1984, RADIOGRAPHY RESULTS OF UNIT 1 VALVES REVEALED SIMILAR FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH 11 VALVES.

ALL UNIT 1 RTD BYPASS LINE VALVES HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH ONES OF A DIFFERENT DESIGN.

PRESENT PLANS ARE TO REPLACE UNIT 2 VALVES DURING THE NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE.

[158] SALEM 2 DOCKET 50-311 LER 84-001 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - RTD BYPASS LINE - VALVE FAILURES.

EVENT DATE: 011284 REPORT DATE: 020984 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: ROCKWELL-INTERNATIONAL (NSIC 189357) IN JAN 1983, SALEM UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A LOW FLOW CONDITION IN NO. 14 REACTOR COOLANT LOOP RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR BYPASS LINE. THE EVENT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO BLOCKAGE CAUSED BY CORROSION PRODUCTS, AND THE EVENT WAS DOCUMENTED IN LER NO. 83-007/03L.

AS A RESULT OF THAT LER, THE USRNC ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-65, DESCRIBING THIS OCCURRENCE, AND RECOMMENDING THAT ALL UTILITIES PERIODICALLY VERIFY THE RTD BYPASS LINE LOW FLOW ALARM SETPOINTS.

l (NSIC 189186) ON MARCH 10, 1984, WITH UNIT 3 IN MODE 1 AT 95 PERCENT POWER, OPERATORS RECEIVED INDICATIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM OF A POSSIBLE SALTWATER LEAK IN ONE OF THE MAIN CONDENSER (EIIS COMPONENT CODE COND) QUADRANTS. OPERATORS REDUCED POWER TO 75 PERCENT AND STOPPED THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP (EIIS COMPONENT CODE P) FOR THE AFFECTED QUADRANT. MAIN CONDENSER BACKPRESSURE STARTED TO INCREASE, AND OPERATORS ATTEMPTED TO RESTART THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP. BEFORE THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP COULD BE RESTARTED, THE TURBINE (EIIS COMPONENT CODE TRB) TRIPPED ON HIGH CONDENSER BACEPRESSURE, THE REACTOR (EIIS COMPONENT CODE RCT) TRIPPED ON LOSS OF LOAD, AND THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (EIIS SYSTEM CODE BA) ACTUATED ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL DUE TO SHRINK. OPERATORS PERFORMED EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION, S023-3-5.1, " EMERGENCY PLANT SHUTDOWN" TO STABILIZE PLANT CONDITIONS. NO SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS MALFUNCTIONED DURING THIS EVENT. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY WATER IN THE AIR REMOVAL PIPING. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE DRAIN LINES ON THE AIR REMOVAL PIPING WERE CLOGGED. THE DRAIN LINES WERE CLEANED, AND THE CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM (EIIS SYSTEM CODE SH) WAS RETURNED TO OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, LEAKING CONDENSER TUBES WERE REPAIRED. NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION IS PLANNED. THERE ARE NO REASONABLE OR CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVES UNDER WHICH THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SEVERE.

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ATTACHMENT III l

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[ 24] CALVERT CLIFFS 2 DOCKET 50-318 LER 84-002 REQUIRED SAMPLING WAS NOT PERFORMED FOR INOPERABLE-RADIATION MONITOR. 1 EVENT DATE: 032684 REPORT DATE: 042484 NSSS: CE TYPE : PWR (NSIC 189525) ON MAR 13, 1984, AT APPROXIMATELY 1025, WITH UNIT 2 AT 98% POWER, THE CONDENSER OFF-GAS RADIATION MONITOR, 2-RI-1752, WAS FOUND TO BE INDICATING LESS THAN ZERO COUNTS PER MINUTE (CPM). A PULSE AND LEVEL CALIBRATION CHECK WAS PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY.

AFTER ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS OF THE DRAWER AND SKID ASSEMBLIES, 2-RI-1752 WAS " ERR 0NEOUSLY" CONSIDERED IN SERVICE BUT INDICATING LOW. A MAINTENANCE REQUEST WAS THEN INITIATED. ON MAR 22, 1984 DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE MAINTENANCE REQUEST, THE DETECTOR'S SIGNAL LEAD AT J104, ON BACK OF 2-RI-1752, WAS FOUND DISCONNECTED. 2-RI-1752 WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 1500 ON MAR 22, 1984. ON MAR 26, 1984 THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR WAS INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS AND THF CONDENSER OFF-GAS RADIATION MONITOR WAS THEN DECLARED INOPERABLE FROM MAR 13, 1984 TO MAR 22, 1984. TECH SPEC APPENDIX 'B', PART 1, SECTION 2.3, TABLE 2.3.1, ITEM 5. THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR INFORMED CHEMISTRY AND A GRAB SAMPLE WAS TAKEN WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS.

[175] FARLEY 1 DOCKET 50-348 LER 83-095 OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA TEMPERATURE CHANNEL INOPERABLE.

EVENT DATE: 122683 REPORT DATE: 012484 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS COMPONENT: INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS (NSIC 188698) AT 2220 on 12/26/83, THE LOOP 1 OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE WHEN TEMPERATURE INDICATOR TI-412C (LOOP 1 OVERTEMPERATURE SETPOINT) FAILED LOW. TECH SPEC 3.3.1, IN PART, REQUIRED THIS CHANNEL TO BE OPERABLE. TECH SPEC 3.3.1 ACTION STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS WERE MET. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY FAILURE OF A SUMMING AMP (NSA) CARD. THE CARD WAS REPLACED AND FOLLOWING SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF FNP-1-STP-201.18 (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TE-412 LOOP CALIBRATION AND FUNCTIONAL TEST) THE LOOP 1 OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL WAS DECLARED OPERABLE AT 0400 ON 12/27/83.

[153] DIABLO CANYON 1 DOCKET 50-275 LER 83-033 BOTH SOURCE RANGE CHANNELS INOPERABLE.

EVENT DATE: 120283 REPORT DATE: 122983 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS COMPONENT: INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS VENDOR: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

(NSIC 188677) WHILE IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN), AND WITH ONE CHANNEL OF SOURCE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED PER TECH SPEC 3.3.1, BOTH CHANNELS OF SOURCE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION l WERE DEENERGIZED FOR ABOUT TWO MINUTES DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST. THIS i EVENT IS REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.1 13B. CAUSE WASeA PERSONNEL ERROR IN THAT AN I&C l TECHNICIAN FAILED TO FOLLOW A WRITTEN PROCEDURE DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST.

l THIS PROCEDURE HAD A SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST LOSS OF HIGH VOLTAGE IN THE MONITORING CIRCUIT. I&C PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTED BY THE ASST. PLANT MANAGER, TECH SERVICES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS.

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LO-LP-39207-00 i IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES ATTACHMENT IV

[169] FARLEY 1 DOCKET LER 83-089 RADIATION MONITOR DECLARED INOPERABLE.

EVENT DATE: 121583 REPORT DATE: 011384 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REAC COOL PRESS BOUN LEAK DETEC COMPONENT: VALVES VENDOR: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

(NSIC 188445 AT 0800 ON 12/15/83, RADIATION MONITOR R-11 (CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PARTICULATE ACTIVITY) WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DIE TO AN IMPROPER VALVE LINEUP. TECH SPECS 3.3.3.1 AND 3.4.7.1, IN PART, REQUIRE THIS MONITOR TO BE OPERABLE. TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS WERE MET. THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL ERROR. AT APPROXIMATELY 1620 ON 12/14/83, A HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIAN SHIFTED RADIATION MONITOR R-11 FROM THE OUTBOARD PUMP TO THE INBOARD PUMP TO ALLOW TROUBLESHOOTING BY ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE. UPON COMPLETION OF A MOTOR CURRENT CHECK, THE SAME TECHNICIAN ATTEMPTED TO SHIFT R-11 BACK TO THE OUTBOARD PUMP. THE TECHNICIAN USED AN INCORRECT SECTION OF THE APPROVED PROCEDURE WHICH CAUSED HIM TO MISPOSITION THE PUMP INLET AND BYPASS VALVES.

OPERATIONS PERSONNEL NOTICED AN ABNORMALLY LOW INDICATION ON RADIATION MONITOR R-11 AND CHECKS WERE MADE BY HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL ON BOTH THE EVENING AND NIGHT SHIFTS. THESE CHECKS VERIFIED PROPER PUMP OPERATION BUT FAILED TO VERIFY INLET AND BYPASS VALVE POSITION.

UPON DISCOVERY ON DAY SHIFT, THE VALVE LINEUP WAS CORRECTED AND RADIATION MONITOR R-11 WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 0830 ON 12/15/83. THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED HAVE BEEN COUNSELED.

[170] FARLEY 1 DOCKET 50-348 LER 83-090 TWO RADIATION MONITORS DECLARED INOPERABLE.

EVENT DATE: 122483 REPORT DATE: 012084 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR SYSTEM: REAC COOL PRES BOUN LEAK DETEC COMPONENT: PUMPS VENDOR: CONDE PUMP COMPANY (NSIC 188446) AT 0800 on 12/24/83, RADIATION MONITORS R-11 (CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PARTICULATE ACTIVITY) AND R-12 (CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE GASEOUS ACTIVITY) WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE WHEN THE VACUUM PUMP TRIPPED ON HIGH FLOW. TECH SPECS 3.3.3.1 AND 3.4.7.1, IN l PART, REQUIRED THESE MONITORS TO BE OPERABLE. TECH SFEC ACTION STATEMENT REQUIREMENIS WERE MET. THIS EVENT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY IN THAT THE FLOW RATE WAS SET TOO HIGH. FNP-0-RCP-27 (R-11/R-12 OPERATION) HAS BEEN REVISED TO MORE CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE THE PROPER METHOD OF ADJUSTING THE MONITOR FLOW RATE. THE FLOW WAS ADJUSTED AND RADIATION MONITORS R-11 AND R-12 WERE DECLARED OPERABLE AT 1035 ON 12/24/83.

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