IR 05000373/1985038

Insp Repts 50-373/85-38 & 50-374/85-39 on 851113-1230.No Violation or Deviation Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety, Surveillance,Maint,Lers & Headquarters & Region Requests

ML20140C667
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	01/15/1986
From:	Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140C651	List: IR 05000373/1985038 ML20140C646
References
50-373-85-38, 50-374-85-39, CAL-85-11, NUDOCS 8601280383
Download: ML20140C667 (12)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j REGION III

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Report Nas: 50-373/85038(DRP);50-374/85039(DRP)

Docket Nos: 50-373; 50-374 Licenses _No. NPF-11; NPF-18

.: 1 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

!! . s Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

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Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL

,t, l Inspection Conducted: November 13 through December 30, 1985

, , Inspectors: M. J. Jordan J. Bjorgen R. Kopriva N. Choules

R. Landsman A. Morrongiello

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l S. Stasek Approved By:

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. C. Wright, Chief ///6/)hb i- Reactor Projects Section 2C Date l-

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. Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 13 threnn U.<ruber 30, 1985 (Reports No.

> 50-373/85038(DRP); 50-374/85039(DRP)) ~

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident t

inspectors and regional inspectors of licensee actions on previous

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. inspection. findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance;

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. Licensee Event Reports; headquarters requests; and region request _ The . inspection involved a. total of 462 inspector-hours onsite by seven NRC ,

inspectors including 89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shift '

l Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Although no violations were issued, the licensee continues to have problems with the planning and coordination of work activities resulting in missed samples, missed surveillances, and over looking maintenance activities that ultimately affect operation of the facility. As briefly addressed in this report, these ar.d other concerns resulted in a separate request for,the licei;see, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), to develop a corrective action plan, g601280303e6gg73~

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

. * J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent

• C. E. Sargent, Production Superintendent

• D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

• W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, Operations M. Jeisy, Quality Assurance

P. Manning, Tech Staff Supervisor

T. Hammerich, Assistant Tech Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the operations, maintenance, health physics, and instrument and control section * Denotes personnel attending the exit interview held on December 30, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Violation (373/84-25-07; 374/84-32-07): Failure to accomplish procurement activities in accordance with documented procedures. This tracking number was inadvertently opened due to an administrative error during the preparation of an inspection repor (0 pen) Open Item (373/85023-08; 374/85018-10(DRP)): Confirmatory Action Letter 85-11, Item 6, requested the licensee to perform a documented review of all Environmental Qualification (EQ) binders to ensure all appropriate EQ requirements were accomplished. The licensee completed this review with Action Item Record (AIR) 373-121-85-00019. The inspector initiated an evaluation of the AIR, the associated EQ binders and related instructions for maintenance and surveillances. Due to the large scope of work identified during this review, the inspection effort could not be completed at the close of the report period. Accordingly, this item will remain open until complete (Closed) Open Item (374/81-00-37(DRP)): According to Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 5, the licensee was to revise rigging procedures to clarify responsibilities, limit loads on slings and better define load path Procedure LMP-GM-9 has been revised to include these requirement (Closed) Violation (373/85023-01; 374/85018-01(DRP)): Severity Level III violation for having three divisions of ECCS inoperable and other  !

actuation instrumentation incorrectly modified. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions outlined in a letter to James Taylor '

from Cordell Reed dated November 26, 1985 and considers them to be adequat (Closed) Violation (373/85023-02(DRP)): Unit 1 RHR shutdown cooling high l suction flow switches inoperable. The corrective actions are included in l the response to the 373/85023-01 violatio . .-. -___ . -.

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(Closed) Open Item (373/85023-05(DRP)): Confirmatory Action Letter item for verifying that critical drawings are properly annotated to reflect the present status of Drawing Change Requests. LAP 810-9 and LAP 1300-2 have been revised to control proper drawing annotation (Closed) Open Item (373/85-07-03(DRP)): The licensee was to walkdown locked valves until the new locks were installed. The new lock installation was completed in November 198 . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the month of December 1985, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:

Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Rooms and Piping Unit 2 Division I, II, & III Batteries and Switchgear Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators Unit 1 and 2 Primary Containment Ventilation and Standby Gas Treatment Systems During this inspection period Unit 1 remained in Cold Shutdown. Unit 1 has the fuel removed for the first refueling outage. Unit 2 was restarted on December 23, 1985 and synchronized to the grid at approximately 10:00 p.m. (CST) following a two month outage for the completion of the installation of environmentally qualified electrical equipment and the inspection of limitorque valve operators. Region III

, provided extended site coverage during 'the startup. Due to delays in repairing and leak rate testing of the personnel access hatch, containment inerting was not completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exceeding 15% power. Accordingly, the licensee declared an Unusual Event at 12:45 a.m. on Christmas Day, December 25, 1985 due to a Technical Specification Action Statement requiring the unit to be in startup within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Power was reduced from 50% to approximately 10%. The containment was successfully inerted at 7:40 a.m. and the Unusual Event was terminate _ _ . . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Contributing to the delay in containment inerting was a relief valve, 0VQ-SV-10 downstream of the nitrogen vaporizer. The valve tends to stick open when the system is operate The relief valve again lifted during inerting, requiring maintenance personnel to be called in to repair the valve. A loss of nitrogen inventory also resulted, necessitating a nitrogen delivery on the holiday. The inspector noted that an open Work Request, L53883, had existed since November 19, 1985 to repair the relief valve. This repair had not been completed prior to Unit 2 restart. The inspector expressed concern to licensee management that this is another example of important maintenance not being completed that eventually impacts on the operation of the facilit Based on a continued Region III concern regarding the licen 'e's inability to improve the regulatory performance at LaSalle, kegion III requested the licensee, via a letter from James Keppler to Cordell Reed dated November 22, 1985, to evaluate and address several concerns including the adequacy of management, maintenance and modification programs, the control of work activities, the implementation of the Regulatory Improvement Program, and the adequacy of the resources committed to the station. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the licensee was requested to reply within 30 days outlining the plans and programs to resolve the noted concerns. Completion of the actions associated with the licensee's response will be addressed in future inspection report On November 15, 1985, the Unit 2 "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) service water pump was started for post maintenance testing of the "B" Process RadiationMonitor(PRM). The test failed but the RHR service water system was left running. Technical Specification 3.3.7.10 requires that grab samples be taken of the system water at least once every eight hours with the PRM not operable. Operations personnel failed to notify the Radiation Chemistry Department to take the samples. Two samples were missed due to failure of the operations staff to make the required sample reques Missed samples has been a recurring problem as discussed in the previously mentioned letter pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f). The licensees corrective actions have been outlined in Licensee Event Report 374/85-047. These include investigating alternate methods for obtaining samples, and reviewing shift turnover requirements stressing the importance of testing in progress. Due to the licensee's prompt identification and planned corrective actions, a violation will not be issued. Completion of the corrective actions, however, will be tracked as an open item (374/85039-01(DRP)).

The inspector observed a special test to crosstie the Unit 1 Division 2 Emergency Core Cooling System bus to the Unit 2 Division 2 bu This special test, LLP 85-110, was performed to assure the crosstie capability in support of removing the common Diesel Generator from service for installation of a prelube modification. The inspector observed the lifting of leads and installation of jumpers, satisfactory completion of the testing, conformance to Technical Specification requirements, and the use of technically adequate procedures. The inspector also reviewed the revised administrative controls to be used to remind the unit operators

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of the special plant conditions while the common diesel is out of service. No problems were identified in this are Cr. November 25, 1985, a security guard found the chain and lock for the

"1A" Diesel Generator cooler outlet valve on the floor beneath the valv The lock was still locked holding two pieces of chain together. The licenser:'s investigation determined that the chain had apparently been originally installed as two chains tangled together. The two chains eventually worked loose and fell off the valve. The valve position was verified to be correct, a new chain was installed and all other valves in the area were also verified to be properly locked. The Region III security branch was notified for information. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and actions and consider them to be adequat Following removal of the fuel from the Unit I reactor vessel, the licensee began preparations for removal of various control rod drive In parallel, the licensee had begun replacement of the Primary Containment Vent and Purge System (VQ) isolation dampers. Since the Unit I and 2 VQ and Standby Gas Treatment (VG) Systems crosstie to provide redundant accident response capability, the shift raised a concern about the ability to consider the VQ & VG systems operable with the Unit 1 VQ dan pers removed. The licensee suspended all Unit 1 core modifications while reviewing this concern. The inspector reviewed the VQ and VG systems design criteria using the licensee's system training manuals, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and the related Regulatory Guide and Industry Standards, Regulatory Guide 1.52 and ANSI N509. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's accident procedures, LGA-03 and LOA-VP-03 for conformance to the design criteri The inspector noted a problem with the design of the VQ and VG system Discussion with the licensee confirmed that the concerns have previously been identified in the licensee's Safety Evaluation Report and by Unit 2 License Condition No. 4. The licensee has committed to resolve these design and operational issues by July 1, 1986 by a letter dated November 8, 1985 from H. Massin to H. Denton. The concerns relate to the ability of the VQ and VG systems to safely depressurize the containment. The purge valves and containment venting systems may not be adequately designed to withstand all system pressure transients. The inspector noted that procedure LOA-VP-03 currently allows the unit operator to fully open the 26 inch containment isolation valves during containment depressurizatio This action could overpressurize the venting systems. In view of the duct work design concerns, this procedure is considered to require interim revision or other administrative action taken to prevent potential system damage. Completion of this action will be tracked as an open item (373/85038'-01(DRP); 374/85039-02(DRP)).

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed the operational testing of the 2B Diesel Generator during troubleshooting of the fuel pump failure alarm using procedures LOS-DG-M3, LES-DG-101, and LST 85-176. The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures but noted that the testing could not be

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satisfactorily completed due to indication problems with the control room frequency meter. The control room frequency meter indication disagreed with the local indication. The control room meter was subsequently found

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to have simply stuck at approximately 60.5 hert It was checked for calibration, freed, and functionally tested satisfactoril The fuel pump failure alarm was found to be caused by electronic noise in the alarm circuit. The 2B Diesel noise suppression circuit was found to

. differ from the Unit 1 diesels. The problem was referred to the technical staff for evaluation. The alarm does not prevent the emergency operation functions of the diese Final resolution of the fuel pump failure alarm problem will be tracked as an open item (374/85039-03 (DRP)).

The inspector also observed the monthly testing of the 2A Standby Liquid Control Pump, LOS-SC-M1. The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, proper operation of the equipment, compliance with Technical Specifications and the ASME Code,Section XI, and proper return of equipment to standby status. The inspector also reviewed the training records of the equipment attendants to verify received training was adequate to perform the surveillanc The inspector noted that the system piping adjacent to the test flow meter appeared to have excessive vibration during the tes The licensee was notified for information and evaluation for possible hanger relocation. This piping is not in the accident related flow path and additional inspector followup is not considered necessary.

3 The licensee notified the inspector on December 4,1985 that a monthly j fire protection hose station inspection, LMS-FP-15, had been missed. The responsible surveillance coordinator went on vacation without providing

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an adequate turnover to his replacement. The surveillance became i

critical on November 30, 1985 but was not completed until December 3, 1985. Technical Specification 3.7.5.4 requires compensatory action to be initiated within one hour for fire zones required to have operable fire hoses. A special report is required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to Technical Specification 6. Failure to take the required

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action within one hour would normally be a Severity Level IV violatio Based on the enforcement policy of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, however, a

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violation will not be issued based on the licensee's prompt identification and corrective action On December 14, 1985, the licensee reported that the control room Ventilation System (VC) failed the 18 month surveillance test. They also reported that some data had been taken on the "A" train on September 11,

1985 which indicated a problem with the system, however, no action at that time had been taken to confirm or disprove operability of the system. A subsequent investigation by the licensee determined that the data taken in September was not valid because access to the control room was not restricted, and opening and closing of the control room doors gave invalid differential pressure and flow indication for the VC system.

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When the test was performed in December, the access to the control room was restricted and data taken indicated that acceptable flow and differential pressure were obtained for train "A". The "B" train was also tested in December with flows and differential pressures failing the l

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surveillance test. The licensee subsequently declared the system inoperable and took the action required by the Technical Specification The inspector held discussions with the site management on the failure of the licensee to issue a Deviation Report (DVR) required by procedure LAP-1500-5 on the data taken in September so that they could have determined operability of the VC "A" train. Concern was also expressed i for the lack of sufficient management overview and direction that prevented the surveillance frem being completed when due (i.e. 18 months)

and not being completed until it became critical (i.e. 18 months plus 25%) with data indicating a potential failure. The inspector also expressed concern that the procedure was not sufficient to allow taking data that could be used to determine operability. The licensee agreed with the concerns and took action as follows to resolve the problems: The licensee management counseled the individual who took the data to make him aware of his responsibility to inform his management of the unacceptable data, and take action to either validate the data or to have the system declared inoperabl . The supervisor was counseled about keeping track of surveillance testing status to try to prevent exceeding due dates and following up on why surveillances are delayed to assure that critical dates are not exceede . Items 1 and 2 above were discussed with all Technical Staff personnel and the licensee management was evaluating extending this discussion to the operating and maintenance department . The licensee was also evaluating several procedure changes such as:

a) Providing instructions on how to handle questionable data after it was take b) Changing the 18 month surveillance procedure (LTS-400-15) to require control room access to be restricte c) Include the LCO time clock in the LTS-400-15 procedur d) Require the operating procedure (LOP-VC-05) to record the differential pressure, e) Revise the monthly operating surveillance procedure (LOS-VC-M1)

tolerance on flow from "plus or minus 10% to plus 0% minus 10%."

This problem was considered to be an isolated case where data was taken which indicated an operability problem and verification of the data was not accomplished in a relative short period of time. The licensee identified the problem to the NRC and their corrective action was extensive. Applying the enforcement policy of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2, no violations were issue . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

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Q The inspector followed the installation of the prelubrication modification for the IB Diesel Generator, M-1-1-82-319 (Work Request L20784), being installed to satisfy License Condition 2.C.(21)b. The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, compliance with Technical Specifications and the ASME code, proper adherence to the licensee's Quality Assurance program in the areas of material procurement, design control and Quality Control hold points. The inspector also reviewed the post modification test requirements for incorporation of all applicable design parameters.

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The inspector observed troubleshooting of the Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System flow control damper, IVG002, per Work Request L 54108. The damper was noted to stick in the intermediate position upon shutdown of the train following the monthly surveillance test. The licensee tested the damper using an alternate power supply. The damper could not be made to stick again during the troubleshooting with the alternate power supply. Accordingly, the licensee suspected dirt in the actuator oil system that could be preventing the close dump valve from opening. The licensee subsequently changed the actuator oil and satisfactorily cycled the damper ten times. The root cause of the sticking problem could not be verified, although some sediment was noted in the removed oil. The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, conformance to Technical Specifications, and proper return of the system to servic The inspector reviewed the licensee's modification package for Environmental Qualification of the 2E22F010 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System full flow test upstream stop valve, modification M-1-2-84-132 (Work Request L 39176). The inspector reviewed the package to evaluate the adequacy of the work instructions, appropriate reference to Technical Specification requirements, appropriate Quality Control hold i points, and the quality of post modification testing requirements. No items of concern were identifie The inspector also followed the inservice testing of Unit 1 mechanical snubbers removed from various piping systems. The inspector reviewed procedures LTS 500-14 and LMP-H0-0 The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, conformance to Technical Specifications and the ASME Cod The inspector also reviewed the contractor test methods for conformance to the snubber manufacturer's recommendations, and noted the use of appropriate radiological control It was noted that one of the 55 snubbers in the initial sample failed the drag test due to tape adhesive residue accumulated on the snubber shaft apparently left over from initial construction. Accordingly, an additional 28 snubbers were removed for testin No items of concern were identified i in this are On December 9-11, 1985, a special inspection of the modifications done on

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. Unit 2 during the recent outage was performed in order to determine equipment operability. The inspectors verified that the packages contained the appropriate documentation, that adequate procedures were used, and that adequate Quality Control hold points were used. The inspectors also verified that satisfactory post installation testing was accomplished to determine the equipment operabilit _ _ __ _

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The only finding was a support strut for a valve motor was not originally going to be installed by the licensee during the outage. After discussions with the licensee on this subject, the licensee agreed to install the strut, which was accomplishe During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the following modification packages: Modification Package M-1-2-85-066 - Replacement of two control room ventilation system damper actuator breakers with temperature compensated breaker l l Modification Package M-1-2-85-065 (Work Request #53398) - Addition l of Resistor Capacitor (RC) filter to Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) '

System timer motors to prevent interaction with main steam line leak detection Riley Modification Package M-1-2-84-132 - Replacement of limitorque valve actuators (motors) having B type winding insulation with equivalent I motors having RH type insulatio l l Modification Package M-1-1-84-079 and M-1-2-84-124 - Power cabinet l relocation and thermal couple replacements to meet EQ requirements on the Hydrogen Recombiner Modification Package M-1-2-85-015 - Replacement of non EQ flow elements with flow elements that meet EQ requirement on the MSIV l leakage control syste As indicated in Inspection Report 373/85032; 374/85033, the licensee l could not find the calibration test data for the 28 Diesel Generator l cooling pump breaker associated with WR 52568 and LER 374/85042-00. As a l result, the licensee removed the breaker from the Motor Control Center '

(MCC) for calibration the week of December 15, 1985. The licensee had established 1250 amps as the minimum current at which the breaker should tri Initial calibration checks of the breaker indicated that the breaker was tripping at 1170 amps on the C phas Further investigation showed the equipment used was not within calibration and the trip readings were low. The actual trip points for the C phase were determined to be 1339 amps and 1378 and 1368 amps for the A and B phases. The trips were higher than the minimum 1250 amps set by the licensee and indicates the breaker was operable when it was installed in the MCC during plant operatio As a result of the out-of-calibration test equipment the licensee decided to calibrate the breaker and other spare breakers on a calibrated tester at the Braidwood Plan The licensee also contacted the breaker vendor regarding the apparent inaccuracies of the breaker dial settings given in vendor supplied data. The vendor indicated that to obtain an accurate trip setting for a given dial setting, an actual test must be performe On December 19, 1985, the inspector witnessed, at the Braidwood Plant, the testing of the breaker which was installed in the 2B Diesel Generator

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cooling pump MCC and a spare breaker. Testing of the breakers was somewhat difficult in that for the three phases going into the breaker, trip currents varied as much as a hundred amps. Finding the actual trip point required several different current input Repeated tests at close intervals could not be performed since heating due to current going through the breaker could change the trip point. Therefore, time had to be allowed to cool down the breaker. Satisfactory calibrations were obtained for both breakers. The spare breaker was installed since the final calibration resulted in somewhat higher trip settings. The trip settings for the three phases of the breaker ranged from about 1450 amps to 1550 amps at a dial setting of approximately S.2 The Diesel Generator cooling pump breaker is a molded case General Electric " Mag Break" motor circuit protector model TEC 36150, continuously rated at 150 amp Based on the above experience with molded case breakers, the licensee was asked to review the adequacy of testing of other molded case breakers in other applications. The licensee agreed to perform this review. This is considered to be an open item pending further review of the licensee's action (373/85038-02(DRP); 374/85039-04(DRP)).

6. Licensee Event Reports (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification /85069-00 - Missed Fire Protection Hose Station Surveillanc This was a personnel erro /85059-00 - Spurious Alarm and Trip of "B" Control Room Chlorine Detector. Corrective action being followed by open item 373/85030-0 /85065-00 - Spurious Trip of "B" VC Chlorine Detectors - Continuing problem. Being tracked by open item 373/85030-0 /84054-01 - Revised to Identify RCIC Trip Due to Rust Inhibitor Precipitating in Mobil Vaportex 011. Oil replaced with Gulf Crest 32 oi /85064-00 - Spurious Trip of "B" Ammonia Detector - Being followed by open item 373/85030-07 for corrective actio /85046-00 - A LPCI Minimum Flow Valve and HPCS Out-of-Service Escalated enforcement. See Report 85034. This also was reported lat /85044-00 - Group I Isolation and Scra Reactor Water Cleanup flow timer lacked RC circuit to prevent spurious spikes. A modification was installed to correct the proble .

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374/85047-00 - Missed Sample of the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Syste This was a personnel error. Open item assigned to track corrective action (374/85039-05(DRP)) as outlined in the LE /85067-00 "1B" Chlorine Detector Spurious Alarm. Continuing problem. Open item in Report 85031 and 50.54(f) response are tracking resolutio /85045-00 - RHR "B" Shutdown Cooling Isolatio Personnel error while lifting lead /85042-00 "2B" Diesel Cooling Water Pump Breaker Proble Investigated and open item assigned in 8503 /85063-01 "B" Chlorine Detector Tri Clogged orifice for electrolyt Dirt precipitate and/or fungus formation. Ongoing problem to be resolved by 50.54(f) respons /85063-00 "B" Chlorine Detector Trip. Low electrolyte flo Ongoing problem to be resolved by 50.54(f) respons /85068-00 - RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation. Suction piping not completely filled and vented caused high flow isolatio /85043-00 - Vacuum Breaker "2A" Cycled Spurious. Cause unknow Repeated occurrence. The licensee's willingness to accept these spurious actuations is an item of concern. Additional investigation and corrective action will be tracked as an open item 374/85039-06(DRP)).

7. Headquarters Requests (25122)

NRC Headquarters requested the inspector to obtain data concerning the quality of construction activities performed by Reactor Controls Incorporated (RCI) as a followup to problems identified at other facilities (T/I 2512/12). The inspector noted that the licensee had identified a potential problem in the Unit 2 scram discharge volume drain piping. A seven foot portion of the drain line was fcund not to have been analyzed in the system stress report due to a breakdown in the system boundary controls between two contractors. Subsequent analysis confirmed that actual piping stresses were within required limit The licensee has initiated a review of all remaining RCI construction activities for identification of any additional problem Inspector followup and completion of this action will be tracked as an open item (373/85038-03; 374/85039-07(DRP)).

8. Region Requests (92705)

NRC Region III requested, via a letter from C. Norelius to Cordell Reed dated November 26, 1985, that the licensee review equipment received from Exo-Sensors, Inc.. This vendor is a supplier of atmosphere monitoring equipment such as hydrogen analyzers. As noted in the letter, an NRC inspection by the vendor branch had identified several breakdowns

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in the vendor's Quality Assurance Program. Accordingly, each licensee that purchased equipment from Exo-Sensor's Inc. was requested to evaluate the equipment received for conformance to requirements. The licensee was requested to forward a report of this review within 30 days to the NRC Region III office. This response was forwarded by a letter dated December 13, 1985 from H. Massin to J. Keppler stating that only non safety related off gas hydrogen analyzers were purchased for LaSall These analyzers were purchased with no special Quality Assurance requirements. This item is considered closed. Administrative closeout of this action will be tracked by closing open items (373/85038-04(DRP);

374/85039-08(DRP)). Open Items

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Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary .

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