ML20199E751

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1985 Annual Rept on Changes,Tests & Experiments, Per 10CFR50.59.All Electrical Mods Designed to Maintain Integrity of Electrical Separation.Welding Accomplished Using Appropriate plant-specific Procedures
ML20199E751
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/09/1986
From: Jasiger W, Josiger W
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IP3-86DC-065H, IP3-86DC-65H, IP3-WAJ-022Z, IP3-WAJ-22Z, NUDOCS 8606240050
Download: ML20199E751 (37)


Text

Indien Point 3 NucheNw'er Plant P.O. Boa 215 Buchanan, New Ybrk 10511 914 739.8200

  1. > NewWrkPbwer 1# Authority June 9, 1986 IP3-WAJ-022Z IP3-86DC-065H Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Re:

Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59 Changes Tests and Experiments

Dear Dr. Murley:

The following constitutes the 1985 Annual Report on changes, tests and experiments for Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant as required by 10CFR50.59.

The Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50.59 (a) specifies that changes ta the facility as described in the safety analysis report, changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report and the conduct of tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report may be made without prior Commission approval provided the proposed change, test or experiment does not involve a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or constitute an unrrviewed safety question.

All the electrical modifications have been designed considering original separation criteria thus maintaining the integrity of electrical separation where required. These modifications were installed in accordance with standards equal to or better than those used during original installation.

These modifications have been therefore deemed to not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Welding required to support modifications has been accomplished using appropriate plant specific procedures based on applicable codes.

These modifications were designed considering both thermal growth and seismic criteria as appropriate.

They were also fabricated and installed in accordance with standards equal to or better than those used during original installation.

These modifications have been therefore deemed to not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant RO. Bon 215 Buchanan. New York 10511 914 739.8200

  1. > NewYorkPbwer

& Authority Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator June 9, 1986 Page Two A description of such changes, procedures and tests performed at Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant for the period of January 22, 1985 to January 22, 1986 and a summary of the safety evaluations of each are contained in Attachment I.

Each has been reviewed to ensure that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased, tha I

possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created, or the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

It was concluded that the changes, tests and experiments do not constitute any unreviewed safety questions.

Sincerely, h - cuf W.

si er R ident ana r WAJ:DC:

02 Enc res: Attachment I cc: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20S55 Attention: Documents Control Desk IP3 Resident Inspector's Office

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ATTACHMENT I i

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MOD 80-03-052 - Conteinm2nt Building Water Lavail This modification provided for the monitoring of water level in the containment building by installing the following redundant environmentally qualified transmitters and recorders / indicators:

a.

Containment Sump, (El. 38' 7"), narrow range, O' to 10' of water.

b.

Recirculation Sump, (El. 34' 4"), narrow range, O' to 14' of water.

c.

Containment Building, (El. 46' 1"), vide range O' to 8

  • of water.

Indicatien is provided in the Central Control Room on two new panels.

This modification provides for continuous monitoring of the containment building water level, fulfilling the requirements set by NUREG-0737.

It also helps to determine any leaks from the containment and ensure a water inventory for the operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System.

The installation has been specified to meet IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1975, in this sense strict redundancy criteria has been adhered to in both the electrical and mechanical phases.

All cables meet IEEE-383 standard and FSAR Bonfire Tests.

MOD 80-03-053 H - Containment Building Hydrogen Concentration 2

This modification provided a hydrogen concentration measuring system which consists of redundant sample conditioners, analyzers and two recorders located in the Central Control Room.

The installed equipment meets IEEE Standards and complies with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 which requires a continuous indication of hydrogen concentration in the Containment Building during and after an accident.

The modification is designed in accordance with NUREG-0737 requirements.

The power to the new system is from the vital buses. The cable and conduit for the entire system is installed consistent with electrical separation criteria.

All cable meets IEEE-383 and FSAR Bon Fire tests.

MOD 80-03-054 RMS - Wide Range Gas Monitor For Plant Vent This modification provided for a revision to this system that was originally designed to be powered from one power source.

Due to the sample pumps high starting currents, their power supply will be from MCC36A and the system instrumentation power supply will be from Instrument Bus 33A.

In this manner, the high starting currents will not effect the instrument bus or the system instrumentation.

This modification provides compliance with the NUREG-0737 position in that the expanded measurement ranges and quality of signals are provided by this installation.

MCC36A is a vital motor control center with a diesel backup.

System powering from MCC36A is within the guidelines of NUREG-0737 and Reg.

Guide 1.97, namely a high-reliability power source.

The entire monitor, including the sample conditioner, wide range gas detector, RM-80 electronic assembly and the read-out assembly and recorders in the control room, is designed to meet Class 1E safety requirements and has been qualified to IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975.

Page 1

MOD 80-03-063 EL - Battery Charger 31, 32 Raplacs=nt and Installation of Battery Charger 35 This modification entailed installation of three new EXIDE battery chargers Model SCRF-130-3-400.

Two of the three chargers are used to replace existing battery chargers 31 (300 AMP) and 32 (200 AMP). The third charger is installed as a spare (35).

All three new chargers have an output capability of 400 Amperes at 130 V.D.C..

Battery charger 35 has the capability of being connected to any of the four station batteries through a plug connector and battery test rig disconnect switch.

The new chargers are sufficiently sized to carry normal plant loads and maintain the station batteries 31 and 32 in a fully charged state.

Additional plant modifications and new proposed higher capability inverters (25 KVA) have been taken into account in sizing the chargers.

The new chargers alarm scheme is consistent with plant existing battery charger alarm schemes with the addition of a new battery discharging alarm.

This alarm adds additional reliability to the new chargers by indicating when the battery is no longer receiving charging current from the charger.

The chargers are seismically mounted to the floor of the 33' elevation of the Control Building to prevent system interaction during a seismic event.

MOD 81-03-068 ESS - Automation and Modification of Valves for Containment Isolation Dependability and Access / Shielding This modification provided for the automatic actuation of Containment Isolation Valves Nos. 958 and 959, and the remote actuation to valves, not requiring any automatic closure signal, which may require postulated post-accident operation, but are inaccessible to plant operating personnel because of postulated post-accident radiation levels.

A total of twenty (20) valves, all motor operated, were installed.

Each valve motor is controlled from the new extension to the Waste Disposal Panel.

The purpose of this modification was to implement the requirements of NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.4, Paragraph 3 (Containment Isolation of Non-essential Valves) and clarified by NUREG-0737,Section II.E.4.2, and to provide remote control capabilities to essential valves which would not be accessible to operating personnel from a radiological standpoint after a plant design basis accident.

This portion of the modification is in response to NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.6.b (Design Review of Plant Shielding) and clarified by NUREG-0737,Section II.B.2.

Page 2

MOD 81-03-090 RCS - R*ector Vassel Head Vznt System This modification provided for the removal of non-condensibles or steam from the reactor vessel head.

This system is designed to mitigate a possible condition of inadequate core cooling due to loss of natural circulation resulting from the accumulation of non-condensible gases in the Reactor Coolant System, in accordance with the requirements set by NUREG-0737.

The Reactor Vessel Head Vent System (RVHVS) connects to the reactor vessel head via an existing part length control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) conoseal port.

The vent piping downstream of the CRDM conoseal port connection tecs into two parallel flow paths.

Each flow path contains a 3/8" orifice and two normally closed solenoid operated isolation valves.

The solenoid operated valves in the separate flow paths are powered from separate vital power supplies.

The two flow paths join together downstream of the second solenoid operated valve and discharge into the pressurizer safety and relief valve discharge header (line

  1. 70).

The common vent line downstream of the valves contains a flanged spool piece which is removable for refueling.

In this manner, the necessary flanged connections are outside of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

All piping and valves upstream of the flanges remain integral with the reactor vessel head at all times.

The common vent pipe upstream of the solenoid operated valves contains a manual globe valve.

This valve is locked open during normal power operation, but may be closed for refueling or maintenance.

The common vent pipe downstream of the solenoid operated valves also contains a manual globe valve which is locked open during normal power operation.

The valve is installed for hydrostatic testing of the downstream vent line after initial installation of the system and after reassembly of the flanged spool piece subsequent to refueling.

The RVHVS is operated manually from the main control room.

The solenoid operated isolation valves are full open/close type valves which are controlled from individual valve control switches in the main control room.

MOD 82-03-012 MULT - Interconnection to Existing Condensate and Potable Water Systems.

This modification package involved the piping installations and tie-ins to connect the condensate system and potable water systems to the new Condensate Polisher Facility (CPF).

This installation involved the following:

1.

Modification of the existing 20" condensate pump discharge piping and installation of new 24" piping, fittings and valves to provide feed and return lines for the CPF. This arrangement also provided for bypass of the CPF and reorientation of flow to original operating conditions.

The existing 12" condensate supply line to the steam jet air ejectors was capped and relocated, maintaining supply to the steam jet air ejectors both with or without the CPF on line.

2.

The Condensate Polisher Facility was supplied with potable water from the existing plant system.

3.

The Condensate Polisher Facility has the capacity to produce its own demineralized water which is needed for condensate polishing operations.

Excess capacity has been built into the CPF demineralizer to supply make-up water to the IP-3 Plant Condensate Storage Tank.

The piping, fittings, and valves used in the modification maintain the pressure d

boundary of the existing system.

All work is in accordance with ANSI B 31.1 Code for Power Piping, and other applicable ANSI standards.

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MOD 82-03-019 EL - 6.9KV Outdoor Switchgtar Addition and Connsction to Existing Cas Turbine Substation This modification provided for the installation of the 6.9 KV outdoor Switchgear in the Gas Turbine Substation and its connection to the existing 6.9 KV system to provide power for the new Condensate Polisher Facility (CPF).

The enclosure for the new bus from the gas turbine substation to the new outdoor Switchgear protects the 6.9KV connection from externally caused short circuits.

A circuit breaker prevents any loadside short circuit from affecting the i

transformer or the remainder of the 6.9KV system.

The Condensate Polishing Facility load is comprised mainly of large pumps which are isolated from the 20MVA trtnsformer, in cases where the transformer is required to supply emergency power to Unit No. 3 6.9KV buses 5 and 6.

The transformer and source are adequately sized to supply its emergency and CPF operating load without degrading the 13.8KV bus.

The new outdoor switchgear is connected to an existing differential relay in breaker 52GT/2F, which protects the 20 MVA gas turbine substation transformer and trips associated breakers.

This fast acting protection is consistent with the existing protection scheme and the substation reliability will not be degraded.

r Connection of switchgear grounds to the existing ground system adds parallel circuits which decrease the ground resistance.

The grounding system has not been degraded.

MOD-82-03-021 RMS - Effluent Radiation Monitor Alarm Tie-in to the IP3 Central Control Room

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This modification installed a high radiation alarm in the Central Control Room for the radiation monitor on the effluent stream from the condensate polisher regeneration waste treatment system.

The devices added to the process radiation monitoring racks are consistent with the existing equipment in the main control room at IP-3.

No modifications or connections have been made to existing control racks or panel mounted devices used in essential services.

Terminal block assignments maintain channelization and plant separation criteria t

has been met.

The new indicating light circuit is fused to prevent a fault from degrading the existing system.

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MOD 82-03-042 IA Rav. 0 - Instrumsnt Air System Upgrada Mechanical tie-ins were provided in order to facilitate the future installation of a third IA compressor / dryer package.

The new equipment was installed near the existing Station Air Compressor.

An isolation gate valve was provided to make the connection to the existing IA header located along the west wall of the 15' elevation Turbine Hall.

The valve is capped until the new compressor is installed.

Interconnections to the existing supply and return lines of the Turbine Hall closed cooling water system were made by a temporary capped isolation gate valve in each line.

The new IA compressor / dryer directly feeds the conventional IA header and is capable of supplementing the nuclear header as well..The connection to the IA header is sized to allow sufficient flow.

The instrument air valve has been supported in a manner typical to the IA header in the Turbine Hall and ensures that the integrity of the IA piping is not compromised.

The cooling water valves have been installed consistent with the existing system in the Turbine Hall.

MOD 82-03-047 WDS-L - Reactor Cavity Drain Filter in the Fuel Storage Building The purpose of this modification was to provide the necessary tie-ins and interconnections in order to process water drained from the reactor cavity utilizing a filtration system located within the Fuel Storage Building.

Shielded disposable filters housed inside high integrity shipping containers are used to process water prior to refilling the RWST, thereby preventing the accumulation of radioactive particulate matter in the RWST and an unnecessary radiation field around the tank.

The Reactor Cavity Drain Filter installation will normally be used only when the plant is in cold shutdown mode with the RCS depressurized and with the exception of the tie-in to Line No. 40, interfaces with Non-Category I Systems.

Since Line No. 40 is Seismic Class I, the tie-in has been seismically analyzed.

The new filter also allows more flexibility in the operation of the Spent Fuel Pit Purification Loop since it may be used as a backup to the existing Spent Fuel Pit Demineralizer and Filter units.

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MOD 82-03-049 COMP - Plant Computer This modification installed a new plant computer to monitor plant parameters.

Design engineered by Combustion Engineering (CE) and formally known as the Emergency Facilities Data Acquisition and Display System (EFDADS), it consists of a Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) and a Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS).

EFDADS was installed in compliance with NUREG 0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Facilities to provide facilities and systems to improve emergency response.

The new Plant Computer replaces the existing PRODAC computer in the Central Control Room.

The inputs from existing plant equipment to the QSPDS and CFMS are provided via terminations in the existing computer I/O cabinets and various existing panels and racks. The system consists of the following equipment:

Central Control Room SRO, RO, STA Displays, (4) by RAMTEC QSPDS Consoles (2) by Electro Mechanics and CE QSPDS I/O Cabinets (3) by Electro Mechanics and CE Printers (3) by Tally Multiplexer Room Analog Multiplexor System (2) by Computer Products Inc.

Digital Multiplexor System (2) by Computer Products Inc.

Micro Processor System (2) by Perkin Elmer Cable Spreading Room Isolation Cabinets (4) by Cutler Hammer TSC Computer Room Central Processing Unit (2) by Perkin Elmer I/O Cabinets (2) by Cutler Hammer TSC Support Room Displays (3) by RAMTEC Printers (3) by Tally Emergency Operations Facility Console System (1) by CE Administration Building 15' El.

Uninterruptible Power Supply by Solid State Controls Inc.

Page 6 l

1 MOD 82-03-050 STR - Structural Modification to the Wall of Existing Haater Bty This modification provided for penetration through the existing Heater Bay wall i

to allow personnel access to the Condensate Polishing Facility as well as installation of electrical cable tray.

The modification is designed in such a way that no structural member of the existing building is affected.

All the columns, beams and bracings remain as they are and the opening was reinforced by steel frame, thus eliminating any impact on the wall strength.

The existing floor of the Heater Bay has been analyzed and is found to be capable of taking additional loads imposed by the new stairs. The Heater Bay is not a safety related structure and there are no safety related structures / equipment in the vicinity of the proposed door opening.

j MOD 82-03-090 RMS - Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor This modification installed a system capable of monitoring the entire range of expected concentrations of radioactive contamination released to the atmosphere through the main steam line safety valves and atmospheric dump valves.

The installed system consists of four RD-12-R detectors, one mounted on each main steam line upstream of the safety relief valves, one RM-80 computer located in the upper electrical tunnel, one RM-23A readout / control module in rack D3 of the Central Control Room (CCR) and two two-pen recorders also mounted in the CCR.

The structural supports for mounting the radiation detectors next to the steam lines have been seismically designed and analyzed.

This modification provides compliance with the requirements in NUREG-0737, Item II F.1.

All wiring for this modification utilized Channel I cable trays and conduits.

The power is supplied from Vital Instrument Bus #32A fed from an i

inverter.

The special cabling between the microprocessor equipment and each i

detector was installed in separate new conduits.

This cabling is qualified to meet IEEE 383-1974 MOD 82-03-098 COND Rev. 1 - Condensate Make-up Water Vacuum Deaerator i

The purpose of Revision 1 to this modification was to replace the originally I

installed pumps, thereby correcting performance deficiencies. Seal water to the pumps was also provided from the existing potable water system in the Auxiliary j

Boiler Annex Building.

A vacuum deaerating system was previously installed as per Revision 0 for the purpose of degasifying condensate from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST), the i

Con Ed Condensate Supply Line, the Water Treatment Plant and the portable bottle demineralizer, to reduce oxygen-related corrosion in the condensate and feedwater systems.

The deaerator unit is located in the Turbine Generator Building, on the 15 f t.

elevation, east side of the HP Turbine.

It neither functionally affects nor is located near safety-related equipment.

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MOD 82-03-107 MULT - Modification to PT-408B Srnsing Lina. Ralocation of Simple Point PCV-1271, and Relocation of Chemical Injection Lines on Line CD-9-20" This modification provided for the installation of a pressure switch, valve, tubing, fittings and supports to be interconnected with the existing boiler feed pump suction transmitter located in the Turbine Building.

It also includes the removal and re-installation of the Condensate Pump Discharge Sample Point in the new condensate line, and the relocation of the hydrazine and amine injection lines on the. condensate line, to move them downstream of the condensate polisher.

This modification does not degrade the function of any of the associated j

instruments or equipment.

The pipe, tubing, fittings, and valves used in the modification maintain the pressure boundary of the existing system.

Failure of the branch connections will neither damage any safety-related equipment nor prevent the safe shutdown of the unit.

Failure of the pressure switch would prohibit polisher bypass and starting of i

the third booster pump.

This condition will not degrade plant operation below I

what it would be without the polisher or additional booster pump in the condensate system.

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MOD 82-03-111 COND Rev. 1 - Condtnsste Start-up Filter System The purpose of this modification was to remove corrosion products from the feedwater/ condensate system piping and components prior to the plant startup.

The installation of the condensate startup filter system is part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator degradation.

This is accomplished by means of mechanical filtration of the feedwater flow and recirculating it back to the condenser hotwells.

The condensate startup filter system consists of four portable filter units with associated piping and valves.

This system is connected to the 30" diameter feedwater piping downstream of the high pressure heaters and discharges to condenser No. 33.

The filtering will be accomplished with one condensate pump in operation, supplying a flow of approximately 8000 gpm.

Revision 1

to this modification was implemented to eliminate operating deficiencies such as excessive vibration, high noise level, aeration of the filter vessels and inconvenience of the valves operation.

The scope of Revision I was comprised of the following improvements:

1.

Replacement of the existing multiplate breakdown orifice with two separate single pinte orifices were installed upstream and downstream of the filters respectively.

2.

Installation of the noise insulation blanket on the two single plate orifices upstream and downstream of the filters.

3.

Removal of the existing flow metering orifice downstream of the filters and substituting it with a new elbow tap flow metering device.

4.

Replacement of the handwheel of the existing first 12" isolation gate valve with a chain operator.

5.

Installation of valved bypass line around the valve in item 4 above.

6.

Replacement of the existing second 12" gate valve with a new 12" chain operated globe valve.

7.

Installation of automatic vents with properly oriented goose necks on each filter vessel.

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MOD 82-03-112 COND Rev. 0 - Condensar Mcke-Up Water Spray Nozzles The purpose of this modification was to deaerate normal condensate make-up from the vacuum deaerator by spraying it above the condenser tube bundles.

This has been accomplished by connecting the normal make-up 4" lines with the make-up nozzles of the condensers at #31 and #32. These make-up nozzles in turn are connected to the new spray headers which are an integral part of the replacement condensers.

The implementation of this modification is part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator tube degradation.

The installation neither functionally affects nor is it located near safety-related equipment.

MOD 82-03-120 CP - Cable Installation and Connections in the Main Control Room and Other Locations This modification provided for the installation and connection of cables to make electrical tie-ins between the Condensate Polisher Facility and equipment in the Central Control Room, Turbine Building, House Service Building, Control Building and 6.9KV Gas Turbine Substation. Cable routing was in existing cable trays and new cable trays and conduit installed for the Condensate Polisher Facility.

Fire stops have been made in accordance with plant procedures, and plant fire protection has not been degraded.

Cables meet FSAR requirements, channel separation is maintained, and cable tray i

fill is in accordance with IP-3 cable and conduit schedule; therefore, there is no adverse effect from installing these additional cables to existing trays.

Circuit breaker protection for cables and equipment has been calculated as adequate to prevent degrading the existing systems while still protecting the new systems.

The transfer of 900 kW of the CPF loads on the gas turbine substation 20 MVA transformer does not degrade the 20 MVA transformer's emergency load capabilities.

Cables have been certified to pass the FSAR bonfire test and meet IEEE 383-1974 flame test.

Ampacity is in accordance with ICEA P-46-426 and P-54-440.

Short circuit capability is in accordance with ICEA P-32-382.

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MOD 83-03-002 IVSWS Rsv. 2 - Ralocation of 3/8" Isolation Valve Saal Water 4

System (IVSWS) Valves for Post Accident Access This modification complies with Item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737 by relocating specific IVSWS valves to an area which will be accessible during post-accident plant operation.

A total of 22 manual 3/8" IVSWS valves were relocated to a rack situated in an area outside the east wall of the Safety Injection Pump Room in the PAB.

The rack and unistrut tubing supports were seismically designed to withstand a DBA.

The original Kerotest globe valves of the nitrogen and water headers were replaced with Nupro bellows valves and Whitey ball valves, respectively.

Note:

Originally, 16 were relocated in 1983.

The modification was reopened to incorporate relocation of six additional IVSW valves in 1985.

i This modification involves only the relocation of IVSWS valves to an area further upstream in their associated supply lines.

It does not change the operation or function of the existing IVSWS system.

This relocation complies with the requirements of Item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737.

i MOD 83-03-024 AFW Rev. 0 - Seismic Upgrading of Condensate Make-up Supply Line to Condensers i

The purpose of this modification was to increase the seismic resistance of the AFW System as required by NRC Generic Letter 81-14 " Seismic Requirements of the AFW System".

The modification involved the installation of a second isolation valve, complete with limit switches and electrical accessories, a set of limit switches for the first (original) isolation valve, a new level switch at the CST, pilot lights on the existing CCR SCF panel for indicating the status of both valves, and a new pipe anchor downstream of the new valve.

The installation of the new valve satisfies the redundancy feature required for compliance with the single failure criteria in the supply line to the condenser hotwells. All instrumentation and control logic are completely independent for each valve, and all conduits and supports were installed in accordance with Seismic Class I criteria.

MOD 83-03-071 EDG Rev. 0 - Installation of Lif ting Beam / Monorail for the RHR Pumps l

This modification involved the installation of a structural steel beam suspended from the ceiling over each RHR pump to alleviate a systems interaction concern.

This was accomplished by welding tube steel supports to steel plates which were bolted to the ceiling. In turn, the lifting beam was welded to each support. A i

standard monorail lifting hook was utilized to facilitate on line repair / maintenance.

Each lif ting beam has been designed for a maximum lif ted weight of two tons and has been seismically analyzed.

It has been determined that this design does not i

j interact with the RHR system during a seismic event. The clearance between each j

RHR pump and - its lifting beam has been determined to be adequate for pump j

maintenance and/or removal.

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MOD 83-03-039 FP Rev. 3 - Extansion of Fire Barriers Inside and Outside Containment Building Inside centainment, non-combustible fire barriers that act as radiant energy shields were provided for the following instrument channels:

1)

From pressure transmitter PT-402 to the electrical penetration, 2) For the instrument cables for TE413A and TE413B at the penetration area, 3) For transmitter LT-417D and associated instrument cable at instrument rack 21, and for the instrument cable 4

at the electrical penetration area, 4) For transmitter LT-459 and associated instrument cable at instrument rack 21, and for the instrument cable at the electrical penetration area, and 5) To protect N31 instrument cable from the related preamp box to penetration H20.

In the electrical tunnels, non-combustible fire barriers that act as a radiant energy shield were provided for the folicwing: 1) Cable Trays JD are protected by 1h Hemyc Wrap, and 2) Conduit for Source Range N31 is wrapped in a Hemyc Wrap.

At the seisnic gap, between the upper and lower electrical penetration area floor elevation 46' and 34',

respectively, and the containment building, the following were provided for:

a.

The work performed involved the installation of a three (3) hour rated seismic gap Fire Seal System.

The general configuration of the three (3) hour fire stop consists of six (6) inches of silicone foam plus an approved damming material.

One (1) inch thick ceraboard was used on each side of the silicone foam for damming.

After the damming material had been installed, the penetration was sealed with Dow Corning 3-654B silicone RTV foam.

b.

Eight (8) inches minimum deep cera loose fill fiber without damming, sealed on the outside with a 1/4" to 1/2" of Promatec Silicone adhesive sealant was used at the narrow section of the seismic gap (elevation 34') to i

elevation 39' in the BIT room.

i MOD 83-03-090 FP - Supervisory Air to Fire Protection System in the Electrical Tunnels The purpose of this modification was to monitor the dry pipe preaction sprinkler systems in the electrical tunnels, and fulfill commitments made to the NRC during a fire protection review.

This modification addressed the installation of air maintenance devices, valves, low pressure switches, piping, supports, electrical cable and conduit, and an air indicating panel in the BIT Room which ties into the common alarm on the Fire Control Panel in the Control Room.

Air is provided to the dry pipe, preaction sprinkler system to monitor the sprinkler piping. A loss of pressure in the instrument air header due to leakage, line breakage, or an open sprinkler head, will activate an alarm in the CCR.

All piping, conduit and valves have been seismically supported.

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MOD 84-03-013 FP - Safe Shutdown Instrumentation This modification provides for alternate RCS Wide Range Temperature indication to observe the natural circulation in Loop 31 and source range indication for monitoring reactor reactivity, to assure safe shutdown capability in case of a postulated fire in the Control Building or Electrical Tunnel Areas.

The modification of the existing circuitry associated with the RCS Wide Range Temperature Indication for Loop 31 does not degrade the functional and performance requirements established during original design and installation.

The modification of existing installations to provide source range indication from the spare source range detector has not degraded the functional and performance requirements established during its original design and installation.

The electrical design and installation of this modification that includes conduit installation, conduit and tray fill, terminations, cable selection and installation, and equipment selection and installation has been done in accordance with approved procedures and specifications.

This ensures that the installation is equal to or better than the original installation and that the channelization, separation and performance of the Reactor Coolant and Nuclear Instrumentation Systems are not degraded.

There will be interfaces with the safety related systems and components, however, the operation of any isolation switch or combination of switches does not initiate operation of any component.

The new instrument cabinet has been seismically designed and mounted.

It is louvered and provided with a heater to assure required environmental conditions inside the cabinet.

The source range high voltage interlock panel, housed in the cabinet, protects the SR detector if flux is above the established bistable set point.

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MOD 84-03-015 H

- Installation of Spara Hydrogen Dryer 2

This modification provided for a backup hydrogen dryer to improve the reliability of the turbine generator hydrogen cooling system.

The new dryer unit is identical to the currently operating unit.

Also installed under this modification is an oil vapor filter which will remove oil vapor from the system and thus protect the desiccant in the two hydrogen dryers.

Implementation of this modification provides the following advantages:

1.

Redundant drying capacity is created.

2.

The desiccant in the hydrogen gas dryers is protected from damaging oil vapor.

3.

Oil vapor, which can ionize when subjected to high temperatures, may be removed from the hydrogen system.

4.

Residual vapors from inadvertent oil entry can be removed from the turbine generator.

This modification upgrades generator protection and interfaces only with Non-Category I Components.

All work is designed to applicable plant standards.

Tie-ins to existing plant systems have been provided to support the operation of the new dryer and filter.

i The feeder cable and supply breakers are adequately sized to meet the hydrogen dryer load requirements and the installation of power feed to the hydrogen dryer is consistent with IP-3 cable separation criteria.

MOD 84-03-022 RCS - Replacement of Pressurizer Level Transmitters LT-459, LT-460, LT-461 and the Relocation of LT-462 on Rack No. 19 Pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 through LT-461 were replaced with environmentally and seismically qualified transmitters on Rack 19.

The deadweight tester LT-458A was removed from Rack 19 and LT-462 was relocated in that location.

The deadweight tester panel in the pipe penetration area was also removed and retired.

The new transmitters have the same range and output scaling and will be mounted at the same location as the existing transmitters, therefore, they are functionally the same as the previously existing transmitters.

The new transmitters have been qualified to IEEE-STD-323-1974 for sustained operations in an accident environment that envelopes the IP-3 environmental profile.

The new transmitters are also seismically qualified to IEEE-STD-344-1975 and are seismically mounted as demonstrated by analysis so that the original rack structure has not been degraded.

Page 14

MOD 84-03-024 SW - Raplacement of Service Water Piping and Val /es for the Diesel Generator Jacket Water and Lube Oil Coolers

- This modification provided for the replacement of existing carbon steel pipe, fittings and. valves with more corrosion / erosion resistant 316 stainless steel pipe, fittings and Jamesbury butterfly valves on the inlets and outlets of the diesel generator jacket water and lube oil coolers.

Previously, the service water supply and return lines on the jacket water coolers and lube oil coolers were composed of cement lined carbon steel. pipe.

l The river water has caused excessive corrosion and erosion of the pipe and fittings in this area.

To mitigate any further erosion and corrosion, 316 stainless steel pipe, fittings and valves have been installed.

The 4 inch 316-stainless steel Schedule 40 pipe has been installed downstream of the 6 x 4 inch reducer on the supply lines (lines 1093, 1094, 1095, 1099, 1100 1101), to a point directly upstream of the 6 x 4 inch reducer on the return lines (lines 1096, 1097, 1098).

The carbon steel and stainless steel pipe is flanged 4

together to eliminate galvanic corrosion between dissimilar metals.

Jamesbury 316 stainless steel lug type wafer-sphere butterfly valves (Model No.

}

815L - 3600) replace the SW-62 and SW-67 carbon steel gate valves previously used. Also, the carbon steel globe vent valves' (SW-75 & 77) were replaced with 1

316 stainless steel globe valves.

The nominal increase in system weight has been analyzed and it was determined that the existing supports are satisfactory.

Additional considerations concern the applicability of the replacement pipe for service water criteria for which 316 stainless steel has been determined to be superior to the originally specified piping components.

The replacement pipe is the same size as the existing cement lined pipe and utilizes the same supports and restraints as the j

original pipe.

The replacement of the existing carbon steel gate valves with stainless steel j

lug type wafer-sphere butterfly valves is an improvement over the original design. The 316 type stainless steel is better in a corrosive environment and exceeds the original material specification.

Jamesbury butterfly valves have shown to be effective in preventing-leakage as replacements for other valves used throughout the service water system.

Therefore, these valves are an adequate replacement for the carbon steel gate valves.

A consideration in the evaluation of this replacement is that the material involved is capable of withstanding the harsh corrosive environment associated with the service water.

The stainless steel alloy, type 316L, has proven resistant to the corrosive environment - of the service water system during.

i previous use in service water applications.

i i

3 i

j i

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Page 15

. _...._, _, _ - _.. _ -.. ~. _ _, _ _.,,. _ _ _. _. _. _ _ _. _

MOD 84-03-037 MULT - Replace Motor Operatzd Valve Actuators This modification provided for the replacement of motor operated valve actuators on valves 744, 769 and 797.

The new actuators were environmentally qualified under IEEE Standards.

The new Limitorque activators close the subject valves more slowly but were evaluated and deemed acceptable for the Class 3 lines on which they were installed.

The new actuators, which weigh the same as the original actuators, are also seismically qualified to IEEE-STD-344-1975 and are mounted in the same location as the existing actuators so that the original piping design is not degraded.

MOD 84-03-039 RCS - Environmental Qualification Replacement of Reactor Coolant System Wide Range RTD's RCS wide range RTD's were replaced with environmentally and seismically qualified RTD's under the Authority's Equipment Qualification Program.

The new RTD's were equipped with Conax adaptors which provided an environmental seal against containment accident environment.

1 The new RTD's are qualified for all operating and accident environmental conditions as specified in 10CFR50 Appendix A.

This modification of replacing new RTDs does not degrade the environmental 2

qualification and does not change any designed instrument functions of the Reactor Coolant System.

The equipment for this modification. provided an installation method equivalent to the installation used during Equipment Qualification testing.

l The electrical installation of the RTDs was in accordance with approved i

procedures and specifications.

The entire modification ensures that the

)

installation of new RdF upgraded RTD's and the connected cable assemblies is better than the original installation.

i i

i 1

Page_16

MOD 84-03-051 EL - Battery Discharge Test Rig This modification installed four 400 amp disconnect

switches, three non-automatic breakers for DC power panels 31, 32, and 33 and associated cables and conduits for this installation.

The non-automatic breakers serve as disconnect switches to remove the batteries from their associated power panels.

34 battery power panel presently contains a main breaker for 34 battery.

Each battery is connected to one of the 400 amp disconnect switches where a battery test rig can be connected.

This modification also installed a permanent cross-tie between power panels 33 and 34.

The 400 amp disconnect switches have been seismically mounted to prevent possible damage to the D. C. buses during a seismic event.

The use of switches improves personnel safety and ease of operation is enhanced.

During testing, to insure battery charger voltage remains stable on the bus under test, cross-ties can be closed between buses 31 and 37 (existing) or 33 and 34 (new). The cross-ties will be used only during testing to ensure battery back-up to the bus under test.

It has been concluded that the addition of switches to present D. C.

circuitry will negligibly increase the probability of open circuiting the D.

C.

system.

Locks are placed on the four new disconnect switches and the three non-automatic breakers when the plant is above cold shutdown.

MOD 84-03-053 SWS - Service Water Pump Flow Metering This modification provided for the ability for proper testing of the Service Water Pumps per ASME Section XI - Inservice Inspection.

Flow sensors have been installed in each of the six discharge pipes for the service water pumps located in the intake structure.

The flow meters are placed in a panel located on a concrete pad on top of the intake structure. Heat tracing and space heaters for the new instrumentation have been supplied.

The annubar installation accomplished the task of flow measurement and satisfies NYPA's commitment to the NRC for flow instrumentation in the Service Water System.

Additional loads to the discharge piping of the Service Water System were analyzed seismically and the results indicated that the piping was not affected by the additional loading.

The electric loading on the circuit at Heating Panel #31 was addressed and it was concluded that the addition of a diversified ampere load to the existing 45KVA transformer should not cause an overload condition.

The subject modification does not affect the normal operation of the Service Water pumps, since its intent is to measure flow without affecting the safety functions of other components in the vicinity.

Additionally, the flow meters will not reduce the flow of service water through the service water piping.

Page 17

MOD 84-03-055 CP - Instellation of a Prd for the 6.9 KV Outdoor Switchgter This modification added a concrete pad in the gas turbine substation for the Condensate Polisher Facility 6.9 KV outdoor switchgear.

The outdoor 6.9 KV Switchgear is located adjacent to the existing gas turbine substation switchgear.

This involved the excavation for the new switchgear foundation proper, placement of concrete, and embedment of anchor plates.

No changes to the existing foundation have been made.

The outdoor switchgear foundation is a new slab on grade with no impact to he existing adjacent structures.

A test trench was dug to locate underground utilities and the new pad was designed not to impact them.

MOD 84-03-057 FP - ABFW Pump Area Fire Suppression System This modification provided for installation of a wet pipe sprinkler system in the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Water Pump (ABFP) Room to achieve compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R,

Section III G.2(b) to assure the safe sbutdown capability of the plant in the case of fire damage.

It provides for full coverage of the area to assure shutdown with at least one motor driven ABFP or the steam-turbine driven ABFP.

The equipment in this modification is not nuclear safety related, but is considered important to the protection of safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant.

Piping has been seismically supported to mitigate the consequences of a postulated carthquake.

In addition to fire protection features, the exposed cable in the trays has inherent fire retardant properties that limit fire propagation.

MOD 84-03-058 FP - CCW Pump Room Area Fire Protection This modification surrounds CCW pump 33 with a one-hour rated fire wall and thus isolates it from CCW pumps 31 and 32 and the surrounding area.

The power feed cable for pump 33 is wrapped from the pump to the ceiling.

This ensures the availability of at least one CCW pump for a safe plant shutdown in the event of fire as required by Section III.G of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

The equipment in this modification is not nuclear safety related, but is considered important to the protection of safety related equipment.

Fire walls have been seismically supported to mitigate the consequences of a postulated earthquake.

Redundant CCW Pumps 31 and 32 are separated horizontally by 18 f t.

from CCW Pump 33.

In addition to this separation, the CCW Pump Room has automatic ionization detectors and CCW Pump #33 and its associated power cable will be provided with a one-hour fire barrier.

Intervening combustibles as defined in Generic Letter 83-33 do not exist between redundant safe shutdown components for this configuration.

Based on this, a one-hour fire rating is justified to meet the requirements of Appendix R.

Page 18

l MOD 84-03-059 FP - Alternate Shutdown Inctrumentation PT-402 This modifiention provides assurance that RCS vide range pressure indication at the Auxiliarf Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) Room Station PT2 and Charging Pump Speed Control Stat. ion PL6 are available for safe shutdown.

This modification provided for RCS wide range pressure PT-402 isolation in cabinet KH4 and two indications, onc in the ABFP Room Station PT2 cabinet, and the other in charging pump speed control station PL6.

The modification ensures compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G and ensures availability of both new indications via suitable isolation capability.

The design of this modification that includes conduit installation, conduit and tray fill, terminations, cable selection, and equipment selection has been done in accordance with existing procedures and specifications which ensures that the channelization, separation and performance of the Reactor Coolant System and the Saturation Monitor is not degraded.

The installation configuration of the equipment installed as part of the modification has been evaluated in accordance with the Criteria established for a Seismic Class I installation.

The results of the evaluation have verified that the seismic design requirements of this modification have been met.

MOD 84-03-060 FP - Alternate Shutdown Instrumentation Re-Channelization of LT462 and LT447D This modification re-channelized cables for pressurizer level LT462 and Steam Generator Level LT 447D into Channel IV so that in the event of a postulated fire scenario, these signals would be protected from fire and available to the operator.

These signals are required for safe shutdown in accordance with Appendix R to 10.CFR.50.

The modification, in conjunction with the cable wrapping, will ensure the availability of the pressurizer and SG No. 34 level indication in the CCR during a postulated upper tunnel fire, thereby maintaining compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.

Page 19

MOD 84-03-087 CWS - Circultting Water System Upgreda This modification was required to satisfy the requirements of the Hudson River Cooling Tower Settlement Agreement with regard to mandated flow variations on an annual basis, and to improve the overall circulating water system operation and reliability.

A provision in the agreement sought to limit fish impingement at the intake screens by requiring a reduction in Circulating Water (CW) system flow. This modification has accomplished the following:

1.

Removal of the old single speed motors and CW pumps, pump / motor bearing lubrication systems and pump base plates.

2.

Installation of new CW pumps and variable speed motors, foundation plates, pump bearing lubrication system, cooling water piping system for pumps and motors including heat tracing and insulation.

3.

Removal of existing 24" diameter recirculation piping (on the CWP discharge), valves and supports and installation of permanent blind flanges on the remaining piping.

4.

Modification to each sump to include a horizontal bottom, side and back wall fillets, center splitter and steel curtain walls at the forebays.

5.

Installation of a new power conversion equipment (PCE) building over the discharge canal to include the following:

a.

Power conversion equipment (load commutated inverters, transformers, inductors, and motor contactors) for the motors, b.

Building services including heating, ventilation, lighting, fire detection, communication systems, and portable fire extinguishers.

c.

125 VDC battery and battery charger.

6.

Installation of power, control, instrumentation, and communication wiring between the intake structure, PCE Building and Turbine Building.

Installation of control wiring to include a sufficient quantity of spare conductors.

7.

Extension of 6.9 KV Bus No. 6 and modifications to the existing 6.9 KV feeder breakers (in Turbine Building) for the circulating water pump motors.

8.

Installation of one (1) fused disconnect switch in each of 480V MCC No. 33 and MCC No. 37 and addition of a new extension to MCC 312A with a 200A thermal magnetic circuit breaker.

This modification has been determined not to effect the site's specified environmental (thermal) releases as documented in the site's Environmental Technical Specifications and in the site's State Pollution Discharge System (SPDES) pemit.

Page 20

l i

r MOD 84-03-099 MS - Raplac e nt of Main Staam Isolation Valva Solanoid Valvas I

The instrument air solenoid valves on the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) are 1

piped in a series / parallel arrangement with 4 solenoid valves per MSIV..These

[

i solenoid valves are energized by the Main Steam Line Isolation circuitry which f

causes the air supply valves to close and the exhaust valves to open..This i

energized valve condition depressurizes the MSIV actuator causing the MSlV to

)

close.

[

l The new solenoid valves are manufactured by Automatic Switch Control Co. (ASCO),

[

4 These valves, like the original R.G. Laurence valves are normally de-energized.

I These valves once energized will operate to close the MSIVS.

" Sealing in" of the Main Steam Line Isolation Signal is accomplished using a spare contact from the actuating relay, i.e.,

MS1, MS2, MS3, and MS4, and maintains the solenoid

[

valves in an energized state.

r The resetting of the " seal in" circuitry is accomplished by. the qualified

[

]

switches which were installed on Panel SBF-1 in the control room.

The new switches are three (3) position switches with spring return to auto.

When a switch is turned to the trip position, it energizes the solenoid valves and I

causes the MSIV's to close. When it is turned to the reset position, it resets j

the " seal in" circuit, de-energizing the solenoid valves and allows the MSIV's i

to be opened, j

j The installation of the solenoid valves which are qualified to IEEE-344-1975 at j

each of the MSIVs control stations was in accordance with Seismic Class I t

design. This ensures that the solenoid valves remain functional during a design basis earthquake. The switches being installed in the SBF-1 Panel are identical in all aspects except for the operational characteristics to those being removed. The new thumb switch installation does not result in any changes that affect the seismic integrity of this panel.

Therefore, the seismic design

[

requirements of this modification have been met.

t t

The electrical installation of the solenoid valves and switches with regard to j

material and methods was in accordance with existing approved Category I l

procedures and specifications. This ensures by design that the installation is

[

equal to or better than the original installation and that the channelization i

i and separation of the Main Steam, Reactor Protection, and Engineered Safeguards

}

Systems have not been degraded.

I o

MOD 85-03-002 EL - Reactor Trip Breaker Automatic Actuation of the Shunt Trip l

Attachment I

This modification provided for automatic trip initiation of the Reactor Trip 1

Breakers through the existing undervoltage (UV) mechanical linkage and shunt I

trip coils, simultaneously.

l 1

i i

In the event of an undervoltage coil failure the reactor trip breaker would now I

be tripped automatically by the shunt trip coil.

The shunt trip coils were I

replaced with environmentally and seismically qualified units.

[

The addition of the new undervoltage relays, the key operated test switch and_

the isolation test switches have been determined not to degrade the reliability j

or operation of the existing automatic reactor trip system.

Instead, this i

l modification ensures that the reactor trip breaker will trip upon receipt of a valid automatic reactor trip signal even if the UV attachment fails to operate.

Using redundant parallel connected relays increases the teliability and by l

j connecting the output contacts in series, the failure of one of.these relays.

will not cause a reactor trip.

The relays selected are suitably rated for the

{

application.

Page 21 i

1

l MOD 85-03-003 STR - Installation of Pads, Underground Bus Ducts atnd Fuel Oil Tank Enclosure for Appendix R Diesel Generator MOD 85-03-004 EL - Installation of Electrical Interties for Appendix R Diesel Generator MOD 85-03-005 MULT - Installation of Cooling Water and Fuel Oil Piping for the Appendix R Diesel Generator These modifications were installed to provide an acceptable source of_ alternate on-site power to meet the Authority's commitment for 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.

These modifications involve the installation of an alternate on-site power supply and all associated hardware and interties.

In order to meet the Authority's commitment to 10CFR50 Appendix R

requirements, a

2500KW self-contained diesel generator has been installed north of the Pipe Enclosure Building.

This installation includes the diesel generator and all associated electrical interconnections and mechanical piping interties that are required. The diesel.

generator is sized to provide sufficient capacity to power all of the loads requiring emergency back-up power during an Appendix R fire scenario.

The alternate diesel generator ensures compliance with the rule for certain fires postulated in the Control Building.

The necessary electrical interconnections include the following items:

]

1.

6.9KV cable tie-in between the Appendix R Diesel Generator and the Gas Turbine Substation.

2.

Control wiring tie-ins between the Appendix R Diesel Generator, Gas Turbine Substation, and Control Room Supervisory Panel SGF.

3.

Fire Detection System tie-in between the Appendix R Diesel Generator and the Main Control Room Fire Detection Panel.

4.

Communication System tie-in between the Appendix R Diesel Generator and the existing plant Page/ Party System in the House Service Boiler Annex Building.

The Diesel Generator Switchgear is equipped with its own overcurrent, reverse power, overvoltage, differential and ground protection relays, thus providing protection for the diesel installation for internal faults.

The Diesel Generator Switchgear is equipped with its own Annunciator system. A category alarm contact from this system is wired to an existing spare annunciator window in the CCR supervisory panel SGF.

The Diesel Generator Enclosure is equipped with its own Fire Detection and Halon Fire Suppression System.

Alarm contacts from this system are wired'to the CCR Main Fire Display Panel to provide the operator with indication of-a fire, Halon system activation, or Halon system trouble.

A page/ party communication system station is provided in the Diesel Generator Switchgear Enclosure.

Page 22

MOD 85-03-008 HV - Control Room Hrbitebility This modification ensures compliance with NUREG-0737 Section III.D.3.4 which requires " Control room operators to be adequately protected against the effects of accidental release of toxic and radioactive gases and that the nuclear power plant can be safely shut down under design basis accident conditions" (Criterion 19, " Control Room", of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants", to 10CFR Part 50).

An intake air isolation damper in the outside air duct located in the air conditioning room of the Control Building El. 15'-0" was added.

The damper was located inside the existing outside air duct and it was mounted to operate satisfactorily under the design basis seismic events.

The damper was installed for manual operation from inside the air conditioning room after an indication to the operator that Damper A or Damper B had failed in the open position.

The damper will always be in the open position until needed to be closed.

The manual operation inside the air conditioning room allows the damper to be closed before any exposure above the NRC Cuidelines is achieved.

The modification does not affect the safe operation of the HVAC system of the plant during the " Normal" and " Incident" modes of operation.

In the

" Recirculation" mode the new damper acts as redundancy to existing dampers A and B.

Therefore, except for providing redundant isolation, the new damper does not alter the operation of the air conditioning system in the " Recirculation" mode.

MOD E5-03-010 FP - Cable Tunnel / Cable Spreading Room Door Modification This modification installed circuitry to ensure that the door between the cable tunnel and cable spreading room will close when the smoke detectors in the electrical tunnele are activated.

The smoke detectors in each of the tunnels and penetration areas have been connected to a relay which will deenergize the existing magnetic door handle mechanism, allowing the door to close.

A time delay is installed in the circuit so that if the door does not fully close within ten seconds after the magnetic door holder mechanism has de-energized, an alarm at the Fire Display Control Panel will actuate.

This modification ensures compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R in that it prevents the fire from spreading from the Cable Tunnels to the Cable Spreading Room, and vice-versa.

Prior to this modification, the door only closed upon detection of a fire in the cable spreading room.

Page 23

MOD 85-03-011 FP - Uppsr Tunnel Hatchwsy Modific.ction The purpose of this modification was to provide a means of smoke ejection in the upper tunnel penetration area.

This modification provided for two openings, covered by a hinged cover, in the hatchway atop the end of the upper electrical tunnel penetration area to accommodate 16-inch circular fan-type smoke ejectors.

This increases the safe shutdown isolation and power cabinets serviceability potential during a tunnel fire.

J For a postulated fire event in the electrical tunnel, the openings in the upper tunnel hatchway provide a means to remove the Gaoke from the upper penetration i

area, using portable smoke ejectors, and thus, enable the plant personnel to operate the Appendix R safe shutdown isolation and power cabinets.

j This modification ensures compliance with Appendix R by assuring access to the j

safe shutdown instrument and power isolation cabinet installed in the upper i

electrical tunnel penetration area in the event of a postulated fire in that area.

Seismic re-evaluation of the existing hatchway accommodating the installation has been verified.

MOD 85-03-012 FP - Automatic Fire Detection System Extension The purpose of this modification - was tc provide for - the extension of the F

automatic fire detection in the PAB.

This modification adds 19 new smoke detectors by the addition of one new zone (255) and extending two other zones (148, 179) in order to fully comply with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.

The following has been accomplished:

7 r

a.

Addition of new smoke detector zone, designated 255, consisting of eight (8) detectors in the ' area between the Residual Heat Removal Pumps, the common corridor, and the fixed storage area on elevation 15'-0" in the PAB.

b.

Extend existing Zone 148, consisting of five (5) new smoke detectors, to cover the storage area, common corridor and area West of Component i

Cooling Water Pump 33 on elevation 41'-0" in the PAB.

I c.

Extend existing Zone 179, consisting of six (6) new smoke detectors, to cover the area next to the cubicle's entrance-way outside the Charging Pumps and the Drum Storage Area.

j The existing Fire Detection System in the Primary Auxiliary Building is used in conjunction with the Fire Display Control Panel (FDCP) located in the Control Room.

The detectors, once actuated by smoke would provide indication and an alarm function on the FDCP to the operator of a potential fire in the area being monitored.

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MOD 85-03-013 SWS - Extsnsion of Snienic Class I Boundsry in the H ater Bay Service Water Valve Pit This modification provided for an extension of the seismic boundary of lines 1219, 1220, 1221 and 1222 (downstream of SWN-6, SWN-7, FCV-1111 and FCV-1112) in order to ensure that they retain their structural integrity within the entire Service Water Valve Pit under FSAR committed seismic loading conditions.

Valves FCV-1111, FCV-1112, SWN-6 and SWN-7 supply service water to the conventional plant loads.

The lines downstream of these isolation valves are classified as non-seismic.

The System Interaction Study postulated that during a seismic event the non-seismic lines in the pit could fail.

This could limit accessibility to the pit and prevent isolating the break.

This modification involved upgrading supports SWN-H&R-1219-1 A-R/1B-S (Lines 1219 and 1220), SWN-A-199-F (Line 1221) and SWN-A-197-F (Line 1222) to ensure that under seismic event loading conditions, a break of the essential and non-essential service water headers downstream of the existing Seismic Class 1 boundary within the Service Water Valve Pit, as postulated in the System Interaction Study, does not occur.

MOD 85-03-026 CWS - Central Control Room Interfaces for Circulating Water System Upgrade This modification covered the addition of equipment to the following Central Control Room Supervisory Control Panels for control, instrumentation and indication of the new circulating water pumps and motor drives:

Panel SKF - Addition of a new circulating water pump control panel complete with RPM meters, indicating lights, pushbuttons, selector switches and rheostats in the location where the Bearing Temperature Recorders were located.

Panel SJF - Addition of a new control switch, indicating lights and ammeter for the 6.9 KV Feeder Breaker for the standby circulating water pump motor drive.

Panel SLF - Addition of a new selector switch and status indicating lights for the standby circulating water pump motor drive.

This modification involved changes to the control panel face cutouts, mounting, wiring, and terminal block assignments for the new equipment. This modification also covered the installation of conduits, supports and cables within the control building for the control, instrumentation and annunciation of the new circulating water pumps, drives and associated equipment, and the installation of raceway, cabling and tie-in of the power conversion equipment building fire detection system to the CCR Main Fire Control Panel. All new conduits have been seismically supported and analyzed to ensure that the control building seismic criteria have been met.

The seismic failure mode and effect analysis performed on the new panel and devices to be installed on the existing Seismic Category I panels SKF, SJF and SLF indicates that any possible malfunction of the newly installed panel and devices will not affect the functional ability of existing devices on the above panels.

Page 25

MOD 85-03-027.EL Replactment of Electrical Panstrations for High Rangt Containment Radiation Monitors 4

The high range containment radiation monitors are intended to provide measurements of high radioactivity following an accident.

The electrical penetrations are an integral part of the containment pressure boundary.

Electrical penetrations H26 and H30, which were utilized for the power and instrumentation cables for the containment high range radiation monitors, were not qualified to the current requirements for Class 1E installation, i.e..

IEEE-317-1976, IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1975, and therefore are being replaced with equipment that meets these standards.

This modification involved the installation of two new environmentally qualified penetrations (which are equal in functional and operational design to the H26 and H30 penetrations) into spare penetration sleeves H38 and H39.

As part of the modification, power and instrumentation cables for the high range containment radiation monitors were relocated from penetration H26 to penetration H38 and from penetration H30 to penetration H39.

The installation of penetrations H38 and H39 including the rerouting and termination of the High Range Containment Radiation Monitor system cabling was in accordance with approved procedures and specifications.

This ensures that this installation is equal or better than the original installation and that the channelization and separation of the Containment System has not been degraded.

The relocated power and instrumentation cables, the electrical penetrations, and their associated supports meet the

seismic, separation and redundancy requirements of the original installation and are, in addition, environmentally and electrically qualified to meet the overall design criteria concerning the Authority's commitment to the NRC.

MOD 85-03-030 EL - 480 Volt Safeguard Buses Undervoltage Protection Modification The purpose of this modification was to install testing provisions for the Loss of Voltage (LOV) Relays and installing a modified protection scheme for the Degraded Grid Voltage (DGV) Relays to ensure continuous mor.itoring of DGV conditions and to provide for periodic testing.

Test switches and indicating lights have been added to the LOV Relays which enable testing of one LOV Relay per bus at a time.

A time delay of 4 45 seconds has been provided to the DGV Relays to prevent actuation in the event of plant transients associated with large motor starts, fast transfers, etc.

Each bus DGV scheme is provided with a dual test switch for testing the two circuit functions.

The installation was designed to appropriate seismic and environmental l

requirements and meets the overall design criteria concerning the Authority's 1

commitment to the NRC.

Page 26

l MOD 85-03-035 MS - Seal Main Steam Flow Transmitters c.nd Terainal Boxas on Instrument Rack 4A and 4B Tag No. FT-419B, 429B, 439B, 449B This modification encapsulated the housing of Train B Main Steam Flow Transmitters in a silicone sealant compound to environmentally qualify the transmitters.

In addition to sealing transmitters FT-419B, FT429B, FT-439B and FT-4493 on Racks 4A and 4B, the conduit entries at the transmitter and the terminal boxes for these transmitters were all environmentally sealed.

s The silicone sealed existing Rosemount D/P type transmitters are environmentally qualified to the IP-3 accident profile and to IEEE-323-1974 with this sealing technique.

The seismic qualification of the transmitter Racks 4A and 4B has not been degraded by this modification, since the combined weight of the transmitters and RTV material does not exceed the weight of the original Barton/Foxboro transmitters that these racks were criginally designed to accommodate.

MOD 85-01-038 CB - Lower Internals Support Stand This modification provided for a support stand for the reactor vessel lower internals for Inservice Inspection of the Reactor Coolant System.

A support stand for the lower internals package is necessary to free the polar crane so it can handle the inservice inspection tool.

i The stand serves no operational, process, or safety function.

During the time fuel is being moved or the plant is in operation, the stand will only have to support its own weight.

A stress analysis and design review was performed and it has been determined that the stand is structurally adequate to support the lower internals without

[

putting undue stress on the lower internals package.

1 MOD 85-03-052 RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Oil Collection System The purpose of this modification was to upgrade the existing reactor coolant pump oil collection system to facilitate maintenance, by allowing for case of

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acsembly and disassembly with the newer designs. This modification replaces all of the RCP oil collection tanks and supports on the present RCP Oil Collection System below elevation 65'-0",

while maintaining the existing enclosures and l

drip pans.

The seismic report that was performed as part of the systems interaction study proved by analysis, that the existing RCP Oil Collection System meets the intent I

of Appendix R to 10CFR50, Section III.O.

The justification for installing the new system is as follows:

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Reduced maintenance time required for removal and installation of the system for RCP maintenance.

Reduce the oil leakage problems of the existing system, for safety and rad waste reductions through the elimination of threaded connections.

Meets the present NRC requirement for a seismic oil collection system.

Reduce manhours spent on pump maintenance for ALARA considerations.

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MOD 85-03-058 EL - Inztalletien of Safety R1rlated Invarters No. 31 end 32 This modification involved replacement of existing 7.5 KVA inverters 31 and 32 with 25 KVA inverters with a built-in emergency bypass switch which automatically switches the instrument bus to the alternate (non-safety related)

AC power source under certain postulated failures.

The modification also provides manual bypass capability in addition to the automatic bypass.

The alternate AC power source is a 480 volt feeder to a new 120 volt SOLA transformer bank installed per this modification for both 31 and 32 inverters.

An evaluation made by comparing the proposed system changes to the existing system design indicates that the modified system meets or exceeds the requirements of the uninterruptible power system with respect to the following:

System Capacity System Reliability and Electrical Separation Criteria System Availability System Redundancy MOD 85-03-062 RMS - Post Accident Sampling System Heat Tracing System This modification provides for a heat tracing system and replacement of the supply tubing for the post-accident containment atmosphere and plant vent stack 1

sample supply lines to assure that a representative sample is obtained for analysis.

The installation of this modification was partially completed.

The i

containment atmosphere sample line tubing from the tap off to Radiation Monitors R11/12, and plant vent stack sample line tubing downstream of 95' El. were replaced, and heat trace of all the containment atmosphere sample line was completed.

Heat tracing is being provided to prevent moisture condensation in the Post-Accident Sampling System atmospheric sample supply lines.

Studies have indicated that condensation within these lines could cause formation of a loop seal with the resulting 100% removal of the particulate radionuclides from the sample gases.

The design temperatures for the heat tracing were selected to prevent the sample tubing from being at a lower temperature than the sample gases, thus preventing condensation of any moisture present.

The increase in tubing I.D. and replacement of the ninety degree elbows with gradual sweep bends have been installed to decrease particulate losses through deposition on the tubing I.D.

The line loss studies performed on the Vapor Containment Post-Accident Sampling System have indicated that these upgrades are prudent and will increase the representativeness of the samples.

The heat tracing is designed to be normally deenergized and to be locally energized from the heat tracing control panel only in a post-accident scenario.

The heat tracing is sized to bring the sample tubing from an ambient temperature up to the design temperature within one hour.

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MOD 85-03-069 COND Rtv. 0 -~Condtnesr Tuba Bundle Raplactment l

The purpose of this modification was to minimize copper and copper oxide ingress I

into the condensate system and improve. condenser structural. integrity, leak tightness and air removal capabilities.

This was acccmplished by replacing the existing condenser tubes, tubesheets, support plates and waterboxes with 3

titanium tubes and tubesheets, more closely spaced support plates and better hydraulically designed waterboxes.

i The phenomena known as pitting and denting are reducing the service life of the steam generators.

It has been determined that copper, oxygen, chlorides and other impurities are the maj or contributors to all known stem generator problems.

The main condensers are. the major source of the impurities.

Therefore, the existing main condensers have been modernized by means of replacing copper-bearing materials of the tubes and tubesheets with high 4

strength, corrosion resistant
titanium, upgrading condenser deaerating i

capabilities, increasing structural integrity and improving leak tightness. The new tube bundles have been installed as prefabricated modules.

The installation of the new condenser tube bundle modules and waterboxes is part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator tube degradation.

MOD 85-03-070 COND Rev. 0 - Condenser Flange Seal System The purpose of this modification was to prevent potential circulating water and air inleakages into the condenser through the condenser tubesheet to shell flange to waterbox flange mechanical joint.

In the original condenser the tubesheet/shell/waterbox flange had been a source of air and water inleakage.

In order to eliminate the leakage, a mechanical joint which is internally pressurized with water, has been installed. The water will create the pressure by the use of a head tank. located on El. 36'. The tank i

is vented to air and filled with condensate via an automatic level control valve. A flow meter has been installed to detect leakage of the seal.

l The implementation of this modification is an integral part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator tube l

degradation by reducing the potential of water and air inleakage through the l

tubesheet/shell/waterbox flange seal.

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r MOD 85-03-072 COND Rtv. 0 - Condenstr Air Rrmoval Syntrt The purpose of this modification was to revise the existing condenser air removal system to accommodate the new replacement condenser design.

The replacement condenser has two air removal zones per condenser with take-off points located within the condenser shell, as opposed to four air removal zones in the existing condenser and take-off points located within the waterboxes.

The original air removal piping penetrated the condenser tubesheet, then passed through the waterbox.

The joint between the tubesheet and the pipe has been a source of inleakage for river water.

In order to eliminate this leakage path, the new condensers have been designed so the air removal piping will pass through the condenser shell.

The new condenser incorporates a new tube bundle configuration, which requires only two air removal pipes per condenser.

The implementation of this modification was part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator tube degradation by improving air removal capability and eliminate a potential leakage path for river water to enter the hotwells.

MOD 85-03-074 FP - Fire Boundary Penetration Seal Upgrade This modification provided for the installation of a qualified Fire Area Boundary Penetration Seal that has a fire rating equal to er greater than the 4

barrier rating (minimum 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) for both electrical and mechanical penetrations in the following fire areas:

a.

PAB-2 Primary Auxiliary Building b.

ETN-4 Electrical Cable Tunnels c.

TBL-5 Turbine Building d.

AFW-6 Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Pump Room The work performed involved the installation ct a three-hour rated Tech-Sil Fire Seal System consisting of either ten (10) inches of silicone foam plus approved damming material or six (6) inches of silicone elastomer plus approved damming material, as applicable. A one (1) inch thick dam was used on each side of the wall or ceiling. Af ter the damming material had been installed, the penetration was sealed with silicone foam or elastomer.

This modification meets the separation requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III G,

since it involves those fire zone boundaries that separate redundant safe shutdown requirements.

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r MOD 85-03-075 W - Fesdwater Heater Rsplactment This modification. provided for the replacement of feedwater heaters Nos. 35a, 35b, 35c, 36a, 36b and 36c with heaters of improved design.

The original heaters were a source of several problems.

The. copper nickel tube bundles are umjor contributors of copper and copper oxide to the feedwater system which cause the phenomena known as pitting and _ denting in the steam generators.

Feedwater heater tube wall erosion, tube pitting and sludge blockage result in tube failures leading to equipment outages.

The installation of ' the new heaters is part of the overall program to improve secondary water chemistry and minimize steam generator tube degradation.

Specifically, design improvements were incorporated into the replacement heaters' designed and manufactured by Foster Wheeler: 1) The new tube bundles are made of stainless steel with superior erosion / corrosion characteristics, 2) the absence of copper will mitigate the erosion / corrosion process in the steam generators, and 3) an improved venting system is installed to increase. the air removal effectiveness of the new heaters.

MOD 85-03-077 FP - Emergency Lighting for Appendix R This modification installed additional emergency lighting units throughout the electrical tunnels, the Primary Auxiliary Building, the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Building, and the Control Building.

The lighting units were installed to enhance the emergency lighting in all area where operation of safe shutdown equipment is required and in all access and. egress routes thereto.

The emergency lights operate when required to ensure illumination of access and egress routes to equipment and for the equipment or panel required to be operated.

They automatically energize when the normal lighting circuits or panel for that area is de-energized.

The modification does not affect the normal operation of the systems involved, since its intent is to improve the lighting capabilities in the vicinity.

It also does not violate the plant electrical separation criteria.

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r MOD 85-03-092 MS - PCV-1310 A&B High T5:peratura CCR Overrida The purpose of this modification was to ensure the availability of steam to ABFP 32, when necessary, during a postulated fire in the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) Room. Currently, there are two temperature switches located in the ABFP Room, whose function is to close valves PCV-1310A and 1310B if a steam break occurs within the room.

This action would protect safety-related electrical components in the room from a harsh environment.

The temperature switches actuate on high temperature, so the valves will also close if there is a fire in the room since the switches can't determine the cause of the high temperature.

To enable ABFP 32 to be operated during a fire in the ABFP Room, the switches in the Control Room for valves PCV-1310A and 1310B were replaced and the wiring and contact development was revised to enable the operator to manually override the close signal from the temperature sensors to open the valves.

Additionally, an equalizing line was installed around each valve to facilitate reopening of the valves against the pressure differential across them after they CloSe.

The portion of the AFW system being modified is classified as Seismic Class 1 and all components tied into this line were designed, fabricated and tested in accordance with ANSI B31.1 as applicable.

The piping system has been analyzed in accordance with the ANSI B31.1 Piping Code, and the results showed that the calculated stresses are within the allowable range.

The existing piping supports for the affected line were re-analyzed in accordance with the requirements of the AISC Code and the calculated support stresses are below the applicable AISC limits for all loading combinations considered.

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MOD 85-03-094 MULT - Rzplactment of Solenoid Valves on Stocm G:ntrator Blowdown and Sampling Valves and the Demineralized Water Supply Isolation Valves This modification provides for the replacement of the steam generator blowdown and sampling and the demineralized water isolation solenoid valves.

This modification was partially completed with only the steam generator blowdown and sampling solenoid valves being replaced.

The Steam Generator Sampling and Blowdown ASCO, 3-way Solenoid Valves (total 16 valves) were replaced with ASCO 3-way series "NP" solenoid valves.

Series NP Solenoid Valves are qualified to IEEE-STD 323-1974. IEEE-382-1980 and IEEE-344-1975.

The demineralized water isolation valves which are presently environmentally qualified, will be replaced in the future.

The new Steam Generator Sampling and Blowdown solenoid valves are functionally the same as the existing solenoid valves (i.e.,

125 volt DC coil, 3-way, Cv, etc.).

The primary difference between the previous and the new solenoid valves is that the previous ASCO valves may not have been qualified while the new devices are qualified to IEEE-382-1980 and IEEE-STD-323-1974 for sustained operation in an accident environment that envelopes the IP-3 pipe penetration area environmental profile.

The new solenoid valves are also seismically qualified to IEEE-STD-344-1975 and will be seismically mounted in the same location as the existing solenoid valves so that the original design will not be degraded.

MOD 85-03-097 FP - Upper and Lower Electrical Penetration Areas Fire Doors Installation The purpose of this modification was to install three (3) hour rated, UL labeled fire door assemblies, as an addition to security doors 210 and 211, in the upper and lower electrical penetration areas.

It also provided for the installation of two (2) three-hour rated, UL labeled fire door assemblies furnished with automatic door closures and latching mechanisms, as an addition to security doors 210 and 211 in the upper and lower electrical penetration areas.

Door 210 separates the upper pipe penetration area from the upper electrical tunnel and door 211 separates the BIT room from the lower electrical tunnel.

The installation of the two new door assemblies will ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.

The use of the U.L. approved three-hour-rated fire door assemblies ensures that the installation is equal to or better than similar installations separating fire zones, and that the integrity of the existing Fire Protection System has not been degraded.

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MOD 85-03-099 PSS - Rtplecrm:nt of Semple Line Flowmitar FI-903 This modification provided for the replacement of the existing Sample Line Flowmeter FI-903 with a new flowmeter that has remote readout capability.

RCS sample flow indicator FI-903 is used to monitor reactor coolant sample flow rate during normal plant operation and to monitor recirculation pump discharge sample flow rate during the postulated post loss of coolant accident operation. During post Loss of Coolant Accident Sampling, radiation fields in the sample room do not permit personnel access therefore sampling is conducted from outside the sample room. This action does not permit the operator to view the existing flow rate indicator FI-903 located in the sample room.

The installation of this modification provides for verification (remote indication) of recirculation pump discharge sample flow rate during post accident sampling operations.

The new OMNIFLOW turbine meter is sized to handle the required flow rates and is constructed of materials compatible with the sample stream liquid.

The turbine meter does not degrade the existing line from a material standpoint.

Line 692 is a class I line and the new flowmeter's dimensions and weight are substantially less than that of the existing flowmeter FI-903, no further seismic analysis was required and line integrity has been maintained.

MOD 85-03-129 FP - Modifications to Fire Doors 201, 203, and 205 The purpose of this modification was to improve fire protection rating of existing doorways.

This modification provides for the following tasks, performed for the doors indicated:

a.

Door 201 - II. 15'-0" Control Building 1.

Remove existing fire / security door and replace with a new three (3)

hour, UL
approved, fire rated door (including removal / modification / reinstallation of security system electrical components).

2.

Modify the existing transom to provide proper three (3) hour rated fire seals for conduit and piping penetrations in the transom.

b.

Door 203 - El. 36'-9" Control Building Modify the existing transom to provide proper three (3) hour rated fire seals for conduit and piping penetrations in the transom.

c.

Door 205 - El. 53' Control Building Modify existing transom to provide proper three (3) hour rated fire seal for conduit penetration in transom.

Transom modifications ensure that the penetrations in the transoms are three (3) hour fire rated to the requirements of ASTM E-119, IEEE 634, and ANI standards. The modifications will also ensure full compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.

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