ML20150F889

Lilco Brief on Substantive Relevance of Remaining Emergency Planning Contentions to Lilco Motion to Operate at 25% Power.* Affidavit of Ej Youngling Encl.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20150F889
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	04/01/1988
From:	Zeugin L HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#288-6015 OL-6, NUDOCS 8804060061
Download: ML20150F889 (33)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION More the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board D

In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGilTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-6

) (25% Power)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

3 Unit 1) )

LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE "SUBSTANTIVE RELEVANCE" p OF REMAINING EMERGENCY PIANNING CONTENTIONS TO LILCO'S MOTION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER Hunton & Williams g 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmon;l, Virginia 23212 g April 1,1988 1

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licenstru Board

O In ti.e Mat cr of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-6

) (25% Pov er)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

O Unit 1) )

LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE "SUBSTANTIVF RELEVANCE" OF REMAINING EMERGENCY Pl.ANNING

'O CONTENTIONS TO LILCO'S MOTION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER 1

'O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street  :

lO P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 April 1,1988 O

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I O LILCO, Apru 1,1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION  ;

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Bef9re the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

O in the Matter of ) ,

) r LONO ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-6

) (25% Power) l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

O LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE "SUBSTANTIVE RELEVANCE" OF REMAINING EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS TO LILCO'S MOTION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER t

On February 26, 1988, this Board instructed the parties to submit briefs on the

impact of pending emergency planning contentions on its abliity to make the "reason-able assurance" finding necessary to grant LILCO's motion to operate at 25% of fu11

power.II Specifically, the parties were asked to address whether the remaining emer- f l

gency planning contentions are "substantively relevant" to 25% operation. February 2G Order; see also January 7 Memorandum and Order at 9. As is explained below, LILCO 7

O believes that none of the remaining emergency planning contentions is substantively relevant to its motion to operate at 25% power, and hence that the motion should be I granted.2/

JO 1/ LILCO submitted its motion to operate Shoreham at 25% power under 10 CFR i 5 50.57(c). That section, in turn, requires the Board to make the six findings specified in 5 50.57(a) before granting the motion. With regard to LILCO's 25% motion, the Board

Q has found that it need only resolve 5 50.57(a)(3) in LILCO's f avor in order to grant the 25% motion. Memorandum and Order (In Re: LILCO's Request for Authorization to Op-erate at 25% of Full Power) at 8-9 (January 7,1988). Section 50.57(a)(3) provides:

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities autho-rized by the operating license can be conducted without en-

O dangering the health and safety of the public, and (11) that l such activities will be conducted in compliance with the ,

regulations in this chapter.  ;

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2/ In its "Request for Authorization to increase Power to 25%" (hereinaf ter "Re-  !

quest for Authorization"), filed initially with the Commission on April 14,1987 and j

'O I (footnote continued) !

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t i

Assessing the substantive relevance of remaining emergency planning conten-O '

tions involves tha concepts of operation of Shoreham at 25% power, the risk of acci-dents at 25% power and the t!me available for offsite response. These technical factors j are discussed in the first section of this brief. They are then used as the basis for con- .

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sidering the substantive relevance of the remaining emergency planning contentions in l

the second section of the brief.

O  !. The Factual Bases for IJLCO's 25% Power Motion t LILCO's motion for authorization to operate at 25% power is clearly supported by a series of detailed analyses of the risks of accidents associated with operation of  ;

J jg Shoreham at 25% power. These analyses include traditional design basis accidents as well as even more unlikely severe accidents.3/ Two important conclusions flow from l

(footnote continued) [

lO I later attached to LILCO's "Motion for Authorization to increase Power to 25%" (dated  !

July 14,1987), LILCO has already demonstrated that the remaining emergency planning (

contentions are not substantively relevant to operation at 25% power. To avoid unnec-

) essary duplication, LILCO will not :epeat those arguments in their entirety in this -

O brief. Instead, those arguments will be summarized here and references will be made to r

the more detailed discussions and f actual material contained in LILCO's earlier submis-  !

sions. For the Board's convenience, the Request and its accompanying appendices are included with this filing. The Request and its accompanying appendices were served on l the entito service list on April 14, 1987 and again on July 14, 1987. Because of the

length of that material it is not being served (for what would be a third time) on the ,

!g parties.

i 3/ LILCO's Request for Authorization contains three independent assessments to j provide conNextual meaning to the risks associated with operation at 25% power:

i  !

! 1. the results of the Shoreham-specific Level 3 PRA for 25%  !

10 power have been compared to the rationale of NUREG-0396 ,

L l originally used to establish the current 10 mile radius for the j EPZt l 2. the individual exposure risk criteria developed for the Indus-

try Degraded Core Rulemak.Ing Program (IDCOR) have been applied to the results of the 25% power Level 3 PR At and lO (footnote continued) 1 i i

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these analyses.

First, the risks from Shoreham's operation at 25% power are sharply reduced rel-ative to a lleensing-basis 100% power analysis, indeed, the risks associated with the op-eration at 25% power are so small that a radius of less than one mile would satisfy the original planning basis (NUREG-0396) for the regulatory 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).M The risks at 25% power are low because the probability of obtaining a se-vere release is significantly reduced from 100% power and the amount of fission prod-ucts released to the environment during any such accident is very small. These reasons closely parallel the factual bases for 10 CFR S 50.47(d), which permits 5% power op-eration without an approved offsite emergency plan.5/ S_ee 47 Fed. Reg. 30,233 col.1 (1982).

Second, at 25% power, the small group of accidents that produce offsite releases progress more slowly from their initiating event El to the release of radiation to the (footnote continued)

3. a showing has been made that, even with exceedingly pessi-O mistic assumptions about various uncertaintles (such as the evacuation assumptions), the Level 3 PRA source terms are of such a magnitude that the occurrence of injury-threatening doses beyond one mile from the plant is ex-tremely unlikely.

O Request for Authorization at 19,60-74.

4/ LILCO's Request does not seek to reduce or shrink Shoreham's 10-mile EPZ. At 25% power operation, LILCO would maintain the 10-mile EPZ and continue to devote resources, training and planning for the full 10-mile zone.

O 5/ lo promulgating 5 50.47(d), the Commission based its conclusion that the degree of emergency preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety at 5% power was significantly less than that required at 100% power on three factors. First, the fission product inventory was much less. Second, at 5%

power there was a significant reduction in the required capacity of the systems needed to mitigate the consequences of accidents. Third, the time to identify accident causes O and mitigate their consequences was "much longer" than at 100% power. 47 Fed. Reg.

30,233 col.1.

!/ An "initiating event" is an individual incident or series of incidents that lead to challenges to the plant's capability to reach a safe and stable shutdown condition. In O (footnote continued)

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envir nment.2/ As is shown in the attached Affidavit of Edward J. Youngling, over O

96.7% of all accidents that lead to core melt at 25% power take seven hours or longer to progress from their initiating event to the release of radiation to the environment.

The remaining 3.3% of all core melt accident sequences, which are comprised almost O

entirely of accideats caused by extraordinarily severe earthquakes that wuld also dis-rupt offsite emergency response, result in offsite relecses within about one hour of g their initiating event. If the severe carthquake-initiated accidents are removed from the universe of core melt accidents, then 99.5% of all severe accidents at 25% power would take seven or more hours to progress to clease of radiation offsite. For the rea-sons discussed on page 10 infra, it is clear that the potential impact of such earth-O quakes need not be considered. San Luis Obispo Mothers of Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir.1984); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating n Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33,14 NRC 1091 (1981).

v For emergency planning purposes, this slower rate of accident progression pro-vides more time to implement protective actions and essentially assures that evacua-g tion can be completed prior to the release of radiation, in situations like Shoreham, where State and local governments refuse to participate in advance emergency g (footnote continued) this filing, the initiating events from the 25% power PRA would very quickly lead an operator in the control room to classify the plant's condition as a "Site Area Emergen-cy" or "General Emergency." As a result, offsite emergency response actions would begin within at most 15 minutes of the initiating event. (Under NUREG-0654, Appendix 1,the nsite organization is mquimd to notify offsite authorities wiMn is mintes of 0 the operator's recognition of plant events that warrant the declaration of an emergen-cy class. The LILCO onsite emergency response plan has been found by the NRC to ecmply with this requirement.)

1/ In this brief, "release of radiation" refers to radiological releases offsite which g produce dose levels approaching the lower end of EPA's Protective Action Guides (PAGs) -- one rem whole body and five rems to the thyroid. Below these lower PAG dose levels, EPA guidance specifies that nu planned protective actions are necessary.

See LILCO Plan, OPIP 3.6.1. Att. 4.

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O planning, the slower rate also provides substantial additional time to coordinate offsite O

tesponse with those governments when they do respond during an actual emerguncy, see 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)(ill)(B) (state and local officials will use their "best efforts" in an actual emergency). The slower progression of accidents at 25% power again parallels O

one of the factual bases for the 5% power exemption contained in 10 CFR S 50.47(d). t See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,233 col.1.

These matters are discussed in more detail immediately below.

O A. The Risks of Accidents at 25% Power The risks of accidents at 25% power were analyzed using the traditional design basis accident analysis as well as a detailed probabilistic risk assessment. The effects O

of design basis accidents during 25% power operation were assessed in the same manne.'

as those in Chapter 15 of the Shoreham Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), filed December 2,1986.N The results of this analysis indicate that four design basis events O

have the highest offsite radiological consequences. These four avents bound the conse-quences of the remaining 34 USAR licensing basis transients and accidents. Request for Authoriz.ation at 20-21. For these four events, the lower PAG dose !!mits, at which O

point some protective action is required, are never exceeded at distances beyond 0.8 mile from the reactor centerline.El Thus, the design basis accident rationale from NUREG-0396, NUREG-0396 at I-5, would be satisfied at less than one mile for O '

Shoreham operating at 25% power.

O 8/ A detailed description of this analysis and its results are presented in LILCO's Request for Authorization at 20-21,62-64 and Appendix 6.  ;

j/ The two-hour whole body dose does not exceed one rem beyond the Exclusion O Area Boundary, which at Shoreham is 311 meters from the reactor centerline. The two-hour thyroid dose does not exceed five rem beyond 1250 meter (0.8 mile) from the  ;

reactor centerline. Request for Authorization at 62-64.

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O L!LCO has also performed a comprehensive assessment of the risk of non-O tradit!onal, severe accidents.EI These analyses considered a number of physical and procedural changes that have been made at Shoreham to reduce core melt i frequencies.UI They also recognized that at 25% power: l O

• the fission product inventory is substantially less than during ,

f ull power operation; l

the system success criteria are significantly improved for '

25% power (for example, containment venting is adequate to I O remove decay heat);

the time available to operators to take action to prevent se-vere accidents is appreciably longer than at fall power, re-sulting in a greater probability that the operator will i O

10/ The results of these analyses are presented in LILCO's Request for Authorization at 21-58 and Appendices 1 to 5. [

M/ These changes include:

0 1. additional onsite AC power including one blackstart gas tur-bine, four mobile diesel generators and one Colt diesel;  ;

2. procedures for using the diesel fire pumps as a cooling ,

source for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchanger when utilized with the Reactor Core Isolation i O Cooling (RCIC) System in the steam condensing mode; l

3. highly enriched boron to be used in the Standby Liquid Con- ,

trol (SLC) System to increase the allowable time for success- '

fulinitiation for ATWS mitigation; [

iO 4. an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) inhibit switch ,

to provide an easy means for the operator to prevent activation of the ADS when it could make the accident more diffleult to control; ,

5. procedural instructions to bypass the High Pressure Coolant ,

O Injection (HPCI) System suppression pool interlock to allow -

the operator to switch the HPCI system back to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST); and

6. emergency procedures allowing for the throttling of the low l pressure Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and of

O condensate during ATV's events.

Request for Authorization at 23-24.

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pJ correctly diagnose the problem and take appropriate correc-tive actions the capacity margins of the mitigating systems required to perform pafety functions are significantly greater at 25%

power;12, and O .

the main condenser is effective as a heat sink for all turbine trip ATWS cases in which it can be nialntained.

The important conclusions for the 25% power probabilistic risk assessment in-n clude:

v the frequency of core melt at 25% power is low; loss of containmet.t (decay) heat removal accident frequen-cles are very low and significantly lower than those at 100%

Power; O

loss-of-coolant accidents are of very low frequency; loss of offsite power is a negligible contributor to core melt frequency; and O

• successful accident mitigation is much more likely because of the additional time available, along with the reduced require-ments for coolant injection and containment heat removal.

Having established the risks of accidents at 25% power, LILCO then analyzed the O offsite radiological consequences of those accidents using several variations of the Cal-culation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC) code.E These analyses revealed much lower dose-versus-distance probability distributions than those presented in O NUREG-0396. See Request for Authorization at 60-68. Indeed, at 25% power, the prob-ability of receiving a dose resulting in serious illness in the months following the acci-dent (200 rem whole body) is very Icw, even at a fraction of a mile from the plant. Id.

O at 67. Most core melt accidents at 25% power would not produce doses in populated 12/ This is true not only for mitigating safety systems such as the Emergency Core Cooling System but also other systems, which provide a coolant injection source, such O as the control rod drive system. Request for Authorization at 28.

[3/ These analyses are presented in Appendix 5 to the Request for Authorization.

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areas in excess of EPA's PAGs at distances beyond about one-tenth of a mile frott. the l

O plant. M. Doses would exceed PAG limits in populated areas one mile from the p.at in ,

less than 10% of all core melt accidents. M. at 67 n.41. ,

These results indicate that the risks to the ' general population livig aprDxi- ,

O mately one mile from Shoreham operating at 25% power are less than the risks identi-  ;

t fled at 10 miles in NUREG-0396.M f B. The Time Available for Offsite Response at 25% Power

'O l A critical factor in assessing whether the remaining emergency contentions are  :

3 of substantive relevance is the time available for offsite response. Pursuant to l NUREG-0654, offsite emergency response plans are predicated on a standard emergen-O cy classification and action level scheme. NUREG-0654 5 II.D and App.1. This scheme not only provides criteria for notifying the public of an emergency, but also triggers the l

notification and mobilization of offsite response organizations.El Under the Shoreham [

'O offsite emergency response plan, the declaration of any emergency classification - be ,

it an Unusual Event or any of the three higher classifications - requires the LERO Di- ,

rector of Local Response to contact appropriate state and local government officials to

]O coordinate offsite response. Thus, the time available for offsite response depends on

the speed at which accidents progress from the initial plant event that prompts the declaration of an emergency classification to the time radiation is released to the envi- [

ronment. The probabilistic risk assessment for 25% power operation is a useful source

.'O for obtaining this timing information.

10 M/ The risks from 25% power operation ace based on tne conservative assumpt'on that immersion and inhalation doses from an expchure lasting 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter the time of -

release. This assumption is used regardless of the time or duration of the release. Re- -

quest for Authorization at App. 5 p.12.

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O M/ For example, the Shoreham offsite emergency response plan provic..

. that at an (

Unusual Event, seven key members of the Local Emergency Response Organization [

(LERO) are placed on standby; the remainder of LERO is unaffected. At an Alert, over <

290 members of LERO report to their preassigned duty stations. At a Site Area or Gen- l eral Emergency, LERO is fully mobilized. LILCO Plan, OP!Ps 2.1.1 and 3.3.3. }

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-9 The Shoreham probabilistic risk assessment for 25% power represents the spec-trum of core melt accidents by ten "plant damage states"E which are further sub-divided into six "release categories."El The resulting groups represent all of the acci-dent sequences that could lead to core melt.

O Since each accident group contains accidents which possess common physical attributes, it is possible to select a "representative" accident sequence E# for each group and then to determine for that sequence the time interval between the initiating O

event and the release of radiation to the environment. LILCO has conducted this anal-ysis for each of the accident groups in the 25% power PRA.E O

g/ A "plant damage state"is the end result of the analysis that defines an accident sequence and quantifies its probability of occurrence. It is comprised of similar acci-l dent sequences that lead to degraded core conditions. The "plant damage states" for

the 25% power PRA are presented on pages 34-35 of the Request for Authorization.

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M/ A "release category" is a set of release events (where a release event is a combi-nation of a plant damage end state and a containment event tree end state) with similar risks. The principal attrib.ites of a "release category" are: (.t) the time from the in!tiating event to the release of radiation to the environment, (2) the duration of the l tadiological releases, and (3) the magnitude of those releases. The "release categories"

!O for the 25% power PRA are discussed in more detailin the Request for Authorization at 42-43 and Tables II.C.3-2 and -3.

l A "representative accident sequence" is an accident sequence used to represent M/

the spectrum of accident sequences that exist for a given release category and plant l damage state. The representative sequence is chosen by identifying the primary con-lO tainment event tree end state within a given release category and plant damage state and then by identifying the dominant plant damage state that leads to that primary containment event tree end state. The dominant plant damage state is determined on the basis of the frequency of contribution to that release category and plant damage l state.

lO Since each given release category and plant damage state contains a multitude l of severe accident sequences, each having an increasingly lower probability of occur-rence, it is practical and appropriate to use representative accident sequences to char- .

acterize the group. Clearly, within a given group worst case accidents could be envi-stoned, however, their contribution to risk is so small as to be considered negligible.

The use of representative accident sequences to characterize a group of severe acci-O dents is consistent with the practice followed in WASH-1400.

M/ See Affidavit of Edward J. Youngling,16.

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The results reveal that 74% of the accidents leading to core melt (represented by release categories RC5 and RC6) require 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or more to proceed from their l

l initiating event to offsite radiation releases as determined by the representative se-l quences. An additional 22.7% of the accidents leading to core melt (represented as 10 parts of release categories RC1, RC2, RC3 and RC4) require between 7 arid 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> to produce offsite radiological releases. The remaining 3.3% of all core melt accidents proceed from initiating event to radiation release in about one hour. Affidavit of O

Edward J. Youngling,17. By comparison, approximately 6% of all core melt accidents at 100% power progress from their initiating event to offsite radiation release in about one hour. Affidavit of Edward J. Youngling,18.

O When assessing the substantive relevance of remaining emergency planning con-tentions, it is important to note that at 25% power the small category of very fast acci-dents is caused almost entirely by seismic events which greatly exceed the safe shut-

!O down earthquake (SSE) used in the design of the plant. Earthquakes of this severity are liktly to cause such extensive damage in surrounding areas that emergency planning 1

l would be of little benefit in these circumstances. For this reason the Commission has lO-long taken the position that the potential impact of such carthquakes on emergency planning need not be considered. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, supra; San Onofre, supra. When the contribution of extraordinarily severe seismic events is O

excluded from consideration, only 0.5% of all core melt accidents at 25% power pro-ceed from their initiating event to the offsite release of radiation in less than seven hours. Affidavit of Edward J. Youngling,19. The probability of occurrence of the O

f ast-breaking group of accidents is 1.4 x 10-7 per reactor year. See Request for Autho-rization, App. A Table A.1-11.

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O II. The Substantive Relevance of the Remaining Emergency Planning Contentions O

In considering the substantive relevance of the remaining emergency planning contentions in light of the risks and speed of accidents at 25% power, it is useful to bear in mind several general principles. First, emergency planning findings are differ-ent from other safety findings that Licensing Boards must make in the extent to which E they are inherently predictive. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Elec-tric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1103 (1983). Second, the reasonable as-O surance finding, required by NRC regulations, does not mean perfect assurance or zero risk. Indeed, an underlying assumption of emergency planning regulations, as recog-nized by the Commission, is that in the event of a serious accident some offsite individ-lO Southern California Edison Co. (San i uals may receive harmful doses of radiation.

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528,533 (1983).

The objective of emergency planning is "maximum dose savings." Cincinnati Gas and O Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983). Finally, emergency planning requirements c'c not involve an inflexible set of protective actions. Instead, they provide for flexible, graded responses. Thus, the O

offsite release of radiation does not require the automatic evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ; instead, release charseteristics and weather conditions could indicate thm a much smaller zone (such as a 2-mile zone) be evacuated while the remainder of the EPZ O

could be instructed to shelter.

Operation at 25% power provides dose savings in two ways. First, for most se-vere accidents the area where evacuation is likely to be recommended will be substan-O tially less than the entire 10-mile zone. Thus, the evacuation of those persons at risk will be completed substantially more quickly than if a larger area was evacuated.N O

2_0/ For example, an evacuation of the entire Shoreham 10-mile EPZ under normal summer weather conditions takes approximately five hours. LILCO Plan, OPIP 3.6,1, Att. 2. The comparable evacuation of a 2-mile zone would take just over 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. I_d.

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Second, given the slower speed of accidents at 25% power, it is much more likely that O

evacuation can be totally completed prior to any significant offsite releases of radia-tion. As a result, in more cases, the offsite response organization would be able to pre-vent the public from receiving a_ny dose of radiation and would not be forced to choose O

between the lesser population dose from sheltering or evacuation.

A. Legal Authority Eight contentions concerning LILCO's "legal authority" to perfocm a variety of O

activities called for by the LILCO Plan remain at issue for full power licensing. These S

activities include such functions as traffic control, making protective action re:om-mendations for the public, notifying the public of an emergency at the Shoreham sta-O tion, and performing access control.

The issues raised by these contentions have changed since their initial filing in 1983. Originally, the contentions argued that LILCO lacked legal authority to perform O

certain functions specified in the LILCO Plan, and that therefore the Plan was fatally deficient. However, LILCO's legal authonty tc carry out the Shoreham offsite emer-gency response plan is nc longer the focus of these contentioils. In CLI-86-13, Long

!O Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 24 NRC 22 (1986), the Commission adopted the "raalism principle which recognizes that in a real emergency, governments would carry out their duty and use their best efforts to protect the public O

health and safety. In November 1987, the Commission codified and further explained the "realism principle" by amending 10 CFR S 50.47(c) to specifically address situations in which state and local governments refuse to cooperate in emergency planning and iO preparedness. 52 Fed. Reg 42,078 (November 3,1987). The new regulation requires 11-censing boards to apply two principles:

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1. State and local government officials will exercise their lO best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public.

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2. These officials will be assumed to general'y follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be re-

! butted by the good f aith and timely proffer of "an ade-O quate and feasible" governmental emergency plan.

See id, at 42,086 col.1-2.W In light of the new regulation, this Board has reformulated l

the eight "legal authority" contentions to now raise the basic issue of "whether the O LILCO Plan with a best efforts or other response (by state and local governments]

meets the regulatory requirements." Confirmatory Memorandum and Order at 2-3 (February 29,1988). In its Order, the Board added:

lO a lack of legal authority cannot be raised under the regulation as a response against LILCO's Plan, nor can simple protesta-tions that the State and County will not use LILCO's Plan.

Acceptable rebuttals to the Plan must include positive state-ments of the projected behavior of the Governments. A de-termination to respond ad hoc would be acceptable only if O accompanied by specification of the resources available for such a response, and the actions such a response could entall including the time factors involved. A failure on the part of the Governments to present a positive case for our analysis and evaluation could result in a finding of default and hence in an adverse ruling on the contention to which is applies.

I!j. at 4. So framed, the eight contentions do not have "substantive relevance" at 25%

power as is explained below.

1. Traffic Control O

Contentions 1, 2 and 4 relate to traffic control during an actual emergency.

Contentions 1 and 2 concern implementation of the traffic control plan contained in the LILCO Plan. This traffic control plan was previously approved by this Board -- a decision that has since been affirmed by the Appeal Board and denied further review by 21/ The lower courts' decisions in Cuomo v. LILCO, which held that LILCO lacked O Tegal authority" to implement its emergency plan, have been reversed by New York State's highest court, the Court of Appeals, as nonjusticiable. Cuomo v. LILCO, No. 3, NYS 2d (February 17, 1988).

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O the Commission. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 793 (1985), aff'd, ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,143 (1986). As a re-sult, the remaining question for full power operation is whether a best effort response by Suffolk County would impede the implementation of this already acceptable plan.MI O

Consistent with a best-effort response, Suffolk County, when notified of a Shoreham emergency, would either dispatch police officers to team with trained LERO Traffic Guides, or authorize LERO Traffic Guides themselves to control traffic. To aid O

this coordination effort, the LILCO Plan now provides for the dispatch of a trained LERO coordinator to the Suffolk County Police headquarters in Yaphank. This coordinator will carry diagrams explaining the traffic control movements at each point O

specified in the LILCO Plan. LERO Traffic Guides will also be dispatched to each traf-fic control point with dosimetry and the appropriate equipment (including traffic con-trol diagrams) for carrying out (or instructing police officers to carry out) the traffic O

control strategies specif!ed for that control point.

Given the extended time between the initiating event and the release of radia-tion for accidents at 25% power, the necessary mobilization and coordination to carry out the traffic control plan could be easily accomplished. In addition, given the gener-l l

ally smaller offsite consequences of accidents at 25% power, any prc+tective action recommendations advising evacuation are likely to be for areas smaller than the entire O 10-mile Shoreham EPZ - most likely, for the area within two miles of the plant. As a result, reduced populations would need to be evacuated,EI thus reducing the traffic lO M/ During the future litigation of Contentions 1 and 2, Intervenors will have the op-l portunity to present an alternative plan for the direction of evacuating traffic. How-l ever, given that the LILCO traffic control plan has already been found to meet NRC re-l quirements and that the realism rule requires any alternative plan to be "adequate and i feasible," 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(1)(ill)(B), it follows that whatever plan Intervenors may Present, it must meet NRC requirements in order to be acceptable under the new regu-lO lation.

2_3/

An evacuation of a 2-mile area around the Shoreham station would affect ap-proximately 20,000 residents, while a 10-mile evacuation would affect 160,000. See LILCO Plan, App. A, p. III-2.

O

3 measures that would need to be implemented and evacuation times. For these reasons, v

Contentions 1 and 2 are not substantively relevant for operation at 25% power.

Contention 4 involves the removal of impediments from roadways during an evacuation of affected zones. The 12 tow trucks provided in the LILCO Plan have al-ready been fo'and to be an adequate number for an evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ. LBP-85-12,21 NRC at 811. Because the areas to be evacuated as a result of acci-dents at 25% power are likely to be much smaller than the 10-mile EPZ, these 12 tow O

trucks will provide a large excess of removal capacity. Furthermore, as this Board rec-ognized when it granted LILCO's motion for summary disposition on the provision of fuel trucks, it is inconsistent with the "best efforts" assumption to assume that Suf folk

O County would intervene at the height of an emergency to prevent the use of emergency equipment LERO has provided. S_ee Memorandum and Order (Granting LILCO

s Summary Disposition Motion on Contention 9) at 11 (March 11,1988). Finally, O

the slow speed of accidents at 25% power will allow more time for these tow trucks to be mobilized and dispatched to field locations in accordance with the LILCO Plan.

Thus, Contention 4 is not substantively relevant for operation at 25% power.

O

2. Protective Action Recommendations Contentions 6, 7 and 8 involve making protective action recommendations for the plume exposure and ingestion pathways and decisions on recovery / reentry, respec-O tively. Making protective action recommendations for the plume exposure pathway re-quires three basic decisions: (1) deciding on the appropriate protective action given plant and weather conditions, (2) informing the public of that decision through an ap-O propriate EBS message and (3) Ectually alerting the public by sounding the sirens and broadcasting the EBS message. Given a best-effort response, governmental officials will notify the public to take appropriate actions if so recommended by LERO officials and plant personnel in an actual emergency. The question for full-power operation thus l

O

O becomes how long that action would take. For 25% power operation, this is not a sig-nificant issue.

In all cases it can be concluded (from the "best efforts" principle) that govern-mental officials would act promptly to proteu the public health and safety. 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(1)(lii)(B). As described in Section I.B above, virtually all(99.5%) accidents at 25% power operation take seven or more hours to progress from their initiating event to the actual offsite release of radiation. Even if one makes the unjustifiably conserva-tive assumption that it will take two hours for LERO and governmental officials to agree on a protective action recommendation and notify the general public,b at least five hours would still remain for the public to evacuate the zone at risk. Evacuation v

time estimates for the Shoreham EPZ reveal that the entire 10-mile EPZ can be evacu-hted in approximately five hours during nocmal, summer conditions.E Thus, the coordination of protective action recommendations would not affect public health and safcty. Accordingly, Contention 6 is not substantively relevant to LILCO's 25% power motion.

The provisions of the LILCO Plan concerning protective actions in the ingestion pathway hwe already been litigated and approved. LBP-85-12, 21 NRC at 875-76.

24/ Under NUREG-0654, the onsite organization is required to notify offsite authori-O ties within 15 minutes of the operator's recognition of plant events that warrant the declaration of an emergency class. NUREG-0654, App.1. The offsite organization is then required to make a "prompt" decision on protective action recommendations, s_ee NUREG-0654 S II.E.6, and to notify the public of that decision by the use of an alerting signal and an instruction message within 15 minutes of the decision, NUREG-0654 App. 3 1 B.2.c. The two-hour decisional period, used as an example, corresponds to O these two 15 minute requirements plus li hours for making the "prompt" decision about protective action recommendations.

2_5/ As described above, the consequence analyses for 25% power operation reveal that it is an extremely rare event that would require such an extensive evacuation. In the vast majority of cases evacuation would not be required beyond one mile from the O plant. Even if it is conservatively assumed that a two-mile zone around the plant is evacuated, then the time to evacuate f alls to just over three hours, l O  ;

O Protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway occur well af ter the O

initiating event. As a result, substantial time exists for LERO to coordinate its inges-tion pathway activities with governmental officials.N Accordingly, Contention 7 is not substantively relevant to 25% operation.

'O Similarly, protective action recommendations for recovery and reentry activities are not substantively relevant to LILCO's 25% motion. By definition, these decisions are made af ter EPZ residents have been evacuated and are safe. Thus, substantial time O

exists for deciding on these actions and integratlag offsite response.

3. Notification of the Pubile Contention 5 involves the activation of sirens and broadcast of emergency O broadcast system (EBS) messages. The contention involves the mechanical activation of the 89 sirens located throughout the Shoreham EPZ, the physical transmission of an EBS message to the lead EBS station and the subsequent broadcast of that EBS message O

to the public. The Shoreham siren system can be activated by LILCO or by LERO at three independent locations. All that is required is for the appropriate governmental entity to direct the activation of that system. This can 'oe done in a matter of moments O It was just once a protective action recommendation has been agreed upon.

demonstrated that ample time exists to make protective action recommendations.

Under the "best efforts" assumption of the realism rule,it can be presumed that the ap-O propriate governmental entity would than direct activation of the public notification system.

O 2_6/ New York State officials recently participated in a "full participation" ingestion pathway exercise at the Ginna nuclear power plant on October 27-29,1987. New York State witnesses have admitted in the OL-3 proceeding that the State's performance re-O ceived "very favorable remarks from FEM A." Affidavit of Papile, Czech and Baranski at 28, attached to Intervenors' Answers to LILCO's Summary Disposition Motions (February 10, 1988).

i O

}O The Shoreham Plan includes a local EBS network that has WPLR-FM as the lead

!O l station. In addition, New York State has an established EBS network for Long Island that is triggered by WCBS.E! Either system could be used to broadcast EBS messages l to the general public. Given a best-effort response, one of these two systems would certainly be used during a Shoreham emergency, with no delay in public notification.

l Thus, Contention 5 is not substantively relavant to 25% operation.

l 4. Access Control Contention 9 raises issues about the implementation of access control at the LERO EOC, reception centers and at the perimeter of the EPZ. Access control at the LERO EOC and at reception centers raises no litigable issues since they are private f a-O cilities owned by LILCO. There is no issue about LILCO's right to control access to its own facilities.

Access control at the perimeter of the EPZ is not required by the LILCO Plan O while an evacuation is taking place. The reason is straightforward: entry into the EPZ during this period should not be forbidden because people are returning to the EPZ to reunite with their families before evacuating. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan requires O traffic guides to discourage, but not prohibit or screen, entry into the EPZ. These pro-visions have previously been accepted by this Board.N The later access control of evacuated treas also provides no litigable issue since O these actions would take place many hours af ter state and local governments would 2_7/ Should the responding governments choose to use the State EBS network, the LILCO Plan provides that WPLR will simply rebroadcast that message simultaneously O over the local Shoreham EBS network. Thus, the general public could receive emergen-cy instructions either from those stations identified in the public information materials they will receive or from an even broader group of stations not listed in that informa-tion.

28/ Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, O 21 NRC 644,804-05 (1985).

O

O i

first become involved in a best-effort response. Arrangements for this access control  !

O could be agreed upon while the evacuation was in progress and could easily be imple-mented following its completion.EI In any case, this coordination should be easier for ,

l accidents at 25% power since the evacuated areas are likely to be smaller.

O B. Role Conflict Among School Bus Drivers Whether regular school bus drivers would perform their jobs during a radiological emergency has been remanded to this Board, in the OL-3 docket, for the consideration O

of additional evidence. This issue is not substantively relevant to LILCO's 25% power motion. To ensure that enough school bus drivers are available to evacuate all schocls in the 10-mile EPZ, LERO has recruited 565 additional school bus drivers to serve in the O

place of any regular school bus driver who falls to perform his job in an actual emer-gency.EI In addition, at 25% power, only the schools less than a mile of the plant would be O

at the same level of risk as people within the 10-mile EPZ are currently judged to be "at risk" under NUREG-0396 criteria. Only six schools of the 38 schools in the 10-mile EPZ are located even within two miles of the Shoreham plant. Five of those schools

O belong to the same school district - Shoreham-Wading River School District. That school district has always stated that it has ample resources to evacuate its own stu-dents and cooperates actively with LILCO in emergency planning. The sixth school, Little Flower Elementary, is also cooperating in emergency planning.E O 29/ See Special Prehearing Conference Hearing Order (Ruling on Contentions) at 15, 20 (August 19,1983)(refusing to admit Contentions 24.Q and 53 on lack of letters of ar-gument with police for providing security in evacuated areas.)

30/ lt has always been LILCO's position that no role abandonment will occur among school bus drivers. Thus, these additional LERO bus drivers provide an ample basis for O reaching a "reasonable assurance" finding.

31/ Request for Authorization at 101 and n.86.

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t C. Hospital Evacuation Time Estimates

'O The accuracy of LILCO's evacuation time estimates for the three hospitals locat-ed essentially on the outer boundary of the 10-mile EPZ is also still before this Board in OL-3 docket. This issue is not substantively relevant to LILCO's 25% power motion.

Given the results of the severe accident analyses performed for operation at 25%

power, particularly when coupled with the shielding provided by these facilities, the probability that a PAG level dose could be accumulated by hospital patients is van-ishingly small.

The only remaining issue involves the accuracy of LILCO's evacuation time esti-mates.E It is settled NRC case saw that there are no requirements for minimum O evacuation times. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986). Thus, the remaining issue does not raise significant p>1blic health and safety issues that must be resolved before LILCO's 25% power motion O can be granted.

D. EBS System Coverage Following the close of the litigation on the adequacy of the LILCO offsite emer-gency response plan, the lead EBS station for the Shoreham EBS network (WALK-AM) withdrew from participation in the LILCO Plan. LILCO has replaced WALK with WPLR-FM. As a result in this change in lead EBS stations, the Commission granted a O motion by Intervenors to reopen the tecord on this issue. New contentions were M/ The evacuation time estimates for hospitals are based on the use of ambulances and ambulettes currently under contract to LILCO. In a real emergency, where Suffolk O County would be participating with its best effort, additional ambulances and ambulettes would be provided by Suffolk County fire and rescue squads. The result would be lower hospital evacuation times.

Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a consultant to the NRC Staff, has previously filed an affi-d vit which concludes that LILCO's evacuation time estimates for hospitals are reason-O able. Affidavit of Dr. Thomas Urbanik II attached to NRC Staff Response to LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Hospital Evacuation Issue (January 15, 1988).

O

O submitted by Intervenors on the adequacy of the present Shoreham EBS network and on O

February 24, 1988, the Board admitted five subparts of Intervenors' proffered conten-tion. Memorandum and Order (Boaro Ruling on Contentions Relating to LILCO's Emer-gency Broadcast System) (February 24,1966). The admitted contentions, pending before O

this Board in the OL-3 docket, all relate to the coverage area of WPLR's signal and of the entire Shoreham EBS system. These contentions do not raise issues of substantive relevance to LILCO's 25% power motion.

O First,if New York State and Suffolk County believe that the Shoreham EBS net-work has insufficient coverage then under a best-effort assumption, they should be as-sumed to use the New York State EBS network for notifying people within the O

Shoreham EPZ. As noted above, the slower development of accidents at 25% power would provide government officials ample time to make this decision, and contact WCBS the lead station in this EBS network. Thus, using the normal New York State EBS O

network would not have an adverse impact on public health and safety.

Second, a sworn aff'4 davit submitted by a quallfled broadcast engineer demon-strates that WPLR, alone, has sufficient signal strength to cover the entire 10-mile EPZ

!O during both day and night. Affidavit of Ralph E. Dippell, Jr. attached to LILCO's Mo-tion for Summary Disposition of % ALK Radio Issue (Noveraber 6,1987) (OL-3 docket).

l l Despite months of opportunity, Intervenors have produced no evidence to refute these O

detailed engineering studies.

l E. Exercise Issues The litigation of the results of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the Shoreham

.O offsite emergency response plan was completed on February 1,1988 with the OL-5 Licensing Board's issuance of its second Initial Decision.E The conclusions of the l M/ The Board's first PartialInitial Decision, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nu-j clear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-32,26 NRC (December 7,1987), held that the (footnote continued)

O

O OL-5 Board will undoubtedly be cited by Intervenors as creating unresolved public health and safety issues that must be litigated before this Board can grant LILCO's mo-tion to operate at 25% power. For the reasons detailed below, that argument is incor-rect.

O First, Intervenors are likely to argue that there must be a full participation exer-cise within the meaning of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,1 IV.F.1, before Shoreham may be authorized to operate at above 5% of rated power. However, this argument is incor-O rect because it ignores the effect of the Licensing Board's January 7,1988 Memorandum and Order. In that decision, the Licensing Board determined that no waiver of, or ex >

emption from, the Commission's emergency planning regulations is needed in connec-O tion with LILCO's showing that any remaining deficiencies in emergency planning are "not significant for the plant in question" under 10 CFR S 50.47(c). January 7 Memo-randum and Order at 6.b O

(footnote continued)

FEMA-supervised offsite emargency preparedness exercise for the Shoreham plant, lO while as comprehensive as any exercise ever performed in FEMA Region 2, had not been sufficient in scope to serve as the basis for issuance of a full power operating 11-t cense for the plant. As the remainder of this Brief demonstrates, an exercise is not a

! prerequisite to operation of Shoreham at 25% power and the exercise results are not a

' material consideration to granting LILCO's 25% power motion. It therefore follows that any deficiencies in the scope of the February 13, 1986 exercise are not substan-O tively relevant to 25% power operation.

The Board's later Initial Decision, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear I Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, 27 NRC (February 1,1988), approved in large part LERO's performance during the February 13, 1986 exercise but found that the ex-ercise demonstrated three "fundamental flaws" relating to (1) communications within O the EOC, among field workers, and at the ENC; (2) timely staffing of traffic control posts; and (3) the training of LERO workers.

LILCO believes that the Licensing Board committed significant legal and factual error in both of its decisions. Those decisions are now being appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. Nevertheless, as is demonstrated below, the O deficiencies identified in these decisions are not substantively relevant to operation of Shoreham at 25% power in any event.

3_4/ The correctness of that ruling is demonstrated by the Commission's Statement of Considerations for its 1985 amendment to 10 CFR S 50.12(a), the rule regarding spe-cific exemptions. S_ee 50 Fed. Reg. 50,764, 50,765 (1985).

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O The exercise requirement in 1 IV.F.1 is simply an amplification of the require-O ment in 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14), which requires periodic exercises and drills. Thus, there is no basis for any distinction between the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR S 50.47(b) and those in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,1 IV.F.1. In short, the Board's decision clear-O ly establishes that LILCO does not need a waiver or exemption from the exercise re-quirement in order to demonstrate that any alleged deficiency regarding that require-ment is not significant for operation of Shoreham at 25% power.

O Second, the litigation of exercise results is not a prerequisite for the granting of LILCO's 25% power motion. An opportunity for an exercise hearing must be provided only if the Commission deems exercise results to be a material consideration in its 11-O censing decision. In Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.

1984), cert. denied, Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Union of Concerned Scientists, 469 U.S.1132 (1985), the D. C. Circuit required a hearing on an emergency preparedness l O

exercise solely because the NRC had concluded that exercise results could be a material consideration in the decision before it, namely, the issuance of a full power license. In so holding, the court expressly noted that "the NRC has great discretion to decide what

?O matters are relevant to its licensing decision" and that it was not limiting that discre-tion. IA at 1446,1448.

At 25% power, exercise results are plainly not material to a decision on LILCO's iO I motion. As explained above, the risks of operation at 25% power are significantly I

lower than those at 100% power and indeed significantly less than the planning basis document. NUREG-0396. Therefore, LILCO's 10-mile planning basis provides a large O

margin over the planning basis that would be adequate for the low risks of 25% power operation. When state and local government resources are added to this existing over-sized planning basis as part of a best effort response, the margin becomes even greater.

O In addition, in virtually all (99.5%) accident sequences at 25% power where emergency 0

O planning will have an effect on public health and safety, seven or more hours exist for O

making and then implementing protective action recommendations. There is reason-able assurance that this lengthy time period would permit the successful imple-mentation of protective action recommendations even if the offsite organizations had O

not practiced as fully as would be optimally preferred. Thus, exercise results are not a material consideration in ruling on LILCO's 25% power motion.EI Third, the fundamental flaws identified by the OL-5 Licensing Board go, with one exception,El to LFRO's performance on the day of the exercise and not to defects in the LILCO Plan itself. Closer inspection of the Board's findings reveals that the "fun-damental flaws" involved shortcomings in performance of a few individuals. This type

.O of performance deficiency has traditionally been lef t to the NRC Staff and FEMA to re-solve through appropriate remedial actions. Thus, they do not pose issues of substan-tive relevance to LILCO's 25% power motion.E!

O O

35/ As described in footnote 56 to Request for Authorization, the immateriality of O exercises for 25% power operation is demons:cated by a series of ad hoc disaster evacu-ations that have been successfully complete with little or no prior planning or practice.

36/ The exception involves the LILCO Plan's failure to provide for lateral communi-cations among field workers to deal with unexpected occurrences, such as major traffic accidents which block entire roadways. LBP-88-2 slip op, at 50,53. The radios used by o LERO field workers have the physical capability to permit this lateral communication.

Furthermore, nothing in the LILCO Plan prevents field workers from communicating with each other should a situation so dictate. In addition, a "best effort" response by local governments would include police manning traffic control posts. Thus, additional lateral communication capabilities would exist.

O M/ An exercise of the LILCO offsite emergency response plan is currently scheduled for the week of June 13. Any of the remaining concerns about the fundamental flaws found by the OL-5 Board as they relate to 25% power operation could be removed by the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment of that exercise.

.O

O III. Conclusion O

For the reasons detailed above, the Board should find that none of the remaining emergency planning contentions are substantively relevant to LILCO's 25% power mo-l tion. That motion should be granted pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.57(c).

IO l

Respectfully submit ted, O

Do'nald P.' ( it(/

Lee B. Ze in Counsel for Long Island Lighting Company Hunton & Williams o 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 1,1988 O

O O

O lO O

g LILCO, April 1,1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of O

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-6

) (25% Power)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

O AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD J. YOUNGLING IN SUPPORT OF LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE "SUBSTANTIVE RELEVANCE" OF REMAINING EMERGENCY P_LANNING CONTENTIONS TO LILCO'S MOTION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER STATE OF NEW YORK )

) To Wit:

O, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK )

Edward J. Youngling, being duly sworn, says:

(1) My name is Edward J. Youngling. My business address is Long Island O Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Wading River, New York 11792.

(2) I am currently Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department, for the Long Is-land Lighting Company, a position I have held for almost four years. I have been em-lO played by the Long Island Lighting Company for '9 years and have served in a number i

of positions, including Startup Manager, responsible for pre-aperational testing activi-l l ties at Shoreham; Nuclear Services Supervisor, responsible for coordination of major O station modifications, design reviews and long-range planning; and Chief Technical En-gineer at Shoreham, responsible for the activities of the Instrumentation and Control, l

Health Physics, Radiochemistry and Reactor Engineering sections of the plant op-  ;

O erating staff.

(3) Prior to my employment to LILCO, I was employed by General Electric as e Mechnical Test Engineer at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (S3G Submarine Reac-O tor Prototype).

O

O (4) I denleved a Senior Reactor Certification from the General Electric Com-O pany on the Duane Arnold Energy Center BWR. I hold a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Lehigh University. I have taken credits towards a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering from Union College and have attended numerous nu-O clear training courses.

(5) As Manager, Nuclear Engineering, I am responsible for all aspects of engi-neering for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. I provided overall supervision of the 0 engineering analyses that support this brief. Personnel under my direction and control were directly involved in preparing the analyses supporting the timing data presented in the attached Table 1.

O (6) Analyses were performed in which the representative severe accident se-quence was selected for each plant damage state and corresponding release category on the basis of its frequency contribution, severity of radiological release and time of re-D lease. The selection of the representative severe accidents sequence was based on the results of the 25% power PR A and an engineering assessment of the app!!cability of the chosen sequence to the release category and plant damage state.

D (7) The results of the analyses reveal that 74% of the accidents leading to core melt (represented by release categories RCS and RC6) require 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or more to pro-ceed from their initiating event to radiation releases offsite. An additional 22.7% of O the accidents leading to core melt (represented as parts of release categories RC1, RC2, RC3, RC4) require from 7 to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> to produce offsite radiological consequences. Finally, 3.3% of all core melt accidents proceed from the initiating O event to an offsite radiological release in about one hour.

(8) By comparison, similar analyses performed for Shoreham operating at 10(%

power reveal that approximately 6% of all core melt accidents progress from their O initiating event to offsite radiation release in about I hour.

O

O (9) The results of the analyses also reveal that when the contributions of large seism!c events (well beyond the safe shutdown earthquake) are excluded f rom consider-ation (portions of Plant Damage State IB and virtually all of Plant Damage State IllD),

0.5% of all core melt accidents at 25% power require less than seven hours to proceed from their intiating event to offsite radiation releases.

(10) I have reviewed the engineering analyses developed in support of this brief.

I, and personnel under my supervision and control, are personally familiar with the technical f acts contained in the engineering analyses, and these f acts are true and cor-rect to the best of my knowledge and belief. ,

0 Edward J. You b '

STATE OF NEW YORK )

lO )

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK )

Subscribed and sworn to report to me this 31 d day of March 1988.

O My commission expires: I%cA Jo, 090

Notw$e$csb)fIfa.vm 1 ~M[

.atm weer e- -

Ctenssion hxes Mrch M 1974 O

O O

l O

~

Table 1 SHORD4AM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -- 25% POWER PLANT DAMAC.E STATE RELEASE CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION (PEPCENT Or CORE MELT)  ;

PLANT DAMAGE STATE RELEASE CATEGORY IA IS IC 10 II IIIS IIIC IIID IV V ACI 1.9E-02 1.9E-02 5.0E-C6 2.4E-05 1.8E-07 3.1E-05 3.7E-06 8.1E-03 2.3E+00 4.3E-04 I (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) ('s . 0 ) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (0.5) (7.0) (1.0)

1. C2 5.3E-02 8.2E-01 1.4E-05 7.3E-OS 1.0E-07 8.4E-05 1.1E-03 3.7E-02 1.0E+00 3.4E-02 (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (0.5) (7.0) (1.0)

RC3 2.8E-01 3.8E-02 7.2E-05 3.5E-04 8.2E-07 4.4E-04 5.3E-05 2.8E-02 7.9E+00 (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (0.5) (7.0)

AC4 2.4E-01 7.3E+00 6.3E-05 C.9E-02 4.7E-07 3.9E-04 1.0E-02 3.2c+00 3.0E+00 9.2E-03 (11.0) (14.0) (11.0) (11.0) (11.0) (11.0) (11.0) (1.0) (11.0) (1.0)

ACS 3.1E+01 2.0E-04 1. 5F.+ 01 7.8E-03 2.1E+00 (48.0) (48.0) (48.0) (48.0) (48.0) l RC6 2.4E*01 2.0E-03 1.8t+00 7.9E-02 2.8E-01

( 60.0) Q O.0) ( 60.0) ( 60,0) ( 60.0) l TOTAL 5.5E+01 8.2E+00 2.4E-03 1.7E+0t 1.6E-06 8.7E-02 2.5E+00 3.3Ei30 1.4E+01 4.4E-02 NOTES

The bracketed numbers below each value c? percent of core melt represent the time (hrs.) from the initiating event to the release of radiation to the environment for the representative severe accident seq 9ence of that group.

The summation of the percent contributions of each group total slightly higher than 100% because of round-of.'.

O LILCO, April 1,1988 DOLKETED thNFC O '88 APR -4 P6 :43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE YDC iYr>Yb<N?Nk MANCH O In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-6 O I hereby certify that copies of LIf.CO'S BRIEF ON THE "SUBSTANTIVE RELE-VANCE" OF REMAINING EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS TO LILCO'S MO-TION TO OPERATE AT 25% POWER were served this date upon the following by Feder-al Express as indicated by one asterisk, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.

O James P. Gleason, Chairman

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel 513 Gilmoure Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline

• Adjudicatory File O Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel Docket U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commlesion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

East-West Towers, Mm. 427 Wash ngton D.C. 20555 4350 East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Edwin J. Reis, Esq.

• C, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Frederick J. Shon

• One 'thite Filnt North Atomic Safsty and Licensing 11555 Rockville Pike Board Rockville, MD 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers, 3m. 430 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.

• O 4350 East-West Hwy. Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Karla J. Letsche, Esq.

Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Dr. David L. Hetrick

• South Lobby - 9th Floor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1800 M Street, N.W.

Professor of Nuclear and Energy Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 O Engineering The University of Arizona Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.

• Tucson, Arizona 85721 Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.

Special Counsel to the Governor Secretary of the Commission Executive Chamber Attention Docketing and Service Room 229 O Section State Capitol U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Albany, New York 12224 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555

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t l Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

!O Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel Room 3-118 Three Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10271 Albany, New York 12223 Spence W. Perry, Esq.

• Ms. Nora Bredes

'O William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Evan A. Davis, Esq.

O Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.

O Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

• Suffolk County Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Street Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 298 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Monroe Schneider O Mr. Philip McIntire North Shore Committee Federal Emergency Management P.O. Box 231 Agency Wading River, NY 11792 26 Federal Plsza New York, New York 10278 0

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1R B.Zeilg 6 O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 1,1988 O

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