ML20203K827

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Rev 0 to Training Lesson Plan LO-LP-39210-00, Containment Sys 3/4.6
ML20203K827
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/08/1986
From: Brown R, Shaw J
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20203K798 List:
References
LO-LP-39210, LO-LP-39210-00, NUDOCS 8608210367
Download: ML20203K827 (19)
v • d • e


Text

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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT g k TRAINING LESSON PLAN ,

TITLE: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.'6 NiMBER, L -LP-39210-00 PROGRAM: LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING 0 REVISION-AUTHOR: J. P. SHAW DATE: 8/5/86 APPROVED: gg h/j% DATE:

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INSTRUCTORGUIDELINES:[

I. MATERIALS A. WHITE BOARD WITH MARKERS B. HANDOUT: LO-H0-39210-00-001

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1. PURPOSE STATEMEN  :

TO TEACH THE STUDENT THE APPLICABILITY AND ACTIONS OF LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SECTION 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.

II. LIST OF OBJECTIVES:

1. The student will be able to determine if in violation of an LCO if given a list of equipment and a given applicability condition.
2. The student will be able to give the required action statement from memory if the time limit for action is one hour or less.
3. The student will be able to look up the required action if given the applicable LCO if action required in more than one hour.
4. The student will be familiar with (RO) or be able to explain (SRO) the bases for each L.C.O.

2

_. LO-LP-39210-00 1

REFERENCES:

1. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 3/4.6
2. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i

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LO-LP-39210-00 l 111. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES A. Primary Containment - Third Barrier to Release

1. Containment Integrity
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.1 P.E.A.L.S.  ;

Penetrations

1) Ask khat containment integrity is Equipment Hatch Airlocks
b. Bases Leakage Rates S,ealing Mechanisms
1) Ensures radioactive release limited to safety analysis a) Leakage paths b) Leakage rates
2) Will limit offsite doses to 10CFR100 limits
c. Examples NOTE: LER's are not written for each
1) Beaver Valley 1 LER 85-001 time an action statement is used.
2) Cook 1 LER 85'-016 Usually only if a shutdown is required
3) Turkey Point 4 LER 83-012 or if a Tech. Spec.

was overlooked.

2. Containment Leakage

Reference:

00152-C

" FEDERAL AND STATE

a. Read section 3/4.6.1.2 REPORTING REQ".
b. Bases
1) Ensures total leakage volume will not exceed value in analysis a) At Pa (42 psig)
2) Further limited to .75 L, a) To account for degradation between

( tests l

b) Further conservatism

3) Conforms to 10CFR50 Appendix J.
c. Example - Trojan LER 85-005 i 4 l

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LO-LP-39210-00 111. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

3. Containment Air Locks
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.3
b. Bases
1) Required to meet containment integrity and leak rate restrictions
2) Surveillances on air lock seals a) Air lock leakage will not be excessive b) Due to seal damage c) During intervals between airlock leakage testing
c. Examples
1) San Onofre 1 LER 85-006
2) McGuire 1 LER,85-010
4. Containment Pressure
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.4
b. Bases
1) Ensure a) Not exceeding design negative delta P of 3.0 psig b) Not exceeding design 52 psig during steam break
2) Maximum pressure expected from steem break is 41.9 psig l a) Plus 3.0 psig for upper limit is t 45 psig

. b) Within safety analysis l .o l

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LO-LP-39210-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

5. Containment Air Temperature
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.5
b. Bases
1) Does'not exceed maximum temperature assumed in accident analysis
2) Equipment operability
6. Containment Structural Integrity
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.6
b. Bases
1) Ensure structural integrity maintained comparable to original standards a) For the life of the facility
2) Required to ensure withstanding maximum pressure of 4,1.9 psig a) Due to steam break
3) Surveillance testing verifies capability
7. Containment Ventilation System
a. Read section 3/4.6.1.7
b. Bases
1) 24 inch required to be closed

(

a) Have not been demonstrated capable of closing b) During LOCA or steam line break i

c) Radioactive material will not be

! released via containment purge

2) Use restricted to 14" minipurge a) Ensure 10CFR100 limits not exceeded I

b) In event of LOCA during purging 6

I LO-LP-39210-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES B. Depressurization and Cooling Systems

1. Containment Spray System
a. Read section 3/4.6.2.1
b. Bases
1) Ensures containment depressurization and cooling will be available a) LOCA or steam line break b) Cooling and depressurization consistent with accident analysis
2) Containment spray and cooling systems are redundant with each other a) But spray takes credit for iodine removal b) More restrictive action statement
c. Examples .
1) Turkey Point 4 LER 85-007
2) Zion 2 LER 83-044
3) Sequoyah 2 LER 85-006
4) Palo Verde 1 LER 85-056
2. Spray Additive System
a. Read section 3/4.6.2.2
b. Bases i
1) Ensures sufficient Na0H added to spray for LOCA
2) Limits on volume and concentration a) Ensure pH between 8.5 and 10.5 l b) Minimizes evolution of iodine c) Minimizes caustic and chloride stress corrosion 7

LO-LP-39210-00 Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

3. Containment Cooling System
a. Read section 3/4.6.2.3
b. Bases
1) Ensure that:

a) Air ter.peratura within limits during normal operations b) Adequate heat removal post LOCA

2) Redundant with containment spray a) Action limits appropriately adjusted C. Containment Isolation Valves
1. Read section 3/4.6.3
2. Bases
a. Ensure containment atmosphere isolated from outside environment
1) In event of radioactive release to containment ,
2) Or pressurization of containment
b. Time limits to close
1) Release limited to LOCA analysis
3. Examples
a. Turkey Point 3 LER 84-031
b. Davis - Besse 1 LER 85-004 I
c. McGuire 2 LER 83-074 D. Combustible Gas Control
1. Read section 3/4.6.4.1 Hydrogen Monitors
2. Read section 3/4.6.4.2 Hydrogen Recombiners i

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LO-LP-39210-00 ll1. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

3. Bases
a. Maintain H e neentration below flamable limit post 2 LOCA
b. Each recombiner can control H 2 f' "
1) Zirc water reaction
2) Radiolytic decomposition of water
3) Corrosion of metals within containment
c. Mixing Systems
1) Prevent localized H fr a reaching 2

flammable limits

4. Examples
a. Kewaunec LER 85-013
b. San Onofre 1 LER 85-002
c. Indian Point 2 LER 85-003 E. Summary
1. Primary Containment
a. Containment integrity
b. Containment leakage
c. Containment air locks l d. Internal pressure
e. Air temperature f f. Containment structural integrity I
g. Containment ventilation system l 2. Depressurization and Cooling Systems
a. Containment Spray System l

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l LO-LP-39210-00 I l

lil. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES
b. Spray Additive System
c. Containment Cooling System 1
3. Containment Isolation Valves
4. Combustible Ca's Control
a. Hydrogen Monitors
b. Electric Hydrogen Recombiners F. Practical Exercises
1. Containment Integrity
a. During "CTMT INTEGRITY VERIFICATION - VALVES OUTSIDE CTNT" 14475-1 Surveillance Test the operator noted that valve 1-1204-U4-160

" SAFETY INJ ACCUM TK LOOP 2 LOCAL SAMPLE CONN" was unlocked and open. What Tech Spec covers this situation and what is required of the operator.

1) TechSpec3.5.1.1(1hourtorestore) -
2) Notify S.S. obtain concurrence to close and lock valve.
b. The valve stem threads in "a" are galled and the valve is ' stuck' open. What has to be done? (Assume it cannot be fixed for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />)

, 1) One hour allowed to attempt to "unstick" valve

2) Be in HOT STBY w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
3) COLD SHUTDOWN w/in following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
4) This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 REF: 00152-C (b)(1)(1)(A) (within one hour) " FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQ" l

l 2. During performance of 14806-1 "CTMT SPRAY PUMP AND CHECK VALVES INSERVICE TEST" it was determined that the eductor for CSP "A" was and would require approximately 4 days to replace. What Tech Spec Action and surveillance testing is required before CSP "A" eductor is declared "0PERABLE" 10

LO-LP-39210-00

. Ill. LESSON OUTLINE: NOTES

1) T.S. 3.6.2.2 allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore or be in HOT STBY w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
2) Up to 48 more hours allowed to restore before commencing cooldown to cold shutdown
3) After eductor is replaced and Q.C.

inspection passed. Surveillance 14806-1 must be reperformed for eductor "A" only before declaring CSP "A" eductor "0PERABLE"

4) Reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(1)(A)
5) Startup allowed after operability assured
3. Combustible Gas Control
a. CTMT Hydrogen Monitor "A" failed its ACOT on 7-2-86 1600. Technicians say it's going to take 3 weeks to procure replacement cards and realign., What Tech Spec are we in?

How many days to restore?

1) T.S. 3.6.4.1 action a
2) 30 days to restore
b. On 7-10-86 122 the low reagent gas pressure alarm comes in on Hydrogen Monitor "B" and Technician say it will take 4 days to order more gas. What actions should you take?
1) Can wait 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.then be in HOT STBY w/in next 6 or
2) Replace reagent gas bottle on "B" with already oos H, Monitor "A" restoring "B" to OPERABLE. Further testing shouldn't be required since analyzer are normally in standby service only.

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LO-LP-39210-00 i 3.6.1.1 CTMT INTEGRITY l

[11] BEAVER VALLEY 1 DOCKET 50-334 LER 85-001 STARTUP PRIOR TO ESTABLISHING CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

EVENT DATE: 010785 REPORT DATE: 020485 NSSS: WE' TYPE: PWR (NSIC 193296) ON 12-26-84, INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED TO VERIFY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

IT WAS SUSPECTED INTEGRITY MIGHT HAVE BEEN LOST AS CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE WAS

'AT 10.2 PSIA AND RISING. AS A RESULT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, (RS-113) THE ' A' OUTSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY PUMP CASING DRAIN VALVE WAS FOUND OPEN. ON 1-7-85, FURTHER INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE VALVE HAD BEEN OPEN FROM BEFORE 12-23-84, THE DATE THE PLANT CHANGED FROM OPERATING MODE 5 TO OPERATING MODE 4. .THIS VIOLATED TECH SPEC 3.6.1.1, WHICH REQUIRES CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY TO BE MET PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO MODE 4.

THE APPLICABLE ACTION STATEMENT HAD BEEN MET, HOWEVER, THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT OF 10 CFR 50.72.B.II WAS NOT MET. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE VALVE BEING OPEN WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION REGARDING THE USE OF THE '0FF-LOG-ONLY' PROCEDURE FOR REMOVING EQUIPMENT FROM CLEARANCE FOR TESTING PURPOSES. THIS PROCEDURE IS BEING RE-EVALUATED TO ESTABLISH TIGHTER CONTROL OF SYSTEM CONFIGURATION. THE 10 CFR 50.72 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT MET DUE TO LACK OF RECOGNITION OF THE VIOLATION BY STATION PERSONNEL. A TRAINING PACKAGE FOR THESE PERSONNEL IS BEING ESTABLISHED TO PREVENT A SIMILAR REPORTING FAILURE. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO FURTHER VERIFY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY AFTER AN EXTENDED OUTAGE OR ANY UNUSUAL SYSTl!M CONFIGURATION.

[87] COOK 1 DOCKET 50-315 LER 85-016 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

EVENT DATE: 041285 REPORT DATE: 050985 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR (NSIC 194832) ON 04-12-85 AT 1030 HOURS, WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY), AN EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE WAS BEING PLACED ON THE RES EUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM FOR RESTORATION FOLLOWING A HYDRO TEST. A VENT INSIDE CONTAINMENT WAS OPENED TO DRAIN THE HEADER, SIMULTANEOUSLY A VENT WAS OPENED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TO DRAIN THE HEAT EXCHANGERS. THIS CREATED A POTENTIAL FLOW PATH FROM INSIDE TO OUTSIDE

CONTAINMENT. THIS IS NONCONSERVATIVE WITH RESPECT TO TECH SPEC 3.6.1.1. THE TOTAL TIME OF THIS EVOLUTION WAS 45 MINUTES. THE POTENTIAL FOR OBTAINING THIS FLOWPATH ALSO EXISTED DURING PREPARATION FOR THE TEST, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT NOTED AT THAT TIME. TO PREVENT RECURRENCE THE HYDRO PROCEDURE HAS BEEN REVISED TO
1) REQUIRE THE EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE TO INCLUDE GUIDANCE ON BOTH THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE BLANK FLANCES UTILIZED TO CONDUCT THE TEST, AND 2) INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION ON MAINTAINING CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING THE TEST.

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LO-LP-39210-00

[204] TURKEY POINT 4 DOCKET 50-251 LER 83-012 REV 1 UPDATE ON CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE PINNED OPEN.

EVENT DATE: 081983 REPORT DATE: 050785 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: ANCHOR / DARLING VALVE CO.

(NSIC 195393) WHILE STARTING UP UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT BREATHING AIR VALVE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (CV-4-6165) WAS FOUND PINNED OPEN AS PER PROCEDURE. THIS VALVE SHOULD BE OPERABLE FROM THE CONTROL ROOM WHEN RCS TEMPERATURE IS ABOVE 200 F. THIS IS A DEVIATION FROM TECH SPEC 3.3.3 AND IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3..

THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. MAINTENANCE WORK WAS BEING PERFORMED INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THIS NECESSITATED AVAILABILITY OF BREATHING AIR TO PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE WORK. AS A SAFETY PRECAUTION, CV-4-6165 IS PINNED IN THE OPEN POSITION TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT CLOSURE OF THE VALVE ISOLATING VITAL BREATHING AIR SUPPLY. THE ROOT CAUSE HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL CONTROLS IN THAT CV-4-6165 IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE IN PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HEATING UP OF A UNIT.

3.6.1.2 CTMT LEAKAGE

[272] TROJAN DOCKET 50-344 LER 85-005 PENETRATION FAILED CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST. .

EVENT DATE: 060185 REPORT DATE: 070185 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: SANDVIK STEEL INC.

(NSIC 195210) ON 6-1-85, THE PLANT WAS IN A REFUELING OUTAGE WITH THE CORE UNLOADED.

WHILE PERFORMING LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION P-50, 'B' TRAIN RECIRCULATION SUMP SUCTION LINE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PERIODIC ENGINEERING TEST (PET) 5-2, ' CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING', A 1/2-INCH CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK WAS DISCOVERED IN A TEST CONNECTION PIPE. THE FAILED PIPE PROVIDED A DIRECT LEAKAGE PATH FROM THE CONTAINMENT TO THE AUX BLDG. THE CAUSE OF THE CRACK WAS IDENTIFIED TO BE A FATIGUE FAILURE. THE FAILED PIPE HAS BEEN REPAIRED. EXAMINATIONS OF ALL SIMILAR TEST CONNECTIONS DID NOT REVEAL ANY PROBLEMS.

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LO-LP-39210-00 l 3.6.1.3 CTMT AIRLOCKS (265] SAN ONOFRE 1 DOCKET 50-206 LER 85-006 CONTAINMENT ESCAPE HATCH INTERLOCK MALFUNCTIONS. ,

EVENT DATE
021385 REPORT DATE: 031885 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON COMPANY
(NSIC 193590) ON 2-13 AT 0812. WITH UNIT 1 IN MODE 3, IN PREPARATION FOR MAINTENANCE, A SECURITY OFFICER REMOVED THE LOCK FROM THE EMERGENCY ACCESS ESCAPE HATCH. HOWEVER, IN THE COURSE OF REMOVING THE LOCK, HE ALSO MANIPULATED THE EH OPERATING MECHANISM j SUCH THAT BOTH THE INNER AND OUTER DOORS WERE OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS  !

MANIPULATION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN, OR REQUIRED BY, HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO REMOVE THE LOCK AND WAS CONTRARY TO EXPLICIT TRAINING PROVIDED ALL PLANT PERSONNEL

PERMITTED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PROTECTED AREA. BOTH THE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY ACCESSES TO CONTAINMENT INCLUDE MECHANICAL INTERLOCK DEVICES DESIGNED TO PREVENT SIMULTANEOUS OPENING OF THE DOORS. THE EH INTERLOCK FAILED DURING THE UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION DUE TO A KEY, WHICH SECURES ONE OF THE INTERLOCK CAMS TO ITS SHAFT,

. DECOMING DISPLACED, HOLDING THE KEY IN PLACE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TIGHTENED DURING j THE LAST MAINTENANCE, OR IT LOOSENED SUBSEQUENTLY. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WAS NOT MAINTAINED AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.6.1 FOR APPROX 21.5 HRS ON 2-13-14. THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT THE REACTOR WOULD NOT HAVE RETURNED TO CRITICALITY AND THAT THE DOSE AT THE EAR WOULD HAVE BEEN BELOW THE DOSE CRITERIA FOR DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT. .

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[204] MCGUIRE 1 DOCKET 50-369 LER 85-010

PERSONNEL AIRLOCK INTEGRITY NOT ASSURED.
EVENT DATE
032085 REPORT DATE: 041985 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR 1

(NSIC 194684) ON MARCH 20, 1985, DURING PERFORMANCE-OF THE LOWER CONTAINMENT l PERSONNEL LOCK LEAK RATE TEST, IT WAS DISCOVERE THAT THE KEYSWITCH FOR THE DOOR ON THE REACTOR SIDE OF. THE CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCK WAS IN THE " BYPASS" l POSITION. THIS CREATED THE POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH AIRLOCK DOORS COULD BE OPEN AT '

l THE SAME TIME, THEREBY VIOLATING CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. BOTH DOORS WERE VERIFIED TO BE CLOSED AND SEAL E , AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. THE j CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS ATTRIBUTED TO PROC EURAL DEFICIENCY, BECAUSE THE APPROPRIATE j PROCEDURE DID NOT REQUIRE A SIGN -OFF STEP TO VERIFY THAT THE INTERLOCK KEY SWITCHES 4

ARE IN THE " ACTIVE" POSITION WHEN RETURNING THE AIRLOCK TO SERVICE. CORRECTIVE

ACTIONS WILL ADDRESS PROCEDURE CHANGES TO ENSURE THAT INTERLOCK KEY SWITCHES ARE l RETURNED TO THEIR " ACTIVE" POSITION PRIOR TO ENTERING MODE 4.

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LO-LP-39210-00 3.6.2.1 CTMT SPRAY

[324] ~ TURKEY POINT 4 DOCKET 50-521 LER 85-007 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP POWER SUPPLY BREAKER INOPERABLE.

EVENT DATE: 021885 REPORT DATE: 032085 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR (NSIC 193601) ON 2-18-85, THE 4A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERABLE. THE 4A CSP 480V POWER SUPPLY BREAKER CLOSING SPRINGS WERE FOUND DISCHARGED AND THE CLOSING SPRING CHARGING MOTOR WAS TURNED OFF. THEREFORE, THE PUMP POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A PUMP START SIGNAL. THIS RENDERED THE PUMP INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THAT EXCEEDED THE TECH SPEC LCO. AT THE TIME OF THIS EVENT, THE 45 CSP AND THE EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM WERE FULLY OPERATIONAL. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRCOC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.36(C)(2). SIMILAR LERS 251/83-017 AND 251/83-014. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE DISCOVERED THAT THE LAST OPERABILIT'I TEST OF THE 4A CSP OCCURRE ON 2-6-85. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CLOSING SPRING CHARGING MOTOR WAS OFF DURING THIS TEST RESULTING IN THE CLOSING SPRINGS BEING DISCHARGED. ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR THE CHARGING MOTOR BEING OFF WAS THAT AFTER AN IN-PLANT CLEARANCE ORDER FOR THE POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WAS RELEAS E ON 2-3-85, THE SWITCH FOR THE CHARGING MOTOR HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT IN THE OFF POSITION. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REASON COULD BE THAT THE SWITCH WAS ACCIDENTLY BUMPED TO OFF BY CONSTRUCTION WORKERS SOMETIME BEFORE THE 4A CSP OPERABILITY TEST ON 2-6-85.

[313] ZION 2 DOCKET LER 83-044 REV 2 UPDATE ON FAILED CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE.

EVENT DATE: 111183 REPORT DATE: 111984 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: DARLING VALVE & MFG CO.

(NSIC 195444) DURING SAFEGUARDS TESTING PT-10, CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE 2MOV-CS0006 FAILED TO STROKE WHEN ACTUATED. THIS FAILURE PLACE UNIT 2 IN A DEGRAD D MODE PER TECH SPEC 3.6.1.C. DUE TO THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED TO REPAIRED 2MOV-CS0006, THE UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO HOT SHUTDOWN. THIS IS THE FIRST EVENT OF THIS TYPE. UPON DISASSEMBLY OF 2MOV-CS0006. THE LIMITORQUE OPERATOR MAIN DRIVE SLEEVE WAS FOUND BROKEN. THE FAILURE OF THE DRIVE SLEEVE WAS THE RESULT OF MECHANICAL LOADING

! CONCENTRATED IN THE TRANSITION FORMED BY THE STEM NUT LIP TO DRIVE SLEEVE. THE

! LIMITORQUE OPERATOR WAS REBUILT. IN ADDITION, THE VALVE WAS INSPECT E FOR DAMAGE,

! NONE WAS FOUND. AFIER REPAIRS 2MOV-CS0006 WAS SUCCESSFULLY TESTED FROM SAFEGUARDS PT-10. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE, NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIRED.

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[-( LO-LP-39210-00 3.6.2 (CONT.)

(288] SEQUOYAH DOCKET 50-328 LER 85-006

' INOPERABLE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP.

EVENT DATE: 040685 REPORT DATE: 050685 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR l (NSIC 194582) ON 4-6-85, THE AIR CONTROL VALVE FOR THE ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER-VALVE 2-FCV-67-186 WAS FOUND IN THE CLOSED POSITION. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE

SUPPLY OF COOLING WATER TO CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CS) PUMP ROOM COOLER 2B-B AND RESULTED IN INOPERABILITY OF THE CS PUMP. THE VALVE WAS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL POSITION. THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE PER 10 CFR 50.73 A.2.I. IN EARLY 1984 MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE ERCW VALVE CONTROLLERS FOR ESF PUMP ROOM COOLERS. TO COMPLY WITH EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATIONS. AS A RESULT, THE EXISTING BACKING PLATES FOR THE SELECTOR SWITCHES FOR THE 3-WAY AIR VALVES PROVIDED INCORRECT INDICATION OF NORMAL AND CLOSED POSITIONS. ON 5-25-84, THE AIR VALVE FOR THE 2B-B SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM (SIS)

PUMP ROOM COOLER ERCW VALVE 2-FCV-67-182 WAS FOUND CLOSED. THE VALVE HAD BEEN PLACED IN THE INCORRECT POSITION FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE INSTRUCTION (SI) 566. THE MISPOSITIONING OF THESE VALVES IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROPER BACK PLATE INDICATIONS.

TO PREVENT RECURRENCE, THE BACK PLATES FOR THE AIR CONTROLLERS OF THE ERCW VALVES FOR

THE CSS, SIS, RHRS, AND CENTRIFUCAL CHARGING PUMP ROOM COOLERS WILL BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE CORRECT INDICATION FOR VALVE POSITION.

i (183] PALO VERDE 1 DOCKET 50-528 LER 85-056 INTENTIONAL ISOLATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM. .

EVENT DATE: 080385 REPORT DATE: 090385 NSSS: CE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: MULCAHY, BERNARD J. INC.

(NSIC 195480) ON 8-2-85 PALO VERDE 1 WAS IN MODE 4 WITH THE RCS AT 335 PSIA AND i 250 F WHEN 2 SPURIOUS ACTUATIONS OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION LOGIC OCCURRED.

i LICENSED OPERATORS REVIEWED THE SITUATION AND CONDITIONS IN THE RCS AND CORE, AND l

VERIFIED THAT NO VALID CONDITION EXISTED WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A CONTAINMENT SPRAY j SYSTEM ACTUATION. THE OPERATORS DETERMINED THAT DUE TO THE OVERALL PLANT STATUS IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY 3

SYSTEM, AND ISOLATED BOTH TRAINS OF THE SYSTEM, A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY THE TECH l SPECS. THIS PLACED THE UNIT IN SPEC 3.0.3 AT 0010 ON 8-3-85 WHICH WAS COMPLIED j

WITH. THE CAUSE OF THE SIGNALS WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MAIN CONTROL BOARD MANUAL INITIATION SWITCH, WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONTACTS WHICH WERE CORRODED. THE SWITCH

! WAS CYCLED TO REMOVE ANY BUILDUP AND THE SYSTEM WAS MONITORED TO ASSURE THAT THE SYSTEM WAS RETURNED TO OPERABILITY. THE SYSTEM WAS INOPERABLE A TOTAL OF 6 HRS AND 4 MINS AFTER WHICH TIME THE ISOLATION VALVES WHERE REOPENED AND THE SYSTEM RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE SWITCH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACED.

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LO-LP-39210-00

3.6.3 CTMT ISOLATION VALVES

[264] TURKEY POINT 3 DOCKET 50-250 LER 84-031 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FAILS.

EVENT DATE: 120284 REFORT DATE: 010285 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: ASCO VALVES

, (NSIC 192793) ON 12-2-84 AT 10:45 AM, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE, CV-3-855, WOULD NOT INDICATE CLOSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE 0209.1, ' VALVE EXERCISING PROCEDURE', CV-3-855 DID NOT GIVE AN INDICATION OF CLOSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM UPON RECEIPT OF A CLOSURE SIGNAL. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL VERIFIED LOCALLY THAT THE VALVE DID NOT CLOSE. CV-3-855 IS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN THE NITROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEM TO i THE SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS. THE SYSTEM CONTAINS A CHECK VALVE DetEDIATELY INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO PREVENT BACK FLOW AND AIR OPERATED SHUT-OFF VALVES ARE LOCATED AT EACH ACCUMULATOR. THESE WOULD PREVENT A RELEASE PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT.

INVESTIGATION BY I & C PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT AN ASCO SOLENOID VALVE HAD MALFUNCTIONED KEEPING THE AIR SUPPLY APPLIED TO CV-3-855. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE AIR SUPPLY TO THE VALVE WAS SECURED AND THE VALVE CLOSED AS DESIGNED, 2) I & C REPLACE THE ASCO SOLENOID VALVE AND THE SYSTEM l WAS RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL CONFIGURATION. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED IN

[ ACCORDANCE WITH TURKEY POINT EMERGENCY PLAN. THE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS TERMINATED WHEN >

THE AIR SUPPLY TO CV-3-855 WAS SECURED AN9 ALL REQUIRED NOTIFICATION WERE MADE.

2 SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-84-020 AND LER 251-84-009.

[ 92] DAVIS-BESSE 1 DOCKET 50-346 LER 85-004 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE EXCEEDS STROKE TIME LIMIT. -

EVENT DATE: 022085 REPORT DATE: 032285 NSSS: BW TYPE: PWR VENDOR: ASCO VALVES (NSIC 193775) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE (QUENCH TANK OUTLET ISOLATION) RC229A EXCEEDED THE LIMIT OF 10 SECS PER TECH SPEC TABLE 3.6-2 WHEN ITS CLOSING STROKE

, TIME MEASURED 10.48 SECS, THE REQUIRED ACTION STATEMENT OF ISOLATING THE PENETRATION i WITHIN 4 HRS WAS NOT MET WHEN THE OPERATORS PERFORMING AND REVIEWING ST 5099.08, I MISCELLANEOUS VALVES QUARTERLY TEST, DID NOT NOTICE THE STROKE TIME LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED. THE DESIGNATED REVIEWER FOR THE TEST INFORMED THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR ON 2-20-85 THAT THE LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED. THE ACTION STATEMENT OF TECH SPEC 3.6.3.1 WAS ENTERED, AND THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION WAS ISOLATED USING MANUAL i VALVE RC79. THE VALVE RC229A WAS REPAIRED ON 2-21-85, AND WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED.

l THIS REMOVED THE PLANT FROM THE ACTION STATEMENT AT 1300 HRS ON 2-21-85.

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LO-LP-39210-00

( 79] MCCUIRE 2 DOCKET 50-370 LER 83-074 TWO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE. .

EVENT DATE: 102883 REPORT DATE: 112883 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: FISHER FLOW CONTROL DIV (ROCKWELL INT) r LIMITORQUE CORP. ,

I (NSIC 191795) WHILE IN MODE 5, DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM VALVE STROKE TIMING-SHUTDOWN TESTING, VALVES 2KC-338 (REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS SU? PLY HEADER PENETRATION OUTSIDE ISOLATION) AND 2KC-424 (REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS . RETURN HEADER PENETRATION INSIDE ISOLATION) STOPPED IN INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS WHILE BEING CLOSED AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED INOPERABLE. THIS CONSTITUTES A DEGRADATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (TECH SPEC 3.6.3) WHICH IS REPORTABLE PER TECH i SPEC 6.9.1.11(D). OPERABLE RE UNDANT VALVES WERE AVAILABLE TO SEAL THE FENETRATIONS j IF NE D ED. ALTHOUGH UNIT 2 WAS IN MODE 5 WHEN THE INOPERABLE VALVES WERE DISCOVERE, THEY ARE PERSUMED TO HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CLOSE DURING EARLIER HIGHER MODE OPERATION. THIS IS ATTRIBUT E TO COMPONENT MALFUNCTION. EXERCISING THE VALVES (FISHER BUTTERFLY, TYPE 9220 WITH LIMITORQUE ACTUATORS) BY MANUAL OPERATION ELIMINATE WHATEVER BINDING HAD BEEN OCCURRING AND ALLOWED OPERATION FROM THE CONTROL ROOM. TEST FREQUENCY WILL BE INCREASED TO DETERMINE IF THE

' STICKING' IS A RECURRING PROBLEM, WITH APPROPRIATE MEASURES TAKEN.

, 3.6.4.1 HYDROGEN MONITORS (177] KEWAUNEE DOCKET 50-305 LER-013 j INFLUENCE OF HEAT TRACING ON HYDROGEN MONITOR OPERABILITY. .

1 EVENT DAIE: 050585 REPORT DATE: 061285 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR (NSIC 194831) WHILE PERFORMING SP 56C-093, " CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITOR OPERATIONAL  :

TEST," THE HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT ON THE SUCTION LINE TO TH2 1A CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER WAS DISCOVERED INOPERABLE. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THIS CONDITION HAD EXIST E SINCE APRIL 4, 1985. ON APRIL 4, 1985, THE SHIPT SUPERVISOR ISSUED A WGRK REQUEST TO REPAIR THE INOPERABLE HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT. THE SHIFT  ;

, SUPERVISOR WAS AWARE OF THE RECENTLY ISSU E TECE SPEC (3/3/85) RECARDINC l l HYDROGEN MONITOR OPERA 11LITY HOWEVER, THE LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF REUNDANT HEAT '

TRACING, ALTHOUGH DEGRADING THE SYSTEM, DID NOT CLEARLY RENDER THE HYDROGEN HONITOR INOPERABLE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE NOT COMPLETED DUE TO THE UNAVAILABILITY OF

, SPARE PARTS, AND ON MAY 5 THE FAILED HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT WAS DISCOVERED AGAIN.

AT THIS TIME MANAGEMENT EVALUATION CONSERVATIVELY CONCLUDED THAT THE 14-DAY LCO PN HYDROGEN MONITOR OPERABILITY HAD BEEN EXCEEDE AND PREPARATIONS FOR AN ORDERLY SHUTDOWN COMMENCE. REPAIRS WERE COMPLETE IN THREE HOURS AND A POWER REUCTION WAS NOT REQUIRED. FURTHER EVALUATION CONCLUD E THAT PLANT OPERATION WAS WITHIN TECH SPECS AS THE REDUNDANT TRAIN'S, MEAT TRACED, SUCTION LINE COULD HAVE BEEN VALVED INTO THE 1A H2 MONITOR. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL INCLUDE ROUTING THIS LER TO ALL SRO'S FOR REVIEW AND PROVIDING TRAINING TO OPERATIONS PERSONNEL.

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LO-LP-39210-00 Y

(214] SAN ONOFRE 1 DOCKET 50-206 LER 85-002 TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDfENT FOR CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITORS HAS DISCREPANCY.

EVENT DATE: ~012285 REPORT DATE: 022285 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR (NSIC 193269) ON 1-22-85. WIIH UNIT 1 IN MODE 1 AT 93% POWER, A DISCREPANCY IN THE IMPLDfENTATION OF SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITORS WAS NOTED. SPECIFICALLY, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.3.3, WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE ,

ON 1-1-85, STATES THAT THE MONITORS' CHANNEL CALIBRATION IS TO BE PERFORMED USING SAMPLE CASES CONTAINING 1 VOLUME PERCENT HYDROGEN AND FOUR VOLUME PERCENT HYDROGEN ON A 92 DAY STAGGERED BASIS. HOWEVER, THE DESIGN OF THE MONITORS IS BASED ON A TWO t VOLUME PERCENT HYDROGEN SAMPLE GAS. UPON DISCOVERY OF THE DISCREPANCY, SOFTWARE CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE MONITOR PROCESSOR AND A SUCCESSFUL CALIBRATION ON HYDROGEN MONITOR Al H2-2001 WAS COMPLETED ON 1-25-85. A SUCCESSFUL CALIBRATION WAS PERFORMED ON THE REDUNDANT MONITOR, AI H2-3001 ON 2-1-85. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED SOFTWARE MODIFICATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE REQUIRED SAMPLE GASES IN A TIMELY MANNER. AS CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT OCCURRENCE, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS GOVERNING TECH SPEC IMPLEMDITATION ARE BEING UPGRADED. A SUCCESSFUL CALIBRATION USING 2 AND 4 VOLUME PERCENT SAMPLE CASES WAS PERFORMED ON AI H2-3001 CN 12-23-84 AND WAS 3.6.4.2 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS

[134] INDIAN POINT 2 DOCKET 50-247 LER 85-003  !

BOTH POST LOCA HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS INOPERABLE. -

EVENT DATE: 021385 REPORT DATE: 031185 NSSS: WE TYPE: PWR VENDOR: FISCHER 1 PORTER CO.

UNION PACIFIC WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

(NSIC 193544) ON 2-13-85 DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS, BOTH UNITS WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE. RECOMBINER' #21 EXPERIENCE A MALFUNCTION OF ITS OXYGEN SUPPLY FLOW REGULATING VALVE, WHILE RECOMBINER #22 EXPERIENCED A MALFUNCTION OF A PRESSURE SWITCH. RECOMBINER #21 WAS RESTORED TO SERVICE WITHIN i

THE REQUIRED 7 HR TIME LIMIT AND THE REC (BfBINER #22 WILL BE RESTORED TO SERVICE WITH2N THE 30 DAY TIME PERIOD SPECIFIED IN THE TECH SPECS. THE POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM, WHICH PROVIDES A DIVERSE CAPABILITY TO THE RECOMBINERS FOR HYDROGEN REMOVAL, WAS OPERABLE. FURTHER, ANALYSES OF THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA INDICATE THAT HYDROGEN CONCINTRATION WOULD NOT REACH THE RECOMBINER ACTIVATION

! LEVEL UNTIL 13 DAYS AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THUS PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT TIME FOR RESTORING l A RECOMBINER IF NEEDED.

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