ML20151B782
| ML20151B782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000574 |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1980 |
| From: | PHILIPPINES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151B767 | List: |
| References | |
| O2N-4-52, NUDOCS 8102180828 | |
| Download: ML20151B782 (200) | |
Text
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. .. p s THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS l Q POOR QUAUTY PAGES i APPENDIX 10 P! .iu._ATd.1Y GU!OES AND MAJOR DES!GN CR1TER ?A ._.i _
l The purpose r :his Appendix 10 it to enumera t e thos e L. ;b. ' :d ' ' d . ' ~
t u we-changes applicable to Philippine NL Jear e' c er Plant Ur : 1 '.
incorporated into the Contract by A,wndment -. The w <r:ng <.ril! be '
. a r ? .J ~ E included in the design and construction of Philippina f
! s k, ,
Unit No. I to tne extent and in the marmer described in '
pages . '0-1 through '0- 17fi.
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HPC WESTING!.;USE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/1T/00 O]02180T}$' - -
k--e .-, ---.m ,.,m.-v_-_ _ . , ,,,..m, --,..,%, - , % . , , , - ,y r.,m.--
s e
~ABLE OF CJNTENTS 4 l 1
Page ;
i io, i l 10-1 ~
- Regulatory Guide 1.121 - Dr mes for Plugging Degraded )
PWR S*.eam Generator Tubes (August 1976)
II. Regt .tcry Guide 1.133 - Loose-Part Detection Program 10-11 l t
for ;be Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors ,
I (Sc,,te-ber 1977) l 1
Segul ory Guide 1.140 - Design Testing and Maintenance 10-30 j i!'.
Oritc. H for Nonmal Ventilation Exhaust System, Air Fil- :
r tratica. ?.nd Absorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled ,
- t Nw lear Power Plants (Revision 1, ' October 1979) ,
l Regu' ory Guide 1.143 - Design Guidance for Radio- 10-32 ;
acti s n'aste Management Systems, Structures, and Com- l Oca""M In;talled in light U .ter-Cooled fluelear Power i i
'l e : :; (Rev rian 1, Octcber 1979) d l
,ry Guide 1.139 - Guidance for Residual Heat 10-33 l
'l e - c u' u 0v i l
i
'agulatory Guide ' .97 - Instrumentation for Light- 10-56 ;
VI. i
%c: d !L.: lear Pow r Plants to Assess Co'nditi'm During i an .icwing an Accidant (Revision 1, Augus+ 1977, f i
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'0 I X .. v
..i 5-U2 :
. 70 08/12/Ti^ ii i
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TADLE 0: C0"7f!TS (continued)
E2n2
". # # - 0578 Recoamendation 2.1.3 - Infornaticn 10-81 A:; Operators in Accident Diegnosis and Control
. !'I. Main Control Board 10-142 i :' . ": "? . - 0573 - Rcccamendation 2.1.6 - Post Accident 10-144 Cent'el of Radiation in System Outside Containment of ::< ' s
. '4 E'. - 0573 - Recommendation 2.'1.7 - Improved Aux- 10-146 n .am reedwater Systen Reliability for PWR's i
' ' ~ ^
. - 0578 - Reco msndation 2.1.9 - Analysis of 10-147 Des n and Off ' 'nnal Transient and Accident l l
II. R. . atory Guir 8.8 - Occupational Radiation Expo- 10-150 1
'^cvision 3) j i
1
. .. Regu 3ry Guide 1.108 - Periodic Testing of Diesel 10-152 )
1 2' :~a;i n Units U.ied On-Site Electric Power Systems a t ';u . :ar Povar Plants (Revision 1) 7' -e f: tory Guide 1.118 - Periodic Testing of Electric 10-153 e Protectionrysters(Revision 2)
Vuic.nic Ash Fall Protection 10-155 e.-e e-.
b .
J',':.3 GC/1 ./ . iii
T '"' E 0r CONTEN15 (rentinued)
_ Pane 10-109
C ,
erpres:: e Protection 10-173 R quiatory Guide 1.120 - Fi. e Protection Guidelines Nu.' " e Pcwer Plents (Revision 1) e
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" T IU!DE 1.121 -' BASES FOR PLUr>G PG DEGRADED PWI STEAM t
j"MRA:7 Jili S (NIGUST 1976 a .. r m i r ' ent ., o f .l . i i will be incorporated sub.f ct to the clarifi-
'it t forth in the following fluclear Safety Position, which has
- mn revieNd and approved by the U.S. fmC as part of the RESAR 414 npiicatiom.
i To deternin, allowatle tube degradation limits of.the steam generator t i.1, e. - tive analytical techniques complemented by testing proce-
'furcs .re *ilired in this program to verify that the structural 1:'.c..n ty of the steam gen 9tator tubes is maintained under normal ,
n i ce'. o 7. ting conditions and postulated accident transients.
. ' n .. cu d E. atory Guide 1.01, entitled " Basis for Plugging Degraded
' 'A .e'n Generator Tubes," describes a method acceptable to the U.S. NC st< 'f for establishing the limiting safe conditions of
- & ' gradation of steam generator tubing, beyond which defec-
m, as c tablisned by inservice inspection, should be se from servie.c by welding pit.')s at each end of the tube.
'-ic"y, the bas. rec" ire <nents consist of verifying that, in ase of tube thinning, the remairing tube wall can meet
- .oo icaale stress lir 'M during normal and accident loading con-In the case of ;uDe cracking, the leak-before-break
" ion will be applied. Factors such' as the accuracy of the
. : ..y c - ent probe and rate of . rrosion during continued opera-
until the ncxt scheduled inspection must be considered in ,
. . r .w . 3.
. i ..
a.e im C8/n/a0 10-1
- -- _ _ = __ _.m ._ _ --. ...._--. . _ _, _ . _ ,
'his everall determination of the minimum acceptable tube wall 9 ness so as to accurately define the steam generator tube
?lua ging criteria. Where operational history of steam genera-
- c-, is not yet available, analytical procedures and testing data obtained from virgin tube material will be used.
This analysis and testing program does rMt consider the effect denting because a separate plugging criterion for denting has been developed in terms of maximum al10wable local strains, inde-e: .cnt of t! c Regulatory Guide 1.121 criteria.
The approach tasen by WESTINGHOUSE to address denting phenomena utilizes plas-Lis analyses to calculate local strains, using naasured restr,ic-tiens and/or flew slot hour-glassing on a plant specific basis.
TE Je mnsurements do not bear meaningful correlations to the can'ete.ional eddy current indications, which provide a measure cf reduced tube strength caused by thinning, cracking,'and/or f retting, while denting is monitored through measured restric-t ' >ns . However, the concerns relative to dit ontinuity and 3?.rcss concentration effects ceused by denting are implicitely canaiderad in the lea (-before-break verification requirement of
.u.atory Guide 1.121. It has previously been shown that dent-
. does not invalidat : the leak-before-break verification that ased on testing of Virgin tube samples.
'. ~
Weal Oescription
' .tyses: All cnalyses are based on uniform thinni: around the i
< e.i re ci rc:mference only. This is becaUse e Regulatory We 1.121 criteria associated with stress limits involve only
' ai/ ntresse. and 1.near through-wall thermal gradients; i l
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E 2 nn : ' ?.: D. 'Q 10-2 l
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c :' '.1.iuity and stress concentration efects are not required
- .o '. ; ! .vl uded.
For the sake of bre."ty, symbols are ur.ed in
?cwibir,y the' varicus analyses details. These .synbols arn 1 2 ':i,cd 1- !be section F. "flomenclature."
?. P m
< S-y detennine minimum required thickness, tr (from ASME Code, )
Section III, Paragraph flB-3324) for maximum operating pres-
.,ure di 'erential, P g. ;
. -Q<2S, , ,
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.:dentify governing transients for normal oper tion and per- l f orm thermal stress analyses to determine tp . ,
?. TL3 + SSE/FLD + SSE ,
4 he maximum accident condition pressure dif ferential, P,,
reurs during a postulated secondary side blowdown acci- [
Jent. This presst~c P and a the maximten tube bending
- resses, due to support motion during SLD/FLB and SSE,
- rt li .
- fed in f ron independent analyses. The minimum j
- ickress will be b:1 nd on the following faulted condition ;
stress limits: ;
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- a. Pm<--2.4 S +m (NB-3324)
- b. * -D
< 3.6 3m* .
1 LOCA + SSE ine pressure and bending loads due to the LOCA rarefaction
-ve in the U-bend and due to support motion from LOCA and !
SSE wi'l be made available from independent analyses.
These loads will be used to perform lower bound collapse analyses. The analyses will consider thi"ilng at the top
'ube support plate (TSP) and/or at the apex of the U-bend.
The acceptance criterion from ASME III-Appendix F is:
Y allow < .9 P c . .
^
T <c : , : o Te?'s are designed on the assumption of through-wall cracks and or :nn thinn"19 around the entire circumference being the worst
- - of defects. On the basis of field observations in the J. thinning.is c0nfin0d over a tube length equal to the tu,,be ,
- 0 us the support plate thickness. Tha test program considers t rffects of thinning, cracking, and the combination of cracks !
l eu ri.tsosed on thinning. The testing program includes the fol-l; wing 'ters:
Or ./ Su ( 'UU S u "~E + P }, whichever is snaller.
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- -n - b?
% N r;D Jo.'12.20 10 4
_ . . . . , , . . , . . _ . .i...._..... _ . . _ . . - . - . . . - . . _ . . . _ -_.
..--..-....7.-
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- . , 1 ?taterial procurement and specimen prepar' tion. incluiing l l
r.re-test examinations of sp>'cimens such as eddy current I l
(ECT) inspections. ,
i
- 2. Surst and Leak Tests The WESTItir"OUSE test ' facility offers the capability to gen-orate urst and leak data. Leak rates will be measured at both the norr.tal operating pressure differential, pn as well !
as at 'ne maximum operating pressure differential, pg .
Results of the burst and leak tests and ECT analyses will *
- : sed for the leak-before-break evaluation. For given i thinning, the critical flaw length (a )c corresponding tg' the accident condition pressure /pa ) will be obtained frcm I burst tests.
). ! . . . " , an't Evalv, tion I
- 1. Frem t analyses, determine the minimum thickness rt . Con-
' this to acceptable degradation.
y ,, t - tp x 3p,z i
_. ' rom. the test t ".1 obtain the allowah ie degradation as ,
'ol l e' s : s k
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- 3
. . .. s W
. ~. ,,:'_:-' 10 5
. . . . - . - - -- - -- - ~ - ~ - ~"~~
. = - . . - . _
- a. For given 4, plot leak rate W=W(a,pn ) and burst oressu.e P b = Pb (a). From these curves find a For acceptability.
7 = a(W 7 ) and Pb=P5 b T).
3(aT ) > Pg .
- b. Repeat for other values of 4 Correlate this data to ECT indications to arrive at c.
allowable degradation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.121 requirement on leak rate and burst pres-sure criteria. .
This can be done by the margins P b (aT ) - P 3on burst p: assure and the associated ECT indications e. Degra-dation corre conding to zero margin is then the maxi-run allovc 2. .
- 3. A11ow3ble tube plugging margir in accordance with the Regu-latory Guide 1.121 requirement is obtained by incorporating into the smaller of the valuee. obtained by analyses and to 'ing the corrosion allow"~n for en-t!nued operation
'111 nr<t scheduled inspection. Estimate of this allowance m:y censervativ 'v So based on previous plant history' data or alternatively, per NRC guideline of allowing 10 percent degradation for cembined corrosion and edcy current measure-ment error.
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. ."CUSE will p" ovide, upon completion of this program, a ,
eca .al report quar *.ing the results of th> malytical and
?. m ' j portions as described in the Technical Description
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F. ,clar- e Primary stress intensity, mi Prinary general membrare stress intensity, psi Primary bending stress intensity, psi Secondary stress intensity, psi
'3 , Allowable pm for design 3 Yield strength, psi
?'
Durst pressure, psi g ffaximum merating pressure differential, psi
'. Normal operating pressure differential, psi
, t'axin:u~ accident condition pressure iifferential, p:;
c' Coitipse pressure, psi Tm'e thi "ing, percent of nominal thickness of cercent degradation ECT indication, percent defect penetration 3
Crack length (axial), in,
- a. Crit ! cal crack length corresponding to p , in.
- 3 Crack length corresponding to Tech. Spor..
alleviable leakage rate, in.
Leakage rate, gpm
. Tech. Spec. allowable leakage rate, gpa C .'
Tube outside diameter - nominal, in.
^
4cni N1 tube thickness, in.
Minimum recuired thi:kness, in.
- J' Steamli-1 break tran31ent
~
Feedw:ter line break transient Safe Shutdown Earthquake
- . . Loss of coolant accident l
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- a7
- = ~~_ r r r - - === ====--
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sw, c, . pri. v : . l
. =ce .!.
'. :GH0!!SI interorets .he tena "l'9 acceptable defects" to apply -
. .m.e irperfer.t.icns rasulting from service-induced nicchanical r - .ic'i degradction of the tube walls which have penetrated
+"
arth >:< c c
. ~ +he Plugging Limit.
' ' n C . . .t .__l_? ' a n d C . 2 . a . (4 ) .
~.' ':Gi:CUSE :ansiders the requirement for a 300 percent m.irgin
.s brst f ailure b r,ed on norrial operating pressure dif fer-
, to be unnecessarily restrictive. WESTIN3 HOUSE will use a
, e mnt ner.':n based on nor'al conditions.
._..' ddl
. es wMru 'ficint inspection data exists to establish a
, ,,un,,, mnce '.he rate used will be an average time-
' mninee , th> r an of the test 6ta.
.?.e.. .\ n rA C .3.d . ( M Y- " e r. t - thc.se requironent , would be to establish
.per .3b; prHar:<-to-second ry leak rate shich may
. the .:irechold of detection with current methods of mea-
-~. 'EST'"'.907~ has determined the maximum acceptable n of a th h-wall-c nck base' on secondary pipe break 1
'" tings wnich are typically twice the magnitude of ;
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- ' .ul operat :g precsure loads. WESTINGHOUSE will use a leak a: >ciated with the crac size determined on the basi s of
..e
- n': 10' nys.
C . 3 . 2. (M T!,"':0US: will supply computer code names and references r c. ' ' ;han the actual codes.
T.. .).' 1 C3f$1 E : ~. N SE will est.; lish a minimum acceptable tube wall thick-
, (P'ugging nit) based on structural requirements and
- Jeratian cf icadirgs, measurement accuracy and, where appli-f 1, a ;egradrion clic.ance as discussed in this position and in 'cccrdance u!Lh the general iritent of this guide. Analyses
- 2. n
-termine the maxirnm acceptable number of tube failures dur-
- ' cer.tulated condition are normally done to entirely differ-
.ases and criseria are not within the scope of this guide.
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).
-- er 'rea ;n:s fc mininun wall are markedly different for
_ ren:: ms ' the tuba bundle ( .g., U-bend area versus
- aht 1 mph .i FESTIE 93E des:gns) tso plug',;ing limits may :
'.c.blishee ia address the varying requirements in a manner !
' a will not remire unnecemary p1" aging of tubes. :
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4 H."oY_ G'.!!DE 1.' ',_- i_000PART DETECTIOff PROGR AM FOR THE PRIMARY ,
.M_._? ." oc ' !GHT-WATr ' r.00 LED REACTORS (SEPTEMBER 19 Tl)
Si!" ' T.i: will prov :!e the Metal Imped Monitoring System, as in the f 'lo sing pages.
A. _Ip v!uction - Metal Iraact Monitoring System n " tal: Impact Monitoring Systen (MIit) is an advanced system ,
u
- ying digital technology developed by WESTItlGlK')SE to detect rv.".a' f ic loose parts impacting within the reactor coolant system ,
- urized water reacters. In the event impacting should ;
e . ' , the MIM system is designed to perforn preliminary data '
' is to assist the n';ility in determining what action sho'u ld !
n.
This cacability can have a niajor benefit to plant !
...a. L lity.
I S. etem consists of redundant transducers at the natural col-i nct:- points of the roctor coolant * > stem, ar..glifiers and t: conditir"crs, digital data processing and analysis, and {
l
'riato d:* play and alarms.
1
.n n d liic debris my be introduced into the reactor coolant sys- I
- 'ther l' the c,ns ";ction stage or during refueling. The 4
al operation of any ncw piping systein is susceptible to con-I
,-- "'en debris not dire' crged by preliminary flueing. During
- . the t.ystra is potentiall . *
- t,cep* le to debris due increring inservic:: inspection requir wents. With a ,
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" c.:.;unt .'fauipment being used in and over the reactor s :c u.' steam generators, and pumps, the probability of debris
- Y. a "O th^ reactor coolant system is greatly increasnd. Also, "e is a low le"el potential- for generation of a loose port
<lue' .0 equipment failure. fE':allic debris, when carried or agi-s-t by the reactor cool int flow, may attain sufficient veloci-ties to inpact and catse damage to fuel, cladding, tube sheets, imarnment penetrations, reactor pump impellers, and other inter-roi :arb:tary system components. Such damage, obviously, can have an 5 verse effect on plant availability.
The imC recut res a loose-parts monitoring program, including ost .lla-icn of an online monitoring system, for all new operat-i . a; iicenses. They have issued a draft of Regulatory E. n 1.133, cose-Part-Detection Program for the Primary Sys-t u' . Light-Water-Cooled P.eactors." Recognizing this need, WESTINGHOUSE has optimized the metal impact monitor to detect imoecting objects and to provide quality data. Evaluation of
- ralimina y data analysis provided by the MIM system may ,
, s.ontinued operation with impacting and permi t the search o- and removal of the impacting object to be postponed to a D' convendent ;o the utility, resulting in minimal or no 4
.t an plant availability.
P ; "E*TINGH005E "IM System is designed by esploying digital cir-y en a modular concept which facilitates its use either as
- ic-alone systun or as a system integrated into WESTINGHOUSL ility improvement instrumentation' One standard equip-
'< can acccmmodste the WESTINGt'0USE MIM System with some
., 'labic for optional ec 'ipment.
'. . !C 10-12 p . . . .
t .
~ a ' r. :c,cri pt i on
' n. ' ' aatt r<
<. ing i . eccom;.lish' ' by the installation of l.. deve mrc>.' ;.ransducers mounted on the ext erior of the m cociant syste mnonents 't the natu -I collection po w.;. Act aration signals from the transducers are ampli-Me", conditioned, filtered, and fed to the metal impact module.
n he nedule, the signal is digitized and processed by micro-
- c. ."- or circuits ;o determine impact peak acceleration, impact qu" ' , and of occorrence, with appropriate display and
- r:
m' sy*;t em bl o:': diagrams are shown in Figures i and 2.
~cun' ;;cr:: a r. ' P w ,,11 fi ers
- cclerc'icn is measured with special transducers (accelero-
- ners) that convert acceleration to electrical signals.
~ > tran- 'uccc are meun..ad at specially selected locations
+ he exteri;r of the reactor coolant system. The monitor-IN2 tiers #rmy'ed by WESTIt3HCUSE are as follows:
""e rvc+cr vessel herd region The rer.c "a- e bottom 'ad with the transducers
- Ount ' to the. nstrum:qtation penetra*.i'ms The steen gener or tubesheet With the transducers m.W.ed to the supports 1
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g Ten ,
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c,,nt.wm i S ntuat %
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ime.n Moevie t' .
cw,t,..
-- ~ ~ : .m, ; N f *f*'I E$
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s , ' ,.n>:me:rt,4ts*
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Figure 1 Block Dirigram of the Input Section of the Metal Impact Fenitor 19 14
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h -- -t c.w.n ci l c et.c.,e - -
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DM ee L - Rs wWe
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(C5tionsu c.m
-4 ; M eg i n 4 TO 7 8 pt O M t#C 8 '
p* .;; .,si a l)
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Figure 2 S' '< Diagra~ of the Processing Mction r>f the ibtal Irvact M.' nit-
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~e v ' rantducers are cunted at each monitoring point for
'andancy since they are inaccessible during normal opera-ion. EaM. transducer contains a piezoceremic material fab-
- cated sc at compression changes of-the material respond l
- o accelerations. A small electric charge proportional to acceleration is generated by piezoalectric behavior. The ciarse is converted to a voltage signal by a charge-sensitive preamplifier. Operation in the charge mode vir-tu.'lly elimir.ates cable effects on the acccleration signal.
' charge preamplifier output voltage is treated as a nor-mal instrument signal requiring only normal shielding and cable considerations.
- nuact Measurement i
"aan '.he occurrence of a m"tallic impact an acoustic, wave '
is generated in the reactor system component causing minute di:placcments in the component material. The minute dis-niacements associated with an impact wave are insignifi-cant. The resulting accelerations, however, are significant because of the high frequencies involved since
.he acce ration associated with a displaceme< t is propor-tional to t'he square of'the frequency of the displacement.
ar t'M roni"n. acceleration resulting from the impact is
'Se p :ter chosen to indicate impact.
l
~x t"nsive d /elopmental testing by WESTibGHOUSE has deter- )
mined that mc t metallic impa' . in' the reactor coolant
- ys:cm will occur with n a frequency range of 2 kHz to 10 kH:. The WESTINGHOUSE metal impact monitor employs l
l
..g
'. 2 : :.9 C , 10 'S i
n
~~~s..
' '. "-ce m. - ;$ ich have .' linear resr:onse between 5 H:
' P tiz .
'c-:< c::cmgrg m" Syst :m has a rot.ntial noise limit of
'er :.m.in 0.002 o /!eak to peak within a temperature r inge c f zero to 650' ?. The system has the capability to detect
' mact:, of cbout 0.02 ft lb at 2 ft from the transducer.
~he sensitivity of impact measurements is dettanined by the nact energy w'- .h is a function of mass, impact velocity,
'he 92cmetry c# the impacting particle, the surface being u., acte J. an.i >.he distance f um the transducer.
". :jst .m Opernion and Impact Monitoring
. :nals f ro the in-containment preamplificq are carried
. rough cor; airmat penetrations to the MIM system electron-
' ~ , cabiny. illustrated in Figure 3. The cabinet includes
'c- cce ,
- / amplifier units, a metal impact monitor
- r. :r, e en interconn- 'nn parol.
~w hear. o' 'he sy. tem is the metal impact monitor drawer
, "::r:'d i. Figure >1 The drawer contains metal inpact les, a cv 'rol rod drive irhibit circuit and a control Mse, eil mounted in a suitable card cage with power res.
3:n - :1 irract mot.ule board contains up to six indepen-e micropr~ crsor-bar ' circuits, each circuit having the
- -b l R e- 'ori ") eithr" a two -edundant transducer,
~
' nnli f i er, a ' an.plifier ch ains.
. Switching b-tween l
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Conditioners
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Ficure 3
. MI.'t Syst.:n Electronics C5 binet 10-18
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,' s is ccw/p!ished under cporator control (manually)
, . chanm:1 f a" :re is detected, by the central proces-a s
- utema'icelly). Up to six add!'ional transducer "as can be conne:ted to provide overall system redun-l cy. .1 this case signal ~ chain switching is controlled l w the ),e;.caerd on the front of the drawer.
- e .r.etal impact module board includes analog-to-digital i l
' ave: . ion of the input frcin the signal conditioner, with '
aer signal processing accomplished digitally. Digital
-o"ssirg allows the utili:ation of a novel discrimination
.chnique to distingui::h impacts f rom both flow-generated
- t'round noise a. ; electrical ncise impulses. In addi s v., a f-n "C" conti ct is provided for use to trigger a
. Enunciator iccated in the control room. The plant
" 1ciater is tr' mred by an alann outpt frotn any metal 1 at. t n'odui e.
c otral ;recessor is controlled by a functional key-ar en the front of the drawer. An alphanumeric, flat ,
m' dispi. 'O char--tors wi* by A lines high, is ; co-disairy ;v:tu operating paramete s and the
..t; cf cutmated cata analysis. Information that can
. I!ad un is listed in Tabic 1 and i"cludes impact ampli-1,c ion, and time of :: m rence. This impact char-ri:ation and prelimina- "
a analysis by the
.JTU CH00SE MIM S. ;te:n will assist the plant operators in "fgementa as tc the significance of any impacting deter:nini ^g tb creper course of action. Adverse ec :. a to clar,t avaiiubilit' can thus be minimized.
- '0.
1
. l 1
l
'ys'r1 control and operation are conducted from the func- l
'onJ' 1:eyboard. The operator can check the status of the
-s. et*.as ch'nrels, adjust alarm setpoints, conduct manual ,
u.:tino, una control the audio and data recording systems '-
.o "mre but a few functions.
~
The c : tem restorts automatically following a loss of power, with all parameters remaining unchanged.
i aclus,/c feature of the t'ESTINGHOUSE Metal Impact Moni-I
. ring System is the MIM inhibit controller used with WEST-
' hG:hi 'E Nuclear Steam Supply Systems. The input to the ,
atal impact module;. #s inhibited during rod control opera- ]
i
_ ion by mans "f a special circuit that interfaces with the -i ZT DGHOUSE rod control system. This feature prevents sig- ]
tis g.nerated by control red -tcpping from triggeringathe
< stem alarms. Contcets are also provided to accept "0WNER-arnished" it' bit signals; for example, a manual inhibit, sicnal c"crator is supp'ded for testing the operation of nha metal !mpact modules. in addition, the test signal pro- .
as a :"" m of c.:.libr' ting the system electronics. The
'r 1 g nerator is automatically controlled by the central l racesser as part of the self-diagnostic so'tware program.
. Jditional Output j l
ara' urveil:ance is a useful practice carried out by lintenance 9ersonne, The WE3"!NGA00SE Metal Impact Moni-P r accomplishes this by feeding the wide and ac voltage
- n. l frcm the signal coMitioners to an audio amplifier
+e -s 9 . = me I,1- ! I c.
N.S _ J O i / L , n '0-21
.- , , . - . , . - , ~. . . . ,
t he v! ^. m. Ry switch selection one may listen to the
'e- ,~11 frc, an" ene channel.
l w 'e cr> nade for interfacir the t'etal impact moni-ig S r.cordinn and analysis equiprun+. Output j.cks ;
" provided m- 'erfacing with an oscilloscope, rnulti- l Horel 4 art : corder, tape recorder, spectrum analyzer,
~
.c x-y e. ,.itter ard orintor. In addition, a digital R5 232 il 1"'e interf ace
- is provided to ccamunicate with e dijita! vste ..
ing
' "2 '~ ~3TU:0' MSE metc
. impact uitor includes the cables )
- ' .. e tran decers to the c';ar go pre.o alifier. These
~
' s are coretructed of materials !. hat are resist. tnt to i
' temperature an~ radiation. The cables transmit the
" :culc atio, signal to the char w preamplifier located in a
~ itiit 3.nvi ronment. The transducer cables are rated
~"
- nd will withst:n o .!n accumulated radiation dose ]
)
r , ,j , l l
l I
~
- " ~ *,ill provide th cables, cable rnuting, and
'ntain- ;t rnretrations frc1 the char"e preamplifier to inst- 2rt c W net. The < utput of + Se charge preampii-is a 'e voi- o signal :ct may b- +ied by any
,,de rd v-t twisted shicided pair cable.
R '. :nterface: Electrrnic Industries Association
'- erface between date *.er ;nal equipment and
.,u i r nent enploying normal binar,/ data interchange.
i t 'M' 2 4 9
I
~
%ne and Mvar:r.ces .
N 1.GTU GHOUSI "ctal Impact 'ionit.oring System incorporates
+ ' ;irab' cenefits and advantages which are summarized .
3 $
1 % WESTIt!GHOUSE metal impact monitor allows the utility to
-ceet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.133. It exceeds the ac,uirements of the Regulatory Guide on sensitivity and J W: provides additional protection to the NSSS. WESTING-USE dacs take exception to Regulatory Guide 1.133 in the ing areas: !
The functional performance requirements for this sys- )
tua serve solely to provide an alert, by impact moni . )
toring, for circumstances which could result from loose metallic objects in the primary system. The system (a) does not maintain the Reactor Coolant Pre cure Bound o* (b) serves no automatic reactor pro-tcction function, and (c) does not classify as a lE sy-m as defined in IEEE-308. Consequently the glica.ien of Class lE criteria is unjustified.
Based on excertion c. above, the requirements of Regu-lear:' Guide 1.100 " Seismic Qualification of L'ec'tric .
Equipment for '!uclear 'ower P' ants" are not appli-ca' ' a. However, the seismic qualification of the WEST-MGPCUSE ;1etal Impact Moni' l'ng System will meet the tirements of Regulatory Guide 1..3 (?!on-Class lE E ;;ipment), and will inci : 0F qualification for l
)
,. ,f~
l
[h) c;f ., ~
10-03 l l
.-3, m -
w<- ,wp.-
f in-c:c,*.ainment equipment and that portior. of the out-r"rfe cr# inment equipment regtrired to provide an a l a r::, ro seismic c 'lification fo that portion of I cutaide containment equipment port.iining to display c:'d data acquis,ition.
'. Based or P'ce? tion a. above, the redundancy and sepa-rati n reauirements for the system are not applicable, except for in-containment hardware where good engineer-in? practice prevails.
'. The use of syste'a noise to provide functional tests is l
- Nquate. The need fer calibrated simulated signals >
cr i' : ntninn:ent calibration is unduly restrictive' and un.vcessary. Impact energy sensitivity is verifi-le frc,rystcm raise signatures.
. . P.ased on exception c. above, the limiting condition
- cr c;,crat n im:cstd by regulatory f osition C.S.b is
~
not applicable. The availability of a non-Class IE sy? tem is n' c: !ntial for continn d safe operation.
. The :'pl:.,2ntation of the meth"i described in Regula-tory Guide 1.123 Section D is a backfit as defined by 10C7 30.109. "ased or 'vception a. above, the backfit acuirennt cann be justifi~i.
'. WESTH'*"CUSE e ,so takes exception to technical require-mnt; !ct enumer"ed here tut which include, as an l 1
excmpl e, the ras' riction "f the t eckground noise level !
)
i l
I l
l r
4
. . . 39.--
1 of the primary system in a nuclear plant to 20 percent j of an '-Sitrary system sensitivity level simulta- l neously established by the guide.
. ^ie system provides online, real-time impact characteriza-
. ion evi preliminary data analy213.
- 3. A.fvanced microprocessor electronics with all-digital signal processing eliminate many calibration adjustments and allow grcer s:/ stem flexibility.
J. l:altiprocessor approach allows each channel to indepen-aantly provide basic alarm fun-f.lons, and a separate cen-i
- al processor provides enhinced system capability.
.ct.ral proce..cor #ailurt does not, therefore, prevent the
.jsti fr , perfonning its essential functions.
E. A u- ue impact discriminaticn technique (patent applied for) is used to maximize system sensitivity to smal'1
'~ne'.s while minimizing susceptibility to false alarms.
'ct lc:ation information is providc as part of tha
-.aciard system. -
- 7. ~he system distirguishes between single ad multiple Sec'use a loose part within the reactor coolant cem will generate many impacts, a single impact can be itten off as a .alve closure er other r tral plant event.
.n' 's c,;e, the MUis give; a caution int cation that does t ause ' control board alarm. The same caution
'O
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~ J
' 4 . i'
. C J,
.,l .
10 - E '. ,
1 I
+
icati , is i: 1 if the :;ystem detects inpects that are
.] : ali to nceed the peak acceleration clari setpoint Ae:/ , by ;ha operator.
_; :el nd remote am disable functions are provided for
.'nino. - ,
'i .
- clanrol integrit" monitor is included in the standard s/t.en. The nanitor can detect charge preamplifier fail- ,
es, cable fa.ilure between chargo preamplifier and signal ;
- cnditience (short circuit or noen circuit), and f ailure
, the charge preamplifier poc 2r supply (located in the ,
or-1 conditioner).
- ':t :;ir ul guaoratnr is includ !; both flow-related
' :round r.ohe and metal impacts can be simulated. . The .
-W i'*:de, d ation, and rate of occurrence of the simu-
':' rpacts a , vari : automatically by the central arcccuor during Se se'f-test operation.
' ' in-cer*:,in mt cerconents of the MI"~. are interchange-
.wr v m21 s . Thin ninimn.cs replacement and spare n> ento.> carts.
.,y. .
-_ s.
- })H Sr ne -
n 9
.i'i ' 7.m ;11 ida the Ylosing hardware:
l l
6 r y *& n
s
, U- c ';
I
- ~
, . . . , _ -,.-......-+-a==* - I
= . . - - - ,
.c ,
i I
a Cight (8) accelerometers and cable from the trans- !
ducers to the charge preamplifier !
f
- o. T ar (4) accelerometer : cunts j t
. Eicht (8) charge preamplifier l i
- c. Eight (3) signal conditioner / amplifiers !
i
- e. One (1) r. ictal impact monitor drawer with central !
prrcessor, keyboard, digical display, metal fmpact ,
modules for (4) accelcrometers, and CRDM inhibit unit l i
T. On2 (:) electronics equipment cabinet, including t r-l mi- ' blocks. rower supplies, interconnect panel with
- audio, cabling, and paint . I
- g. One (1) CRD activity detector (card mounts in rod cen- i
'~^sytemcabinet) i i
- . Printer This printer is recommended in 11cu of strip chart recor:: ors or tape ecorders to provice data recording to t , tent of Regulatory Guida 1.133, with all rele-v nt infer atio, concerning events printed in a com- l cact, readily understandab'a f' m. Preliminary data
, analysis is performed (a"crage' .ind maximum amplitudes and rates, etc.) to avoi' a flood of useless paper. !
l
'~ '
_E.
~* S.'D i . s.
n-? .u.
! TEE 03/ U' ' 0 3-27
\
I
- 1. Lystem Seismic Qualifica* ion
' is is to provide an alar.n system qualified to the LJ seismic level as specified in the draft Regulatory ;
Guib e !
4 Transient Recorder :
Th:; option (see Figure 2) provides for the simulta- 4 neous digital recording of an imp;ict event from 4 transducer channels.- This information can then be ,
reproduced on the customer's data storage device. ,
3 i
.1 P. . i ic1d Cables - ;
- 1. FM Tape Recorder - 4 Channel "
This is a portable instrument used for baseline data recording. It will be~ installed in the MIMS cabinet
'ar audio sic 11 ccmparison of tase-line-to-audio recording, whan necessary. }
2 WESTINGn005E wil,1 provide the folicwing software and >cr-vices: Drawings 'and documentation ,
k e
i t
I
[57' ??k wuEni;< 10
- -4-52
. i .'iTD 'M/12.' C 0 10-28 w ape ee====n eman-com m e p o emessmoepe - ;g g po s ame,gyommuseasesw e, en- * *eg e*w*. e o =e-e*** e8 p=*
- e_-- "
wee e+i e4 > ++e e g e =w e mmy w eo s e , _.
e-,-, ,g ,,y - ,y- - - w y- , .- y,- ,-
,,-,,7y ,r _ , - , -c_,,--,._-% . _ . - _ ..e,..- , w. , - . . m,.,, -.. ,, , .- , , _ , , i. -- -
l TABLE 1 J i!"^H0'.lSE ": ' O!5 FLAY AND PRDITER FORMAT k.n r ir f ormation may bc displayed and is printed for each channel cr "s A.f 1 1.-' ;ur period) during which an event has occurred:
1, Ct :1 a 0 ;" l 'cJ ti O?)
'. Ch,mn01 at;r '
- 1. T i r. o" ' irs,t impac;. at Q.3 location
. : Mr a in.; acts with anplitudes exceeding alann setpoint t
. F,nbur n- ir.1oacts with uplitudes not exceeding alarm setpoint
. arn ,egoint (in r;) ,
- ?. -'v" o ~~ ampl i tude (i n g)
. s.. amplitude (in 9)
. .vera::a c ,te (impacts / minute) .
, l:uixa. rate (impacts / minute)
'r 1-ninute periods during which impacts have occurred
... 5er c' in.ucts dotected at this locction which are known from time ar-i > t! sequence to have occurred elsewhere in the primary system
. T2 ,c;st event
'.w4 g e 6.
'Z'
, ,1, 60 10-29 ,
w e, ei e ow- e g es.% . . - ,,e - ame e am es.* - so m
--e w,. e- e ee si .. - e ,,see . _ .
- ++*--
"jll_ATOU G!. j" 1.140 - DESIGN TESTIflG A:.'O MAINTEtlANCE CRITERI A FOR WP VDTILATION E : UST S' STE'i AIR FILTRATION AND ABSORPTION
!lM!TS 'e t iGHT '".TER-COOLED O! CLEAR POWER PLANTS (REVISION 1, OCTOBER
'i
+ eseee'ae Regulcory Guid .160, P.evision 1 deals with charcoal filtration of r mi ventilation systens. The following are identified as neces-ry to cret Regulatory Guide 1.140, Revision 1 requirements:
A. Md om charc:al Ond one hepa filter bank to each of the filter plco.w. in the reactor building containment purge exhaust .sys-tr. The existing plenums can acco:mdeto these filter banks, es t:r. f aitial design had made provision for later addition of i
- V '. t
. arks.
/d .' f i r' crotection water deluge system for each charcoal., fil-wr v J route deluge water in existing drains.
C, AJ eld.n.ric pr: heating coils in the ductwork upstream of the riitar plenues, which centain charcoal filters in the following The ical inneling butiding c:th ust -2 E. ? miliv nntrol cecosr areas -1 2, wxili y building chareal
. u ti n] <Fm - I common
- 4. "'
itainment pur"7 exhaust system J3 :.}anged by Section A above) '
- 1 ccr on
-ag
. MT23 G3; 10-30
' '*VPN"'sup* M e ' ape m we.,,,f,e.e,y,,,,,, - - -
j
=
4 1
T is cdditv. ' requirement of Regulator" Guide 1.140, Revision 1 is
- r. 3 n; ;. a rv t i achieve the Alara reduction in effluent radioactivity.
T' cre/.ou ;)NPP design operated the charcoal filters to achieve e,,m- nceptable icw by 10CF350 Append'ix 1 Critoria.
\
e 4
(
i f' V
. yg =
.,m-e).' %' i' ,'E U p!'. ,1O m,
A H 2. 2 /" ' 70 10-31 e e-se e .e e e4 ogee
- NN _
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, .-.e .,e.4 ,4 -4 m<d..a.. eswee = we
'f'
. * ~ *' GUIP" 1. M3 - D' .'.IGN GUIDENCE FOR R ADItMCTIVE WASTE MAN-
. _ T: .' ~ ~v2, STR!,'CTlgrs, AC COMPONENTS ItlSTALLED IN LIGHT-WATER-
. . ___, . _; - PC;'PttmTS(.7EVISION1. OCTOBER 1979},
'7 -
- PN; Waste Processing Syr.tems meet the requirements of this F.d a:. c ry Gu ide , i n general . However, it is necessary to make some
, chan;rn or additions. Several indoor . tanks will require curbs
- or * :v.!tcd door. r thresholds.** Also, several locnl alarms for ti .: Icvsis 'ill have to be a6!ed to outside tanks.
s
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l
. _ _ _ _ . .e_ .. .
.- Frai . 12urir"! hot. show rs: and evaporator condensate
'c:
. :ula-up tan' ;.
1 1
O e
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l 10- 0,;
g
- g . * * =e e e e e emer e '**'em. er"a*"W**'**" * * **
e se m. e , heap *
- r v r.oint . ro!DM!t'E s FOR RESIPUAl. Hr AT REMOVAL (MAY
~a m to this Regulatory Guide, WESTINGHOUSE will provide the e > 3rnN Colu Shutdown as described in the following pages.
. .. m: W. that this design incorporates the reactor head vent and
- ..ressuri; er vent systc::s resulting f rom Three Mile . Island ,
er,uiremn;s.
Di w.4,o of Channes
!!c these modifications primarily provide increased safety
- ".n ":'.s, they also reduce dependence on a long-term safety
~e. :lliary feedwater sot"me, which for some salt water '
M *nay provide an adco<! economic benefit.
Tac ,asic CSD design censists of those modifications necessary to r ra.ble the !!SSS to be taken frcm hot standby to cold shutdown c: .itions, using only safety gr 'e systems, with or without u; c-o te power and with a single failure, with limited remedial
- s
-r:or act' 4
'aiev7 cold shut '"a,
. three primary functions must be per-r.' : hor". ion, dcpressurization. and heat removal. While
. .e %nctional abilities obvicusly exir:, they presently do
.- / exclusively on safety grade systems nor are they neces-
, L "sincle-failure proof." This is jur ied based on both O - nistorical and the encrent WESTIf!GHOUSE position that hot
" ": v is a safe and stable condition, sufficient for safe shut-d . '! ewe v e r. ' th the NRC's app',ication f the criteric
, , ,c , 3 ,3 av*4a
- . . .~ .. . ... . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 1
. 1 l
l l
l c at..ed in Regulatory Guide 1.139, the adeau > of these his- l
.:al caratiitties is being quer.tioned.
1
. * -/EcuiDw:r't ";dif' 'tions 1
1
- 1. % ground
~ ' cc:omplish the cold shutdown function, thrce critical f unctions inust be performed. These are removal of residual and consiSie boat, boration, and depressurization. While these functiens obviously exist in the Philippine Project.
' hey do not rell. exclusively on safety grado systems. To, a::ntalish these functions, and provi N a safety grade CSD
' " sign, WE5T7f!GHOUSE has reviewed its scope of supply to ass t~n e n'edifications necessary to accomplish a safety grade CSD. This review wa. ecconplished by making use of ,
c.<ict i1g so !y grade systems with the appropriate addi+tms/ modifications as required to satisfy the CSD Nign br a' ' ackncwledginr: the lesscns learned frem the ext -ionce . TMI.
l l
,'m '.iE5i. ::TL*5E intern'1 drsign bases for developinc sys-tv ; in response tn '.egulator;> noide 1.139 specifies that
- i r. zJewn cc "tions shoo' I be achievchle following any Cc
, '1-,IL, - IV initiating event. A high priority
- uir"9 ant airo s, cifies that this capabi;ity
'id Stainable wich no opera * :r action outside the Re.'u: to Table ' for WESTIitGHOUSE design bases.
ku a ,_
.i T, ' '.3i. 20 10-34 ,
l cc, trol room. 'While limited " remedial" operator action is "c nissible in view of the design bases, the post TMI evalu-ation by industry of containment and auxiliary building
.ccessibility warrants streng consideration of' remote respense capability.
Specifically, thb' capebility in WESTINCHOUSE systems to take the Nuclear Steam Supply System to cold conditions within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> following any Condition II, III, or IV evelt, including loss' of power, is provided. Cold shutdown is defined to be the reactor subcritical (Xefrj,99),with tie reactor coolant temperature less than or equal to 200*F .c in the RC5. The capability to achieve cold shutdown condi-icar is provided through the use of only safety grade l l
syste.... 1 The majer revisions provide safety grado CSD are the' fol!cwing:
1
- a. Beration is accomplished via the Safety injection Pump injectirg 7000 pcm boric acid from the refueling water 4
l storage tank <ith letdown provided f ~en the reactor vessE' head to the pressurizer rellc.f tank (P7T).
Also capability to utilize the excese letdown pith is provided.
.; . Heat removal is accomplished via safety grade stnam generat t.r power operated relief valves and auxiliary Jeedwater system for tae initial phase of cooldown.
"PC 7 3-. ,
U JC 03/1Te/30 10-35 .
- " *ePW *ggemo-esiimouseaMe "+ = + ww** Me<
- e 9 =*O*J
- espe w e - ge=emem = me - e e g eesome *eme e esse 'essee*. _ _ __ _
b folh u H by operation of the Reside'l Heat Romoval Sys- I tem for the final stage. )
1 1
Jer.'scuriza; ion is via new solen'id operated safety I graW' pm: operated relief valves on the pressurizer. l
'n ir -
at phonc?.ena, comon to the above functions is the
.eurci circulation o. 'ha reactor ccolant during the hot l J 'dby to cold ahutd%u progresr. ion. With the assump. '
'. i c n:: of the '">D criteria, the reactor coolant pumps are a"ailable for forced circulation; therefore, reliance s en Lural circulation.
_ br.ic ouations during a safety vado cold shutdown
- i 1.,c! !; the following:
- 1. Barab' the RCS by initia'Ing injection flow frem the i
- daty injectic, pumps while letting down from the reactor vessel head letdoim line (vent).
, !h 2 laticn of bor im, he'in prim.1ry side cool-
. 'a ,a t-
- ntinc ste.rn f rcm the ste:m generator power
'r:ted ral 2 - ta l v ~: .
Oum .urize the RCS by venting steam frcm the pres-1 suricor through the - of the P:RV's. l l
l (Pon reachinn the cut :n ce:ditiens for the P"'S l
(@ 0 p;i. ' $. initiate RHRS caeration, completing l the plan. .wn to 200 F. l l
3:' s '. ) 10 . -
4
1 1
- 2. Heat Removel I nitially the plant is brought to hot standby by the inser-g ion cf control rods and maintained in this condition until the cocidown to cold conditions is initiated. During this t a. c a hot standby residual heat is removed by utilization of the auxiliary feedwater system and the steam generators.
- i. ; ural circulation of reactor coolant is relied upon to transfer heat from the core to the steam generators.
Fr the first stage of cooldown, heat removal is also accogs ni ;hed by the auxili'ry feedwater system in conjunction 4 oth 'toen 'elease from the steam generators. For purposes of lpecifying the volumetric requirements of auxiliary feed-c". it is assumed that the plant remains at hot standby for sixteen hours and is cooled to 350*F in another six hou .. This results in a requirement for 102.8 gal /MWt not considering spillage, level margins, etc. 1his volume may ac less then that required by providing tankage exclusively
'ar :rcintaining long term hot shutdown. In order to pro-
.ide thi",.apability,,the steam generator newer operated ralief valvna must be a safety grade design.
.~m tna second s; age of cooic.wn, heat removal is accom-Shed using the existing Residual Heat Removal Sys-
- In (RHRS). The RHRS suction isolation valves and their Tr sted e'7ctrical power supplies must allow the initia-a 'f cne of the RHRS subsystems while retaining the capa-
.y of isolating the RHRS from the RCS event with the l
l
)
.7, er
-g a o se ' .
Or C 10-37 .
. . _ _ . . _ _, . - _ . . . -. _~ ._
4
\
act ilmiting singic failure. To accomplish th'is, and I
- enrdato single failure, separate class lE power sup-J . i cs t ~) each of t'n four PliR3 suction. isolation valves
- i be r ovided. ' o of the valvos will remain powered their c.~isting 4130 VAC source while the other two ;
v."ves must b' provided with power by independent _.(one por valve) deJ!cated batt -ics through either M-G sets or
- nverters.
P.a present design of the condensate tanks has a portion of s c.h tant dedicated for use as a water supply for Auxiliary )
i ee" ater, and the remaining oc~ tion is used for condensate ;
m.' volume. ;
l S2 -hutdoim scenario described by WESTINGHOUSE involves
,eur hours decision time af. hot standby, eight hours addi-
, ' icnal at. hot standby to borate to shutdown concentrations, f 24 hc s for depressuri:ation and cooldown. This sco- l 1rio results in a need for saf ety grade Auxiliary Feed- i
"'or in a trontity suffic: ant for the equivalent of twenty
]
. v:-: st h>t standby c~ !:.fons (about 360.000 gal.).
, , j
^
. Muiremnt can ba r?. by converting tha two exis'.ing I l
v r.d e.e storago Tn ':s for use as Auxiliary Feedwater j As only. Tht: rc; '*.s in a ccmbined capacity of 400,000 l
, of ater in ::eism, . missile-protected tanks.
.o n-der to Stain the needed suige'volir for condensate \
wh; be lost by this conversion, a new 200,000 gal.
I i
\ -.~
. ~ ' ); ,
oL'10
.J 10.L e'k 10-38 ,
._- = . - _ . --
i cond mate tank would have to be added. This is a non-1:. f a :. muda tank. Suitable tar.k foundatic, and level
' wtrum 2ntelion, a:: kell as condensate piping changes would clso be regu;rnd.
J. 03 ration
- cmally the RCS is borated by using the Chemical and Vol-ume Control #Ntem to inject concentrated boric acid while letting dcwn reactor coolant to the boron recycle system.
Given the redundanca in the CVCS in terms of mutlliple pumps er.d charging and letdown paths, it is likely that it would rewin availebic, even f611owing an initiating event and a
'ne;1e failure.- liowaver, in the event that all control go equipmc t is assumed unavailable, a safety grade w w of boration is required.
Th.a safety grade means of injecting boron into the RCS is
.covided by using the safety injection pumps to inject "M0 pra berir a:id from the refueling water storage tank.
~ W design has been selected to address both the require-
"v.3 of hig:i energy line breek as a potential initiating
^1t and the restrictions concerning local operation ac.icn. iJ so, safety' injection pump throttling capability 1; inc~ 1 allcw flow 'ntrol consistent with the more rest rict . . .tdew: flows of a safety grer'e cold shutdown operation.
.a order to wide ' e:e new opabiliti:s, c ~tain piping and valve revisions are required. The valving revisions
. 4 b l [.l ..
l , >. . ' 3 l "U C/ .,:' 0 1.0-34 ,
r.;lude the conversion of c -tain manual valves to remotely
- .c r0M' velves and th" ,vfdition of other new motor and
,,lenoid op rated vaives. The valving revisions have been >
l
- i >c' " : to optimize the use of existing valves, thereby
- inimizing the increase in total valve count. The changes m-vide two independent subsystcrc of boration/ charging capability with flow control, assuri.19 protection grade sub-nystem ser a ction.
'M r ,enges are shown schematically in figure 1.
. m safety crade me'rs of letdown is uniquely provided by 3 additi n, of ie down line connection from the reactor al . ecd. . .ess letdcyn line has been reconfigured inci: + th, one in, reactor ver 21 head letdown l i r,1! . /,n e.ergency reactor conlant letdown path is'then c' wided f rom the vessel hee .o the pressurizer relief n '. The parallel and series valve arrangement provides I c' .or ccolent letdown via safety grade systems, even in l ac ev .: of a sir.gle f ailure. Connections to the vessel
~1 ai:,o pr: vide benefits for potential post accident vent-
- and 'c ' Sead cooling during an emergency cooldown hou' offrite power. An additional bene
- it 11 that it
- r0Vides a p iped Up vent for non.1al plant startup, thereby I
~ jucing personal exposures and fluid handling durinq nor- l renting c;eratiens. With tLa ur.e of 2000 ppm bm "
cid, a one in. lin ? provides sufficient letdown to achieve a twelve hour beration enriod, consistent with the WESTING-P'USE CS9 design ba_ 3.
ST'
[ .i 10 43
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i.
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j
(
I -
1 I
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- t .
!. ; a ;- .
i 1 ;
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i 8
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. J, i ,
3 .. ...
t ,
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+
f
- i .
- t. y.
j i (0 !
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' N 1111
~
- r. ", t t !.
l (? ,,,,,
asa gl 4J 'a* ,- ,
y .s N' y
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' __.t y - . o.s
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'. V
+. ._ .:~.1 p '? * *
, I h ).
- l . g;j L g ; f;- {.>] " (NL '"" !
ro fu,2 _z fyl. .cj-- @uw . MuS
- 3 , jI _
Ptthe:n .
! A i _
EcstL M ui 3a
- ?,%_1 -
r E ;
1 i
- Figure 1 Philippines Cold Shutdown b ration System Desi.ja l
4
- Denotes required additional llESTIliGi100SE supplied valves.
Only valves required fer operation are shown. ,
All gate and globe valves are remotely operated from HCB.
, Letter destgaation A or B denotes electrical train.
- l. .
?
l
.i Tais new reactor vessel head vent is shown in Figure 2.
Lepressurization N3rmally the RCS is depressurized utili:1ng pressurizer spray. Even without offsite power the CVCS auxiliary spray could be used. Howeve , in the unlikely event that all con-trol grade equipnent is assumed unavailable, a safety grade menns of de .ressurization is required.
The safety grade means of depressurizing the RCS proposed involves venting steam from the pressurizer relief tank vja w soleneid operated pcwer operated relief valves. For, this currace, the power operated relief valves are revised
'rca control grado classification to a safety grade ci cs s i f i c.'t d ,n. -
i 1.e new solenoid operated PORV's will be capable of reliev-
'? the sur' flows as the existing type valve, i.e.,
6 0,000 lb/h steam at 2250 psig, will have stroke times of j,L' ' ^0onds to open and 15 seconds to close and will be 2:i 2cl to the requirements of IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1375. A ,tive valve indication will be provided as part
- the valve design to address the experience (lessons)
-ned from TMI. This PORV schematic is shown in
. ;ure 3.
/('.i*ionall", to as' ure that th. SIS accumulators can not 1,:aicit system depre surizatic" or add N2 to the RCS, changes will be made to the accumulator valves. Th~ power 7 .4 _ , 7, j
+: :: ,.
, :!- '-?
7 .. /20 10-42 ,
I
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l r
e .
~,
. e s
. tu.
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4
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'\ $
& ?.4
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- g k S s
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h-/ I
-an..
- t 6
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. A, n 4 s
~ ~'
i
.' '{,;s]' <* -
i s, ;- .
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e 7 <. .J
,., ,. . .i
.,".7.
s ;
. . .a
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G m*
++
I. a-r* < *\ P., t
- "~ ~ - ~ s' . O fy .y (,3
' " - ~ iD %y, ~ g .3 ,
5 .
yq g e e
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.=
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= w s
t h,L!.)r ~. e% O Q a;r e=
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h , ;6 a . i l l
'wt,~,,
e a
2 9 4 3 ..-. .. .
s i
I
- .-.4 ..'. - . .. m...- -
. , m ., i, = w w . --- . _ _ . - -
- 5
- - i 1 Pressurizar
-. r. - . 14 ety "d- V41.es s, i n...-._
i yp}
PCV .4- n'A s c< n L:.-
i s.s ._
\ soray I
Y a Y i ! ptv - . :u .
@ i b /M O. ,
. .l~$** - -.y(
a A .
7 -9 *r ,
on-ened .
x <. t l e r vil m< . .
4
( .fe:
- cnde) .
Pro:url:ar I.
Je::n 2 Ois:
y$ Ee l ! -v u * *1 ,
, j cs:a inm4o: . - -
/ ) s ..
,', p a _.
) n.. J
! t l
- s. . ..- .
z j ,
x --
s e- w 11.s r ra n k. ..
ns M . t. .
Figure '1 Safety Grade 00 -er- rization for C3D {
10-14:c'~ '
i
*v-
crain assignment ' 'or the dir^harge va.ves will be changed 10 *: at all' valves are on the : me train. ' Further,. the "2 gas vent ~ val as will Se powered frem the other safeguard
'actr- ' train ~ d upgraVI to be electrically operated to prc: prc' action grade vent capability.
The ac:umulater venting scheme is shown in Figure 4. .
5 " alecs 7 : d valves nre required for the boration system, head let-d mn. system and Acr."t'ulater venting system, as well as the rm -loncid cperated PORV's. These valves are defined in
- oi c 2.
I new valves e m clearly indicated by valve number on Fig-cres 1 4 In acaition, a number of valves may either be deleted or ^ they have bcen ordered, either used in other slicatinn; or as spn.res. These valvrq are also deline-
^
t .td i n T 'd ?
~
' 11 -1/.~ t.ruc tu ra l halysin kE ~ 1HGl!005I will provide Cir- 1 pining and supports. Per-tions of this p% lng wil' be prefabr ted in appropriate langth- n' ship; d to the Site for installation as part of a u; ! cssembly. Supports wil! ?.lse be selected
- atible with the upper head assembly.
l l
l i +, n m l l %-[--
' m..: .. ;
!P~.] 0 2 '?O 10-45 l
l
0
.i Ac.:o u.or.cr Isolation / Vent - Either ' ilet Isolation Valve (A) '
Can be ased or Vent Valves (D) -
Can be Ope.,ed y .
- n k l ser i k.
t
~-. , g,r 8 g .
l
, , ~.
~! ., c v u. c-o ,>
e.
o,
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i L,
g___,,# v-n t g) J,>i /<,f,
N{, 41
,fp , -
eg.gi ~,} .m
- c
/ .
F ,
- . . ., cb[.. (,T/ P.) 0:her -
ID b b Vent
,,. k . ., Ae.w.w l a to rs (
L utv 900
/ \, ,
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),
I
( i NEw
. 9 At v E I
i 1
\, A, Zi
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MH31
[/, ---
, ,3 "7 3" .aaix i;';Mrs
,s.. - , - %
Q3 :c: c. t.
'.__ ...e.
, Figure 4 o s - t 'r,
' 10-c3 '
j J
. eeps. eo+ p -sene * * *eeneut**
- an.m one e se - mm ma e er andueese aw e p . w w e m aw g samme ga.g M ageene est e eae se ame .sguae ee e 484W
- ede me r
s a
i
. i.
MPn i t
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. s x
e l
,* l 1i .
s; . s . , f,\s 1
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- T
+. U
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..J.
l,
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3
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3 n.
i :
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- +
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.7
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-A
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s I
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/: 5 n o
r e
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- a gr i
- i u :-
- Fg n
' i a
- . f r
.~
1 n i o
'l g C e r
,I r. u
. i o s
, )!t <
P3 i s
. _. t e c r
,\ ;t u P S
- w S e 0
1 P H
/ I'
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r
/ T Pa a a
- : i!
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c l A O e ,.,"'
e e
m.
m 3 :,. .i. . . 1;; .! t: ;;b : i" il is lj. la 1 ti g ll:s'
-:3T;;!:0USE will provide the Class 1 piping, supports off m head assembly and structural design of Class 1 head van- Di- ;g, consisting of the following:
<. Dvs:;n specificatien for Class I head vent piping up
- flange r f seismic support platfore..
- b. WE.17..!GHOUSE will also supply additional or connecting miscellanecus piping and valves, and applicable stress analysis.
. Constitation for determination of support locations,.
types and directions for supports. ,
i n: s ., . 33 T;dia 3 identifies the many changes involved in a safety grade
- ~ ss i g n.
T- 4 ident Pies itcs specifically not included.
34
? :-:::
' 'E. 0
,, ::. 10 43 ,
I
/
TA3tE 1 WO fINGHOUSE Si.LECTR I
) DESIGil BASES
- 1. im CN Jithin 35 Hours after Trip with or Without off-Site
P wa r. 'I
- 2. Anec One Coincident Single Failure , Assuming Credit for Limited .
T ' dial.0perator Action Outside Containment.
- 3. }
Utilin only Safety Grade Systems. -!
'. Provide , 0 after any Condition II, III, or IV Initiating Event, .or i
t Can'rol r:orm Evacuation,' Eliminating Dependence en Initial Plant ;
r.cnditi. a. ,
i Ccw m ' Transient Stress Analysis will Consider an Emergency CSD to l
^
- e ene ' currer::e in Plant Life. I i
f 2fc*v .cade Short Terif 4 Hours Hot Shutdown Capability will be !
)
icea 'ith tM CSD Cesign. - '
7 In Add' tion to Minicur, Safety Systcms to Satisfy Above, Systen.s ;
("ahc 2 Mon-Safet.y Grado) must be Av.iilable to Provide Backup in !
Assuring Pi :nt Safety. '
i i
i i
'lacted to ad:Iress Regul ory Guide 1.139 P!ay 1278). {
2 ac ; tor suberitical RCS 1 200 F, with RCS "ressure :
/pptrrix G . .
a tuleted " random" initiating event such as fire, helb, -
ct:. ma - t' uvailability of one train, a ' flure in the second r.,i:, vued ~ , postu htea. l
.I i
r..~. <*
,.>:. v. l 5
> : : . . i~; ;, .L 33 10-49 4emgg e m e ,g .s me , e pe**N** . a- ' *
- WTV"********'**W89"*M568N#9**** ""
-- - -- es-e, .- -
.m_.e m s, m-m
'I l
l
~
TABLE 2 l
.T 'l : UNIT 1 VAM REVISIONS - COLD SUUf DOWN DESIGN OU30 Portien)
. ' . - - - . - -a icy cjT9uTU"9T9..i'lE - SAFETY INJECTION Shtm *la .
Old I.D. New I.D. Scope
.:J 1-C'203C 3-GM78 Fila W 3,c d 1 - 3f,t..lc 3-G!:78FNA W
'd -
1 3090A,0 1-RS78SNA -
W
.~
1
' A1 ! ..:.T ~-.__' ' SY STf?/P.'W T/ " ' - * : .' . l'id I.D. tiew I.0. Scone .
1-f M1 1-178 W 1 :- '7A,3 1-TS88FNB W
' 1 .: ' 3A ,0 1-TS88FNB W i-3339/',3 1-RS78SN W
- -604 J 1-in7CR W e i t.u
- ':V-6553.
S SC.s 3-1,- -ZA
. 3-580' ri W (T ' Grade) l I
l
- e %
a 7
. ,4 <.
e.- 1 in.,cg -
e.= = * ' em ee m= e .e ese == ..no,ww, e . , ap.emsee - n me .ewomme 4 ee a s see =
- rw_
l TABLE (C0t;7P 7)
. ' : q p.r
_. _. m. . . ). ' . . _ .. .'~;,, I.D.
finw I .D. Sc o r_-
1-0375A,3 1-IA70',5 1-IM76RS cr W 1-IS76RS N i .c : - ! ^'!- Cl O l .RA36RSA
- "136RSA W im i of . / mthd valve- UEST'"0HC 1E Scope (Solenoid, Motor,
!. a d ) . ,
ick R DSFO c . ' lete/ Utilize in other Applications
' !- e i 'i8 75A ,
, '75B , and HC'/-900.
l l
e
. b a g
-u. pwee * * * -e.w me**armNa ******e'8* '""'*N#* M ** #** '
.m, ,m+ , , , %
TACLE 3 LIST OF MAJOR CHANGES FC!!
SAr ~.T. G:,ADE C0! O SHUTDOWN
.;;. :01. . ?
. +: " n (Nes)
- 1. .i e ' nteen (17) Valves (Including 2 PORV's)
- 2. tead L2t icwn ripe (Vent Pipe) (Up To Flange Tcp Seismic Sup-af.P1atform) wts For Pipe Off Vessel Hecd Assembly
^ (5 rap On Type) For Head Vent Pipe
. .a Class l? f,CS Pressure Tran*;mitters
.. :Nir Class lE RCS Pressure Indicators (High And Low' Range)
- 7. T to >G Sets
- 3. Two 3atterics
- 0. Witional Hiscellaneous Valves, Piping., Instrumentation,
- trols, and Electrical Equipe.ent (r ;P Portion) 2 200.' O Gallen Con9nsate T,nk
. . ' rie - '"ay I:n;>- 3 Acided Ha-dware Or Change To Existina) 1
^
'. . ass Cabinet L 9ic
\
I
. Control To Protection Cabinet C% nges l
. ' !dition RTD Functir,
. . Da ate Pr Mtton Cabinet C. c.sfeguards Test robinet
'. mic Sv" port latform wIe 4
e
,:, } c,
10-T'
--. . - w--- e eme==4..- ow a . w een e =e* e* * + +
- eID= em * = *
" BLE 3 (CONT!rVED)
-- .. , ,v, m : .t n.u n ,sn. ,. ,... )
. n..,.,
8 we s+e- .+h
. 7iagrams C, w nt Lis*e,
. are tion Diagrars E" Configurat ion Drwing
. 6" :ing Instruction Re-emar.'iation Changes / Additions
. -' m Description ,
. i on.31 R ew ' annts i '~ransi'> J.ddi t i on/Ch a ntes
, , . 4. \
..)
. .. > D awirge,, ' '3 'via l s 9.rc3s Reports ,
f' u;rds Test Cabinet Drawings
' v- 'iary Rel. y R ,ct Drawings n y rim CH : .m.
~'
s e t .' , 3,q g ,3
- t 'n '
. Chances
....,.s.< g.... .,,s,,
- ur,2cy Oc e sat C!,
.m
' ec:::. dure C:' i:~ "s Ce.ign :p.:cication (Head 'ent)
. ' + -face Det.
?.rical ("11vej ;ccuirrrents c rj - i ng Diagren Changes
. -ic Su; mort Dr." ring C' "< es (To Indicate Head Vent Pipe / .
"t '_ocaticosi
. ~. a1
.> } ,
4
. 4 . + m e mer -e eee- ,=e =wro.e* 9 989****84848**8**-***"8""**'**
i 1
I I 1
1 TABLE 3 :
l (CONTINUCD) r l
l r.,a 9 .,
rg.. .:.
, uaq. .. n .**ir- j
- r. * .< . . _ . _ , .
1 1
J 'i ,
':iASE nunt.R F01 LOy
)
i S
i i
)
l 4
I l
..y. ;
. ... . c.
n I I
sv v_ .-. .
I E'; " '*.o C3/12/C] 10-54 !
1 i
i
l
. l
- 1
,.i A,2 ..
- 172:" SPE'J .~ 'i' ALLY NOT INCLUDED
/ ' :is _. OcVeloc FSAR Type Curves for N or N-1 Core Comf f-
^
- .' lic 'g Hot Shutdo in Condition to Cold Shutdown Conditions
, .; ; :: . . Type Curves).
0RV <S e" Valve Test incJ (Ref. NUREG- 378).
t'h!1 mire Project Natural Circulation Test.
M ncqtaticn.
. I' ' i i : 's :n to Addr ss the llESTItlG!!OUSE Design Bases Requirement of
'ino Ce brui Room Evacuation.
. t r. :o f f.'.nu : As :nciated with Cold Overpres::ure Protection.
1 4
.. 10. s e
4 a
,,. v0 <, ",0 U GillDE I .97-INSTRUNNTATI0f FOR LIGHT WATER COOLED NUCLEAR
' ' . R ' 1*1T5 TO A3SESS PLANT CONDITION OURING AND FOLLOWING AN ACCl-r:C D?l: ---- -.O_NC 1. A'tGUST 197 7 )
For th Containment Hydrog~1 Monitoring, it will be necessary to e v. ? e , d ; present TP hycrogen monitoring range from a range of 0 to 5 percent to a range of 0 to 10 percent, and it will also be neces-sary to meet the qualification requirements of IEEE 344-75.
Furtr instrumentation that will be required is described in the fol '
1 ms : ng ' ces . These secticns are called: Supplemental Instrumenta-tica *- ist Flant Operation in Post-Accide :t Honitoring and ,
"~.'~" ^ iOUST Meclear Safety Position on Regule. .ary Guide 1.97, ,
I 2 '. ! " ' .
Ig; d ce < :nstrumentatice _T_o Assist Plant Operator in Post-Accident M :itort-A. '-creductinn and Background l 1
a re~Ct of its raview of the TMI-2 accident, the Advisory
- - a9' on Re.:ctor Safeguards has recommended that both the ana the ut t ity industry give close scrutiny to the environ-al qualification of instrumentation in nuclear riants.
Seper'te from the TMI-2 event and the ACRS recommendations, the ci; uc and environmental qualification of critical safety-r: a d instrumentati' ras already a sub %ct for detailed NRC l
- side tion. (Note
- IE Buli tin '). 79-01, dated Febru-
~
1979)
. , .3 , n ' . . -
.a
- c.-s; y CD c'i/1!/00 10-5
- :
ir. addition tr these regulatory facters. WESTINGHOUSE believes d ; it is prudent for the utilities to begin a review of their
.::pective units to define the information available to the oper-0" e subsequent to any design basis event, especially those m may lead 'to a requirement for instrumentation functioning ,
in a severo environment. In order to aid utilities in this c' view, WESTINGHOUSE has proposed and conducted for the TMI cxaers group a generic review of all of the information avail-3:ne to the operator in a WESTINGHOUSE PWR and has developed a list of post-accident information which is useful in bringing the p' ant to a stab!e condition following condition II, III, or Fl cibats. .'
1
- 7. , sneric ruview has defined the minimum set of instrumenta-
=.: .n that is recuired for operator information in order to diag-nr:e the type of plant event that has occurred, take any'
.essary manual ar' ions. or monitor necessary olant parameters.
.. .10 I pr ovides a ';stin? of the required parameters tn be mont- l Lo.eJ :s well as other pertinent information associated with l
of the parameters.
j i
, 2ndm"1 describos that plant instrumentation that will st the 'lant operator in po ' accid ^nt monitoring and will rtida n resultant set of qualiflod instruments to monitor all-
~ Pa functions listed in Table 1 WESTINGHOUSE believes that
.h inntrenent functions listed in Table 1 provide a minimum but su'fic.ent t :t of information necessary to ai< the plant oper-
'a post Tcc hient manitoring.
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! Mf alen Ntaber of Scosers Recer.nended for a Typical Prant 2-t000 Pt.P.F.G E R ItflCTION 3-LCOP 4-LCOP COP?!ENTS
.h tliarv Teedst.tcr
' it 2 3 4 One per leop, diverse af th wide range -
g j e.; s team generator Icvel, sensor loca ted outside contatamnt, raonitors t atal f1rw to each steara 92nerator.
liig's !!ead Sa fe ty 71 2 2 5 Sensor located outside contatraent, injection Fica measures total 5.1. flow (including tha t g through B. I.T.) .
P
$ imr I en d Sa fe ty 2 H 2 2 Injection Flow Sensor located outside contsinment.
measures thac 5.1. flow. .
Pressurizer !!ater H 2 2 2 Sensor located inside contatroent, reference tw e . ,
leg cocpensation may be required.
Refueling "s ter Storage' N, 2 2 2 Sensor located outside contsincent.
Tar.1 Na ter level .
Contalment Building D. H 2 2 2 Water Levet Sensor located inside or outside containment g (depends on plant layout), at least RCS '
volume
- RwST voltne + CST voltne.
Systen illde H 2 2 2 Range Pressure N Sensor located outside contelnment (to meet accuracy requirements), containeent isolation by tellows.
(II Function D A function u!*d for diagnose: In Westinghouse reference Emergency Operating Procedores.
Function M A function used fcr rnanitortng durintf an accident.
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The hardware to be supplied by WESTINGHOUSE (2 ensors, process control equipment, indicators, and recorders) is designed to meet current codes and stardards.
The process control equipment to be supplied will include WEST-INGHOUSE 7300 series process control cards.
S. Ecuipment Description ,
- 1. Differential Pressure Transmitters The transmitters to be supplied are the result of a seismic
'- and environmental supplemental qualification program for class IE components subject to the requirements of IEEE-323-1974.
UESTINGHOUSE intends to purchase the transmitters in rela-tively large quantity lots (100 to 300 transmitters per f;
. t, # . .
lot). Each lot will have procurement requirements requir-ing the mar"facturer to procure critical items such as
,7 resistors, diodes, transistors, bellows, and strain guages in lots with material composition traceability back to spe- .;
cific batches or heats. In addition, all transmitters in a lot will be manufactured to the same procedure.
The intent of these procurenent requirem'nts is to obtain transmitters which are as ide,tical to each other as is practically possible. From cach lot of transmitters, a ,
representative group will be randomly selected by WESTING-HOUSE for confirmatory testing to demonstrate that the lot NPC WESTINGil0UT APPENP:X 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-61 6
. ..... n. _ -- .. .: -. -- . _ . . . . . . . ..-..-.; _
.. . - . _ - . - .=.
1 1
l will m et cil technical requirements. If any failures occur during testing which can be construed to be common mode failures, additional testing, rejection or rework of the entire lot will be acccmplished as required.
The trane.mitters to be provided are those necessary to measure:
- a. Containment Pressure
- b. Steamline Pressure
- c. Narrow Range Steam Gencritor Water Level
~
- d. Wide Range Steam Generator Water Level
- e. Boric Acid Tank Water f.evel
- f. Condensate Storage Tank Water Le"91 9 Refuel.ing Water Storage Tank Water Level ,
- b. T ~ surizer Water Level
- i. Reactor Coolant System Nide Range Prassure J. Containment Building Water Lavel
- 1. High Head Safety Injection Flow
- m. Low Head Safety Injection Flow
- 2. Radiation Monitoring Equipment The WESTINGHOUSE Post Accident Digital Radiation Monitoring System is based on a digital microprocessor approach. Each monitor channel is self-contained and consists of a detec-tor and a data processing module which contains the micro-processor. Monitors include area, liquid, and gas types. ,
Complementing the system is a safety-related console to be located in the control room. s The data processing module is the heart of the system.
This module converts the incoming detector signal to a radiation measurement in engineering units and determines the status of various alarms. Channel status is displayed locally and transmitted to the safety-related console which it is also displayed and alarmed. The data processing :aod-ule and block diagram is shown in Figure 1. i The microprocessor, coupled with a log counter, calculates the true mean count rate of the source hing monitored as well as the confidence interval of the measurement at the
{
95 percent confidence level. The microprocessor uses pro-gramable 'ariables, channel gain and bacHround level t.o compute a disp'ayed radiation me:: dement in counts per minute, R/HR, or uCl/ce, if desired. The displayed radia-l tion measurencnt is compiared to the programmable alarms:
l 1
- iPC i WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 CJ" :-52 PRIU1ED 08/12/06 10-63
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Figure 1 Data Processing Module and Block Chart 10-64 k, *
- es s k .
low, int'ermediate and high. In addition, the micro-processor tests for nonprogrammable alarm states: top of scale (detector saturation), loss of d. c. voltage, faulty communications with the safety-related console, and' inter-nal failure.
The data processing module displays the radiation measure-ment on a six character Light Emitting Diode display using scientific notation. Alarms are announced with lamp (s),
horn (s) and control relays.
The complete channel status is sent to Ine safety-relateds consolo at least once a minute. The ccenunication link is a 4800 band send / receive half duplex differential link.
The communications link meets all surge requirements of IEEE Standard 472-1974. '
- a. The Safety-Rel,ated Console The safety-related consolo contains all the roadcuts and controls for the safety-related post accident moni-tors. These channels confom to the cur' rent interpre-tation of all the NRC, IEE and ANSI Standards. Tbc normal display (digital motor) informatien consists of count rate to 'r, decimal places, exconent, units and any alarm. Die operator can set the alarm trip p* 'nts by the use of thumbwheel switches.
Np~
WESTING l1035E APPENDIX 10 ,.
02.' 4 '^ '
PR.NTEU 08/12/SC 10-65
_ = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . - - . . . . . - . . . - - - . . . . . - ..
- b. printer The printer provides hard copy of the displayed infor-mation. The printer can be operated in an automatic time sequenced mode, or manually to provide infor-mation on demand. in an alarm condition, it will l
continuously print alarmed channel information until -
the alarm condition is cleared or manually stopped, i
- c. Monitors l The following channel monitors are to be provided in ,
the following Table.
l 1
TABLE Tvne Quantity Location _ Range Area (2) Containment 10 to 108 R/Hr Area (2) Control Room 10'l to 10I R/Hr l Area (2) Auxiliary Building 10-4 to 10+4 R/Hr .l Gas (1) Auxiliary Building 10-7 to 10-3 uc/cc Xe l33 l Particulate (1) Auxili'ry Building 105 II to if uc/cc 7
1 131 Gas (2) Air Ejector 10-0 to 10~I ue/cc Xe l33 Liquid (i Steam Gen. Blowdown 10-6 to 10-I uc/cc Co S8
- 3. Incore Thermocouple System The mee thereccouple syste desianed a- suppliad by WEST-INGHOUSE :: designed to measure-coolant temperature as it
.N PC WESTI!!GHOUSE APPEND X 10 02N.a-52 PRINTED 08/12/30' 10-66
- , - - - . . .. -. - . = . _ _-. _. . .-_ - - .
l 1
l exists from instrumented fuel assemblics. The thermo- l
- couples are then connected.to one of two reference junction boxes located inside the containment. From the reference junction boxes. each indicatien is routed both to the ther-mocouple cabinet and to a thermocouple indicator located on the control board. The thermocouple cabinet provides a tie-point for the thermocouple wiring and provides isolation and conversion of the. signal prior to sending it to the pro-cess computer, i i
The hardware to be provided is that hardware necessary to ,
, I upgrade the existing thermocouple sy.ctem in order to meet the appropriate scismic and environmental qualification, requirements. The hardware to be replaced is as follows: i
- a. The two (2) existing thermocouple riference junction boxes and connectors, located within the containment, are to be replaced with seismically and environmen-
-tally qualified components.
- b. The two (2) manual switching units and thermocouple ,
indicators; located on the control beard, are to be replaced with seismically qualified components. >
- c. The single (1) bay thermoccuple ccbinet located adjacent to the control room that contains the 1
thermoccuple transmitters, power, supplies, jacks and terminal blocks is to be replace' aith a seismically qualified cabinet, l
NPC VESTINGHOUSE
/PPENDIX 10 0?" :.52 PC ' ;f ED 03 /12/R0 10-67
- . . - . . ...i.-
~
.. . - . . + . - . . . . - . - . - . . . . . .
l
- 4. Resistance Thermal Detectors
- a. Wide rangh hot leg and cold leg resistance thermal detectors (RTD's) are necessary to monitor coolant temptrature during post accident situations.
- b. The four (4) wire RTD's to be supplied are designed with a platinum thermoresistive element sheathed in a stainless steel housing. The design incorporates high temperature and high radiation rated materials mated .
to the resistive element through armored ccibling and a moisture-proof connection head. The design is con.
trolled through WESTI!FiH00SE control and electrical system standards which specify interchangeability and accuracy requiretants.
- 5. Information Dir, play WESTINGHOUSE will utilize an instrument display arrangement that will Sest present this information to the plant operator.
C. Eauipment Qualification To avoid the unnece:sary effort and costs a::sociated with quali-fying this equ ent to different qualification standards 'for differ 9nt plar' custcc.crs, one . set of envel'ning qualification tests is planned. Specif.ically,thise$ip' it will be quali-fied according to the procedures identified 14 a WESTIt:GHOUSE Topical Report, WCAP-8587, in order to caet e criteria NPC WESTING' 'USE APPEiOIX 10 0211- ~ 52 P t "TED 08/12/80 10-68
- -a- -- .. .. _ -.. .... _ _ _
1 _
identified in IEEE 323-74. Sir c the IEEE 323-74 criteria expand upon the requirments identified in IEEE 323-71, the t equipment will not only meet but exceed the qualification crite--
ria identified in IEEE 323-71.
Historically, safety-related electrical equipment has been tested under the severe envirbnmental conditions expected to occur in the event of a design bcsis accident. This testing pro-vided a high degree of confidence in the safety system perfor-mance under the limiting environmental conditions. However, in keeping with the advancing state-of-the-art, qualification cri-teria were revised in 1974 by revision of IEEE 323-1974 and by Regulatory Guide 1.89 which endorses this IEEE standard. Th'e
<:encept of aging was highlighted in IEEE 323-1974 and interpre-tation of the scope of aging and implementation methods were soon argently required. Sema guidance on the scope of.applica-bility of aging conside' rations was subsequently provided by the WEC-7-24-75 " Nuclear Power Engineering Committee Position Stste-ment to Foreword of IEEE Standard 323-1974."
Shortly after IEEE 323-1974 was issued, WESTINGHOUSE WRD formed i an engineering task group to inte"pret new requirements and to -
recommend implementation methods. The qualification procedu.res described in detail in a WESTINGHOUSE topical report, WCAP-8587, are the result of this tuk group's efforts 1 subsequent evolu- ,
tion. The task group mcq5ers were also assis' greatly by dis-cussions with experts frc, other divisions of the company and the nuclear industry as well as from NRC Staff and IEEE commit-tee personnel. The WESTINGHOUSE qualification methods described in 'ACAP-8587 will be utilized to meet IEEE 323-1974. They are I
HpC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-69 eu !
l l
-s' Abts. MDOM GP W . ,_ , ,_ m . , -en smt w = --
- _. -. - - _ . ~ . . - . . . --- - . - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
described briefly below and are consistent with the interpreta-tion set forth by the NPEC position mentioned above.
The recogni:ed methods available for qualifying safety-related electrical equipment are established in IEEE 323-1974 as being:
type testing, operating experience, analysis, ongoing or a combi-nation of these methods. The choice of qualification method to be employed by WESTINGHOUSE, for a particular item of equipment, is based upon many factors, including: practicability, complex-ity of equipment, economics, availability of previous qualifica-tion to earlier standards, etc. The qualification method to be employed for the equipment offered in this proposal will be iden- l tified in the individual Equipment Qualification Data Packages whether by test, experience, analysis or by s 2 combination of these methods.
- 1. Qualification by Test Qualification by test is, in general, selected as the pri-mary method of qualifiraion for complex equipment, not readily aneanable to analysis, and/or for equipment requir:d to perform a safety-related function in :: high energy line break ("~' O qvironment. For the equipnent offered in this proi qualification by test is the pri-mary method of qual . Pn.
- 2. }:alification by Experience i
Quali'ication by evnerience is not employed by L'ESTINGHOUSE hT,0 as a prime method of qualificatien. Aerating i
HPC
'AESTINGHD:"r AN'ENDIX 10 02'i 4-52 DRINTED 03/ M/80 10-70
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experience may be provided as supportivt evidence to the prime nethod of qualification. Where such inf,ormation is provided, l'STINGHOUST will demonstrate that the experience
-is applicable to the functional requirements for which the !
equipment is being qualified. This applicability detennina-tion will include an evaluation of operating environments, j rountin'gs, performance requirements and perfonnance history.
\
- 3. Qualification by Analysis 1 I
Qualification by analysis'alone is not employed by WEST lNG- l HOUSE. Analysis is employed to supplement testing or to !
provide verification that the test results are applicable.
D. Scone of Supply and Division of Resconsibility -
WESTINGHOUSE will supply the following hardware and software: I
- 1. Differential Press re Tran:mitters 1
l
- a. Thirty (30) halifiad Differential Pressure Trans- l mit+ers, including:
- 1) Two (.?) necessary to measure Containment Pressure
- 2) Four (4) necessary to reasure Steamline Pressure
- 3) F+ 'r (4) necessary to treasura ' farrow Range Steam Generator "1ter Level lPC WESTINGH0":E
/PPENDIX 10 c2N-1-52
?!NTED 08/12/80 10-71
- ~ - - -
- 4) Two (2) necessary to measure Wide Range Steam Generater Water Level
- 5) Two (2) necessary to measurn Boric Acid Tank Water Level
- 6) Two (2) necessary to measure Condensate Storage Tank Water Level
- 7) Two (2) necessary to measure Refueling Water Stor-age Tank Water Level
- 8) Two (2) necessary to nieasure Pressurizer Water Level
- 9) Two (2) necessary to measure Reactor Coolant S;;a tem Wide Range Pressure
- 10) Two (2) necessary to measure Containment building Water Level
- 11) Two (2) necessary to measure Auxiliary Feedw. iter Flew
- 12) Two (2) necessary to measur~ iir'h Hea ' ?nfety Injection Flew
- 13) Two (2) necessary to e,easbre Lcw Head Safety Injection Flow IPC
'r:STINGHOUSE APPEtiDIX 10 02tl-4-52 PRIrlTr0 08/12/B0 10-72 9
_ow_ oc o - we en m aa .as a. ,, .-
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, i
- b. Thirty (30) Qualified Indicators - c;e each for every ,
Differential Pressure Transmitter i l
- c. Seventeen (171 Qualified Recorders, including: l l
- 1) One (1) necessary to record the measurements of -
Containment Pressure
- 2) Two (2) necessary to record the measurements of Steamline Pressure .l t
- 3) Two (2) necessary to record the measurement of j Narrow Range Steam Generator Wa er Level ;
- 4) Two (2) necessary to record the measurements of ,
Wide Range Sten i Generator Water Level - f
- 5) One (1) necessary to record the mt:asurements of l Boric Acid Tank bater Level [
i
- 6) One (1) necessary to record the measurements of ;
Condensate Storage Tank Water Level ,
i
- 7) One (1) necesury to record tha measurements of !
Refueling Water Storage Tank iater Level [
- 8) One (1) necessary to record th? measurements of j Pressurizer Water Le"el ' !
i NDC ,
W STIt'GMOUSE l APPENDIX 10 t 02N 4-52 ;
PRINTED 08/12/S0 10-73 ll
. ~_ -- . _ - - _ _ . _ . _ _ . -
- 9) One (1) necessary to record the measurements of i Reac':'- Coolant Syr, tem Wide ~R inge Pressure
- 10) One (1) r.ecessary to record the measurements of Containment Bu'lding Water Level
- 11) Two (2) necessary to record the measurements of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow
- 12) One (1) necessary to record the measurements of High Head Safety Injection Flow
- 13) One (1) necessary to record the measurements of Lot Head Safety Injection Flow
- d. Outline drawings and installation information for the differential pressure transmitters.
~.
Purchaser order documentation associated with the dif-forential pressure transmitters f.
Seismic and environmental testing necessary to qualliy the differential pressure transmitters, indicators and recorders provided 9
Qualification documettation "or the differential pcas-
"ir?
'ransmitters, indicators, and recorders provir 4d i l
NPC i WESTIUrH0'JSE APPEND J 10 r".4 52 P 4fEP 08/12/60 10-74
. ._ - . =. . . . _ . _ _ _ _ .. _
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- h. f lant specific functional recuirements for the differ-ent.ial pressure transmitt ers, indicators, and recorders e
- 2. One qualified three-bay Process Control Cabinet, including: '
- a. The necessary 7300 series process control cards j l
- b. Integral power supplies P i
- 3. Radiation Monitoring Equipment ;
- a. Twelve (12)RadiationMonitors, including '
j h
- 1) Two (2) Containment area monitors !
4 l
- 2) Two (2) Control Room area monitors
- 3) Two (2) Auxiliary Building area monitors }
l
- 4) One (1) Auxit !ary Building gas sampling monitor i s !
- 5) One (1) Auxiliary Building air particulate [
monitor ;
t
- 6) Two (2) Gas Sampling monitors to sample from the [
conde~ser air ejector [
l
- 7) Two (2) Liquid Sampling monitors to sample liauid {
from the steam generator down fluid [
t NPC WESTINGHOUSE !
APPENDIX 10 t 02N-4-52 i PRINTED 08,.,2/80 10-75 !
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- b. A Safety-Related Console to be located in the control room
- c. Twelve (12) data processing modules
- d. A printer including interface electronics necessary to i provide hard copy of the information displayed on the Safety-Related Console All Mating Connectors necessary to install the radia-e.
tion monitoring equipment i
- f. A Technical Manual for the supplied equipment 9 System Interconnection diagrams
- h. Outline and assembly drawings for the hardware provided 1
- i. Wiring diagrams and schematics for the hardware provided l
i
- j. 'ibration :curces (except for the containment area ;
monitors)
- k. Seismic and environmental testing necessary to cualify the radiation monitoring equipment l
l NPC WESTINGHOUSE _
, APFLNDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/S0 10-76 .
w.., . . . . - . . - . . - . ._ . . . . ~ , . _
I
- l. Dat, packages detailing the seismic and environmental test results for the radiation monitoring ' equipment provid"d i m. Plant specific functional requirements for the radid-tion monitoring equipment provided
- 4. Incore Thermocouple System upgraded components
- a. Two (2) qualified thermocouple reference junction boxes and qualified connectors
- b. Tvzo (2) qualified manual switching units and connec-ters to be mounted on the control board
- c. One (1) qualified single bay thermecouple cabinet including the necessary transmitters, power supplies, jacks and terminal blocks
- d. Seismic and environmental testing necessary to quaiify the thermocouple system compon"nts
- e. Data packages detailing the seismic and environmental test results for the Incore Then~ mple System ccmpo-nents provided T. Technical Manuals for the equitment supplied 9 Sys'en interconnection diaorams, nutline drawings and installation information flPC WESTI?;GHOUSE APPEtiD!X 10 0?N-4-52 PP. INTEu 08/12/03 10-77
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- h. Wiring <liagrams and schematics for the equipment supplied
- 1. Plant Specific Functional Requirements for the Incore l Thermocouple System components provided
- 5. Four (4) Wide Range Resistance Temperature Detectors j
- 6. WESTINGHOUSE will also supply the following hardware:
l
- a. All interconnecting cabling associated with the difier- ' I ential pressure transmitters, indicators and recorders
- b. Mounting and installation of the dif ferential pressure transmitter indicators on the control board
- c. All field cabling associated with the installation of the Radiation Monitoring System equipment p ovided
- d. All necessary pumps, sample coolers and piping needed to handle fluid ficw to the gas and liquid radiation
, , monitoring equipment s -
3
- e. All field cabling associated with the installation of the thermocouple system components provided t-lESTINGHOUSE Nuclear Safety Position on Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 1 The WESTINGHOUSE design is in agreement with t: a regulatory positions of l
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 1 with the following exceptions:
i l
NPC i WESTINGHOUSE
+
, .' APPENDIX 1-l O.'? N 52 l PRINTED OC/12/80 10-78 i
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- . . - _ . ., . , . . , . . . , m
- _ , . - . - - - . . . . . - - _ _ .u y n. . .;.- nr . _. . _ .
l A. Reculatory Pc;ition C.l.
- 1. WE*TINGil0VSE will provide Post Accident Monitoring -
'ru-mentation to monitor key Reactor Coola.nt System pirameters, containment conditions, and the effectiveness of the Engi-neeredSafetyFeaturesSystem. The instrumentation pro- i vided will provide the operator with information to enable him to perfonn required manual safety functions and to detemine the effect of normal safety actions taken follow-ing a reactor' trip due to a Condition II, III or IV event. ,
- 2. Instrtmentation identified in Battelle-Columbus Labora-tories Report DMI-X-647, April 9,1973, with the exception of that listed in A.1. above, will not be provided. l B. Reculatory Position C.3.
- 1. WESTINGHOUSE does not supply instrumentation to satisfy ;
position C.3. The delineated parameters in position C.3 extend far beyond the worst cose values following SAR, Chapter 15 Des!gn Bases Events.
- 2. Post Accident Monitoring instrumentation will be supp: led ;
as delineated in section A.1 above. WESTINGHOUSE believes that position C.3 should bo deleted or redified to maximum range corresponding to worst case condi fons. For example, !
the ra ne for containmt presr.ure is typically 115 percent >
of the plant's containwnt design pressure which is i
extended to a rar"e that bounds the SAR containment integ- j rity analysis.
t NPC l WESTINGHOUSE i
/PPEfC:X 10 !
02n a-se l PRINTED 08/12/00 10-79 j t
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C. Regulatory Position C.4 Post Accident l'onitoring instrumentation will be qualified by implementation of the f inal ??RC staff approved version of WCAP-8637.
D. Regulatory Position C.S.
- 1. ' WESTitiGHOUSE will provide recorders for certain accident monitoring channels.
- 2. Of those paramenters selected to provide transient or trend information to the operator, at least ene of the redundant accident monitoring channels is recorded. The recorder is not redundant, does not meet the single-failure criterion,
! does not have its own isolation amplifl. r (the incon.ing sig-
- nal will already be isolated from the accident monitoring channel) and may have multiple pens to permit rore than one channel to be recorded. The equipment in the generic envi-ronmental and seismic qualification program includes these
! recorders. These recorders will not be qualified to func-tion during the postulated seismic event. Followi q the-event, the recorders will regain an oper9 ting status.
E. Ipplementation The NRC Staff has failed to show that the installatinn of equip-ment to meet Regulatory position C.3 in particular and the whole guide in general will provide " substantial additional protec.-
tion" which is required for the public halth and safety or 'he l com.on defense and security (10CFR50.109). 75e prmisions of position C.3 will not be impicmented by WES~'ilGHOUSE.
yrt j T 'TIfiGHOUSE N EtiDl" 10 02tl-4-5..
'RINTED 08/12/SO 10-80 i
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VII. "UREG-0 08 - RECOMMENDATION 2.1.3 - INFORMATION TO AID OPERATORS IN ACCIDENT UIAGNOSIS f"O CONTR0*.
A. Rerotawnda: ion 2.1.2a - Direct Indicatic af cower-onerated relief valt and safety valve position for PWRS's The present design for the pressurizer relief and rafety valves incorporates the following features:
- 1. Each relief valve has indication lights on the control board which are actuated by stem position limit switches.
- 2. A temperature indicator and high temperature alarm are ictu-ated by temperature sensors located downstream of the relief and safety valves.
- 3. The pressurizer relief tank has temperature, pressure, and level indication and alarms on the control board.
- 4. There are high pressurizer pressure al3rms in the control room.
As can be seen from the above there are many indications c< ail-able which can she.v the conditions surrounding the valvec.
Ho ver, while the relief valves are eq' tipped with direct indica-tions of the valve stem position, the safety valves are not so equipped.
To satirfy this recommendation, WESTINGHOUSL vill install a Crit-ical System Leak Monitoring System. The Systc~ utilizes 1
NPC l WES~!NGH00SE APPENDIX 10 l
02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/1./80 10-81
-j
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Sect i on. - Technical Description A. Principles of Oparation As pressurized water escapes through a crack in a metal-boundary, the turbulent ficw generates an acountie signal which is wideband and continuous, very much like randem noise. A localized leak through a pressure boundary or a valve seat gener-ates metalborne acoustic waves which are detected by acoustic transducers mounted en selected pressure boundaries or on the piping adjacent to the valves. The transdu ers convert the acoustic waves into electrical signals which are amplified and r then transmitted to the leak detection system. By nonitoring the appropriate frequency band of acoustic noise, the WESTING-i "OUSE Critical Systems Leak Monitor can provide rapid detection of . cracks in pressure boundaries or valve seat leakage..
B. System Desion The Critical Systems Leak Monitor is not a safety system but is a nuclear surveillance system with the in-enntainment ccmponents (acoustic sensors and pre mplifiers) hardened for the opera-tional environment inside the containment. The equiprent is also seismically qualified. ,
The block diagram of the system (Figure 1) illustrates both the signal processing path and the components quired for the basic system which monitors the pressu izer pek -operated relief and safe' valves for seat leakage, and the adjacent pressurizer ;)ip-ing for lecks. The acoustic ~1scr , and prc3rplifiers are NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDU 10 02N ? 52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-83
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i background, and an " alarm" level, which is set higher. In the !
event of an " alert," the control room display provides the Icek ;
location and rms level. Should the leak increase to an "al'.rm, * !
the control room display provides location, rms level. and poss1-ble " range of leak si:es" (an order of magnitude indication). I With the controls the operator can check background rms levels and " alert" and " alarm" setpoints. The system includes self-diagnostics and troubleshooting software routines, and will alarm in the event of a system malfunction.
The system is expected to have a leak detection sensitivity of better than 1 gpm for the pressurizer valve se3t leakage and a sensitivity of better than 0.5 gpm is expected for piping sys-tems, including the feedwater system. A higher sensitivity is pos:.ible dependent upon the actual background noise levels ,
encountered. To preclude false leak alarms, thn system includes inhibit circuits designed to accept owner-furnished signals for j plant operations that would generate high-level acoustic s-i g na l s .
i A t st signal gcnorater is provide'! to facilitate the test and calibration of the acoustic channels. Frcm the s : pal proceu-ing electronics cabinet, a known test signal is injected into on" transaucer and detected by another tr'usducer. C nparing the detected signal with baseline infonnation allows the oper-ability of each channel in the complete tv, tem to be verified.
tirC WESTINGil0USE APPE." DIX 10 02N-4-52 PIMNTED 08/12/30 10-85
D. System Installation l
To aid in the ease of installation, the number of in-containment components have been minimized and the space required for the controls and electronics maintained compact. The control board module is approximately 7 in. high x 19 in, w0fc x 18 in, deep; the electronics leak detection module requires only 20 in. of vertical rack space. Figure 2 shows a typical system layout with 22 channels.
I Section 3 - Bcnefits and Advantaces The Critical Systems Leak Monitor provides a cost-effective method o' f l monitoring systers and valves which are important to reactor safety, or which are relatively inaccessible during plant operation. The modifications and installation of hardware, required inside contain-ment, can be made during the normal course of a refueling outage.
After the installation of the base system, the electronics package can support a total of 32 acoustic channels, allowing expansion of the system or adding redundancy to existing channels by adding only an acoustic-transJucer, preamplifiers, and an amplifier for each required channel. .
NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-87 m-. e m s, O commew eeew m-m. ws me * *- 6 M* * * ' * *
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l Section - Scope of Supply . Base System WESTINGHOUSE Scope:
A. [ .STINGHOUSE will provide hardware as follows:
l l
- 1. Five (5) acoustic transducers and mounting hardware l
1
- 2. Five (5) pra mplifiers l
- 3. Five (5) amplifiers /rms signal conditioning modules 4.. One (1) leak detection module consiet.ing of: l
- a. Analog-to-digital converter and multiplexer
- b. Microprocessor and mtmory i
1
- 5. Control room module including satallite microprocessor key- j board, and digital display !
i B. WESTINGHOUZ uill provide sof tware as follo't.:
- 1. ~ Schematic and ou'line d ' wings
- 2. Installation and operating instruction.
1 1
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Wt a i lNGl!0USE APPEtIDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRIflTED 08/12/80 10-89
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, C. WESTin3 HOUSE will also sonply the followinc3ditional 1 har dware 1 Required interconnricting cabling i
- 2. Required contain:nent penetrationa
- 3. nounting hardware 4 l
1 NPC WESTI NGN0t' .2 Apr>END X ,!U 02N t. "2 ORINTED Do " 2 'SO 10 N)
i D.
Recommendation 2.1.3b - Instrument for Detection of Inadeouate Core '.ocling for PWR's and BR's Complying with this recommendation involves two systems. The i
first one is the Core Subcooling Monitor. The second is the i Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System. !
t CORE SUBC00 LING MONITOR (minimum scoce) t This system utilizes input from the hot leg RTD's, reactor vessal $
pressure sensors, and ten core outlet thermocouples. Redundant chin-
{
nels include rock mounted input and microprocessor units and main con- !
trol board readout. i Section 1 - Introduction
- l A core cooling monitor has been designed to provida improved infor- ;
mation presentation and display to the plant operators on ? Se status ;
of core he-t removal capability. This ' stem is offered as a rathed '
of addressing NUREG-0578 Section 2.1.3b ani consists of redundant channels c' surveillance gprde instrumentatica with redundant control '
board meters to ir.dicate the margin to core subceoling. . -
l Sy tfon 2 - Background NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.35, requires the imple ation of procedures and the installation of systems to provide pr.~ upt recognition of Icw r metor cor: ant level and inadequate core cooli~
l I
i 1
NPC l U~STINGHOUSE l TENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED C3/12/80 10-91
4 The preeant incore thermocouple systr' a digital list of thermo-couple temperatures from the plant computer, or a large number of hand readings from a manual readout device, canrot be readily inter-preted by the plant operator as margin to saturation. Also in a plant accident condition, the print out of this information by the plant computer may be delayed.
The WESTINGHOUSE core subcooling monitor is designed to give an early warning to'the plant personnel that core conditions are approaching a saturation condition.
Section 3 - Technical Description The core subcooling monitor utilizes inputs from the existing hot leg PTDs, reactor coolant system pressures, and twenty selected incore-thermoccuples. A microprocessor is enployed to e,1culate saturation temperature for the existing reactor coolant system pressure and determine the margin to saturation based on the various temperature inputs. Information display consists of main control board indica-tion of the m'rgin to saturation and expanded information at the electronic's drawer which may be located with the eqisting plant pro-tection and control equipment.
The supplied system will utilize redundant' inputs, microprocessor units, and control board indication which satisfy the physical requirements of safet/ grade equipment. However, total safety grade
(
qualification will require a formal qualification program which would I be the subject of a separate proposal, l NPC WEST!UG400SE
/#PENDix 10 P?N-4-52 a;1NIED 08/12/80 10-92 l
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l The system is divided into two redundant channels, each accepting inputs from t* , hot les RTDs and ten thermocouples. The redundant I analog meters counted on the main control board have nonlinear (
scales, expanded near saturation, with the ranr,c extended to the limits of the incore thermocouples. I* addition to the numerical indication, the metet faces wil be color coded to increase visual aculty for the operators.
Tne auctioneered low reactor coolant system pressure is utill:cd bt the microprocessor to calculate the naturation temperature for the existing system prcosure,.By subtracting the auctionected hir,h incore thermocouple, signni from the calculated saturation tem-parature, the current margin to saturation is calculated. Thle information is then displayed on the main control board meters.'
The margin to saturation from the auctioneered high hot 1cc RTD is also available on the main control board meters by means of a two position switch to be located on the main board.
Tuo IcVels of alarm are provided, the fire to indicate the devalop-ment of off-normal conditions, the second the approach tp loss of core subcooling, Contact closures are provided for interfacing to the ouner's annunctator systen. The actuni set point of either alar" is controlled by the microprocessor and is casily codified by keyboard entrics at the main processing unit.
Expanded informatien is dispidydd en the front of the ccicctro-tes drawers ' o enabic plant persoinel to deter : a core cool' g con-ditions during all plant operating conditlen- Rach of the redundant l
/0-93
4 microprocessors will utilize the computed saturation temperature for comparison with the following plant parameters.
- 1. Individual loop wide range T hot
- 2. Auctioneered high wide range T hot
- 3. Average incore thermocouple
- 4. Auctioneered high incere thennoccuple In addition, the following information will be available for display.
- 1. Temperature difference betw1cn average incore thermoco$ple and individual loop T hot
- 2. Time, in minutes, to a loss of subcooling based on the rate of change of reactor coolant pro sure and temperature In addition to the above digital displays, a graphic, color,15 lamp display of the incore thermocouples is provided on the electronics drawer. The core is divided into five regions, four peripheral and one central, with inputs frem tw thermocouples used to generate the display for each region. Each region has three lamps, grec4, yellow, ;
and red. Two sets of three lamps are also provlied for the hot leg !
- 70s input into cach drawer. If all temperatures ,re sufficiently below saturation, the lamps will be green. If any individual tem-perature reaches an off-nonral condition, the' lamp dispi .y changes to ],
yellow and alann contacts for the plant annumiate are closed. j Shnuld conditions conti me to degrade to the ' eset margin to L
1 NPC WESTING'!0VSE APPENDJX 10 02N-4-52 3
PRINTED 08/12/80 10-94 '
4 I g saturation, the lamp display charges to red and an additional set of alann contacts are closed for the plant annunciator.
Each channel of the input and microprocessor ;ctronics drawer will require 15 in. of vertical, standard 19 in, rack space. System inter-connecting wiring'is accomplished with twisted, shielded pairs.
_Section 4 - Scope of Sunoly WESTINGHOUSE Scope - Base System A. WESTINGHOUSE will provide hardwat e as follows:
s
- 1. Two (2) clectronics drawers including the following:
- a. Input electronics ,
- b. Microprocessors
- c. Front panel graphic display l
- d. Digital meter with selector switch
- e. System status lights
- f. Controls
- 2. Two (2) analog meters for main ccat'rel beard
- 3. Four (4) alann r? lays NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-95
-_ ,,,, . _ .g.7-.-_ _
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- 4. Inter:onnecting cabling and connectors
- 5. Signals from wide-range hot leg RTD's, reactor presure chan-nels, and incore thermocouples, including signal isolation, if required 7
r
- 6. Instrumentation racks for electronics drawers
- 7. Equipment installation B. WESTINGHOUSE will orovide software as follows. j l
- 1. Schematic and outline drawings l l
- 2. Installation and operating instructions REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM WESTINGHOUSE will 3rovide a combination of the tuo ".ystems describr'!
in the following pages: " Reactor Vessel Level I .trumentation Sys-tem" ani " Water Level Instrumentation System for the Reactor V w.el llead Plenum." This ccabination is reflected on the separate pages, "Prec :ss Connection Schenatic," and the combined system list of hard-were which are also included.
Section 1 - Intro >ion WESTINCHOUSE has developed the Reactor Vessef Lt Instrumenta' ion
- ystem to provide a relative y sir.., a and straigh. forward mears to monitor the water level in the reactor vessel. r !s water level NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N 4-52 FRINTED 08/12/80 10-96
, . _ , , , . , , . _ . - , - - ' ' " ^ ' ' ' ' ' '
- i instrumentation system is suitable for installation in operating plants' as well as plants under construction, and neither replaces any '
existing system nor couples with any safety system. This system '
does, however, act to provide additional information to the operator '
during accident conditions. The WESTINGHOUSE reactor vessel level j inctrumentation, system utilizes differential pressure (d/p) measuring devices to indicate water level and relative void content of the :
i circulating primary coolant system fluid, i i
The reactor vessel level instrumentation system will serve to do the following: !
- 1. Assist in the detection of the presenco of a gas bubble or void in the reactor vessel
- 2. Indicate the need for the addition of water to the reactor coolant system ,
- 3. Indicate the formation of a void in the reactor coolant system during a transient i
WESTINGHOUSE will supply the system design, d/p cells and associated hardware, installation drawings, material, instr ' lon and super- ;
vision of installation contractors. !
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l NPC
- WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02*l-4-52 l
PRINTED 08/12/80 10-97 l
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, Tectjan ? System Description A. Introduction
'Joder certain plent accident conditions, the potential exists a
for. the formation of voids in the reactor coolant. System. Under ~
these conditions,'it would be advantageous for the reactor opera-tor to monitor directly the true water level in the reactor ves-sel or the approximate void content during forced circulation conditions in order to' assist him in subsequent actions. There-fore, as the pressurizer level indication may not reliably and directly provide infot.ution on the water level in the reactor ,
vessel for all break sizes and locations, the reactor vessel
' level instrumentation system was designed to provide direct read-ings of vessel level which can be used by the operator. The desiro of the system provides suitable barriers to guarantee proper isolation at the containmnet boundary when needed. This system satisfies the separetion criteria for instrumentation as defined by IEEE-323-74.
B. ._Sys tem Sunina ry F
The reactor vesse' level instrumantation system (figure 2-1) utilizes two sets of.d/p cells. These cells measure :ne pres-cure drop from the bottom of the reactor vessel to the top of the reictor vessel. This different al pressure measuring system utilizes cells of differing ranges' to cover different flow behav-ior with and without nump operation. Each ses of pressure drop measurements provides the following informa' ", as is described beles.
. . "C wtSTINGHOU">E APPEtcIX 10 02:1-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/30 10-98 l
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'h i e, i n s t rui,ien t ; v i t ie.. .ui i tal i c n /ero or erg reacter coolon:
pu:::p i s oper'0 t i ng. The i re;t rumen t wi!? also mossni the reac tor core drid iriterridi s pres t,ure di op, end there fore p"o-vide en indicatiori of tlie relative vn, + coriterit or density ;
of the circulating fluid, when only I to- reactor con f. int '
nump (f.CP) i s oper;it ing. When n.oi e ti.sn orie RCP i'. er ur-et'rg, t he leistrument readir:9 wil! be of t s c a ' ." .
?. 1:eettor Vessel Pressure lirop Wid" Ranw (/ PL )
This iristrument provides an indicat t er, of reactor are,
- nternols, and outlet nonle pressure crop f or any cocibi-nal. ion of crerating RCps Comparison ;f tho measured pres-cure drop with the nonnal, single phase pressure drop will provide an drproximot.e indication of the relative vold cori-tent or density of the circui nting fluid. This instrument
. ill nenitor core cor ditions un o cont, vir <' basis. .
To prov ide the recg.i ned acco:m.y for t er l evel v. ..isure-
' n t , t e.tipe t'd tit re l'idd'. res n t ihe f3 ' a r;ce , leg 5 dre pro-VIded. Ihese medsurer:v.'uts , i.ogulht r t/1 t.h the exi st i fig reactor Coulont !umperature Medsur. 'Ols , a re Uset! . '. dpfrb-Dridle t o compofi' dte i he d/p t rdns .'- Gulputs tv- di f f er-ein e s i n c.y s t t.<u t emne r -s t o re a nd re f . leg temp..oture, p.trt'CU! !y duri tig i he Chi.fifi i t' unVi r'Jnment i r '.1 d-
'. h a c. u r i rment ;t r"r t.ure f ol i ove ' ':<t dri acc irb'nt.
I'C
.c i f.. l s !
,S t.- ,i u.
,g*6 un ,
l The d/p cells are to be located cutside of the containment to eliminate the large reduction in measurement accuracy asscciated with the change in the containment environment (temperature, pressure, radiation) during an accident. The cells ar: also located outside of containment so that cali-bration, cell replacement, referunce leg checks and filing, and system operation is made easier.
C. System Layout Schematics of the system layout for the reactor vessel level instrumentation system arr shown in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. There are two reactor coolant system penetrations for the cell refer-ence lines: the one reactor head connection at a spare pene-tration near the center of the head, and the one connection to an incore instrument conduit at or near the scal table. The ,
design criteria which have been followed to ensure that tile read-ings of the d/p measurement system are accurate are described in Section 3.
The pressure sensing lines frem the top of the reactor vessel attach to a pressure tap inctalled in a head adaptor p ug. A minimt:n length of impulse line is used to alleviate potential errors due to dirt or gas entrapment. A diaphragm is provided as shown in Figure 2-3 which will serve as a hydraulic coupling to permit pressure indications to be' transmitted frcm the pres-sure tap to a sealed sensing line, which is a sensing line full of water and completely sealed so that no venting, filling, or flushing is needed. The refueling disconnect would be made as described in Figure 2-4, which would be located as close to the twC WESTitlGICUSE I APPEriD U, 10 1 02N-4-5" l PPINTED 03/12/80 10-101 )
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d Figure 2-2 Proces!, Onnaction Schematic - Train A
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i Figure 2-3 I Pronn ed Connection to Top of Reactor Vessel l For cool,no Level oe. . mi ne '. l on l l
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R.V Head Connection For Cor nt Level Determir '. tion <
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- 4 the reactor coolant and capiilary line temperatm . and ;
density effects E. Installation The process connections,. utili:e scaled capillary systems within containment to safeguard the system against fluid losses which could occur as the result of localized -line breaks and/or cer-tain postulated rapid depressuritation occurrences.
The diaphragms affecting connections to the reactor vessel and the movable detector conduit, are of special design for this application. These sensor bellows contain features which ,
i include the following.
- 1. Retention of capillary fluid even in the event of post-accident superhead conditions enroute through the con-tainment
- 2. Large volumentric displacements to accennodate thermal expansion in postulated postaccide" environment :
- 3. Special seal construction consistent with noral service lifetimes and postulated accident rediation environments Capillaries are standard one-quarter in, heavy wall type con-sistent with the minimal fluid volume requir ,ents of the sys-tem. It is intended that capillary coilh n oximating plant length requirements be shop assembled, wei. .i and tested to I
assure integrity and unifonnity in qualit. l l
NPC WESTING!UdSE N'PENDIX 10 i UPN-4-52 j PRINTED GP/12/80 10-106 1
. . - - _ . r ---- au -
i
~
-The capillaries are routed to hydraulle isolation devices. i These are constructed similar to d/p type switches except with minimal fluid volume consistent with the thernul expansion con- !
siderations discussed above. Displacement volumes are inrge in ;
t e nn ., of hydraulic coranunication from the process connection to. :
i the measuring transmitters located outside of the containment. i The isolators require a d/p of only in. of water fer full dis-I placement and will actuate switches for the unbalanced con-ditions which would occur when unacceptable hydraulic coup 1 tng exists between the reactor coolant systen process connections l !
and the d/p transmitter instruments external to the containment.
The isolator similar to the diaphragn above will seal off full '
process pressure in either direction and will actuate switches !
to indicate the occurrence. l l
Impulse line conn'ections from the above hydraulic isolat. ors to the d/p transmitters are also capillary tyre tubing. Thoy
- differ only to the extent that valving must be employed at the i instruments to facilitate calibration checks of transmitters ..
without requiring access to the containment. Capillary tubing j
also is necessary to minimize fluid volumetric expansion.. Simi- j larly, the transmitters sust be located relatively close to con- [
tainment to minimize amblent temperature effects on the fluid I volumes between the isolators and the trans*1tters. ;
The maintenance of degassed solid fluid fills between the trans-mitters and hydraulic i olation ccvices through transmitter cali- !
bration and service operations requires special provir. ions in :
tems of the initial filling, scaling, and the maintenance of i
.HPC .
E STINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 '
PRINTED 08/1P/30 10-107
. ~ . .
- --c., -
sw. ,.
the seal during valving and calibration operations. (Gas snoul.1 not be used in calibrating.) -
l l
Transmitter elevations above incontainment isolators are recom-mended. Alternatively, loop seals are required in capillaries l
being routed shrough valves, d/p transmitters, and calibration !
ports.
i In sone cases, a variable volume disp?Scement diaphragm may be
'{
required to effect the letdown and return of the fluid through the d/p transmitter to the line pressure through the isolators.
Additional bellows at the instrument racks may be desirable in some installations to assure continuity of hydraulic coupling, following maintenance operations.
In operation, variations in fill fluid volumes are displaced from the transmitter to the reactor coolant system by displace-ment of the isolator and sensor bellows system, respectively.
Status lights at the instrument rack indicate the status of this coupling during service operations. An alarm is conveyed from the instrument rack when the coupling is inadequate, due to a lack- of fluid volumes cya flable for thermal expansion and/or due to process conniction failur'es.
Capillaries should be routed in metal cor.duit or closed metal trays to effect physical separation and to afford a degree of thermal-insulation against postulatwd LOCA transients.
Thermocouples should be located in the midplanes of these enclo-sures in an ascending er descending route of ch incontainment.
NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-G2 PRIN1ED 08/1:/80 10-108 I
1 l
capillary to meas' re the mean fluid temperatures for compen-sation during signal processing of tbc d/p signals, tlESTIt;GHOUSE will provide new stand alone cabinet to simplify instellation of the process el ctronics. .
~
Section 3 - Desion Basis
!n order to obtain accurate cressure drop readings and therefore, reactor vessel level indications, care must be taken in the design.
routing and instrumenting of the pressure drop measuring system. The design requirements for the . reactor vessel level instrumentation sys-tem are described as follows:
A. The total accuracy of the d/p measuring sys'. 3m for determining reactor. vessel level should be with 6 percent with the reactor coolant pumps not operating.
B. Capillary sensing lines should be e signed to minimize vertical elevation changes and to minini:e the nu-+er of sectior exposed to the various temperature conditions d',;ch may occur during accilent conditions. These temperature variations must be accounted for in the ' interpret.nfon of the d/p readings. The l capillary lines shoult be instrumented w'th the appropria'n num-ber of thermocouples for temperatore ccmp 2nsation.
C. The d/p cells should be located outside the containment so that operation during postaccident condition 'is assured and the errors associated with the use of 1.strumentation for Po:, tac:i- !
dent P mitoring (PN!) do "et apply to the d/ cell s. The
. . . . . _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . _ . - _ . . - ~ _ _ _ . . . . . . . _ .
4' d/p cells should be located in accessible ireas es close to the contairanent penetrations as possible.
D. The capillary lines inside the containment shall be sealed to j maintain a constant liquid inventory in the lines, to prevert flashing during depressurizations, and to prevent reactor cool-ant leakage outside containment. Bellows seals shall be pro- l vided on each capillary line at the process connection (upper head and seal table connections) and just inside the containmono boundary at the penetration. l l
E. Provision should be made for impulse line charging and venting from the d/p cells to the first bellows and calibration of the d/p cells outside the containment. Adequate valving should be provided to permit replacement of failed d/p cells.
F. The maximum break area for the 4/p lines should be less than or equal to that which can be made up by the high head charging
pumps.
G. The d/p line manifold must be designed for the f,cismic considera-tions of the plant and vessel and should not fail if a loss-of-coolant accident occurs. The lines should t. properly constrained to prevent pipe whip.
i NPC WE STINCH0'JSE 1
APPErWIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-110 1
4
- e ** ***-=e **eW==- * * * * * * * * " * * * *
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4 l
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'n j i.i 4 - Scoy and !'ivision of Pesponsibilitiers l
A. P.tr.1 - Scve of Surinly Thie subsec ion defines the scope of bot!- '" ':TlftG110' SE J a ri.!
1.
the CWNER. A more detailed listing is provided in Part 2.
- 2. WESTINGHOUSE wt11 provide the following in the scope of supply.
- a. liardware As defined in the listing of Hardwire in Part ? -
Detailed Responsibilittee.
- b. Software i
System design engineering, in:;f oding the following: !
- 1) 5""am description, including reference op rating I
pr. :dures
- 2) Engineering flew dicgram i
- 3) Equipnent :pecifications
- 4) "lectrical/ process interconn n wiring diac-am:
S) Balance-of-plant interf ac: 'it criteria NPC WE $ T I NGHf""'"
-PPEND1:t 10 G2t: 4-S PRINTED cL'/1;:/80 10-111
< l
. 1
. j I
1 l
- W
- 3TINGHOUSE will provide structural design and analy-sis of all Class 1 and 2 components and piping. This design and analysis effort consists of tha following for those portions defined in the WESTINGHOUSE Scope:
- 1) Design specifications for Cla*,s 1 and 2 piping
- 2) Determination of support locations, types, and direction of action for all supports for Class 1 and 2 piping
- 3) Preliminary and interactive analyses to locate the supports in the plant so that all applicable' ASME Code and Design Specification requirements are met for the Class 1 and 2 portion
- 4) Final analysis to meet the applicable ASME Code and Design Specification requirements, and prepa-(. ration and submittal of the certified stress report for the Class 1 and 2 portion of the line
- 5) Design of all required seismic and daadweight sup-ports, including preparation of the dmign drawings
- 6) Isometric piping drawings for analytical purposes for a Class 1 and 2 equipment 1
l NI'C WESTINGHOUSE l AP P E N9 '. 10 l 02N a-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-112 4
=-....j..-e...-.,.,- _..,#....y
1 1
1
. 1
- 7) ',!ESTlf1GHOUSE will also be re:,ponsible f or t he reconciliat hn of the stress report to the I ds-built status
- 8) WESTINGii003E will .iew the piping stren report as required by the ASME Cec!c, Section Ill
- 9) Jet impingement en the Class 1 or 2 portions of the system will be considered if required for spe-cific plant analysis
- 10) The effects of jets front postulated breats in the Class 1 or 2 portions of the systtm on L'EST1l!G-Il0VSE equipaent will be evaluM nd Required revisions te plant Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that the present envelope of accident analyses will remain valid; therefore, the reanalysis of accidents is not included in the scope of this proposal.
WE5TINGHOUSE will also supply the following he Scre and softe re:
- 1) Hardware o Insul ition, iring. .ind entainment pipe penetrations l
IlpC WE ST ' fiCHO'J SE APP C T I /. 10 l O?N t,-52 l PRITI:0 08/12/09 10-113 ,
t e Interconnecting piping ar"f associated flanges, supports, and embedment.s 6 Sdie',y gTdde Control and power CirChll5 COh-trol board switches er swt tch modules, annon-Ciator window and circuit, associated wiring, cabling and electrical contairimerit penetrations
- 2) Software - Revised control board layout, control board wiring diat 'ms, and revised annunciotor drawings '
O. Part 2 - Detailed Responsibilities Table 4-1 contains a listing of the WESTin - .Esoftw$rs,and hardware t'esponsibilities.
i l WATER IEVEL INSTRUMEtlTATI0fl SYSTEM FOR THE REACTOR VCJJL HEAD PLENUM l
Section 1 - Introduction WESTINGil0USE has developed the Level Instrumentation System for the Peactor Vessel Plenum liedd to provide a relatively simple and straight forward means to monitor the water level in the reactor ves-sel head. This water level instrumentation systu is suitdle for installation into operating plants as well as plants under constroc-tion, and neither replaces any existing system'n couples with any safety .ystem. This system does, however, act Li provide additionci infonnation to the nperator during accident condi:.: ens. "+
Nt*C WE;TINGHUUSC APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTLD 08/12/GO 10-114
TABLE 4-1 I
REACTOR VESSEL IllSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM I DIVISION OF RESP 0tlSIBILITIES Supply-Software Quantity Responsibility l
Vessel shroud piping for level system Define criteria W Detailed design W Refueling disconnect of level system piping for connection to vessel head l
Define criteria W l
Detailed design W .I Seal table incore detector conduit conn::ction adaptors Define criteria W Detailed design W Piping installation design Define criteria i W Detailed design , , W ,
Piping stress and structural analysu for W Class 1 and 2 components as defir:ed in Section VI Part 1 Schematic drawings for installation of level W instrumentation system for piping in WEST-IflGHOUSE Scope Schematic drawings for installatior of level W instrumentation system for piping in OWNER's Scope UPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02H-4-52 M:INTED 08/12/ 0 10-115
. . - . . - . . .. - , . . . . - - .. - -- - . . . . - ._ =. . . - -
1
+ l i
TABLE 4-1 (Cont.)
REACTOR VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM DIVIS'ON OF RESPONSIBILITIES Supply Sof twa re Quantity Responsibility Instrument calibration, venting, and operating W instructions As-built survey of impulse line piping Define criteria W ,
Detailed effort W Instructions for process electronics, scaling, W calibration, and operation Revision of engineering flow diagrams 'W-t Revision of appropriate block diagrams u Installation of incore detector conduit W adaptor and head adaptor Hardware 3/4 x TSS root valves 2 W :
Set of instrument valves 2 sets W Modified head adapter plug 1 W
ilydraulic isolators 4 W
[
Special hi nt volume sensors 4 W 3-Bay cabinet assembly '1 W Pcwer supplies 4 W T/C converters 10 W ,
Signal converters (1/E) 6 W NVC WESTlWLitCUSE
"rENDIX 10 0 :fN G2 PRINIL!' 03/12/80 l'0-116
-l I
TABLE 4-1 (Con'..)
1 1
REAC10R VESSEL INSTRUMDiTATION SYSTEM DIVISION OF R!:SPONSIP,ILITIES l
Lopply )
lia rdwa re giant._i t v lhispons ib il i t v l
Signal isolators (E/E) 22 W
)
Summators .
4 W I bltidividers 2 W Filters 4 W Signal characterizers 12 W Auctioneers 4 'd Ter." cards 70 W Corviuter i npu'. nads 2 W Seismically cualified AI transmitters 4 W i
Control board indicators (PAMS qualified) 4 W Hydraulic isolation alarm 2 W Capillery tubing ' :-r.aths W Wu f tj 4
F b
l 1
NPC
' r::;rp urc fM LitiH.1 10 .,
0 2N--;- 5.' l PR1ri!ED 03/12/80 10-117
1 k'ESTINGil00SE reactor vess'el level instrumentation system utili:es differential pressure (d/p) measuring devices to indicate the level of the coolant in the reactor vessel head.
level instrumentation system of the reactor vessel head will serve to do the following: ,
- 1. Assist in the detection of the presence of a gas bubble or "cid in the reactor vessel head
- 2. Indicate the desirability to conduct venting of the reactor vessel head 1
- 3. Indicate the formation of a void in the reactor cooldrit sys-tem during a' transient This system will provide the instrumentation necessary for proper operation of a system designed to vent the reactor vessel head.
WESTIflGHOUSE will supply the system design, d/p cells and associated hardware.
Section 2 - System Description A. Introduction Under certain plant accident conditions, th- "otential exists l
for the formation of voids in the reactor coolant system. Under '
1 these conditions, it would be adyantageous for the reac+or opera- l tar to monitor directly the true water le-1 in the rer.;or flPC WEST'L'iHOUSE APP.iulX 10 02.1-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-118
vessel head in order to assist him in a decision to operate the !
head vent system. Therefore, as the pressurizer level indico- '
tion may not reliably and directly provide information on the need to operate the head vent system for all br" A sizes and locations, the level instrumentation system for the reactor ves-sel head was designed to provide direct readings of vessel level 1 which can be used by the operator. This level instrumentation system for the reactor vessel head does not replace existing sys-tems and is not coupled to safety systems, but acts only to pro-vide information to the operator concerning the successful operation of the head vent system The level instrumentation system for the- reactor vessel head con-sists of two separate d/p measurements across the region of the reactor vessel es shown on Figure 2-1 frca the top of the vessel to the het leg. Each measurement requires separate pip'in'g con-nections to the side'of the hot leg piping, and a single connec-tion to a spare central
- vessel head permtratirn. The design of the system provides suitable barriers to marantne proper isola-tion at the containment boundary rhen nevhd. This system sat-isfhs the separation critoria for instru.~1:tien as defined by IEEE-223-74. - '
B. System Stmnay The level instrinnentation system for the react.or vessel head ut es two sc rate d/p cells. These cells redundantly mea-sr the pressure drop frem the side of the rr': tor coolant het leg piping to the top of the reactor vessel head. Each pressure drop measurement provides the information described following. 1 HPC WCSTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 30 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-119 i
- O ~ * " ~ ~ ~ " '
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/ .
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i Figure 2-1 Reactor Vessel Water Level Measurem nt System 10'-120'.: -
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The indicator LPa in Figure 2-1 provides an ,dication of reac-tor vessel water level above the middle of the hot leg pine when i the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) in the loor with the hot leg con- i nection is not operating. The number of reac or coolant pumps operating in the other loops has an effect of less than 10 per-cent on this indication. When the RCPs are onerating in tho' ,
loop with the hot leg connection, the instrinnent reading will be off scale. ,
t To provide the required accoracy for water level measurement, '
temperature measurements of the reference legs are provided. i t
These measurements together with the existing reactor coolarg 4 temperature and pressure measurements are used to compensate the f
differential pressure transducer outputs for differences in ref- I erence leg temperature, particularly during the environment !
inside the containmen* structure following an accident and reac- l tor coolant density variation. l l
The level instrumentation systen for the reactor vessel h"ad l utilizes d/p cell instrumentation in tro of the hot Ing pipes. I The d/p cells for any of these rassibilitics are to be loca*.ud !
outside of the containment to eliminate the large reduction in l measurement accuracy associated with the change in containment l
environment (pressure, temperature, and radiation) during an j accident. The cells are also located out.~ Je of containment so l that calibration, cell replacement, referenc leg checks and l filling, and system operation is made e nier. !
i i
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i i
)
HPC WESTliKNOUSE APPEt0 . 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 104 21 1
.ww,. ..
5 C. System Layout ,
Schematics of the system layout for the levd instrumentation ;
system for the reactor vessel head arc shown in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. There are three reactor coolant system penetrations for ,
the cell reference lines: the one connection to a spare reactor i vessel head penetration and connections to the side of two reac-tor coolant syst-m hot leg pipes. The design requirements which have been followed to ensure that the readings of the d/p mea- l surement system are accurate are described in Section 3.
The pressure sensing lines from the top of the reactor vessel ,
attach to a pressure tap installed in a head adaptue plug. A minimum length of impulse lines is used to alleviate potential ,
errors due to dirt or gas entrapment. ,
A diaphragm is provided as shown in Figure 2-3 which will' serve as a hydraulic coupling to permit pressure indications to be transmitted from the pressure tap to a scaled sensing line, .
which is full of water and completely scaled so that no venting, ;
filling, or flushing is needed. The refuelino dis 'nnect would be made as described in Figure 2-4, which would be located as close to the reactor vessel head as possible. These sensing 1mes would then be connected to the d/p measurement cells located external to the containment. Appropriate diaphragms and couplings are provided to guarantee containment isolation in j l
case of a break in any of the sensing lines, and to prevent the flow of primary coolant system water ou: the containment structur.e.
i NPC WESTINGHOUSE
!- APPENDIX 10 l 02N-4-52 '
l PRINTED 08/12/80 10-122
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Figure 2-4 Proposed Connection to Top of Reactor Vessel i For Ccolant Level Decerminatic,10-125 1
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The delta pressure sensing lines which measure the pressure of the reactor coolant hot leg piping will be connected to pressure taps in appropriate locations ;n the hot leg piping as shown in Figr o 2-5. Se sing lines, diaphragmn, and thennoccupies are provided in a manner similar to those for the measurement of reactor vgssel head pressure, i
4
- 0. Plant Operator Interface Instrumentatio'n for the operation for the level instrumentation system for the reactor vessel head is intended to be unambiguous and reliable so that the potential for operator error or misin-terpretation is minimized and successful operation of the head vent is assured. The system would include the two control board indicators to provide an indication of upper region water level on each of the two instrumented loops, displaying water level in feet from 0 to 16 ft after compensation for any reactor c'colant and capillary line tenperature and density effects.
E. Installation The process connections utilize sealed capillary systens within containment to safeguard the system against tiuid losses which )
could occur as the result of localized line breaks and/or cer-tain postulated rapid depressurization occurrences.
l The diaphragms affer: ting connections to the reactor vessel head l penetration and the hot leg pipin" are of special design for l this application. These sensor t tows .
" 'n the follouing features:
HPC WESTINGHOUSE APPLiiDIX 10 02N-4-52 "RINTED 08/1?/80 10-126
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- 1. Retention of capillery fluid even in the event c post acci-dent superheat conditions enroute '.hrough the containment
- 2. Large volumetric displacements to accennodote thennal expan.
sion in postulated postaccident environment 3.- Special seal construction consistent with normal service lifetimes and postulated accident radiation environments Capillaries are a standard one quarter 1'n. heavy wall type con-sistent with the minimal fluid volume requirements of the sys-tem. It is intended that capillary coils approximating plant-length requirements be shop assembled, welded, and tested to' assure integrity and uniformity in quality.
The capillaries are routed to hydraulle isolation devices.
These are constructed similar to d/p type switches except with
, minimal fluid volume consistent with the thermal expansion con-siderations discussed above. Displacement volumes are large in terms of hydraulic connunication frcm the n-ocess connection to the nelsuring transmitters located outsiv u tFe containment.
The isolators require e differential prc- e of only inches of 1
water for full displacement and will ac:. switches for the ;
unbalanced conditions which would occur unacceptable hydrau-lic coupling exists between the reacto" colant system procen ;
connections and the d/p transmitter instruments external to le l containment. The isolator similar to the diaphragm above will seal off full process pressure in either' direction and will act.u-ate switches to indicate the occu rence.
NPC WESTIfGHOUSE
/,PPEN0lX 10 OLN-A-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-128
~
S-F impulse line connections from the ebove hydrculic isoldturs to the d/p transmitters are also capillary type tubing. They di f-fer only to the extent that valving must be employed at the instruments to facilitate calibration checks of transmitters without requiring access to the containment. Capillary tubing also is necessary to minimize fluid volumetric expansions. Simi-larly, the transmitters must be located relat bely close to con-tainment to minimize ambient temperature effects on the fluid volumes between the isolators and the transmitters.
The maintenance of degassed solid fluid fills betwcon the trans-mitters and hydraulic isolation devices through transmitter cali-bration and service operations requires special provisions in terms of the initial filling, scaling, and the maintenance of the seal during valving and calibration operations. (Gas should not be used in calibre Ing.) ' -
Transmitter elevations above incontainment ".olators are recom-mended. Alternately, loop seals are required in capillaries being routed through valves, d/p transmitters, and calibration ports.
In some cases, a variable volume displacement diaphragm may be required to effect the letdown and return of the fluid through the d/p transmitter to the line pressure through the isolators.
Additional bellows at the instrument racks may be desirable in some installations to assure continuity c' hydraulic coupling following maintenance operations.
l NPC '
WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-129 L
. . . . . . c. __. . . ~ . . . ;.:. _ . . . . . . . . .
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i In operation, variations in fill fluid volumes are displaced from the transmitter to' the reactor coolant system by displace-ment of the isolator and sensor bellows system, respectively.
Status lights at the instrument rack indicate the status of this coupling during service operations. An alarm is conveyed from the instrument rack when the coupling is inadequate, due to a lack of fluid volumes available for thermal expansion and/cr due to process connection failures.
Capillaries should be routed in metal conduit or closed metal trays to effect physical separation and to afford a degree of thermal insulation against postulated LOCA transients.
s Thermocouples should be located 'in the midplaner, of these enclo-sures in an ascending or descanding route of each incontainment ,,
capillary to measure the mean fluid temperatures for compitsa- .
- s. tion during signal processing of the d/p signals.
WESTING!t0VSE will supply new stand-alone cabinets to simplify installation of the process electronics.
Section 3 - Desinn Basis In order to obtain a~ccurate pressure drop readings and the: afore.
reactor vessel level indicstions, cire must be tn'1n in the design, routing, and instrumenting of the pressure drop measuring system. ,
The design requirements for the level instrumentation system for the reactor vessel heed are described as follows:' ,
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UPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-130
A. ' The tctal accuracy of t' e d/p measuring system for determining 3 reactor vessel level should be with;n 6 percent with the reactor !
coolant pumps not operating, i
G. Copillary sensing lines should be designed to minimize vertical i clevation changes and to minimize the number of sections exposed to the various temperature conditions which may occur d. ring 1 accident conditions. These temperature variations must be accounted for in the interpretation of the d/p readings. The capillary lines should be inst'rumented with the appropriate num- l ber ~of thermocouples for temperature compensation.
i C. The d/p cells should be located outside the containment se that operation during postaccident condition is assured and the errors associated with the use of instrumentation for Post-accident Monitoring (PAM) do not apply to the d/p cells. The d/p cells should be located in accessible areas as close to the containment penetrations as possible.
D. The capillary lines inside the containment shall be seale.1 to maintain a constant liquid inventory in th9 lines, to prevent flashing during dapressurizations, and to prevent reactor coc1-ant leakage outside of the containment.
Bellow seals shall be provided en cach capilla line at the process connection (upper head, hot leg, end v 1 table ce1nec-tions) and just inside the containment boundary at the pere-tration.
1 1
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NPC WESTINGHOUSE
,VPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-131
~.
- 2. Software
- a. System Design Engineering, including the following:
- 1) "ystem description, including reference operating ,
procedures
- 2) Engineering flow diagram l
- 3) Equipnent specifications !
- 4) Electrical / process interconnect wiring diagrags s
- 5) Balance-of-plant interface / layout criteria
- b. WESTINGHOUSE will provide structural design 'and analy-sis of all Class 1 and 2 components and piping. This design and analysis effort consists of the following:
- 1) Design specifications for Class 1 and 2 piping
- 2) Determination of support locations, types, and direction of action for all supports for Class 1 and 2 piping
- 3) Preliminary and interactive analyses to locate the supports in the plant c' that all applicable ASME Code and Design Spec'ification requirenents are met for the Class 1 a"d 2 portion ;
I NPC WESTINGHOUSE ;
APPENDIX 10 02N 4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-133 w ---- - _ --- --
4 4
- c. Required revisions to plant Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that the present envelope of acr.ident analyscs will remain valid; therefore, the reanalysis of ac-idents is not included in the scope of this amendmnt.
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NPC
- WESTINGit00SE APPENDIX 10 ,
02N-4-52 PRINTED 03/12/90 10-135 l I
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- 3. Port 2 - Detailed-Resconsibi'ities l TABLE 4-1 l
REACT 0o VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES I
l Supply Software Quantity Responsibility Vessel shroud piping for level system Define criteria W Detailed design W ,
Refueling discount of level system piping.
for connection to vessel head -
Define criteria W~
Detailed design W Piping installation design Define criteria W Detailed design s Piping stress and structural analysis for Class.1 and 2 compenents as defir d in Section IV, Part 1 W Schemetic drawir.gs for installation of '
level instrenentation system for piping i i n Westinghouse scope W NPC l WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-136
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- l 1ABLE 4-1 (cont'd)
REACTOR VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEtt DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES Supply
_ Software Quantity Responsibility' Schematic drawings for installation of level instrumentation system for piping in Owner's scope W Instrument calibration, venting, ami oper-ating instructions W As-built survey of impulse line piping Define criteria W Detailed effort W Instructions for process electronics, scaling, calibration, and operation W kevision of engineering flow ciagrcm W Revis. ion of appropriate block diagrams W NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRIlilED 08/12/80 10-137
4 l
l TABLE 4-1 (cont'd)
REACTOR VESSEL ItbTRUMEllTATION SYSTEM DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES Snooly Hardware Ouantity Responsibility Modified head adapter plug 1 W W
3/4 x T58 roet valves 3 Set of instrument valves 2 sets W RCS hot leg bosses 2 W Hydraulic isolators 4 W i Special high volume sensors 4 W Capillary tubing 4 lengths W (total of 1600 f t) - -
3-Bay cabinet assembly 1 W Power supplies 2 W 8 W T/C converters Signalconverters(I/E) 6 W Signal isolators (E/E) 14 W Summators 4 W Muhidividers 2 W Filters 2 W Signal characterizers 12 W Auctioneers 4 W Test cards it W Computer inout pads 2 W Seismically qualified P trans-2 !!
mitters (0 to 16 ft) i e
L NPC
?:ESTINGHCUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-133 ,
TABLE 4-1 (cont'd)
REACTOR VESSEL ItlSTRUMENTATI0ff SYSTEli DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES Supph
}la rdware Quantity, Responsibility Sheathed surf ace tt<nperatore T/Cs 0 W Control board indicators (PNtS quali fied) 2 il liydraulic isolation alarm 2 W RCS mnips trip switches 2 l!
RCS pump indicator: "
2 W 1
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l MFC WESTifGii0USE APPEtID!X 10 02:(-4-52 PRI?l'ED D3/12/00 10-139 i
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. . _. _ _ _ . _ ._. - - . _ . .. ._ . e .. . .
4 1
TABLE 4.2 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (COMBINED SYSTEM)
\
Hardware Quantity :
i l
4 .j 3/4 T58 Root Valves 2
Set of Instrument Valves Modification of H.A. Plug 1 6
Hydraulic Isolators Special High Volume Sensors 6 3 Bay Cabinet Assembly 1 1 l
6 Power Supplies 11 Temperature Converters ,
6 Signal Converters (I/E)
Signal Isolators (I/E) 3'6 Summators 12 .
4 Multidividers l 6
Filters 16 I Signal Characterizers .
2 i Auctioneers 26 l Test Cards 4
Computer Input P'ds 14 i Surface RTD's i 6 !
Control Board Indicators (PAMS Qualified) i 8 i Hydraulic Isolation Alarm ,
Capillary Tubing - 6 lengths 2400 feet l Reactor Coolant Pump Indicators 2 l Seismically Qualified AP transmitters 6 !
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i NPC WESTINGHOUSE f APPLiiDIX 10 02N-4-52 .
PRINTED 08/12/80 - 10 140 l e = . eo e anse e
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Vill. MAIN C0flTROL BOARD The Main Control Board (MCD) presently being supplied will be severely impacted by the additional instrumentation controls required for the proposed Cold Shutdown System (Regulatory Guide 1.139), Criti-cal Systems Leak Monitoring (NUREG-0570, Rec. 2.1.3a), Core Subcool-ing Monitoring (NUREG-0578 Rec. 2.1.3b-1), Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring (NUREG-0578 Rec. 2.1.3b-2), and Post-Accident Monitoring System (Regulatory Guide 1.97).
The modifications / additions to the MCB include:
A. Revision of the MCB layout to integrate new equipment with exist-ing equipment.
B. flodification of the structure to meet post-accident monitoring separation requirements.
C. Relocation of BOP equipment from right side of MCB to provide space for additional system. (B0P equipment to be located on the new vertical panel.)
D. The design and procurament of an additional 10 ft x 3 ft x 8 ft ,
vertical panel.
E. Procurement of test sections and performanm of seismi- test /
analyses for qualification to IEEE 344-1975.
WESTit"UOUSE will send expatriate technical experts to the Plant to supervise the field installation, mounting, and wiring of all NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 rRINTEC 08/12/80 10-142 l
l j
e U.c. The equipnient not on the Board Sections as shipped elerated basi from actual field installation must be done onh WE anTIriG- acc involving the expenditure of overtime by personnel of bot WESTIliGHOUSC will exert every ffort It0VSE and its Subcontractors. k required.
to minimize the amount of field installation wor
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I tlPC w'ESTIrlGHOUSE APPEtio!X 10 02tt-4-52 10-143 PRitiTED 08/12/80
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s IX. NUREG-0578 RECOMMENDATION 2.1.6 - POST ACCIDLNT CONTP L Of T10!! IN SYSTEMS OUTSIDE CONTA!fiMENT OF PWR'S A. Integrity of Systems Outside Contaiament likely to Cont.af n Radioactive Materials (Engineered Safety Systems and Auxfliarv Systens). . ;
To assure cor pliance with 10CFR20 and 10CFR100 in the post-accident env ronment, this task involves a study to eliminate and/or reduce leakago rates in engineered safety features sys-tems and auxiliary systems which may be required to function during a transient or accident with radiation material in fluid being processed. These include the RHR, CNCS, 51, Waste. Process- ,
ing, Valve Steanuleakoff and Containment Spray Systems. 1 This task includes design changes to reduce leakage rates by cap-pinq and backwelding all pipin j and equipment vents and drains, :
isolating all continuous drains from the floor drain systm to i monitored collection points: replacing current vent and drain valves with diaphragm valves and capping and backwelding vents !
and drains; end providing monitoring inste m ntation for peri. !
odic systems Irakage evaluation. ' ^
D. Design Review of Plant Shielding eF Snare for Post-Accident j Operation '
This task involves a <'esign revi > to identify the location of l vitalareasandecuipment(suchascontrblroum,radwitecon- !
trol stations, emergency power supplies, motor control ceters, f
utrument areas) in which personnel occupancy mey be unduW
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l
!!PC f
WESTINCHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 !
PRINTED 08/12/80 '10-144 !
-- g ,.,...n-,-n - - - - - - -- -
limited or safety equipment may be unduly degraded by the radiation fields during post-accident operations.
j This task includes a design review, including shielding calculo- l tions, of systems contcining primary coolant outside containment and identification of areas where access is essential following an accident. The accessibility of these a~eas and the equipment performance will be evaluated and solutions proposed for problem
\ areas. This amendment does not include the supply of any addi-tional shielding that the design review may show as desirable.
i !
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1 i
tIPC WESTitKUf00$E APPD10!X 10 ;
02N-4-52 i PR IfiTED 03/12/80 10-145 J_ _______-___:_~_ _' *_"T_XYr '~T_-
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X.
NUREG-0578 - RECOMMENDATION 2.1.7 - IM" ROVED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR PWR'S A. Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System WESTINGHOUSE complies with all of the reconmeni t tions in this section except that a local panel will 'be added near the main '
feedpump switchgear to simulate main feedpump trip and start of auxiliary feedpumps in order to test for main feedwater pump trip.
B. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication to Steam Generators WESTINGHOUSE complies with all of the recommendations in ....s section except that the present indicators for auxiliary feed- c water flow indication on the control bo.ird have to be ' replaced
, with indicators of a safety grade classification.
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l NPC WESTINGHOUSE i
APPENDIX 10 :
02N-4-52 i PRINTED 08/12/80 10-146 i 4
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XI. NUREG-0578 - RECOMMENOATION 2.1.9 ' ANALYSIS OF DE;tGN AND OFF-NORMAL~
TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT 1
This is an area that needs a larger interface betwnen NRC, the util-ity OWNER / operators, and the reactor plant verdsc; (WCSTINGHOUSE) for the following reasons:
A.
WESTINGHOUSE has on-going efforts aimed at improving emergency operating procedure guidelines for immediate actions and loss of reactor coolant in connection with small break loss of coolant accident analysis. These have'been discussed with the NRC staff.
/
B.
Further definition of the scope of inadequate core cooling is needed from the Staff, such as system failure and operator error assumptions to be made in the analyses. At present, model prepa-s ration is in progress to permit response to identified action.
WESTINGH;USE does plan to perform pre-test calculations of the LOFT tests when we are provided with the necessary input information.
C. The purpose of section c of 2.1.9 is to provide an increase in safety by improving the performance of reactor operators during
. transient and accident conditions. Ti primary concern is that the operator training and emergency operating procedures arr' based on the conservative plant FSA9 Chart 15 analyses. C :-
ter 15 should continue ta be used for design basis analyses since these show the most limiting initial approach to safety limits, both core thermal and system c"c' msurization. What l
NPC WESTINGHOUSE i
APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/30 10-147 -
1 n ,
..r.m.. - - ..._ --- w.-
a um
is n'eeded to meet the intent of this section of NUREG-0578 is to show the long-term consequences using realistic assumptions (bet-ter estimate modeling) incorporating the effects of the following:
- 1. Operator's failure to act when required.
- 2. Operator's inappropriate actions during an accident.
- 3. Additional failures.
- 4. Selected system operations (e.g. re-starting of RCP's etc.)
The results of these analyses can be used to evaluate informa-l tion available to the operator and the adequacy of existlag pro-cedures. Appropriate changas can then be incorporated into the
. e esting procedures, designs, and training programs. Develop-
, r'nt of the models to incorporato such , effects is in itself a long-term effort before detailed analyses can be run. Si gni fi-cant interaction between industry and the 'mC is required to agree on the assumptions, bases, appropricte actions or mis-l actions to be modeled, and best estimate boundary condf tions.
When completed, the analyses results using the better estir3tc modeling tools nn chance the current oper:cor training pro-grams F providing additional insight in',o the course of events the ope; itor will likely encounter during a transient.
Many of the domestic utilities have grouped themselves and WEST-INGMOUSE together in the "WESTINGliOUSE Cm!EPS Group" (WOG).
1 NPC WESTING!T";E APPENDIX 10 92N-4-52 PRiflTED 08/12/8G 10-148
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1 XII. REGULATORY GUIDE 8.8 - OCCUPATIONAL RADIATP'l EXPOSURE, A.
Regulc ry Guide 8.8 deals with a program to ensure that the radiation exposure of plant personnel will be as low as reason-ably achievable (ALARA). ffuch of the Guide deals with a pr ' gram set up by the operator to administratively control exposure' to. , ,
the extent feasible.
The Guide also addresses the design considerations which go into achieving ALARA.
In a design of this vintage, there are improve-ments which can be made in this area.
B.
WESTINGHOUSE will perform a detailed study of the radiatien expo-sure implications of the layout with a view tnward: reccamer Jing cost-effective augmentations wherevcr practical, including:
- 1. Access Control '
- 2. Shielding and Geomet'y 3.
Location of Instruments and Con:rols 4.
Control o' Airborne r Jicactive liateriais
,5 .
lif tigation of Crud Buildup
- 6. Leakage Isolation 2'
i HPC i '
i WESTItlGil0USE APPENDIX 10 i 02H-4-52 !
PRINTED 08/12/80 10-150 l
5 t
l 4
XIII. REG!)LATORY GtJ10E 1.108 - PERIODIC TESTING OF DIESEL GENERATOP liflI1:,
USED AS ON-SITE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEtiS AT NUCLEAR POWEP PL (REVISION 1)
This' Revision 1 will recessitate the fullowing changes. It will': ,
e A. Provide.that the diesel generator start and test circuit will b.e modified to be testable during operation. The design shall have provisions such that testing of the unit will simulate automati: ;
start load sequencing and load shedding features.
B. Provide an emergency override of the test mode.
C. Provide status of diesel generator unit in the Control Room. ,
D. Provide sequence of operation of generator pr.:tective trips to facilitate trouble diagnosis.
NPC l J
WESTINbHOUSE I
APPENDIX 10 J
0::N 4-52 10-152 PRINTED 08/12/80 l
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XIV. RECULATORY GUllE 1.118 - PERIODIC TESTING 0F ELE PROTECTION SYSiCMS (REVISION 2)
A. For the NSSS, PHPP-1 is in compliance as described below:
WESTINGHOUSE will make clear thn distinctionThebetween "reco mendations" and " requirements" when addressing criteria. /
position is as follows:
WESTINGHOUSE defines " Protective Action Systems" to mean the electric instrumentation and controls portions of those protec-tion systems and equipment actuated and controlled by the protec-tion system. <
Equipment performing control fun < tions, but actuated from pro-tection systems sensors is not part of the safety system and will not be tested for time response.
s Status, annunciating, display and monitoring functions, 7xcept those related to the Post Acc.ident Monitoring Systems (PAHS) ar Reason-considered by WESTINGHOUSE to be control functions.
ability checks, i.e., ccmparison between or among similar such I '
display functions, will be made.
Response time testing for control functionslorcover, ope-1ted frca pro-Nuclear tection system sensors will not be perforned.
Instrumentation System detectors will not !:e tested for ti ' l response.
Also, Fuclear Instrumentation's asors are exempt from is not a l testing since "their worst case resp;nse timo 1 1
t i
t NPC l WESTINGHOUSE
[
APPENDIX 10 !
02N 4-52 10-153 i PRINTED 08/12/80
.., .._.c._--.-' - . - . - _
i
I J respanse (i.e.,
significant fraction cf the. total overall syrh -
lass than 5 percent)." This exemption is perinitted by IEEE-338.
I The standard WESTINGl10VSE protection system desion does not process include provisions which pennit in site testing .
sensors.
i B. For Dalance-of-;1 ant equipment, compliance with this Revision l involves the addition of a loss-of-power under vol tage test sys-tem which can be used to test the operability of the cmergency The upgrade power ilitiation signal without tripping equipment.
l involves the addition of relays, pushbutton contracts, test devices and supporting cabling, along with the revi:; ion of appro-priate elementary, functional, cable tray, conduit, and connoc-tien drawings.
i f
i NPC WESTINGil0VSE APPENDIX 10 02H 4-52 1)-154 PRINTED 08/12/80
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4 XV. Vol.CANIC ASHFALL PROTECTION A. WESTII:GHOUSE will provide those measures which can be taken to protect PNPP-1 from the effects of volcanic ashfall originating from a distant volcano, without delaying th" currently fore-WESTINGHOUSE's approach is based casted Plan completed date.
upon the criteria provided by NPC in NPC/WIM-0496, and upon the following assumptions:
- 1. The Plant will be shut down as the ashfall is observed to begin.
Et.ergency 1 diesel
- 2. .0ff-site power will be used as available.
generators will be used when off-site power becomes unavaiiable.
- 3. Necessary personnel will not be evacuated and will be available when needed.
- 4. Fuel oil for diesels vdll be replenished and deliverable when necessary.
- 5. Ash is consider 9d to fall in a uniform layer on all areas ,
and no drifting will occur.
- 6. The concentration of ash in the air is assumed to be 0.33 g per cubic ft. >
the ^1 ant to be put
- 7. There is no definite specified time fr back in operation.
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NVC j
WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 19 ,
02N-4-52 10-155 1 PRINTED 08/12/80 !
I
- - = *
- . . _ ,7 ppm .
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- 8. Weight of dry ash is assumed to be 50 lb/ cubic f t.
- 9. Weight of wet ash is assumed to be 95 lb/vuote i s.
i). There will be no toxicity present in the atmvas.ere.
- 11. Ash fall occurring through a period of sixty (60) hours results in a total accunulation of ash o.ounting (o 25 cm.
Tne auxiinum hourly ash accumulation rate will be 2 cm per hour. One hundred percent of the ash will be snaller than 1 cm ir4 aneter. Twenty percent of the ash will pass a nunber 200 sieve. The larger particles will contain a high percentage of air voids ai.. would tend to float on water for sone time.
1 WESTINGHOUSE will provide cc.naercially' available aic wauier units and associated water-l..ndling equipment rather than ASME Code qualified equipment. The equipment will be sei;mically supported and powered from the emergency power supply where nec-essary. Thr 11esel generatcra are presently cooled w!rh air by radiators. la prevent clogging with ash, these will be changed to water cooled heat exchangers. As these would be used at ti..as other than during ashfall, they will be supplied as ASME Code heat exchangers.
Roof loads for category I structures utili..J the t u lowing loading combinations:
HPC
! WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-156 u
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-0+D ash * ponding
- 9sse (D + Dash) l For the turbine building: l l
l U-D+ Dash + Dponding
- 9ubc (D + Dash) where:
1 0 -.
roof load N l
0 = dead load 3
D ash
=
95 lb/ft D = dead load due t, trapped water ponu l
g sse
= seismic acceleration due to a safe s...aown l earthquake gubc
=
seismic acceleration due to a seis..ic zone 3 Uniform Building Code requi, ...ent.
No provision will be made for drifting. As . .e roof load may exist for longer than 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> of the ashfall before it is removed, it is considered prudent to use ti.: coiaulned load as .;
sh own. However, it should be noted that nantOly two extreme natural events are not usually considered to occu.-
sinoltaneously.
Presently there ou not exist any codes, standards, or r. sal atc. ,
requirement wnich are applicable to this event. Thus the WES'l-INGHOUSE obligdtlen is limited to furnishing the equipment l
l l
NPC WESTINGHOUSE '
APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 4 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-157 1
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I described in the following pages whi:h have been selected with regarc to tha aforen,entioned criteria.
WESTINGH0bSE's obligations do not include any pre ;sions for
- testing these systens for performance with actual or simulated ash. Only nonnal fic and opere. On will be demonstrated.
Licensing support is considered to be similar to any other part of the plant as far as FSAR writ _ps and discussion with regu- .
latory bodies are concerned. However, any addi uo,al\ require-ment, material, or services that uay be necessary as a result of licensing requironents are not included in this amendment.
B. Structural Integrity The structural integrity of the varinus plant structures has been investigated against the revi.e. criteris for osh density (50 pcf dry and 95 pcf saturated). Drifting of ash was not considered.
A 25 cm layer of wet ash on the -
r<. : of a buildin, will probably
- clog the roof drains. If the roof has a parapet, additional standing w. .r could accumulate, _p to che height of the scup-pers. Tr;e uesign of the roof was examined for each building, and modifications made to ensure the roof will not collapse from the added load.
'4C WESTINGH003E APPENDIA lo 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/:J/30 10-158 me M. m ger=,
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- 1. Auxiliary, Intermediate, Control, Comconent Cooling, Diese Cenerator and Radwaste Buildings The ash t.as considered to clog all roof drains and scup-pers. The load ccasidered was 10 in. of satw ;ted ash uni-formly distributed along wita ponded water trapped above the layer of ash. Scupper details will be modified to ensure that this loading represents the upper lion t.
N
- 2. Fuel Handling Building scope of Required Chanc , -
Scupper details The same load as in It:m 1 wss considered.
will be modified to limit build-up of ponded vacci . WEST-INGHOUSE compared this load with the existing design load-ing. Tne concrete slab has enough reserve capacity to ,
withstand the additional load.
s The beams supporting the renfs will reqaire strengthening as will some of the suppor: a walls. Scuppers ar.a v uc-a tural steel udll be required.
- 3. ESW Structure Scope of Required Changes for Rcsf Landing The various roof areas on the structure are designed for a minimum of 60 psf Live Load. There are no parapets and tnerefore no potential for ponding 'of wate.
e r
fit w WESTINGHOUSC APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 i PRINTED 08/12/80 10-1;u . .
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, 4. Shield Building Scope of Required Chan 3 i
On this rce, there will be no pec51en .vith build up of loading due to ash f ... Wucer a.,; . aturated ato will build up n the area nf the spring line due to clogging of i
the drains. The height of dam,ej water is limited by th height of the parapet. -
N
- 5. Turbine Building and Auxiliary Boiler 0.qom i
Scope of Required Chanc.3 The ash was considered to cic3 .ne r.of urains. Tne load-iny considered was 10 in. of saturated ash along with ponded water trapped above the ach layer. Additional s ap.
, ers will be required along the caves of the e.. : Jing and of such a design as to limit the load buildup to that assumed in the design. Items such e; ; . lins, scuppers, ,
and steel reinforcing will be required.
The turbi... ouilding, with additional strengthening.of the roof truss and a change in strength of the roof deck -
ing, will be able to ...castand ;ne comoined ic,1 due to the u.afall and a sei..iic event equal to that required by the uniform building code.
t l
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i Nis WESTINGHOUSE APPENDTV 10 02N-4-D2 '
PRINTED 08/12/80 10-160 t
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. 6. Administration Buildinq and Maintenant.- Shop /Wcc .ause Scope of Required Changes The loads due to ash fill and subsequent clogging of ur e.
will result 1., an incr:ased roof load due to saturated ash and ponded water. A redesign 'will be required . inc, case beam ca; ; city. In addition the scupper detail will require modification to limit lcuding. -
N
- 7. Circulating Water Puuphouse Score of Requires Changes .
The load due to clogging of drains will result in an increass. roof loac due to saturated ash and ponded water.
This will requ' ire a redesiu.. of trusses. The scuppl..
detail will require modification to limit the da.ign load.
- 8. Equipment or Material . , be Furnished for this Structural Integrity Se,ction i additional stru;tural steel, approxin.ately 64 metric tons.
C. Coolii.4 Tower Peformance
- 1. A discussion with the v:.ndor, Ceramic Cooling Tower, indi-cated that as long as tne fans were on, nest of the osh would be prevented from falling into ,the tower and clogging the fill. Also, with the water circulating, the aan in the air passing through the intake; would be removed and 1
l NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 0d/12/80 10-161 t' l l
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-deposited in the b. sin. T,e re...aining problem would then be one of alleviating the consequences of ash in the .in Water.
It is assumed that the ash . Lt: .,., <$cing the pH or the basin water. In ac,:ttion, volcanic ash is likely to be abrasive. The design wi'i' inclue the rollowing items:
- a. A cher.ii:.a1 addition systea to r.eutralize the basin water. .
i
- b. Partitions and weirs in the basin to trap flcatis.] and sunken ash.
- c. Strainers in the ESW pt:mp discha. ge to remove sus- ;
pended ash from the wo er. l
- d. Sludge pump to remove sc . is. ach from the o.an.
i
- 2. Equipment or Material o be Furnished for this Coo 11i. j
- I Towee section C
, . a. Chemical addition subsysten ,
One (1) 10,000 gal. tank !
One (1) pump i r
piping and valves !
i i
l 0. Two (2) ASME Class 3 self .ae'ing n strainers 2 eludi. ,
I
( 4-150 psi 24 in. flanges and t'..o (2) 24 in, expan.'ivn ,oints {
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NPC WESTINGHOUSE j APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/c0 10-162 . . - f i
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,,,-.-.-.#.-.--..-- _ _ _ . - _-- ...--+"-.w.... . - . - -- .
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- c. Miscellanecus equipnent ter clean-up including ram skinners, vacuum cleaners
- d. On.1 (1) sludge pump
- e. Necessary piping and v41ves
- f. . . . . . .4 ants including a pH meter, ccntcclier., and necessary switches.
D. Non-Essential Ventilation l l
1 Continuing alth normal ventilation auring the as;. fall will pull u.h into the buildings and deposit it a equipment. In aany
~
I cases, this could lead to equipment ... unction. The best stra-tegy is to keep the ash out of the plant. Accordingly, the design will be mcJi fied so t. . , ,e intakes c; a.1 n-on-essential ventilation c.:n be closed off to seep ti.e ash out of u.e build-ing. About LiOO ft2 of fixed louvers will La changed to oj.erable 1c..ces.
E. Essential V....flation Cert 31n areas require that u.e ventilation ranain in operation.
These include:
- 1. Diesel Generator - cu . 4stion air and u. .ent on i
- 2. Component Cooling Building l
NPC WESTINGHOUSE
! APPENDIX 10 l 02N-4-52 PRINTED G8/12/80 10-163 l .
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_.,J,- __ 7 W S
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- 3. ESW Puiap House
- 4. : pent Fuel Pit Sweep System 6 Battery Rosis The ash in the air for these flow pans w:;l be t. <ed, su that the essential rios of air can a main:ained. -
s The air cleaning systua for each flow path is tk same: -dular air washer units will L rrovided a.s a bypass to the noririal flow .
path. The air passes chrough a wot e spray inside the air washer unit. Ash laden water is str 1ned end reci, . ;ed. A -
continuous b; ,n of au Nater m; .are frca,the L o iners rui.vves the o.... A make. - ater wpply froa the stor ;e tanks replaces the t.'cwdown iuasas, Becau:. . of ti, long distance between the air washu. units and the los NPSn available, each modular unit needs a pump strainer, and ., urge tank combination to circulate . 4ubbing water, and discharge the blowdown.
F. 0;esel Generdor Conibustion Air .take Modular air wash e will be addd as a bypass on the e. : air intake. Train waration will t,a maintained. :
s
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i NPC WESTInu.iOUSE APPENDIX 10 02.'i-4-52 !
Pl(INTED 08/12/00 10-164 i
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__-.._a..---,s..u..--.-- ..
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The following equipnent will Le included for this sectio.. F:
- 1. Two (2) 18,200 cfm air washers Ductwork I m x 1.n Safet" Jamper
- 2. Two (2) E00 gpn punps s
- 3. Two (2) 3000 gal. t..;ks 4 Two (2) 500 gpn self cleaning. strainers Necessary piping, fittings e.id solves ,
- 5. Necessu.s S.ectrical twitches, instrocents and circuits.
G. Dit el Building Ventilation, E_ _. ump House Ventilation s
The existii. axhaust fans ill be used as supply fan:. Air washers will be added as a bypass on the inlet ductwork. Train separation ,iill be maintained. .
The following er;uipment will be included for this section G:
- 1. Two (2) 75,000 cfm air washers
- 2. Two (2) 17,000 cf.a air washers
- 3. Ductwork 2 m x 2 m
- 4. Ductv . 1.0 m x 1.0 m I
NPC WESTINGHOUSE APPENDIX 10 02N-4-52 ,
PRINTED 08/12/80 10-165 l 9
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_ _ _ .sweg. W gJuka t N 1*er* N ** h ahecememessa.Wree eme _ - _ _ _ _ __
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- 5. vampers - safety
- 6. Four (4) Nu0 gpm pumps
- 7. Two (2) 150 g,... pumps
- 8. telf cleaning strainers
- 9. Four (4 ) 3000 gal . ..... ;
- 10. Two 2000 g 1. , uks
- 11. Necessary pipi.n,, i aings anu valves e
- 12. Necessary electrical instrui..cnts, switcnes etc.
II. gmponent Cooling Building, Snent Fuel Pit and B.tu ery tRocm
~
Ve.itilation A conrnon bypass inlet wi . air 6;asher will be ... .ed to t.w inlet
. ductwork.
The following c:quipment will be added for this ' sect . J:
- 1. One (1) 30,000 cfm air ash:r
- 2. One (1) 7,500 cna air wasi.
- 3. One (1; 000 cfm u sasher <
l i
NPC l WESTINGHOUSE I APPENDIX 10 02N-4 52 PRINTED uw .2/80 10-16u
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- m. e A 9
4
- 4. One (1) LOO gpn pumps 9
- s. Two (2) !ZO gpm pumps
- 6. Selfeleaning strainers
- 7. Dampers, safety
- 9. Ductwork 1.b .a x 2.0 n.
- 10. Ductwork 1.0 m x 0.75 m
- 11. Necessar., piping, fittings an,. valves I; i n scella.,cous electrical in. ,oents and equipnent. !
I. Water 1pgly for Air Scrubbers
. Air scrubbers are rc qired to a witti ash fall, and these scrubbir., systcac require seir-cleaning strairn s. The r keup ,
water supply system provides t'.a source of water for o. stic blowdown frc.a the strainers. The nakeup system consi- ei two ,
new storage tanks, t,<o new supply pumps, and piping and valvas necessary to provide flow to the air scrubbing systems. The new tanks and punps Tre located in the yard, near the existing con- ;
densate storage ranks. Piping is provided to supply ..;e scros- l ber located in or near the 01c.el Generator Building, t .a l I
Essential Earvice Water Punp House, the Intermediate Building, i
l NPC
.. STDru . ..
APPENDIX :)
02N-4-5:'
PRA..o . ,,, . . , 8 0 .s-167 l l
. .. . . , , . - - *m . $. ~ , . . - , . . .e- --
, _ . - - , . , .. _ ..y*, ..-- -mew m -e**..
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the Component Coolin. Lutiding and the Refueling .iater Storage Tank The equiprac.t i te bu included ft.- .51s Sect. is as . 11ows;
- 1. Two (2) 600 rumps
- 2. Two (2) 325,00 gal. t; s
- 3. Neces, cy pipic.,_ , fittings and valves
- 4. Miscellaneous electrical equipment and instr._Snts
\
J. Water Cooling Diesel Engine Rather than scrubbing the air for cooling the radiator cn the diesel engint, it i .osed to reptace the radiator wi.h water-to-water ' :at excaangers, cooled by ESW.
The aquipment included for thi z S- 'On J is as follous;
- 1. Two (2) hece c. angers ASME Code c a r ev.. steel '...; psig 450 su. area u. h
- 2. Necessasy piping, fittings and valves
- 3. hiacellaneous electrical equieraent .. d instrue.ents.
R
/O- / bE t
the Component Cooling Iiding and the Refueling Water Storu,,
Tank.
The equipment tc be included for this :ection I is as fol. ....,,
e
" e 9
L e j I
a
XVI. RCS OVCRPRFSSURE dTECTION
! This U.S. NRC requirement stems frocn Brancn Technic i eusition 5-2 1
L and requires a system to mit. 7te the prt. 2ility of exct .ng l 10CFh50 Appen :ix G teuperature sure in..its.
L j
since 12/2, there eave been ove, su r ,,urted incidents ' pressure l transients in pressurized woter reactors which have exceed &d tne pres-sure temperature limits of the ru.etor vessel. . These limits were those idan.. iled !: une technical sp :ifications for each racilicy ;
and were based on c requirements of Appendix G to 10CFR Part 50.
The majority of tucae events c:carred while in a -wat : solid .Ji- ;
tion, during startup or shutdown operations, and at relative is ;
reactor vessel te..., cures.
neactor Ve..el pre ~ure transients nave been initiated b; , variety of causes which ca. grouped into the following categories: perse..-
nel error, procedural deficiencies, commonent random failure, and spu-ricus valve actuation. The result _.;t pressure transients are of two basic jpes: a mar, input type fran c';4rging punps, safety injection pumps or safety injection accumulators, cr a . thermal expansion type caused by tha feedback of heat from the second. .ie of th" stedai generators.
In view'of the frequency of i .se tru . ants and the associat... puten-tial fcr reactor vessel damage, the anc concluded etiot mea.arar should be taken to minimize the number of occurrences of pressure transients in the future and to reduce the se'v erit / of such tran-sients should they occur.
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NPC WESTINGl100St
( APPENDIX 10
! 02N-4-52 PRIniTD 08/12/80 10-169 1
i .+ %_ __ em 4 .-i.e '**N = +===i=* ' " *=*-m "-'** ~*
4
- WESTiltGHOUSE ha' designec u system ts provic .ror the suici9ation of potentiel RCS cold overpressuri: tion transients. The design has been established to prevent thu.a Ljpes of overpressurizat men to date in operating plants, as well as to address the tiRC's sign criteria.
The system deve;vped employs a two-pc = cuneept, utilizing harJuare _.
in conjunction wico procedures. Through this approach, pl:nt opera-tions are more tailored to minimize the potential for an overp .:s-surization from m; curring while the hardware pruvices installed capacity to deal with such an event should it develop. This is felt to address the NRC's desires for developing better operator awareness and control of L ie plant in addition to providing protectiv; systems.
The design developed will utilize the new sol maid .., . rated PORV's related to Regulatory Guide 1.l' - Sa fet) Grade Cold Shutdown, with modifications nL__ to existing valve logic. This reviseu 1-gic pro-vides for RCS inventory con. col woenever plant operation approacnes a temperature / pressure condition that could violate Appendix C ' tic.ics.
This inventory control is . functional throughout the entire .pectrum of Appendix G limits and is n.anually Liucxed at nornul plant oper-
, ating conditions.
4 Through this de-.,n, plant inventory control at shutdown conditic...
is provided by the charging / letdown function, the 4R relief valves, and the PUR/'s. This provides several diverse i,athods of L ,ntaining deceptable system assures.
f T) augment these installed inventory control .. cas, procedural revi-sions will ta provided. Through onese revised procedures, pi.
NPC 3 WEST!"^!!0USE n vChbiX 10 02N-4-52
..dNTED 08/12/a0 40-170
. _ , . . . - . . ~ . . _ , , , . . . - . - - . . - . . . . . . -
cperator o.arer._ n will be heightened during those per 1 af plent operation .then Inost . .ceptible to an overp.easurizution incident. ,
/.dditintwily, the period when ic..;t vulneraale to an event will be greatly reduced. This will .a achit,_ through trie development of startup and shuto ,.cocedures which maxirair t.a use of a steam t_b-ble in the pressur.;er, A pressurizer cushion effecti.- .cners the plant resganse to any pressure transient raecitaiii .a u. . ~.,...en t s the performance cf a pressure control s, stem. %
The following are ae d5Li;n bases app 11.4 to the WESTIkGHCUSE RCS Overpressure Protection Systen:
- 1. The de:, . so utilizes safety grace .s.i cc;abilitio. in dddressing the NRC cold overpressurization criterio L c.d includes a safety grade depresscr12.. :an logic.
- 2. The design utilizes reoundant, logic input to the new sole-noid operated pressurizer relief valves for additional RCS inventu.s control augmented by pi ocedures whic; maxism_a steam bubble operation.
- 3. 'i i . desi gn uti l t...; nes sol ur.. .e .pcrated PORV's whi". will be designed to meet current active valve criteria.
In surmury, the procedural changes will provide increased 1..... :.ity to an everpressurization transient ever developing, while t' hari,are modifications will provide installed capabili:, so mi' ...ca such en event it' it should occur and provide the added capalii t ty of c fety
- rade depre.,suri a t system.
HPC WESTINGHOUSE APFCNDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED Go,.z/80 10-171
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. An 'indicatec above, the systenr is -bat;ed on. the utilization Se new PORV's related to . Regulatory Guide 1.139. Consequently, .ne rensed logic will require additions /modifical.lons to WESTIflGit0USE supplied Process Instrumentation and Control i: cks, etc. S h1 p,.u . of such equipnent will not be held, but maairication kits ..ill te provioed with the associated hardware to facilitete the field to 'nisert the .,
additional nordwa> and wiring. 1 s
l 3
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i NPC i WES TINC. . ,USE APPENDIX 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-172
XVil. kLGULATORY GUIDL' ).120 - FIRE PROT" '0 GulDEti;' uR NUCLle..s POWERPLANTS (REVISION 1_1 A. WESTINGHOUS1 ..ill modify the PNP, .ign te oe en pu..i-ble wiu.a .. causing a dela/ in ,a ant completion unedule, i.aprove the fire protectic.. consluecing t. e ouidelines in this revised Regulatory Guide.
s u .. Scope Re .latory J.uide 1.lh,. in addition to outlining n.ar.eruus requiremen;. ror fire protection a nuclear po.m fl2nts, require; a fire hazard analysis to be perfonaeu . carlect tm const. _ction, arrange.vnts, materials, and f. :llities of the plant and ensure the cm _quacy of the plant overa; fire protec-tion program.
Based on our initial evalu...an utilizing expm.>ience on buck-fitting fire pro.;ction on other plants, certain requiremants cannot be implemented from a physical and practical standpoint i t. .'n.<. of the advanced stage of tha project. In vie.4 of ti.is Brunch Technical Position ACPBS 9.5-1. which establisoes the fire protection design requirc..~nt, for plants prior to Ja;y 1,1976 is used for guidance. Presented L. low 1s an out-t line of the design modifications to reasonably comply with (1) the regulatory positions of the guide, (2) the requirerr.ents of AC?BS-9.5-1.1.aere implementation of Reg. '. is impract . -
cal, and (3) the expected results of the ' fire hazard an.;jsis.
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NPC WESTINGHOUSE
,VFENDIX 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/li'/80 10-173 l
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- l. Ada Battery Room C0 2 system anJ lialon S; sten in tF contivl 2
room .
- 2. Provide separation wi t three-hour rated fire wants (includ-ing fire daa. recs, fi,a accrs, and rire barrier penetrations as applicable) for the following:
- a. Chases includits. avse not presei.tly encloste
- b. Cable spreading room u El. 131.87 and cat. .a vaul:;.
- c. Bet. .n sel ected areas containing multiple safety related cable tras s of oppuaite trains.
- d. Between safety related equipas..u of opposite trains
. not presently encloseu ..nere potential fire hazards exist.
Affected nr.., are identifieJ in Table 1, , cou 3.
- 3. Upgrade fire damper; ...a rire doors to three-hou. ;ted vetwaer fir 4 zones ncw existing between major buildings. ,
- 4. Provide three-hour r:ted fire stop,s in all cable trays which penecrate fire barriers e,.d fire stops which wfll - w vent propagation for 30 minute, at 20 ft interv31. . ..;
the trays.
NPC WESTINC"OUSE APPENf;:X 10 02N-4-52 -
.RINTED 08/12/80 10 :74 4
Mg e wmum - w*w= -** * # *4 88 '* 9 4P est- e-O 4* 4 =9 ****(V -e *W= TOsaw _
4 Add three-hour rated ietaraant coating on safety-related cable trays subject to a a hazarJ in th. - fire area as safety relat.ed e p pment af the opposite u in.
- 5. Provide .dditional aute. -ic later 4.ce supp4 ,sion cysten for safety-related caole trays af opposite trains 4.a. sepa-r, . d fran each other by three-nour raced fire :. :rrier . ,
Replace existing manual y strer with autc:: . . hstens.
- o. R evi ew t.he exi s t i ng . .n.t i l l wn sy:. . .ns a . J N . ..: re possible to provic.: acequ . > ventilation to 411 Tire areas.
r
- 7. Seismically support all fire prc4ection piping heeders and s,tand pipes ano n de st 'icm , up tc nd including the fire j valve :, applying a spri.o ler s.n. tem. ;
- 3. ProvlJ. a seismic fire water marce by cross connection to the E .ential Service water Sntua to enare a minimum nter supply of 150 gpm during an earthquake. l 1
- 9. Provide a third fire ps..a to upgrace the existi :apacity {
if derign review sho.vs present capacity to Le i insurric.:nc. ,
j
- 10. A WESTINGHOUSE stas.a ..: v1. : pillagu collection systan will !
be aJJcJ to the Reactor ;colant pumps. I i
- 11. An extesa. d smoke detection mLT. Will be provided, and in t some areas a cabic tray heat dew wion sy;, tem will be used. !
. E t ?
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i HPC WESTINGil00SE i APPENDIX 10 !
l 02N-4-52 10-175 !
l PRINTE0 08/.:/80 E
l- .
l . r i
L
j
, 1 TABLE 1 JRADLv
_ENCLOSURFS TO BE
- W // Ecuiomer,. L Resiaual Heat Ren, oval Pumps AB/El. 82.85 RilAPRH-01 & 02 CIAFCS-01 a 02 Containment Spray I na/El.
s 82.F' AB/El 86.t,s VA251 Allu01 A & 018 Aux. Bldg. Spray Puu.h ..coling J..
R.H.a. Puu.s Cooli ng a ts AB . 86.00 VA252AHU01A & OlB Lor'ety injection Fu...ps AB/Ei. 94.21 SIAPSI-01 & 02 CuPPD 0 ;itive Displacuaent Cha" jing Puac AB/El. 94.'.
r_ntrifugal Charging Punip. AB/El. 94.21 CSAPCH 01 L 02 V ASB2,ulV01B Cont. Batt. Rin. AHO 18/E1. 10C. a RHAHRS 01 & 02
- iJual Heat E). chang. AB/El. 100.
VA531AHU01A d 018 ......R. Ai r Conc. sys. AhU . IB/El. 107.62 VAS41 AHU01 A &
- C.B. Elect. Rm. Coot og Sys. AHU IP '1. 10/.62 VAS42AHUU2B GHRECA 01 & 02 Catalytic Hydrogen L ....D i ne rs ABh f . 107.62 VA441PLM01A & OlB S.F.r. Charcoal Cleanup Exh. Plm. \B/El. 115.55 VA241PLM001 a 002 Aax. Bldg. Charcoal Exh. Pim. AB/El. 115.55 R.B. Annulus he ,. P. es. Filter ei a. AB/El. 115.E; VA181PLM01A 6 018 .
VA172PLM001 & 002 R.B. rurge Exhausi Sys. Pim. AB/Ei. 415.55 VA572PLM001 Controlled Accer.s Area t..arcoal C a. Plm. I D/El . 116. -
VA521PLM01A & 018 M.C.n. Charcooi Cleanup r ilter Pim. IB/El. 119.82 CZ101CHLO1 A & 01 ' Chilled Water Chillers Is/c.. luu.30 .
AF10lPHP Turbine Driven Feeo.,ater Pump IB/El. 100.30 ,
VA581AAHOU M Battery P.com Ventilativa AHU IS/t.l. 100.3L 1
NPC WESTINGH00SE APPENDIX 10 04N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-176
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- f. NEW THREE-HOUR RATED FIR oARRIERS Are:. E qo . ,..aent Location CC/El. ;.21 Reactor Hakeup Pamps AB/El . :,.,.74 Centri fugal L..a ;ing Pump Coo' ling Unit Motor Driven Aux, f. ,1 water Pump IB/E1,f00.3 Battm., Roo.n Ventilation AHU Ib. i. iu0.3 nocor Control Centers AS/El. 100.3 B. CABli. 1.EAS 'O BE SEi%:ATED BY NEW THREE-HOUR FIRE .ARRIERS Building El ec. Area i
Auxiliary Bid;. 98.17 51 e ,. ..~.. Safay Pumps
' Intermediate Bldg. 104.26 wole Area above Battery Roer Control Bldg. 104.87 Cable Sp Jing Rosa aoove
' 104.8, t
1 l
NPC i WESTINGHOUSE l APPENDIX .0 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08,.2/80 10-177 l .
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TALLE 3
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EQUIPMENT TO BE RELOCATED (ouipnient [pcation Electri .1 Panel _i. 100.'.
Electric., Panel CC/El. 100.3 Electrical Panel IB/El. l'01,62 Electrical Po.. . CP/El ~' . 6 2
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I NPC WESTINC' _
APPE401 A 10 02N-4-52 PRINTED 08/12/80 10-li'8 s
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