ML20197J910

Advises of Planned Insp Effort for Next 6 Months at Prairie Island Nuclear Plant.Encl Info Provided to Minimize Resource Impact on Staff & Allow for Scheduling Conflicts & Personnel Availability to Be Resolved in Advance of Inspector Arriva

ML20197J910
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	11/24/1998
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Wadley M NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9812160028
Download: ML20197J910 (41)

Text

_..

o November 24, 1998 Mr. M. Wadley President, Nuclear Generation Northem States Power Compar,9 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401

SUBJECT:

MID-YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING (IRPM)-

PRAIRIE ISLAND

Dear Mr. Wadley:

On November 4,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM).

The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region lil to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in April 1999. to this letter advises you of our planned inspection effort for the next 6 months at Prairie Island Nuclear Plant.

This attached information is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during the IRPM. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Northem States Power Company.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (630) 829 9629.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bruce L. Burgess Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Docket No.: 50-282;50-306 License No.: DRP-42; DRP-60

Enclosures:

1.

Inspection Plan 2.

Plant Issues Matrix See Attached Distribution i

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PRAIRIE ISLAND INSPECTION PLAN DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH APRIL 1999 NUMBER OF TYPE OF NRC INSPECTIONI INSPECTIONI TITLE / PROGRAM INSPECTORS /

PLANNED DATES ACTIVITY ACTIVITY AREA INDIVIDUALS COMMENTS IP73753 Inservice 1

Outage (Nov/Dec,1998)

Core Inspection IP81700 Security 1

March 22 - 26,1999 Core IP83750 Occupational 1

April 26 - 30,1999 Core Radiation Exposure (Outage)

Operator 2

May 17 - 21,1999 Core Examination Legend:

IP Inspection Procedure Core Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

g PLANT ISSUES MATRIX i/23s8 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP*

SALP Area =

• Operations * ; Beginning Date = *10n/97*, Erwing Data = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

9/10/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Operations 2A 28 The material condition of the 11,12,21, and 22 station batteries was good. The surveillance and maintenance procedures for the batteries incorporated Technical Specification requirements and irduded Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and battery vendor maintenance and testing recommendations. The licensee was effectively monitoring battery performance.

2 8/1/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Operations 1A 3A The planned power reduction on Unit 1 was conducted in a controlled and deliberate manner, with good control of core reactivity and effective supervisory oversight.

3 7/30/1998 Positive IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Operations 1A 1B 3A Most operations activities were conduced well with operators being cha!!enged by electrical grid problems on several occasions because of hot weather and severe storms. On one occasion, operators failed to display Unit 1 containment parameter trends, contrary to management expectations.

4 6/28/1998 Positive IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Operations 1A 3A The planned power reduction and subsequent retum to fu!I power on Unit 2 were conducted well with a comprehensive pre-job briefing, good supervisory oversight, good reactivity management, and adequate communications.

5 6/18/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Operations 1A The Unit 1 reactor startup from cold shutdown conditions and subsequent power ascension was performed in a deliberate and safe manner with no significant discrepancies noted. During the approach to crit'r.ality, the operators involved focused solely on the task at hand.

6 6/18/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Operations 1A 3A During the performance of power changes and relatively complex system alignments, the operators maintained good control of the plant and, when confronted with abnormal conditions, took prompt and conservative actions to restore the conditions to normal.

7 6/18/1998 Negative IR 98008 NRC Operations 1A 4A 4C Discrepancies in both the Technical Specifications and the Update'd Safety Analysis Report regarding whether the rteam line isolation logic used the Low Tavg or Lo-Lo Tavg setting were identified. The discrepancies had no affect on plant operations because surveillance test procedures included the proper setpoints and logic. In addition, operators were knowledgeable of the proper setpoints and inputs to the isolation logic.

Page 1 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1 /23/98 Prairie island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area = ' Operations * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Dato = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8

6/12/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Operations 3B Operator training and practical experience at maintaining the plant in a hot shutdown condition with the main steam isolation valves closed and using steam generator power-operated relief valves for decay heat dissipation was limited.

9 6/12/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Operations 3B The simulator sicam generator power-operated relief valve fidelity was dissimilar to tne p' ant and the licensee wrote a non-conformance report.

10 6/5/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Operations 1B During subsequent actions to stabilize the plant, a lack of three part communication, a lack of consistent plant oversight, and unfamiliarity of steam generator power-operated relief valve response contributed to failure to adequately remove decay heat.

11 6/5/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98010 NRC Operations 1B The operators lacked adequate procedural guidance for stabilizing the plant and dissipating decay heat by dumping steam using the steam generator power-operated relief valves during a hot shutdown condition with main steam isolation valves closed. A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was issued. The tracking number for the violation is 50-282/98010-01(DRS); 50-306/98010-01(DRS).

12 6/5/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Operations 1B 3A The operator's initial response and actions taken based on indications for the dropped rod event were good; however, subsequent operator actions to stabilize the plant and dissipate decay heat were not completely effective as evidenced by the inadvertent rise in Tave and lifting of the steam generator #1 A safety valve.

13 6/5/1998 LER LER 1-98-08 Self-Operations 2A Unit 1 tripped from 100% power on a negative flux rate trip generated by Revealed power range nuclear instrumentation. Subsequent investigation revealed that control rod G7 dropped because of equipment failure and caused the negative flux rate trip. Troubleshooting revealed a blown fuse to rod G7 in a power cabinet due to a short to ground on the rod G7 stationary gripper coil wires.

14 5/11/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Operations 1A All operations activities observed were conducted well. Operators rapidly identified and responded property to several turbine control valve problems and a problem with volume control tank level instrumentation.

Page 2 of 13 I

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1 /23/98, Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "sALP" ; SALP Area =

• Operations" ; Beginning Data = *10/1/97 : Er.cmg Data = "9/3G98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 15 5/11/1998 Negative IR 98007 NRC Operations 2A The licensee's Individual Plant Examination did not fully identify the effects of raw water (cooling water, circulating water, or fire protection water) line breaks in the screenhouse basement because the examination failed to recognize that flooding of the area could result in inoperability of the motor starter disconnect switches of the fuel oil transfer pump for the diesel-driven cocling water pumps. The safety significance was mitigated by the ability to fill the diesel day tanks from other safety-related, independent fuel oil supplies.

16 4/22/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Operations SC Ucensee corrective actions for potential flooding of the Unit 2 main steam isolation valve rooms, a self-iderf ed condition adverse to quality, were not thorough because engineers failed to promptly identify a potential equipment operability concem if an adjacent room were flooded. This was a violation of Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," of Appendix E +0 CFR Part 50. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-306/E ")07-01(DRP).

17 4/13/1998 Negative IR 98007 NRC Operations 3B An outplant operator had insufficient knowledge of tha location of auxiliary equipment for the D5 emergency diesel generator and failed to use self-checking techniques when verifying that precautions and limitations for a surveillance test were met.

18 4/9/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A The temporary modification and bypass control processes were effective.

The processes were well implemented with few temporary modification outstanding at any one time. One concem was identified with the lack of periodic verification of stickers and identification of bypasses within the plant and control room. The licensee was in the process of developing a verification process.

19 4/9/1998 IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A Operations personnel generally had a good understanding of indicators on the control board. The control operators were attentive to their assigned duties and aware of plant and equipment statuses. Operators frequently walked down the control room panels. Some minor indication and equipment discrepancies were noted. However, operations management's expectation that operators walkdown panels once per hour was low. Also, the unit supervisors

• review of the control panels varied greatly among the crews observed.

i Page 3 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX n/23s8; Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP ; SALP Area =

• Operations * ; Beginning Data = *10/1/97*, Endeng Date = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 20 4/9/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A Control room personnel were cognizant of the overtime hour limitations and operated in accordance with program guidance. The documentation i of the on-shift hours in support of active license maintenance was clear and concise. Control room shift briefings and relief tumovers were conducted in accordance with program guidance. However, the l

inspectors concluded that the Unit-1 control operators could be hindered from monitoring the panels during the shift briefing evolution.

+

21 4/9/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A The control room operators responded appropriately to unexpected annunciator alarms; however, response to expected alarms was inconsistent between crews. Management's expectations for operator response to expected alarms upon receipt was low. The operations personnel were effective in communicating plant conditions and evolutions. Plant operators were knowledgeable of the facilities and equipment status.

22 4/9/1998 IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A The overall housekeeping and material coridition of the plant was good.

Recently overhauled equipment indicated a conscious and significant i

effort to maintain a high standard for material condition. However, several examples were identified where operations personnel accepted 1

discrepant equipment conditions such as sealed-in alarms, inaccurate flow indication, and inappropriate application of a component cooling flow indication gauge. This demonstrated a lack of a questioning attitude by the operators in accepting degraded equipment, procedure problems, and workarounds as a part of normal plant operation.

23 4/9h998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A The licensee's program for identifying operator workarounds was acceptable. Operations personnel were cognizant of the open workarounds and procedures were revised to address additional operator actions required.

24 4/9/1998 IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A 3A In general, the control room operators were effective at controlling work in l progress and performing pre-evolution briefs. However, one shift supervisor did not consider the potential affect of cross-tieing buses prior to a pre-job briefing until questioned by the inspectors.

Page 4 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/23 n.

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Operations * ; Begirnng Data = *10/1/97* ; Ending Date = '9/30,98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 25 4/7/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A in general, the licensee implemented the temporary memo and special order processes in accordance with procedures. Operations personnel were knowledgeable of the conditions. However, the licensee did not remove an outdated temporary memo when a modification was completed on the instrument AC distribution system. This resulted in a violation for an inadequate procedure associated with transferring power between units for motor control center 1MA2. The tracking number for this violation of Criterion V of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50, is No. 50-282/98006-03(DRS); 50-306/98006-03(DRS).

26 4/1/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A The control room and plant operators were knowledgeable and competent when tagging system components for planned work.

However, one violation for failure to follow an electrical breaker tag-out procedure was identified. The tracking number for this violation of Criterion V of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50, is No. 50-282/98006-01(DRS); 50-306/98006-01(DRS) 27 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations 1A Most of the operations activities observed were accomplished well. In particular, two evolutions involving somewhat unusual reactivity manipulations, undertaken to determine the cause of a recurring noise in the Unit 1 reactor, were conducted carefully and conservatively.

28 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations 1C Safety Audit Committee members engaged in an open, introspective discussion conceming the roles and responsibilities of the committee and its members. Emphasis was placed cn methods to increase member's contact time with plant personnel to help them understand performance trends.

29 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations 2A The spent fuel pool coolin;' system was found to be in good material condition with no discrepancies noted. For the areas examined, the as-built configuration of the spent fuel pool cooling system met the design basis requirements cited in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

30 3/4/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Operations 1A 3A The Unit 2 startup and retum to full power operation was conducted well with no discrepancies noted by the inspectors. The Unit 2 shift supervisor held timely and adequate pre-job briefings during the Unit 2 power ascension. Operators correctly followed procedures with a good questioning attitude. When discrepancies were found, procedure change requests w ere submitted.

Page 5 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX iii23s8 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP*, SALP Area =

• Operations * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Date = '9/30,98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 31 3/3/1998 NCV IR 98005 Licensee Operations 1A 3A in one case, an operator hung an isolation hold card on the wrong electrical breaker. The error was discovered by the electricians before starting work on the system. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/98005-01(DRP); 50-306/98005-01(DRP).

32 2/26/1998 Negative IR 98005 NRC Operations 3A One crew of operators failed to use readily available attemate instrumentation to he!p determine the cause of an unusual source range nuclearinstrument indication.

33 2/24/1998 Misc IR 98003 NRC Operations 1A Unit 1 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 operated at or near full power until January 24,1998, when it was shut down because of a reactor coolant system leak. Unit 2 remained in cold shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period.

34 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 2A The winter plant operation procedure was adequate to ensure that equipment in all of the buildings inspected was warm, dry, and adequately protected from the cold. The inspectors identified one minor procedure problem.

35 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 2A 4A The safeguards ventilation systems inspected were in good raaterial condition with no deficiencies noted. The inspectors identified one minor Updated Safety Analysis Report discrepancy.

36 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A Operators demonstrated a significant increase in awareness of procedure adherence requirements. They frequently stopped to revise steps that were unclear or could not be accomplished as written. In the last seven months, only one minor case of an operator failing to follow procedures was identified. Licensee corrective actions to improve operator procedure adherence appeared to be effective.

37 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A 1A Control room access control, communications, and professionalism were improved compared to previous inspection observations. Control room operators consistently managed access to the areas designated "at the controls" and ensured that no personnel with food, drinks, hard hats, or i

other unauthorized material approached the control panels. The inspectors also noted improvements in timely attendance at shift briefing meetings by crew members and overall improvements in control room professionalism.

Page 6 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98,

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Operations * : Beginning Data = *100/97* ; Ending Data = "9/30/98*

[ DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 38 2/9/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Operations 1A After new information conceming the flaw size in the Unit 2 reactor coolant system pressure boundary became known, the licensee was slow to establish increased monitoring for potential Unit 1 reactor coolant system leakage. In addition, the basis for evaluating operability of Unit 1 was not adequately documented. Once established, the compensatory actions were comprehensive and reasonable.

39 1/29/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A 1A Draining of the Unit 2 reactor vessel head to conduct welding was well-controlled. An excellent pre-job briefing was held and diverse ind' ations c

and inventory balance calculations were used throughout the evolution.

40 1/24/1998 LER PNO-Ill-98-011 A Self-Operations 2A The licensee shut down Unit 2 to investigate a reactor coolant leak LER 2-98-02, Revealed associated with control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) G-9. The licensee Supplement 1 IR identified the source of the leak as a 3/4" through-wall crack in a 98008 manufacturing weld on 4"-diameter tubing located at the base of the partial-length CRDM. This location is part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. On February 10,1998, after the drive rrWJianism and tubing had been removed from the reactor head, the licensee ultrasonically examined the exterior of the weld and tentatively identified two significant circumferential linear indications on the inside diameter of the part. On February 11,1998, the licensee examined a second partial-length drive assembly removed from Unit 2 and identified no flaws.

Additionally, the licensee plans to remove and examine the remaining two partial-length CRDMs from Unit 2.

As of May 22,1998, Unit 2 part length CRDMs have been removed and replaced with head adapter plugs which were screwed on and seal welded. Root cause analysis indicates the flaw on the G9 part length CRDM originated during fabrication and is an isolated case. Equipment t

Malfunction 41 1/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 LER 2-Self-Operations 3A A reactor coolant system leak on Unit 2 was rapidly identified and 98-02 Revealed conservative action was taken to shut down the plant for repairs. The operators performed a well-controlled, deliberately paced shutdown.

42 1/21/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A 1B Operations personnel responded rapidly and properly to a failure of a main feedwater valve and to the loss of the 10 transformer, which resulted in the momentary loss of power to a Unit 2 safeguards bus.

Page 7 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX W23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' ; SALP Area = ' Operations * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Data = '9fJo/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 43 1/13/1998 Misc IR 97023 NRC Operations 1A Unit 1 was restarted upon completion of a refueling outage on December 13,1997, and the generator was placed on the grid for the first time on December 14. After extensive testing of the newly installed turbines, the

~

unit reached full power on December 19. Power on Unit 1 was reduced to about 5 percent on January 9,1998, and the generator was taken off line in order to accomplish turbine balancing. The generator was placed back on line January 10 and the unit retumed to full power on January

11. Unit 2 operated e' or near fu!! power for the entire inspection period.

44 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97023 NRC Operations 2A 1A During a walkdown of the Unit 2 containment spray and caustic addition systems, the inspectors bund the systems properly lined-up and ready for safeguards operation. It eignficant material discrepancies or system deficiencies were identified that.

' _revent either system from performing its intended function involved Management 45 1/13/1998 Negative IR 97023 NRC Operations 28 The inspectors identified several minor deficiencies in the surveillance procedures for operational pressure test inspections of the cooling water system. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 46 1.'13/1998 Negative IR 97023 NRC Operations 3C 1A Management expectations and procedures for conduct in the control room, such as those delineating the frequency and completeness of main control board walkdowns, were not always clear. In addition, first-line supervisors did not always enforce those procedures that were clear, such as those relating to communications and control room access.

Inadequate Oversight 4

47 1/9/1998 Positive IR 97023 NRC Operations 3A 1A Following the retum to full power operations after the Unit 1 refueling outage, power was reduced to 5 percent to allow balancing of the main turbine. Control room activities for the power reduction, turbine balancing, and return to full power were conducted well. Involved Management 48 12/13/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Operations 3A 1A Unit 1 startup operations from the refueling outage were generally conducted well with no significant problems. Procedures were followed and operators remained attentive to plant indications during plant mode changes. Involved Management Page 8 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX u/23ss. -

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; sALP Area =

• Operations". Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Data = '9/3oS8*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 49 12/12/1997 NCV IR 97023 Licensee Operations 3A 1A One instance occurred during the Unit 1 startup where an operator did not verify that an annunciator (the ROD AT BOTTOM annunciator) had cleared in a timely manner. Although this error was not safety significant, it emphasized the need for improvements in procedure organization and for further evaluation of procedum use expectations. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) is No. 50-282/97023-01(DRP). Personnel Performance Deficiency 50 12/10/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97023 NRC Operations 3A The inspectors identified that a physics testing procedure had not been followed in that the amount of reactor coolant system temperature change,

called for in the procedure was not accomplished. The tracking number for this violation (of Technical Specification 6.5 on following procedures) is No. 50-282/97023-03(DRP). Personnel Performance Deficiency 51 12/2/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 3A 1A Normal plant operations were conducted without significant problems.

Operators were especially prompt and conservative in responding to a missing ladder that was needed for access to several valves in the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident and a faufty breaker for a control room ventilation fan. Teamwork / Skill Level 52 12/2/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 3A 2A 1A All operations refueling activities observed were performed well with good [

pre-evolution briefs, careful execution, and proper procedure adherence.

Activities observed included the flooding of the reactor cavity after the reactor head was removed; the unlatching, drag testing, and relatching of control rods; fuel shuffling, and the filling of the reactor vessel after steam l generator restoration. Involved Management 53 11/17/1997 LER 1Rs 98003,97023 Self-Operations 2A 1B The No.10 transformer locked out (tripped) on sudden pressure. The i

& 97021 LER 2 Revealed 4.16 kilovolt safeguards bus 26, being supplied from offsite power by the 05 transformer via the 13.8 kilovolt bus CT12, automatically transferred to its 2RY transformer source by bus sequencer actuation. All automatic switching occurred as expected without any equipment malfunctions.

Despite an extensive investigation, no cause for the actuation was i

determined, but the sudden pressure relay was replaced as a precautionary measure. Equipment Malfunction Page 9 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/23/98,.

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Operations *. Beginning Data = *10/1/97*, Ending Data = "9/30S8*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 54 11/17/1997 Positive IR 97021 Self-Operations 2A 18 SA All equipment responded as expected to the loss of the 10 bank Revealed transformer, which was providing offsite power to the onsite safeguards bus 26. Operators properly followed the appropriate annunciator response and abnormal operating procedures to recover from the event.

The system engineer led a thorough investigation into the cause.

Equipment Malfunction 55 11/3/1997 NCV IR 97023 LER 1-Licensee Operations SA 2B The licensee identified that during previous performances of a monthly 97-15 surveillance, the circuit to automatically close control room ventilation outside air intake dampers on a safety injection or high radiation signal was inadvertently bypassed for a short time period. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation (of Technical Specification 3.13.A.1) is No. 50-282/97023-0E(DRP); 50-306/97023-05(DRP). Inadequate Procedure / instruction 56 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Operations 1A 3A Unit 1 operated at or near full power until September 29,1997, when a gradual power coastdown was begun. On October 18,1997, Unit 1 was shutdown from about 82 percent power to begin a scheduled refueling outage. Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except for a brief forced shutdown on September 26-27,1997 to repair a leaking containment airlock. Operator control of the plant during the two reactor shutdowns and one startup ranged from good to excellent with no significant problems. A conservative operability decision was made regarding the containment maintenance airfock. Teamwork / Skill Level 57 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Operations 2A The Unit 2 safety injection system was properly lined up for safeguards operations with no significant material condition issues. Teamwork / Skill Level 58 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Operations 3A Control room operators were attentive to their panels and knowledgeable of plant conditions and activities in progress. Communications were consistently clear. Shift tumover briefings were concise but thorough.

Pre-job briefings for infrequent or complex evolutions were excellent.

System engineers were frequently consulted regarding their systems. No significant problems were noted with routine plant operations. Involved Management l

Page 10 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX i/23ss.

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and sMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP", SALP Area = " Operations", Beginning Data = *10/1/97*, Erdng Data = '9/30,98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 59 10/21/1997 Negative IR 97018 NRC Operations 3C 1C The inspectors identified that several Section Work Instructions contained operating instructions that should have had Operations Committee reviews but did not. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 60 10/21/1997 URI 1R 97018 NRC Operations SC 4A The licensee was making reasonable efforts to resolve the control room habitability issues in a timely manner. These issues were previously documented as Unresolved item in Report No. 50-282/97015(DRP); 50-306/97015(DRP). Involved Management 61 10/18/1997 LER LER 1-97-13 Licensee Operations 1A With Unit 1 in Mode 3 as part of a planned and orderfy shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, the 12 auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) selector switch was placed in MANUAL and the 12 AFW pump was started to provide feedwater to the steam generators for reactor heat removal. After starting the pump, the switch was placed in SHUTDOWN AUTO. During the time the switch was in MANUAL, the pump was inoperable and the shutdown Technical Specification (3.0.C) was entered. The problem is caused by the lack in the Technical Specifications of an appropriate action statement for Mode 3 operation of the AFW pumps. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 62 10/9/1997 VIO/SL-IV 1R 97019 NRC Operations 3C 1C The licensee was implementing Section Work Instructions as the underlying procedure in lieu of approved and Operations Committee reviewed procedures. This was considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.5,

• Plant Operating Procedures." The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-282/97019-02(DRS); 50-306/97019-02(DRS).

Inadequate Oversight 63 10/3/1997 URI IR 97019 NRC Operations 1B The inspectors questioned the adequacy of emergency operating procedure EOP 1E-3 (Unit 1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture," Revision

13) for implementing concurrent actions to cooldown and depressurize the reactor coolant system in order to meet a 30-minute time limit in the USAR. The tracking number for this Unresolved item is No. 50-282/97019-04(DRS); 50-306/97019-04(DRS).

64 10/3/1997 Negative IR 97019 NRC Operations 38 1C During an inspection of the licensed operator requalification programs, the inspectors noted that the licensee continued to demonstrate difficulties in procedure use. Inadequate Oversight Page 11 of 13 i

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ur23/98, Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descendang) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' ; SALP Area = ' Operations * ; Beginrdng Data = *10/1/97* ; Ending Dato = *&'30/96*

1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 65 10/3/1997 Positive IR 97019 NRC Operations 3B 3A The licensed operator requalification programs were irr.plemented in accordance with 10 CFR 55 requirements. All portions of the annual requalification examination were judged to be effective tools for determining operator weaknesses. Control room operators demonstrated an appropriate level of attentiveness to the operating panels and were knowledgeable of plant conditions. Licensee controls to revise the r

licensed operator requalification training program were satisfactory. The licensee's remediation program contained adequate measures to ensure individual and crew performance weaknesses were addressed prior to resumption of licensed duties. Self-Critical 66 10/3/1997 Negative IR 97019 NRC Operations 38 3A 1A During an inspection of the licensed operator requalification programs, the inspectors noted that communications were at times informal and did not always meet management expectations for three-way communications. In addition, there was a lack of formal controls to restrict personnel access to vital control areas within the control room.

Inadequate Oversight 67 10/3/1997 Negative IR 97019 NRC Operations 3C 1B The licensee's use of the " dual-role" Senior Reactor Operator / Shift Technical Adviser could potentially impair crew performance.

Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 68 10/3/1997 Negative IR 97019 NRC Operations 3C 1C The licensee's instruction for fire brigade personnel on respirator fit qualification was clear, but no such guidance or instruction was in place for all otherlicensed operators. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction i

Page 12 of 13

11/23/96 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

'l A counter number used for NRC intemal editing-DATE e est or @ cant he. For mose hms mm h a char date d occurrence use me acW date H me W date b noNown, use me he the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

i SOURCE The document that contains the issue information IR for NRC inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID(DY Identifiotion of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Funchonal Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Sensor Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executrve Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

• Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty

~

requirements that are being considered for A - Normal EEI*

Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licensing Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues 8 - Programs and Processes Nogetive Indnndual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Indnndual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance am made. Bdore the NRC makes its Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement dec,s,on, the hcensee will be C - Work Environment ii URl" Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIOISL-l Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering /Desigt 4

VKVSL-il Notice of Violation - Severity Level II (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Desip VIOfSL-ill Nobce of Violation - Severity Level lit conference.

B - Engineering Support VIOISL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV

" URis are unresolved items about which C-Programs and Processes d

Weelmess Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

Problem tification and Resolution

,h in tion acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY mncefomance, or a violation. However, B - Analysis the NRC has not reached its final C - Resolution Licensee The licensed utility

' conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identification unknown Page 13 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M/23/98 Prairie Island Seart:h Sorted by Date (Descending) a d SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area = ' Maintenance * ; Begriig Date = *10/1/97* ; Ending Date =

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

9/21/1998 LER LER 1-98-13 Licensee Maintenance 2A 2B On October 11,1998, the licensee identified during the performance of the steam exclusion check damper monthly test, that an additional platform installed on September 21,1998, onto the inspection scaffold previously erected on September 3,1998, interfered with the movement of the swing arm on check damper CD-36036 and prevented the damper from moving to its closed safeguards position.

2 9/14/1998 LER LER 1-98-11 Licensee Maintenance 4C 3A in March 1996, a procedure change was made that resulted in the application of incorrect acceptance criteria for ASME Section XI stroke time testing of a component cooling heat exchanger cooling water outlet control valve. During the period the procedure was in error, valve stroke times were outside alert limits on 4 occasions and corrective actions were not taken.

3 9/10/1998 LER LER 2-98-04 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee identified that recent maintenance on the shield building access doors may have breached shield building integrity for a period of time greater than the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Technical Specification Section 3.6.G. This was caused by an inadequate procedure. The requirements for the air lock type doors between the auxiliary building and the shield building were not reworded as part of Technical Specification Revision 91 and the implementation of this revision did not address a!! procedures affected by this change.

4 9/10/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee was implementing a comprehensive Year 2000 Readiness Management plan to address the computer readiness issues discussed in NRC Generic Letter 98-01, " Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants.*

5 9/10/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 2B 3A All the routine maintenance activities and surveillance tests observed by the inspectors were conducted well and the licensee used safe work practices and demonstrated good communication and coordination between the control room operators and workers performing the work / tests.

6 9/10/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 28 3A 4B Throughout the D1 diesel generator outage, good coordination was demonstrated between operations, engineering, maintenance, and instrumentation and control personnel. System engineers demonstrated ownership of their systems, contributed information during many briefings, and helped coordinate efforts at the work site.

Page 1 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M/23/98, Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

• Maintenance * ; Beginning Data = *10/1/97* : Ending Data = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 7

9/1/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 3A The inspectors identified that maintenance personnel did not perform a charcoal filter tray removal and replacement work activity in accordance with applicable procedures in violation of Technical Specification 6.5.C.1 procedure adherence requirements. Specifically, maintenance personnel failed to follow the surveillance procedure as written, implement the temporary change procedure process, and inform supervision that they had deviated from the surveillance procedure. Considerable management attention and focus had been placed on procedure quality, adherence, and compliance over the last several months. Overall, these procedure quality and adherence improvement initiatives have been effective in improving overall performance in these areas. The tracking number for this violation is 50-50-282/98015-01(DRP).

8 7/31/1998 NCV IR 98015(DRP)

Licensee Maintenance 28 5A During investigation of a problem with the proper timing of testing of the LER 1-98-09 reactor coolant system vent paths, the licensee identified that contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 4.18.2, the flow through reactor vent paths in their entirety had not been verified. The inspectors determined that this problem was a Non-Cited Violation and assigned a tracking number of 50-282/98015-03(DRP); 50-306/98015-03(DRP).

9 7/31/1998 NCV IR 98015(DRP)

Licensee Maintenance 2B 5A The plant engineering staff identified that recent testing of the reactor LER 1-98-09 coolant system vent paths had not been performed in literal compliance with the wording of Technical Specification 4.18.1. Contrary to the words

• after each refueling," operability of the solenoid operated valves had recently been tested during cold shutdown and during refueling shutdown prior to establishing full tension on all reactor head closure bolts. The inspectors determined that this problem was a Non-Cited Violation and assigned a tracking number of 50-282/98015-02(DRP); 50-306/98015-02(DRP).

10 7/30/1998 Positive IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 2B Technical Specification requirements were property included in procedures for all of the 46 requirements checked. Only a few minor editorial or format errors were identified in the 71 procedures reviewed.

11 7/30/1998 Positive IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Maintenance 3A 28 All of the 14 maintenance and surveillance testing activities observed were performed well. Thorough pre-job briefings were held for all except the most routine work. The activities were all conducted safely, with proper consideration given to the radiation fields and other environmental conditions at the job sites. Communications between all parties involved in the tasks were good.

Page 2 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

"/23/98 '

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

• Maintenance *, Beginning Data = *10n/97*, Erdng Data = "S/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 12 6/18/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Maintenance 2B For the seven maintenance and surveillance activities observed, no significant problems were noted. Unexpected interference between one surveillance test and a concurrent maintenance activity in the same area resulted in water entering a dewatered circulating water bay. However, the interference could not have reasonably been predicted.

13 5/11/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 2A Safety-related and nonsafety-related backup air accumulators for air-operated valves in Unit 1 and Unit 2 were maintained well and met design, functional, and performance requirements. One minor error was noted in the design basis document describing the safety-related backup air accumulators for the containment vacuum breaker valves. Two more minor discrepancies were noted in the configuration documentation contained in a computerized database for the nonsafety-related portions 1

of the backup air accumulator system.

14 5/11/1998 LER LER 1-98-06; irs Licensee Maintenance 2A The licensee identified that mechanical components associated with the 98007 & 98008 122 control room outside air supply and steam exclusion damper, CD-34177, were not have been adequately designed for the postulated post-accident environment. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected failure to assure that suitable materials, parts, and equipment were selected for the damper so that it could perform its safety-related function of isolating outside air to the control room during all design basis accidents was a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil, " Design Control," and is assigned a tracking number of No.

50-282/98007-09(DRP); 50-306/98007-09(DRP).

15 5/11/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 2B The lack of clear direction to maintenance personnel reinstalling auxiliary feedwater flow orifices led to the orifices being installed backwards. The work order step for orifice reassembly did not provide instructions or refer ;

to the drawing containing the proper orientation of the orifice plates. This was a violation of Criterion V," Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"

of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50. Maintenance personnel also demonstrated the lack of a questioning attitude concerning proper orifice orientation by either not noticing or fully considering the implications of the word " Inlet" stamped on the orifice face and not referring to drawings describing correct system configurations. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-306/98007-05(DRP).

t Page 3 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/23/98,

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP", SALP Area =

• Maintenance * ' Beginning Date = *10/U97*, Ending Date = 9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 16 5/11/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 98007 NRC Maintenance 2B The failure to update auxiliary feedwater refueling surveillances with revised acceptance criteria resulted in performance of two surveillance tests with the wrong acceptance criteria. This was a violation of Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," cf Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50. It also resulted in a missed opportunity to identify improperly installed flow orifice plates in the system. A weakness in the licensee's administrative con'.rol program was also revealed in that there was no guidance for placing procedures in quarantine until necessary procedure revisions were completed. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-306/98007-06(DRP).

17 5/11/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 28 All of the ten maintenance and surveillance test activities observed were performed well with only two minor self-checking errors noted. One was identified by a licensee quality services inspector and the other by the NRC inspectors. Safe work practices and proper procedure use and adherence were also noted. Communications between the workers in the field and the control room were good. One minor procedure weakness was identified in hat a survei!!ance test procedure did not contain tolerances for test data.

18 4/30/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 28 A procedural deficiency and poor communications between electrical maintenance supervisors and operations personnel contributed to the inadvertent rolling of the D2 emergency diesel generator during electrical post-maintenance testing. Specifically, the test procedure did not provide instructions for ensuring that mechanical portions of the diesel system were properly isolated. This was a violation of Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-282/98007-03(DRP).

19 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Maintenance 3A Most of the 16 maintenance and surveillance test activities observed were performed well with few discrepancies noted. Proper operator self-checking techniques were observed during operability testing of the 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump and a good attitude towards continuous improvement was rioted during this testing evolution. Procedures were carefu!!y reviewed and changes were made as appropriate, except for one case in which engineers misinterpreted the administrative requirements and failed to properly revise a work order when they determined that a change was needed.

Page 4 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ir23/98 Prairie Island l

Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area = " Maintenance *, Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Date = '9/3098*

L DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 20 3/19/1998 Negative IR 98005 NRC Maintenance 28 During annual maintenance on the 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump, a i small opening was left uncovered in a piping system, indicating the need for increased attention-to-detail conceming foreign material exclusion controls.

21 2/26/1998 LER IR 98005 LER 1-Licensee Maintenance 2B 2A An inadequate preventive maintenance procedure resulted in a motor 98-04 overload relay heater being set at a value that would not allow long-term operation of the motor. The subsequent post-maintenance test run was too short for the inappropriate value to be detected. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/98005-03(DRP).

22 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Maintenance 2A 2B The backlog of corrective maintenance work orders was relatively small and stable. Priority work and control room deficiencies received adequate attention. Equipment failures which led to entry into Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation were infrequent and rapidly resolved. There were very few temporary modifications in place.

Work was completed in a timely manner and was generally done correctly the first time. Operability decisions because of degraded equipment were conservatively made. Overall; a review of the maintenance backlog indicated a strong maintenance program which was receiving suitable management attention. The backlogs were about 1100 non-outage work orders of all kinds, about 70 power block corrective maintenance work ordes,39 control room deficiencies,12 " operator workarounds," and 5 temporary modifications. There were 10 Limiting Condition for Operation entries due to equipment issues in the previous six weeks, no missed surveillance tests or preventative maintenance tasks in the previous year, and about 1 repeat work order per month in the previous year.

23 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Maintenance 2B Following the identification of a leak on Unit 2 partial length control rod drive mechanism G9, removal, nondestructive examinations, and repair activities associated with all of the Unit 2 partial length control. x1 drive mechanisms were conducted we!L The methods, tools, and tecniques used during the nondestructive examinations were adequate for the inspections performed. An effective task force was established to manage the repairs. Contractors were carefully supervised by system engineers and performed the component removal and repairs in a deliberate, controlled manner. Quality services (quality assurance) i oversight of the project was good.

Page 5 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX n/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP', SALP Area =

• Maintenance *, Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Ending Date = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 24 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Mainternnce 3A Maintenance and surveillance test activities were performed well with no discrepancies noted. However, examples of surveillance test procedures needing improvement continued to be identified as highlighted by the inspectors

• identification of inaccurately indicating source range meters at the hot shutdown panels.

25 1/21/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98003 Self-Maintenance 4B 3A An inadequate review of the 1H3 breaker protection logic led to an Revealed inappropriately sequenced work order for a non-routine maintenance activity. This resulted in an engineered safety feature system actuation.

The event was the fourth documented case in a little over a year in which an inadequate review of logic circuits led to problems during maintenance or testing activities. All of the events occurred during either first-time evolutions or infrequent and emergent work activities. A violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) was identif.ed for failure to provide an appropriate work order. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-282/98003-02(DRP); 50-306/98003-02(DRP).

26 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97023 NRC Maintenance 3A Operators involved in maintenance and surveillance activities displayed a good questioning attitude and appreciation of radiation dose control.

Conservative Decision 27 1/9/1998 NCV 1R 97023 Licensee Maintenance 3A 4B A good questioning attitude by an operator resulted in identification of an inadequacy in a procedure for main turbine torsional testing. However, the initial review of the operator's concem by engineering was poor, and the concem was not validated until the test was started and equipment did not respond as expected. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) for an inadequate procedure is No. 50-282/97023-02(DRP). Self-Critical 28 12/7/1997 NCV IR 97023 LER 1-Licensee Maintenance SA 28 As part of the investigations underway per Generic Letter 96-01," Testing 97-18 of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," the licensee determined that the 121/122 control room air handler auto-start from its associated 120122 control room cleanup fan is required to be surveillance tested by Technical Specifications but was not. The auto-start feature had not been tested because of oversight during original surveillance test development. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/97023-04(DRP); 50-306/97023-04(DRP). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction Page 6 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/2ar98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area = "Maintewd : Beginning Date = *10/1/97*

Ending Data = "9G0/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 29 12/2/1997 Negativa IR 97021 NRC Maintenance 2B 3A Unit 1 containment-penetration checidists and procedures contained inconsistencies between procedures and editorial errors within _

procedures. However, the errors were not significant enough to prevent successful performance of the procedures. Labels specified by one procedure were not a!! installed and operators who performed the procedure apparently failed to identify or correct the discrepancies. The Unit 2 containment-penetration checklists and procedures demonstrated a much improved quality and consistency as compared to those for Unit 1.

Inadequate P ccedureilnstruction 30 12/2/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Maintenance 3A 2A 48 Maintenance, surveillance, and refueling outage activities were performed well with only minor problems. All activities observed were performed safely with proper procedures being used and followed. Activities observed included the disassembly, inspection, and re-assembly of a main steam isolation valve; removal of the reactorintemals; and an emergency diesel generator 24-hour load test. System engineer involvement was strong, involved Management 31 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Maintenance 2A 3A Procedures were properly used and followed in activities associated with 9 maintenance work orders and 13 surveillances observed by the inspectors. Maintenance personnel were experienced and knowledgeable in their tasks. All activities were performed safely.

Involved Management i

e Page 7 of 8 l

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TAisLE LABELS

~

A counter number used for NRC intemal edeng The date of the event or sagruficant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date 4

the issue was identihed For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or in+;+1--i report date.

TYPE The categonzation of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

13 CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SIAR CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

I DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violaticns of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Ee= lated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal EEI*

Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action i

Licensing Licensmg issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Material Condshon.

RIlse Meecellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding. etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condmon I

NCY Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Indnndual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Indnndual Good Licensee Performance may be modihed when the Gnal decisions A - Work Performance makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilines Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance ef is the licensee will be C - Work Environment URf" Unresolved Inspection item i

VIQtSL-1 Nohce of Violabon - Sevarity LevelI (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineermg/ Design:

VIOfSL-N Nohce of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design I

VIOfSL-El Nohce of Violation - Severity Level ill conference.

B - Engineering Support VIOfSL-IV Nohce of Violahon - Severity Level IV

" URIs are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes

[h herthe 5

Problem identification and Resolubon.

j Weakness Overall Wcak Licensee Performance n

t nsn i

acceptable item, a deviation, a A - IdetiHcation

{

ID BY nmconfonnance, or a violation. However, B - Ana@

(

j the NRC has not reached its final C - Resolution Licensee The licensed utility conclusbns on the issues, and the PIM I

NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final l

Self-Revealed idenhfication by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identihcahon unknown i

i i

Pap 8 of 8

=

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP*. SALP Area =

• Engineering" ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Endmg Date = 9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

9/10/1998 Strength IR 98015(DRP)

NRC Engineering 3A 4B System engineers continued to demonstrate ownership of their respective systems. The detai!ed system knowledge possessed by these engineers routinely aided in the successful briefing, coordination, and completion of many surveillance procedures and maintenance activities.

2 8/11/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

Licensee Engineering 3A 4B During a review of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and heavy i load documents, the licensee was unable to confirm the weight of the reactor vessel head used in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants - Resolution of TAP A-36,* load drop calculations.

1 This finding resu!!ed from a good questioning attitu-fe by engineering personnel and demonstrated the comprehensive nature of the ongoing USAR update project.

3 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRP)

Licensee Engineering 3A 4B Through a good questioning attitude, system engineers identified two issues with the reactor coolant system vent system. Once identified, conservative and timely corrective actions were taken to address each issue.

4 7/30/1998 Strength IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Engineering 3A 3B 4B During operations, maintenance, and survei!!ance testing activities, the system engineers were closely involved. They were consistently present in the field for all except the most routine activities. The system engineers often led and were usually involved in pre-evolution briefings for activities. The system engineers were also very knowledgeable about the operation of their systems and responsive to questions from both the operators and inspectors.

5 7/30/1998 NCV irs 98009(DRP) &

NRC Engineering 4B SB The licensee's initet engineering evaluation of whether testing of the 98007(DRP) LER blocking of the reverse current trip of the emergency diesel generators 1-98-07-01 was required by Technical Specifications, as documented in Licensee Event Report 50-282/98007. Revisiori 0, was flawed in that the points considered did not support the conclusion reached. Nonetheless, adequate corrective actions were taken for the inadequate testing which had existed for about 20 years. After discussions with NRC inspectors, the licensee subsequently re-evaluated the testing requirement. The results of the re-evaluation were reviewed by the inspectors and were satisfactory. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 4.6.A.3.e testing requirements. The tracking number for this item is 50-282/98009-01(DRP).

Page 1 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX i /23/98.'

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search';olumn = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Engineering

• Beginning Cate = *10/1/97. Ending Dato = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 6

6/22/1998 Positive IR 98008 Licensee Engineering SA 2A Several additional environmental qualification concems with steam exclusion dampers were identified during corrective action activities for a finding associated with a control room damper. Licensee engineers completed a comprehensive evaluation which adequately justified interim operability until the completion of evaluations and corrective actions, where necessary.

7 6/18/1998 Negative IR 98008 NRC Engineering 4B Although calculations eventually demonstrated that there should be sufficient indicated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow under worst case conditions to prevent operators from unnecessarily tripping reactor coolant pumps during a loss of feedwater accident with only one AFW pump available, the initial operability assessment of the effect of installing the AFW flow indication orifice plates backwards was weak because it did not address that issue.

8 5/26/1998 LER LER 2-98-03 Licensee Engineering SA The licensee determined that two previously identified instances of inadequate or questionable separation of safe shutdown equipment were reportable. In one instance, a door and a trench between a storage room fire area and a fire area in the Unit 2 turbine building did not meet 10 CFR,

Part 50, Appendix R criteria for fire barriers. In the other instance, some penetrations between two fire areas in the auxiliary building were not sealed.

9 5/11/1998 Negative IR 98007 NRC Engineering 48 Several deficiencies were identified with engineering support for equipment operability issues or maintenance and surveillance testing activities. Taken together, the findings raised a concem on the part of the NRC with the quality of engineering support at the facility.

10 5/11/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98007 NRC Engineering 4C Although Temporary Modification 95T047, which added a safety-related backup instrument air supply for operation of the cooling water strainer backwash valves, had been in place for over two and one half years, it had not been replaced by a permanent modification nor had periodic test or inspection procedures been developed to verify its proper operation.

This was a violation of Criterion XI, " Test Control," of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-282/98007-08(DRP); 50-306/98007-08(DRP).

Page 2 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1 /23/98, Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP", SALP Area =

• Engineering". Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ereng Date = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 11 5/4/1998 Negative Ltr to licensee NRC Engineering 48 Submittal of hcense amendment request dated March 6,1998, was not dated May 4,1998 timely, particularly considering the complexity of the change involved and the number of staff required to review this amendment. The request was to update the Technical Specification heatup and cooldown rate curves and extend the reactor vessel fluence limit from the current 20 effective full power years (EFPYs) to a new value of 35 EFPYs, incorporate into Technical Specifications the use of a Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, and change the power-operated relief valves temperature requirement for operability. Although the submittal was not timely, the staff was able to complete its review in time to not impact plant operations '

because your package was complete and addressed all the Pressure Temperature Limits Report requirements set forth in Generic Letter 96-03, " Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Limits."

12 4/22/1998 URI 1R 98007 NRC Engineering 2A The licensee was performing additional research and analysis on the effects of the feedwater line break on the ability of the main steam isolation valves to close. The inspectors will review the final results of i

that research and analysis. This will be tracked as Unresolved item No.

50-282/98007-02(DRP); 50-306/98007-02(DRP).

13 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Engineering 48 System engineering support for all operations and maintenance activities observed was excellent. System engineers closely monitored the status of their systems during the Unit 2 startup and power ascensior They consistently issued work orders promptly after equipment issues were identified, and were actively involved in or closely followed all troubleshooting and repair activities.

14 3/23/1998 LER LER 1-98-05, Licensee Engineering 4A The licensee declared the Unit 1 main steam iso ation valves (MSIVs)

Supplement 1; 1Rs inoperable due to flooding concems in the event of a postulated 98007 & 98015 feedwater line break. The loop A MSIV and its rr. lated solenoid valves and terminations are located in an enclosed ares except for floor grating above, and a large opening 6 feet above the flooi The loop A feedwater line passes directly above the room. On March 24,1998, Unit 2 MSIVs were declared inoperable due to similar flooding concems. Interim compensatory measures were taken and the MSIVs for both units were restored to operable. On April 22,1998, Unit 2 Train A manual actuation system for the MSIVs was determined to be potentially ? 1 operable due to similar flooding concems.

Page 3 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = "SALP' SALP Area =

• Engineering *. Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Endmg Data = '9/30,98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 15 3/4/1998 Negative IR 98005 NRC Engineering 28 3A 4B Engineering personnel failed to attach the appropriate temporary memorandum to a surveillance procedure affecting the 22 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and then did not cancel the same temporary memorandum attached to the applicable operating procedure in a timely manner when it was no longer needed. Since the temporary memorandum was not attached to the survedance test, operations personnel were not aware of the temporary memorandum when the surveil!ance test was performed, and they would not have carried out its l

instructions. Had the pump's discharge check valve not already been repaired, damage to the suction pressure gauge and switch could have i

occurred. These concems indicate a weakness in the administration of the temporary memorandum program.

16 2/24/1998 Negative irs 98003,97015 Licensee Engineering 2A The results of special contro! room ventilation envelope testing, initiated in LERs 1-98-01 R1, response to previous NRC concems, indicated that potentialin-leakage 1-98-02 into the control room was greater than design assumptions from both steam exclusion and dose control standpoints. Although design assumptions could have been exceeded, the control room would probab!y have remained habitable. Confirmatory calculations were in progress.

17 2/24/1998 NCV IR 98003 NRC Engineering 4A The inspectors identified the failure of the licensee to install a remote radiation monitoring readout at the local containment purge and exhaust sytem control panel as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). However, because it was likely that the licensee's USAR review project would have eventually identified this problem and because the containment purge and exhaust system was seldom used and would normally be controlled from the control room whera radiation monitoring instrument indications were available, this item is considered of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation of Criterion 111, " Design Control," of Appendix B,10 CFR Part

50. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/98003-01(DRP); 50-306/98003-01(DRP).

Page 4 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP' SALP Area =

• Engineering *, Beginning Data = *10/U97*, Ending Data = *9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 18 1/22/1998 LER 1R 98003 LER 1-Licensee Engineering 4A SA The licensee identified that the cabling for the discharge dampers for the 98-03 50.72 No.

safety-related containment fan coil units is routed as normal cables in non '

33577 safety-related cables trays. This condition has existed since original plant construction. Prior to Revision 12 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) in early 1994, the USAR stated that these cables would be routed in safety-related cable trays. Currently, the USAR does not specify safety -

related cable trays for these cables. The licensee concluded that the 10 CFR 50.59 review used to support Revision 12 was not adequate. In addition, the licensee concluded that the plant is operable with the current i configuration. Engineering / Design Deficiency l

19 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97023 Licensee Engineering 4A SC Recent findings by the engineering organization involving the control room i ventilation system and a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R issue regarding inadequate separation of pressurizer level cables indicated that thorough design reviews were being conducted and reflected a willingness to identify and resolve old design and compliance issues. Self-Critical 20 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4B 3A System engineers were heavily involved with all aspects of operations, maintenance, and testing of their systems. The engineers rapidly i

investigated any operational abnormalities, took an active role in r

maintenance and troubleshooting activities, and closely followed all surveillance testing on their systems; however, in one instance, during turbine torsional testing, a system engineer did not provide adequate technical support. Teamwork / Skill Level 21 12/6/1997 NCV irs 97023 &

Licensee Engineering SA 4A 1C The licensee identified that the condition of cabling to pressurizer level 98016(DRS) LER transmitters 1LT-433 and 1LT-426 did not satisfy the 20' separation 1-97-17 criterion of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G 2. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation (of Appendix R) is No. 50-282/97023-06(DRP). Engineering / Design Deficiency 22 12/2/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Engineering 4B 3A System engineers were involved in all aspects of plant operations, refueling, maintenance, and surveillance activities. The engineers rapidly investigated any operational abnormalities, took an active role in maintenance and troubleshooting activities, and closely followed all surveillance testing on their systems. Involved Management Page 5 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

'8 Prairie Island Search Sor*ed by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' ; SALP Area =

• Engineering * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*. Ending Date = '9/30/98*

i DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 23 11/19/1997 Strength IR 97020 NRC Engineering 28 The licensee's steam generator inspection program is maintained with state of the art procedures and equipment. The Unit 1 steam generators are Westinghouse Model 51, in which the tubes are historically susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and intergranular attack. To assure structural adequacy of the tubes experiencing various forms of degradation, the licensee has employed the latest eddy current (ET) technology to inspect the tubing, and performed condition monitoring, which included in situ pressure testing of IGSCC indications to assure that the degradation did not exceed NRC Regulatory ;

Guide 1.121 requirements within the last operating cycle. In addition, the licensee has increased control of the inspection contractor by employing an ET Level !!! resolution analyst and requiring all analysts to be certified as a Qualified Data Analyst (ODA) to EPRI guidelines TR-107569-V1R5 Appendix G. The licensee has an ET Level lli who has responsibility for the oversight of the steam generator inspection to assure compliance to Technical Specification and ASME requirements. Steam generator sleeving operations appeared to show improved weld quality as a result of..

enhanced precleaning and visual inspection criteria added to the process. Involved Management 24 11/19/1997 Positive IR 97020 NRC Engineering 28 4C Indications identified during Unit 1 steam generator tube eddy current examination were predominantly axially oriented indications located in the tube roll transition in the tubesheet region; indicative of outside diameter stress corrosion cracking. The effort to evaluate tube integrity by assessing growth rates for this type of cracking by historical eddy current data reviews / comparisons and in situ pressure testing evidenced an aggressive program. Program improvements were noted by the inspectors in the implementation of eddy current procedures for the examination of the steam generator tubing. Improved process techniques were noted in the steam generator tube sleeving repairs. Involved Management Page 6 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

• 8 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Engineering * ; Beginning Date = *10n/97* ; Ending Data = "9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 25 11/19/1997 NCV irs 98003 &

Licensee Engineering 5A 4A 1C During a Unit 1 refueling outage, the licensee discovered that a potential 97021 LER 1 pressurized leak from the oil lift pump and associated piping for the 16 50.72 No.

reactor coolant pumps would not be captured by the installed collection 33288 system as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section Ill.C The same condition exists for the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps. The licensee's finding was a result of a proactive, voluntary review of fire protection issues in preparation for a future NRC pilot inspection. Prompt corrective actions were planned to modify the system to be in compliance with NRC requirements. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/97021-02(DRP); 50-306/97021-02(DRP). Self-Critical 26 11/18/1997 Licensing NRC Letter to NRC Engineering 4C During the NRC's review of an amendment request incorporating voltage-Licensee based steam generator repair criteria, errors in the licensee's dose calculation were identified by both the licensee and the NRC. These errors necessitated numerous teleconferences between the licensee and the NRC staff to clarify the application and resulted in additional supplements to the original application to correct the calculational errors. Inadequate Oversight 27 10/21/1997 Negative IR 97018 NRC Engineering 4A The inspectors identified several minor discrepancies in the descriptions of the containment pressure instrument penetrations in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Inadequate Oversight 28 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Engineering 4A 1C The inspectors reviewed remote tachometer indication circuitry for the D1 and D5 emergency diesel generators (the designated 10 CFR 50, Appendix R safe-shutdown diesels) and verified that a control room fire causing a " hot short* affecting the tachometers would not render inoperable other diesel generator protection or control functions.

Other/NA 29 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Engineering 48 3A The system engineers were frequently involved in all aspects of plant operations, maintenance, and survei!!ance activities. The engineers promptly investigated any operational abnormalities, took an active role in maintenance and troubleshooting activities, and closely followed all surveillance testing on their systems. The engineers also monitored industry events for applicability to their systems and were frequently observed conducting walkdown inspections. Involved Management

)

Page 7 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

'/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Cooes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

• Engineering * ; Begi=a.g Data = *10n/97 : Ending D DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 30 10/9/1997 Positive IR 97021 LER 1-Licensee Engineering 4A SA As part of an Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) review, the 97-12 engineering staff identified that operation of the plant during hot or cold shutdown with the shutdown margin required by Technical Specifications would not provide the time identified in the USAR for operator action :o mitigate an inadvertent boron dilution. The staff also identified a potential boron dilution accident not described in the USAR resulting in the residual heat removal system injecting to the vessel without adequate mixing. The licensee's discovery that there was no analysis for a dilution accident during shutdown conditions was an excellent finding and indicated a thorough Updated Safety Analysis Report review process. Self-Critical 31 10/3/1997 NCV irs 98003 97021 NRC Engineering SA 2B 4A Licensee-identified findings indicated the engineering staff had conducted

& 97018 LER 1 a thorough review of logic circuits in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 11 96-01. The licensee's initial actions in response to the findings were conservative. The licensee identified that the low pressure auto-start feature of the No.121 motor-driven cooling water pump was not being tested as required and that there was inadequate separation between the pump's low header pressure switch and the No.12 diesel-driven cooling water pump low header pressure switch, such that a single failure could disable both switches. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/97021-01(DRP); 50-306/97021-01(DRP). Self-Critical Page 8 of 9

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

~

A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

DE The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a data of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance. Operations, Plant Support and All/Muttiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Chril Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal EEI*

Escalated Enforcement Issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Licensing Licensing issue from NRR Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues 8 - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance am made. Beforg the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the 1:censee will be URl" Unresolved inspection item C - Work Environmen

provided wrth an opportunity to either V!O/SL-I Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineeiing/ Design:

VIO/SL41 Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-III Notice of Violation - Seventy Level ill conference.

B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV

" URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5

Problem Identification and Resolution:

wh e ue in que o a

acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification ID BY nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - Anap the NRC has not reached its final C - Resolution Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 9 of 9

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1 /23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = " Plant Support", Beginning Data = *10/1/97*. Ending Data = "9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1

9/25/1998 LER 1R 98016(DRS)

Licensee Plant 1C The site staff reviewed the susceptability of the redundant containment LER 1-98-15 Support sump to RHR pump suction MOVs to multiple failure due to a single fire.

It was unclear whether a postulated fire-induced spurious opening of the MOVs would drain the refueling water storage tank to containment, thereby causing a loss of the sole credited source of reactor coolant makeup for this postulated fire. Appropriate compensatory measures will ;

be maintained in the affected fire areas until the status of the subject MOVs is resolved.

2 8/28/1998 Negative IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C The inspectors identified a weakness where the licensee *s timeline f

Support analysis did not assume a fire-induced transient condition so that reasonable time limits could be determined for achieving safe shutdown.

3 8/28/1998 eel IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C 4B The inspectors identified that eight residual heat removal (RHR)

Support containment sump suction valves were not analyzed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA). Spurious operation of these nonessential safe,

shutdown valves could cause a flow diversion that could adversely affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. This was considered an apparent violation and assigned a tracking number of eel 50-282/98016-01(DRS);

50-306/98016-01(DRS).

4 8/28/1998 Negative IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant 2A 1C Fire door No. 62 did not meet installation criteria identified on plant Support drawings. In addition, the fire fighting strategies and the location of fire fighting equipment could contribute to fire brigade actions that would expose redundant post-fire safe shutdown systems to the effects of a l

common fire by requiring them to breach the fire barrier that separate these trains.

I 5

8/28/1998 Negative IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant 2A 1C The inspectors concluded that the actual fire-resistive performance of the Support Kaowool fire barrier system installed at PINGP was indeterminate.

However, the licensee implemented and will maintain appropriate ~

compensatory measures until the Kaowoolissue is resolved.

6 8/28/1998 Positive IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant SA 5B SC The inspectors concluded that the reactor coolant pump oil collection Support system assessment was comprehensive and that the licensee took appropriate corrective actions for deficiencies.

Page 1 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

"' 'S8 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP*, SALP Area =

• Plant Support', Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Date = "9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 7

8/28/1998 Positive IR 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant SA 5B SC The inspectors concluded that the licensee's fire protection self-Support assessment project contained acceptable administrative controls to identify, track, and resolve issues; to review, identify, and control commitments; and to ensure configuration management controls were appropriate 8

8/27/1998 LER 1R 98016(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C 3B The NRC inspectors identified that the control cable for motor-ope.ated LER 1-98-14-01 Support valve MV32335, (Condensate Storage Tank to No.12 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump) in Fire Area 32 in the turbine building was not,

protected (as required by an exemption to 10CFR50, Appendix R).

Appropriate compensatory measures wil! be maintained in the fire area until the fire barrier for the control cable is replaced. This was considered an example of an apparent violation and assigned a tracking number of eel 50-282/98016-02(DRS); 50-306/98016-02(DRS).

9 8/26/1998 eel IR 98016(DRS)

Licensee Plant 2A 1C The licensee identified that conduits associated with the Train B safety LER 1-98-12-02 Support injection (SI) pump suction valve in Fire Area 58/73 were missingthe required one-hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, the subject equipment, necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby condition, would not be free of fire damage. This was considered an example of an apparent violation and assigned a tracking number of eel 50-282/98016-02(DRS);

50-306/98016-02(DRS).

10 a'7/1998 eel IR 98016(DRS)

Licensee Plant 2A SA The licensee identified 32 Appendix R related motor-operated valves LER 1-98-10 Support (MOVs) that were susceptible to physical damage due to fire-induced hot shorts. Affected systems include residJa! heat removal, component cooling, sb.~ety injection, reactor coolant, and auxiliary feedwater. For compensatory measures, operations dapartments instructions and alarm response procedure changes were issued. This was considered an apparent violation and assigned a tracking number of eel 50-282/98016-03(DRS); 50-306/98016-03(DRS).

11 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant 2A Security facilities and equipment observed functioned as designed and Support compensatory measures were seldom required. However, the inspectors noted very high alarm rates for supposedly environmental-related alarms.

Some minor inconsistencies were noted in security component testing.

12 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant 3A No deficiencies were noted during the review of ten security force training Support and qualification records.

Page 2 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98 Prairie Island Search Soned by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascerong): Search Colurnn = *SALP" ; SALP Area =

• Plant Support" : Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Date = "9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 13 7/31/1998 Strength IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant 3A No violations or deviations were noted during an inspection of the physical Support security program.

14 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant 3B Security force members were knowledgeable of post requirements and Support performed the duties in an adequate manner. A minor deficiency was noted pertaining to contractor personnel authorizing visitors into the i

protected area.

L 15 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant 38 Security records and documents reviewed were complete and accurate.

Support 16 7/31/1998 Strength IR 98013(DRS)

NRC Plant SA Security self-assessments were considered a strength. The self-Support assessment program was varied, aggressive, and well documented.

Findings were effectively documented and monitored until closure.

17 7/24/1998 Strength IR 98012(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise Support was effective and demonstrated that emergency plan implementation activities met regulatory requirements.

18 7/24/1998 Positive lR 98014(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C The licensee's program to sample ar.d analyze waste streams for the Support determination of radionuclide scaling factors remained effective and enabled the staff to appropriately classify radwaste for shipment.

Previously identified issues regarding scaling factor determinations and data review were adequately addressed.

19 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRS)

NRC Plant 1C The overall implementation of the radioactive material transportation Support program remained effective, as licensee documentation and inspector observations confirmed that the licensee met station and regulatory requirements.

20 7/24/1998 Strength IR 98014(DRS)

NRC Plant 2A 3B Plant personnel continued to effectively implement the solid radwaste Support program. In particular, the dewatering equipment was highly reliable and the radwaste storage area surveillances were comprehensive. Pldnt personnel developed radwaste processing initiatives to improve the efficiency of resin useage and fi!ter drum disposal.

21 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98012(DRS)

NRC Plant 3A The Operational Support Center's staff performed well in coordinating Support activities and maintaining control and status of the inplant response teams. Communications with the response teams and other emergency response facilities were performed well.

Page 3 of 8

+

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX

/23/98 i Prairie Island Search Sorted by Da% (Descending) atv1 SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP*, SALP Area = "Ptant Support", Beginrnng Date = *10/1/97*. Ending Date = '9/3058*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP

!SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 22 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98012(DRS)

NRC Plant 3A Overall performance of Emergency Operations Facility staff was Support competent. Communications to onsite emergency response facilities and offsite agencies were frequent, and offsite notifications were timely.

23 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98012 (DRS)

NRC Plant 38 The Technical Support Center staff's performance was effective.

Support Briefings and status board maintenance were competent. The emergency action level logic diagrams were proactively reviewed.

Extensive decision-making and event mitigation activities were observed.

24 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98012 (DRS)

NRC Plant 3B

^ erall performance in the Control Room Simulator was effective.

Support Facility briefings were informative. Good communications and teamwork were evident.

25 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98012(DRS)

NRC Plant SA Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough, self-Support critical, and included inputs from exercise participants as well as controllers.

26 6/27/1998 Positive IR 98009(DRP)

NRC Plant 3A 1C The securit, 'orce provided timely and important information to the control Support room staff conceming severe weather conditions having a potential safety impact. Also, the security force reacted quickly to compensate for damage to perimeter monitoring equipment cause by a lightning strike.

27 5/26/1998 NCV IR 98016(DRS)

Ucensee Plant 1C 5A SC The licensee identified several inadequate Appendix R fire barriers and LER 2-98-03 Support unsealed fire barrier penetrations. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions as described in LER 50-306/98003 were adequate and determined that the problem was a Non-Cited Violation, with a tracking number of 50-306/98016-04(DRS) 28 5/11/1998 Negative IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The two air ejector radiation monitor check sources (containing nine Support microcuries of Cesium-137 in each source) were not included in the annual radioactive source inventory lists. Even though the sources contained exempt quantities of Cesium-137, the radiation protection department had made a common practice of including all sources on the annual inventory lists for control and tracking purposes.

Page 4 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1 /23/98, ;

Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP*, SALP Area =

• Plant Support' ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97*, Ending Date = '9/30/98*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 29 3/20/1998 NCV 1R 98004 NRC Plant 1C The radiation protection staff exercised effective control of work practices Support and radiological conditions. Monitoring and control of airbome radioactivity and contamination was successful, as evidenced by the low number of radioactive intakes and personnel contaminations.

Housekeeping and key control issues were noted for high radiation areas and one Non-Cited Violation for an unposted high radiation area was identified. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/98004-01(DRS); 50-306/98004-01(DRS).

30 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C The control of radiological conditions and the ALARA measures Support associated with the partial length control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) forced outage were well implemented, and the dose expended was reasonable for the work accomplished. However, the inspector noted that better communication between work crews would have reduced radiation exposure.

31 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C Radiation work practices and radiation protection coverage for routine Support and non-routine tasks were appropriate. Pre-job briefings were effective and the staff generaly utilized low dose areas during their work.

32 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C Improvements in the calibration program for the process and area Support radiation monitors were well implemented. These improvements included procedure revisions, thorough data review, more extensive testing, and timely instrument repair. The materiel condition of the monitors was very good, as evidenced by operability and performance data. In particular, the elevated reading of a containment radiation monitor was the first indication of the partiallength CRDM leak.

33 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C Effective implementation of ALARA measures for the Unit 1 refueling Support outage resulted in significant dose savings and indicated a continuing strong ALARA commitment. The ALARA post-job reviews were well done, as staff identified pertinent actions to further reduce dose for future activities.

34 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 2A 1C The operability and materiel condition of the post accident monitoring Support eouipment were excellent, and records indicated that staff were appropriately trained to operate the monitors to collect and analyze post accident samples.

Page 5 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX M/23/98 Prairie Island Search Soned by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

• Plant Suppor:", Beginning Data = *10/1/97*. Ending Date = "9/30S8*

DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 35 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98004 Licensee Plant 5A 1C The radiation protection (RP) program reviews met regulatory Support requirements and effectively identified site issues and action items for followup. The recommendations appropriately focussed on improved RP performance. in addition, various licensee observation reports were comprehensive and detailed. The RP supervisory staff did not identify any adverse performance trends.

36 2/24/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Plant 3A 1C The inspectors observed several instances of good radiation control Support practices to maintain dose as low as is reasonably achievable during the Unit 2 partial length control rod drive mechanism repairs.

37 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97023 NRC Plant 3A 1C Good involvement of radiation protection personnel in job planning and Support execution in order to maintain low doses was observed, as exemplified by the involvement of radiation protection personnel with operators during performance of a reactor coolant system integrity test. Teamwork / Skill Level 38 12/2/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Plant 3A 1C The radiation protection staff performed well in controlling exposures Support during refueling activities. Involved Management 39 10/31/1997 Positive IR 97022 NRC Plant 3A 1C The licensee's ALARA reviews and radiation work permit / job planning Support identified and addressed radiological conditions for various outage tasks. i The pre-job briefings were thorough and ALARA measures were effectively implemented. The continued development of dose reduction initiatives indicated a strong ALARA commitment. Involved Management 40 10/31/1997 Positive IR 97022 NRC Plant 3A 1C The radiation protection stcff exercised effective control of work practices Support and radiological conditions within the plant. Monitoring and control of contamination was successful as evidenced by the low number of t

personnel contaminations. Although there were some minor housekeeping issues identified during the inspection, the outage activities were conducted with a good ALARA focus. Involved Management 41 10/31/1997 Positive IR 97022 NRC Plant 3A 1C Surveys conducted for the free release of turbine components were Support extensive and the storage of conditionally released components was adequate to prevent the spread of potential contamination. Involved Management Page 6 of 8

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX n/23/98 Prairie Island Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP", SALP Area =

• Plant Support" ; Begtnrung Date = *10n/97*, Ending Date = 9/30S8" DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 42 10/31/1997 NCV 1R 97022 NRC Plant 3A 1C in general, radiation worker practices were appropriate. However, one Support Non-Cited Violation was identified due to an experienced radiation worker's display of a lack of respect for radiological boundaries and postings. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-282/97022-01(DRS); 50-306/97022-01(DRS). Involved Management 43 10/31/1997 Positive iR 97022 NRC Plant 3A 2A 1C The chemistry staff successfully conducted chemical additions during Support reactor shutdown which resulted in a reduction of the source term.

Hideout retum results were very low, confirming exce!!ent water quality L

chemistry cnd indicating that fouling of the steam generators was not significant. Teamwork / Skill Level 44 10/28/1997 LER 1R 97021 LER 1-Self-Plant 2A 3A 1C A small but smoky fire occurred in the maintenance shop located in the 97-14 Revealed Support service building. The fire started in an air filtration unit attached to a welding and cutting table in the shop. It was extinguished in about 20 minutes; 12 employees were treated onsite for exposure to smoke and released to retum to work. The response of the fire brigade, control room operators, and other licensee personnel to the fire was good.

Teamwork / Skill Level 45 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Plant 1C Licensee staff performance during the annual medical emergency drill Support was good. Teamwork / Skill Leve!

l l

46 10/3/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97019 NRC Plant 1C The licensee implemented an inadequate procedure which circumvented Support required emergency operating procedures steps. This was considered a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." The licensee's interpretation of what constituted an entry condition for the reactor trip emergency operating procedure was incorrect. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-i 282/97019-01(DRS); 50-306/97019-01(DRS). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction Page 7 of 8

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

DATE The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date, if the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1

Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal eel' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiung Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER Ucense Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licensing L.icensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.)

However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative individual Poor Licensee Performance identdied by the Eels and the PIM entries 3

Human Performance:

P sitive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance are made. Befom the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Sks!s, and Abilities Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Wed Environment URl" Unresolved inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4

Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-il Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional er:farcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Notice of Violation - Soventy Level lli conferenca.

B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Seventy Level IV

• • UR!s are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance l

5 Problem identification and Resolution:

w er ue in as acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification ID BY nonconformance, or a violation. However, B-Analysis the NRC has not reached its final C - Resolution Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Rivealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 8 of 8