ML20154L197

Stipulation as to Contentions.* Submits Final Wording on Contentions on Seabrook Plan for Commonwealth of Ma Communities

ML20154L197
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/19/1988
From:	Chan E, Dignan T, Traficonte J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION, NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC), PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY
To:
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ML20154L135	List: ML20154L131 ML20154L197
References
OL, NUDOCS 8809260119
Download: ML20154L197 (41)

Text

s September [L, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 UCLEAR REGULATORY CO!GISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEllSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC STRVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

!;Eh' HAMPSHIRE , et al. ) 50-444-OL

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site Emergency

) Planning Issues)

)

STIPUIATION AS TO CONTENTIONS Set forth below is the final wording of contentions l on the SF C portion of this proceeding. By entering into this stipulation, no party waives any objection it may have to evidence which 1..sy be offered. In particular, and without limitation of the foregoing, parties reserve the right to object on the basis of prior board orders to evidence when, as and if offered.

1 The Board will note that wording of two contentions, JI 7 and JI 8, is in dispute and calls for Board resolution.

0809260119QB[h43 PDR ADOCK pgg O

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I. EVACUATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. Inaccurate and Unrealistic ETEs . . . . . . . 1 JI 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 JI 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 JI 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 B. Traffic Manager.cnt Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 JI 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 JI 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 JI 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 C. Transit Dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 JI 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 JI 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 II. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 JI 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 JI 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 JI 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 JI 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 JI 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 JI 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 JI 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. PAR GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 JI 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 JI 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 JI 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 JI 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 JI 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 JI 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 JI 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 JI 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 JI 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 JI 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 JI 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 IV. COMMUNICATIONS / NOTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 l JI 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 JI 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 JI 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 JI 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 l JI 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 JI 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 JI 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 JI 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1

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O JI 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

. JI 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 JI 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 JI 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 JI 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 JI 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 V. LEGAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 JI 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 JI 42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 JI 43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 JI 44A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 JI 44B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 VI. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PARTICUIAR POPUIATIONS . . . 30 JI 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 JI 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 JI 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 JI 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 JI 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 JI 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 VII. EVACUATION ECUIPMENT AND FACILITIES . . . . . . . . 32 JI 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 JI 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 JI 53 . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 JI 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 JI 55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 JI 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 JI 57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 JI 58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 JI 59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 JI 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 VIII. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 JI 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 l JI 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 l JI 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1

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. I. EVACUATION PROCESS A. Inaccurate and Unrea'11stic ETEs 1

JI 1 (MAG 32] j contention No evacuation time estimata study has been done to l assess what the realistic evacuation times would be in the t Massachusetts portion of the EPZ in light of the special j l difficulties, circumstances, and delays in conducting an  :

evacuation in Massachusetts under the SPMC. The Final Report of the KLD Evacuation Time Estimate Study and Traffic Management Plan Update, completed in August 1986, did not  !

take into account these special circumntances, difficultico, and delays. A new evacuation tima estimate study needs to be L l conducted before the SPMC can meet the requiremet.ts of 10 l C.F.R. 50. 4 7 (a) (1) , 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. l 1,Section II.J.10.e, and Appendix 4 of NUREG 0654, Rev. 1.  ;

JI 2 (MAG 391 TOA 4Kr MAG 47T] l t

Contention The evacuation time estimates contained in the SPMC, i l Pro-2.5 at Attachment 4, are too unrealistic to form the i basis of adequate protective action decision-making.

Realistic ETEs would be much longer. The SPMC, therefore, L j does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR l 50.47(a)(1),  !

l 5 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J.10.1, and j l NUREG 0654, Appendix 4.  ;

1 v l Basis ,

I A. (MAG 39C, D. I. N. O. P1 l

I orderly and efficient traffic flow will not be maintained due to the inadequacies in planning for the use of traffic control personnel and for the removal of road t blockages by tow trucks. I f

B. fMAG 39J. FF. K)  !

The ETEs are based on incorrect assumptions concerning the number of cars that will flow through roads, i intersections and rampL in Massachusetts, f f

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c. fMAG 39S1 The ETEs fail to account for the delays that will result fror the confusion among the public caused by hearing different emergency nessages from different sources.

D. IMAG 3901 TOA 4K]

The ETEs are based on a traffic management plan that overestinates the traffic flow rate through the intersection at Route 110/I-95/ Elm Street in Amesbury.

(Note: Litigation of this raatter is limited to those ratters not already litigated in the NHRERP phase.)

E. { MAG 39W. X, Y) .

The ETEs are based on an undercount of the number of vehicles evacuating from and through the Massachusetts portion of the EP2.

P. IMAG 39AA)

The ETEs are based on the implicit assumption that in inplenenting the traffic management plan the placement of cones and barricades will not actually block vehicles with legitirate reasons to travel against or across the flow of evacuation traffic. In fact, if the traffic management plan is irplerented according to the diagrams in Appendix J and cones and barricades are placed as shown, these vehicles will be blocked at cany intersections.

G. IMAG 39BB1 The ETEs were calculated using an irrelevant "planning basicd which assumed that the public is notified to clear the beaches at the Alert levol, that a General Energency occurs 15 ninutes later, and that the order to evacuate is transmitted to the public 10 minutes after the General Erergency is declared. This "planning basis" has no relationship to the SPMC.

II . 1 MAG 39DDI The ETEs are based on the unrealistic assumption that the implementation of access control will not significantly delay or irpede returning commuters as they travel back into the EPZ to residences in one of the six Massachusetts connunities.

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+ l I. IMA9 39EEf MAG 47T] l Because there are no special population evacuation tinos in the SPMC, the ETEs in the SPMC appear to be based on the ,

unrealistic assumption that the evacuation of the transport I dependent population and those in special facilities and  !

schools will take no longer than the evacuation times  !

calculated for evacueos using private automobiles. t i

JI 3 fMAG 42]

Contention  !

The SPMC does not provide protective action decision- l makers with sufficiently realistic ETEs for the Massachusetts EP: population for a wide range of times and conditions in 2 the summer months. Only one pre-determined ETE is provided .

t for a summer weekend with good weather, despite the fact that i ETEs for such occasions vary dramatically as the site of the l beach population (a factor to which the ETEs are highly  ;

sensitive) rises and falls. These beach population changes are substantial and occur from hour to hour, day to day, and i veck to week. Absent a real-time, computer-based system to monitor the size of the beach population and compute real- [

time ETEs, the SPMC is deficient, because there is no .

reasonabic assurance that adequate protective measures can I and will be take,n as required by 10 CFR i 50.47(a) (1) . (

". l (Note: . . With respect to the proposed real-time, i computer-based, data-collection, ETE-calculation system, the l-Attorney General has the burden of proceeding with evidence  !

I that such a system has material benefit and is practical." l Menorandum and order - Part I, dated 7/22/88, at 67.) f

]I l B. Traffic Management Plan  ;

! JI 4 (MAG 37; MAG 38; TON 1.j CON lt CON 2; CON 6;  !

1 TOA 4 B(1) , (2) : ToA 4Jr ToA 40: TOS 67 TOS 9; j TOS 17f TOWN 7.2Cf TOWN 8.3. .4. .5._.6) l Contention l

3 The evacuation plan contained in the SPMC is so poorly

) designed and so inadequately staffed that, even if State and I 1 local officials are assumed to make a best efforts response, I

there is no reasonable assurance that either the permanent 2

residents or the transients can or will be evacuated as i efficiently as possible, therefore, the SPMC does not provide J reasonable assurance thct adequate protective measures can and vill be taken, and it fails to comply with 10 CFR

50. 4 7 (a) (1) , 50,4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (c) (1) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. l j 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J.  ;

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Bacin A. The number of traffic control personnel relied upon by the SPMC is inadequate.

B. Insufficient capacity-enhancing measures and other poorly conceived traffic control strategies are utilized by the SPMC's traffic management plan. The SPMC has not adequately addressed the problems that will occur during an evacuation in the event that the Gillis Bridge is closed to traffic in order to facilitate the passage of boats.

C. The traffic control diagrams contained in the SPMC i are not sufficiently clear to allow the SPMC's traffic ransgement plan to be implemented.

JI 5 (HAG 73D, El TOWN 8.21 TON 5)

Contention The rethod utilized by the SPMC f or surveillance and reroval of road blockages is not adequate to ensure that road blockages will be identified and removed promptly enough and the corrunications procedures for dispatching tow vehicles once blockages have been spotted are coo cumbersono and ineffective.

JI.6.[TOS 13]

Centention The SPMC fails to provide assurances that adequate reasures can and will be taken to protect the public in the Town of Salisbury because the Utility's plan fails to provide for protective nessures for possibly hundreds of commercial and pleasure boaters on the Merrimac River all or great numbers of when may be confined to the river basin by '

frequently occurring conditions of wind and tide, without adequate dockage and transportation ashore.

C. Transit Dependent JT 7 [ CON 3; CON 4; TON 1; TOS 4 TOS 5; TQS_1(1 TOWN 7.2A, B. Dr TOWN 8.11 CON 7f TOS 181 1 Contentian No adequate planning hos been done for the transit dependent population because the bus routes proposed will het expedite the evacuation of this population.

[As proposed by Intervenors)

. No adequate planning has been done for the transit i dependent population because the bus routes proposed for '

Newbury, Newburyport, West Newbury and Salisbury as particularized in their contentions as filed, wi\1 not expedite the evacuation of this population.

[As proposed by Applicants; concurred in by Staff)

JI 8 fTOWN 8.101 SAPL 61 TOS 191 contention No adequate planning has boon done for the transit dependent populat. ion because the present plans call for t!.e transit dependent to wait undetermin6d lengths of tino outdoors thereby running the risk of increasing radiation dcso and exposure to the clot. tents.

[As proposed by Intervenors)

No adequate planning har been dohe for the transit dependent' population in West Newbury and Salisb".ry becauno the plans ca33 for the transit dependent to wait undetermined lengths cif time outdoors thereby running the risk cf increcsing radiation does and exposure to the elements. ,

(As proposed by Applicantst concurred in by Staff) >

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JI 9 IMAG'101 .

Contention *

, No provisions is made in the SPMC for procedures to be '

. employed in the event of a strike or other form of job action affecting the availability of the emergency personnel relied on to adequately staff and maintain the NHY ORO. In the absence of such procedures, this utility plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective

, measures can and will be taken. Sgg Lona Island Liahtina

- CanRADY (shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 21 NRC 644, 888 (1985).

JI 10 fMAG 751 Contention The SPMC fails to provide adequate arrangements for

' requesting and effectively using Federal assistance resources and does not comply with 50.47(b) (3) and NUREG 0654, II. C.

1.a, b. and c.

Basis A. The SPMC simply asserts that the Federal government will respond to an emergency when a "regulated entity such as Seabrook Station, requests Federal support, or when Federal agencies must respond to meet their statutory responsibilities." Plan 2.3-2. However, the SPMC points to no legal authority to support these claims. There is no indication in the SPMC whether any of the 12 Federal agencies participating in the FRERP "must respond to meet their statutory retponsibilities."

B. The SFMC also asserts that federal agencies will respond directly "in accordance with established plans and procedureb or preexisting relationships." Plan 2.3-1.

The SPMC then makes reference to three Federal agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of the Interior ("DOI"). The SPMC, however, fails to reference either established plans or procedures or any preexisting relationships pursuant to which these agencies would respond to a Seabrook emergency in the manner relied upon in the SPMC. Moreo ir, the FRERP indicates that DOI is to coordinate its emergency response with State and local governments. 50 Fed. Reg. 46562.

C. Lessons learned from exercises of the FRERP conducted at the Zion nuclear facility in June, 1987, s

~ indicate that responsible emergency organizations (there the State and local governments) should meet and plan adequate interfaces with the NRC to insure effective use of FRERP Federal ar.sistance. No such provisions for meetings between the NRC arid the ORO are contemplated by the SPMC.

D. The Lessons learned from the exercise of the FPFRP conducted at the Zion facility in June 19F7 indicate that the estimate of 3 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for a federal response at Plan 2.3-2 is totally unrealistic and that 24 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> would be more reasonable.

E. Some of the responsibilities attributed to federal agencies at Plan 5 2.3.3 exceeded both the FRERP and the policy of these individual agencies. Some of the federal support options identified would be available only in light of a Presidential Disaster Declaration which FEMA has resisted in the past for ra?iological emergencies.

F. The ORO is totally unprepared to effectively interface with these Federal agencies in the event of an actual emergency. Monitoring and dose assessment information provided to the NRC by the Department of Energy during the Zion exercise of the FRERP in June 1987 overwhelmed the capacities of the NRC. The SPMC has no procedures for effectively integrating this Federal resource into the ORO's response. The SPMC does not provide the practical information neaded to assess whether communication links and other forms ou interface betwrt ORO and the Federal agencies will even be possible during e cmergency. Egg NUREG 0654 II.C l.c.

JI 11 IMAG 771 Contention The SPMC fails to provide for the adequate or continuous i

staffing of ORO personnel to maintain or sustain an emergency response. For these reasons, tne SPMC falls to meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1) , (2), and (5), and the regulatory guidance established by NUREG 06!4 II. A.l.a.4.,

B, and E.2.

JI 12 fMAG 781 Contention There is no reasonable assurance that there will be adequate second shift manpower capability for certain evacuation-specific positions. Therefore, the GPMC fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a), 50. 47 (b) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (15) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.4. and II.O.

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. JI 13 fMAG 79; MAG 81D1 Contention The prerequisite experience required for qualification to hold numerous critical ORO positions, and the training provided by tho'SPMC for these positions, is inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that ORO can and will implement adequate protective measures in the event of a radfological emergency at Seabrook Station. Therefore the SPMC fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (14 ) .

50. 4 7 (b) (15) , NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A, II.N, II.O.1 and II.O.4.

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JI 14 fMAG 80: TOA 4.C. H1 Contention i

The SPMC provides inadequate training to me'.tbers of ORO, and the State and local governments e:aployees and other organizations who may have to respond in an ad h2s fashion to-an energency are not receiving any training at all on LPMC procedures. There is no reasonabic assurance that the bus drivers who purportedly have agreed to respond to an emergency at Seabrook in fact have sufficient experience or training to perform this function. The SPMC therefore '

violates 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (15) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.O.

Basis A review of the ORO training modules and information  !

received from those who have received ORO training indicates that the training is entirely too general in nature, is much 7 too brief, is not wall done, and does not qualify ORO [

staffers to perform their jobs under the difficult and confusing circumstances that will prevail in the event of a  !

serious radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.

JI 15 fMAG 831 Contontion l ORO emergency workers will be liable for damages  !

resulting from their actions and the SPMC does not discuss at '

all what, if any, provisions or agreements for indemnification exist. [As a result, the emergency response by ORO workers is unpredictable). Moreover, although state l emergency workers are indemnified by the Commonwealth pursuant to statute, the SPMC is silent on the relationship,  !

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if any, between atsthorization of police powers and indemnification for'ORO workers, ,

(Note: The burden'of proceeding with the evidence on

+-this contention is upon the Massachusetts Attorney General.

,., $_9.2 Memort.ndum and Order - Part I, dated 7/22/88, at 107.)

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• III. PAR GENERATION JI 16 IMAG 82; MAG 811 Contention -

Provisions in the SPMC for radiological monitoring are inadequate. The SPMC, fails to provide reasonable assurance that. adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency are in use or could be used and, therefore, does not comply with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(b) (2), (4),

(8),'(9) and (10), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appcndix E, IV, B.,

E., 2.

JI 17 FMAG 261 Contention The SPMC fails to provide a range of protective actions for the public within the Seabrook plume exposure EPZ. No choice of protective actions is set forth in the SPMC for large r. umbers of people. Thus, the SPMC does not meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654 II.J.9, 10.m. and does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. 50. 47 (a) (1) .

Basis A. The SPMC does not provide an alternative to evacuation for the beach areas in the Massachusetts portions of the EPZ. Evacuation alone does not constitute a range of protective measures. Secondary mitigating measures, including decontamination, are not protective "measures" or "actions" under 50.47(b)(10). In fact, the Commission itself has identified "appropriate protective measures" as evacuation or sheltering . 10 C.F.R. $ 100.3(b).

B. In the absence of sheltering for the transient beach populations, the SPMC does not provide adequate protective measures under 50.47(a) (1) because for all fast-paced serious accidents that produce offsite consequences in less time than the transient beach populations can effect an evacuation, those populations have no adequate protection from severe radiological doses. Substantial portions of the beach population are entrapped by the traffic congestion generated by an order to evacuate and cannot remove themselves from areas close-in to the plant for many hours.

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JI 18 fMAG 27; TON 9; MAG 561 Contention The SPMC does not establish or describe coherent decision criteria to be used by emergency decision-rakers in formulating an appropriate PAR and otherwise fails to provide guidelines for the choice of protective actions consistent with federal policy. The SPMC's decision-making criteria for selecting a sheltering as opposed to an evacuation PAR is inadequate and inaccurate, and, therefore, fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654 II.J.10.u. and Appendix E, IV, A.4. As a result, the SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 50.47 (a) (1) .

JI 19 fMAG 31; MAG 56 F1 ,

Contention The SPMC, in conjunction with the NHRERP, allows and encourages decision-makers to call for an evacuation of EPZ by sectors (S, SW, NE, SE, N), even within 5 miles, depending on which way the wind is blowing. This is a deficiency in

- violation of 10 C.F.R. 50. 4 7 (a) (1) , 5 0. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG

, 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J. Because wind-shifts in the area of the plant are so frequent, and because the phenomena of seabreezes at this site makes actual direction of plume travel difficult to predict, if an evacuation is required for any sognent, there should always be a 360' evacuation out to the distance necessary. The sudden 180' wind shift during the course of a serious hazardous materials fire at Seabrook, New Hampshire in March 1988 demonstrates the folly of evacuating by sectors rather than by 360' increments. Instead, the SPMC's procedures direct decision-makers first to determine the Wind direction and, if ,

conditions warrant an evacuation, to evacuate (beyond two miles) only the downwind sectors. See IP 2.5, Attachments 1, 2, 3 and 6. For this plant site, the normal potential 1

results of high and low wind spoods as shown on Attachment 6 ,

to IP 2.5 simply are not reliable, j 1

JI 20 fMAG 331 Contention  !

Even if there were an appropriate ETE study accompanying the SPMC, the SPMC's procedures do not instruct ORO Workers to refer to it at all, lot alone describe how to use it to adjust an ETE contained in the table in Attachment 4 of IP -

2.5. Absent such procedures, the SPMC fails to assure that l ,

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the ETEs used by protective action decision-makers can or will be adequately adjusted t'o account for conditions that vary from those assumed in the ETE study.

JI 21 fMAG 40; TON 61 Contention In making the choice of protective actions during an emergency, it is extremely important for the decision-makers to have ready access to maps which accurately.show the population distribution around the nuclear facility. The 4 SPMC fails to include such maps. NUREG 0654, Rev. 1,

'Supp. 1,Section II.J.10 states: "The off site response organization's plans to. implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include: . . . (5) Maps showing population distribution around the nuclear facility. This shall be by evacuation areas (licensees shall also present the information in a sector format)." Absent such maps, the SPMC fails to comply with 10 C.F.R. 50. 4 7 (a) (1) ,

50. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J.10.b.

JI 22 IMAG 431 Contention Because the SPMC's evacuation time estimates have been rejected by State and local officials as totally unrealistic .

and unreliable, in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, Massachusetts State and local decision-makers will always reject any immediate implementation of ORO's protective action recommendations based on those ETEs. As a result, and because those decision makers have no alternative ,

set of ETEs available to them, State and local decision-makers will make an ad hqs judgment.regarding what protective ,

actions are likely to maximize dose reductions. However, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective i measures can or will le taken through such an ad h22 decision-making process. Therefore, the SPMC does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1), (b) (10) , (c) (10) ,' and ,

NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, Sections II.J.10.1 and 10.m.

JI 23 fMAG 59; TOA 2.B1 Contention The decision criteria described in the SPMC are not coordinated with those set forth in the NHRERP. Thus, the possibility exists for delayed and conflicting PARS being formulated, transmitted and recommended to the relevant State governments. The SPMC has no adequate procedures to prevent

1. 4 this and therefore.does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1) and (10) and the guidance of NUREG 0654 II.A. and J.

JI 24 ITOA 2.Al Contention Assuming.tne Comaonwealth and EPZ municipalities would delegate authetity to NHY to perform governmental emergency response func', ions, gag, SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2, an assumption the Town of Amesbury denies, the anticipated protracted delay in obtainino this authority under emergency conditions would preclude prompt public notification or a timely public emergency response. Een, NUREG-0654 II.E.6 and NUREG-0654 Appendix 3 (b) (2) (a) . For example, following NHY notification to the Commonwealth of an.omergency, NHY must explain its own capabilities, and brief the Commonwealth on the emergency.

PROCEDURES 2.14, p. 5. The Commonwealth, under the SPMC, then is required to asses's its protective action response (PAR) capabilities and, if inadequate, purportedly may authorize NHY to implement police powers to provide ,

assistance. Id; SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2. The cumulative effect of these delays, briefings, multiple notifications, and

" communicat ions through numerous lines of authority, will result in substantial delay in public notification and in timely PARS by the public, even if it is assumed that police power authority ultimately may be delegated by the Commonwealth and EPZ towns.

s JI 25 fMAG 611 Contention only a small handful of ORO personnel appear to be trained and qualified to make protective action recommendations, Pro-2.5 at 3, and only one individual is designated as having the responsibility to "formulate" these PARS - the Radiological Health Advisor ("RHA"). The RHA will not assume his responsibilitios until arrival at the EOC and that arrival will be delayed Jocause the RHAs live and work too far from EOC and will have to transit the EPZ to reach it. Pro-l.2 at 4, Appendix H at A.4. As a result, the SPMC does not meet the standards set forth at 50.47(b)(1), (2),

(3) and (10); Appendix E, IV.A.4 and the guidance set forth in NUREG 0654 II.A.2; B; C and J.

1 JI 26 IMAG 631 Contention The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50. 47 (b) (1) , (3), (9) and (10) and the planning guidance of NUREG 0654 II.A., C., I. and J.11; FEMA Guidance Memorandum IN-1 and FEMA REP-2, REP-12 and WINCO-1012 because the provisions, procedures and planning for the 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zone are not adequate.

Basis A. The SPMC makes no' provision whatever for the prompt notification of the appropri-fa officials and agencies at both the State and local levels concerning the need for .

protective measures for she ingestdon pathway EPZ. The SPMC does not identify the appropriate officials by title and agency and has failed to meet the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 2, IV, D. 1.

B. Adequate public information for the ingestion pathway EPZ has not been prepared.

C. The SPMC provides inadequate information as to the

. identity and location of food and milk producers and processors.

D. Sampling procedures in the SPMC are inadequate and field samples will not be adequately gathered, recorded or tested thereby making timely and effective ingestion pathway PARS impossible.

E. The SPMC ignores the family farm as a producer (and consumer) of milk. The number and location of r,uch farms in the 50-mile zone are not identified. The SPMC does not establish prior to an emergency how and when food produced in the 50-mile zone, is transported for processing and/or marketing.

F. The Sample Collection Teams are not adequately trained and. the SPMC states that no experience is required for these positions. Plan 2.1-8. In fact, persons should be sought who reside within 20 miles of the plant, are familiar with the local areas and are already experienced in

) sampling procedures.

i 1

IV. COMMUNICATIONS / NOTIFICATION JI 27 IMAG 8; TOA 4.Bf311 Contention At an organizational level, the SCMC fails to adequately establish and define the relationships between the ORO and other organizations which are expected and relied upon to perform emergency response activities. Further, the SPMC does not adequately provide for effective coordination of effort between or clearly delineate the primary .

responsibilities of those other organizations and the ORO.

As such, the SPMC does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50. 47 (c) (1) , (2), (3), (5) and (6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV, A.6, 7, 8; and the planning guidance set forth in NUREG 0654 II. A.1.b., c, 2.a., b, 3; B.6, 9; C.5 (Supp. 1) ; E.1; and F.1.

Bacis A. The SPMC creates nine liaison positions staffed by ORO personnel, one local EOC liaison for each Massachusetts town and three State liaisons, one for the State EOC, one for the Area 1 EOC and one for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. The function and role of these liaison personnel is left completely undefined. There is no procedure in the SPMC to insure that these liaison personnel are themselves knowledgeable about the SPMC so that they '

coulo intelligibly respond to inquiries concerning its structure and function, or otherwise "advise and assist state and local officials in implementing" portions of the SPMC.

NUREG 0654, Supp 1, II.C.5. Moreover, there is no portion of the SPMC which would provide any indication to a local governmental official of the actual role to be performed by specific local organizations. The liaisons fail to establish any organizational or communicational link between the ORO and the local organization which are relied upon to perform l certain ems.rgency activities Ee2 Plan, Table 2.0-1.

B. The 3PMC states that "law enforcement, fire and rescue needs and snow removal agencies are expected to be within local capabilities supported by mutual aid agreements and it is assumed that in an emergency, these agencies (sic) will continue to carry out their normal emergency functions."

Plan 2.4-3, -4. The CRO will assist these "agencies" with "appropriate omorgency information and exposuro control."

Plan 2.4-4.

1. There is no , asis for the assumption in the SPMC l that local capabilities will be augmented or supported by i "mutual aid agreements." Obviously, other EPZ towns will not

be able to provide such assistance and no prior arrangements l or procedures are set forth in the SPMC to enable non-EPZ towns to"identify the need for resources or to penetrate the EP7 access control to supply such resources. Thus, there is eily an assumed coordination of effort described by the SPMC.

4'

2. What is'noeded during a radiological emergency in something different from "normal emergency functions." The particular probisms of security, public health, timely evacuation and emergency-specific rescue needs in addition to the overall scope and extent of the emergency response make the SPMC's reliance on business as usual totally inadequate.

Because the SPMC has not even adequately identified the ,

emergency responsibilities of police, fire and rescue t agencies during a radiologicci emergency, it certainly has

'not ascigned or established them adequately. Ege 50.47 (b) (1) , Moreover, the SPMC would be of absolutely no assistance to l'ocal emergency workers or officials at the time of an emergency if they desire to participate in an ad hos f ashion.

C. The SPMC totally lacks local plans that are specific to the six Massachusetts communities and totally ignores the particular established routines existing in these communities for response to emergencies. Thus, no effective ad h22 relationship will develop between the ORO and the local communities making eftective emergency responr,e on the basis of the SPMC impossible.

D. There is no procedure for the notification of supporting organizations concerning which mix of authorization -- as to activity and jurisdiction -- is to be implemented by the ORo. As a result, none of the supporting organizations will be informed as to who has control and command over any particular portion of the response. Further there is no delineated relationship between ORO personnel and non-ORO employees of support organizations as to issues of control and command, responsibility and liability.

E. The SPMC does not detail how a delegation of authority during an emergency would actually take place. No verification procedures are set forth that would insure that the specific content of state authorization is understood and verified. Further, no verification procedure exists ac the identity of those giving and receiving such authorization. ,

F. The SPMC does not detail what emergency responce activities can be implemented or what mitigating actions will '

be taken for those activities for which no authorization is '

forthccming from the State. The SPMC does not indicate how the ORO will modulate and specify its response to accord with 16 -

i

_____-n. . . , _ . . .- ,-

t *

, 'the specific authorization mix --as to activity and jurisfiction-- that results at the time of an emergency. Ens Pro-2.14, Attachments 7 and 8.

G. The SPMC fails to indicate that effective planning has been done to coordinate the ORO and the SPMC with the state of New Hampshire's emergency response organizations.

In fact, the SPMC dces not even indicate that necessary New Hampshire personnel have read the SPMC or been trained with it. Ess App C, pages C-la-1d.

.J I 28 IMAG 121 s

Contention Communication systems relied on for the mobilization of ORO personnel and the activation of the EOC are not adequate '

because no back-up personnel will be contacted by these systems and critical positions are filled with only one .

designated person per shift.

JI 29 FMAG 131 Contention '

The SPMC fails to meet the standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E.9 and 50.47 (b) (6) and (8)'because i there is no indication that the off-site communication systems relied upon for emergency communications with ,

emergency response personnel have a back-up oower source.

l

, JI 3Q fMAG 14 CON 51 Contention The SPMC relies too heavily on commercial telephone links for critical and essential emergency communications. l Because commercial telerhone lines will be and should be assumed to be overloaded shortly after the onset of an '

accident at Seabrook, no essential emergency communications should be based in the first instance on commercial telephone

, communications. As such the SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (6) and planning guidance of l NUREG 0654 II F. l JI 31 IMAG 151

(

. p Contention I The SPMC fails to meet the standards of 50.47 (b) (6) because there is no provision for an effective horizontal or lateral network of communications directly linking emergency l

.t i

17 -

1

field personnel with each other. As a result, all communications must be first vertically transmitted, processed and recommunicated leading to delay, miscommunication and gaps in the communications network. The failure to provide a lateral communications system is a defect in the SPMC which will affect traffic management and evacuation, security, timely response to emergencies-within-the emergency and otherwise result in a wooden and ineffective emergency response. Egg Lena Island Lichtina Connany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2 at 50 21 Egn. (February 1, 1988).

JI 32 IMAG 161 contention The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV, E. c., 50.47 (b) (6) and NUREG 0654, II.F.1 (Supp. 1), because there is no provision for adequate communications with State and local response organizations or Eocs, or with other private response organizations, because the ORO has no access to emergency' radio frequencies used by State and local agencies and no alternative to those means of communication.

JI 33 IMAG 171 l contention Federal EBS regulations and the Massachusetts EBS operational Plan ("Operational Plan"), which governs operation of the EBS in Massachusetts, makes no provisien for third party activation as envisioned by the drafters of the SPMC. Rather, such provisions were designed to provide solely for government activation. Absent amendment of the Operational Plan to expressly provide for authorization of ORO, activation by parties other than the government

! officials expressly named in the Massachusetts operational l Plan is therefore inconsistent with both Federal and State l

EBS design. The plan, therefore, inadequately provides for notification through the EBS system and does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (5) and (7) and the planning guidance of NUREG 0654, II.E.5.

Basis A. Insufficient provisions exist for verification of the Massachusetts Governor's authorization of ORO to activate and broadcast over the EBS. For example, no procedure provides that a government official will contact the EBS station to verify authorization. Instead, the EBS station must rely entirely on the word of the ORO staff or person 18 -

purporting to be ORO staff. Thus, ' activation by only authorized individuals is not assured.

.B. In notifying the public of an emergency, NHY would have to choose the level of urgency appropriate for public notification in light of the circumstances. NHY has a vested interest in promoting public perception that the plant is safe. Consequently, in the event of a radiological incident, NHY has an interest in minimizing the public perception that the plant is a source of danger. NHY will thus be faced with the conflicting interests of minimizing the public perception of danger and notifying the public in suitably urgent terms.

The Governor of Massachusetts, whose primary interest is

' public protection, will not be faced with such competing considerations and is therefore'the appropriate source of public notification.

JI 34 QiAG 18; TON 12t TOWN 3)

Contention The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (5) and the guidance provided in NUREG 0654, II.

E. l., E.2 and F.1 because the notification and mobilization of response organizations and personnel is not adequate.

Basis A. Appendix G describes the procadures to be followed by the.NHY Offsite Responsc EOC Contact point in the event of an accident. E22 giss Plan 3.2 3.2-FL These procedures are far too complicated and time-consumang to be performed effectively by one individual. The only prerequisite for this position is experience as a security guard which is totally inappropriate for t.his highly stressful, complicated and pivotal position.

B. Key ORO personnel apparently have no car phones or other means of communication during their mobilization period. In light of the distance traveled to get to the EOC by these personnel and the absence of trained and experienced 24-hour staff, this delay means that the ORO may not be functioning during the critical periods of an emergency.

C. The SPMC provides no adequate means of alerting, notifying and mobilizing key emergency personnel such as bus drivers, ambulance drivers and others. The SPMC aimply leaver, this function to the contracting empicyers, but provides no detail on who, how and when such notification will take place. This fails to meet the standard set forth at NUREG 0654, II.E.2.

19 -

, a D. Many of the private organizations and contractors .

expected to play emergency roles under the SPMC are not themselves notified unless and until those ORO personnel -

responsible for such notification are first alerted and mobilized and arrive at the EOC. No procedures exist for back-up assignments in the event ORO personnel with notification responsibilities is delayed or does not arrive.

E. The SPMC provides no assurance that State and local government employees and those providing contract services to the State and local governments (such as snow removal companies, private ambulances, and the like) will be adequately notified of an accident at Seabrook.

JI 35 fMAG 201 Contention i

The emergency messages to be utilized by the ORO in the event of an emergency at Seabrook are inadequate and will not be effective in communicating necessary information to the public. As a result, the SPMC does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1), (5) and (6) and the i guidance provided by NUREG 0654 at II E.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8,

, and F.1.

Basis A. The messages prepared by the ORO are overly long, misleading, confusing, self-contradictory, impossible to '

l oither broadcast or receive in the time available and ignore important characteristics of the recipient public in t Massachusettr. and its response to a radiological omergency at I Seabrook.

B. The SPMC makes no provision and provides no procedure for coordinating emergency messages with 1 participating and non-participating State and local governments as required by NUREG 0654, II.B.7.d. and Supp. 1, II.E.8.

C. The messages do not adequately address the issue of their sourco-and do not explain who and what is controlling and directing the emergency response. There is no discussion i in the messages of the emergency relationuhip between ORO and the stato and/or local governments. Egg NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, i II E.7. ,

D. The SPMC provides no adequate procedures for

-insuring that the omorgency mer, sages broadcast to the public <

corrolato with the messages and information provided to the media by the NHY ORO and other officials. ,

20 -

t i

t

~

. E. , The ' pre-established messages set forth in the SPMC at Pro-2.13, Attachments 2-24, may be altered or modified by the Public Notification Coordinator. Pro-2.13 at 6. No guidance or training is provided this individual on the essential components of an effective emergency message. As a result, the messages (s) actually broadcast may be less effective than those set forth in the SPMC.

.JI 36 fMAG 211 Contention f

The SPMC does not provide adequate procedures for coordination with the news media, and therefore does not meet the planning standards of 10 C.F.R. 50. 4 7 (b) (7) and (8). No adequato procedures for coordinating the activities of the public information staff at the EOC and the personnel at the Media Center are provided. Adequate procedures also do not exist for the coordination of the activities of Media relations representatives who will be communicating directly with the press by telephone.

I JI 37 fMAG 221 Contention The SPMC f ai? s to provide adequate information and access to information at the time of an emergency to those State and local governments which are not participating in emergency planning. While New Hampshire response officials will have access to the Emergency Operations Facility ("EOF")

and the Emergency Operations Center ("EOC"), officials from the Commonwealth will not be permitted at these locations -

(assuming they could be reached in a timely fashion.) As a result, no coordination of response, including coordination of public notification and communication will occur and the d

planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) ('.), (2), (3), (5),

(6), (7) and (8) and the corresponding criteria set forth in NUREG 0654 have not been met.

JI 38 f_ MAG 23f TOS 161 4

s contention The SPMC provides inadequate proceduros for rumor control during an emergency and fails to meet the standards set forth in 50.47 (b) (7) and NUREG 0654 II G.4.

- - - . - - _ , , - - _ _ _ , ,. m, - - _ , - - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ , , , - _ , , _ _ , , ,,-- , , , , , -,-,--_c_,_, n p .--_.-----g-+,---- - - - - - ,

.h'-

"- +- -

. . .. , ei

,on JI 39 fMAG 24; MAG 531 ,

. Contention '

4- .

The information to be made available to the public pursuant to the SPMC prior to an emergency does not meet the regulatory standards as set forth at 50.47 (b) (7) , NUREG 0654 II. G. and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV. D.2.

JI 40 IMAG 521 Contention The SPMc does.not contain an appropriate or timely alert and notification system for residents who have special notification needs. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50.47(b)(5), 50. 47 (b) (7) , 50.47(b)(10),

and NUREG 0654, Rev., 1, Supp. 1, II.E, II.G, and II.J. >

4 J el 0

h i

p -

v .L L V. LEGAL ISSUES

, e JI 41 fMAG 11 +

Contention State and local officials responsible for emergency

, preparedness and response in Massachusetts have no intention

of implementing or following the SPMC in the event of a 4 radiological emerg'ency,at Seabrook. Based on its determination that no adequate planning is possible at this aite, the Commonwealth will not participate in any tests, d ril-1 s , exercises, training or otherwise engage in any planning for such an emergency. State and local officials will respond to any Seabrook emergency on an ad has basis in light of the~resourcos, personnel and expertise then available. In, light of this considered governmental position, the SPMC is irrelevant to this licensing proceeding. No emergency plan exists that meets the planning standards of 50.47(b) and further'provides a basis for the

, finding of "reasonable assurance that adequate protective  :

measures can and will be taken." 10 CFR 50.47(a) (emphasis supplied).

JI 42 IMAG 31 Contention Assuming arquend2 that at some future time there is record support for the application of 10 CFR 50.47(c) (1) to-the litigation of the SPMC, the permissive presumption set forth at 50.47(c) (iii) should not be applied to the SPMC. As a result, although this Board might assume that State and local governments will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public at the time of the ,

emergency, no presumption should be entertained that those l officials "would generally follow the utility plan." In reality, as noted in Contention 1, these officials would respond to an emergency on an ad h22 basis. Such an incomplete and uncertain state of emergency preparedness cannot support a finding of adequacy under 10 CFR 50.47(a), l (b), (c) (1) . t

i JI 43 fMAG 41 i i

Contention Ansuming arcuendo that at some future time there is record support for the application of 10 CFR 50.47(c) (1) to f

the litigation of the SPMC, and this Board presumes that the relevant governments will "generally follow" that plan, that j presumption will either be rebutted or its evidentiary  ;

- 23 -

i

?

i

x. .

significance eliminated by the Commonwealth. As a result, there would exist two evidentiary possibilities, neither of which could provide a basis for the requisite ' finding of "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures GAD and will be taken":

1. Once the presumption is rebutted, the Board will ,

find tnat the relevant governments will not "generally, follow" the SPMC. As noted, in reality, the actual response of these governments would be Ad h22

2. Once the presumption is rebutted, the Board will be unable'to determine with an degree of certainty whether or not the relevant governments will "generally follow" the SPMC. (The governments will establish in the record that they will respond to an emergency on'an Ad h2s basis but will not "generally follow" the SPMC. Without benefit of the presumption, the Applicant will no doubt aver that the governments' response will result in the implementation of the utility plan.) The uncertainty surrounding this

dispositive issue - whether the SPMC will be implemented -

will make it impossible to find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures "will" be taken.

JI 44A fMAG 61

Contention The SPMC contemplates an unlawful delegation of the polico powers of the Commonwealth by State and/or local officials to an unincorporated association or organization itself formed and maintained by a division of a bankrupt foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Commonwealth. Activities envisioned for this entity are ultra viren under the relevant states' corporation laws. As a debtor-in-possession, PSNH's activities outside the ordinary course of business -- such as being the unlawful i delegatee of the police powers of a sovereign state --

. require prior approval of the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over the debtor's estate. Without such approval these activities are not permitted under the Bankruptcy code.

As a corporation not licensed to do business in I Massachusetts, PSNH and its division NHY are not authorized to engage in the contemplated activities - i.e., act as the delegatee of the polico powers of Massachusetts. In sum, the SPMC can not be "generally follow (ed)" by the relevant governments because it cor. templates an unlawful delegation of power to an apparent entity behind which operates a ccrporation not licensed to engage in the contemplated activities in Massachusetts and not authorized to do so by the court which now supervises it. Further, the activities a

l

^

, themselves are ultra vires under the laws of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. -

Basis A.1. In a section of the Plan entitled "Authority", the Applicant provides a completely cursory and misleading description of the legal basis on which the NHY-ORO is to be authorized to perform identified emergency activities. Plan 1.2 -1 to -3. After describing certain sections of the Civil Defense Act ("CDA"), Massachusetts Special Laws c. 31, the Plan states:

The administrative authority of the Governor (under ,

the CDA) may be delegated to the MCDA/OEP

[ Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency / Office of Emergency Preparedness) Director. The Director may subdelegate such authority gg crovided. Section 4 of the Commonwealth of Mansachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Appendix 3 to Hazard Specific Supplement No. 6, specifies the responsibilities delegated to the MCDA/OEP gDd 4

pthers. Plan 1.2-2 (emphasis added)

Neither the CDA nor the Massachusetts RERP provide any besis whatsoever for a delegation of the police powers by the Governor or his "designee" to a foreign private corporation.

Eqe Plan 3.1-1.24 (start footnote 24) The SPMC claims at various points that the Governor,"his "designee", the Director MCDA/OEP, the Director's senior duty officer, or the duty officer who happens to be at the Framingham EOC at the time, all could authorize the NHY-ORO to implement the SPMC.

ERS Plan 3.1-1; Pro-2.14, at 5. No support is offered for these claims. (end footnote)

2. The Applicant acknowledges throughout the SPMC that the NHY-ORO can not legally implement the SPMC on its own.

For example, at Pro-2.14 Attachment 7 page 27, there is a list of seven emergency response actions which the Applicant acknowledges cannot be implemented without prior authorization from the Governor:

1) Activating the Prompt Notification Systen and broadcast of EBS messages; l

2) Making recommendations for protective' actions to the public;  ;

3) Making Ingestion Pathway Protectivo Action f recommendations to the public; i

1 I

i

,i  !

4) Making recommendations for recovery and reentry to

. the public;

5) Directing traffic and blocking roadways;

6) Performing access control; and

7) Removing obstructions from roadways, including towing private. vehicles without owner permission.25 In addition, there are other police powers not listed by the Applicant which the governments would have to delegate unlawfully to NHY-ORO if the SPMC were to be successfully implemented;

'i 8) Command and control over the emergency response;

9) Contemporaneous planning and response to contingencies as they arise during an emergency;

10) Authority to direct and control State and local personnel engaged in emergency response;

11) Authority to request federal assistance pursuant to the FRERP;

12) Authority to communicate the views of the relevant governments to the public and to third parties;

13) Control over all offsite field monitoring, sample ,

collection and accident assessment;

14) Power to uake actual decisions that result in

• protective action recommendations for the two planning zones and for reentry and recovery;

15) Authority to identify areas of danger and determine that they are areas from which the public should be excluded; i

16) Authority to"secure and protect private property during the period of an emergency;

17) Authority to coordinate and implement the evacuation of all governmental buildings and facilities

18) Power to exercise control over individuals whose behavior during an emergency puts others at immediate risk of harm or impedes the l

implementation of protective measures; and t

. - , - - - - , - - , - , - - - . - - - - - - - - , . - - , - , - - . --,,,---y - , , -y-- -- - - - . , , ~ . . - ~ - - - - - -

1

19) Power to control and regulate the food, milk and water pathways within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of an emergency. ,

To the extent that the Applicant denics that these powers need to be delegated to the NHY-ORO, the Commonwealth contends that absent such powcrs the NHY-ORO s_pMid Ds2%

successfully implement the SPMC and that no finding that adequate protective measures will be taken can be made.

Activities that are likely going to be required for successful' implementation of the SPMC during an emergency --

such as controlling individual instances of deviant behavior

~~ even if not detailed and set forth in the paper plan, must be assumed to be within the power of the NHY-ORO or otherwise '

in an actual emergency it will be unable to successfully implement its plan.

All of these enumerated powers make clear that what is contemplated, if the SPMC is to be successfully implemented, is a fundamental transfer of the police power of Massachusetts to the NHY-ORO. However, the constitutional, statutory an3 case law of Massachusetts make clear that not '

or.ly may private parties not unilaterally exercise such police powers, but these powers are exclusively reserved to the state and its subdivisions and may not be delegated to '

private parties. Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.E.2d 565, 566 (1952) (citing the Massachusetts Constitution Declaration of Rights, Art. 30, part 2, c. 1, sections 1, 4; Amends. 2, ,

70) ; Civil Defense Act, 54, Special Laws c. 31 (legislature  :

has delegated police powers to Governor to prepare for and respond to radiological emergency). (start footnote 25) This list essentially tracks the 10 Legal Contentions filed by Intervenors in the Shoreham proceeding in 1983. The list also appears in NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1 ("Supp. 1") at II. A.2.a. The SPMC does not state the applicable Massachusetts law that reserved these functions to State and local governments as required by supp. 1. Id. (end footnote) i

3. Without an express authorization of the police poworo, the NHY-ORO simply cannot implement the SPMC.

Further, if the relevant governments were assumed to implement the SPMC, not by express delegation of authority, but by following the directives of NHY-ORO personnel who ,

advised, directed and guided the emergency response, such l emergency response puppetry would constitute a de facto .

delegation of authority to the NHY-ORO.  !

t B. As a debtor-in-possession, PSNH's activities outside the ordinary course of business require prior approval of the Bankruptcy Court supervising the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C.

5 363 (b) (1) . No such approval has as yet been obtained or even sought by PSNH and/or NHY. Thus, the statement made at >

Plan 3.1-1 that "[t]he NHY Offsite Response Director has boon

.--,.y -- , -y, - , - - . _-,,m.--v- -w--ww-, - - - - - - - ---vr-

authorized by the President of New Hampshire Yankee to commit i

. the resources of the company (money, manpower, facilities, and equipment) through the NHY [0RO), to respond in the l Commonwealth of Massachusetts to protect the public . . . " -

begs the question. Such "use" of the property of the estate

! of the bankrupt can not be effectively authorized without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Egg also App. C, letter from Edward A. Brown dated September 9, 1987. That such activities would be outside the ordinary course if established, inter alia, by the fact that PSNH and/or NHY l' j would require prior legal authorization to engage in th02.

C. PSNH is a foreign corporation as defined at M.G.L.

c. 181, 5 1 and the activities contemplated in the SPMC -

both at the planning phase and at the implementation phase - '

I constitute doing business in the commonwealth under M.G.L. c.

i 181, 6 3.26 As.such, PSNH is statutorily required to file a '

certificate or report of condition with the Secretary of State pursuant to M.G.L. c. 181, 94 identifying those activities in which it is engaged in the Commonwealth. (It should be noted that foreign corporations are prohibited from ,

all activities also prohibited to domestic corporations under '

, the laws of the Comn.onwealth. M.G.L. c. 181, 5 2) PSNH has not filed such a cortificate. As a result of this failure

, PSNH is subject to fine, is disabled from maintaining any l action in the courts of the Commonwealth and may be enjoined and restrained from further activities in the Commonwealth.

l In short, the present activities of PSNH with regard to ,

emergency planning are not presently authorized by law. [

] (start footnote 26) To the extent New Hampshire Yankee is

• j functioning only as a "managing agent" for the Seabrook j Owners then its pledge of its own resources is suspect. j Moreover, even as a "managing agent" NHY is "doing business" '

! under c. 181, 5 3. Finally, the Seabrook owners individually l are "doing business" in the Commonwealth as a "principal" l with a managing agent. Yet, throo of these owners are not j authorized to do business in the Commonwealth. Together l

) those three own 50% of Seabrook. (end footnote) j l

f (Note: The Massachusetts Attorney General has the j

] burden of proccoding with the evidence in support of this ,

contention.)

l JI 44B f NERNP. 4 )

!' Contention  !

l To the extent that Mode 2 of the SPMC contemplates the (

substitution of Applicants for stato and local governments in i carrying out an emergency response, it violates the emergency planning rule and Massachusetts state law. ,

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7 _______ _

Basis The SPMC contemplates that under "Mode 2," Applicants will "assume responsibility on behalf of the State / locals (upon authorization by the State) for implementation of the entire emergency response or integrating specific portions thereof." SPMC at 3.1-2. To the extent that Mode 2 contemplates the substitution of Applicants for state and local governments in carrying out an emergency response, it violates the emergency planning rule and Massachusetts state law. Mode 2 conflicts with the basic premise of the amendments to 5 50.47 (c) (1) , which acknowledges that a utility is without legal authority to exercise the police powers that inhere in state governments. Indeed, as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts points out in its contention 6, Applicants cannot lawfully be authorized to exercise the state's police powers.

[ Note: The burden of proceeding with the evidence on this contention is.the Intervenors'.)

e VI. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PARTICULAR POPULATIONS JI 45 IMAG 47;' TOWN 7.31 Contention The SPMC fails to offer reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a timely fashion for schools and day care centers. Thus, it f ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (10) ,

50. 4 7 (b) (14 ) , 5 0. 4 7 (b) (15) , 50. 4 7 (c) (1) ; NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J, II.N and II.0; and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Appendix 4.

JI 46 fMAG 48; SAPL 5; SAPL 71 Cont 5ntion The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented for' all those persons who are patients in the two hospitals within the Massachusetts EPZ and for those who become injured during the emergency, from radiation contamination / exposure.

The SPMC therefore f ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) ,

50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (b) (12 ) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J.10.d, 10.e, 10.g; and II.L.

JI 47 fMAG 491 Contention There is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station for

institutionalized persons (e.g., patients in medical facilities) who cannot be evacuated. The SPMC therefore

, fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (10) and

! NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II.J.9, II.J.10.d, and II.J.10.e.

JI 48 IMAG $01 4 contention i

The SPMC is deficient because it has not identified all or even most of the special needs resident population, has not sufficiently assured the security of acquired information i

- about special needs individuals, has not adequately determined the specific assistance needed by identified indl.viduals to cope with a radiological emergency, has not ider tified other individuals and organizations capable of assi sting and the type of assistance required, and has no adequate procedures for assuring that this data is

s.

periodically validated. Thus, the SPMC does not comply with

. 10 CFR 50. 4 7 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (7) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (c) (1) ,

and NUREG--0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Sections II.G and II.J.

JI 49 fMAG_51; TON 31 Contention The SPMC's provisions for assisting the special needs i

,o' resident population in taking protective actions are grossly  !

' deficient and provide no reasonable assurance that adequatts protective measures can and will be taken by'this population.

The SPMC therefore f ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1),

50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (c) (1) or NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Section J, and FEMA Guidance Memorandum 24 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons.)

JI 50 fMAG 54; TON 10; SAPL 11; SAPL 7; TOA 4Df211 Contention The SPMC fails to identify all of the special facilities which exist in the EPZ. Even for those facilities which have been idertified, there is not reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be implemented in a timely and effective manner. Thus, the people in special facilities will not be adequately protected in the event of an energency, and the SPMC, therefore, fails to comply with 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (3) , 50. 4 7 (b) ( 8) , 50. 47 (b) (10)- and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II.A.3, II.C.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.10.e and II.J.10.g.

I i

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VII. EVACUATION EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES JI 51 IMAG 55j SAPL 71 Contention The SPMC proposes that individuals who have been evacuated from special facilities will be relocated to a single "host special facility". This special host facility contains a large auditorium, an arena, and miscellaneous space on two floors. The SPMC's plans for use of this facility do not provide reasonable assurance that it will be available in a timely fashion in the event of an emergency or that, even if available, it will be adequate for use as a special needs congregate care center, or that the care available will be adequate for the number and kind of special-needs individuals to be sent there. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.4? Is) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (3 ) , 50. 47 (b) (8) ,

50. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II A.3, II C.4, II J.10.d., and II J.10.g.

J_I 52 fMAG 66; MAG 681 Contention The facilities identified in the SPMC as the Emergency Operations Facility, ("YOF"), the Emergency Operations Center

("EOC") and the Media Center a.re inadequate for the purposes required. As a result, the SPMC fails to moot the planning standards set forth at 50.47(b) (7) , (8); NUREG 0654 II.G.,

H.2., 3 and 4 and Appendix E, IV, E, 8.

Basis A. The EOF and EOC should not be housed in the same building. No provision is set forth in the SPMC for back-up power in the event of the loss of power to those facilities.

Such loss of power would affect both facilities simultaneously.

B. The EOC and the Media Conter are not accessible to Massachusetts State or local government officials during an omorgency at Scabrook. The EOC is located at Newington, Now Hampshire, approximately 15 miles north of Seabrook Station on the New Hampshiro-Maine border. Interstate 95 passes within two miles of the station and the other two north-south secondary roads fall within the EPZ 10-mile arc. Personnel fron Massachusotto would be placed at maximum risk while trying to transit the EPZ to reach the EOC. Additionally, New Hampshiro authoritics may be in the process of ovacuation and enforce access control which would prevent Massachusetts 32 -

local authority representatives from transiting the EP2 to

. reach the EOC.

LI_ n_JXAG 67. SAPL 21 Contention The facility identified as a staging area located in Haverhill at 145-185 Water Street is not now available to the ORO for this purpose and no other facility has been identified. The City of Haverhill on Februaty 26, 1988 issued a Cease and Desist Order at to all uses of the premises as a Staging Area based on violations of the City of Haverhill Zoning Code, 5 255.13. In April, 1988, the Superior ccurt of the Commonwealth entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting any further use of these premises for the purpose. In light of the function and role of the Staging Area in the SPMC, the absence of any identified lawful location for such a fhcility makes the effective implementation of the SPMC impossible and the SPMC fails to meet the standards set forth at 50.47 ( b) 8.1 ) , (S),

(10) and NUREG 0654 II J.10.g, k and H.4.

JI 54 IMAG 691 l

l Contention The SPMC relies upon the American Red Cross to ectaclish and operate all 27 congregate care centers and the nost special facility, yet it does not contain any kind of uritten agreement with tne American Red 'ross which identifies the emergency measures to be provi;v.: In Massachusetts and the natually acceptable criteria for . heir implementation.

Because it is the po. icy of the American Red Cross to engage in planning for nucicar power plant disasters only in concert with governmental planning efforts, the American Red Cross has undertaken no planning for its response in Massachusetts to a disaster at Seabrook Station. It has therefore not entered into any agreement cf any kind with NHY or the Joint Owners to provide any services. In the event of an emergency at Scabrook Station, the American Red Cross response would be at best ad has. Such a responso does not provide ressunable assurance that any of t he congregate caro contors or the host special facility will be operated by the American Red Cross or that, if the Red Cross does act to establish mass care centers in Massachusetts, it can be done in a timely fachion. The SPMC therefore 1.' ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , 50. 47 (b) l3) , 50. 4 7 (b) (8 )

50. 4 7 (c) (1) ard NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.3, II.C.S.

and II.H.4.

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. JI 55 (MAG 11; MAG 72; MAG 73; TOA 4A, H;  ;

, SAPL lif TOA 1Bf TON 2Af TOWN 9.1. 31 '

Contention The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that an C adequate number of bases, ambulances, wheelchair vans, vans, tow trucks, drivers and road crews can and will respond in a timely fashion. Therefore, the SPMC violates 10 CFR 50.47(c)'1), 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (3) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) ,  !

50. 4 7 (c) (1) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.3.,

II.C.4., II.C.S. and II.J.10.

JI 56 f SAPL 31 Contention The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate procedures, personnel, equipment and facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of general public evacuees, emergency workers and special facility evacuees (e.g. nursing home residents) have been established. l Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a) (1) ,

5 50. 4 7 (b) (8) , $ 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , $ 5 0. 4 7 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1 II.H.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.12, II, K.5.a and K.5.b. have not been met.

l JI 57 ISAPL 41 Contention i The SPMC fails to provide adequate means for the handling and disposal c.' contaminated waste water and .

j contaminated materials, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , $ 50. 4 7 (b) (9) $ 50. 4 7 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654 ,

II.I.B. and k.5.b.

JI 58 ITOA 1A_1 Contention I The SPMC fails to demonstrate that each principal

response organization has staff to respond and to augment its i

) initial response on a continuous basis, fails t, provide for  !

l an adequate number of available manned emergency vehicles, in violation of 10 CFR F 50.47(a) (1), 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) ( 3 ) ,

50. 4 7 (b) (6) , 50. 4 5 (b) (8 ) , NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, REV. 1 (hereinafter "NUREG-0654") II.A.1.e, II.A.3, II.A.4, II.C.4, and II.F.1.a. Contrary to Applicants' assertions of "formalized agreements" demonstrating a commitment to provide l certain emergency response resources, agg SPMC Plan, p. 1.1- l 2, many Letters of Agreement (LOAs) with service providers ,

t i

I I

5 n .-_- ,--.-,-_--,_,--n~, .,-

_,n- _,,e, ,, - ----. ~ ---------,n. - - - - - - !'

i ,

e are specifically identified only as a "proposed contract,"

, rather than a binding agreement. Additional Letters of Agreement are due to expire, by their express terms, on or before September 1, 1988, or even before completion of litigation on the SPMC before the Licensing Board. There is no reasonable assurance that the Letters of Agreement proffered by New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) represent binding commitments by the purported service providers or that the personnel relied upon in the SPMC will in fact be available -

in the event of an actual emergency at Seabrook Station.

JI 59 fMAG 641 contention The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , (8) and (9) and the guidance of NUREG 0654 l II.A.3. because there is no assurance that resources relied '

on in the SPMC will be adoquate at the time of an emergency. l Basic A. .1 letters of agreement and contracts entered into .

before January 28, 1988, the date on which PSNH filed for bankruptcy, are prina facie unreliable.

s

l. These contracts are executory under 11 U.S.C. $

365(a) and the debtor-in-possession, with Court approval, may

, assume or reject them. Either these contracts run between private suppliers and NHY -- a division of the bankrupt -- or i

the Seabrook Owners (with NHY functioning as "managing agent"). In the latter case, the 35% Lead Owner is a debtor-in-possession and its obligations under these agreements is individual up to its proportionate ownership share. To date, the Bankruptcy Court has not granted the bankrupt the necessary approval.

JI 60 ITON 2B; TOS 15f TOWN 8.12J Contention The SPMC fails to adequately identify the emergency equipment available for use in implementing the plan. The SPMC thus fails to provide a reasonable assurance that adequate equipment is provided and maintained as required by NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.H. The SPMC fails to identify the equipment available for use in diucouraging or encouraging direction of traffic flows. The number and location of cones, barricades and other control devices are not adequately set forth in the SPMC. Their availability for timely use is not described. This contention is confined to the towns of Newbury, Salisbury and West Newbury.

35 -

. VIII. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE JI 61 fNECNP 31 Contention ^

Applicants have not met the requirements of 10 CFR 6 50.47 (a) (1) to provide a "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Radiological emergency" at Seabrook because they have failed to show what emergency response measures will be i 6

taken by the Massachusetts state and local governments in the i event that Mode 1 of the SPMC is followed. Section a0. 4 7 (c) (1) (iii) (B) contains the presumptions that a) "state and local government officials will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public", and b) where an applicant's inability to comply with 5 50.47(b) results wholly or partially from the nonparticipation of state and local governments, that in the event of an actual Radiological emergency state and local officials would "generally follow" the utility plan. The SPMC establishes two alternative "modes" for the Massachusetts state and local governments to follow. Mode 1, contemplates that Applicants will provide only resources -- i.e. equipment, buses, ambulances, personnel, etc. -- to the state and/or local governments. SPMC at 3.1-2. Aside from broadly describing the emergency response functions of each state agency, however (SPMC, i 2.2), the SPMC does not contain any blueprint for state and local government agencies to follow in undertaking primary responsibility for the emergency response. The plan describes emergency response functions for the New Hampshire offsite Response Organization ("ORO")

rather than state or local governments. The means by which the state and local governments are thus presumed to "follow" the SPMC in Mode 1 consists only of using Applicants' resources in carrying out an ad uns response. The mere provision of resources to support an unplanned emergency responso does not adequately compensate for the state and local governments' lack of preparedness to respond to an accident at Seabrook.

JI 62 fNECNP 4r TOA 2B; TON 11b1 To the extent that the 3PMC contemplates integration of the utility's functions with state and local emergency response functions, it does not compensate adequately for the lack of preparedness of state and local officials to respond to a Radiological emergency at Seabrook.

The SPMC does not provide a mechanism by which the state and local governments can swiftly and efficiently interact with ORO officials to mount a timely and adequate response to

~

an accident. This results from the cumbersoma communication a

and coordination problems created by the parallel existence of government and ORO. emergency, response organizations. Each ,

counterpart of the state and local response organization must take the time-consuming steps of communicating and coordinating'its efforts with a counterpcrt in the ORO organization. For each function, the parties must take the ,

time-consuming steps of agreeing on divisions of ,

! responsibilities and all of the accompanying logistics.

including communication and sharing of equipment and j personnel. To the extent that the state and local

governments might assume responsibility for an accident

response under Mode 2, there are no guidelines in the SPMC that are designed for state and local governments to' follow.

The Implementing Procedures for the SPMC are addressed to the '

management of.the emergency response by the ORO, not state .

and local governments. There is simply no plan for the l governments to follow. t i r r

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' "o JI 63 (MAG 70; TOWN 9.2; TON 11d; i TOS 231 TOWN 4; TOWN 8.111 Contention The SPMC fails to provide adequate arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance and resources that are purportedly available to the State and local governments. Plan 5.3-1. Adequate emergency facilities and equipment are not provided and maintained by State and local governments for an emergency at Seabrook. Thus the SPMC has not mot 50.47 (b) (3) and (8) and a reasonable assurance finding under 50.47(a) cannot be made.

Respectfully submitted, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ,

AND ALL OTHER INTERVENORS

-( . <

By: , _' " Cr [

~

Jphn Trafic'o'nt'e -

Assistant Attorney General 4

f / Department of the Attorney-(/ General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108  !

I APPLICANTS g eCsM_ '. - 7 By_:j d j'~Vb'd:Q

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t . /

/' _.  !

' Thb$as Gfgn1M, Jr.  ;

Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street  !

J '

Boston, MA 02110 I NRC STAFF ,

i

^ ^- '

By:  !

Elaine I. Chan '

U.S. Nuclear P.egulatory .

Commissior, i Of fice of Gerleral Counsel l Washington, DC. 20555 l 4

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