ML20198D545
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Allegation Category: QA/QC 6, QC Inspection g
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Allegation Number: AQ-38 V
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Characterization:
It is alleged that QC inspectors were harassed by being
" told to ignore problems." This allegation related specifically to the
-inspection of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) pipe whip restraints, in that an inspector noticed weld defects on vendor-inspected restraints after j
their delivery to the site.
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Assessment of Safety Significance:
This allegation was~previously evalu-ated by NRC Region IV, and the results were published in inspection report (IR) 82-10/82-05, dated June 30, 1982.
The evaluation documented in that report states:
(a) Defects had been noted previously in CB&I welding. The NRC had issued a notice of violation (50-445; 50-446/80-20) datec' September 24, 1980, to TUEC for welding defects in CB&I-supplied moment limiting restraints, which are similar to pipe whip restraints. The moment limiting re-straints were reworked to meet acceptance criteria.
[See QA/QC Cate-gory 7, AQ-20, for the NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) evaluation of vendor defects in the moment limiting restraints.]
(b) CB&I continued to have difficulty meeting vendor requirements estab-lished by Texas Utility Electric Company (TUEC); TUEC's inspection of CB&I in February, March, and April of 199?., rated the performance of CB&I as unacceptable in each month.
(c) A nonconformance report [NCR] written by the alleger, a QC inspector, r
against pipe whip restraints in January 1982 could not be located.
The NCR, although prepared in draft form, was'never released into the TUEC NCR system, possibly because of comments from some of the inspec-tor's supervisors that discouraged release of the NCR.
i The earliest related NCR written by the inspector that the TRT could locate was NCR M-82-00296, dated March 22, 1982, which noted defects in four pipe whip restraints. The NCR had been dispositioned on March 31, 1982, as requiring repair of the defects noted on the four restraints.
The inspector involved was also the subject of a TUEC memo from T. Brandt to G. Purdy of April 12, 1982, which states: " Subject employee [i.e., the inspector] has demonstrated a lack of ability in performing assigned task, in-that he refuses to limit his scope of responsibility to pipe whip re-st:aints and insists in getting involved in other areas outside his scope
[i.e., vendor welds, not just field welds].
Consequently, his services are no longer required." The Region IV report (82-10/82-05) noted that-TUEC intended to transfer the inspector from TUEC non-ASME inspections to Brown & Root (B&R) ASME inspections; however, since there were no job open-ings for inspectors at B&R at that time, the inspector's employment was terminated on April 12, 1982.
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-Investigation of the alleger's termination has been conducted by the Depart-ment of Labor and was the subject of litigation (Reference 6). The TRT i
investigated the technical issues related to the allegation.
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I The TRT identified 36 additional NCRs, written after the inspector's employment was terminated, against CB&I welds on pipe whip restraints to document weld defects.
These weld defects were generally identified after 3
restraints were painted.' Twelve of the NCRs specifically affected weld cefects for 115 pipe whip restraints of the total of 118 supplied by CB&I.
In order to disposition the 12 NCRs, TUEC initiated the following actions.
I Gibbs & Hill (G&H) structural engineering reviewed the documentation a.
of the weld defects on the 115 pipe whip restraints, marking all defects on restraint drawings.
In addition, G&H engineering evaluated each restraint based on the load transfer mechanism and evaluated the seriousness of each defect in each restraint. As a result of this review, G&H dispositioned 67 restraints as having insignificant defects.
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Of the remaining 48 restraints, those with the most defects (21 re-straints) were reinspected by a special team that consisted of a welding' engineer, a QC inspector, and a structural engineer to quan-tify the defects. As required, paint was removed from the welds on these 21 restraints for this reinspection.
Stress analysis was rerun on the 21 restraints, and no welds were c.
i found to be overstressed.
Since, according to TUEC, these 21 had the worst defects of all pipe whip restraints initially identified as
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having potentially significant defects, all restraints were consi-dered acceptable.
d Because of the CB&I welding discrepancies, on September 30, 1982, TUEC initi-I ated a complete inspection of all vendor shipments of non-ASME code structural components (e.g., pipe whip restraints) upon receipt.
This was, in fact, a
- reinspection, since these items had been vendor-inspected before shipment.
This reinspection of all vendor shipments continued until February 22, 1983, at which time TUEC returned to inspecting _only those items that had not been i
i vendor-inspected before shipment.
In addition to the pipe whip restraints, CB&I also supplied 105 moment limiting restraints to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)-
site. Some weld defects in these restraints were noted early in the manu-facturing process. Because the moment limiting restraints are ASME-code stamped (pipe whip restraints are not), they were reinspected upon receipt, and restraints having weld defects were reworked or returned to CB&I for repair, as documented in TUEC letter TXX-3544, July 19, 1982, and in NCR M-2512.
Because of personal lawsuits pending at the time of this evaluation, some L
individuals at CPSES were reluctant to talk to the TRT about this subject; therefore, the TRT could not adequately identify the circumstances sur-F rounding the preparation and lack of submittal of the initial NCR in January 1982. However, the generation of the additional NCRs caused the weld defects to receive some degree of evaluation and disposition in accord-l ance with the NCR system. Because of the lack of specific information provided by TUEC related to paint removal and the weld reinspection process, i
the TRT could neither confirm nor refute that the evaluation and disposi-tion were adequate. Consequently, additional explanation for this rein-spection process has been requested from TUEC.
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Conclusion and Staff Positions:
The decision regarding the allegation of inspector harassment is documented in Reference 6.
Vendor weld defects initially noticed by the inspector, which caused QC management to warn the inspector to stay within the scope of his responsibility and which may have been a contributing factor in terminating his employment, were subse-quently identified and ultimately dispositioned in accordance with the NCR system.
Therefore, the allegation that inspectors were " told to ignore problems" was essentially substantiated.
The open issue regarding weld reinspection will b.e evaluated and documented in a subsequent SSER.
The origina' tor of this allegation declined a meeting with the NRC to dis-cuss the results of this assessment.
A copy of these results was trans-mitted by letter to the alleger.
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Attachments:
None.
l Reference Documents:
1.
Region IV Inspection Report 82-10/82-05, dated June 30, 1982.
2.
TUGO letter TXX-3544, dated July 19, 1982.
3.
Gibbs & Hill letter CTN-67097, dated August 8, 1983, with Gibbs & Hill letter GTT-9816, dated June 14, 1983.
4.
NRC letter, D. Eisenhut to M. D. Spence, dated January 8,1985.
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ASLB transcript of September 11, 1984, p. 15271.
6.
Brown & Root vs. Donovan, 747 F. 2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984).
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This statement prepared by:
M &
duu/
/a./t. //- r-T'. E. Curry, TRT f Date/
Reviewer Reviewed by:
24/t4/17 b-745 Herbert Livermore, -
Date Group Leader Approved by:
Vincent Noonan, Date Project Director 0-217
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A k
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