ML20154E094

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Forwards Remaining Answers to 880127 Questions Re Ofc of Investigations,Training & Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel,Nrc Proposed Policy Statement on Maint & NRC Policy Statement on Enforcement
ML20154E094
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/01/1988
From: Zech L
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Breaux J
SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS
Shared Package
ML20154D958 List:
References
FOIA-88-237 NUDOCS 8809160211
Download: ML20154E094 (16)
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Text

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DO Taylor / Martin

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Rehm

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RHartin JMartin The Honorable John Breaux, Chairman -E'.!$;l

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~~' Mcdonald Jorda Subcomittee on Nuclear Regulation .

Comittee on Environment and Public Works ~._~ 5i.2 ~ . . . .

EDO 3450 LUnderwood United States Senate Fr - - - " "

Washington 0.C. 20510 .t w .v . -..

Dear Mr. Chaiman:

I an enclosing the remaining answers to your January 27, 1988 questions

'1 pertaining to the Office of Investigations (01), Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, the NRC Proposed Policy (Statement on Maintenance, and the NRC Policy Statement on Enforcement with the exception of 15(E) and 37) as follows: 14 through 22, 24 through 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 41 through 46.

The other answers in these areas were provided on February 24, 1988.

Remaining answers to questions concerning the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor and the NRC Material False Statement Rule, as well as 15(E) and 37, will be sent via separate letter.

Sint.erely, hwt4 w. A.

Lando W. Ze Jr l

Enclosures:

As stated .

cc: Sen. Alan K. Simpson 1

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8809160211 080030 [4/A*8/*JJ't,C[J [

237 PDR NbTON . . ._ .-.

OUEST10N16.(continued)

(F) Explain' why the 01 Director was not a voting member of the IRS.

ANSVER:

l The Director of O! was not a voting member of the IRB primarily because 01 did not want to participate as a voting member. The staff proposed that O! be invited to the IRB meetings as an observer and participant, but not as a voting member. Comissioner 1.sselstine proposed to have 01 as a member of the IRB.

The Director of 01 believed that it would be better for 01 not to participate as a member of the Board to preserve 01's independence and to conserve O!'s i

resources, but 01 should receive information copies of all estters referred to the IRS. Infomation copies of all matters referred to the IRB yere sent to O! l while the IRS was in operation. M /g f8 #h fl y [(

pe/ A da-c @ sw yR8p4bd.

1 1/27/88 BREAUX Q16

QUESTION 18.(continued)

(C) What did the 01 Director ask for in the SECY paper?

ANSWER 01 asked, (1) that the Commission reaffirm Ol's authority and responsi-bilities, and (2) that the Commission' direct O! and the Staff to develop joint guidance to ensure that all NRC employees are informed of the scope of Of -

authority and responsibility so that all matters of wrongdoing are brought to  !

Ol's attention. The paper was withdrawn without Commission action at Ol's request.

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l 1/27/82 BREAUX Q13 l 1

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1 Has the Comission ever denied an O! request to initiate,an \

00EST10N 21.  ;

investigation under its jurisdiction? If so, describe the l

specific incidences and why the request (s) were denied.

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ANSWER I

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The Comission has never denied an 0! request to initiate an investigation i under its jurisdiction. '

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1/27/85 BREAUX Q21

1 Please explain the relationship between wrongdoing and QUESTf0h 22.

safety issues in the context of 01's responsibilities to investigate wrongdoing. In the Comission's view, does wrongdoing always have safety significance? Does 0! share the Comission's view of the relationship between wrongdoing and safety issues?

ANSWER Nonna11y, NRC prescribes requirements to protect public health and safety.

wrongdoing as it occurs under the purview of NRC involves a delibera;e violation of NRC requirements. Wrongdoing or deliberate violations are of significance because they reach to the character, reliability, and integrity of the licensee individuals involved. The potential significance to safety is For also gauged by the position and responsibilities of the person involved.

example, wrongdoing on the part of a nuclear plant manager is clearly more significant than wrongdoing by a firewatch.

The Comi:sion cannot prejudge the safety significance of each case of wrongdoing. The safety significance of wrongdoing also varies depending upon the specific requirement violated. Each case is reviewed on its merits. For example, wrongdoing could span deliberately concealing incapacitated systems vital te reactor safety all the way to falsification of logs used to record the reutine tours of fire watches.

01 offers the following observations regarding the interrelationship of wrongdoing and safety:

1/27/8S BREAUX Q22

OVEST10N 02. (continued)

For the most part, our The nuclear industry is largely self-regulating.

regulatory assumption is that mest licensees will comply voluntarily with NRC requirerents, and that their commitment to the protection of the public health 01 does not disagree with this and safety is as vigorous as that of the NRC.

assurption. But this is what makes character and integrity so important.

The NRC must be able to rely on persons in the industry to comply with, not circumvent NRC requirements.

Industry employees who eng:ge in deliberate violations of NRC requirements represent a potential safety threat in terms of their unreliability.

It is difficult enough for NRC inspectors to detect non-compliance when it is not deliberate given NRC resource constraints. When such violations are done er purpose, and covered up, such non-compliance is highly unlikely to be discovered during routine inspections. Whatever character traits that may lead licensee employees to ecmnft such violations render them untrustworthy for regulatory safety responsibilities.

Thus, it is 01's view that wrongdoing, as defined by the NRC, generally has safety significance.

1/27/89 BREAUX 022

.e .

In his October 8,1987, testimony before the Subcomittee, QUESTION 24 i Mr. Hayes noted 01's mission of providing thorough, objective, and timely reports to the staff to assist them in making regulatory decisions. What criterta is used to suspend an investigation based upon a regulatory need? Who makes this decision? Please give specific examples of O! investigations ,

l that have been suspended. ,

1 ANSWER The Director. 01, may elect to suspend an investigation based on a lack of ,

regulatory need, but this would be an unusual action for the following reason.

4

! Virtually all current O! investigations have been carefully reviewed by the i

Staff and 01 price to initiation. At the time of a staff request for I investigation there is a consensus that a regulatory need for it exists.

Example of factors that could lead to a decision that a regulatory need for investigation no longer exists would be evidence supporting a reasonable belief -  !

that wrongdoing did not, in fact, exist or that the basis of regulatory need no

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j 4 longer exists. Under those circumstances, the assigned investigator would, i

with the concurrence of his supervisor, discontinue the investigation and write l

1 a final report of completed investigaticn work that would be issued in accordance l with standard procedures.

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I 1/27/8.! 3REAUX 024

. . - -.~. --, . . - . . - - . - -. - . - . , - - . - - . - -

l OVEST!0N24.(continued)

Although the original reque'stor of an investigation may assert that he or she no longer requires an investigation, the investigation r,ay be discontinued only by the Director. 01, if there was a reasonable belief that there was no

wrongdoing.

4 On the other hand, the Director: 07, may want to close a case due to a requestor's assignment of a lower priority to the investigation. For example,  !

the requester of an investigation initially assigned a high priority r.ay, ,

f based on the belief that the icvestiiativet results no longer are necessary, request it be treated as a low priority case. Under those circumstances, the

' case could become a candidate for O! administrative closure if the priority i of the case is such that the investigation will not comence within six  !

months. The practical results of such a Staff action would be to cause the matter to be closed administrative 1y. At that point the staff would be notified and could take further action on its own or request OI to reopen the case with a higher pricrity if circumstances warrant.

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As of December 31, 1937, O! has closed 39 cases administrative 1y.

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-/  %, UNITED ITATES Taylor / Martin

. I n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g Rehm I

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JMartin The Honorable John Breaux, Chairman -hj;. .;

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Mcdonald Subcomittee on Nuclear Regulation - Q..- -

Jordan t Comittee on Environinent and Public Works icd. --

ED0 1450 United States Senate - LUnderwood Washington, D.C. 20510 Fa n-... -- =

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am enclosing the remaining answers to your January 27, 1988 questions vrtaining to the Office of Investigations (01), Training and Qualification i, Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, the NRC Proposed Policy Statement on Vsintenance, and the NRC Policy Statement on Enforcement (with the exception of 15(E) and 37) as follows: 14 through 22, 24 through 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 41 through 46.

The other answers in these areas were pravided un February 24, 1988.

Remaining answers to questions concerning the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor and the NRC Material False Statement Rule, as well as 15(E) and _

37, will be sent via separate letter. l Sincerely,

w. e.g A .  !

Lando W. Ze , Jr j

Enclosures:

As stated cc: Sen. Alan K. Simpson I

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OUESTION16.(cantinued) -

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(F) Explain why the O! Director was not a voting member of the IRB, AMSVER:

The Director of O! was not a voting member of the IRB primarily because 01 did .)

not want to participate as a voting member. The staff propot.ed that O! be invited to the IRB meetings as an observer and participant, but not as a voting nenber. Comissioner Asselstine proposed to have 01 as a member of the IRB.

The Director of 01 believed that it would be better for 01 not to participate 1

as a member of the Board to preserve O!'s independence and to conserve Ol's resources, but OI should receive infomation ecpies of all matters referred to the IRB. Infomation copies of all matters referred to the IRB yere sent to O!

while the IRB was in operation. [ IN Y #'// k W A [(

pgc ,(k W<G h, #8 G42- [ k k f&W

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1/E7/63 BREAUX Q16

. OVESTION 18. (continued) l l

(C) What did the O! Director ask for in the SECY paper? ,

]

1 ANSWER 01 asked. (1) that the Commission reaffirm Ol's authority and responsi-bilitie's, and (2) that the Commission' direct 01 and the Staff to develop joint guidance to ensure tht; all NRC employees are inforwed of the scope of 01 authority and responsibility so that all matters of wrongdoing are brought to Ol's attention. The paper was withdrawn without Commission action at Ol's l request.

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) 1/27/88 EREAUX 018  !

a.

QUESTION 21.

Has the Comission ever denied an O! request to initiate an investigation under its jurisdiction? If so, describe the specific incidences and why the request (s) were denied.

ANSWER The Comission has never denied an O! recuest to initiate an investigation under its jurisdiction. ,

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1/27/25 SREAUX Q21 j L-----_----_.-----__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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QUESTION 22. Please explain the relationship between wrongdoing and safety issues in the context of Ol's responsibilities to' investigate wrongdoing. In the Comission's view, does wrongdoing always have safety significance? Does 0! share the i

Comission's view of the relationship between wrongdoing and i safety issues?

l ANSWER j NRC prescribes requirements to protect public health and safety. Nonnally, wrongdoing as it occurs under the purview of NRC involves a deliberate violation of NRC requirements. Wrongdoing or deliberate violations are of 1

i significance because they reach to the character, reliability, and integrity of the licensee individuals involved. The potential significance to safety is also gauged by the pcsition and responsibilities of the person involved. For l

example, wrongdoing on the part of a nuclear plant manager is clearly more

! significant than wrongdoing by a firewatch.

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The Comission cannot prejudge the safety significance of each case of j i

wrongdoing. The safety significance of wrongdoing also varies depending upon

the specific requirement violated. Each case is reviewed on its merits. For example, wrongdoing could span deliberately concealing incapacitated systems vital to reactor safety all the way to falsificatien of logs used to record the routine tours of fire watches. l l

J

t O! offers the fo11 ewing observations regarding the interrelaticnship of i wrongdoing and safety:

1/27/88 BREAUX 022

QUESTION 22. (continued) t The nuclear industry is largely self-regulating. For the most part, our

. regulatory assumption is that most licensees will comply voluntarily with NRC requirements, and that their comitment to the protection of the public health and safety is as vigorous as that of the NRC. 01 does not disagree with this 1 assumption. But this is what makes character and integrity so important. i i l The NRC must be able to rely on persons in the industry to comply with, not circumvent NRC requirements. Industry employees who engage in deliberate violations of NRC, requirements represent a potential safety threat in tems of their unreli W 11ty. I J

i It is difficult enough for NRC inspectors to detect non-compliance when it is  !

not deliberate given NRC resource constraints. When such violations are done 1

on purpose, and covered up, such non-compliance is highly unlikely to be I

i discovered during routine inspections. Whatever character traits that may

< 1ead licensee employees to comit such violations render them untrustworthy 4

for regulatory safety responsibilities.

I T

l Thus, it is Ol's view that wrongdoing, as defined by the NRC, generally has l safety significance, j

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1/27/88 BREAUX 02?

)

QUESTION 24. In his October 8,1987, testimony before the Subcomittee, Mr. Hayes noted Ol's mission of providing thorough, objective, and timely reports to the staff to assist them in making regulatory decisions. What criteria is used to suspend an l investigation based upon a regulatory need? Who makes this decision? Please give specific examples of O! investigations that have been suspended.

ANSWER The Director. 01, may elect to suspend an investigation based on a lack of regulatory need, but this would be an unusual action for the following reason.

Virtually all current 01 investigations have been carefully reviewed by the Staff and O! prior to initiation. At the time of a staff request for ,

investigation there is a consensus that a regulatory need for it exists.

Example of factors that could lead to a decision that a regulatory need for j investigation no longer exists would be evidence supporting a reasonable belief that wrongdoing did not, iri fact, exist or that the basis of regulatory need no  !

longer esists. Under those circumstances, the assigned investigator would, with the concurrence of his supervisor, discontinue the investigation and write a final report of completed investigation work that wculd be issued in accordance with standard procedures.

1/27/83 BREAUX 024

1

  • QUESTION 24. (continued) .

Although the original reque'stnr of an investigation may assert that he or she ne longer requires an investigation, the investigation may be discontinued only by the Director. 01, if there was a reasonable belief that there was no wrongdoing.

On the other hand, the Director. 01, may warit to close a case due to a requestor's assignment of a lower priority to the investigation. For example, J the requestor of an investigation initial!y assigned a high priority may, f j

based on the belief that the investigative results no longer are necessary, request it be treated as a low priority case. Under those circumstances, the i case could become a candidate for O! administrative closure if the priority I of the case is such that the investigation will not commence within six i

months. The practical results of such a Staff action would be to cause the 1

matter to be closed administrative 1y. At that poiat the staff would be notified and could take further action on its own or request O! te reopen the ,

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case with a higher priority if circumstances warrant.

'i As of December 31, 1987, O! has closed 39 cases administrative 1y.  ;

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