ML20151A415

Proposed Tech Spec Section 3.10 Supporting Cycle 12 Reload. GE Affidavit Encl

ML20151A415
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	03/30/1988
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
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ML19302D386	List: ML20151A408 ML20151A411 ML20151A415 ML20151A418 ML20151A422
References
NUDOCS 8804070006
Download: ML20151A415 (11)

Text

3.10 CORE LIMITS Applicability: Applies to core conditions required to meet the Final ,

Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Performance.

Object've : To assure confomance to the peak clad temperature lim itations during a postulated loss-of-coolant accident as spect fied in 10 CFR 50.46 (January 4,1974) and to assure confomance to the 14.5 KW/ft (for V and VB fuel and 13.4 KW/ft (for P8x8R and GE8x8EB fuel) operating limits for local linear heat generation rate.

Specification: A. Average Planar LHGR During power operation, the average linear heat generation rate (LHGR) of all the rods in any fuel assembly, as a function of average planar exposure, at any axial location shall not exceed:

A.1 Fuel Types V and VB i The product of the maximum average planar LHGR (MAPLHGR) limit shown in Figures 3.10-1 (for 5-loop operation) and 3.10-2 (for 4-loop operation) and the axial MAPLHGR multiplier in Figure 3.10-3.

A. 2 Fuel Types P8x8R and GE8x8EB The maximum average planar LHGR (MAPLHGR) limit shown ,

in Figure 3.10-4 and 3.10-5 for both 5-loop and 4-loop operation.

A.3 If at any time during power operation it is ,

l detemined by nomal surveillance that the limiting '

value for APLHGR is being exceeded, action shall be initiated to restore operation to within the  ;

prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is not returned to  ;

within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, ,

action shall be initiated to bring the reactor to the oNo b cold shutdown condition within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. During this period surveillance and corresponding action shall 88' continue until reacto: operation is within the .

@8 prescribed limits at which time power operation may  !

co o be continued.

,o s 1

88 oc B. Local LHGR o During power operation, the linear heat generation  ;

l L rate (LHGR) of any rod in any fuel assembly, at any ma axial location shall not exceed the maximum allowable ,

LHGR:

3

OYSTER CREEK 3.10-1 Amendment No.

16, 24, 35, 39,

48, 75

6261 f 1

I B.1 Fuel Types V and VB As calculated by the following equation; LHGR 6 LHGRd [ 1 A P max ( L) ]  ;

7 1T.  :

Where : LHGRd = Limiting LHGR (=14.5)

AP = Maximum Power Spiking Penalty $

7 (=0.033 and 0.039 for fuel Types V and VB respectively)

LT = Total Core Length - 144 inches L = Axial position above bottom of core B.2 Fuel Type P8x8R and GE8x8EB LHGR 4 13.4 KW/ft.

B.3 If at any time during operation it is detennined by nonnal surveillance that the limiting value of LHGR is being exceeded, action shall be initiated to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the LHGR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, action shall be initiated to bring the  ;

reactor to the cold shutdown condition within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

During this period, surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits at which time power operation may be continued.

C. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

During steady state power operation, MCPR shall be greater than or equal to the following:

APRM STATUS MCPR Limit

1. If any two (2) LPRM assemblies which 1.50 are input to the APRM system and are separated in distance by less than three (3) times the control rod pitch l contain a combination of three (3) out of l four (4) detectors located in either '

the A and B or C and D levels which are failed or bypassed i.e., APRM ,

channel or LPRM input bypassed or l inoperable. I OYSTER CREEK 3.10-2 Anendment No. : 16, 24, 35, 39 48, 75, 111 6261 f I

APRM STATUS MCPR, Limi t

2. If any LPRM input to the APRM system 1.50 at the B, C, or D level is failed or bypassed or any APRM channel is inoperable (or bypassed).

3. All B, C, and D LPRM inputs to the 1.50 APRM system are operating and no '

APRM channels are inoperable or by passed.

When APRM status changes due to instrument failure (APRM or LPRM input failure), the MCPR requirement for the degraded condition shall be met within a time interval of eight (8) hours, provided that the control rod block is placed in operation during this interval.

For core flows other than rated, the nominal value for MCPR shall be increased by a factor of kr, where kr is as shown in Figure 3.10-6.

If at any time during power operation it is detennined by nomal surveillance that the limiting value for MCPR is being exceeded for reasons other than instrument failure, action shall be initiated to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the steady state MCPR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two [2]

hours, action shall be initiated to bring the reactor to the cold shutdown condition within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. During this period, surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limit at which time power operation may be

• continued.

Bases:

The Specification for average planar LHGR assures that the peak cladding temperature following the postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident will not exceed the 2200'F limit specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (January 4,1974) considering the postulated effects of fuel pellet densification.

The peak cladding temperature following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident is primarily a function of the average heat generation rate of  :

all the rods of a fuel assembly at any axial location and is only dependent secondarily on the rod to rod power distribution within an assembly. Since expected location variations in power distribution within a fuel assembly affect the calculated peak clad temperature by  ;

j less than + 20'F relative to the peak temperature for a typical fuel i design, the limit on the average linear heat generation rate is I sufficient to assure that calculated temperatures are below the limits i' specifieo in 10 CFR 50.46 (January 4,1974).

OYSTER CREEK 3.10-3 Amendment No.: 75 i

6261 f

The maximum average planar LHGR limits of fuel types V and VB are shown in Figure 3.10-1 for five loop operation and in Figure 3.10-2 for four loop operation, and are the result of LOCA analyses perfomed by Exxon Nuclear Company utilizing an evaluation model developed by Exxon Nuclear Company in compliance with Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 (1). Operation is permitted with the four-loop limits of Figure 3.10-2 provided the fifth loop has its discharge valve closed and its bypass and suction valves open. In addition, the maximum average planar LHGR limits shown in Figures 3.10-1 and 3.10-2 for Type V and i VB fuel were analyzed with 100% of the spray cooling coefficients specified in Appendix X to 10 CFR Part 50 for 7 x 7 fuel. These spray heat transfer coefficients were justified in the ENC Spray Cooling Heat Transfer Test Program (2).

The maximum average planar LHGR limits of fuel types P8x8R and GE8x8EB are shown in Figure 3.10-4 and Figure 3.10-5, for both 5-loop and 4-loop operation, and are based on calculations employing the models described in Reference 4. Power operation with LHGR's at or below those shown in Figures 3.10-4 and 3.10-5 assures that the peak cladding temperature following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident will not exceed the 22000F limit.

The effect of axial power profile peak location for fuel types V and VB is evaluated for the worst break size by perfoming a series of fuel heat-up calculations. A set of multipliers is devised to reduce the allowable bottom skewed axial power peaks relative to center or above center peaked profiles.

The major factors which lead to the lower MAPLHGR limits with bottom skewed axial power profiles are the change in canister quench time at the axial peak location and a deterioration in heat transfer during the extended downward flow period during blowdown. The MAPLHGR multiplier in Figure 3.10-3 shall only be applied to MAPLHGR determined by the evaluation model described in reference 1.

The possible effects of fuel pellet densification are:

1) creep collapse of the cladding due to axial gap fomation;

2) increase in the LHGR because of pellet column shortening;

3) power spikes due to axial gap fomation; and

4) changes in stored energy due to increased radial gap size.

Calculations show that clad collapse is conservatively predicted not to occur during the exposure lifetime of the fuel. Therefore, clad collapse is not considered in the analyses.

Since axial thermal expansion of the fuel pellets is greater than axial shrinkage due to densification, the analyses of peck clad temperatures do not consider any change in LHGR due to pellet column shortening. Although the fomation of axial gaps might produce a local power spike at one location on any one rod in a fuel assembly the increase in local density would be on the order of only 25 at the axial midplane. Since small local variations in power distribution have a small effect on peak clad temperature, pgyer spikes were not considered in the analysis of loss-of-coolant accidentst ' J.

0YSTER CREEK 3.10-4 Amendment No. : 75 6261 f

Changes in gap size affect the peak clad temperatures by their effect on pellet clad thermal conductance and fuel pellet stored energy. Treatment of this effect combined with the effects of pellet cracking, relocation and subsequent gap closure are discussed in XN-174. Pellet-clad themal conductance for Type V and VB fuel was calculated using the GAPEX model

( XN-174 ) .

The specification for local LHGR assures that the linear heat generation rate in any rod is less than the limiting linear heat generation rate even if fuel pellet densification is postulated. The power spike penalty for Type V and VB fuel is based on analyses presented in Facility Change Request No.6 and FDSAR Mendment No.76, respectively. The analysis assumes a linearly increasing variation in axial gaps between core bottom and top, and assures with 957, confidence that no more than one fuel rod exceeds the design linear heat generation rate due to power spiking.

The power spike penalty for GE fuel is described in Reference 3.

The loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analyses are performed using an initial core flow that is 705 of the rated value. The rationale for use of this value of flow is based on the possibility of achieving full power (1007, rate power) at a reduced flow condition. The magnitude of the reduced flow is limited by the flow relationship for overpower scram. The low flow condition for the LOCA analysis ensures a conservative analysis because this initial condition is associated with a higher initial quality in the core relative to higher flow-lower quality conditions at full power. The high quality-low flow condition for the steady-state core operation results in rapid voiding of the core during the blowdown period of the LOCA. The rapid degradation of the coolant conditions due to voiding results in a decrease in the time to boiling transition and thus degradation of heat transfer with consequent higher peak cladding temperatures. Thus, analysis of the LOCA using 70% flow and 1021 power provides a conservative basis for evaluation of the peak cladding temperature and the maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) for the reactor.

The APRM response is used to predict when the rod block occurs in the analysis of the rod withdrawal error transient. The transient rod position at the rod block and corresponding MCPR can be determined. The MCPR has been evaluated for different APRM responses which would result from changes in the APRM status as a consequence of bypassed APRM channel and/or failed / bypassed LPRM inputs. The steady state MCPR required to protect the minimum transient CPR of 1.07 for the worst case APRM status condition ( APRM Status 1) is detemined in the rod withdrawal error transient analysis. The steady state MCPR valves for APRM status conditions 1, 2, and 3 will be evaluated each cycle.

The time interval of eight (8) hours to adjust the steady state of MCPR to account for a degradation in the APRM status is justified on the basis of instituting a control rod block which precludes the possibility of experiencing a rod withdrawal error transient since rod withdrawal is physically prevented. This time interval is adequate to allow the operator to I either increase the MCPR to the appropriate value or to upgrade the status of the APRM system while in a condition which prevents the possibility of this transient occurring. l i

l OYSTER CREEK 3.10-5 Amendment No.: 75, 111 l 6261 f ,

1

The steady-state MCPR limit was selected to provide margin to acconnodate transients and uncertainties in monitoring the core operating manufacturing, and in the critical power correlation itselflJ) state,

. This limit was derived by additi;n of the o CPR for the most limiting abnomal operational transient caused by a single operator error or equipment malfunction to the fuel cladding integrity MCPR limit designated in Specification 2.1.

Transients analyzed each fuel cycle will be evaluated with respect to the steady-state MCPR limit specified in this specification.

The purpose of the Kr factor is to define operating limits at other than rated flow conditions. At less than 100% flow the required MCPR is the product of the operating limit MCPR and the Kr factor. Specifically, the Kf factor provides the required themal margin to protect against a flow increase transient.

The Kr factor curves shown in Figure 3.10-6 were developed generically using the flow control line corresponding to rated themal power at rated core flow and are applicable to all BWR/2, BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors. For the manual flow control mode, the Kr factors were calculated such that at the maximum flow state (as limited by the pump scoop tube set point) and the corresponding core power (along the rated flow control line), the limiting bundle's relative power was adjusted until the MCPR was slightly above the Safety Limit. Using l

this relative bundle power, the MCPR's were calculated at different points along the rated flow control line corresponding to different core flows. The ratio of the MCPR calculated at a given point of core flow, divided by the operating limit MCPR determines the value of Kf.

REFERENCES (1) XN-75-55-( A), XN-75-55, Supplement 1-( A), XN-75-55. Supplement 2-(A),

Revision 2, "Exxon Nuclear Company WREM-Based NJP-BWR ECCS Evaluation Model and Application to the Oyster Creek plant," April 1977.

(2) XN-75-36 (NP)-( A), XN-75-36 (NP) Supplement 1-( A), "Spray Cooling Heat Transfer phase Test Results, ENC - 8 x 8 BWR Fuel 60 and 63 Active Rods, Interim Report," October 1975.

(3) NEDE-24195; General Electric Reload Fuel Application for Oyster Creek.

(4) NEDE-1462; "0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION SAFER /COREC00L/GESTR-LOCA LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS," August 1987, i

OYSTER CREEK 3.10-6 Anendment No.: 75 6261 f

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! D GENERAL ELECTRIC CONPANY AFFIDAVIT I, Rudolph Villa, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. I am Manager, Consulting Services, General Electric Company, and have been delegated the function of reviewing the information described in paragraph 2 which is sought to be withheld and have been authorized to apply for its withholding. },

2. The information sought to be withheld is contained in "0yster Creek Nuclear i Generating Station SAFER /CORECOOL/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident i Analysis", NEDC-31462P, August 1987.

3. In designating material as proprietary. General Electric utilizes the de-finition of proprietary information and trade secrets set forth in the (

American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section 757. This definition provides:

"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which  :

gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do  :

not know or use it.... A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so [

that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in  !

acquiring information.... Some factors to be considered in determining I whether given information is one's trade secret ares (1) the extent to '

which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent l to which it is known by employees and others involved in his businesst j (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the i informations (4) the value of the information to him and to his i competitors: (5) the amount of effort or money expanded by him in developing the informations (6) the ease or difficulty with the which (

the information could be properly acquired or duplicated bv others."  ;

4. Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of l proprietary information are

a. Information that disclosed a process, method or apparatus where i prevention of its use by General Electric's competitors without license from General Electric constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies;

b. Information consisting of supporting data and analyses, including test data, relative to a process, method or apparatus, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability; 1

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c. Information which if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality or licensing of a similar products

d. Information which reveals cost or price information, production ,

capacities, budget levels or comercial strategies of General Electric, its customers or suppliers;

e. Information which reveals aspects of past, present or future General Electric customer-funded development plans and programs of potential comercial value to Ger.aral Electric:

f. Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may  !

be desirable to obtain patent protections  !

g. Information which General Electric must treat as proprietary according to agreements with other parties. ,

5. In addition to proprietary treatment given to material meeting the standards enumerated above, General Electric customarily maintains in confidence preliminary and draft material which has not been subject to complete proprietary, technical and editorial review. This practice is based on the '

fact that draft documents often do not appropriately reflect all aspects of a problem, may contain tentative conclusions and may contain errors that can be corrected during normal review and approval procedures. Also, until the ,

final document is complete it may not be possible to make any definitive i determination as to its proprietary nature. General Electric is not generally willing to release such a document in such a preliminary form.

Such documents are, however, on occasion furnished to the NRG staff on a '

confidential basis because it is General Electric's belief that it is in the public interest for the staff to be promptly furnished with significant or potentially significant information. Furnishing the document on a >

confidential basis pending completion of General Electric's internal review permits early acquaintance of the staff with the information while protecting General Electric's potential proprietary position and permitting General Electric to insure the public documents are technically accurate and correct.

6. Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is typically made by the subsection manager of the originating component, who is most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge. Access to such documents within the Company is limited on a "need to know" basis and such documents are clearly identified as t proprietary.

7. The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the Subsection Manager, Project manager, Principal Scientist or other equivalent authority, by the Subsection Manager of the cognizant Marketing function (or delegate) and by the Legal Operation for ,

technical content, competitive ef fect and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation in accordance with the standards enumerated above. Disclosures outside General Electric are generally limited to r regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers and licensees then only with appropriate protection by applicable regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements.

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8. The document mentioned in paragraph 2 above has been evaluated in'accordance with the above criteria and procedures and has been found to contain information which is proprietary and which is customarily held in confidence by General Electric.

l 9. The information to the best of my knowledge and belief has consistently been i

held in confidence by the General Electric Com;any, no public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties have been made pursuant to regulatory provisions of proprietary

agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence.

10. Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the General Electric Company and deprive or reduce the availability of profit making opportunities because 1

it would provide other parties, including competitors, with valuable information regarding analysis inputs and results using the SAFER /GESTR-LOCA methodology, which were obtained at considerable cost to the General Electric Company.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 8

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )

Rudolph Villa, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein a n t. rue and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed at San Jose, California, this 2 Y ay of ,198].

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I i h 4-Rudolph Vilfa

,' General Electric Company j

Subscribed and sworn before me this M day of S p}(nht(198].

L cdfr5SA A r

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, NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF CALD'ORNIA >

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