ML20154E020

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Responds to 850117 Request for Legislative History on Congressional Ceiling of 38 Positions for Ofc of Investigations
ML20154E020
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/24/1988
From: Kammerer C
NRC
To: Asselstine J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20154D958 List:
References
FOIA-88-237 NUDOCS 8809160194
Download: ML20154E020 (42)
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Text

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/ . UNITIO ST Af ts NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMIS$10N MsY.433RI4N)

' [ %N%.. f *f cosectes c' c retit ATTACHMENT

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' L j MEMDRANDUM FOR:

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SUBJ!CT: RESOURCES For THE OFFICE Or INVESTIGATIONS

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N Your meecrandum dated January 17, 1985 asked that we provide a legislative  ?,

1 history on the Congressional ceiling of 38 positions for the Office of Qky j . Investigations (01). This review is provided in resp nse to your request. ,

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As hev are aware, the Comission advised our three authorirlHo% and two apprcpriations subcomittees in Congress of its intention to consolidate agency investigative functions in a new Office of Investigations by letter f rom Chaiman Palladino, dated June 10, 1952 (Attachment A). The Chairr.an's letter was transmitted du-ing FY 1982 after the NRC's FY 1983

. budget had been subritted. '

I The Cessnission's FY 192.2'budpet dic not include a separate category for investigations. Resources for enforcement, investigativus and sp?cial

) programs (including ecergency pretaredness activities) were identifieli as a i subcategory of the budget for the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. In the FY 1/82 budget submission, the request for this category was for 140

! personnes. In the FY 1983 budget submission already be hre Congress, emergency preparedness activities we'e ider.tified se;arately so that <

personnel requireretts for enforcement, investigations and special programs were estimated.to be at 107 people for both FY 1982 and FY 1983.

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l The Chaiman's June 10, 1982 letter Jid net specify the number of positions 1

having investigative functiers within this subcategory of O!E. It sirply statec that present NRC investigative personnel were being transferred into .

I the ne. office and that additional trained personnel would be hired "within '

NR*'s current personnel ceiling." However, a wbsequent letter from i Chairran Palladino mentions a "total staff limit of 36 positions  !

1 distrQuted among both headcuarters and field offices" and this number was  !

previously cornhicated to the Congressional oversight coner.ittees by OCA in I response to inquiries. '

The House Appropriations Subcomittee on Energy and Water Development responded to the Chairzan's advisory letter with a letter, dated June 21, '

i 1982 and signed by both Chairran levill and Ranking Minority Member John Myers. The levill/Nyers letter (Attachment I) acknowledges receipt of the June 10, 1982 letter and states the Subcoscittee's view that "staffing levels and budgetary resources for this new office, in excess of levels.

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' Tne Congress die nct pass an Energy and Wate' Levelopment Appropriatiot for Fi '.971. During the fiscal year, the NRC anc ether affected agencies operated at FY 19Et levels under Continvirs Reso19 tion, in Jar.very 19E3, the NPC subeitted its budget request for FY 1984 That budget subrissier.

i was the first to identify resources for investigations (or 01) as a i separate itee under Program Techrical Support rather than under Inspectier.

] and Enforcement Programs, i

' The FY 1954 recuest ettimated 32 people for 0; in FY 1984 anc again in Ff 1955. The FY 1964 budget justification (Green look) provided a brief description of 01 and indicated that all estimates of people were statec in j terrs of fu11 tir4 equivalents (FTEs).

The House Appropi'istions Corrittee report on the FY 1984 Er.ergy and Water Development Appropriation Bill (H.Rept. 98 217) r.ade no mention of staffing ,

recdirerants for C1. It did, ho.itver, contain the follcwing language I relating to the investigations program:

1

  • 'The Ccerittee is concerned with the relaticeship betwevn l the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ent and the recently l

establishec Office of Investigations. The Cornittee is not

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convinced that there is any need for a separate Office of j Investigations and whether the esistence of that separate

' office in fact is consistent with an integrated investigatier and enforcement program.

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'The Corrittee has been advised that the Office of ,

Investigatier.s has not made public their policies and I I procedures. The Coerittee directs the MC te make a rescrt i

to the Comittee regarding the interrelationship of these  ;

offices and what legal problers exist that right prevent the publishing of the policies and procedures of the Office of i

i Investigations."

On June 16, 1963., subsequent to the issuance of the House Appropriations

, Comittee report on May 24, 1963 Chairnan Palladine wrote to the 1

Subccrnittee. Hisletter(AttachnentC)advisedthatafterayearof  !

experience with the new 01, the Cosnission had concluded that an additional l eleven (11) full-tise employee positions should be allocated to Oi, The  :

, follo ing justification was provided in the letter:  !

'The nurier of allegations requiring E C investigation is  ;

substantial and growing 'All of thee need at least a i screening investigation. Our inability to coeplete l

investigations in a timely manner may result in a reduction '
in the level of public safety, licensing celay or both. Such j delay is iminent in several corplex cases before the , j l Comis sion.' '

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9 a C M ' er e r ! Junt 1(,19&1 letter ste ,t: that the s'rrnsec reprog crrq actier ode core 'fror wittir the evtq personnel levels already crencec fer the hRC fc' Fi 19E3" and recuested etely anc favorable  !

consideration of the Comission's request. het long after tne Chairner's letter was sent OCA was askee to aavise the Subcomittee that the  ;

Comissior, was reducing the requested number of positions to be '

reprogramed f rom eleven to six. This was comunicated orally to the Subcorrittet staff by OCA.

l The SubcoviEtte never provided a writter, response to the Cceristion's i

request and the reprograming was never implenented. The Congress enacted the FY 1954 Energy and Water Development Appropriation and the assur.; tier

! on the part of both agency and Subcomittet was that a reprograming action i

was required to increase the level of personnel for O! above the FY 1982 level, continued in FY 1983 by Continuing Resolution and requested by the  ;

NRC in its budget submission for FY 1964 Throughout the remainder of FY 1983 and much of FY 19$4, Subcorrittee staff

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repeatedly expressed the desire to receive the NRC report on O! called for in the Corrittee's May 24, 1953 report before taking any action on the L

{ Comission's reprograming request. The called for report on Ol's ,

l interrelationship with Olt and what legal problems might prevent '

putclication cf O! policies and procedures was not subHtted te the i Subcorrittee until March 14, 1984 .. eight days before its hearing on the

. NRC's FY 1985 budget request.

The Ccerission's budget subeission for FY 1985 included a sweary of -

estimates for Program Technical Support Programs by function wt.ich stated an actual figure for FY 1953 for O! of 36 people, an estirate for FY 1954 ,

ef 44 people (presunably reflecting expected acceptance of the Corrissier's pendizg reprograrring recuest for an increase of sin people) and at

{ estimate of 45 people for O! for FY 1955. The Chain an's stateeent rade ne Pention of special needs for O! and the related text in the F11985 Green look was cursor,y: "Increases in staffing reflect greater schasis placed

,! on lnvestigations...'

l 's budget In cor.junctiet submission, with the Subcorrittee's the Subcoerittee asked a numberhearing on rethe agencisting to 01.

of questions

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These included a question about whether the Conrission planned to move O! l under the direction of the [secutive Director for Operations. However, j l there were.no questions relating to staffing requiresents for the office.

! , Although both the House Coerittee bill and the appropriation finally

! enacted subst4ntially rer uced the agency's overall budget request, no l 3 specific 'innguage was inclueed in either House or Senate Cuarittee report or in the Conference Report that would specifically limit the number of l people assigned to 01.

  • l However, on hoveeber 7,1964, the Comission transmitted the agency's l initial FY 1985 Base Table (Attacheent 0) to the House Appropr'ations j Subccrrittee an: other Congressional o'versight subcorrittees. The Base. j l Table transmitted te Congress shows adjustMnts and reductions rade in the i i

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Nep i t e i g % '. '.;. s u bt i t t e : by the N :*ce.9: a r .- : & et e ut eer:t tri  !

. <c ct.ceriting reprogramnt retions ur:t- Reprog te- ng p ocecures  !

i e nseus1,. supplied by the House AppropritDon: Swt:cm: tee ( Attect.n.ert  !

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Footnote 1 to the last Table describes FTC ret t10:stions includirt t l' increases anc reduction > in various p-ograms and *rt increase in the numbe-  !

cf investigators.' '

i It should be noted that, with respect to the position allocation for O' I

the lese Table simply reflects the Comission's budget as subritted to the l l Office cf Management and Budget (and soon to be submitted to Congress by  !

i the President), which estimtes 36 FTES in both FY 1985 and FY 178(.

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! If the Comission wishes to revise this number for 01, it would be  !

j acvisable to do so before the budget hearing cycle begins and to identify I

' clearly the need for a staffing increase for O! in its budget  !

cretentations. In particular, the Comission needs te eddress the points l

. rede in the original reprograming reevest of June 1963 in light of our  !

aeditional experience over the lest eighteen months. For example, since the reallocation of staff was not perritted is there any evidence of '

i either licensing delay or a reduction in the level of public safety as a i resuh?

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, Last year's House Appropriations Comittee report ude several references  !

j w*.ich could be construed as relating to 01 and its staffing requirements.

i Thest ouM to be taken into account in any Comission justification for  !

1 further prsonnel for 01. 1 I

First. the Comittee empressed supoort for Chaire.an Palladino's suggestion  !

that MC develop a policy for handling last minute allegations with a high l threshold for the introduction of new allegations. for example.

  • supported (

j by signed affidavits, and presented in a disciplined way.* One effect of  !

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4 suct a policy would presumably be to reduce de ands on the resources of 01. l Secced the Comittee repeated previous ' concerns over the MC establishing i duplicative and redundant staf.fs* noting that "Comission level staff, as  !

staff, has now grown to 261 p0sitions.* The House i

opposed report directed to theHCAgenc{to take imediate action to review this situation and  ;

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take steps to strearline one improve the unagement process" stating,  !

without recomending specific Nepower Ceiling redwttions, its espectati9n {

that the MC would isolement reductions to Comission level staff prior to i submission of the FY 1986 budget. Previous Comittee coments have expressed concern about the overlapping duties of OSC and ELD. During the {

budget hearing, the 5ubcomittee asked about whether the Comission still

) planned to put 0! under the direction of EDO. about the, training 01 j investigators may have had ir: nuclear safety or nuc16er operations, and I' about steps MC had taken to assure the safety significance of any violatien uncovered by 01. Taken together with the Comittee's previous - I J

request for a study of the interrelationship between 01 and O!!. these j questions reflect a continuing uneasiness on the part of the Comittee t i

about the apparent isolation of the O! investigative staff currently l reporting to the Comission from HC's inspection and enforcement - -

activities under the supervision of the EDO.

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Tne Honorable hek Hatfield, Chairman Subcastittee on Energy and Water Development I

Comunittee on Appecpriatiorts united States senate i

. Wshington DC 20510

Dear M . Dalrean:

" . In *en effort to upgrade WtC's investigative capabilities, the Cowsission is 1

~7taking steps to consolidate Mtt's investigatory functions in a new Office of I 2.. Irwestieations (01). . The new Office will, for the time being. report dirutly '

sco the tourrission aM will be responsible for investigating all allegations of  ;

7":,9 J wrjongdoise by ,tadividuals or pryanita tiens other than RC employees or con-

r. . tractors.. The Office will devalop policy, procedures and l
. standards for the conduct of all 03 investigations and will ens $ality cent
1 irnestigaton art properly trained. ure that all O!

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' Present RC investigative penonnel in the Office of Inspection and f.nforce- '

. esent and in ,the Regionai Offices are beirs transferred to the new Off. ice. '

< .' ' ;will ' in Mied te=porarily by W. James Fitzgerald, an Assistant General It

.. - Counsel, until a permanent director can he' hired. Mditional trained person-nel will be teruited for the new Office within EC's current penennel ceil.

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.The Commission believes that restructuring NRC investigative activities to i provide es sentially a mort centralized and high-level focus is urgently needed kr plans irwolve the reorganizing and upgrading of existing activities rather than an echarkation on any new prcgrams or Activities. W believe that I cur aQectives can be a:wplishec within existing NRC funding and personnel I l 1evels for FY 1982.

1 We will, of coene, continue to keep you apprised of significant Comnission  !

efforts in this and other areas of interest and importance. l 1

5incerely.

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Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino .

Chairman .

U.S. Nuclesr Regulatory Comission

. Washington, DC 20555 l t

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

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We have reviewed your letter of J c..e 10, 1982, concerning tha '

reorganization of HRC's investigatory (unctions into a new Office of

. Investigations reporting to the Comission. You note that additional trained personnel will be recruited for the new office'within NRC's current pemonnel ceilings. .

While we comend your efforts to improve NRC's operations, it would appear that the staffing levels and budgetary resources for this new offica, in excess of levels previously provided for by the Corm:ittee, should be -

submitted for Comittee review through the usual r.eprograming procedoras.

Sincerely, *

. I hn T. Myers .  : Tom Bevill, Chairman l Ranking Minority Member Subenmittee on Energy l Subcomittee on Energy and Water Development ',

I and Water Development .

1 DCA for a ppropria te action. . . . . . . . .ce; EDO, RF. . . . . . . . . . .SECY-82-0660 OW C I/

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June 16, 1983 e g 's The Honorable Tom Bevill, Chairman Subcomittee on Energy and Water Development -

cor.ittee on Appropriations United States Hoese of Representatives Washington 0.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

A year ago, I advisert you by letter that the Comi'ssion was consolidating its investigative functions in a new Office of Investigations, which would report directly to the Comission and which would be responsibit for investigating all allegations of wrongdoing by' individuals or organizations other than NRC employees or contractors. ,

In my letter to you, dated June 10, 1982, I indicated that our plans essentially involved a restructuring and upgrading of on-going investigative

' activities and that the Comission believed its objer.tives could be met within existing NRC personnel levels for FY 1982, i.e. within a total staff limit of 38 positions distributed among both headquarters and field offices.

After a year of experience, we have concluded that an increase in our investigation staff is needed. The number of allegations requiring NRC investigation is substantial and growing. All of them need at least a screening investigation. Our inability to complete investigations in a timely manner may result in a reduction licensing delay or both. Such delay is iminent in several in the level of public safety.

complex cases before the Comission. .

.'aerefore we propose to reallocate an additional eleven (11) full-time employeep ,ositions to the Office of Investigations for this purpose. This proposed reprograming action will come from within the overall personnel levels already provided for the NRC for FY 1983.

Your early and favorable consideration of this reprograming' action is reques ted.

Sincerely, ,

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. Nunzio . Palladino cc: ' Rep. John T. Myers *

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i The Honorable Richard L. Ottinger, Chainnan Subcomittee er. Energy Conservation and Power Comittee on Energy and Comnerte United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chaiman:

For your information, enclosed is 7 copy of the NRC's FY 1985 Initial Base Table.

Sincerely.

Carlton Kamerer, Director Office of Congressional Affairs  :,

Enclosure:

As stated ,

cc: Rep. Carlos Moorhead IDENTICAL LETTER SENT TO:

Sen. Simpson/cc: Sen. Hart'.

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Rep. Udall/cc: Rep. Lujan .

Sen. Hatfield/cc:  !;en. Johnston Rep. Bev111/cc: Rep. Myers .

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FY 19Ei Initial Best Tatie (Dollars in Thousancs)

Prasident's Congressional Initial Budoet Adjustments 1 Reduction Base Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) S 90,950 +S1,001 -5 700 $ 91,251 2nspectier,andEnforcement(IE) 92,190 + 844 - 1,000 92,034 Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) 43,520 -

t184 - 1,000 41,636 Nuclear Regul,atory Research (RES) 168,415 -

655 - 17,300 150,460 Program Technical Support (PTS) 30,545 + 86 30,631 Program Direction and

. Administration (PDA) 42,580 - 392 ' 42,188 Total 5468,200 -

-320,000 $448,200

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Seeattachedpage(s)forfootnotes.

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  • U.S. huclear Regulatesr;. Comissior FY 1985 initial East Table (Dollars in Thousand!.)

M Includes comparability transfer of $750,000 from the Office of the Secretary (SECf/PDA) to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP/ PTS) for ths Transcription Services Contract. ASLBP is using this contract in support of the ASLBP hearing process. In previous years, SECY funded this entire con-tract.

Now SECY is only funding for effort in the Washington, D.C., area; and ASLEP is funding for effort outside the Washington, D.C., area.

Also includes adjust 2nents for salaries and administrative support. At the time the budget is forinulated, salaries and benefits are allocated to each program based on the most current actual average 501ary rates for the staff vithin the program. Portions of administrative supgrt costs are assigned directly specific toprothe applicable program (i.e., ADP costs directly related to a i staff year. gram) with the remainder allocated to programs based on a rate per )

The following year, when the next year's budget is fortnulated, actual sair.ry rates have changed and the estimates for the direct allocation of administrttive support costs are more refined. Therefore, to make the )

- "current year" column of the budget on a comparable basis with the "budget year," the rate change adjustments are made. In addition, minor staff changes which have taken place in the past year require a reallocation of salaries and )

benefits, administrative support, and travel. The FTE reallocations are related to increased support of reactor operator licensing activities, increased reactor inspection efforts, increases to improve implementation of quality assurance recomendations, reduced uranium mill renewals and amend-ments, reduced research effort consistent with the research funding reductions, and no increase in the number of investigators.

U NRC allocation of the $20,000,000 reduction to our appropriation for FY 1985. i Most of the reduction was applied to the research program (RES). As we stated in our letter to Senator McClure on August 31, 1984:

"We carefully reviewed how best to distribute this reduction as ,

equitably as possible among Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Inspection and Enforcement, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, and Nuclear Regulatory Research. There were no easy options. About fifty percent of NRC's budget is non-discretionary - Salaries /

Benefits and Administrative Support are directly tied to the size of our staff and their corresponding logistical support -- and must be paid, the only remaining area from which the $20 million reduction could be taken was the $237.5 million in Program Support funds. Of this $237.5 million, $151 million represented research support work and the remaining $86 million was for the support of the day to day licensing and regulatory oversight of operating plants, safeguards, transportation safety, and review and appraisal of new plants. We felt we could not cut det.'ly into ti.: 586 million operating support without seriously threatening our istnedista safety oversight respon-sibilities. Since NRC must give priority, tr rougi. its inspection and licensing programs, to assuring'the continued safety of operat-ing facilities and industrial and medical use of radioactive

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  • t *.e-iali a nc becaust c' the mB9tuoi o# int reduct10r., the O"ict cf I.U lear Regulatory ResearCf. absorb 6c a larger recuction than a p-c rata share, he were terribly trou'let by the need tc apply suct a disproportionate share of this $20 million cut tc the research program but given the circumstances we felt we hac no other' options."

The principal impacts of this reduction to the research program Are: reduction cf some of the materials aging studies; termination of certain plant instrumente-tion and control programs; cancel planned thermal-hydraulic research on steam generators; reduce the analytical coda effort to a maintenance level; signifi-cant reduction in hydrogen research; defer certain high-level waste research; and perform no research to provide technical guidance to states related to low-level waste facilities. Sufficient funds have been provided to complete the Phase I fuel damage test program at the PBF facility. The remainder of the Congressional reduction was allocated t. lower priority activities related to licensing amendments (NRR), inspection support (IE), and transportation safety and waste management (NM55).

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c.;4 . . . . . '; NOV 6 384 MEMORANDUM FOR: Carlton C. Kamerer. Director O'(ice of Congressional Affairs FROM: Edwin G. Triner, Director Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management

SUBJECT:

FY 1985 BASE TABl.E

, Attached are sufficient copies of NRC's initial FY 1985 Base Table for you to distribute to the respective appropriation and authoriza.

tion comittees.

If you have any questions concerning the infortnation contained in the table, please call Rich Shunway or Ray Sanetrik at 492-7988.

/W Ed/in G. Triner, Director Division of Budget and Analysis Office of Resource Management

Attachment:

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QUESTION 26. The NRC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are developing a memorandum of understanding to provide for coordination of investigations between the two 6gencies.

(a) Describe what problems existed between the NRC and D0J which led to the need for a memorandum of understanding.

ANS9ER The decision to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOV) arose not so much out of specific problems as it did from the mutual recognition of the desirability of formalizing the procedures for the exchange of investigative information between the two agencies. Both agencies felt that an MOV provided

, for a greater degree of consistency and understanding in these areas.

Moreover, the development of an MOV allowed both agencies to arrive at an agreement regarding such issues as the timing of investigative referrals and the mechanisms and criteria for either agency to defer actions until the other has taken its action.

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I BREAUX/SIMPSON/01 i

02/09/88 1

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OUEST10N 26. The NRC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are developing a memorandum of understanding to provide for coordination of investigations between the two agencies.

(b) Deicribe what priorities have been tentatively agreed to with respect to NRC referrals to 00J.

ANSWER There has been no discussion of priorities, per se, with respect to NRC referrals to 00J. The Director. 01, refe s to DOJ those matters for which the 01 investigation has produced sufficient evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that a criminal violation has occurred. Although this is normally done at the completion of the investigation, the Director 01, rnay elect to advise DOJ prior to completion of the 01 investigation. Such a decision may be made on a case by case basis to allow 00J additional time to evaluate the i matter. This may occur in highly visible cases such as when 6here has been considerable Congressional or media interest, or when 00J intervention may be i necessary to prevent additional criminal activity or the destruction of evidence. The NRC does not have a fonnal prioritization system for its criminal referrals to DOJ.

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l BREAUX/SIMPSON/01 i i

02/09/88 i

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' CLESTICP 27 In testifying before the Subcomittee on October 8,1987, fir. Hayes said he would favor legislation codifying 01 authoritier arc' responsibilities as lor.g as certain .

"guarantees" were included. Describe more fully the "guarantees" envisiontd.

ANSKER Mr. Hoyes has provided the following c>plaration:

My retrark abeut "guarantees" was in response te a question from Senator Simpson (hearing Trur.scrirt, at page 90, line 21) as to whether "providing a statutory underpinning for 01" would be a satis'actory solution.

My response was thht it weel(' be satisfactory were the legislation to "incorperate tl.e guarantaes of the Inspector Gercrr.1 to the extent...that an IG Bill does...". Tiir vru.d include at least the authorities currently granted 01 in the original E7 Corrission-approved 01 Pelfry Statements and other delegt.tiert cf authority. A nost inportant feature would be the establishrcent by statute of O! as a Comissier-1nel office. ,

l In addition to codificctier ef its existing authoritics and responsibilities, I was also referrir.g to at leest three important auttorities given to Inspectors Cer.ert1, hit currently not given to 01. These are: I (1) the i BFEA.UX/SIMPSON/01 l

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-s 4 cetterity of the Director 01, to appoint, direct, and supervise all sub-crdinate O! personnel, (2) statutory authority to conduct crininal irvestiga-tions, and (3) e srrt.rcte appropriations account to assure OI independence.

My testinery was meant to reflect my belief that a statutcry 01, reportable and accountable to the Cennission as we were prior to February 1,1988, that

was crarted authorities as described above, wculd be a satisfactory alterna-tive to making 01 a part of a strtutory flRC Office of Inspector General.

!!ithout those authorities, I an no lenger cerfident of OI's ability to continue to provide the quality art e.ctrtity of investigative support that it has provided this agency and the Are.rican public for the past five years.

BREAUX/SIMPSON/01 02/09/Es

. s QUESTION 27. In testifying before the Subccanittee on October 8,1987, Mr. Hayes said he would favor legislation codifying 01 authorities and responsibilities as long as certain "guarantees" were included. Describe more fully the "guarantees" envisioned.

ANSWER Mr. Hayes has provided the following explanation:

My remark about "guerantees" was in response to a question from Senator Simpson (hearing Transcript, at page 90, line 21) as to whether "providing a statutory underpinning for 01" would be a satisfactory solution.

My response was that it would be satisfactory were the legislation to "incorporate the guarantees of the Inspector General to the extent...that an IG Bill does...". This would include at least the authorities currently granted O! in the original 27 Comission-approved 01 Policy Statements and other delegations of authority. A most important feature would be the ,

1 establishment by statute of 01 as a Comission-level office. j l

l In addition to codification of its existing authorities and responsibilities, I was also referring to at least three important authorities given to Inspectors General, but currently not given to 01. These are: (1) the 1 l BREAUX/SlHPSON/01 l l

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authority of the Director. 01, to appoint, direct, and supervise all sub-ordinate 01 personnel, (2) statutory authority to conduct criminal investiga-tions, and (3) a separate appropriations account to assure O! independence.

My testimony was meant to reflect my belief that a statutory 01, reportable and accountable to the Commission as we were prior to February 1, 1988, that was granted authorities as described above, would be a satisfactory alterna-tive to making 01 a part of a statutory NRC Office of Inspector General. ,

Without those authorities, I am no longer confident of 01's ability to ,

continue to provide the quality and quantity of investigative support that it nas provided this agency and the American public for the past five years.

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,6 o l authority of the Director. 01, to appoint, direct, and supervise all sub-ordinate O! personnel, (2) statutory authority to conduct criminal investiga-tions, and (3) a separate appropriations account to assure 01 indepen'dence.

My testimony was meant to reflect my belief that a statutory 01, reportable and accountable to the Comission as we were prior to February 1,1988, that was granted authorities as described above, would be a satisfactory alterna-tive to making 01 a part of a statutory MRC Office of Inspector General.

Witbout those authorities, I am no longer confident of 01's ability to continue to provide the quality and quantity of investigative support that it has provided this agency and the American public for the past five years.

Distribution:

s/f RED 3 Breaux/Simpson c/f l

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I Comunicated Successfully via DW/5520 to Tom Rehm on 2/11/88.

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OUESTION 14 In testimony before the subcomittee on Ocsober 8,1987, Cheirman Zech stated that there were a number of reasons, other than the lack of trained investigators, for establishing 01.

Please describe other reasons or specific incidents which that led to establishing 01.

ANSWER.

In the face of Congressional criticism of the NRC investigative prcgram, in late 1981 and early 1902, the Comission elected to establish an Office of Investigatiers that would report directly to the Comission. The Comission announced thet it was taking this step to impreve NRC's capability to perform credible, thorough, tinely and objective investigations. Although the staffirig of the new office with trained investigators was an irrpertant step in achieving this geal, the Cemission recognized that the past preblems were a product also of the organizational dispersel of the investigative function, its degree of functional independence, adequacy of stsffing levels, and the amount and Quality of investigative authority and perfomsrce standards. Thus, the decision to establish O! was predicated or, the Cormission's desire to strengthen all of these areas rather than confine the remedy only to recruiting trained investigators.

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NOTE: This response deserves Comission scrutiny, as the staff is nc longer able to find historical date en this subject.

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QUEST 10fi15. Please pmvide te the Comnitter the following, since 1982,

. bLXf.a.r :

(A) the total number of alleged violations of MRC rules and regula tions referred to 01.

(8) the total number of the alleged violations which resulted in the opening of 01 cases.

ANSWER.

O! has not kept records of the number of investigative requests that have been  !

declined by 01. It is a rarity for O! to decline investigative requests, especially since the greater forr.alization of investigative request procedures over the past two years. Consequently, the below cited case iritiation statistics also serve as a fairly accurate indication of all matters brought to Ol's attention.

YEAR NUMBER OF CASES OPEriEC 1982 164 1983 186 l 19M 158 1 1985 150 i 1986 86

) 1907 P7 TOTA 1. TO DATE: 831 Presur/51rpsen/Cl 2/1t/E6

QUESTION 15. Please provide to the Comittee the following, since 1982, by year:

(C) the total number of ceses 01 referred to the DepArtrent Of ,,

Justice. i ANSWER:

YEAR CASES REFERRED 00J 1982 0  !

1983 12 1984 14 ,

1985 15 i

1980 15 .

1987 y 2 TOTAL TO DATE: 81  :

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OllESTION 15. Please provide to the Copurittee the following, since 1982,  ;

by year:

(d) the total number of cases referred to the office of  !

InspectorandAuditor(OIA)by01.

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ANSWER,.

01 Referrals to 0IA a

1982 --- 0  ;

e 1983 --- 0 l

1984 --- 0 i

1985 --- 5 '

r 1986 --- 3 5

1 1987 - - 11 1

! 1988 --- 1 i

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QUEST 10M 15. Please provide to the Canmittee the following, since 1982, by year:

1 (E) the total number of cases O! and OIA collaborated on.

ANSWER.

i We assume that "collaboration" means instances where both OIA and O! joirtly work the sare investigation or portions thereof, such as the conduct of joint interviews. We can find no record of any such 0!A/01 collabcration.  ;

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I QUEST 10t; 16. Since 0!'s inceptied ir 1982 there has been considerable discussion of O! aut rity to self-initiate investigations.

(a) Specifically describe the extent of authority te self-initiate investigations.

(b) What doeurent identifies Ol's self-initiation authority?

I ANSWCR.

The at.thority of 01 to self-initiate investigations is set forth in 01 Policy 4 Thir policy codifies the autFcrity to self-initiate investigations that was granted 01 at the time of its 198? creation. The Corsnission re-affinned this authority in response to an April 1987 O! Comission Paper (SECY 87-93).

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l QUESTION 18. In April 1987, the 01 Director submitted SECY 87-93 to the Comis sion.

(a) For what specific reasons did the 01 Director submit the '

SECY paper to the Connission?

(b) What events led to submitting the document to the Comission?

ANSWER l

SECY-87-93 arose out of an O! concern that certain Staff and Comission ,

actions taken frw 1986 on hari the effect of creating confusion regarding the a scope of 01 authority and responsibility. Two actions in particular -

Comission approval of a Staff proposal (SECY-85-369) regarding the initiation, establishrent of prinrities, and the termination of investiga-tiens, and establishment of an Investigation Referral Board - appeared to conflict with long standing 01 policies and procedures, particularly in such areas as the authority of the Director 01, to initiate investigations sua spente, or the obligation of NRC employees to report wrongdeing matters to 01. l l

The need for clarification became acutely evident in February 1987 when l, controversy over 01 self initiation of an investigetion over the objections of some Staff officials led to at least one Cornissioner severely criticizing the 01 actions and suggesting the need for disciplinary action for the Director, l 01.

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.00ESTION 18. In April 1987, the O! Directer submitted SECY 87-93 to the Comission.

(c) What did the 0! Directnr ask for in the SECY paper?

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AMSWER O! asked, (1) that the Consnission reaffim Ol's authority and responsi-bilities, and (2) that the Consnission direct O! and the Staff to develop joint guidance to ensure that all NRC employees are informed of the scope of 0!

j authority and responsibility so that all matters of wrongdoing are brought to 01's attention. 0! then provided a list of seven ttatements of O! authority and responsibility for Consnission affirmation.

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QUESTION 18.

In April 1987, the 01 Director submitted SECY 87 93 to the Comission.

(d) What arran9empts were reached as a result of the ranage- ,

ment meeting held to discuss the SECY paper?

MSWER P

The Director 01, and his staff met with the Connission on July 29,1987, to discuss SECY 87-93. During that reeting the Comission re-affirmd its support for the existirg 27 01 Policy Statem nts. The Comission particularly ,

re emphasized the authority of 01 to Self-initiate investigations. Prict to that management meeting, but subsequent to the submission of SECY-87-93, the ,

Investigation Referral Board was disestablished, and the Comission announced that neither Comission nor Office of General Coursel review cf proposed O!

referrals to the Departant of Justice would be required. Based on the foregoing, as well as the advice of Comission staff, 0! sutstitted SECY 87-93A l I which forv411y withdrew SECY-87-93. 01's withdrawal of SECY-87-93 was based on its understanding that the issees raised by that paper had been favorably resolved by the above oescribed actions.

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OVESTION 19. What NRC docuinent's) define the procedures for conducting investigetions under Ol's jurisdiction? l (a) Define the thresholds for conducting 01 investigations.

ANSWER 01 investigations are conducted in accordance with the twenty-seven Consission-apprnved 01 Policy Statemnts. Implernenting procedures are l j contaired in the O!/ Investigative Procedures Manual.

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QUESTION 19. What NRC document (s) define the procedJres for conducting investipations under 01's jurisdiction? l (b) Define the priorities for conducting 0! investigations.

i ANSWER r

The thresholds for conducting 01 investigations are fourd generally in Part 111. 8.1. of the Aprendix to NRC Manual Chapter 0517. The threshold for a .

Staff investigative request is a reasonable basir, fer belief of wrongdoing anj! n a Staff deterrination that an invest 1 Cation is necessary for enforcement or  ;

other regulatory action. The Director. 01, r.ay self-initiate ar investigation ,

besed on reasonable belief of wrongdoing in accordance with O! Policy 4 ,

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,00ESTION 20. What has the ultimate authority, within NRC, to open a full scale investigation under Ol's jurisdiction? Who has the primary responsibility to detemine whether or not an O!

investigation is needed?

ANSWER Ultimate authority rests with the Connission. Although the EDO and Reptonal Administrators P.ay request investigations, only the Coemissien may direct O!

to open an investigation. Thus, on a practical basis, the Director. 01, 4

determines whether or not to initiate an investigation. Similarly, authorized requesters have a responsibility to request 0! investigations when the threshold criteria of NRC Manual Chapter 0517 are ret. The Director. 01, must also remain avere of matters that may require investic'* ion ard be prepared to inittste investigations in the absence of a request. The fore-going procedures have been followed in the past.

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QUESTION 21. Has the Corsnission ever denied an 01 request to initiate an investigation under its jurisdiction? If so, describe the specific incidences and why the request (s) were denied.

ANSWER The Comission has never denied an 01 request to initiate en investigation under its jurisdiction, but did decline to seppert the initiation of an investigation involving two senior sanagers at the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Burlington, Kansas, in early 1985.

  • ruorance with Copenission policy regarding the investigation of persons for reasons of character and intagrity, O! brought to the Comission's attention certain actiers on the part of these two senior offietals - alleged sexual harassment, alleged I

blackballing of a fomer eeployee, anc the alleged illegal search and seizure of decurents fror, that employee's vehicle (without tl.at employee's knowledge).

) 01 did not specifically reconenend a course of action in the Ccertission paper setting forth the above allegations, but Comission Asselstine proposed an 1

investigation be conducted. The Comission voted not to support this action.

Ereaux/Sirrsen/01 2/11/8A

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.00EST!0A 22. Please explair the relationship betweer wrongdoing and safety issues in the context of 01's responsibilities to investigate wrongdoing. In the Commission's view, does wrongdoing always have safety significance? Does 01 share the Commission's view of the relationship between wrongdoing and safety issues?

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$N/S.3 NRC prescribes requirtments to protect public health and safety. Norra11y.

wrongdcing as it occurs under the purview of NRC involves a deliberate I

violation of NRC requirements. The safety significance of wrongdoing varies i

6epending upon the specific recuirement violated. Fne example, wrongdoing coulc span deliberately cencealing incapacitated systems vital to reactor 1

j safety all the way to falsification of legs used to record the routine tours l l

of fire watches. Nonetheless wrongdoing or deliberate violations, are of i

significance because they reach to the character, reliability and integrity cf I the licensee fndividuals involved. The petential significa^r.e to safety is also gauged by the position and responsibilities of the person involved. For i

example, wrongdoing on the part of a nuclear plant manager is clearly more significant than wrongdoing by a firewatch.

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OUEST10N22.(continued) -2 The cuclear industry is largely self-regulating. For the most part, our regulatory assurgtion is that most licensees will comply voluntarily with hRC requirements, and that their ccmmitment to the protection of the public health and safety is as vigorous at that of the NRC, 01 does rot disagree with this l assurption. But, this is what nakes character and integrity so impertant.

The NRC rust be able to rely on persons in the industry to ecmply with, not i circumvent NRC requirerents. Industry employees who engage in deliberate violatiers of MRC requirements represent e potential safety threat in terms of their unreliability.

It is difficult enough for HP.C inspectors to detect non-compliance when it it not deliberate given NRC resource constrair.ts. When such violations are done on purpose, and covered up, such non-compliance is highly unlikely to be discovered during routine inspectiers. Whatever character traits that say j lead licensee employees to connit such violations render then untrustworthy for regulatory sefety responsibilities.

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Thus. it is Ol's view that wrcredoing, as defined by the NRC, qgperally has safety significance.

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fWESTION 24. In his October 8,1987, testimony before the Subeceittee, Mr. Hayes noted Ol's mission of providing thorough, objective, and timely reports to the staff te assist them in making regulatory decisions. What criteria is used to suspend an investigation based upon a regulatory need? Who makes this decision? Please give specific exarples of O! investigatiers that have been suspended.

l ANSWER i

The Director. 01, may elect te suspend an investigation based on a lack of regulatory neec, but this would b= an unusual cction for the nileWe vasen.

Virtually all current O! investigations have been carefully reviewed by the Str.ff and 01 prior to initiation. Each open case represents a joint Staff /0!

! decisinn that the facts available to the NRC at the outset represent a reasonable beliet that wrongdoing associated with an NRC regulatory matter her occurred. As by definition, regulatory reed attaches to all wrcngioing within 01 jurisdiction, farter that could lead to a decision that a regulatory need no Innger exists would be compelling evidence supperting a reasonable belief  ;

that wrcegdoing did not, in fact, exist he the basis of regulatory aped could

@t be sustained. Under those circunstances, the assigned investigator would, j with the concurrence of his supervisor, discontinue the investigationg write i a final report of ccepleted investigation werk that woulo be issued in l

accordance with standard procedures.

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QUESTION 24. (continued) -?.

Although the original requestor of an investigatier ray assert that he or she no longer requires an investigrtion, the investigation may be discontinued only by the Director. 01.

On the other hand, the Director. 01, may want to close a case due to a  !

requestor's assignment of a lower priority to the investigation. For example, the requester of an investigation initially assigned a high priority my, based on the belief that the investigative results no 1erger are necessary, request it be treated as a low priority case. Under those circumstances, the case could becore a candidate for 01 adininistrative closure for lack of resources. Thus, although 01 would not close a case solely on the basis that the Steff asserts that there no longer is a regulatory reed, the practical  :

results of such a Staff action would be to cause the matter to be clesed l

administratively for lack of resources.

As of Decenter 31, 1987, C! has closed 39 cases administratively for lack of resources.  !

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QUESTION 75. Please provide to the Subcomittee the following date by fiscal year through 1987.

(a) the number of positions requested by 01.

(b) the number of positions requested for 0! by the Co# mission.

(c) the number of positions allecated to 01.

(d) the neber of positters allocated to O! by the Cengress.

ANSWER  !

The Office of Investigations (01) was established in mid 1982 and allocated a personnel ceiline of 38 full-tire equivalent (FTE) staff. The FY 19P3 personnel ceiling for 01 was also 38 FTE. The table below shows the Coemission's FY 1984-1988 budget requests tn both OM3 and the Congress for 01.

Fiscal Corrission President's j Year Rott to OMB Budget M FTE FTE 8

i 1984 42 38 b

1985 #9 49 b

! 1986 3? 44 i b 1987 44 44 I

a

The Office cf Investigations personnel ceiling was held in 38 FTE's untti FY 1906. (See attached 1/24/65 meno from C. Kamerer to J.Asselstine.)

b Congressional Authorization Act and Appropriations Act did not reduce the President's Budget reouest for the Office of Investigations, i

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, QUESTION 26. The NPC and the Department of Justice (00J) are developing a memorandum of unterstanding to provide for coordination of investigations between the two agencies.

(a) Describe what problems existed between the NRC and 000 which led to the need for e memorandum of understanding, t ANSWER The decision to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (POV) arose not so much out of specific problers as it did from the mutuel recognition of the 3

desirability of forralizing the procedures for the exchange of investigative 1

inferration between the two agencies. Both agencies felt that an M00 provided for a greater degree of consistJncy and understand 1rp in these areas, j Moreover, the development of an MOV allowed both agencies to arrive at an agreerent regarding such issues as the timing of investigative referrals ard the mecherisms and criteria for either agency to defer actions until the other l has taken its tetion.  ;

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j  ; When criminal wrcngdoing in the nuclear 1rdustry occurs both the NRC and the i i l ,' DOJ are interested in prosecuting such tetion so as to defer future criminal

.' wrongdoing. Sometimes the criminal wrongdoing can pose an irrediate threat te p blic health and safety. When this happens. the NRC has a duty to take

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1 trpropriate action. Norvally, the DCJ prefers ne action by hRC pending the

!, prosecution of a criminal case. However, 00J recognizes flRC's over-archino f 4

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I QUESTION 26.(continued) 2 4

i bealth and safety responsibilities. A central purpose of the M0l' is to i

clearly define and regularize the process for NRC and 00J carrying out their dif ferent responsibilities hameniously. ,

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QUESTION 26. The NRC and the Departrwnt of Justice (00J) arc developing a meroranden of understanding to provide for coordinatier. of investigatters betwee.1 the two agercies.

(b) Describe what priorities have been tertatively agreed to with respect to NRC referrals to D0J. l ANSWER 4

i There has brer. no discussion of priorities, per se, with respect to NRC referrals to DOJ. The Director. 01, refers to D0J these matters fer which tFe 0! investigation has produced sufficient evidence to support a rettenable suspicion that a criminal violatior has occurred. Although this is norina11y l done at the completion of the investigation, the Director 01, may elect to j advise C00 prior to ecopletion of the 01 investigation. Such a decisien may )

be rade on a case by case basis to allow DCJ additienti time to evaluate the l natter. This may occur in high1) visible cases such as when there has beer.

considerable Congressienal or redia interest, er when DOJ interventien ray be  ;

I necessar.v te prevent additional criminal activity or the destruction of evidence. The NRC does not have a femal prioritization system for its

< cririnal referrals to DOJ.

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OVESTION 07 In testifying before the Subcomittee on October 8,1907, Mr. Hayes said he would favor legislation codifying 01 authorities anc responsibilities as long as certain .

' guarantees" were included. Describe more fully the

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' guarantees' envistored.

AN$teER 4

Mr. Hayes has provided the following explanation:

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) $impson (hearire Transcript, at page 90, line 21) as to whether 'providing a statutory underpinning for Ol' would be a satisfactory solution.

5 My response was that it would te satisfactory were the legislatten to 1

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  • incorporate the guarantees of the Inspector General to the extent...that an 16 Bill cces...'. This would include at least the authorities currently granted O! in the original 27 Corrission approved 01 Felicy Staterents ano other delegations of authority. A post important facture wuuld be the i establishment by statute of 0! as a Comission-level effice.

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j In accition to codification of its existing authorities and responsibilities.

1 I was also referring to at Itast three irportant authorities given to Inspecters General, but currently not given to 01. These are: (1)the authority of the Director. 01, to appoint, direct, and supervise all sub-ordinate 01 persennel, (2) statutory authcrity to conduct criminal investigc-tions, and (3) a separate apprrpriations account te assure 01 independence.

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OUESTION27,(continued) -2 My testimony was meant to reflect my belief that a statutory 01, reportable and accountable to the Connission as we were prior to February 1,1988, that was granted authorities as described above, would be a satisfactory alterna-tive to r.aking 0! a part of a statutory NRC Office of Inspector General.

1 Withcut those authorities, I am no longer confident ef Ol's ability to centinue to provide the cuality ano quantity of Investigative support that it has provided this agency and the American public for the past five years.

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QUESTION 18. In April 1987, the 01 Director submitted SECY 87 93 to the Comission.

(c) What did the O! Director ask for in the SECY paper?

t ANSWER l 01 asked. (1) that the Comission reaffim Ol's authority and responsi-bilities, and (2) that the Comission direct 01 and the Staff to develop joint

! guidance to ensure that all NRC employees are infomed of the Scope of 01 I authority and responsibility so that all matters of wrongdoing are brought to ;

i Ol's attention. 01 then provided a list of seven statements of 01 authority  :

and responsibility for Comission affirmation.

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QUESTION 21. Has the Comission ever denied an 01 request to initiate an investigation under its jurisdiction? If so, describe the  !

specific incidences and why the request (s) were denied.

ANSWER i i

The Comission has never denied an 01 request to initiate an investigation under its jurisdiction, but did decline to support the initiation of an l j investigation involving two senior managers at the Wolf Creek Generating 4

, Station Burlington, Kansas, in early 1985, in accordance with Comission 4

1 policy regr.rding the investigation of persons for reasons of character and l integrity. 01 brought to the Comission's attention certain actions on the part of these two senior officials - alleged sexual harassment, alleged  ;

blackballing of a former employee, and the alleged illegal search and seizure l

l of documents from that employee's vehicle (without that employee's knowledge). [

t j 01 did not specifically recomend a course of action in the Comission paper i i '

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! setting forth the above allegations, but Comission Asselstine proposed an

! i investigation be conducted. The Comission voted not to support this action.  !

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QUESTION 22. Please explain the relationship between wrongdoing and safety issues in the context of Ol's responsibilities to investigate wrongdoing. In the Connission's view, does ,

i wrongdoing always have safety significance? Does O! share the Comission's view of the relationship between wrongdoing and

. safety issues?

ANSWER  :

l l 01 offers the following observations regarding the interrelationship of wrongdoing and safety. The NRC does not prescribe requirem6nts for non safety f I

I reasons. As wrongdoFng in the NRC context always involves the deliberate ,

I l violation of MRC requirements, it must always have safety significance.

Wrongdoing is not a random chance event. A component does not just happen to '

] fai'., nor an individual just happen to make a mistake. To the contrary, an

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1 individual, or more ominously, a group of individuals, sets out not only to 1

i violate a safety requirement, but in virtually all instances, to conceal or  !

j cover up this violation. The underlying violation may vary in significance  ;

' from falsification of QA records relating to components that are, in fact, of sufficient quality to falsification of QA records that conceal actual defects.

)

But the safety significance of the wrongdoing does not turn only on the l appcrent magnitude of the violation per se. The real safety significance lies '

with the person or persons who comitted the violation. In other words, the

, I issue is character and integrity.

I Q l l

( BREAUX/SIMPSON-Ol l

l 02/09/38

! i

6, ,

i OUESTION 22. (CONTINUED)

The nuclear industry is largely se'if-regulating. For the most part, our regulatory assumption is that most licensees will comply voluntarily with NRC ,

requirements, and that their comitment to the protection of the public health

.)

and safety is as vigorous cs that of the NRC. We do not dissgree with this assumption. But, this is what makes character and integrity 50 iliportant.

The hRC must be able to rely on persons in the industry to comply with, not l

circumvent NRC requirements. Industry employees who engage in deliberate r

violations of HRC requirements represent a safety threat in tenns of their l

unreliability.

I j

lt is difficult enough for NRC inspectors to detect non-compliance when it is 2

not deliberate given NRC resource constraints. When such violations are done

' on purpose, and covered up, such non-compliance is highly unlikely to be discovered during routine inspections, hus, the licensee eeploye

engages in wrongdoing is like a Trojan horse within the regulatory system.' -

i j wnamer cnaracter traits that may lead them to coninit such violations render l l

such employees safety hazards of the first order.

I Thus, it is 01's view that wrongdoing, as defined by the NRC., alway has a degree of safety significance. l l

l i

BREAUX/SIMPSON 01 1 02/09/88 i

QUESTION 24 In his October 8, 1987, testimony before the Subcommittee.

Mr. Hayes noted 01's mission of providing thorough, objective, and timely reports to the staff to assist them in ocking j reguletory decisions. What criteria is used to suspend an investigation based upon a regulatory need? Who makes this decision? Please give specific examples of 01 investigations that have been suspended.

7 f

ANSWER The Director. 01, mey elect to suspend an investigation based on a lack of 4

regulatory need, but this would be a rare action for the following reason.

Ytrtually all current 01 investigations have been carefully reviewed by the Staff and 01 prior to initiation. Each open case represents a joint Staff /01 j

decision that the facts available to the NRC at the outset represent a (

reasonable belief that wrongdoing has occurred. As by definition, regulatory :

l need attaches to all wrongdoing within 01 jurisdiction, the only factor that j could lead to a decision that a regulatory need no longer exists would be 1

compelling evidence supporting a reasonable belief that wrongdoing did not, in I 1

l fact, exist. This norm ily would be a result of the investigative process, t

Under those circumstances, the assigned investigator would, with the concur- i rence of hts supervisor, discontinue the investigation and write a final report of investigation that would be issue 3 in accordance with standard J l

procedures.

i l

BREAUX/SIMPSON/0!

09/09/88 1

t

Although the original requestor of an investigation may assert that he or she no longer requires an investigation, the investigation would be discontinued by the Director. 01, only if there was a reasonable belief that there was no wrongdoing.

On the other hand, the Director. 01, may want to close a case due to a j requestor's assignment of a lower priority to the investigation. For example,

! the requestor of an investigation initially assigned a high priority may,

! based on the belief that the investigative results no longer are necessary, request it be treated as a low priority case. IJnder those circumstances, the case could become a candidate for 01 administrative closure for lack of f

resources. Thus, although O! would not close a case solely on the basis that ,

the Staff asserts that there no lorger is a regulatory need, the practical

results of such a Staff action would be to cause the matter to be closed ,

l administrative 1y for lack of resources.  !

i As of December 31, 1987, 01 has closed 39 cases administrative 1y for lack of  ;

]

{

resources.

i l

BREAUX/ SIMP 50N/01

! 02/09/88

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