ML20154M416
| ML20154M416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1985 |
| From: | Malsch M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151K691 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-409, TASK-AINC, TASK-SE ALAB-781, SECY-85-028, SECY-85-28, NUDOCS 8603140257 | |
| Download: ML20154M416 (39) | |
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ADJUDICATORY ISSUE ~ ~
""""U '
(NEGATIVE CONSENT)
For: The Coaanissioners From: Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel
Subject:
REVIEW OF ALAB-781 (IN TiiE MATTER OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY)
Facility: Diablo Canyon, Unit No. 1 l
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Recommendation: .
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tiartin G. Malsch .
Deputy General Counsel J
Attachments:
- 1. Analysis of Issues
- 2. ALAB.781 -
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SECY NOTE: In the absence of instructions to the contrary, SECY will notify OGC on Monday, February 11, 1985 that the Commission, by negative consent, assents to the action proposed in this paper.t ,.
DISTRIBUTION:
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, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
ATOMIC SAFETY-AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Admir.'strative i Judges
0{,gTjD
/ Thomas S. Moore September. 6, 1984 Dr., John H. Buck "-
,,'Dr. W. Reed Johnson (ALAq$8g g #20:21 3 ,
-E5!6jy$r:'- .
In the Matter of ) .
)
) Docket'Nos. 50-275 OL
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. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
) 50-323 OL (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Unitis 1 and 2) )
)
SERVED SEP 71984 =
Joel R. Reynolds and John R. Phillips, Los'. Angeles,._ _......
.,i California, and David S. Fleischaxer, Oklahoma City, -
Oklahoma, for the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace,
- '-~
et al., joint intervenors. .
Byron S.'iGeorgiou, Sacramento, California, and Herbert H. Brown and Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Washington, D.C.,
~~
for EdarInd G. Brown, Jr. , (former) Governor of the
- .- ; State of California.*
Malcolm H. Furbush, Robert Ohlbach, Philip A. Crane, Jr., and Richard F. Locke, San Francisco, California,\ .
and Arthur C. Gehr and Bruce Norton, Phoenix, Arizona, for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, applicant.
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~ ~ -~ ~
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Lawrence J. Chandler, Donald F. Hassell and Sherwin E.
Turk for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff.
i -
'opinI,on.Sincethebriefingoftheissuesdecidedinthis
, George Deukmejian has assumed the office of -
Governor. Pursuant to Governor Deukmejian's request, he has been substituted for Governor Brown as the representative of the State of California. The Attorney General of the State
& of California is, noW . representing Governor Deukmejian.
9 0
. . . , , _ . . . , _ _ , _ . ._ _ . - _ . . . . , _ , _ _,__.,,,..,,m,,-__.,m_,_mem ..,-,7%r_ _.__.,___.,.r,,__._.,y._y.,,,,_,_-m,_,__.m , _ , ,,, ,
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DECISION All parties appealed the Licensing Board's August 31, t 1982 initial decision, LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756 (1982),
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authorizing a full power license for Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units -
. 1 and 2. 'In'this decision, we address thq appeals of the -
joint intervenors and the Governor of Ca'iifornia from that decision. Previously, in ALAB-776, 19 NRC (June 29, 1984), we decided the appeals of the applicant and the NRC staff. The present appeals challenge the adequacy of emergency planning at Diablo Canyon. In addition, the joint intervenors dispute the sufficiency of the hRC's *
. environmental review of the'Diablo Canyon project. -
- 1
-The adjudicatory history of the Diablo Canyon project
, extends over a period exceeding a , decade and can be traced ,
' through numerous agency decisions. See, e.g., ALAB-334, 3 NRC 809 (1976) (authorization of Part 70 license to store new fuel) ; LBP-78-19, 7 lutC 989 '(1978)' (partial initial decision on environmental and some safety issues); -
LBP-79-26, 10 NRC 453 (1979) (partial initial dec'ision on non-TMI issues, e.g., risk from aircraft, seismic and security); ALAB-598, 11 NRC 476 (1980) (reopening of record ;
for seismic issues); ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903 (1981) (seismic findings on reopened record); LBP-81-21, 14 NRC 107 (1981)
(partial initial decision authorizing fuel loading and low power testing); ALAB-653, 14 NRC 629 (1981) (security findings based on reopened record; expurgated findings attached to CLI-82-19, 16 NRC 53 (19 8 2) ) ; CLI-81-22, 14 NRC 598 (1981) (immediate effectiveness review); CLI-81-30, 14 NRC 950 (1981) (suspension of low power license); ALABa728, 17 NRC 777 (1983) (low power authorization affirmed);
p (Foo'tnote Continued) l ' .
__-..__.___.____~..._.____.__.._,.________.' _ _ _
'. 's 3
! I.
In its initial decision, the Licensing Board made
_l
- :: -- E' detailed factual findings on the numerous facets of the _.
onsite and offsite emergency response planning for Diablo
.. Canyon.2 The Board then concluded that emergency planning
. .- . t- ..'or f the facility complies with the Commiss, ion's emergency .
~
.. response regulations and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.3 On appeal, the joint e
(Footnote Continued)
CLI-83-27, 18 NRC 1146 (1983) (fuel loading . and .
.. pracriticality testing authorized); CLI-84-2, 19 NRC 3 (1984) '(hot system testing authorized); ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571.
(1984) (findings on adequacy of unit 1 design following reopening of record); CLI-84-5, 19 NRC 953 (1984) (lifting suspension of low power license); CLI-84-13, 20 NRC
. . (August 10, 1984) (immediate effectiveness review).
2 LBP-82-70, supra, 16 NRC at 763-792,- 799-849.
- .. g
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What we stated in ALAB-776, supra, 19 NRC at n.4, concerning the format of the Licensing Board's initial
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decision warrants' repeating:
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The Board's initial decision consists of essentially two parts. The first is a lengthy " opinion" discussing the issues, the evidence, and the Board's resolution of
- the issues. LBP-82-70, supra, 16 NRC at 759-98. The second is an equally lengthy listing of " findings of
' fact" and " conclusions of law" largely repetitious of what the Board already stated in the first part of its decision. Id. at 798-855. Besides being exceedingly time consuming for both the writers and the readers, this format holds the potential for creating . . ..
inconsistencies within the four corners of the decision.
N-3 LBP-82-70, supra,'16 NRC at 761, 797-98.
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intervenors and 'the Governor challenge these conclusions on several grounds.4
,-. . . A. They assert that the Board erred in making these -
determinations without first considering the effects upon.
.. emergency planning of a major earthquake which causes, or
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-- . :.:. occurs during, a radiological emergency at the facility.5 _ , , ,
In a prehearing conference order the Licensing Board '
rejected the attempt to inject this issue into the f
proceeding,6 relying upon the Commission's then recent i
j decision in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre _. ,
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' Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI'-81-33, 14 l
4
, Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.762 (1962) , the joint ,
l intervenors filed 198 exceptions to the Licensing Board's
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initial decision and other related rulings while the Governor filed 83 exceptions. See Joint Intervenors'
' ', Exceptions to the Licensing Board's August 31, 1982 Initial '
Decision (September 16, 1982); Exceptions of Governor (of California] To Licensing Board Initial D,ecision of August 31, 1982 (September 16, 1982). Only those issues briefed by the joint intervenors or the Governor are treated in this opinion. The remaining except.io.ns.are deemed waived for
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failure to brief them on appeal. See Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating. Station, Unit
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1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981); Public Service Co. of l ~ Indiana (Marble Hill Station, Units 1 and 2) , ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 315 (1978).
5 See Joint Intervenors' Brief In Support Of Exceptions (November 8, 1982) [ hereinafter Joint Intervenors' Brief] at
.21-30; Brief of Governor (of California] In Support of l Exceptions (November 8, 1982) [ hereinafter Brief of '
, Governor] at 2-8. . 1 6
See Memorandum and Order of December 23,1981
- (unpublished) at 1-2. ,
5 NRC 1091 (1981) .
- That decision held the agency's
- regulations do not requira specific consideration of the i : ..:.. - . impacts of earthquakes on emergency planningr :*. . ~.
. The joint intervenors and the Governor raised this same
_. . ... . issue in their earlier appeals7 from the Licensing Board's
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. . .. . .. partial initial decision authorizing fuel, loading.and. low. -...
.. - power testing at Diablo Canyon.8 In ALAB-728, we resolved
. . this issue against them, holding that the Commission's San Onofre decision "could not be more emphatic..or clear: the possible complicating effects of an earthquake on e'mergency
- .- . : planning should not be considered in individual licensing -
proceedings."8 Normally, our resolution of this issue in .
. ALAB-728 would be the law o.' the case and preclude any. .
further consideration of the same issue on appeals from the
, . . Licensing Board's initial decision. In this instance, ,
however, the Commission has, in effect, directed certification of the issue on its own motion. After i
1 See Joint Intervenors' Brief In Support Of Exceptions (September 2, 1981) at 53-55; Brief of Governor (of California] On Appeal Of The Licensing Board Partial Initial j Decision of July 17, 1981 (September 2, 1981) at 35-40.
- 8 See LBP-81-21, 14 NRC 107 (1981). .
I 17 NRC 777, 793 (1983).
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See 10 CFR 2".718'(1).
._.._,,__.,-____.,___._,_,.____,,.,_---,-,,_,_,-,-,,-,,,_-__.,,_r,-
6 declining to review ALAB-728, the Commission, on April 3,
- 1984,. announced that it would decide whether the effects of L *
. . earthquakes on emergency planning at Diablo Canyon should be considered.12 In a decision issued August 10, the Commission " determined that the information before it does ,
not warrant departure from the decision in, San onofre that -
the NRC's regulations 'do not require consideration of the impacts on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental release.'"13 In these circumstances, the issue appealed by the joint intervenors and the Governor is no longer before us. -- " -
B. The joint intervenors also argue that the Licensing Board erred in authorizing a license for Diablo .
Canyon without first addressing the consequences of a Class 9 accident at the facility.14 Like their argument
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concerning'the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, the joint intervenors raised this issue cns their appeal from the Licensing Board's partial initial l
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11 See CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).
12 See CLI-84-4, 19 NRC (1984).
13 CLI-84-12, 20 NRC , (slip opinion at 1)
(1984).
14 See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 47-53.
y A
decision authorizing fuel loading and low power testing.
once again this issue was resolved against them in ALAB-728.
In a Memorandum and Order dated June 19, 1981, the -
., n . , , , . Licensing Board denied the joint intervenors' motion to-reopen the record to consider the environmental i n ;, _,. consequences of a Class 9 accident at Diab,lo Canyon.15 on -
appeal of the decision authorizing low power testing, the -
joint intervenors argued that the Board's denial of their
. earlier motion was error. They asserted that the Commission's June 13, 1980 policy statement entitled
_ .." Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the --
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," 45 Fed. Reg.
.;40,101, mandated that the agency consider Class 9 accident .
~
sequences for Diablo Canyon in its Environmental Impact
. Statement (EIS). In ALAB-728, we fully rehearsed the
.:. evolution of the agency's treatment of so-called Class 9 g
accidents from the time such postulated events received no consideration through the issuance of the Commission's 1980
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policy statement, which announced that future agency -
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environmental impact statements should include.their consideration. Contrary to the joint intervenors' argument LBP-81-17, 13 NRC 1122 (1981). ...
10 See Joint Intervenors' Brief In Support Of _"
Exceptions (September 2, 1981) at 56-57. See also ALAB-728,
.c. supra, 17 NRC at 795. .
8 that pending cases required consideration of Class 9 .
accidents, we held that the policy statemen,t,,by its terms, was limited to proceedings where the agancy had not yet issued a' final EIS.1 In the case of Diablo Canyon where.
the final EIS had already been issued, supplemented,
. litigated and found adequate, we held that the " change in policy announced in 1980 was not intended by the Commission to apply."18 We went on to note, however, that the Commission's policy statement did not completely foreclose consideration of Class 9 accidents in proceedings,like
_- ,_ Diablo Canyon if certain "special circumstances" were shown.
But we'found that
. in their brief, joint intervenors'make no argument.
. that "special circumstances" exist at Diablo Canyon so as to require expanding the already completed EIS for the facility. Therefore, we
/ need not consider that question. We note, a however, that in denying the joint intervenors' motion to reopen the record, the Licensing Board '
concluded that no such special circums existed with respect to Diablo Canyon.}gnces.'
The joint intervenors now seek to argue on this appeal
'that the Licensing'Bodrd's' conclusion'that no special circumstances exist at Diablo Canyon was erroneous. Their argument comes too late. Nothing barred.the joint 17 ALAB-728, supra, 17 NRC at 795-9C -
18 Id. at 796.
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_Id.
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- - .-,--~w,w, y,,-,,,,,,,,- --g ,me,-,e_-,-ne,w- . , , - , e-,,--- -- ,
y intervenors from* raising this additional argument on their previous appeal. Indeed, they were required to put forth all their arguments on this issue at that time. - To allow a
, second appeal of the same' issue would lead to endless litigation.
In any event, the joint intervenors', argument that . --
special circumstances exist at Diablo Canyon is without merit. As noted in ALAB-728, the Commission's policy
. statement set forth the " unique circumstances" in cases that had in the past warranted consideration of Class 9
, - accidents.20 The C-ission cited the novel design of thee '
- .. proposed Clinch River Breeder Reactor, the high population -
i -
density surrounding the proposed Perryman site, and the ~
potentially serious radiological exposures associated with water pathways from Offshore Power Systems' floating nuclear
. . .. power gilants. It then indicated that final environmental
{ statements should be expanded to include Class 9 accident analyses only in "similar special circumstances."21 The ,
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joint intervenors do not contend that Diablo Canyon presents l
t circumst ances similar to those listed in the Commission's j policy statement. Rather, they argue there is a fourth 20 ALAB-728, supra, 17 NRC at 796; 45 Fed. Reg. 40,101, 40,102 (1980).
21
- i. 45 Fed. Reg.,' sudra, at 40,103.
9
, , . - - , . - - , ,_,n. , _ , - - . . - , - . . - , ,,,._-.m,e e,,,.y-, , , . - --,,.,-.-,,,,,,,e,,-,,.v-
10 category -- proximity to a natural hazard -- that demands
' consideration of Class 9 accidents because ,Di,ablo Canyon is located in the vicinity of the Hosgri Fault and in a region '
l of known seismicity. -
The " natural hazard" category relied upon by joint "
intervenors originated with the commission,'s opinionin~~
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Foic Station,. Units 1 _l and 2) , CLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433, 434 (1980). There the <
Commission reversed our erder requiring the staff to inform the Commission whether class 9 accidents should be
- h e considered for that reactor.22 Black Fox preceded the commission's policy statement and was an evolutionary step toward the policy's development. In that decision, the ,
, l Commission listed the same three categories of special cases that subsequently appeared in the policy statement. It also 9
noted'a fourth cate5ory, i.e., " proximity to man-made or natural hazards," that represented the " type of exceptional case that might warrant additional' con' sideration."23 !
Because the natural hazards category was not subsequently i
repeated in the policy statement, that category's continuing validity is suspect. Nor is the natural hazards category l
22 See ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 790-92 (1979).
23
.. CLI-80-8, supra, 11 NRC at 434 (emphasis in tite 1
criginal). -
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11 "similar" to the other categories in the policy statement.24
. Putting these distinctions to one side, theinatural hazard
._r- ;-- r 2-- category s.till does not advance the joint intervenors?. -
. position. ,
- -c. -
- -- . contrary to joint intervenors' argument, the fact that -
Diablo . canyon is located in the vicinity o,f- the Hosgri Fault ~'.
and.in a region of known seismicity does not make the Diablo Canyon situation " unique" or " exceptional" as required by i
l the policy statement and Black Fox. Pursuant'to General i
- - Design Criterion 2 (GDC 2) of 10 CFR Part 50,. Appendix A, 2
,, u . - - nuclear power plants are required to be designed to .
. . . . . withstand earthquakes and certain other natural hazards.
, specifically, it directs that they -
shall be designed to withstand the effects of l natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without l . .- loss of capability to perform their safety functions.~ The design bases for these structures,t 0 systems, and components shall reflect: (1)
Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reporte'd for the site and surrounding area, with
_. ;. sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, -
. .- quantity, and period of time in which the - -- - '
_ __ historical data have been accumulated, (2) - _ . -
- appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena and (3) the imp safety functions to be performed.ggtance of the 1
l 24 See Metromolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island
.. Nuclear Station, LJnit No. 1) , ALAB-705, 16 NRC 1733, 1742 l .o n.24 (1982).
. 25 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 2.
/ .
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- - . - . _ - . . - . . . . . - . . - _ - - - - . . . - . __ u ._ _- - _ . . - - - - -
9 12 Diablo' Canyon, like other licensed facilities, has been I i'
found to meet this standard.26 In other wo,rd,s, the effects of the. hazards listed in GDC 2 are typical of those that all commercial reactors must be designed to meet. They are not i the " unique" and " exceptional" circumstances that unde,r the Commission's precedents and policy stateme,nt require ;
consideration of Class 9 accidents.27 Accordingly, the Licensing Board was correct in concluding that no special circumstances exist at Diablo Canyon that require consideration of Class 9 accidents.28 s . . .. . . .
- At the time the joint intervenors moved to reopen
, the record for consideration of Class 9 accidents at Diablo .
, Canyon, the Licensing Board had already conducted exhaustive hearings on the effects of seismic forces on the facility.
Subsequently, the Board found the seismic design adequate.
. . See-LBP-79-26, 10 NRC 453 (1979). Thereafter, we reopened '
'." the record.to hear new evidence that was not available to
.- ' the Board below and,after further hearings, affirmed the
,# Licensing Board's decision. 'See ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903 $
(1981). '
27 We note t' hat the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has also denied two petitions filed pursuant to
. 10 CFR 2.206 seeking to have the agency consider the effects of Class 9 accidents at Diablo Canyon. See DD-80-22, 11 NRC 919 (1980); DD-81-3, 13 NRC 349 (1981). The second petition was filed by the joint intervenors. In denying both petitions, the Director found that there were no special circumstances at Diablo Canyon warranting the consideration of Class 9 accidents.
28 The joint intervenors also argue that the Licensing Board's failure to consider the consequences of Class 9 accidents violates the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC 55 4321 et seq., and the regulations of the Council on
.. EnvironmentiT~ Quality, 40 CFR 1502.9 (c) . The explicit (Footnote Continued)
G
. 9
_m_-,------------~-._---n-- - - , - - - ~ , . - -
13 C. Next, the joint intervenors and the Governor argue 4
. - that the Licensing Board erred in authorizirig 'the issuance .
. . - - . _ 3 .-
of a full. power license before the Federal Emergency - .. -
Management Agency (FEMA) issued " final" findings on the' ,
~~
=- , - adequacy of the state and local offsite emergency response - -
2 . - __ plans for Diablo Canyon. They argue that,such " final". FEMA -
. findings, and their right to rebut them,' are. mandated by the .
Co-4ssion's emergency response regulations, 10 CFR
- 50. 47 (a) (2) .29 This issue was decided in ALAB-776 in resolving the appeals of the applicant and the staff from. - -
- . :--- . the Licensing Board's 171tial decision. In opposing those* -l
. appeals, the joint intervenors and the Governor made the f . .
- - .-, . identical argument and proffered the same interpretation of ,
the Commission's regulations.30 ,
We held that the i
. . Commission's emergency response regulations did not require
" final" FEMA findings on the adequacy of offsita emergency 5
- f. -
(Footnote Continued) - -
purpose of the Commission's June 13, 1980 policy statement, - - -
r however, was to ensure compliance with NEPA. We are, therefore, bound by the policy statement. See ALAB-705, supra, 16 NRC at 1738 n.13.
29 See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 12-20, 37-38; Brief of Governor at 12-14. .
. 30 See Joint Intervenors' Response To Pacific Gas And Electric Company And NRC Staff Briefs In Support Of Exception To August 31, 1982 Initial Decision -(December 20, ;
1982) at 4-11; Brief Of Governor (of California] In Reply to '
PG&E And NRC Staff Briefs In Support Of Exceptions (December i }. 20, 1982) at 1-6.
.._-.,nn.- , - - - - , - ~ , , , , , ~ - , , , , , , , - - - , , , - - - . __ww.,nn,we,-, .,-- ,,_ .w.--ee, p.
14 response plans, and that interim FEMA findings and the
' testimony of FEMA witnesses with respect toithe adequacy of i
such plans was all that was needed to comply with the '
regulations. Further, with respect to the state plan and preparedness, we found that the hearing record fully supported the Licensing Board's conclusion, that there was ~~
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.31
. D. Central ,to the development of offsite emergency .
response plans under the Commission's regulations is the concept of emergency planning zones (EPZs) , i.e. , those areas around a plant for which planning is needed so that .
timely and effective actions can be taken to protect the
.,.. public in the event of a radiological emergency.32 The commission's regulatory scheme contemplates the . g
- establishment of two such zones: the plume exposure pathway i
j that "shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in
. radius" and the ingestion pathway that "shall consist of an l
31 ALAB-776, supra, 19 NRC at (slip opinion at 13).
32 See 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (2); 10 CFR Part 50', Appendix E;
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
.. Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1
.-:- (November 1980) at 10.
4 5
15 area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius."33 As we stated in
- ., reviewing this regulatory scheme in Cincinnati- Gas & -
,j_y_,. Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station,. Unit No. E 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 765 (1983), -
--. ._. .. . . . .c [t]he plume EPZ is concerned principally with the -
j .7 ! .- ~ .
avoidance in the event of a nuclear facility --
_'. ." ~ [ . . accident of possible (1) whole body external--- '
exposure to gamma radiation froni the plume and
' from deposited materials and (2) inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume. The duration of those exposures could vary in length
' from hours to days.- The ingestion EPZ is established primarily for the purpose of avoiding
, . exposures traceable to contaminated watu or foods (such as milk or fresh vegetables), a potential ~
_, _. , , .. _ , , exposure source that could vary in duration from hours to months. ,
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The commission's regulations then require that emergency 4
response planning within these two zones meet the . .
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.47 (b) .
t
,, ,. - In its emergency response planning for Diablo Canyon,
.".the State of California established substantially large_r g ,
EPZs around the plant than those specified in 10 CFR
,- 50.47,(c) (2) . Although recognizing the Commission prescribed EPZs, the State established three zones that more than i
33 l 10 CFR 50. 47 (c) (2) . The Commi sion's emergency l response regulations further provide that "[t]he exact size
! and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular '
j nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land !
. characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional t
- .. boundaries." d I_d,. .
\
16 ancompassed the federal zones: the California Basic EPZ
'(plume); the California Extended EPZ (plume) ; .and the ,
4
, California Ingestion Pathway EPZ. The Basic EPZ, for instance, has an average radius of about 15 miles but .
extends 18 miles beyond the plant to the north and 20 miles to the southeast.35 Following the example, of the State, San Luis obispo County (the jurisdiction in which the plant.is located) adopted the same state zones in its emergency reponse plan.36 i In its initial decision, the Licensing Board noted the five EPZs (i.e., three state and two federal) applicable to !
Diablo Canyon and held that the Federal requirements are minimum standards for,
, planning and not inflexible targets which must not be exceeded. This Board, however, has no authority to enforce State standards which exceed thoserequiredbyFag9ralregulations. That is *
..- for the State to do.
. p - -
"Because the county emergency plan incorporating the 4
California Basic,EPZ would be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon, the Board inquired 34 See Applicant's Ex. 73, Appendix C at 7, 12, and i Figs. 2, 6.
i 35
. IJ1. at Fig. 2. .
36 See Applicant's Ex. 80 at I.5 (2) and Fig. I.5-6.
37
.- LBP-82-70, suora, 16 NRC at 764. See also ~~id. at
- 801-02.
i I
+~,---v,.-y-,,,--ym---,,-,.,ww+w,,w--ee,mm., v w e w mw, a y - w----, m_ _-e--w-. ---
17 into the status of planning in the state zones beyond the
. . areas set forth in 10 CFR 50.47(c) (2) only to ' assure that l : :--. .
all-levels.of emergency response would be integrated. The' ~'
Board then generally found that offsite planning within the
-...:- ; federal EPZs was adequate and met the Commission's emergency ~ ,
- response requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 (b) . , Additionally, it' '
. . m found that beyond the federal zones there was reasonable assurance that planning would be sufficient to permit appropriate integration prior to full power operation.38
-- .. - - - :r . On apper21, the joint intervenors and the Governor
,- :___.., f assert that the Licensing Board erred in failing to give -
. . effect to the state designated zones. They argue that the
. < _:- Board's conclusion, which largely ignores the state zones .
beyond the areas specified in the Commission's regulations,
.. . . . _ . . contravenes established principles of federal-state comity -- principles'that are specifically' recognized by s section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 52021.38 l
.:.. The applicant and the staff, on the other hand, support the
{ :: . .. . Licensing Board's treatment of the state zones, arguing that
- . the Board properly declined to require compliance with the k
I i
38 See id. at 765, 768, 802.
39 See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 31-3'6; Brief Of
- - Governor at 8-12.
.t
18 Commission's emergency planning requirements throughout the entire state designated zones. .
Contrary to the argument of the joint intervenors and the Governor, the Licensing Board's focus o.1 emergency ..
P lanning within the EPZs set forth in 10 CFE 50.47 (c) (2) was correct. .That regulation evidences the Commission's considered expert judgment as to the necessary size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ and the ingestion pathway EPZ for light water commercial nuclear power plants.40 Although the
. regulations provide that the exact size and configuration of a particular EPZ is to be determined with reference to site
. specific factors,41 the wholesale enlargement of the
! Commission prescribed EPZs by the State cannot preclude a ,
licensing decision based upon the requirements of the NRC
- . regulations. As the Licensing Board concluded in l
...co'nsidering the same' . type of expanded state EPZs in Southerns California Edison Co. (San Onofra Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2"and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1181 ,
l l , . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
40 See Statement of Considerations accompanying promulgation of Final Emergency Planning Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402, 55,406 (1980); NRC Policy Statement,
" Planning Basis for Ercrgency Responses to Nuclear Power
. Reactor Accidents," 4. Fed. Reg. 61,123 (1979). See also
" Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local.
Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396-EPA 520/1-78-016 (December 1978) at 15-17, I-6 to I-7, and I-20.
s
$. 41 See n.33, supra.
- - * . - - - - +-----.-w,---_
. o.
19 s.
(1982) , aff ' d, ALAB-717, 17 NRC 3 4 6 (1983), the Commission's regulations " clearly allow legway for a mile or
. . .,, , ,,two in either direction, based on local factors. But it ---
~
. ... clearly precludes a plume EPZ radius of, say, 20-or~, --
more miles." The same Board then correctly determined that
. , 4 ., , . , ,_
a party seeking to impose such a radical d,eparture from-the'- r Commission's prescribed EPZs should seek an exception to the -
rule pursuant to 10 CFR 2.758.42 Before the Licensing Board neither the joint
._, intervenors nor the Governor sought an exception or waiver
._ _ _ _ ,- , , -(pursuant to 10 CFR 2.758) of the Commission's 10 and 50 mile emergency planning zones. Nor'did they-present
- ;- .. . , evidence that the plume exposure pathway EPZ and the ,
4 ingestion pathway EPZ established pursuant to the commission's regulations should be altered to accommodate l[ ~ particular 1ocal conditions.43
~
Rather, they now argue that
. . \
42
_ , See LBP-82-39, supra, 15 NRC at 1181 n.14. .
43
~ In their briefs, both the joint intervenors and the -
~
~. ~ Governor cite Governor's Exhibit 8 and suggest that it ~
provides the most appropriate basis for determining the size of the EPZs for Diablo Canyon. See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 34; Brief of Governor at 8. This exhibit, published by the California office of Emergency Services and entitled
" Emergency Planning Zones For Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents" (November 1980), delineates enlarged EPZs for al'1 huclear power plants in the state. In the hearing below, the Licensing Board admitted this exhibit into evidence for .
the sole purpose of identifying the boundaries of the.'three
,, state EPZs. It was specifically not admitte.d to provide the
~
- x. (Footnote Continued)
.- 21 within the NRC prescribed EPZs complies with the
, ,, , _ j fa==4 ssion's emergency response requirementsj- Accordingly, 3 ; . . . the Licensing Board did not err in refusing ~-to adopt -the - - - --
l, _
_ [..a_enlargedstateEPZsand, correspondingly,inrefusingto -- -
g ...._. require compliance with the Commission's emergency response i
. . . _ , 3,, requirements in the areas outside the fede,ral#EPZs'- - .
- - 7 E. Additionally, the joint intervenors argue that the Licensing Board abused its discretion in authorizing a full power license for Diablo Canyon even though at the time of
- n _;-.::; _ the hearing on emergency planning several defects;in the
~
- ,,.
- ;-.__, - -county's response plans existed.45 Principally, they '
complain, with little elaboration, that the county's '
',_,_,_.q. _, planning is inadequate because its public information ~
program had not been implemented and its communications i
, ,, , system had uncorrected deficiencies. Further, the joint l .. ,-
intervenors, joined by the Governor, claim that the county's i \
l l
45 '
The joint intervenors also claim that, at the time
, ,. , ., ' of the hearing, state emergency planning was inadequate
~ ~ ~ . because evacuation plans for special state jurisdictions
'within San Luis Obispo County (i.e. , California Men's Colony and California Polytechnic Institute) were incomplete. See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 38. In ALAB-776, suora, 19 NRC l at we reviewed the evidence underlying the Licensing BoarET,s conclusion that state planning was adequate and .
upheld that finding. Moreover, as found by the Licensing -
Board, both of the joint intervenors' examples of inadequacies in state preparedness are in areas that lie outside the federally prescribed plume exposure pathway
, where evacuation would be needed. See LBP-8.2-70, suora, 16
'..NRC at 766 n.8.
4
, . 22
.. . . emergency response planning is generally deficient because
,. . soc.iological and psychological profiles of the population in
. 'he t evacuation zone have not been conducted to gauge the
! - 3 . -- _. ,_[ public response to a radiological emergency?at Diablo' .. -
Canyon.46
- 1. In addressing emergency response information programs for Diablo Canyon,47 the Licensing Board concluded
. .. . that the applicant had developed an adequate program. That
_,:: , , . . program included a page of appropriate information in the San Luis obispo County telephone directory and the periodic l_,
i
~disseminadion of newsletters to the residents within the i California Basic EPZ informing them about the plant, general nuclear ' issues, emergency planning and instructions on how . .
residents will be notified and what they should do in the t
g event of a radiological emergency.
The Board found that the 7 , .
I ,. ,
1
.. . : a. - .
40 See JoinY Intervenors' Brief at 40-47; Brief- of - -~
!r
l Governor, at ,15, _17.,
47 The Commission's planning standard on public 1
information,10 CFR 50.47 (b) (7), provides that: i Information is (to be] made available to the public on a periodic basis on hotr they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
- listening to a local broadcast station .and remaining l indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are [to be] established in advance, and
.- procedures for coordinated dissemination of information
- to the public are (to be] established.
e ww-w--,---_.______--_m .-__ _- _ . _
23 s L ,e
-3 - . applicant had prepared various sites for the' news media in '
. .the event of a radiological emergency and had established
!....--.... procedures for the coordinated release of information to the 1:,;;3-, - - . . general public and the media.48 g ,,,pg .to the-county - L program, the Board indicated that the county planned to
.. . publish and distribute throughout the California Basic EPZ an information booklet containing emergency response 4
__:_: . - instructions but, at the time of the hearing,- the document -
- .. . . -was only in draft form . The Licensing Board, like FEMA in
~
its review of the county plan and preparedness, found that
{' -
- the. county publication was a necessary element of the public j: .
information program. It therefore placed a condition upon its' license authorization that the county information .
. booklet be published and distributed to the public well in i
.. s '
advance of full power operation of Diablo Canyon.48 .
~
The Li. censing Board also fully canvassed the question !
)- . . . : . of the adequacy of the onsite and offsite communications -
. . systems necessar to respond to a radiological emergency.50 i The Board concluded that there were no serious deficiencies i
i .
48 See LBP-8?.-70, suora, 16 NRC at 777, 820-822. !
, 49 Id. at 778, 823.
50 The Commission's emergency communications planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (6) , provides that: " Provisions
[must] exist for prompt communications among principal !
.. response organizations to emergency personnel and to the ;
. public."
~----,-.,, ween-, , ,---,--v-,e_,n -.e.--e,,-r--.-New.- m._,.vm.- ~ ~ -,,-a.- m m -- w . r,n-w, n.----wm-ww--e
24 with'the applicInt's'onsite emergency communications systems
'but, with respect to offsite communications,.it identified several defects in essential components of the county i-system. The Licensing Board found, however, that such .
. defects were temporary in nature because th'e:' applicant had~ '~ ~
. committed to replace or add necessary equi,pme'nt to the '
county system thereby eliminating the cited' difficulties.51 Thus, the Board concluded "that the critica~1 requirements of the communication system for offsite communications in San
. Luis obispo County are or will be met" and the county system met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (6) 52 ., .
The Board's findings on the adequacy of the county's
. public information program and emergency communications ,
system fully discuss each issue and thoroughly and accurately detail the record evidence. No useful purpose
}wo~uldbeservedbyrepeatingallofthoseparticularshere, 4
- g suffice it to say that the Board's findings are supported by the record and ou'r examination of the evidence do,es not ,
j Eonvince us'that'the record compels a~different result'--
I tlie standard applicable to our review of the Licensing 1 -
1
- j 51 LBP-82-70, supra, 16 NRC at 775-77,,816-20.
~
1 52 Id. at 776.
.. 25 Board's factual findings.53 Moreover, the joint
, , . _ - . .intervenors' complaints stem from the predictive nature of -
. u.. . .dut . Board's findings (i.e. , that actions taken in: the future 1,.. . - _.. will rectify deficiencies) and the condition placed:by the --
- ,- Board on its authorization to ensure certai'n actions are
- :...... take.n. The gist of the joint intervenors', position 71s that :: :
. .. .all corrective actions must be taken before the adjudicatory -
.. . . -hearing, not after it, with the result that all licensing -
. details must await the hearing process.
r___;,.. The Commission's emergency response regulations, -
~
however, contemplate, in appropriate circumstances, -'
. predictive findings on emergency response planning so that
. 53
, ,, . See Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear'. . . _ . .
, . y. Generating Plant, Unit 1) , ALAB-611, 12 NRC 301, 304 (1980);
,, Niagara Mohawk Power ~ Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,.c_ _
+ Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347,'357 (1975).
We note that in the staff response to our April 10, l 1984 order inquiring whether the appeals of the applicant [
, , and the staff from the Licensing Board's initial decision "
l , were moot, the staff attached an April 2, 1984 FEMA ~
memorandum on the current status of offsite emergency ~ . ' ~
-; planning at Diablo Canyon. The FEMA memorandum indicates ~
i . .. that the county emergency response information booklet has l been published and distributed and that a second
- distribution is already planned. The memorandum also states l
that the deficient items in the county communications system (i.e. , those identified by FEMA as critical for emergency planning) have been corrected and that the reliability.of the county's microwave and VHF systems has been very g6od during the last year. See Memorandum for Edward L. Jordan, NRC, from Richard W. Krimm, FEMA (April 2, 1984), attached
, to NRC Staff Response to the Appeal Board's , Order of April
<< 10, 1984 (April 18,1984) [ hereinafter FEMA memorandum].
-- . 7__
26 -
operation of a fa'cility need not be delayed unnecessarily by the hearing process.54 Energency planning need not be
.:-~ _ -
complete at the time of the hearing as long as the evidence--
permits the Licensing Board to find that "there is ..
.::.. - :_.;reasonabia assurance that adequate protective measures can -
i.
L
_ . :.- and will be taken in the event of a radiol,ogical .-- - .
emergency. 55 Indeed, prior to 1982, the agency's -
.- regulations required a finding that "the state of onsite and
, offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance
- that adequate protective measures can and will be takes."56
.tr; : -
- . In -1982, the~ Commission deleted the reference to the " state" of emergency preparedness "to clarify that the findings on
- -. emergency planning required prior to license issuahce are .
predictive in nature and need not reflect the actual state j -
of preparedness at the time the finding is made."57 Thus,
,,' ...as here, the Licensing Board's findings can properly be. ,
i .
l
' ,f 4 See San Onofre, cupra, 17 NRC at 380 n.57. See -
generally Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power , _ _
. Plant, Unit 2) , ALAS-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1067. (1983). -
55 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) .
56 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) (1982).
57 47 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1982). At the same time the commission removed the reference in 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) to ;
j the " state" of emergency preparedness, it also added a'last i sentence to the section providing that emergency preparedness exercises need not be held before any initial licensing decision. .See.47 Fed. Reg. 30,232, 30,236 (1982). l
[
- (Footnote Continued) e l
\ -
.' ~
27 predictive in nature.58 Similarly, the Board's licensing
. . . authorization may be appropriately conditioned on the
- .- u : . -completion of items found deficient at the time of the ' - --
hearing.5 _.
(Footnote Continued) ~ -
. This new provision was invalidated in Unio'n'of Concerned
_ . . Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, . ._',
. 735 F.2d 1437 (D. C. Cir. 1984) on the ground snat it denied
. the right to a hearing on a material licensing factor
, required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, in contravention of Section 189 (a) (1) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2233 (a) (1) . That holding is inapposite to the type-of . . .
predictive findings and conditions involved-here. ..- --
1.
- -.- - . 58. No unfairness results from such a system for just as -
. one party can demonstrate that a planned course of action will resolve an identified deficiency, an opposing party can
. . .. establish that the deficiency cannot be resolved by that .x.
planned action. Supervision of a party's compliance with a .
, commitment or a licensing board condition is left to the staff. If one party is dissatisfied with the way another
, party has fulfilled a commitment or met a condition, the l . .. matter.may, in appropriate circumstances, be brought back to -
l-
., the licensing board or become the subject of a petition under 10 CFR 2.206. .
- 59 The joint intervenors also claim that, at the time
- . of the hearing, county preparedness was deficient because i not all of the standard operating procedures (SOPS) for I..
. - -- implementing the county plan had been finished, a' proved p a'nd
. adopted, and that no letters of agreement between the county
- - and other private and public organizations for supporting
. . services had been secured. See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 39-40. The Licensing Board found that all the SOPS for actions within the federally prescribed plume exposure pathway were complete, and that no difficulties stood in the way of completing the remainder. See LBP-82-70, suora, 16 NRC at 764-65, 803. The Board also found that the critical' elements for implementing the county plan were contained in SOPS and that letters of agreement were used only for noncritical elements of emergency support. Moreover,_the Board found that no obstacles stood in the way of the county
~
, obtaining such letters of agreement. See id. at 767, 804.
, h. (Footnote Continued)
I l
28 **
t
- 2. The joint intervenors and the Governor also assert
. . .that, contrary to 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , therei is no assurance '
. that the emergency plans for Diablo Canyon can be :
.- -- implemented because sociological and psychological profiles ~
- __. of the affected populations in the evacuation zone have not i .
- ::.. . been conducted to assess the public response to a -;
~
. - radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon. In rejecting the need for local surveys, the Licensing Board found that such
. studies are not required by the agency's^ regulations and
_u. _would not improve public information planning.60 It 4
r:-- - . - concluded that "(h]owever interesting such data might be, it is irrelevant to the task of informing the public about the
- .- - - , necessity to travel a limited distance from Diablo Canyon in.
~
ar. emergency."61
- In addressing the testimony of the joint intervenors'
... expert witnesses (i.e. , that surveys were necessary because g people behave differently in. radiological emergencies than it
" "" ~~
'(Footnote' Continue'd) -
The Board's findings accurately reflect the hearing evidence and are fully supported by the record. We are not convinced the evidence compels any different result. Further, we note that the FEMA memorandum on the current status of offsite
! emergency planning at Diablo Canyon (see n.53, supra) 4 indicates that the county SOPS for the areas outside the federally prescribed plume exposure pathway EPZ are substantially complete and that the county has obtained
, substantially all the letters of agreement.
60 LBP-82-70, supra, 16 NRC at 778-80, 823-25. -
~
$, 61
~
d at 780.
Id.
f 2
e
-m--- e v -, e -
, . ._,m__-r... - _ _ , . _ _ . , _ .. _ _ - . _ _ , . . _ _ _ , - . . _ _ _ _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . , . _ . , .,.____,.m __
j, .
29 in other disasters and either overreact by doing more than i
.:- _._ 'is required, or underreact by becoming immobilized), the -
Board found that ,
- I- -
there is no apparent hazard to public health and safety if overreaction occurs. Assuming overreaction was likely, we have no remedy beyond -
. . .. . that which is already planned, which is to -
_ . . : : :. : ; broadcast accurate, consistent information.:: '
.... _.. _ .. . . Some people require repeited warnings and repeated information bulletins in order to become -
. . convinced that a hazard is real and that they ,
should react. We see little value in a social
. survey in counteracting this phenomenon, however.
.. .. The phenomenon of underreaction is already known.
,n.- : r. _ -
. The remedy is repeated consistent warnings and - - - -
, _ .: _ , .. .. information bulletins. The public will recei
- r ; . . . . ,. : - .
these through the emergency broadcast system.gg ^ ~ -
The Board also found the testimony of the applicant's
. _ _ . ,. . expert, who indicated that studies of human behavior in. .
other types of disasters provides a sufficient basis to establish workable emergency plans, "more credible as regards the public information program."63 , ,
contrary to the suggestion of the joint intervenors and l
l the Governor, the Licensing Board adequately confronted the
_. .c'onflicting viewpoints of the expert witnessesCand resolved ~
i
- 6+
62 Id. at 779.
k.- 03 ^
Id. at 780.
30 o each issue before' it.64 Its findings are amply supported
'and our examination of the evidence does not convince ,
us
. . that the record compels a different result.65 ,
J .
77,
.__e. ;
. c .;t 3. Finally, the joint intervenors challenge the Licensing .
r...: .
Board's' finding that the power operated re,l'ief' valves .. -
. (PORVs) at Diablo Canyon have been adequdtely designed,
. constructed and tested.66 They do not contest the Board's findings on the basis of the underlying hearing record.
- ^ Rather, the joint intervenors argue that information revealed by the applicant subsequent to the hearing on the PORV issue removes the evidentiary support for the Board's findings. They point out that the Licensing. Board received .
. s-64
- - . See generally Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) , ALAB-442, 6 NRC 33, ^41 '
, '(1977) . ,
65 In his brief (at 16) , the Governor also argues that the Licensing Board erred in refusing to order a survey to assess the magnitude of role conflict among emergency
. . . workers who might evacuate with their families in an emergency instead of reporting for duty. The. Licensing Board found that role conflict would not cause professionally trained emergency workers, including plant operators, to abandon their duties. LBP-82-70, supra, 16 NRC at 770, 807-08. Further, it found there was no
" dichotomy between operators performing their duties and seeing to their family's safety. Reasonable individuals would do both." Id. at 770. These findings are also fully i
supported by the record and we are not convinced that the evidence demands a different result.
66 See LBP-82-7.0, supra, 16 NRC at 761,.795-97,
^ 850-854.
.______y -.,_.,n .
.---.--v- ,.n.. ,.,
-,---w-,--,- , . , , , _ . , .
. 31
~
notification from the applicant after the evidentiary
_ _ . .. . hearing, but before the issuance of the initial- decision,
- : . . . ;. .. that the initial piping design reviews conducted as part of
.: .__;_:: .the Commission ordered independent design verification- .
- _ program (IDVP) revealed that some piping analyses
.. : _t. potentially affecting the PORVs may not have been---
- - - conservative.67 Subsequent events, however, have made joint intervenors' argument academic.
. While the joint intervenors' appeal of the initial
. . .- - decision was pending, they filed a motion with us ~ to reopen
- r. g ..the record on the issue of the adequacy of the applicant's
- - . . design quality assurance program. We granted that motion,
. along with a similar one filed by the Governor. The - . - .
reopened proceeding focused on the adequacy of the independent design verification program and the joint intervenors had the opportunity to litigate the same ma_tter g they claim on appeal undermines the Licensing Board's findings. The joint intervenors chose not to contest the
~
. adequacy of the PORVs although the issue was fair 1y -
encompassed by one of the Governor's issues concerning the verification of Westinghouse supplied equipment. In 67
, See Joint Intervenors' Brief at 53,56 and Exhibit
<B.
9 L e
32 l
~
ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 586, 609 n.193 (1984) , we found verification of the design of that equipment, adequate.
For the foregoing reasons, the initial decision'of the Licensing Board authorizing the issuance of-a: full power .
.._n- - , license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, is affirmed. - As we - -
explained in ALAB-763,68 howevu , the Board's license authorization for Unit 2 shall not be effective until we have made our findings with respect to the adequacy of the applicant's design verification program for that unit.
It is so ORDERED. -
, FOR THE APPEAL BOARD ,
~
O.MN%AU
- C. Qan S~nce. maker Secretary to the
- Appeal Board
.~.-
3
. i I
1 l
1 68 19 NRC at 58'2.
,,,yrr*-+---.v-- awm - - - . ,vm,-.+--, m.,r.%-,- -.--,,w., ,%.--,_....r. , . . . . . . - , , - - - - - - . ~ , - , - - , , . .
r ,
., i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'E*, SP '.9 E'; I BEFORE THE COMMISSION t .- .
". . . J .:' r..4.'!.
. .)s : -
)
In the Matter of ) -
)
Docket Nos.- 50-275 0.L.
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPAN7 }
) 50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) .
)
) - . _ . . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . . _
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1.. .
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of September, 1984, I
._ have serve.d copies of the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' PETITION
, FOR REVIEW OF ALAB-781, mailing them through the U.S. malls,' first) class, postage prepaid, to the attached list.
t
. . -.r%. . . .
,- CHRISTINA CONCEPCION e
- D ,
S O 9 t
SERVICE LIST Nunzio Palladino, Chairman James Asselstine, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission
. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Lando W. Zech, Jr., Commissioner Frederick Bernthal, Commissionez
. .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.. Commission Commission
. -- Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
. . . . Thomas Rcberts, Commissioner Samuel J.~ Chilk, Secretary -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.. Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas S. Moore, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing
.. . . Appeal Board Appeal Board
.U.S. Nuc l ear Regu l atory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
-. Commission Commission
- - Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington,.D.C. 20555 Dr. John H. Buck Docket and Service Branch Atomic Safety & Licensing Office of the Secretary
... .. Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Lawrence Chandler, Esq.
.. Office of the Executive Legal Director - BETH 042 ' '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Post Office Box 1178 . .
Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Bruce Norton, Esq.
Norton, Burke, Berry & French P.O. Box 10569 Phoenix, AZ 85016
. Malcolm H. Furbush, Esq.
Vice President & General Counsel Philip A. Crane, Esq. .
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Post Office Box 7442 San Francisco, CA 94120,
John Van de Kamp, Attorney General Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Attorney General
- Michael J. Strumwasser, .
Special Counsel to the Attorney General Office of the Attorney General State of California , ,
3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800
- Los Angeles, CA 90010 Richard B. Hubbard MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, CA 95125 Virginia and Gordon Bruno Pecho Ranch Post Office Box 6289 Los Osos, CA 93402 Sandra and Gordon Silver 1760 Alisal Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Carl Neiburger Telegram Tribune .
Post Office Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 Tom Devine Government Accountability Project 1901 Que Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 Eric Havian, Esq. i Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe 44 Montgomery Street. , 31st Floor San Francisco, CA 94133 E
o g
-_.-_______.-___m-,._--__,.,_7-, ,-, , --_-w,-,,., ,_c7,,,,__ _ - . , _ _ - . _ - -, ._y m.,-_ .y-_s,,_ _.-.--,,w.,.- -%e, . --.e