05000266/LER-1997-017, :on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised

:on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised

ML20147J449
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/01/1997
From:	Flentje F WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20147J446	List: 05000266/LER-1997-017, :on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised
References
LER-97-017, LER-97-17, NUDOCS 9705070170
Download: ML20147J449 (4)

LER-1997-017, on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
2661997017R00 - NRC Website

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l NRC 7ORM 366' U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OM8 NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)

EXPlRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE (See reverse for required number of TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT digits / characters for each block)

BRANCH (T-6 F33),

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, W ASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT FACILITV NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 1 OF 4 TITLE (4)

Containment Third Door Blocked Open During Refueling Operations j

EVENT DATE (5) l LER NUMBER (8)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) l YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 08I92I97 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05 017 --

00 05 01 97 05000 OPERATINO l THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9)

N l 20 220im 20.22031aH2Hvl X

60.73(a)(2His 50.73(aH2)(viiii l

20 2203(a)(1) 20.2203(aH3)(il 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

POWER LEVEt. (10) 000 20.2203(aH2)(i) 20 2203(a)(3Hii) 50.73(aH2)(in) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(aH4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) oTHitR 20.2203(a)(2Hiii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2Hv) specify m Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 60.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2Hv4) e' m hlRC Form 366A LICEN CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

N A ME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Cods)

Fritzie A.

Flentje, Regulatory Specialist (414) 755-6221 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTE M CGMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORT ABL E TO NPR9S TO NPRDS B

VI UDMP N

B VI DUCT N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MON TH DAY YEAR YES SUBM:SSION (if yes, comp 6ete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 31, 1997, during a review of condition reports relating to potential Technical Specifications violations, it was discovered that a condition report was initiated on May 9, 1992, that described an event which had been screened as not being a Technical Specification violation.

Accordingly, no 30-day licensee event report was submitted to the NRC. On on May 8, 1992, immediately following installation of the Unit 1 reactor vessel upper internals package, it was discovered that ramps used to transport equipment into and out of the containment blocked open the temporary third door on the upper personnel containment access.

TS 15.3.8.1 requires that,

....a temporary third door on the outside of the personnel lock shall be in place whenever both doors in a personnel lock are open."

NRC FORM 366 (4 95) 9705070170 970501 PDR ADOCK 05000266 S

PDR

• U.S. NUCLE A;4 RELULATORY COMMISSION (4-C5)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION f ACILITY NAMI (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (65 PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMMR NUMMR 2OF4 97 017 00 TEKT !!!rnere space is required, use additionalcopks of NRC Forrn 366A) (17) i

Event Description

i l

On March 31, 1997, during a review of potential Technical Specification j

violations, it was discovered that a violation of plant Technical Specifications occurred on May 8, 1992.

On May 8, 1992, immediately l

j following installation of the the Unit 1 reactor vessel upper internals, it was noted that portable ramps that are used to transport equipment into and out of containment were blocking open the temporary third door on the upper personnel containment access.

At the time of discovery, both doors J

of the personnel lock were open.

A condition report was submitted on May 9,

1992, documenting this event.

1 The condition report, CR 92-237, indicated that the ramps had been in place, thus blocking open the temporary third door, during the installation of the reactor vessel upper internals.

The condition report had been determined to not be a violation of Technical Specifications.

Specification 15.3.8.1 states, "A temporary third door on the outside of the personnel lock shall be in place whenever both doors in a personnel lock are open (except for initial core loading."

During installation of the upper internals, both doors of the personnel lock were open.

1 The reason provided for this event not considered to be a violation of Technical Specifications was that TS 15.1 defines refueling as, "Any operation involving movement of core components (those that could affect the reactivity of the core) within the containment..."

Replacement of the reactor vessel upper internals was interpreted to not be within the

~

context of this definition.

A retrospective review of the determination made in 1992 concluded that the event should have been reported as a violation of Specification 15.3.8.1.

cause

The initial reportability review based its conclusion upon an interpretation that movement of core components per the definitions section of Technical Specification rather than the literal wording of Specification 15.3.8.1.

Specification 15.3.8.1 requires that the temporary third door on the outside of the personnel lock be in place whenever both doors in a personnel lock are open.

f4RC FORM 366A (4-95)

eU.C. NUCLEA;; REOULATORY COMMSSSIM (4-osi LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME fil DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER 16)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMMR NUMMR 3OF4 97 017 00 iEXT (11more space is requwed, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Corrective Actions

1.

The routine maintenance procedure for removing and installing the reactor vessel head and upper internals was revised to verify that i

refueling requirements are met prior to replacing the reactor vessel upper internals.

This action was completed with issuance of the i

revised procedure on September 4, 1992.

2.

The operations refueling procedure was revised to require the temporary third door to be closed prior to installation of the upper internals.

This action was completed with issuance of the revised procedure on August 18, 1992.

Subsequent to this event, a similar event occurred during the Unit i 1993 spring refueling outage.

The event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i).

LER 266/93-004-00 was submitted on May 10, 1993.

It was further determined that the corrective actions take as a result of the previous event (described herein) had not been completely offective in preventing recurrence of this type of event.

Accordingly, additional short and long-term corrective actions, as described in the referenced report were taken.

These corrective actions included:

1.

Refueling procedures were revised to ensure that no equipment is placed into or extended through the personnel locks during refueling operations.

Refueling operations include unlatching / latching of control rod drive shafts, removing / replacing the upper internals, and removing / replacing the reactor vessel head in addition to fuel movement.

2.

An alarm has been installed on thu third door such that any activity or movement of equipment and personnel through the door which causes the temporary door to be open greater than 2 minutes results in generation of an alarm.

The alarm is received by Security and the control room is immediately notified.

The control room contacts the core loading supervisor, who in turn, ensures immediate response by either Security or Operations to the open temporary third door, and/or suspension of refueling operations.

Reportability

This licensee event report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."

PRC FORM 366A 14 95)

~.

1U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATLRY COMM64;lON il 951 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACitlTY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL HEVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMBER NUMBER 4 OF 4 97 017 00 TEXT ll1 more space is required, use addttwnel copies of NRC form 366A) (17) s

safety Assessment

1 There are no safety consequences from this event. The temporary third door was capable of being shut with minimal effort by removal of the ramps, had this been necessary.

Additionally, Point Beach Nuclear Plant abnormal operating procedure AOP-8B, " Irradiated Fuel Handling Accident in Containment," requires the core loading supervisor or his designated alternate to verify the temporary third doors are closed following a fuel handling accident in containment.

The health and safety of plant personnel and the public were not endangered by this occurrence.

j l

Similar Occurrences:

There were two events that are similar to this event.

The first event, was documented in Licensee Event Report 91-003-00, dated November 8,

1991, for Point Beach Unit 2.

The second event, subsequent to this event, was documented in Licensee Event Report 93-004-00, dated May 10, 1993, for Unit 1.

No similar events that have occurred since the above noted licensee event report.

ceneric Implications None.