IR 05000373/1985030

Insp Repts 50-373/85-30 & 50-374/85-31 on 850907-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Surveillance, Maint & Interim Radwaste Storage

ML20138F544
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	10/21/1985
From:	Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138F467	List: IR 05000373/1985030 ML20138F461
References
50-373-85-30, 50-374-85-31, NUDOCS 8510250283
Download: ML20138F544 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III ,

Report Nos: 50-373/85030(DRP); 50-374/85031(DRP)

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Docket Nos: 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

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Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: September 7-30, 1985 Inspectors: M. J. Jordan I J. Bjorgen R. Kopriva N. Nicholson

Approved By: .C W t Chief Reactor Projects Section 2

/0//tdf Date Inspection Summary -

Inspection on September 7-30, 1985 (Reports No. 50-373/85030(DRP);

50-374/85031(DRP)

i Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational ,

safety; surveillance; maintenance; interim radwaste storage; Licensee Event Reports; headquarters requests; and licensee training. The inspection involved a total of 203 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors including 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shift Results: The licensee continues to have difficulty in resolving the problem with unnecessary ESF actuations of the chlorine detectors and the recurring i

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problem of high radiation doors.being left open. The licensee's corrective

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actions in these areas have not been effective to prevent recurrence. The licensee's planning and scheduling of work to be accomplished during the upcoming Unit 1 outage has not been effective as indicated by the necessity to acquire two emergency changes to the Technical Specifications because the licensee had originally overlooked items of which would have required an

. early shutdown of Unit 1. Further, the inspectors have been requesting an g j% 3 G

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overall schedule of_.the work planned for the upcoming ~ outage and at the end of.the inspection period have not been provided with a schedule. The licensee does appear to have opened channels of-communication with the other sites to prevent similar problems from occurring at this site'as documented in Part 3 of this report. A problem was noted, however, with a valve being returned to service that had a part in it that did not meet original vendor requirements ,

and did not have an evaluation to justify its us .

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DETAILS Persons Contacted G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station

• R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent

• C. E. Sargent, Production Superintendent

• D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, Operations t M. Jeisy, Quality Assurance

• H. Massin, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• P. Manning, Tech Staff Supervisor

,fT. Hammerich, Assistant Tech Staff Supervisor The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the operations, maintenance, health physics, and instrument and control section * Denotes personnel attending the exit interview held on September 30, 198 I Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(0 pen) Open Item (373/85007-03; 374/85007-03(DRP)): The licensee was

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, to verify the position of all ESF locked valves, except those in high i radiation areas, on a weekly basis (subsequently relaxed to 14 days).

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, i The licensee has completed replacement of the locks on these valves and

3i instituted a new key control procedure. Accordingly, the periodic

commitment to verify valve positions for these valves.is no longer L

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required. This item will remain open, however, until all ESF valve locks are replace (Closed) Open Item (374/84002-05(DRP)): The licensee completed followup action to a 10 CFR Part 21 Report on a defective stem guide bushing on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System turbine throttle valve. Work Request L35433 replaced the bushin , ', (Closed) Open Item (373/84010-02(DRP)): The licensee was to complete

.' ' inspection and repairs to 105 electrical cable splices. The reinspection i anthrepair was completed by bork Request L3481 (Clased) Violation (374/65017-04(DRP)): Several inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature and Reactor Protection System operations. The licensee

, < has conducted training and issued procedure LOP-AA-03 to assist operators

'in determining the consequences of mode switch change . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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E The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable s logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the hspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected

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emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the month of September 1985, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:

Unit 1 and 2 Standby Liquid Control Systems Unit 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment Systems Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators Unit 1 Division II 125 Volt Battery and Switchgear Unit 2 Division I 125 Volt and 250 Volt Batteries and Switchgear Unit 1 A and B RHR Pump Rooms and Piping The licensee reported to the resident inspector a problem which occurred at the Dresden Station concerning the synchronizing of the opening of the vent valves and closure of the scram valves on the scram discharge volum This may also be a problem at LaSalle. The problem at Dresden occurred when the mode switch contacts did not all pickup resulting in one channel of the scram system being able-to be reset and the other channel remaining tripped. This configuration allowed the vent valves on the scram discharge volume to open with the scram valves still open due to the scram pilot solenoids associated with the reset channel having high leakage. The licensee received this information from Dresden and took administrative action to prevent the occurrence at LaSalle. This is documented here to emphasize the ability of the station to communicate with other sites'on problems and take action to prevent the occurrence at LaSall During this inspection period, the licensee continued to have a problem with high radiation doors being left open. This problem appeared to had '

been resolved since the last occurrences of this nature which happened in April 1985. However, during this inspection period,-four (4) high radiation area doors were found left open. The licensee has taken action /

to stop these occurrences. These events have been designated as unresolved items and forwarded to the region for further evaluation by the radiation specialist assigned to LaSalle (373/85030-01; 374/85031-01(DRP)).

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed the operation of the IB Emergency Diesel Generator !

(LOS-DG-M3). The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, conformance to Technical Specifications, and noted satisfactory operation of the equipmen \

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The inspector observed the functional testing of the Unit 2 RHR (LPCI Mode) pump discharge pressure permissive switches (LIS-RH-401). The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, the use of appropriate radiological controls, and that test equipment was currently calibrated. The inspector also verified that the instruments were satisfactorily returned to servic . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspector followed the licensee's actions during the chemical cleaning of the 1A and 1B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Heat Exchangers. The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures, implementation of appropriate upgraded fire prevention controls, the use of appropriate radiological controls, and compliance with the Technical Specifications. The chemical cleaning process of each heat exchanger included provisions for exhausting the fumes from the process to the atmosphere by utilizing a penetration through the secondary containmen The inspector verified that the licensee's procedure for maintaining secondary containment complied with the Technical Specification The inspector observed the disassembly and inspection of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Process Radiation Monitor (PRM) (Work Request 51526). The inspector verified the use of technically adequate procedures and appropriate radiological and cleanliness control The inspector observed portions of the installation of the Environmentally Qualified motor on the limitorque operator for the Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System suction valve 2E12F004A (Modification M-1-2-84-132; W/R 39176). The inspector verified the use of technically adequate proceiiures and appropriate radiological controls. The inspector also reviewed the modification package for appropriate testing requirements. The inspector noted that the modification package controlled the work for several valves. The actual work and testing of each valve required the use of three separate documents; the modification package, a work request package, and a surveillance test. Accordingly, the inspector expressed a concern to the licensee about the possibility of missing key work step The licensee reported to the residents a potential generic problem with the limitorque actuators. The internal wiring on a jumper in the switch board between the limit switch and the torque switch was not of the same material as the wiring used by limitorque during Environmental Qualifications. The licensee is presently evaluating the affect of this improper material. This will be followed as an open item (373/85030-02; 374/85031-02(DRP)).

The inspector also monitored the licensee's activities while excavating

.the Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System full flow test lin As noted in Inspection Report 373/85017, the piping was found to be

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leaking in May 1985 during a full flow test of the HPCS system. The licensee is excavating the pipe to determine the cause of failur A region based inspector is following this investigation and the results will be documented in a future repor The inspector, while reviewing the licensee's Degraded Equipment Log, noted that the Unit 2 Scram Discharge Volume Vent Valve 2C11F380 was identified as having a non safety related part installe Subsequent discussion with the licensee found that the original spring tension plate had faile Since the original part was a casting and hard to obtain, the licensee decided to manufacture a temporary replacement from forged material. The licensee proceeded to install the part and declared the valve technically inoperable and degraded on August 17, 1985. Surveillance testing, LOS-RD-M1, was satisfactorily performe When the inspector reviewed the work package on September 27, 1985, a concern was raised about the operability of the valve, the scram discharge volume, and the control rod drives. The licensee had received the correct replacement part and was proceeding with installation on the afternoon of September 27, 1985. The licensee initiated an Unusual Event at 6:00 p.m. CDT on September 27, 1985 and terminated the Unusual Event at 6:20 p.m. when repair and testing of the valve was complete The licensee disagrees with the NRC opinion that the control rods were inoperabl At the close of this report period, this issue was still under investigation and will be tracked as an unresolved item (374/85031-03(DRP)).

6. Interim Radwaste Storage (65051)

The licensee is constructing an Interim Radwaste Storage Facility (IRSF) to store low level waste onsite for a maximum five year perio This is because of the potential for closure of the existing three low level radioactive waste burial sites to radioactive waste generators from outside the geographic boundaries of the " compacts" containing the burial sites. The IRSF is a generic Commonwealth Edison design under construction also at the Quad Cities and Zion stations. Noncombustible, solidified waste generated onsite will be stored in the IRSF; separate storage facilities and alternatives for dry radioactive waste are under consideration. Design storage capacity of the LaSalle IRSF is approximately 3.1 years, based on FSAR generation rates. An inspector observed onsite construction activities; scheduled completion date is March 1986. Adequate storage space during the interim is available in the radwaste buildin The IRSF is being built in accordance with the Uniform Building Code and consists of a storage area, truck bay / loading area, control room, and mechanical / equipment roo Hookups and space for decontamination facilities are availabl Two blind sumps - one collecting runoff from the storage and decontamination area, the other from the truck bay - have been installed and will be drained and contents treated as potentially

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contaminate As an ALARA measure, no personnel access to the storage area is anticipated; no personnel doors to the area have been constructed. Containers are remotely manipulated by an overhead cran According to licensee representatives, smearable and direct radiation levels of stored containers will be in accordance with D0T shipping criteria; the containers will be sealed in a shippable for No further pre-shipment processing is anticipated. Containers will be resurveyed before final shipmen The licensee is developing an operational surveillance program for the IRSF. In response to the inspector's comments, licensee representatives will:

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formalize sampling programs to routinely monitor sump collections and ambient control room and storage area / truck bay atmospher (0 pen Item 373/85030-03; 374/85031-04(DRSS)).

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develop a container inspection program to verify stored container integrity has not been breached. (0 pen Item 373/85030-04; 374/85031-05(DRSS)).

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review the potential for hydrogen and gaseous generation from resin stored for extended time periods and develop a gaseous monitoring system if applicable. (0 pen Item 373/85030-05; 374/85031-06(DRSS)).

The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation required before facility operations was reviewed by the inspector. This evaluation will be reviewed further during a future inspection. This will be followed as open item 373/85030-06; 374/85031-07(DRSS)).

7. Licensee Event Reports (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordan c with Technical Specification /85060-00 - Ammonia and Chlorine Detector Trips Upon Inadvertent Disconnect of Power Supply. This was a personnel erro /85062-00 - Chlorine Trip of "B" VC/VE Trai Suspected cause believed to be radio frequency interferenc /85058-00 - Reactor' Scram While Performing Surveillanc A violation was issued in Inspection Report 373/8502 /85056-00 - Spurious Trip of "B" Control Room Ventilation System on High Radiation Signal. This was caused by radio interferenc l

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374/84044-01 - Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation on High Flo This was a revised LER to identify that the licensee has reworked piping to correct alignment problems with the relief valve and has revised operating procedur This has reduced the number of unnecessary isolation /85057-00 - Contaminated Drums Found at the LaSalle Station Dum This LER is being followed by a radiation specialist from Region II /85057-01 - Seven 55 gallon drums and an area of soil located in the site dump were found to be contaminated. Security has been instructed on proper vehicle inspection of materials leaving site. Also the

" Unconditional Release Program" has been reviewed end will be enforce /85038-00 - Failure to Calibrate 2821-N101B RCIC High Level Trip Switch. This was discussed in Inspection Report 374/8502 /84043-01 - Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Isolation on High Differential Flow. Revised to update cause and corrective actions section. Operations personnel have been instructed on how to determine the position of ball valves and signs have been placed at the ball valves explaining how to determine valve positio /84045-01 - Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Isolation. High differential flow. Supersedes previous report to update the corrective actions section of the report. Operating personnel have been instructed on how to determine the position of ball valves and signs have been placed at the ball valves explaining how to determine valve positio /85039-00 - Electrical Fault on ECCS Division III MCC 243-1. Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling Sysem Division III Feedbreaker tripped resulting in a loss at power to Bus 243-1. Cause of the trip was an electrical fault originating from the 2B Diesel Generator cooling water pump circuit breaker compartmen The compartment was replace /85047-01 - Missed Off Gas Hydrogen Sampl Four samples for hydrogen concentration of the off gas system were collected at an incorrect location due to confusion as to which prefilter was in operation. This error was due to poor communications between operations personne /85061-00 - Failure to Run 1A Diesel Generator Within 1 Hour Timecloc Unit 2A Diesel Generator was taken out of service for air start motor maintenanc Technical Specification 3.8.1 requires the 1A Diesel Generator to be run within one (1) hour from the time the 2A Diesel Generator is declared inoperable. The 1A Diesel Generator surveillance was not performed for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 30 minute Due to the continued problems with chlorine and ammonia detector actuations as identified in the LERs above, the inspectors have requested the licensee to identify what actions they are taking to resolve the unnecessary actuations. The licensee provided the inspectors with the following informatio L

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. By October 10, 1985, the licensee will have made a decision on the need for requesting a Technical Specification change to delete these detector By October 10, 1985, the licensee will have made a decision on the need to replace the present sensors with a different sensor, By November 1, 1985, the licensee will have made a schedule for installing additional detectors if "a" and "b" above do not prove feasibl These actions will be tracked as open item (373/85030-07; 374/85031-08(DRP)).

8. Headquarters Requests (92704)

NRC Headquarters requested the inspector to provide some information on the licensee's operation of the Primary Containment Vent and Purge System. The inspector obtained the requested information as follows:

The primary containment is normally vented through the 26 inch diameter vent syste Each unit is provided with a filter train and vent fan that discharges through the plant offgas stack. The primary containment vent and purge train cross connects to the unit Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT)

Train. The SBGT train may be used to vent the primary containment if the normal vent system is not available. Technical Specifications limit the S8GT being used in this manner to less than 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year. The licensee documents this data in surveillance LOS-VG-SR For Unit 1, in 1984, the SBGT train had a total operating time of 185 hours0.00214 days <br />0.0514 hours <br />3.058862e-4 weeks <br />7.03925e-5 months <br /> with zero hours used in venting the primary containment. Since Unit 2 started commercial operation in October 1984, the SBGT train was operated for 32 total hours until December 14, 1984, with zero hours being utilized to vent the primary containment.

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The primary containment is continuously purged with nitrogen as required to maintain the required containment pressure during normal plant operation. Two nitrogen supply lines are available. A 1 1/2 inch line provides the routine makeup whereas a 4 inch line is available for rapid purge such as needed during unit startup. Plant operating procedures provide instructions for venting and purging to assure proper containment pressure and maintaining drywell to suppression pool differential pressur . Licensee Training (41701)

The inspectors observed portions of the licensee simulator training at the Production Training Center in Braidwood. Licensed operators were being trained on the use of the new Emergency Operating Procedures. The inspectors observed this training in order to become familiar with the i new procedures because they treat the responses to accidents differently 1 than the previously used methods. The new procedures direct the operators to respond to plant parameters rather than a particular even ___-____-_--

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10. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action ca the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5 and . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely infornstienal contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar .

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