ML20137D429
| ML20137D429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1985 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137D426 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511270071 | |
| Download: ML20137D429 (166) | |
Text
r.
7;--
I N
ATTACHMENT CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY Big Rock Point Plant Docket 50-155 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A SEISMIC EVENT AT THE BIG ROCK POINT PLANT November 21, 1985 i
e I
b 0011270071 851121 ADOCK050g5 l*DH f'
164 pages OC1185-0002A-NLO2 l
TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
Introduction II.
Selection of Initiating Events III.
Identification of Important Systems and Equipment Tollowing a Seismic Event IV.
Big Rock Point Plant Response To a Seismic Event (Event Tree r
Description)
V.
Seismic. Capacity, Tailure Modes, Ef fects, Repair and Recovery L
VI.
Methodology for Identification of the Seismic " Weak-Links" at Big Rock Point VII. Tault Trees VIII. Results and Conclusions I
l N110383-2628A-BA01
1 INTRODUCTION Review of the seismic design of the Big Rock Point Plant began in 1979 as a part of Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic III-6. Since that time, relatively significant analyses and modification of the Big Rock Point Plant have been completed. Evaluattoes performed to date have included 15 major structures and systems; anchorage of 56 equipment items which could have an impact on safety-related electrical equipment during a seismic event; analysis of various major mechanical equipment important to plant response following an earthquake; and, seismic qualification of cable tray and conduit raceway systems. Capital expenditures to date have totaled more than $2 million excluding work performed in house or the cost of modifications. Re-evaluation of Big Rock Point seismic resistance therefore, has been the sinple most resource intensive of the more than 100 original SEP topics.
It is also clear from the Nuclear Regulatory Staff's (Staff) draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated October 19, 1982, that seismic reevaluation of Big Rock Point is also the single SEP topic with which the Staff had the most difficulty in coming to a clear conclusion.
In December,1982 the Staff requested Consumers Power Company to investigate alternative methods of resolving the differences of opinion as to the seismic design adequacy of the plant. These alternative methods could consider the comparison of seismic risks at the Big Rock Point site with those considered acceptable at other more typical nuclear power facilities and an evaluation of the consequences of failures as a result of an earthquake or combinations thereof. This report then is in response to this Staf f request and is effectively an assessment of the consequences of a seismic event at the Big Rock Point Plant.
In evaluating the effect of an earthquake at Big Rock Point, consequences can be viewed in two different ways. As indicated by the Staff's request there are the consequences of the failure of various plant components and their effect on the transient response of the plant to these seismically-induced failures; there are also the consequences of the earthquake with respect to the health aad safety of the public should sufficient systems and equipment in the plant fail with a resultant significant radiological release from the site. Seismic hazards levels are specified for each nuclear site by the NRC to minimize the potential for such a radiological release. The seismic-hazards curve for the Big Rock Point site is presented in NUREG-CR-1582, "Seianic Hazards Analysis" and 19 graphically displayed along with the hazards curve f rom the Big Rock Point PRA in Figure I-1 of this report. The Staff has defined the design basis ground acceleration for a given nuclear facility to be that which occurs itse frequently than once every thousand years.
If Big Rock Point were a new facility being constructed today, the design basis ground acceleration would be less than 0.113 (referring to the Staf f's hazards curve). Given that Big Rock Point is significantly different than a typical or average f acility being built or in operation today in that it is much smaller, consideration should be given to applying design NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
l 2
basis ground acceleraties criteria such that the risk er level of protecties afforded the public is ceameasurate with that which is considered seceptable at a newer typical or everage facility, he public risk associated with a seismic event at a nuclear facility any be represented as fellows:
R e f, a P
- D th Where R
= Public risk associated with a seismic event at a nuclear site f'
= Frequency of onceeding a given ground acceleraties abete which a sisatficant release any eccur P
a Fission product investery which potentially can be released gg is curies (propertional to electrical er thermal power)
D
= Public dose per curie released The public dose following a significant event can be viewed la ese of two ways: that dose to the public as s whole; or, that dose as individual may receive as a result of the release. The dose to the public as a whole per curie released has been published for a variety of plaats in NURgG-CR-1497 "Radteactive Materials Release free Nuclear Power Plants" and NURao-CR-1498 " Population Dese Commitment Due to Radioactive Releases free Nuclear Power Plant sites in 1977." A summary of the information presented in these documents is shown in Table I-1.
If the average dose per curie released fer these 33 plaats represents that dose which could be espected from an average er typical plaat*,
them it can be sees that a curie released at the Big Rock Pelat site results la i dose to the public of a factor of 14 lower than a dose free an average er typical site. This is due to the lower population density and its distributies in the Big Rock Potat area. Factoring in that the Big Rock Point Plant design faciuded only 105 et the radienectide investery of the typical plaat, one can see that the risk to the public as a whole is a facter of 140 less severe for a given earthquake at the Big Rock Point site than at a typical site. Risk to individuals la the Big Rock Pelat vicinity is a different matter, bewever. The poteattat dose to an individual is independent of the populaties density or its distributies. Therefore, the individual risk for a given earthquabe is reduced only by the fractional fission product inventory found at Big Rock Point as compared to another site, 101 The risk to an individual in the Bis Rock Potat Plant area is therefore a facter of 10 less than for sa tedividual near a typical facility.
Ustas saly the individual risk perspective, one esa coactude that requiring the design tiesis ground motion for the Big Rock Point Pisat to be equivalent to that which would be applied to a newer typical facility results in the mandatory implementation of a level of protection to the health and safety of the public at least a facter of ten more restrictive than at the newer facility, such a requirement is set
- Assumes meteorelegy, rette of dose to inhalation, and terrain similar for these plants.
NUO383 262sA~gA01
3 l
necessary, given the public risk posed by Big Rock. CPCo and the staff coactuded that less quantitative, rigorous approaches to determining the seismic risks were appropriate.
Qualitatively, an assessment of a power plant's resistance to an earthquake can be made by using Table I-2 of this section, which gives a brief description of the effects on objects at various Hodified Mercalli Intensity Oft!) categories. Usina the original plant design seismic loading factor, low end Category V1 effects may be expected.
If the Staffs hasard curve value for Big Rock Point (if Big Rock were considered as a new facility), high end Category VI - low end Category VII effects may be expected. Since Big Rock Point is constructed of structural steel and reinforced concrete (with masonary catagorized as masonary 'C') the expected damage would include some cracks to the masonary 'C' walls and broken glassware, but n_o major structural damage is espected to occur. This, therefore, supports the conclusion that qualitative assessments of the need for seismic upgrading of the Big Rock Point Plant are appropriate.
An alternate approach in performing a seismic consequence analysis is to forego the use of hazards curves altogether and attempt to determine the maximum size earthquake the facility can withstand based on knowledge of plant transient response and relative structural capacity of plant systems and components. This is the approach taken in generating this report. A brief description of this approach follows and is presented in greater detail in later sections of the report.
Identifying the design features of the plant most susceptible to the earthquake, those transients which were felt most important or most likely to occur following a seismic event were selected. Three transients were chosen for study loss of offsite powers a medium steam line break inside containments and an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). Loss of offsite power was chosen because of its ef fect on essentially every mitigating system at Big Rock Point. Other transients affect only portions of the systems avattable to shut down and cool the reactor. The medium steam line break inside containment.
was chosen because for this Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), adequate core cooling is dependent on the most systems. Steam line breaks inside containment require the use of enclosure sprays to maintain containment atmosphere within the environmental qualification envelope.
A medium break was selected because it requires the satisfactory functioning of the Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) to prevent core damage.
The logic behind each of these transients had been developed previously in the PRA. The loss of offsite power and medium steam line break event trees were extracted from the PNA and modified to reflect the use of only those systems which could potentially be shown to survive the earthquake. The logic (by which failure of the systems were noted) in the event trees was also extracted from the PRA. Tault trees for each of these systems were reviewed and substantially simplified. As an caseple, the RDS tree was revised to include only a single train of power supplies, sensors, actuation cabinets, and depressurination valves because all four trains are essentially identical to each other WUO343 262sA-BA01
4 in terms of their function, location and structural features. In other words, if one train fails as a result of the seismic event, this study assumed the likelihood of a similar failure in the other trains was quite high. Components which may have dissimilar seismic resistance (such as the two diesel generators) or have functional dissimilarities in the way they operate (such as the fire pumps and their power supplies) were not combined in this manner. Passive components and structures normally unimportant during these transients but whose failures may be made important as a result of ground motion were added to the trees (such as masonry walls).
By combining the fault trees for each core damaga sequence, dependencies between the important systems were identified and a complete list of cut sets
- for each sequence was produced. All the combinations of all the failures which must occur following an earthquake at Big Rock Point were thus tabulated for each core damage sequence identified in the event trees. Over ten thousand of these cut sets were produced with the size of the cut sets ranging from one to seven members.
A conservative estimated ground acceleration which would result in the failure of each component in the fault trees was determined. Applying these accelerations to the cut set members, the acceleration at which all members of a cut set will fail was determined. This acceleration was the acceleration at which the strongest component in the cut set failed and represented the seismic resistance of that cut set. The seismic resistances for all the cut sets were ranked with respect to the size of the earthquake necessary to satisfy the cut set. Those cat sets which were satisfied at the smallest ground accelerations represent the seismic " weak links" at the Big Rock Point Plant. These weak links are the components and structures at which proposed modifications for upgrading the plant should be aimed. Modifications addressing members of the more seismically resistant cut sets are of little benefit unless the weaker links are also addressed.
It was recognized that the best estimate ground accelerations for many of the components identified in the attachments were not available.
However, a great deal of information was extracted from the Big Rock Point design and review analyses performed to date as a part of the SEP. Where this information was not available, a conservative approximation of the failure acceleration was used, in some cases even a value of zero. The more components with which this approach was taken the more artificially important seismic events would become.
The weakest of the weak links combined with the acceleration at which the transient occurs represented an estimate of that size earthquake which would result in a significant release. This estimate obviously does not represent a rigorous deterministic analysis. Nor does it represent a quality PRA evaluation. Risk is presented in units of ground acceleration and no mention of probability is made. The acceleration at which the weakest link fails cannot be translated to a core damage probability by use of a hasards curve because the effect of
- A minimal cut set is a smallest combination of component fattures which, if they all occur, will cause the top event to occur, VII 15 NUREO-0492 - Fault Tree Handbook - January 1981.
NUO383 2628A BA01
/
5 random failures on top of seismically induced failures has not been incorporated in this analysis and no effort has been made to address the effects of the uncertainties associated with the assumed component capacities.
This approach can be used to rank the relative importance of various combinations of failures against one another, however.
It is, therefore, useful in focusing any future efforts in assessing or upgrading the seismic capacity of the Big Rock Point Plant.
The report is broken up into several sections besides the introduction.
These include the following:
Section Description II Selection of Initiating Events Identifies the appropriateness and completeness of selection of the loss of offsite power, medium steam line break and failure to SCRAM in evaluating seismic risks at Big Rock Point.
III Identification of Important Systems and Equipment Introduction to Big Rock Point systems, structures and components important in the mitigation of the loss of of fsite power and medium steam line break events.
IV Big Rock Point Plant Response to an Earthquake Detailed description of plant transient response to steam line break and loss of offsite power events.
Introduction of event tree logic for these events.
l l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
l I
6 V
Seismic Capacity of BRF Structures and Components Identification of assumed capacity for each structure and component important during a seismic event.
Failure mode and effects analysis for each component. Discussion of assumptions made with respect to repair and recovery following an earthquake.
VI Methodology Description of methods developed for identification of Big Rock Point seismic " weak-links".
VII Fault Trees System logic models important to loss of offsite power and main steam line break events.
VIII Results and Conclusions Prioritized listing of seismic
" weak-links" at Big Rock Point ranked from weakest to strongest.
Commitments to upgrade plant.
NUO383 2628A-BA01 u.
7 s
The last sectic,n o the report contains the conclusions of this phase of the review of Brg Rock Point's seismic resistance.
It contains commitments to specific upgrading or elimination of design features
'within plant.systemi, structures and components (those with unknown capacity) that represent the' plant's weakest links. These upgrades
~
include:
1.
Prov ding tig prevention for the toobcabinets in the toolcrib.
2.
Installing impact bumpers to reduce jarring of the actor operated valves, or modifications to reduce interference.
3.
Installing a removable stop to prevent the clean-up demin hoist from being stored over the enclosure spray valves.
4.
Structurally upgrading the support of the vertical column in the electrical penetration room.
5.
Providing swing prevention for the lead blanket used to shield PT-174.'
Also included is a cossnitment to examine means of upgrading the next
,. set of weak links (those classified in the.13 range). This includes items such as examination of aneb6tage of supports on the emergency condenser, identifyjeg Weans of upgrading or relocating equipment in the yicinity of insidrtant masonry. walls, etc.
/
- r s
e-
- 4 M b g~
\\
+
b s
a B /
4 v'
3' San mA e
I
's h
W b)
NUO383-2628A-BA01
?,b
' +
8 TABLE I-1 10-' Person-ren Population Person-Rem Curies Plant Tyy_e Power (Mwe) 2-80 km (Whole body)
(Noble gas)
Curie Arkansas FWR 836 1.6+5 0.09 1.39+4 0.65 Big Rock BWR 63 1.3+5 0.28 1.34+4 2.09 Brcuns Ferry EVR 1067 6.7+5 2.7 1.66+5 1.62 Erunswick BWR 790 1.9+5 6.3 2.46+5 2.56 Calvert Cliffs PWR 850 2.4+6 0.7 2.23+4 3.14 Cook PWR 1054 1.1+6 0.063 3.8+3 1.66 Cooper BVR 778 1.8+5 0.017 1.27+3 1.34 Crystal River PWR 825 2.2+5 0.014 -
3.35+3
'.42 Davis Eesse PWR 906 1.8+6 O.008 1.27+3 0.63 Dresden BUR 1003 6.4+6 180.0 8.3+5 461 Duane Arnold BWR 545 5.7+5 0.3 3.87+3 7.7 o
Fitzpatrick BWR 821 8.3+5 0.54 2.33+4 2.3 Fort Calhoun PWR 478 7.5+5 0.044,
3.81+3 1.15 Cinna PWR 490 1.2+6 0.056 3.2+3 1.75 Conn Yankee PER 582 3.4+6 2.2 3.12+3 70.5
)!atch BWR 786 2.8+5 0.1 1.9+3 5.26 Indian Point PWR 873 1.6+7 12.0 1.6+4 75.0 Eevaunce PWR 535 6.0+5
.021 2.4+3
.0.87 f.aCrosse BWR 50 3.3+5 1.6 4.25+4 3.76 Maine Yankee PWR 825 5.7+5
.01 2.86+2 3.5 Millstone 1 & 2 PWR 1530 2.5+6 220.0 6.2+5 35.5 Honticello PWR 536 2.1+6 0.2 6.87+3 2.9 Nine !!!1e Pt.
BWR 610 8.3+5
.098 3.5+3 2.8 Oconce PWR 860 7.4+5 0.69 3.56+4 1.94 Palisades PWR 740 1.0+6 1.5-3 59.9 2.5 Peach Bottom BUR 1665 4.1+6 5.0 7.11+4 7.0 P11 grin
- PWR 670 4.4+6 52.0 4.13+5 12.6 Prairie Island PWR 520 2.1+6 0.32 673.0 47.5 Quad Cities BWR 789 6.7+5 1.3 2.56+4 5.1 Robinson PWR 665 6.4+5 0.024 4.76+2 5.0 St Lucie PWR 777 2.9+5 0.58 2.54+4 2.28 Salem
- PWR 1090 4.9+6 0.038 19.6 194.0 Zion PWR 1040 7.0+6 9.5 3.22+4 29.5 760 avg 2:1+6 30.3 1CO283-0017A-RS01 1
c N
.[
TA33 3 2 g
APPROXIMATE RELATICptCPS BtWEEE INTIESZTT.
Accr* '_*ATICE. esAORIME. AE" Im0T T'1
"t (Riebter, 1950 Modified Mad==
Rnergy Acceleretion Richter Selease intensity Description of Ifforts (Masonry A. 3. C. & D (g)
Magnitude (orgs) s Scale M2,,_,,
ik I
act felt; marginal and lood period effects of large g
earthquakee evifest II Felt by persone st reet, or. upper floors, or favnsbly g3 placed
-_ 10 M'
III Felt indcoren hanging objects swings vibration like 16 might not be recognised as an earthquake to
-_ 10
-si.g of tiet trucis ouurs, dmti estimated.
0.003 0.007 amassas enseets setasi vibratica seaws tant is time pneetas er 10
-, t,wn.. er taere is a eenention er a 3.a une a my 0.,007 Me _
man strintas the ennen nameias meter ears reets.vtaes o.
8 4tekee and esere restles classee eliang ereekery elaeason la 0.015 the upper peace of IT enseen sella ene fyame areas 10 Felt outdoores duration estimateds sleepers vakens
,,,_,10 V
liquide became disturbed, some spill; amall unstatie 0.015 objects are displaced or upsett doors swing, close.
to and opent shutters & pictures move; pendulta clocks 0.03 stop, start, and char.se rate M5 19 Patt tr sua saw are trientemed and ru essesores pereens esta 0.03 ens %seilts esseuse, esease. sisseeere trona. tain-a-*=.
g, VI numbs. ste.. fall ett shelvees pasture rau ett causa turas. 0.09 tore meses or everturess seen plaster ese assenry a eruas sumu haus rias (eneret. sementh trees. tamane scene g
20
.aiarnests se siends setteet er ertvere of meter e res maastas
_ 10 eassets gesvers twaiters tremast dennae severe se sneenry D.
0.J7
~
smelmar-arwass went salmneys at roer 11aea plaster. lesse to VII trians. esemes, tues, eerstees fans name armaae appear ta fa22
~
masenry cs saves appear en ponds, water surtis vtta most ammu g_-
nuese med essotas seeur alans eene er grovel knames lasse e
m-w e
sneertas er seier een strerses6 emmes emre a masenry c.
21 wata sanaan eeuapees emme emme.s emre se uneenry a, nei emme ne amasser as nem ens e-meemer sans seus win.
0.15
-_ 10 ses. ran er %,, ee.n.y sees,s,e.,e e,mmuse,r,ese,e g, one ene neuere go VIII see annese esmas aseen ses.1 emne en tares ena semas.r.
0.3 essee.es no me
,,e e se en,
esser na fase er esserveere er sprtase and 1ela en armese eageer to est ages ed e seems e*=
=.
emessei smats, amenary a to eestdanseury C le muevtir esB=
.sme. emmutamme alta eme&ste enklassen ensamry e is eartemmar lx mensus. enmarna emmen omre en :-
s rues enrertene 0.3 NT,,_,
gg22,
an6tt err sementsame, reeme evenna mortees to ammese essee se ve.or,sr oss emaissa ens esemas espear se arees6 eens es mes es e neona 0+7
~-
estes.. _ a pass s e=sesse-nessanueterne esens. _ - - -
c.-
-<- ens sans erasese enow Most mascary and frame structures are destroyed, with their roundationas some well-built wooden structures 0.h5 I
and bridges are destroyeds serious damage occurs to to dams, dikes and onwknents; large landslides occur 1.5 23 water is thrown gg M0 Rails are bent greatly, underground pipelines are 0.5
- C compittely out of service to t
3 3
i Damage nearly totals large rock masses are displayris 3.5
~j III lines of sight and level are distorted; objects are to thrown into air 7
M9 _.
x e
Masonry A.
Good worksanship, morter, and design 6 reinforced especially laterally, and bound together by using steel, concrete, etc.; designed to resist lateral 4
forces.
Mason.ry A.
Good workmanship and mortarn reinforced, but not designed in detail to resist lateral farces.
Masonry C.
Ordinary workmanship and mortar; no estrete weaknesses like fa. ling to tie in at corners, but neither reinforced not designed against horisontal 4
m fasees.
Masonry D.
Venk materiale, such as adoten poor mortarn low standards of workmanship 6 weak borisontally.
m N
6 e
i 6,1..
4
... - -=
_,,. ~...
p-E
.u..
.. w,
.2 o
.. -. s.. a T., r.rK3n.% : s gar-e gp.T-r m."W 10
.:. z W iy,,'~_h R i, Q
.aa
,-.,,,,,,.,,,,,L.i._.,_.
' ;,. ~- : : ~. _- *** - ~ ' - ~ *
- = =-.=__"'- _ _ -
2 EE-a-
_,,,,, _ = - _. _ - _ _. -.- a. -1.12.-.46ITihur. -.W-c--
i.z w
~
1 307...-
l s...-
t...'==
.--...n_;===._.w..___...q----_.
t...
c.
a:
n.
- a...
.e-
=
3,, :-==: _
__ -. _ =. - _ - -
,.~
i====..
w
- D-s
,k
,lI m
I z
i n
u g
g
- =
h k
W 1.03 3
f a
I 8..
s..------
3 i
A I
E,=
1, g
1' it s
- a..
4 4
\\)-I'f"-
y 'i,'t,
I i
,\\,M,,
I ii i
,k
'l I
n
.l h
'i I
I I
{l i
4 l
i 10,
'HMH-E-SHMA s.
s.
7 S.
g Mr,.i H,
w.
.- _"__,.-i_____
3
_ _,s N ' W.
u --.
s, i
_==.E
=n_
.,. i '.,-i M M, T _
t h
g i
5p I
l i
l 5
i i
3 l
,i i
s i
l
}
s%
W,,,
0 0.'05 0.10 0.15 0.20 (Peak Acceleration in g's) a
'.'I-12 9
. ~ ~
. ~
11 j
. SELECTION OF INITIATING EVENTS II.
In this section, a discussion of the possible initiating transients which could occur at the Big Rock Point Plant as a result of a seismic event will be presented. An initiating event is a failure which requires active' response of systems and/or the operator in order to prevent an accident sequence. A number of initiating events were identified as a part of the Big Rock Point PRA (Appendix XII). The development of this list of events was an iterative process utilizing a variety of industry sources (see Table II-1), Big Rock Point Plant specific incidents and the event trees and fault trees of Appendixes I and II of the PRA. This list is considered sufficiently complete to use as a basis for studying the response to a seismic event of the Big Rock Point Plant.
Unless the fragility of the equipment required to fail in order to initiate a transient is assessed, the assumption must be made that any of the initiating transients identified in Appendix XII of the PRA is
. possible.
It is desirable to limit the number of systems required for study following a seismic event due to the complexity and cost of evaluating the seismic resistance of structures and components associated with those systems. For this reason an attempt will be made to categorize the events in PRA Table XII under limited number of' transient and accident headings-and choose a most limiting event for each category that requires sufficient systems and equipment to completely characterize
~
the Big Rock Point Plant operating response to an earthquake regardless of the transient that occurs.
i Four major category headings will be chosen under which the transients and accidents will be compiled: Anticipated Transients; LOCA; reactivity transients; and, external events. The last category, external events, c
is the category in which earthquakes reside. Other external events include wind, tornado, fire, toxic chemical accidents, airplane crashes, flooding, etc, all believed to be extremely remote simultaneous with an
. earthquake. This category will not be considered further.
Tables II-2, 3 and 4 contain a tabulation of transients under each of the three remaining categories. _The lists begin with what is considered a
the most limiting transient representative'of all the other transients in that category. The three most limiting transients are: Loss of Offsite Power; Medium Steam Line Break Inside Containment; and, ATWS for the anticipated transient, LOCA and reactivity traasient categories, respectively. A statement as to why each event listed is believed to 4
- be conservatively bounded by the most limiting transient is presented following the transient-description.
i
- Only one transient, simultaneous closure of the recire loop valves was not categorized. Based on both the availability of ac power in order to initiate this transient and the relatively significant amount of time the operator-has to terminate the transient by reopening the valves or providing a makeup water source, this transient is probably less limiting than a loss of offsite power. However, as the power to NUO383-2628A-BA01 y
.,u,w m --
ywz%--, e e e me.c
--r-
,m r., -, - -,
,-,---,n, ewe
-,y
,.i
-,w-,,,
c y
n--
12 the control' circuitry for these valves is normally disabled through the hand switch, a closure of these valves resulting from the earthquake
~
- was not considered possible and the transient was not categorized, s
r n
c.
e k
4 f
+
4 1
1 t
a e
NUO383-2628A-BA01
_i-~.
w y-,,E. w._...,, _..-.,
w.7..
y
._.my.m
.,.ms,..-,-%me,.m.,.,,e,.
,,m,,-.,m-,_.......,...m.,w.-.%.m e w,., vm -
4 13 d
TABLE II-I
-' INDUSTRY AND BRP TRANSIENT. INITIATOR REFERENCES GE Standard SAR GE Generic-ATWS Report NEDO-10349 WASH - 1400 EPRI Report on ATWS EPRI NP-801 Standard Review Plan Chapter 15 Systematic Evaluation Program Topics - Item XV GE Service Infornation Letters-EPRI LER Eata Base BRP Control Room Logbooks and SCRAM Reports BRP LERS NUO38'$-2628A-BA01
?
m,
.,n-,
=.,,n.
14 TABLE II-2 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS POTENTIALLY RESULTING FROM AN EARTHQUAKE Description' Discussion Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP)
Most Limiting Transient Turbine Trip Considered as a Part of LOSP Load Rejection Considered as a Part of LOSP Loss of Main Condenser Considered as a Part of LOSP MSIV Closure Considered as a Part of LOSP IPR, Fails Closed Considered as a Part of LOSP Miscellaneous Plant Occurrences No Out-of-Tolerance Conditions Necessarily Exist Manual SCRAM No Out-of-Tolerance Conditions-Necessarily Exist Spurious Nuclear No Out-of-Tolerance Conditions Instrumentation Necessarily Exist Loss of Feedwater Considered as a Part of LOSP Loss of One Feed' Pump Considered as a Part of LOSP Feedwater ' Controller Failed Considered as a Part of LOSP Closeil Recire Pump Trip Considered as a Part of LOSP Recire Pump Shaft Seizure-Similar to Recirc Pump Trip Only With One Pump Loss of Auxiliary Power Considered as a Part of LOSP Loss of DC Power DC Power Dependencies Considered as a part of LOSP Loss of Misc Power Panels Considered as a Part of LOSP Service Water Failure Considered as a Part of LOSP Instrument Air Failure Considered as a Part of LOSP
-NUO383-2628A-EA01
,. k 15 TABLE II-3 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS POTENTIALLY RESULTING FROM AN EARTHQUAKE i
\\
' Description Discussion Medium Steam Line Break Inside Most Limiting Transieut - Requires Cont'(MSLB)
Enclosure Spray, Core Spray, RDS and Post-Incident Cooling Feedwater Maximum Demand Assumed to Hydro Primary System and Results in Safety Relief Valve Sticking Open (Same as MSLB) 4 IPR Fails Open Blowdown through. Turbine Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Inadvertent Opening of Safety Requires Same Systems as MSLB Valve Spurious Opening of Bypass Same as IPR Failure Valve Spurious RDS Requires Same Systems as MSLB lEELB in hecire Pump Room Requires Same Systems as MSLB HELB in Pipe Tunnel Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Interfacing LOCA (Inside Cont)
Requires Same-Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray s
Large LOCA (Inside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Medium LOCA (Inside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Large SLB (Inside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Small SLB (Inside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB j'
Except Enclosure Spray
.Large-SLB-(Outside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray NUO383-2628A-BA01
.i 16
' Medium.SLB (Outside Cont)
Requires Same Systems as MSLB Except Enclosure Spray Small SLB (Outside Cont)
Requires Same. Systems as MSLB
}
Except Enclosure Spray f
e f
4 ~
NUO383-2628A-BA01-
17 TABLE II-4 POTENTIAL REACTIVITY TRANSIENTS RESULTING FROM AN EARTHQUAKE Description Discussion ATWS Most Limiting Transient Loss o'f Feedwa'ter Heater-Momentary Power Transient Core Spray--Injection at Momentary Power Transient Start-Up
. Rod With'drawal.at Start-Up Momentary Power Transient Rod Withdrawal at Power Momentary Power Transient Rod Drop Momentary Power Transient Idle Recire Loop Start-Up Momentary Power Transient NUO383-2628A-BA01
A 18 A
III. IDENTIFICATION OF IMPORTANT SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT
.Three transients were identified in Section II as being those incidents which would. require sufficient systems and equipment to characterize completely Big Rock Point Plant operational response following a site seismic event. These transients were: a medium steam line break inside containment; a loss of offsite power; and an ATWS.
In this section, a description will be developed of each system important for 1
. providing adequate core cooling following any of these three transients.
This description will. include identification of major components making up each system, location of the equipment with respect to major plant structures and development of success or failure criteria associated with each system function. A list of major active components described in this section and supporting instrumentation and equipment is provided in Table III-1.
i Fire Protection System To provide core cooling following a major LOCA or the actuation of the RDS, the Big Rock Point Plant is equipped with a low-pressure core-spray system referred to as the Fire Protection System (FPS). The FPS is located in four distinct areas of the plant as shown on the system line diagram presented in Figure III-1.
These four areas include the screenhouse, turbine building, reactor containment and core-spray beat-exchanger room located within the fuel. cask loading dock structure.
The FPS consists of two-fire pumps (one diesel powered and one ac powered).
Actuation of the FPS is automatic on low-steam drum level ($17" below steam drum center line) or low-fire-header pressure (<70 psi electric pump or <60 psi diesel pump). Manual actuation of.the FPS can be accomplished from either the RDS Panel in the control room or from local control panels in the screenhouse. The FPS draws water from
~beneath the screenhouse and. discharges to the yard piping through carbon steel and cast-iron piping components within the screenhouse.
The yard piping is buried cast iron.
It encircles the turbine and reactor buildings and provides three paths into the plant through which core spray, water can flow.
Two.of the paths enter the plant through the turbine building. Turbine building fire piping is carbon steel and includes threaded joints and mechanical couplings. The core spray water passes through basket strainer filters prior to entering,the containment through sections of welded piping in the turbine building pipe tunnel.
FPS inside the containment is primarily welded carbon steel piping.
l'
. ater flow to the reactor vessel following reactor depressurization is W
through two core spray piping paths. Each path contains two normally closed motor-operated valves which automatically open on combined low-reactor-water level -(52'9" above the core) and low-reactor pressure
-($200 psig). One pair of valves is de-powered (MO7051 and M07061) while the other pair is ac-powered (M07070 and M07071). Operation of NUO383-2628A-BA01
19 the de powered valves permits water flow to a ring sparger through a penetration in the side of_the reactor vessel. The ac-powered valves feed a nozzle. located in the reactor vessel head. Spray flow distribution from either of these sources is sufficient to provide adequate cooling of all -the fuel assemblies.
? A third path for FPS is actuated through the fuel-cask loading-dock area.to the containment by opening a de-powered motor-operated valve
- (MO7072). ManualLoperation of the valva also' can be accomplished locally.
Successful operation of the FPS during a LOCA requires the automatic starting ofgat least one fire pump, the opening of either the ac or dc motor-operated _ valves in the, core spray lines and maintaining the integrity of the FPS from the' fire pumps to the containment building through the screenhouse, yard loop and turbine building.
If time permits,.the fire pumps can be started within minutes >from the control room by operator action.
If a significant amount of time is available, the pumps may be started locally in the screenhouse and any FPS failures which might have occurred in the turbine building can be. isolated from the yard and bypassed by opening the de-powered valve (N07072).
Success of this alternate path is considered effective only if the fire piping leading to and in the containment are ' isolated from ruptured piping so as to prevent significant diversion of core spray water from
>the. containment.
If coincident with a loss of offsite power, success of electrical components'(electric fire pump, ac core-spray valves, and fire pump manual-start circuitry in the control room) requires the operation of
'the emergency diesel generator, the emergency electrical bus and
- associated electrical switchgear. Again, if significant time is
-available,'the standby diesel generator can be started manually and pick up important loads after connection to the emergency bus.
. Reactor Depressurization System In order to permit the functioning of the low-pressure core spray
~
4 system during the course of a transient, a method for lowering the pressure of the primary coolant system is necessary. At Big Rock Point, this function is provided by the RDS which allows a means of rapid depressurization of the primary coolant system should a loss of coolant inventory occur. The major components of the RDS are located in the containment, service building, - turbine building arid screenhouse.
The RDS is shown on a system line diagram of the primary system in Figure III-2..This system consists of four 6-inch diameter pipes each con.taining two-in-series normally closed valves. The first valve
'(CV4180 through 4183) is an air-operated fail-open isolation valve.
Air pressure is provided to the valve operator through a normally de-energized solenoid valve (SV 4980 through.4983). The second valve, referred to as the depressurization valve, is a pilot-operated solenoid valve which is closed when de-energized. Depressurization of the NUO383-2628A-BA01
_,,yy gte-9=tvM~e-=m - ttqWm.*-3
'my t+-95y g
M 20
~
1
~
~
' primary'cooltat system through these lines requires energization of each solenoid valve resulting in the opening of the isolation valve and-
-depressurization valve in each line. Three of the four paths must be opened in this manner to result in a sufficiently rapid depressurization
. of the reactor to permit core spray.
Actuation signals are provided through solid-state circuitry located in
. actuation and sensor cabinets in the service building. Sersors for satisfying RDS actuation logic include steam-drum level instrumentation, freactor level-instrumentation (each located in the containment),
fire-pump discharge pressure instrumentation (located in the screenhouse) and the two-minute timers (located in the control room).
Power sources for energizing -the solenoid valves are derived from a set of UPS (uninterruptible_ power supplies) batteries located in the turbine building. System operation is accomplished as follows. A loss of i
primary _ coolant system inventory will result in a lowering of the level
.in the steam drum.
At.17" below the center line of the drum,.an actuation signal-is sent to each of the two fire pumps in the screenhouse and a two-minute timer starts. The low-steam-drum level signal,_ fire pump discharge pressure (2100 psig) and the timing out of the two-minute l-timers are three of the four signals required to provide an actuation signal to the RDS valves. When the primary coolant level reaches 2'9" above the top of the core, the fourth signal is provided by the reactor
-level instruments completing the actuation logic and opening RDS valves depressurizing the reactor.
L
' Success of this system requires proper functioning of two of four sets of steam-drum-level instrumeats, reactor level instruments, fire pump pressure switches and two-minute timers. The UPS power sources for each~of_the preceding sets of RDS instrumentation must be available and at least.one fire pump must start. Proper functioning of each pair of valves in three of the four blowdown paths must also occur.
Time permitting, the operator can manually start a fire pump and-actuate the RDS from the control room. Use of this manually initiated J.
method of blowdown in conjunction with a loss of offsite power requires P
the functioning of the emergency or standby diesel generators, the emergency bus and associateu switchgear.
Enclosure Spray System
+
In the event that the earthquake results in the rupture of a steam line inside containment, the sticking open of a safety relief valve or the spurious actuation'of an RDS train, it is possible that fluid escaping the primary coolant system could super heat resulting in an escalation of the containment-atmospheric temperature above the 235 F environmental qualification temperature for important RDS and core spray system components..The purpose of the enclosure (ie, containment) spray system is to spray the containment atmosphere with water from the FPS, quenching the'superheated steam and thereby lowering the containment atmosphere below the qualification temperature. The enclosure spray system is included as a part of the line diagram in Figura III-1.
tl' NUO383-2628A-BA01
=e.
,, - ~
21 The enclosure spray system consists of two spray headers located at the top of the reactor building internal structure (ie, containment) with each header. controlled by a normally closed motor-operated valve. One valve (M07064) is automatically actuated by containment pressure switches located on the outside cable penetration area (~ 2.2 psig).
.This motor-operated valve requires a de power supply. An ac powered motcr-operated valve (MO7068). controls the backup containment spray header and is manually actuated from the control room should the de valve fail to operate.
Success of the enclosure spray system requires that either of the two motor-operated valves open..The enclosure spray system additionally j
relies on the same FPS inside and outside containment that the core spray system requires for successful operation and includes the operation l
of either of the two fire pumps. Operation of the ac motor-operated valve requires that the emergency diesel generator, the emergency bus and the associated switchgear are operational when normal ac power is unavailable.
This system is not required when the primary coolant loss results from i
rupture of piping normally containing saturated liquid or a full blowdown of the RDS.
Post-Incident System Following RDS and core' spray actuation, the containment will begin to l
fill with water coming from the primary coolant system, the core sprays l
and the enclosure sprays. On reaching an elevation in the containment between 587 ft and 590 ft (approximately 260,000 gallons), the operator
'is required to terminate water addition to the containment and initiate-decay heat removal by means of the post-incident system. Switchover to post-incident recycle occurs on the order of 4 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> depending on the nature and location of the source of primary coolant inventory loss.
t The major components associated with post-incident recycle are located in the fuel-cask loading-dock area aad shown in the line diagram presented in Figure III-1.
Post-incident system initiation consists of starting one of the two core spray pumps, drawing water from the bottom of containment and pumping it through the core spray heat exchanger and core spray system piping back to the core spray and containment spray headers. Either core spray pump can.be started remotely by a hand switch from the control room. To remove heat from the containment water, FPS water is supplied to the shell of the core-spray heat-exchanger through motor-operated Valve MO7066 (an ac-powered valve remotely actuated from the control room). Fire water addition to the containment is terminated by closing hand-operated Valves (FP-29 and VFP-30 located in the turbine building.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
I 22 Successful operation of this system requires the availability of a
. single fire pump, screenhouse fire piping (the yard loop), core spray p
piping in -the fuel-cask loading-dock area, core spray piping inside i
containment, the functioning of N07066 and the operation of a single core-spray pump.
Operation of the ac powered. equipment (core spray pump, M07066, and the electric. fire pump) will depend on the emergency or standby diesel generators, emergency bus and miscellaneous 480 V ac distritution equipment if coincident with offsite power. failure.
l Failure of remote operation of N07066 can be overcome by remote operation of N07080, which is parallel to N07066.
Local manual operation of l
either valve is an option. Rupture of underground yard piping also can i
be bypassed by isolating the yard piping from the screenhouse and connecting fire hose from the hose manifold on the side of the screenhouse I
to Valve VPI-10 in the shell side of the heat exchanger.
i:
Operation of the system is assemed to be required for a minimum of one j.
i month following its initiation at which time natural heat losses from the primary coolant. system and containment are sufficient to ensure removal of decay heat.
i Primary Coolant System Isolation i
l Should the transient which occurs following the seismic event not result in a significant loss of primary coolant inventory within the containment, i
it is beneficial to ensure that no such loss is occurring i
outside the containment by isolating the main steam line.
This function
~is accomplished by closing the MSIV (N07050).
The MSIV is a de powered motor-operated gate valve located just inside the containment shell:
(see Figure III-2). Automatic operation of this valve requires that electrical equipment associated with the reactor protection system (RPS) be functional (in the event of a loss of offsite power, voltage to the RPS will he lost, automatically sending a signal closing the MSIV) and that de power is available.
If time permits, the valve can l:
be actuated manually from the control room.
t i
Emersency Condenser System Assuming a LOCA inside containment is not occurring and successful l.
primary system isolation is accomplished, the emergency condenser system is used for removal of decay heat and ultimately the cooldown of
'the primary coolant system. The emergency condenser is shown in both line diagrams found in Figures III-1 and III-2.
The emergency condenser system consists of a large tank (ie, shell) of water in which two tube l
bundles are immersed and through which steam from the primary system flows by natural circulation, condenses and returns to the steam drum, s
l
. Each emergency condenser tube bundle has a normally open ac-powered i
inlet valve (N07052 and N07062) and a normally closed de-powered outlet valve (N07053 and N07063). The de-powered motor-operated valves receive a signal to open when a high reactor pressure is experienced (21450 psia) or a loss of station power occurs. Either emergency condenser tube bundle is capable of removing sufficient heat from the NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
23 l
primary coolant system to accommodate decay-heat generation and prevent the actuation of steam drum safety relief valves (lowest valve set point is 1550 psi). The emergency condenser shell contains a stored
(
water supply capable of removing the equivalent of four hours of decay heat. To prevent a reactor pressure rise to the safety relief valve set point due to depletion of the emergency condenser shell inventory, sources of makeup water are available through a manually actuated de-powered valve (SV4947) which can be operated from the control room.
j The emergency condenser makeup line draws its water supply from the L
enclosure spray headers upstream of the de power-operated Valve M07064.
Success of the emergency condenser requires automatic or manual operation
. of either of the two de-operated outlet valves, manual actuation of the makeup valve from the enclosure spray headers and maintaining the l
integrity of the makeup pipe, core spray piping inside and outside containment, yard piping, screenhouse fire piping and at least one fire pump. As was assumed during operation of the core spray system, if turbine building piping failures occur and fire water is supplied to I
the containment through M07072, makeup to the emergency condenser shell is successful only if ruptured turbine building piping is isolated from the FPS to prevent diversion of fire water.
If coincident with a loss of offsite power, emergency condenser operation depends on emergency ac power sources (either diesel generator, emergency bus and switchgear) only through operation of the electric fire pump.
Control Rod Drive Makeup The purpose of the control rod drive system following an earthquake is to supply high-pressure low-volume makeup to the primary coolant system in the long term to overcome shrinkage due to cooldown and normal primary coolant system leakage. Shrinkage of the primary coolant by itself will not result in uncovery of the core but when combined with sufficient primary coolant leakage (<1 spa unidentified and <10 spa identified at 1350 psi reactor pressure) could result in extremely low reactor water levels. These levels are not expected to occur for a day or more af ter shutdown of the reactor at these leakage rates. The core spray system can be manually initiated following cooldown of the reactor to less than 150 psi, but the control rod drive system is the preferred source of makeup as it can be initiated at any time during the cooldown, even with the reactor at elevated pressures.*
Major components of control rod drive makeup are located in the reactor and turbine buildings. The system includes a 25,000 gallon capacity condensate storage tank (which is normally more than half full), welded carbon steel piping located underground, the condensate pump room and the pipe tunnel in the turbine building, and the recirc pump room in the reactor building. Water flows through the underground piping to an air-operated valve (CV4090) which opens on a loss of instrument air or a loss of the condensate pumps to the suction of the control rod drive pumps (25 spa positive displacement pumps) inside containment. From l
- It is emphasized that contral rod drive makeup is a backup to core spray.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 7
24 there.the water is pumped to the reactor through the control rod drive mechanisms and the reactor cleanup system.
Success of this system requires periodic operation of at least one control rod drive pump and the opening of the normally closed Valve CV4090 if the condensate pumps are not running or instrument air is not available. Control rod drive pump suction and discharge piping must remain intact as must the condensate storage tank.
Reactor Trip The electrical equipment and hardware required to ensure shutdown of the reactor by automatic rapid control rod insertion following an earthquake includes the RPS, control rod drive SCRAM piping, air-operated SCRAM valves and the CRD mechanism. Both channels of RPS circuitry are located in the control room and include the logic and relays for terminating power to the SCRAM valve solenoids. Reactor protection sensors most likely to trip the reactor following an earthquake include any or all of the following:
reactor pressure (21400 psia); low steam drum level (58" below drum center line); low reactor level (52'9" above the core); high condenser pressure (28" Hga); high enclosure pressure (51 psig); loss of voltage to reactor protection system ($52 V); high neutron flux (2120 1 5% power); or manual SCRAM depending on the nature of the transient which is initiated by the earthquake.
Control rod drive hydraulic equipment which must function following the earthquake includes the piping between the control rod drive mechanism and the SCRAM dump tank and the air-operated SCRAM discharge valves (CVNC10) including the solenoid valves from the instrument air header (SVNC27). The hydraulic piping need not remain intact following the earthquake but must not fail such that flow from the control rod drive mechanism to the SCRAM dump tank is prohibited (such as by crimping of the piping). With the reactor at pressure (>450 psig), the reactor pressure alone is sufficient to permit control rod insertion without the aid of the SCRAM piping to the control rod drive mechanisms or the nitrogen-filled accumulators.
Success of this system requires the tripping or loss of power to the RPS terminating power to the SCRAM solenoid valves causing them to close venting the air from the SCRAM valves. The SCRAM valves fail open on loss of air venting the top of the control rod drive piston to the SCRAM dump tank forcing the control rod into the core due to the resultine large differential pressure across the control rod drive piston. Normal core geometry must be maintiined by reactor internals to permit insertion of the control rods.
Success of this system has no dependency on the availability of any ac or de power supplies.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 t
I
r-25 TABLE III-1 BIG ROCK POINT PLANT Important Active Components Following a Seismic Event Additional Instrumentation Major Active Instrumentation and Equipment Useful in Manual Components Required to Actuate Components Actuation of Components Electric Fire PS615 (Fire Pump Discharge LIRE 19A & B Pump Pressure)
(Drum Level Indication)
LT3184 A-3187 (RDS Drum Level)
I RDS Actuation Cabinet 6.1 Fire Pump Control Panel C17 UPS Batteries Diesel Fire PS612 (Fire Pump Discharge LIRE 19A & B Pump Pressure)
(Drum Level Indication)
LT3184-3187 (RDS Drum Level)
RDS Actuation Cabinet 5.1 L
Fire Pump Control Panel UPS Batteries Core Spray Pumps IA and 2A Buses LT3171 & 3175 2B Bus (Reactor Building Level)
Control Rod 1A and 2A Buses LT3180-3187 Drive Pumps 2B Bus
-& LIRE 19A & B (Drum Level Instrumentation)
Emergency Diesel Control Panel C18 Generator EDG Batteries UPS A Batteries Undervoltage Relay Standby Diesel Standby EDG Batteries Generator Standby EDG Transformers l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
i 26 TABLE III-1 Additional Instrumentation Major Active Instrumentation and Equipment Useful in Manual Components Required to Actuate Components Actuation of Components SV4984-4987 RDS Actuation & Sensor.
LSRE09 A-D (Depressurization Cabinets, UPS Batteries (Reactor Level)
Valves)
LT3184-3183 (Drum Level)
LT3180-3187 (Reactor Level)
PS789-796 (Fire Pump Pressure) 2 Minute Timers CV4180-4183 SV4980-4983 (Isolation Actuation & Sensor Cabinets Valves UPS Batteries LT3184-3183 (Drum Level)
LT3180-3187 (Reactor Level)
PS789-796 (Fire Pump Pressure) 2 Minute Timers CVNC10 SVNC27A & B (SCRAM Valves)
Reactor Protection Channels A & B Reactor Protection Sensors:
PS664-667 (Enclosure Pressure)
LSRE09A-D (Reactor Level)
LSRE06A-D (Drum Level)
PSRE07A-D (Reactor Pressure)
PS654-657 (Condenser Pressure)
Flux Monitors:
RH01A-B (UV Contacts)
NUO383-2628A-BA01
"~
,s.
?
^
27 s
t
- FIGURE III-1
' Additional Instrumentation
. Major Active Instrumentation and Equipment '
Useful in Manual Components Required to Actuate Components Actuation of Components N07070 and'7071 LSRE09B, D, F&H (Reactor Level)
- (Care Spray)
PSIG11B, D, F&H (Reactor Pressure)
Contact Relay for M07070 and 7071 Bus 2B N07051 and 7061~
LSRE09A, C, E&G (Reactor Level) f(Core Spray)
PSIG11A, C, E&G (Reactor Level) de Bus D01 Station Batteries j
j.., -
N07064 PS636A & B
-(Enclosure Spray-PS7064A & B } ( ""
'"#* '#888"#*}
L de Buses D10, D02 and D01 Station Batteries b
.c
.N07068 Contact Relay for M07068 PI367
-(Enclosure Spray) 2B Bus (Enclosure Pressure)
N07066;.
Contact Relay for N07066 LT3171 and 3175-l' (Core Spray Htx) 2A Bus (Reactor Building Level) 2B Bus
!~
N07080-Contact' Relay.for M07080 LT3171 and 3175 (N07066 Backup) 2A Bus (Reactor Building Level).
2B Bus h07072 de Buses DIO, D02, and D01
-(B;ckup Core Spray Supply)
Station Batteries N07053 and.7063
-PSRE07A-D (Reactor Pressure)
PSID28E
- (Emergency Condenser)-
Bus D01 PIA 49-Station Batteries-(Reactor Pressure)
L-SV4947 de Buses D01 and D02 LS3550
'(Emergency Condeaser Makeup)
Station Batteries (Emergency Condenser Shell Level)
PIA 49' (Reactor Pressure) o I.
l 5
l l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l-l_
~
Yg a
x
) n' H
.egn g
d n
wt "2
o 4
E o
(
I
) [
g2 EU C :Eg
+
8 i
g
.1 gi s
5
> r-o os a
y M
u d
\\
a E~
b w,
r, ep Af sd W
C4 j
."W g
v 5'
8_J 55 l"
o>
i O OOs#
a a
I s
r e
i p
3 1
->a
(
s"
\\
'j' N
d' fg_
$g a
a c
e O
s
/
\\
/
/
Ud 3;
O G
$5 s
3 s ' f w3 E
u D
)
s z
(
g) s c
a a
I a
+- <.., e s
2 1
Q) s Y
O ".1 S
M f
A 5
O 3
w v
3 0
yi e5 d
e
\\
2 5
a
/
?
s a
r y
4 A
4 m.
(_
t 2
J 0
3 S'E
!7 E,
/
l ;g %p; e
a a
s
$f V!
o y:
O 8
_o_
as
FLU RE. IIL - 2 29 g gsy_c930 VENT TJ
\\
CV-418o ATMoSMERE
[
SV-4984 Mo-1050 h
I C>C MAIN STEAM f
REALTOR gW"
[
M k
DEPRESSURtIATION
~
VALVES SV-4985
+
Mo-704.Z r
f V
9 W~sv-4 Sat X
EV-4LSt X
SV-4984.
me.1ost REF:
g 0740C.40102.
T h
E" E*'E "'T 014 oc.40 to, cv-4 as sas CONDEN SER 0740G40 t to
'SV-4987 0140G4olts l
l l
l w
s r
STEAM DRUM
(
l bEMIMERAtlIER l
No.7053 O
o A
r' mo-7ot.s coubCN SATE
[
STORAGE V
Ct.EAMuP I
PUMP FRoM Mand 4
g COMDENSER l
NON-REGENERATWE yg,37 Q,, cy.4opo HEAT EE. HANGER V REAETOR Faos i
REGENERATtVE
(
/
'p 7gy3 @ j "
d5 HEAT E%CHAMGERS cy,43,u O
OO
'O
'anu:
\\
/
N G }j m
C C
h TO SCRAM HEAwalcnMs TO CRDMS h
CONTROL Rob DRtVE PUMPS l
g m
U U
O O
Q l><
VRD-NC30 CV-NCIS l
~
ry e
30
.IV.
BIG ROCK POINT PLANT RESPONSE TO A SEISMIC EVENT (EVENT TREE DESCRIPTION)
.In this section, plant response to two of the three initiating events identified in Section II.is described in detail. The loss of offsite power and medium steam line break inside containment transient descriptions take the form of event trees. Logic for these trees was presented initially ir. Appendix I of the PRA. This logic was modified for the purpose of this study to reflect only those systems which were felt to be easiest to show to be resistant to the forces of the earthquake, those systems are described in Section III. More detail was added to the " loss of offsite power tree" than exists in the PRA for ease of identifying dependencies between systems within the tree and simplifying the process of identifying the seismic weak links where they exist in the plant design. For loss of offsite power sequences leading to the use of long-term cooling methods involving the emergency condenser, a detailed long-term cooling event tree was developed. This tree reflects the need for loas-term cooling makeup from the control rod drive system and reflects the use of the RDS, the core spray system and the post incident cooling system as redundant systems to this makeup source. The following transient descriptions begin with an event tree diagram, definitions of event tree headings and are followed by a discussion of each branch point of the event tree.
The third transient, ATWS, is not developed in this section. The potential for this transient to occur will be presented'in Section V by identifying those equipment failures which must occur to result in SCRAM failure. ' Discussion of additional evaluations which will ensure that a failure to SCRAM will not occur will then be presented in Section VIII.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
FIG URE IY-l M E'bi U M ST EAM LINE BREAK -
31 IN S13E CONTAIN ME.MT - SE.tSMICLY INbuCEb i
M5LB 4
ESS RDS C5 Pl5 4
3 Ltp 2
tc, LR LE MSLB-MEttuM STEAM LINE. BREAK E.SS - E.NCLOSURE SPRAY SYSTEM Rbs - REACTOR DE. PRE.SSU R)2 ATION SYSTEM CS CORE. S P R AY SY ST EM PIS POST lutl1ENT SYSTEM
32 BP 1 Enclosure Spray At Branch Point 1 (Figure IV-1) a break in a steam line has occurred as a result of an earthquake. Offsite power is assumed to have been lost also as a result of the earthquake. Because the steam superheats as it leaves the primary system the containment temperature begins to rise toward the environmental qualification teniperature of 235*F.
On containment pressure attaining 1.7 psig a signal is sent via PSo36A & B and PS7064A & B to open M07064 actuating enclosure sprays. Success at this branrh point implies the availability of M07064, the containment pressure switches, the valve's de power supply, the integrity of fire piping in the containment, turbine building, yard and screenhouse, and the operation of either of the two fire pumps. The ac fire pump will require the operation of the emergency diesel and 2B bus. Automatic starting of the fire pumps on low drum level or low fire header pressure due to enclosure spray actuation will be required. Should M07064 fail to open the operator may manually actuate the Backup Enclosure Spray Valve M07068 which is an ac-powered valve with dependencies on emergency power.
Failure to deliver water to the enclosure spray header is assumed to result in the exceeding of the environmental qualification temperature resulting in the failure of important RDS or core spray equipment by Sequence LE.
Successful enclosure spray leads to RDS operation at Branch Point 2.
BP 2 RDS As the blowdown progresses a low drum level signal at 17" below drum center line will occur startias the fire pumps and a two minute timer in the RDS logic. Drum level will continue to fall to the low reactor water set point of 2'9" above the core. On reaching this level, coincident fire system pressure
>100 psi, low drum level and two-minute timer closure a signal will be sent to the solenoid valves on the RDS isolation and depressurization valves. Opening the valves rapidly depressurizing the reactor allowing low pressure core spray. Successful system operation requires three of the four RDS valve trains to operate, two of four sets of drum level, reactor level, fire pressure and timer instrumentation to operate, and one of the two fire pumps to run.
Operation of the sensors and valves depends on the UPS, operation of the electric fire pump depends on emergency ac power. Failure of this system is assumed tc result in inadequate depressurization of the reactor and at least limited core damage before a pressure is low enough to allow core spray (sequence LR). Success leads to the need for core spray actuation.
BP 3 Core Spray A low reactor level coincident with reactor depressurization to <200 psig leads to actuation of ac and de-powered core spray valves permitting fire system flow through a spray nozzle in the vessel head or a ring sparger around the vessel perimeter. Flow >290 gpm through either of these lines is sufficient to cool an uncovered core. Success of this system depends on opening either the ac or de-powered valves, the integrity of fire piping in the containment, turbine building, yard and screenhouse and the operation of at least one fire pump. The ac valves have a dependency on the operation of the diesel generator and the 2B bus.
Failure of the core spray system leads to an inadequately NUO383-2628A-BA01
m 33 cooled core by sequence LC, success ultimately leads to the need for post-incident long-term cooling.
BP 4 Post-Incident System Water will enter the containment by way of primary coolant loss, core spray and enclosure spray. On the addition of - 260,000 gallons of water to the containment (587 ft elevation) the operator will place the post-incident system into service and isolate the fire water system water addition to the enclosure by closing hand-operated Valves VFP-29 and 30.
Success of this system implies the operation of one core spray pump, the integrity of pump suction piping from the containment sump, discharge piping to the heat exchanger, removal of heat by way of th* core spray heat exchanger and the integrity of post-incident system piping back to the core spray system inside containment.
Heat removal through the heat exchanger implies the addition of fire water to the heat exchanger shell through M07066 or parallel valve M07080 integrity of the yard loop or bypass with a fire hose, integrity of screenhouse fire piping and the operation of at least one fire pump. M07066, the core spray pumps and the electric fire pump are assumed to require emergency ac power by way of the 2B bus and the emergency or standby diesel generators. Operation of the post-incident system is assumed to be required between 4 and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the LOCA. Failure of this system leads to Sequence LLp.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
~
LOSS OF OFFS tTE POWER-SLISMLCALL'( IWbuCEb
' htf.URE. IT-1 3h g, pcgg.g, e ups. ENGR AC FP3. Gao sRDS*CSe LTr./P15 gp 8,
PL 1
si,
lo s PEwLp 6
9 i
pal 13 67,
fin i PatmLp it 15 i
pag,c 4
PatnR Pat 2t i
20s PLLL W
i PuEm PEF 18 24, 23 PuGL
=
22 Puntn 3
Pd&F 30, 29 :
PEyLp 28 i
21 Pty,t Pty R i
Pty F 2L 34, 33 peg QLp i
3E 3
PEv QC 25 Z
pgvgg PtyGF Pt y LL 29 i fit.p 3a i
pit 37 pga PIF 3fe 44r 43 i PIaly t
4Z n
Pint 35 4l PIQR P1QF TIll so, 49 PDL py, p As 41 PDR 4(*
45 PDF PDE PDu.
- Station DC Power PCS ISO - Primary Coolant System Isolation (MSIV)
E
- Emergency Condenser Valves y
- Uninterruptable Power Gupply (RDS) i Emerg AC - Emergency AC Power FPS
- Fire Protection System l
Em
- Emergency Condenser Makeup RDS
- Reactor Depressurization System CS
- Core Spray System LTC
- Long Term Cooling
-,, - -. ~..
~
s 35
- a 8
EARTHQUAKE GENERATED LOSS OF 0FFSITE' POWER BP 1 DC Powe'r\\
s At Branch Point 1 (Figure IV-2),.an.* earthquake has occurred in which significant ground motion resulted.at the Big Rock Point Plant Site. A loss of offsite power has been the consequance of this ground motion. Loss of offsiti power may result at Big' Rock Point following a seismic event due to a variety of failures which are considered to be " weak-links" with respect to the availability of offsite power d4Gng such an event. These " weak-links" include the 2400~V voltage regulator in the switchyard, ceramic insulators in the switchyard or
~
at offsite substations, or various masonry walls to which the 2400 y cable to the Station Power Distribution System is mounted. At Branch Point Idhe _.
' success or failure of the 125 V de Di'stribuEion System is determineii. Failure at this branch point implies that either the station batteries or the 125 V d2 j
.MCC D01 has failed as a result of the earthquake, leaving the plant.without a s
station de power source at Branch' Point.45.s The functioning-3f station dc power leads to Branch Point 2.
V j
.BP 2, MSIV-
-Q v ei
~D s
I Assuming de power is available, the first automatic action required will be isolation of the Primary System by closure,of the MSIV. Successful MSIV %
actuation' implies success of the, Reactor Protection System in generating a N
contairunent isolation signal. Wt}ure to close the MSIV is conservatively J
assumeil to result in a blowdown auhside the containment either due to a' M
failure of the 03ckup~ valves to the MSIV to close.or due to the failure of
-steam piping,in the pipe tunnel. These failures lead to Branch Point 35.
j SuccessfulMSIVclosureleadstoBranchPoint3.;.,.
^
lBP 3 Emeraency Condenser Valves T-
['
~~
^
q
+
A loss of offsite poker has occurred as a result of an *aarthquake and the Primary System has isolated by auteniat'l'c'st'osure of the MSIV. Also generated Q' -
as a part of station power loss was a signal to open the outlet valves to the emergency condenser (M07053 and M07063).' This signal'was' generated by PSRE07 A-D which are ac powered switches that fail closed on loss of voltage. Had
' station power been available, high reactor pressure (1450 psia) would have resulted in the closure of these switches. A manual demand to open the de emergency condenser valves can also occur if the operator is aware of the rising re. actor pressure due to decay heat generation.
Indication of reactor pressure is available to the operator'lu the Control Room via PIIA07 which is dependent o'n emergency ac power oper'ation. ThA operator has six minutes froE the time of isolation of the Primarf System uitfl the first safety relief valve lifts (1550 psia) in which to mandally actuate the emergency condenser s
should automatic actuation fail. Successful automatic or, manual initiationsof either of the emergency condenser outlet ' valves leads to Branch Point 4.
Failure of both of the valves to opsn leads to Branch Point 25.
,,y
+
(
' #h 4
NUO383-2628A-BA01
~
e r
r
36 BP 4 UPS Following isolation of the Primary System, this event tree contains a heading for.the UPS power supplies and actuation / sensor cabinets. The UPS will have an impact on several of the systems which follow in this tree, such as operation of the RDS,' automatic loading of the emergency generator onto the 2B bus and the functioning of various instrumentation which the operator may require for manual initiation of these or other functions. Success of the UPS in surviving this earthquake leads to the sequences following Branch Point 5.
Failure of the UPS' leads'to Branch Point 18.
BP 5 Emergency AC An earthquake has occurred, offsite power is unavailable, the Primary System is isolated and the emergency condenser is in service removing decay heat and cooling down the Primary System. Little, if any, dependency on ac power has been required up to this point in the tree. For the next four hours the plant will remain isolated with little loss of primary coolant inventory.
By the end of this four-hour period, depletion of the water in the shell of the emergency condenser will have occurred, reactor pressure will have risen back 17 m
' to above normal operating conditions and a safety relief valve will begin to lift (1550 psia) limiting Primary System pressure unless action by the operator is taken to provide a source of makeup to the emergency condenser. Several of the systems following this branch point do have a significant dependence on ac power for success. At this branch point, therefore, the functioning of an a
emergency ac power source is required. Successful operation of the MSIV and emergency condenser valves, a significant amount of time to ensure that' emergency ac power operation is available and successful actuation of either the egergency generator or the standby generator in loading the.2B bus will s
lead to the Branch Point 6.
Failure of the 2B bus or both of the diesel generators will lead to a relatively lengthy station blackout described at
[
Branch Point 12.
e BP,6 Fire Pumps hw '
'. The* success or failure of the fire pumps is determined at this branch point.
?.
-The plant is cooling down on the emergency condenser and emergency ac power is available^.. Success at this branch point assumes that the Fire System piping in the screenhouse is intact and that either of the two fire pumps, diesel or electric powered, is running. A loss of the piping integrity or failure of c
both'. fire p~mps within the first four hours of the transient results in u
lifting of a steam drum safety relief valve due to the inability to makeup to the~ emergency condenser shell from the Fire System. Gradual depletion of the Primary Coolant System inventory occurs for the next two hours at which time t
sufficient water has left the Primary System through relief valve actuation to ar ;
begin' to uncover the core.
If the fire pumps are not recovered within this c
additional two-hour period it is assumed a core damage situation ensues via Sequence Pf due to the inability to provide adequate core spray. Maintenance of-tne screenhouse piping integrity and successful operation of either fire pump,will lead to Branch Point 7.
3
., i'.v p
.v' NUO383-2628A-BA01
~
l a
-m.
-<-q A
i-.- - - -. +,,
7
'+
uss 37
~BP 7 Emergency Condenser Makeup Successful isolation of the reactor, operation of the emergency condenser and availability of a fire pump will allow use of the emergency condenser to cool the reactor to near shutdown conditions and maintain those conditions in the long term at Branch Point 8.
Success of emergency condenser makeup implies the manual operation of de powered SV4947 allowing fire water flow from the Core Spray System to the emergency condenser shell. As this valve,is operated manually, indication that makeup to the shell is required should be available to the operator. This indication is assumed to be provided by an annunciation of shell low-level via LS3550 or by an indication of rising primary system pressure on PIIA07 both being in the Control Room.
Emergency condenser makeup also relies on the integrity of core spray piping inside the containment, the yard piping and piping between the yard and containment through the Turbine Building or the Post-Incident System. Should
-Turbine Building piping be unavailable as a result of the earthquake, it must be isolated from the yard loop and containment piping to prevent diversion of
- fire water and a flow path to containment must be established through de-operated M07072. Credit for this operator action is taken in this tree given thd amount of time available to perform these operations (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />).
Failure of the emergency condenser makeup by way of failure of the makeup valve, Control Room shell level instrumentation,* containment, yard or unisolatable Turbine Building piping failures, or failure to establish a flow path to containment through the Post-Incident System given a failure of Turbine Building piping is assumed to lead to Branch Point 9.
BP 8 Long-Term Cooling Cooldown of the isolated reactor on the emergency condenser has been successful including makeup to the shell. The reactor is most likely at or near atmospheric conditions. Reactor cooling can continue indefinitely in this manner with the aid of makeup systems such as the control rod drive pumps or core sprays to cccommodate any minor' leakage which naturally occurs from the Primary Coolant System. Success ~ or failure to cool the core at this branch point using these systems is developed in detail in the long-term cooling event tree which
-follows this discussion.
BP 9 RDS Primary System isolation and eme dency condenser actuation have been successful and fire pumps are available, bu,t emergency condenser makeup has failed resulting in the repressurization of the reactor on decay heat to the safety relief valve set point. Gradual depletion of the ' reactor inventory is occurring due to periodic relief valve operation. No credit for makeup to the reactor by control rod drive pump operation is taken due to uncertainty in its ability to operate in the steam environment created by relief valve actuation.
e%
NUO383-2628A-BA41 w.
y..
v.-
~..,. _
38 Within six hours of the transient initiation, reactor inventory has reached the RDS actuation set point (2'9" above the core). Successful operation of the RDS at this stage of the transient leads to the need for core spray at Branch Point 10.
Failure of RDS implies failure of isolation (CV4180-CV4183) or depressurization (SV4980-SV4983) valves to open or failure of an automatic or manual actuation signal. Automatic actuation of the RDS is dependent on drum (LT3184-LT3183) and reactor level (LT3180-LT3187) instrumentation, fire pump pressure sensors (PS789-PS793) and RDS timers. Manual actuation is assumed to depend on the availability of reactor level indication to the operator.
In addition to the RDS level, instrumentation control room annunciation of low reactor level is provided via Reactor Protection
-Switches LSRE09 A-D.
Manual operation of'the RDS from the Control Room also has. dependency on ac power distribution equipment via Panel 1Y.
Failure of RDS at this branch point is assumed to lead to a gradual uncovering of the core at pressure by Sequence PEmR.
BP 10- Core Spray Depletion of primary coolant inventory to the point of RDS actuation requires core spray initiation. Successful core spray implies actuation of either of the sets of core spray valves (de-actuated M07051, M07061 or ac-actuated M07070 or M07071). Sensors required to actuate these valves include reactor level and Pressure Switches LSRE09 A-H and PSIG11 A-H.
Credit is taken for manual initiation of important core spray functions by the starting of a fire
. pump but only if appropriate drum level' instrumentation is available. Manual actuation of the core spray valves can also be accomplished from the control room although credit-for this action is not included as a part of the logic of these trees.
As was the emergency condenser makeup, core spray is dependent on the integrity of core spray piping inside containment, yard piping and.a path from the yard
. loop to the containment either through the Turbine Building or the Post-Incident System..The Turbine Building path is that path normally valved in for operation, but should rupture of this piping occur as a result of the earthquake, sufficient time is available to establish the path through the Post-Incident System by opening M07072 (more than six hours). Again, as with the emergency condenser makeup supply, core spray. flow is considered adequate only if any ruptured fire piping which does exist in the Turbine Building is isolated from the yard loop and containment.
Success of this equipment leads to the need for a long-term cooling heat sink at Branch Point 11.
Failure is assumed to lead to temporarily uncovered inadequately cooled core by way of Sequence PEmC.
BP 11 Post-Incident System RDS and core spray actuation having been successful, the containment will begin to fill with water coming from the Primary System, core and enclosure sprays. Reactor and steam drum level will recover quickly following core spray actuation and water will flow from the drum to containment through the RDS valves. The operator may control flow to the Primary System from outside NUO383-2628A-BA01
7.-,.
s, 39 the containment by regulating flow with Valves VFP-29 and VFP-30 or MO7072,
' thereby. limiting the amount of water which. enters containment. This tree
- assumes, however, that a containment water elevation between 587 feet and
~
590--feet is. reached ultimately and the need for post-incident recycle.and cooling is required.
Success of the Post-Incident System requires that at least one of two core spray pumps be started pumping water from the bottom of containment, through the core spray heat exchanger to core spray piping inside the containment.
Failure of post-incident piping, core spray piping inside the containment, both of the core spray pumps or their station power buses or Reactor Building
- level instrumentation implies failure of the system. As assumed for the Core Spray System, diversion of water to rupture of piping in the Turbine Building will also fail the system'unless this piping is isolated from the containment.
Heat removal by way of the core spray heat exchanger is required for success-of_the' system. This heat removal is established by the opening of M07066 remotely from the Control Room or locally by hand. An ac motor operated
- valve, M07080, in' parallel.with M07066 can also be opened to supply Fire System water to the shell of the core spray heat exchanger. Success of this system implies the integrity of Post-Incident System piping to and from the heat exchanger, the heat exchanger shell itself and yard piping. Yard piping
~
' failures which occur may be bypassed with-the installation of a fire hose from the hose manifold in the screenhouse to Hand-Operated Valve VPI-10 also in
- parallel to M07066.
Failure of.this system to supply sufficient flow to the reactor to makeup for decay heat losses implies eventual core uncovery and inadequate core cooling by way of Sequence PEmLp.
BP 12 Fire Pumps Without AC Power
- A seismic generated loss of offsite power has -occurred, the Primary System has isolated, an emergency condenser cooling path has been established; station de power and the UPS are available but emergency ac power is unavailable due to loss of the 2B bus or both of the diesel generators. The Fire System is required to be functional to provide makeup to the emergency condenser and core spray if necessary. The success and failure'of this system are identical to that described for the Fire System in Branch Point 6 except that only the diesel fire pump is available due to the failure of onsite ac power.
In addition, the ability.to start a fire pump manually from the RDS panel in the Control Room is no longer available due to this circuit's ac dependencies.
- Failure of the diesel pump or screenhouse fire piping under these conditions is assumed to lead to core damage Sequence PQF. Time frame for reaching this state of inadequate core cooling is the same whether or not ac power is available (approximately six hours).
Successful fire pump operation allows emergency condenser makeup at Branch Point 13.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l-
+
'40
~
.BP 13 Emergency Condenser Makeup Without AC Power Primary power dependency of emergency condenser makeup is on station de power
. which is assumed to be available during this sequence. This dependency is a result of DC-Powered Makeup Valve SV4947.. There is a minor ac-power dependency-at this branch point in that Control Room Primary System' Pressure Indicator PIIA07
' requires an ac power supply.
The description of this branch point is therefore identical to the discussion
- presented in Branch Point 7 except that continuous reactor pressure instrumentation used as backup verification that emergency condenser makeup is occurring is not available. Failure of makeup leads to the need for RDS and core spray at Branch Point 15; successful operation leads to Long-Term Cooling Systems at
~ Branch Point 14.
BP 14 Lons-Term Coolina As indicated at Branch Point 8, detailed long-term cooling event-tree has been developed and is presented following discussion of this loss of offsite power tree. This tree includes a discussion of long-term ac power dependencies.
l BP 15 RDS Without AC Power
. The > success or failure of RDS given primary coolant level'has reached 2'9" above the core is identical to that discussed in Branch Point 9 except that the ability to manually actuate a fire pump or manually depressurize the.
reactor from the Control Room is no longer available due to these circuits' dependencies on ac power.
(RDS panel control switch and annunciation power is l
from Panel 1Y.) Failure of automatic RDS actuation leads to eventual inadequate cooling of the core at elevated pressure in a time frame similar to that which
- would occur with ac. power'available (~ six hours) by way of sequence PQR.
Successful RDS operation leads to the need for core spray at Branch Point 16.
BP 16 Core Spray Without AC Power As a result of the unavailability of any ac power source, the ac-dependent motor-operated valves (M07070 and.MO7071) of the Core Spray System will not be available to provide core cooling after RDS actuation. 4 The de powered valves 4
(M07051 and M07061) will be available however as station de power is assumed to be unaffected. Therefore, with the exception of the ac valves and the ac-powered Control Room instrumentation and actuation circuitry for manually' starting a fire pump from the Control Room, the Core Spray System will function or fail as described in Eranch Point 10.
Failure of the Core Spray System will lead to an uncovered core at Sequence PQC, successful core spray will
. lead to Branch Point 17 and the need for long-term cooling.
F BP 17 Post-Incident System The success and failure of the Post-Incident System in long-term cooling at this branch point are identical to those described for Branch Point 11 even though there are ac power dependencies in the operation of the core spray pumps and M07066. Recall from the discussion of this branch point that the a
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
t
s 41 i
path by which water fills.the containment is through the RDS valves (well above the reactor core). The operator has the ability to monitor containment level (LT3171 and 3175) and -reactor and drum level (LT3180-LT3183 and
'LT3184-LT3187) and regulate the flow to the Reactor Building from outside containment without ac power availability.
It is assumed at this -branch point that' rather than terminating core spray makeup to the reactor entirely, allowing the core to become uncovered, the operator will regulate core spray.
= flow allowing makeup to cover losses due'to decay heat generation until an emergency ac power source for the core spray pumps can be recovered or offsite power is restored. This method of core spray flow regulation can occur for days which is sufficient time to allow restoration or repair of ac power.
Failure of' post-incident cooling equipment described at Branch Point 11 after emergency ac power failure then leads to an inadequately cooled core by Sequence PQLp.
1 BP 18 Emersency AC Without UPS i
1 An earthquake has' occurred which has resulted in a loss of offsite power. DC power remained available, the MSIV closed and the emergency condenser outlet valves opened providing a heat sink for the Primary Coolant System.
It is assumed that the UPS have not survived, however, which has implications with respect to the manner in which emergency power is provided to the :2B bus, j.
<RDS actuation and Control Room indication of reactor and drum level.
At this branch point the success and failure of emergency power is discussed.
Automatic isolation of the 2B bus and loading of the diesel generator cannot
-be accomplished because of the switchgear dependency on UPS and de power.
However, given that the Primary System is isolated and the emergency condenser s
l is in service, four hours minimum exists before safety relief valve actuation can occur and six hours minimum until the RDS actuation set points are satisfied.
Given these' time frames, manual operation of the 2B bus electrical switchgear is extremely likely and the importance of the emergency power dependencies on y
the UPS is very small.
Success at this branch point implies the operation of either the standby or emergency diesel generators and the-loading of this power to important equipment
.on 2B bus.
Successful emergency ac power leads to Branch Point 19.
Failure of. emergency ac power leads to Branch Point 22.
BP 19 Fire Pumps Withcut UPS j
There is no dependency by the fire pumps on the UPS with the exception of the-
- automatic starting of the pumps on low drum level as measured by'RDS drum level instrumentation (LT3184-LT3187). Similar to the emergency generator switchgear this dependency is not important at this branch point given the time frame in which makeup to the emergency ccadenser (four hours following transient initiation) or' core spray (six hours) is required. The success or failure of the fire pumps at this branch point is the same as that presented in the discussion for Branch Point 6.
Successful fire pump actuation leads to 2
Branch Point 20 emergency condenser makeup. Failure of the fire pumps at this i
1 NUO383-2628A-BA01 1
42 branch point leads to eventual core damage Sequence PUF due to the failure of the makeup source to the emergency condenser and ultimately core spray failure.
BP 20 Emergency Condenser Makeup Without UPS The description of success or failure at this branch point is identical to that presented for Branch Point 7 as there is no dependency on UPS by the fire water makeup to the emergency condenser. Success of this system leads to long-term cooling Branch Point 21.
However, unlike Branch Point 7, failure of makeup to the emergency condenser by itself leads to inadequate core cooling by way of Sequence PUEm. After having cooled the Primary System adequately for four hours, the emergency condenser has ceased removal of heat from the reactor due to depletion of shell side water. The reactor has repressurized and a safety relief salve is limiting pressure at 1550 psia.
Inventory depletion of the Primary Coolant System is occurring because no makeup water is available (like Branch Point 9, no control rod drive makeup is assumed because of the steam environment inside containment). Approximately six hours following the earthquake and loss of power, the reactor water level reaches the RDS actuation set point (2'9" above the core). As no power supply is available for energizing the solenoid-operated RDS isolation and depressurization valves, the reactor remains at pressure and the core slowly becomes uncovered without the ability to provide low-pressure core spray injection.
BP 21 Long-Term Cooling Similar to Branch Points 8 and 14, long-term cooling given the success of the emergency condenser is developed in a subsequent event tree.
BP 22 Fire Pumps With UPS and Emergency AC Failure For the same reasons stated in Branch Point 19, the success or failure of the fire pumps has limited dependence on the UPS. However, ac power availability does have a significant influence on this system. Therefore, the description of this branch point is essentially identical to that presented in Branch Point 12 with the failure of the diesel fire pump leading to core damage Sequence PUQF. Successful diesel pump operation allows emergency condenser makeup at Branch Point 23.
BP 23 Emergency Condenser Makeup Without UPS and Emergency AC There is no dependency of emergency condenser makeup on UPS and only a minor dependency on emergency ac.
This dependency was described in Branch Point 13 and involves the inability of the operator to use PIIA07 (primary coolant) as backup verification of the need for adding makeup to the emergency condenser shell.
LS3550 (shell level) is assumed to be available, however, as de power is still functional. Successful makeup addition to the emergency condenser shell at this branch point is still possible, therefore, and leads to the need for long-term cooling systems at Branch Point 24.
Failure of emergency NUO383-2628A-BA01
43 condenser makeup piping, Makeup Valve SV4947 or shell level indication is assumed to lead to core damage Sequence PUQEm for the same reasons presented in the description of Branch Point 20.
BP 24 Long-Term Cooling Development of a long-term cooling event tree follows the description of this event tree.
BP 25 Through 34 Emergency Condenser Valve Failure At this branch point a loss of offsite power resulting from a seismic event has occurred, de power is available and the MSIV has closed isolating the Primary System. The assumption is made at'this branch point that neither of the emergency condenser outlet valves (M07053 and M07063) opened leaving the Primary Coolant System without a heat sink. Reactor pressure has risen to the set point of the first safety relief valve (1550 psia) and Primary System pressure is being limited in this manner. Assuming the reactor was operating at full power at the time of the transient, this reactor state will be reached within six minutes from initiation of the transient.
There are no dependencies on emergency condenser valve operation within the UPS, emergency ac power, fire pumps, RDS, core spray or Post-Incident System with the exception of de power (which is assumed to be available during these sequences). Emergency conderser makeup obviously will not be required following failure of the emergency condenser valves, hence no branches between Branch Points 27 and 28 or 31 and 32.
There is a minor dependency of emergency condenser valve actuation on ac power in that PIIA07 can be an unambiguous indication that the emergency condenser valves need to be opened given that they have failed automatically. This pressure indicator relies on automatic starting of the emergency diesel generator and operation of switchgear connecting it to the 2B bus.
Given the limited time frame in which this instrument is being used no credit for manual actuation of the emergency diesel or standby diesel generators is taken in manual operation of these valves.
Given these limited dependencies, it can be seen that the reactor states and sequence descriptions resulting from transient sequences leading to inadequate core cooling as a result of emergency condenser makeup failure are identical to those whi:h occur following emergency condenser valve failure, the only difference being the time required to reach the final reactor state.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
s w
(
44' Emeraency Condenser Makeup Failure Sequences
' Corresponding Emeraency Condenser Valve Failure Sequences'-
Time of SRV Time of Core Time of SRV Time of Core Sequence Actuation Uncovery BP Sequence Actuation Uncovery BP i
l l
PEmLp 4h Days 11 PEvLp 6m
. Days 30 PQEmLp 4h
-Days 17 PEvQLp 6m Days 34 PEmC 4h 6h 10 PEvC 6a 2h 29 PQEmC 4h 6h 16 PEvQC 6m 2h 33 PEmR 4h 6h 9
PEvR 6m 2h 28 PQEmR 4h 6h 15 PEvQR 6m 2h 32 l
l PF 4h 6h 6
PEvF 6m 2h 27 l
l PQF 4h 6h 12 PEvQF 6m 2h 31 l
PUF 4h 6h 19 No Corresponding l
PUQF 4h 6h 22)
Sequences PUEm 4h 6h 20 PEvU 6m 2h 25 PWh 4h 6h D
l l
l NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
d 45 BP 35 Primary Coolant System Isolation Failure On loss of offsite power a signal is generated by the Reactor Protection System to close all automatically-actuated containment isolation valves. At l
this point on the event tree the station de power supply is assumed to have survived the seismic event but the MSIV has nevertheless failed to close. No assumptions are being made with respect to the ability of backup valves to the
_ MSIV to close, or if they do close, to prevent leakage from the unisolated main steam line to the main condenser, or of the integrity of the main steam line piping or its branch connections to remain intact following ground t
-motion.
It is conservatively assumed, therefore, that failure to close the f
MSIV following a loss of offsite power leads to a blowdown of the reactor to the Turbine Building or pipe tunnel.
If large enough, such a blowdown could L occur over the course of several minutes. The energy loss of such a blowdown is more than that added to the Primary System as a result of decay heat eliminating a demand on the emergency condenser valves to open or the need to
- makeup to the emergency condenser shell.
At this branch point then the success or failure of UPS is discussed. Failure of UPS implies the failure of the batteries, power supply or actuation / sensor cabinets. Failure of more than one UPS is sufficient to disable the RDS i
leading to an uncovered core with an insufficient blowdown to allow timely core spray initiation.
If the blowdown continues outside containment or one or more RDS trains actuates properly, core spray injection can occur eventually although not before limited core damage has occurred. Failure of UPS leads to inadequate core cooling via Sequence PIU. Successful operation of at least three of the four UPS leads to Branch Point 36.
BP 36 Emeraency AC Power Following MSIV Failure As the blowdown occurs due to failure of the MSIV to close, the emergency diesel generator will attempt to start and energize the 2B bus to provide power for important equipment such as the electric fire pump and ac core spray valves. Failure of the diesel generator to start or load the 2B bus leads to Branch Point 41; successful energization of the emergency bus to Branch Foint
'l
)
37.
Due to the potentially limited duration of this transient, no credit is
).
taken for manual operation of the emergency or standby diesel generators.
BP 37 Fire Pumps After MSIV Failure On attaining a Icw drum level (<17" below center line) a signal will be sent to start both fire pumps. Success at this branch point implies the starting
- of at least one of the two fire pumps and the maintaining of screenhouse fire piping integrity. This will allow fire pressure permissive (>100 psig) to the RDS actuation logic and provides a source of fire water for core spray.
Success leads to Branch Point 38 while failure leads to a lack of adequate 4
t_
core cooling after RDS and core spray actuation fails, Sequence PIF. No credit for operator action to start the fire pumps is implied, again due to the potentially limited time frame over which this transient occurs.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
46 -
t BP 38 RDS With MSIV Failure a
As the blowdown outside containment continues, low drum level will initiate a two-minute timer and a low drum level signal to the RDS actuation logic.
Further blowdown will result in reaching the low reactor level set point (2'9" above the core). When all four signals occur simultaneously in two of four lUNS sensor trains, low drum level,: low reactor level, high Fire System pressure and time out of the two-minute timer, the RDS solenoid valves will be energized l
opening the isolation valve and depressurization salve in each train. Failure' of. blowdown in more than one train is assumed to lead to an unsatisfactory
. depressurization of the reactor and limited core damage by Sequence PIR.'
Successful blowdown through three of the four RDS trains leads to the need for core spray at Branch Point 39.
Again, no credit for operator action is taken-due to the short duration of the transient, failure of automatically-operated' components is assumed to lead to system failure.
BP 39 Core Spray After MSIV Failure The reactor has depressurized by RDS actuation after blowdown through the main steam line. The fire pumps and emergency power are successfully operating.
At low reactor water level a signal was sent to the core spray valves, and on reaching 200 psig reactor pressure the ac-and de-operated valves receive a signal to open. Success of the Core Spray System at this. branch point implies opening of either of the pairs of ac or de valves in the core spray lines j
maintaining the integrity of the core spray piping in the containment, in the
- Turbine Building ano the underground yard piping. No credit is given for isolation of the Turbine Building piping should it rupture as a result of the earthquake or establishing a backup fire water path to containment through the Post-Incident System, again due to the limited time frame over t't.h the transient occurs. Successful core spray leads to long-term cooling at Branch Point 40, failure leads to degraded core cooling Sequence PIC.
BP 40 Post-Incident System With MSIV Failure Although a result of water loss was effectively a loss of coolant accident outside containment, the Long-Term Cooling System description at this branch point is identical to that at Branch Point 10.
Following a transient of much longer duration, one might argue that the main steam line is open outside i.
containment and water overflow from the Primary System preferentially will pass through this line rather than through the RDS valves whi-h are located at a higher elevation. This argument could lead to the potentially unconservative assumption that the Post-Incident System will not be needed for long-term cooling following a reactor blowdown outside containment.- The assumption will be made, therefore, that repairs to main steam line components are made following the transient isolating the Primary System and ultimately requiring use of the Post-Incident System. Failure of this system is assumed to gradually lead to inadequate cooling by Sequence PILp.
i NUO383-2628A-BA01 7
1 4
n
47 BP $1 Through 43 A failure of the MSIV to close has resulted in a blowdown of the reactor to the Turbine Building. At this branch point, de and UPS power are assumed to be available but emergency ac power is not available due either to a failure of the emergency diesel generator or within the 2B bus.
The description of Branch Points 41 through 43 is identical to Branch Points 37 through 39 with the exception that the electric fire pump and ac-powered core spray valves are not functional due to the loss of emergency power. Failure of the diesel fire pump or one of the de core spray valves by themselves will lead to Sequences PIQF and PIQC. Sequence PIQR occurs just as described in Branch Point 38.
Successful diesel fire pump, RDS and core spray actuation lead to long-term cooling Branch Point 44.
BP 44 Post-Incident System The description presented in Branch Point 11 is applicable to Post-Incident System operation at this branch. Again the assumption is made that the Post-Incident System is required, perhaps, as a result of a repair of the main steam line. The standby diesel generator is now considered available for potential use as backup to the emergency generator. Even if both diesels failed as a result of the earthquake, operator action limiting the amount of water added to containment will postpone the use of the Post-Incident System for as much as several days until repair or restoration of an ac power source for the core spray pumps is made available.
BP 45 UPS With DC Power Failure The earthquake has resulted in a loss of offsite power. The assumption is made at this branch point that the station de power supply (station batteries or Panel D01) also has failed.
DC power failure automatically results in the inability to isolate the Primary System by closure of the MSIV. As was assumed at Branch Point 35, a blowdown of the reactor to the Turbine Building results. A failure of the UPS has two important consequences at this branch point. Failure of UPS A disables the ability of automatic loading of the diesel generator onto the 2B bus leaving no power source to the ac-powered core spray valves should they be needed. A rapid blowdown outside containment will result in core uncovery without core spray as the power supply to the de core spray is also assumed to be disabled.
Failure of more than one of the UPS will result in inadequate reactor depressurization perhaps leading to limited core damage as discussed in Branch Point 38.
Success of three of the four UPS, at least one being UPS A, leads to Branch Point 46.
Failure of UPS A or any two UPS is assumed to lead to degraded core cooling by Sequence PDU.
BP 46 Emergency AC With DC Power Failure Failure of the emergency diesel to start or failure of the 2B bus to energize disables the power supply to the ac core spray valves. As stated previously, should a rapid reactor depressurization occur, no credit for manual action in starting the standby diesel can be taken and core spray will be disabled by NUO383-2628A-BA01
48' way of Sequence PDQ. Successful energization of the 2B bus leads to Branch
- Point-47.
BP 47 Fire Pumps With DC Power Failure
._There is no dependency of the ac or diesel fire pumps on station de power.
Therefore, the discussion of this sequence is identical to that presented for Branch Point 37.
Failure of the fire pumps is assumed to lead to inadequate cooling Sequence PDF. Success leads to Branch Point 48.
'BP 48.RDS With DC Power Failure There is'no dependency of the RDS on station de power. Therefore, the discussion of this sequence is identical to that presented for Branch Point 38.
Failure of the RDS is assumed to lead to inadequate cooling Sequence PDR.
' Success leads to Branch Point 49.
' BP'49 Core' Spray With DC Power Failure A significant dependency of the Core Spray System on de power exists in that station de power operates Core Spray Valves N07051 and M07061. The description for Branch Point 39 is applicable at this branch except that the de core spray valves are not operable. A ' failure of either ac core spray valves to open in addition to those failures described in Branch Point 39 is sufficient to reach inadequate core cooling Sequence PDC. Successful core spray leads to the need for long-term cooling at Branch Point 50.
BP 50 Post-Incident System Failure There-are no de power dependencies in the Post-Incident System. The discussion of Branch Point 11 is therefore applicable to Branch Point 50 with the exception of the de powered level instrument. Post-Incident System failure at this branch point leads to Sequence PDLp.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 A-
-m....
w
FI G U R L 15r-3 LONG TERM C0OLit4G M E. MERGE.MCY CONbENSE.R L9 AFTER SE.lSMICLY INDUCE) LOSS or orFStTE 90wt_R PIS EM RDS UPS
- EMER. AC'
- CRO LS e
3 6
E PYLP 4
PVC 2
PYR 9
8 potp 7
pot I
POR II l4 13 PUYt.p
- 2
- o pgyc PUYR I5 PODY EM
- LMCRGLNCY CONDENSER MAKEUP UPS
-UNITERUPT A&LC FOWC.R SUPPLT EME.RG. AC-EME AGENCT AC POWER CRD
-CONTROL Rob tRtVL M AKEUP RD5
-RLACTOR bEPRESSURIT.ATION SYSTEM CS
- CORE SPRAY SYSTEM RIS
- POST l>4Cl1LNT SYSTCM
50 Long-Term Cooling Given Emergency Condenser Operation Following a Loss of Offsite Power The previous tree described a loss of offsite power transient generated by a seismic event. Four branches of that tree lead to a need for long-term cooling assuming the Primary Coolant System was isolated, the emergency condenser was in service and emergency condenser makeup f rom the Fire System is successful. An assumption is made that of fsite power may not be available for several days leading to the need to makeup to the Primary System allowing a recovery of normal level overcoming shrinkage due to the cooldown and normal Primary Coolant System leakage.
Shrinkage by itself is not sufficient to result in uncovering the core.
Combined with normal Primary System leakage from packing, seals, etc, over several days there exists the potential for attaining very low Primary Coolant System levels, however. For this reason in additional system, Control Rod Drive Makeup, is required for use during long-term cooling in addition to the emergency condenser. Failure of the CRD makeup, like the emergency condenser, will be assumed to lead to water levels below the low reactor level set point and a nee d for RDS, core spray and post-incident recycle. Failure of this makeup supply is not expected to result in these low levels for over a day allowing a relatively long time for the operator to establish this makeup supply.
In fact, if the Primary Coolant System pressure is maintained below 150 psi by the emergency condenser, the Core Spray System can be used to provide the required makeup. As the CRD System is the preferred source of makeup and as it can be actuated even with the reactor at elevated pressures, the tree which follows was developed conservatively ignoring the potential Core Spray System option.' The core spray can be added if needed by inserting an additional heading following CRD makeup in the long-term cooling tree.
BP 1 UPS Long-term cooling has been established for the Primary System through use of the emergency condenser. This tree (Figure IV-3) contains a branch point for UPS, similar to the loss of offsite power tree to account for its effect on various important system functions such as providing Control Room indication for reactor drum level and actuation of the RDS if necessary. UPS failure 1cada to Branch Point 10 whereas success results in Branch Point 2.
DP 2 Emergency AC Success of emergency ac implies operation of the emergency diesel or standby diesel generator and energization of the 2B bus. This system is necessary to provide a power source for the CRD pumps and is also important in providing power for the electric fire pump, ac core spray valves and various Control Room indicationn.
Emergency ac failure leads to Branch Point 7; successful energization of the 2B bus leads to the operation of the CRD pumps at Branch Point 3.
- It is emphasized that control rod drive makeup is a backup to core spray.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
w
51 BP 3 CRD Pumps Successful operation of this system imp 1f )s that one of the two CRD pumps be operating from the emergency power source, that the condensate storage tank be intact, CV4090 be open, CRD suction and discharge piping be intact and a path to the reactor (most likely through the scram header) be available. Failure of this system is assumed to lead to the need for RDS, core spray and post-incident cooling around a day following the loss of offsite power, Branch Point 4.
Periodic operation of the system implies successful long-term cooling.
BP 4 Throuah 6 RDS, core spray and post-incident cooling are required in these branches.
Description of these branch points is identical to that presented for Branch Points 9 through 11 in the loss of offsite power tree except that rather than emergency condenser makeup, CRD makeup failure has occurred. Failure of these systems leads to inadequate core cooling via Sequences PYR, PYC and PYLp.
BP 7 Throuah 9 Loss of emergency power source automatically implies the inability to makeup with the CRD pumps and the need for RDS, core spray and post-incident cooling.
The description of these branches is identical to Branch Points 15 through 17 of the loss of offsite power tree except rather than emergency condenser makeup, CRD makeup failure has occurred. Failure of these systems is assumed to lead to inadequate core cooling by Sequences PQR, PQC and PQLp.
BP 10 Emergency AC With UPS Failure Given the length of time associated with this branch of the transient (on the order of a day), there is little dependency of ac power on the UPS. This branch point is therefore identical to Branch Point 2.
Success of ac power leads to CRD makeup at Branch Point 11, failure is assumed to lead to core damage Sequence PUQ because of the inability to makeup to the reactor or actuate the RDS.
BP 11 CRD Pamps This branch point is identical to Branch Point 3 except that reactor level instrumentation powered from the UPS is not available.
Failure of CRD makeup is assumed to lead to inadequate cooling by way of Sequence PUY because of the inability to makeup to the reactor with the CRD System or actuate the RDS.
The RDS dependancy upon UPS (BP-12, sequence PUYR) is redundant to sequence PYR, as the RDS logic model contains all the dependencies on UPS.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
I, 52 t
h l
V.
SEISMIC CAPACITY, FAII,URE MODES. EFFECTS REPAIR AND RECOVERY This section contains a table identifying each plant component important to the systems described in Sections III and IV.
In addition to the components included as a part of the systems, descriptions, plant structures and equipment not normally considered important to the l
functioning of the system but which may be made important as,a result of ground motion are identified, such as major plant structures and masonry walls. The effects of the failure of each component are assessed as well as the expected failure mode. As the purpose of this study was to rank the importance of these plant components in some manner, an assumed capacity for each of these components was also dete rmined. A compilation of this information is presented in Table V-1.
The components chosen were those identified as being important to the
. systems used to perform important plant shutdown functions in the event tree headings of Section IV. The effects of the failure of each of l
these components were based on the system-success-and-failure-criteria presented in the system descriptions and event tree discussions.
Important passive components whose structural failure could lead to loss of any of these system components were identified previously in l
plant walkdowns such as those conducted for IE Bulletins (electrical equipment, anchorage, masonry walls).
In Table V-1, equipment dependencies on passive components were identified for major plant equipment and their power sources. To have a more complete system failure analysis; equipment dependencies on cable routings were included in the models. For the equipment identified in Phase I, and as updated by this Phase II report, all the cables listed in the schemes for the various pieces of electrical equipment were l.
identified. The raceway routing of these cables was then listed and a
_ general walkdown of the raceways was conducted. Of primary concern during the walkdown evaluations were items that may fail the cables by falling onto the cable trays, conduit, or equipment. For instance. the walkway grating by the screenhouse entrance door (CCHDW) was assumed to fail the diesel and electrical fire pumps, due to cables which run underneath this walkway. The seismic capacity of these items was assumed to be that of the structure to which it is attached. For the example above, the walkway was assigned a ground acceleration of 0.500s which is the value of the screenhouse structure.
The capacity of the raceways has been evaluated by the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG). The group concluded:
...that the existing raceway systems in SEP plants possess substantial inherent seismic resistance and that the seismic qualification of raceway systems is not a significant safety issue."
NUO383-2628A-BA01
B 53 l
i Based upon this conclusion, the seismic capacity of the cable trays was set equal to the capacity of the structure it is mounted to.
Pending final NRC approval of the SQUG conclusions, no further analysis of the cable trays will be undertaken.
Therefore, the bases for the capacities for the components listed in Table V-1'are discussed in this section as well as assumptions made with respect to potential operator respcase in recovery and repair of the component failures should they occur. The procedure for using the L
information presented in Table V-1 is discussed in Section VI.
A.
Assumed Capacity In order to evaluate the seismic capacity of Big Rock point structures, equipment and components on a consistent basis, information from many sources was reviewed.
Information sources included analyses, tests, specifications, historical equipment seismic reports and judgments made by experienced engineers. The seismic capacities determined for Big Rock Point structures, equipment, and components are based upon the following:
1.
Detailed structural analyses of as-builts, 2.
Detailed structural design analyses, I
3.
Comparison based upon historical performance with respect to items of similar physical appearance and functional requirements, and 4.
Visual inspection and evaluation based upon experienced judgments.
Assessments with respect to the adequacy of structures, equipment and components at some level of seismic input were reliably estimated by the above four means. However, the specification of a lower-bound free-field seismic excitation at which an item fails was more difficult.
Therefore, a significant amount of judgment was required to normalize all sources of information and to unify all data on a consistent basis.
The results of detailed analysis of as-builts and seismic designs provided margins with respect to code (ASME, ANSI, AISI, AISC, ACI, etc) requirements. An unlerstanding of the margins with respect to the codes themselves provided a basis for establishing mean capacities and variances associated with structural integrity or reliability. A mean capacity minus one standard deviation provides what is referred to in Table V-1 as an " assumed capacity."
An evaluation of items on the basis of historical performance may well be directly amenable to similar potential calculations as to those employed for items analyzed. For some items, such as welded pipe, very few failures due to seismic excitation have occurred. Thus, statistics are not suitable. Therefore, the " assumed capacity" is the lowest free field seismic excitation at which a failure has been known to occur.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
54 Such an " assumed capacity" will be much more conservative (lower) than that derived statistically from distribution of failures.
Evaluation of items by inspection was done by corparison with items which had a historical performance data base or which had been analyzed at Big Rock Point. An assignment of an " assumed capacity" was based on statistics or lower bounds of historical performance data.
Examples of items evaluated by the general four groupings above are contained in the following table:
BIG ROCK POINT SELECTIVE ASSUMED CAPACITIES Item Basis for Evaluation Masonry Walls Detailed Analysis to As-Builts Building Structures Detailed Analysis to As-Builts Statio.. Power Battery Racks Detailed Analysis Design Fire Piping - Screenhouse Detailed Analysis Design Electrical Equipment Historical Performance Welded Piping Historical Performance Diesel Generator Unit Inspection - Historical Performance Turbine Building Fire Piping Inspection - Comparison with Analyzed Pipe All assumed capacities reflected an understanding of item location, overall building and local response, and the site specific spectral shape. Scaling of capacities from Regulatory Guide 1.60 (Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant) to those of the site specific spectra was based on an overall scale factor of 1.5 where applicable. For plant structures, the assumed capacity was associated with a potential lack of serviceability. The capacities were elevated from the results obtained by D'Appolonia (Report 78-435, August 1981 - Volumes ! - X, Seismic Safety Margin Evaluation - Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Facilities). Serviceability is generally defined as code limits except for secondary steel members in highly redundant structures where code limits were handled more liberally. A scale factor of 1.5 for spectral shape between Reg Guide 1.60 and the Big Rock Point site specific spectra was used to relate D'Appolonia results to the site specific spectra. The increase in allowables of 1.6 for the safe shutdown earthquake (NRC-Standard Review Plan 3.8.4) was used for some steel member allowables in evaluating capacities.
For concrete, no ductility factor or Standard Review Plan allowable increase was employed. Thus, concrete allowables were those determined strictly from the ultimate strength design method per AC1-349-76.
The assumed capacities for masonry and for some other equipment items in Table V-1 were determined from fragility analysis similar to that of Kennedy et al (Probabilistic Seismic Safety Study of an Existing Nuclear Power Plant, Nuclear Engineering and Design 59 (1980) 315-338).
NUO383-2628A-BA01
55 The assumed capacities for equipment not limited by building capacity are based on a minus one standard deviation from the estimated mean capacity. The standard deviations are composite values based upon both random variabilities and variabilities associated with the uncertainty
'of the mean value.
l:
l NUO383-2628A-BA01
56 B.
Operator Initiated Recovery and Repair It was not assumed that because a particular structure ot< component listed in Table V-1 did not survive an earthquake that the function provided by the failed component was unavailable for the duration of the transient. Numerous options for repair or recovery of systems are available to the Big Rock Point operator depending on the nature of the failures and the time frame in which the failed system functions are required.
In this section, the ground rules for assumed operator response in overcoming component failures identified in Table V-1 are presented. These ground rules were used as a basis for identifying operator response following an earthquake for which credit was taken in the event tree branch point descriptions of Section IV.
Recovery of failed systems was assumed to be possible if sufficient major components of a system which provided a given function survive the earthquake but were not operating because of secondary failure modes. An example of this situation would be the failure of the diesel generator to start because undervoltage relsys did not generate any actuation signal but, given sufficient time, manual operation of the generator or standby generator could be accomplished providing power to the emergency bus. The following assumptions were made in recovering a system which was not adequately performing its function due to seismically induced failures:
1.
No operator action was assumed to occur while ground motion was occurring. This assumption was applied to any recovery actions required to occur over the first few minutes of the transient.
As examples, no credit for manual RDS or core spray actuation was taken if a rapid blowdown of the reactor was occurring due to LOCA or MSIV isolation failures.
2.
Limited manual recovery of systems which have survived the earthquake is assumed during the first few minutes following the earthquake.
Examples of these operator actions include manual operator actuation of the emergency condenser outlet valves or enclosure spray valves. These actions are assumed to be possible only for those systems that do not have to function while ground motion is in progress, whose actuation can occur from the control rooms and, are considered successful only if instrumentation is available to the operator indicating the need to actuate the system and has also survived the earthquake.
3.
Manual recovery of systems from outside the control room was considered possible only if a relatively significant time frame was available to the operator to perform these actions (eg, hours).
Such actions included operation of the standby diesel generator or isolation of ruptured fire system piping in order to establish a flow path to the reactor building through the post incident system. These typus of operator action were considered possibic only if the systems were currently designed to be operated in NUO383-2628A BA01
t l
57-r b
r this manner (ie, no credit was taken for " modifying" a system for unusual operation within a time frame of several hours).
Again, indication that these types of actions were necessary needs to be available to the operator.
4.
Repair or modification of a system was not considered possible in a time frame on the order of days. An example of this type of operator action was demonstrated in the dependency of the core spray pumps on ac power.
If the emergency bus or IA and 2A buses failed to survive the earthquake due to the collapse of a nearby block wall, the only way power could be supplied to these pumps, if required, would be to provide temporary jumpers from one of the diesel generators directly to the pump motor, bypassing normal station power disteibution equipment. Credit for this type of repair or modifica cion was taken only when 1
significant time frames were available for repairs or mods.
i i
P i
i i
)
f t
r NUO383 2628A-BA01 i
58 i
TABLE V-1 COMPONENT FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CAPACITIES l
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA) l Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Containment Building Loss of components anchored to
.4g - interpretation of D'Appolonia l
ICternal Structure reactor building concrete structures Report 78-435, Volume II I
(ie, piping, instrumentation, electrical Shear Failure of Reinforced cabinets, electrical and pneum. tic valves)
Concrete Wall l
Fuel Cask Leading Dock Failure of Post Incident System
.4g - interpretation of D' Appolonia l
components located in core spray Project Report 78-435, Volume VI l
Column Interaction Turbine Building Failure of components anchored to
.25g - interpretation of D' Appolonia a.
Pedestal pedestal and pipe tunnel structures Project Report 78-435, Volume III (ie, core spray and CRD pump suction piping)
Sliding of Turbine Pedestal b.
Steel Superstructure Failure of components anchored to steel
.32g - interpretation of D' Appolonia members of turbine building (ie, piping, Project Report 78-435, Volume III turbine building crane, electrical cabinets)
Failure of Overall Steel Superst ructure c.
Foundation Failure of components anchored to concrete
.35g - interpretation of D'Appolonia structures in the turbine building other Project Report 78-435, Volume III than turbine pedestal or pipe tunnel Failure of Foundation Below (ie, electrical cabinets, motor control Steel Superstructure centers, electrical instrumentation batteries Service Building Loss of equipment anchored to service
.35g - interpretation of D' Appolonia building structures (ie, control room electrical Project Report 18-435, Volume III panels, and electrical instrumentation, Failure of Steel Structures RDS actuatien/ sensor cabinets)
Screenhouse Loss of components anchored to screenhouse
.5g - interpretation of D' Appolonia and diesel generator room structures Report 78-435, Volume VIII (ie, diesel generator electrical panels, elettrical instrumentation t.atteries, crane)
NUO383-2628A-BADI
1 59 TABLE V-1 I
i Assumed capacity (ZPGA) e-m est Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Stack Loss of turbine building, service building
.25g - interpretation of D'Appolonia l
l and electrical penetration components Project Report 78-435. Volume IV l
(ie, control room, RDS and station power Tensile Stress in Vertical Rebar l
roen equipment)
Olock Walls (8)
M100.01 Loss of CRD pump suction piping in
.33g - interpretation of SMA condensate penp room Report 13703.01-R003 Loss of Blocks or Collapse i
MIGO.02 Loss of condensate piping between 1.4g l
bot well and condensate storage l.
tank (CRD pump suction piping) l M100.03 Loss of UPS A (RDS power supply and power
.63g 1
supply for emergency diesel generator circuit breaker) l M100.04 Loss of UPS B
.533 l
MIOO.05 Loss of threaded fire piping in turbine building
.53g l
M100.06 Loss of UPS A and B
.33 l
M100.07 Loss of UPS C and D
.37g M100.08 Loss of UPS A and C
.31g M100.09 Loss of UPS B and D
.31g M100.10 Loss of UPS A
.333 MIOO.Il Loss of UPS C
.373 l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
I
I 60 l
TABLE V-1 Assumed capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode MICO.12 Loss of UPS C
.16g l
M100.13 Imss of UPS D and threaded fire piping
.16g in turbine building M100.14 Loss of de power source (station batteries,
.53g and 125 V de Bus DOI, D02 and D10)
MICO.15 Loss of threaded fire piping in turbine building
.53g M100.16 Loss of de power source (station batteries,
.53g 125 V de Bus DOI, D02 and DIO, core spray piping and 2400 V cable (offsite power))
MIOO.17 Loss of 2400 V cable and contactors for motor
>>1.0g operated valves MO 7072 and MO 7064 MIDO.18 Loss of station ac distribution equipment
.13g (2400 V Bus, IA, 2A and 2B Buses)
MIDO.19 Loss of 2400 V cable and core spray piping
. e3g in turbine building and de power sources adjacent to black wall M100.16 N120.20 Loss of core spray piping in turbine building
.12g MIDO.21 Loss of 2400 V Cable (of fsite power)
.Ilg and threaded fire piping in turbine building)
M100.PIS Loss of electrical power to MO 7066
.4g - (same as fuel cask loading dock due to size of wall and encased all four sides by loading dock concrete structure)
NUO'tS3-2628A-BA01
l 61 i
l TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
+
ev nent Consequences or Failure and Failure Mode 2400 V Voltage Regulator I.oss of offsite power
.25g Historical capacity of unanchored switch yard equipment Falls from supports Emergency Condenser IDCA, RDS valve and fire piping damage
.12g - interpretation of SMA Shell Report 13702.01-R003 Support failure Nonregenerative IDCA
.13g - interpretation of SMA Heat Exchanger Report 13702.01-R003 Support failure Cleancp IDCA
.11g - interpretation of SMA Demineralizer Report 13702.01-R003 Support failure Reactor ATWS Not characterized lcternals CRDM Discharge ATVS Not characterized Piping Crisping IDCA Not characterized Rupture Ceramic Insulators Loss of offsite power
.2g Historical capacity Fire Piping in Screenhouse Inability to supply water to yard piping
.25g - interpretation of Catalytic (Cast iron components) and failure of automatic RDS actuation Calculation Book 2076 October, 1981 Rupture / leakage NUO383-2628A-BA01
62 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Ycrd Piping Inability to supply water to turbine building
.2g - Interpretation of D' Appolonia or containment through post incident system Report 78-435, Volume IX Rupture / leakage Fire Piping in Turbine Inability to supply water to containment through
.35g - Inspection Building turbine building and potential diversion Failure due to internal Threaded and of water from fire piping in containment if load of basket Victolic Couplings coincident with failure of Valves VPI 301 or 302 strainers Welded Piping
.25g (Same as turbine pedestal as penetrates pipe tunnel wall)
Fire Piping in Core Spray Inability to supply water to containment through
.4g (Same as fuel cask Heat Exchanger Room Post incident system or shell side of loading dock due to core spray heat exchanger historical performance of welded carbon steel piping)
Rupture / leakage Fire Piping Inside Inability to provide makeup to emergency
.4g (Same as reactor Containment condenser shell, core spray, or building internal structure containment spray due to historical performance of carbon steel piping)
Rupture / leakage l
Electric and Diesel Inability to supply water to fire piping
.25 - interpretation of Catalytic l
Fire Pumps (Pumps 6 and 7) in screenhouse and failure of automatic Engineering Evaluation Book 2076 l
RDS actuation October 1981 Rupture / leakage of cast iron casing l
NUO383-262&A-BA01 j
i l
.63 l
TABLE V-1 L
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
C-7_; r-eent Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Care Spray Pumps Inability to recycle water from the
.4g (securely anchored to (Pumps 2A and B) containment sump to core sprays for fuel cask loading dock long-term heat removal af ter a foundation)
LOCA or RDS actuation Loss of function-l or rupture / leakage Control Rod Drive.
Inability to makeup to reactor _in long
.4g (securely anchored to l
Pumps and Piping term to accommodate normal primary coolant reactor building internal Inside Containment system leakage structure)
(Pumps 4A and B)
Loss of function or rupture / leakage l
l Containment Piping outside
.25g (anchored to pipe
_ tunnel walls)
Rupture leakage l
Emergency Diesel Failure to supply. automatic emergency
.5g (securely anchored to l
Generator ac power to 28 Bus diesel generator room floor)
Loss of-function l
l Standby Emergency Failure to supply backup emergency ac power Not characterized Diesel Generator to 2B Bus (manually actuated)
Loss of function l
Emergency Diesel Failure of emergency diesel to run
>l.0g (Buried tank) l Fuel Supply Leakage / rupture i
Diesel Fire Pump Failure of diesel fire pump to run
>1.0g (Buried tank)
Fuel Supply' Leakage / rupture l
Standby Diesel
. Failure of standby diesel generator to run Not characterized Fuel Supply Leakage / rupture
- .+,{
Vl s
+
NUO383-2628A-BA01
_=
64-I TABLE V-1.
l l
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA) l Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode I
Care Spray Heat Failure to remove decay heat or diversion
.4g'(securely anchored to
~
Exchanger of post incident system water during fuel cask loading dock long-term cooling af ter LOCA' or RDS actuation foundation)
Leakage / rupture Station Batteries Loss of,;wer to major 'dc powered
.35g (securely anchored to electrical equipment (125 V de Bus Dol) turbine building foundation)
Loss of function l
UPS Batteries Loss of power to RDS sensors and' solenoid
.35g (Securely anchored to).
valves (UPS A also suppliesLpower to emergency turbine building foundation diesel generator switchgear)
-Loss of function Emergency Diesel Loss of power to emergency generator
.5g (securely anchored to Generator Batteries starting circuit and motor starter diesel generator room floor)
(EDG failure to start)
Loss of function Standby Diesel Loss of power to standby diesel generator Not characterized Generator Batteries motor starter (standby EDG failure to start)
Loss of-function Diesel Fire Pump
. Loss of. power to diesel fire pump starting
.5g (securely anchored to Batteries circuit and motor starter (diesel fire screenhouse floor) pump failure to start)
Loss of function 125 V de Bus Loss of power to major de powered electrical
.35g (securely anchored to equipment (Bus D02, de core spray valves, turbine building foundation) emergency condenser. outlet valves, MSIV)
Loss of function / overturning 125 V de Bus (D02)
Loss of power to major de powered equipment
.35g (securely anchored to turbine)
(Bus DIO, emergency condenser makeup valve, building foundation) station annunciators, mise station power Loss of function
,switchgear-NUO383-2628A-BA01
i 65 i'
- p l
TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA) and Failure Mode Component Consequences of Failure
~"
125 V de Bus (D10)-
' Loss of ' power to de powered enclosure spray valve
.35g (securely anchored to turbine an;l, backup fire water supply valve to core spray
. building foundation) through PIS Loss of function r
a:
.35g'(securelyanchoredtoturbine 3
480 V Bus IA and 2A Loss of power to ac powered core spray pumps core spray heat exchanger valve, CRD pumps building foundation)
Loss of functi93/ overturning
- 3 480 V Bus 2B Loss of power to ac powered core spray valves,
.35g.(securely anchored to turbine electric fire pump Bus IA and 2A, auto throwover building foundation) panel Loss of function / overturning Bus 1 and 2 and' Causes secondary failure of auto throwover
.35g (securely anchored to turbine l
Station Power panel and contactors for core spray valves and building foundation) ac powered containment spray valve Overturning s,
Auto Throwover Panel Loss of power to panels 1Y and 3Y
.35g (securely fastened to turbine (C05) building north wall, turbine building fcundation)
Loss of function 1Y Panel (BUS 1Y)
Loss of ac power to control room instrumentation
.32g (securely an',hored to turbine l
(RDS manual actuation switches, reactor presgure building structural steel) indication, RPS drum level indication, emergency Loss of function condenser shell level indication) g RDS Sensor and Loss of power to RDS valves, sensors and control
.35g (securely anchored to computer Actuation Cabinets room. 'adication (reactor and drum level) room floor, service building) automat c and manual actuation failure of RDS and Loss of function / overturning i
j fire pump at' art circuitry (auto:only)
-Panels Col, C02 and.c40' Loss of indication and control for main control
.35g (securely anchored to control room and RDS panels room floor, service building)
Loss of function / overturning NUO383-2628A-BA01
66 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Panel C30 Causes loss of instrumentation on south wall of
.4g (securely anchored to reactor steam drum enclosure reactor pressure switches for.
building internal structure)'
emergency condenser valves and core spray valves, Overturning reactor level switches for core spray valves and RDS control room reactor pressure and drum level indication Electric and Diesel Fi!.e Failure of diesel and electric fire pumps
.5g (securely anchored to screen-Pump Control. Panels to start house structure)
(C17 and C09)
Loss of function Emergency Diesel 1 tlure of emergency diesel generator to start
.5g (securely anchored to Generator Control diesel generator room wall)
Panel (C18)
Loss of function Standby Diesel Failure of standby diesel generator to
.15g (historical performance Generator Setup and supply emergency power to 2B Bus of unanchored transformers-Stepdown Transformers SSNRP)
Loss of function UPS Battery Chargers Failure of UPS power supplies to RDS
.35g (securely anchored to turbine building foundation)
Overturning onto UPS batteries Station Battery Chargers Failure of DC power supplies
.35g (securely anchored to turbine building foundation)
Overturning onto station batteries or DC distribution panels MSlV Failure to isolate primary system potential
.40g (okay as pressure boundary)
(MO 7050) blowdown outside containment MSIV is sufficiently restricted that it will not impact surrounding structures.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
I 67 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure
~ and Failure Mode Emergency Condenser Loss of primary system decay. heat sink.
Not characterized (okay as Outlet Valves pressure boundary). Fails to (MO 7053, MO 7063) open because of operator impact on surrounding structure due to seismic motion Emergency Condenser Loss of primary system decay heat sink
.4g (securely anchored to Mikeup Valve reactor building internal (SV 4947) structure)
Fails to open Ac Core Spray Valves Loss of redundant core spray nozzle Not characterized (okay as (MO 7070, MO 7071) pressure boundary.) Fails to open because of operator impact on surrounding structure due to seismic motion DC Core Spray Valves Loss of primary core spray ring sparger Not characterized (okay as (MO 7051, MO 7061) pressure boundary). Fails to open because of operator impact on surrounding structure due to seismic motion Ac and dc Enclosure Failure of RDS and core spray equipment following
.4g (well anchored to reactor Spray Valves LOCA due to exceeding environmental qualification building internal structure motion (MO 7068, MO 7064) envelope limited by supports with reasonable clearance to surrounding structures >6")
Core Spray lleat Inability to supply remotely actuated cooling
.4g (securely anchored to foundation Exchanger Valves water to side-of core spray heat exchanger (loss of fuel cask loading dock, motion (No 7066, MO 7080) of long term cooling heat sink following LOCA limited by supports and good or RDS actuation clearance from surrounding structures)
Fails to open NUO383-2628A-BA01
i 68 l
[
TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
L Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Backup' Fire Supply
-Inability to supply remotely actuated cooling
.4g (securely anchored'to foundation to Containment water to fire system inside containment through of-fuel cask loading dock, motion (N0 7072) post incident system (loss.of emergency condenser limited by supports and reasonable.
or core spray makeup if coincident with turbine) clearance with surrounding structures)
Fails to open Core Spray Check Core spray or emergency condenser water makeup Not characterized Valves diversion to turbine building if coincident with Internal failure causing (VPI 301, 302) turbine building welded fire piping failure back flow RDS Isolation Valves Loss of ability to depressurize reactor allowing
.4g (securely anchored to (CV 4180 thru 83) low pressure core spray reactor building internal structure catalytic)
Failure to open RDS Isolation Solenoid Loss of ability to vent air from CV 4180.4g (securely fastened to RDS (SV 4980 thru 83) isolation valves)
Failure to open RDS Depressurization Loss of ability to depressurize reactor
.4g (securely fastened to reactor Valves allowing low pressure core spray building internal structure)
(SV 4984 thru 87)
CV4090 Control rod drive pump suction valve CV4090.
0.25g (given valve of turbine Loss of reactor make-up via loss of control building pedestal). Valve is rod drive suction line.
mounted to pipe tunnel wall.
SV4894 Solenoid valve for CV4090. Loss of reactor.
0.25 (given valve of turbine make-up via loss of control rod drive suction building pedestal),
line.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
k M:-
69-TABLE V-1 Assumcd Capacity'(ZPGA)
. i Component Consequences of Failure and Failure' Mode 4
I&C. Transformers' Loss of Panel 1Y and contactors for ac core
.35g (securely anchored to north.
spray and enclosure spray valves wall of station power room-turbine building foundation)
Fall from supports-Station Power Room Loss of Panel 1Y
.32g (secured by turbine building Cooling Unit structural steel)
Falls from supports Tool Crib Loss of UPS Band D Not characterized Overturn of tool cabinet..
Lights Near Station Shorting of station batteries
.32g (secured to turbine building Batteries structural steel)
Falls from anchors Lights Near UPS Shorting of UPS batteries
.13g (capacity of most fragile Hztteries UPS blockwall - secured to 4
steel on ceiling)
Falls from anchors Steel Enclosure for Loss of RDS drum level Transmitters C&D
.4g (securely anchored to reactor Drum Level Mirror building internal structure) and Emergency Falls from anchors Light Vent Ducts in SFP Loss of RDS reactor level Transmitter A
.4g (secured to reactor building Heat Exchanger Room internal structure)
Falls from support i
l Hypochlorite Tank Loss of screenhouse fire piping
.5g (securely anchored to screeu-house structure)
Falls from support NUO383-2628A-BA01
70 TABLE V-1, Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)'
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode Circulating Loss of fire pumps due to flooding
.2g - Inspection Wzter Piping in Rupture / leakage Screenhouse 4
Heater, Lights, Battery Lose of diesel generator batteries
.5g (securely anchored to diesel Charger in Diesel generator rnom wall)
Generator Room Falls from supports Diesel Genetator Failure of diesel generator to run
.5g (securely anchored to diesel Cooling Water Head generator room structure)
Tank and Muffler Turbine Building Crane Failure of turbine building fire piping
.32g - interpretation of D'Appolonia modeled as a part of turbine building structure Fails with turbine building structural steel Reactor Building Crane Failure of fire system piping in containment
.2g - interpretation of Whiting (before crane rail modification)
Rail overturns Cleanup Demin Hoist Failure of enclosure spray valves Not characterized Load / hoist falls from rail Screenhouse Trolley Failure of fire system piping in
.5g captured by screen-screenhouse house structural steel 4
Falls from rails NUO383-2628A-BA01
a 71 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode' RDS Holst Failure of isolation Valves CV 3182 and
.4g (securely anchored to reactor 3183 building internal structure with large gussets and baseplate Overturns IT Emergency Condenser Fails emergency condenser level instrument piping
.4g (securely anchored to reactor Beam (drains shell) building internal' structure with large gussets and baseplate)
Overturns Reactor Building Crane LOCA plus potential failure of core spray
.2g-interpretation of Whiting piping inside containment Analysis (before crane modification)-
LT3180-3183 RDS steam drum level instrumentation
.4g (reactor building internal leads to inability to automatically actuate structure) anchored to south RDS, automatically start fire pumps and wall of steam drum start RDS drum level indication in control room Loss of function LT3184-3187 RDS reactor level instrumentation
.4g (reactor building internal leads to inability to automatically actuate structure) anchored to wall in spent RDS.
Also results in loss of RDS reactor fuel pool heat exchanger room level indication in control room Loss of function LSREO9A-H Reactor level switches. Leads to inability
.4g (reactor building internal to automatically actuate ac or de core spray structure) anchored to south valves wall of steam drum and spent fuel pool heat exchanger room wall LS3550 Emergency condenser shell level switch
.12g (emergency condenser shell) leads to failure of emergency condenser attached.to piping on side low level annunciation in control room of emergency condenser shell NUO383-2628A-BA01
TABLE V-1 s
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure.
and Failure Mode'
~
LIRE 19A and B Drum level indicators leads to loss.
.35g (turbine building column of ac powered drum level indication
. uplift) in control room LTRE20A Steam drum level transmitter. Leads to loss 4.g (reactor building internal of ac powered drum level indication in control structure) located in Panel C30 room anchored to floor near personnel lock Loss of function LEREO8B Steam drum level element. Leads to loss 4.g (reactor building internal of ac powered drum. level indication in control structure) attached to east room end of steam drum Loss of function-PSIG11A-H Reactor pressure switches. Leads to loss
.4g (reactor building internal of automatic opening of. core spray structure) anchored to south valves on low reactor pressure wall of drum enclosure and fuel pool heat exchanger room walls Loss of function PIIA07 Reactor pressure.
Leads to loss of reactor
.35g (turbine building column pressure indication in control room uplift) located in Panel CO2 in control room Loss of function PSID28E Reactor high pressure. switch.
Leads to loss
.4g (turbine building column of high reactor pressure annunciation uplift) located on control room in control room Panel CO2 Loss of function PSRE07 Reactor pressure switches. Loss of automatic
.4g (reactor building internal actuation of emergency condenser outlet valves structure) located on south wall of steam drum enclosure Loss of function NUO383-2628A-BA01
73 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Ccaponent Consequences of Failure
.and Failure Mode PS636A and B Enclosure pressure.
Loss of automatic Not characterized. Mounted actuation of enclosure spray valve to angle iron in cable penetration area Loss of function PS7064A and B Enclosure pressure. Loss of automatic Not characterized. Mounted actuation of enclosure spray valve to angle iron in cable penetration area Loss of function PS612 and 615 Fire pump discharge pressure.
Loss of
.5g (screenhouse) located automatic starting of fire pumps r-low in fire pump control discharge pressure panels anchored to screenhouse floor Loss of function PS789-796 Fire pump discharge pressure.
Loss of_
.5g (screenhouse) anchored automatic actuation of RDS to screenhouse wall Loss of function PI367 Enclosure pressure.
Loss of control
.35g.(turbine building column room enclosure pressure indication uplift) located in control room Panel CO2 Loss of function PT174 Enclosure pressure.
Loss of control
.35g (turbine building column room enclosure pressure indication uplift) anchored to wall in cable penetration area Loss of function NUO383-2628A-BA01
74 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode LT3171 and 3175 Enclosure level. Loss of control. room
.4g (reactor building internal indication of enclosure water level structure) anchored to wall in recirculation pump room entrance area Loss of function HSPMO7 Fire pump hand switch. Loss of ability
.5g (screenhouse) located to manually start fire pumps locally in fire pump control panels anchored to 4
screenhouse floor Loss of function i
HSVEC1 Hand switch for SV4947.
Loss of ability
.35g (service building) to makeup to emergency condenser shell located in control room Panel Col Loss of function i
HSPBRDS RDS push buttons. Loss of ability
.35g (service building) i to start fire pumps or manually located in control actuate RDS from control room room Panel C40 Loss of function HS7053 Emergency condenser outlet valve hand
.35g (service building) switch.
Loss of ability to manually located in control actuate emergency condenser
' room Panel Col Loss of function HS7068 Ac enclosure spray valve hand switch.
.35g (service building)
Loss of ability to manually actuate located in Panel CO2 M07068 from control room in control room.
Fail open HS7066 Core spray heat exchanger valve hand switch.
.35g (service building)
Loss of ability to remotely actuate MO7066.
located in Panel CO2 in control room.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
1 75 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode HS7080
_ Core spray heat exchanger back-up valve hand
.35g (service building) switch.
Loss of ability to remotely actuate located in Panel CO2 MO7080.
in control rumn.
HSPM04 Hand switch for control rod drive pumps.
.35g (service building)
Loss of CRD pumps.
located in control room.
HSPM02 Hand switch for core spray pumps. Loss of
.35g (service building) core spray pumps.
located in Panel Col.
HSSDL Reactor depressurization system hand switch
.35g (service building)
(drum and reactor level), loss of RDS located in Panel C40.
HSRDS Reactor depressurization system hand switch.
.35g (service building)
Loss of RDS located in Panel C40.
CB3550 LS3550 circuit breaker. Loss of emergency
.32g (turbine building condenser level indication in control room superstructure)-located in panel in station power room Fail open CB1YF1 PIIA49 circuit breaker. Loss of reactor.
.32g (turbine building superstruc-pressure indication in control room ture) located in Panel lY anchored to wall in station power room
~
Fail open CBlYL1 Circuit breaker in the lY panel for reactor 0.32 (turbine building super-structure) located in lY panel, mounted to vertical column in-station power room.
CB7072 MO7072 circuit breaker.
Loss of power
.35g (turbine building to NO7072 foundation) located'in Panel DIO located in station power room Fail open NUO383-2628A-BA01
76.
TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode CBlYPB Circuit breaker to RDS control panel. Loss
.35g (turbine building of ability to manually actuate fire pumps foundation) located in or RDS from control room Panel lY anchored to wall in station power room.
Fail open PNL3Y PIIA07 circuit bre;xer (in panel 3Y).
Loss
.35g (turbine building of pressure indication in control room.
foundation) located in Panel 3Y anchored to wall in station power room Fail open CB7053 Circuit breakers for emergency condenser
.35g (turbine building outlet valves.
Loss of ability to foundation) located in Panel D01 actuate emergency condenser anchored to station power room Fail open CB7051 Circuit breakers for de powered core
.35g (turbine building spray valves.
Loss of core spray flow foundation) located in Panel D01 through MO7051 and 61 anchored to station power room floor Fail open CBEDG Emergency diesel generator circuit breaker.
.35g (turbine building Loss of ability to energize emergency foundation) located in Bus 2B bus via EDG anchored to station power room floor Fail open CB7070 circuit breakers for ac powered core
.35g (turbine building spray valves. Loss of core spray flow foundation) located in Bus 2B through MO7070 and 71 anchored to station power room floor Fail open NUO383-2628A-BA01
-77 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode CIPM06 Ac fire pump circuit breaker. Loss of ac_
.35g (turbine building fire pump foundation) located in Bus 2B anchored to floor in station power room Fail open CB7068 Circuit breaker for ac enclosure spray valve.
.35g (turbine building Loss of ability to actuate H07068 foundation) located in Bus 2B anchored to floor in station power room Fail open CBSDG Circuit breakers for the stand-by diesel generator 0.35g (turbine building Loss of stand-by diesel generator.
foundation) located in Bus 2B in station power room.
CDPM04 Circuit breakers for control rod drive pumps.
0.35g (turbine building Loss of CRD pumps, foundation) located in Bus IA and Bus 2A in station power room.
CBPM02 Circuit breakers for core spray pumps.
Loss 0.35g (turbine building of core spray pumps.
foundation) located in Bus IA and 2A in station power room.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
l B
-78 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode CB7064 Circuit breaker for de enclosure spray valve
.35g (turbine building l
l Loss of ability to actuate N07064 foundation) located in Bus D01.
anchored.to floor of station l
power room l-Fail open l
CBIA2B 1A-2B, 2A-2B tie breakers. Loss of ability to
.35g (turbine building disconnect 2B bus from auxiliary buses foundation) located in t
Buses lA and 2A anchored to floor of station i
power room l
Fail closed CB2A2B Tie breaker for Bus 2A to 2B.
Loss of ability 0.35 (turbine building to connect the 2A bus to the EDG.
foundation) located in Bus 2A c
in station power room.
l CB7050 circuit breaker for MSIV. Loss of ability
.35g (turbine building to isolate primary system
~ foundation) located in Bus D01 anchored to floor of station power room CB7066 Circuit breaker for core spray heat exchanger
.35g (turbine building valve NO7066. Loss of ability to remotely foundation) located in Bus 2A, actuate NO7066.
anchored to floor of station power roce.
Footnotes:
(8)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
( ) Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
i 79-i L
TABLE V l t
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA).
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode i
(
CB7080 Circuit breaker for core spray heat exchanger
.35g (turbine building 1 back-up valve M07080. Loss of ability to foundation) located in Bus 2B, remotely actuate M07080.
anchored to floor of station power room.
i Access Hatch Condenser circulating water pump access
.5g (given.value of of screenhouse I
hatch is screenhouse. Failure of electric structure).
l fire pump, RDS switches PS789.
Air Duct Air duct in core spray test tank area.
.4g (given value of containment Failure of containment level indication building internal structure).
(LT3171 and LT3175).
l l
Computer Equipment Computer, desks and printers in computer
.35g (given value of service building) room.
Loss of RDS cabinets in computer room.
Computer Room Ceiling Computer room ceiling tiles and supports.
.35g (given value of service building)
Loss of RDS cabinets in computer room.
Computer Room Wall Plaster wall in computer room.
Loss of
.35g (given value of service building) l cables from RDS cabinets in computer room to control room.
Telephone Room Wall Wall between computer room and telephone
.35g (given value of service building) l room.
Loss of cables from RDS cabinets in computer room'to control room.
Footnotes:
(*)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
(2) Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
l NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
l t
1 I
l 80 i
i TABLE V-1 l
l l
Assumed Capacity (ZPGA) l Component Consequences of Failure
~and Failure Mode Emergency Lights and Lights and emergency eye wash units near
.5g (given value of screenhouse)
Eye Wash Stations the diesel fire pump and emergency diesel generator batteries. Loss of this equipment.
l File and Storage File drawer and test cabinet, storage
.35g (given value of service building) l Cabinets cabinets, behind the RDS cabinets in l
the computer room.
Loss of RDS.
1 Floor Grating
- a. Grating over rod drive access area.
.4g (given value of containment l
Loss of containment level switches building).
LS3562, 3564 and 3565.
- b. Grating in electrical penetration room,
.4g (given value of containment inside containment. Loss of LSRE09 building).
- c. Grating near personnel lock area.
Loss
.4g (given value of containment of rod drive pumps and LT3180-3184.
building).
- d. Grating at steam drum enclosure access
.4g (given value of containment area.
Loss of LS3550 and N07053.
building).
- e. Grating f rom upper reactor cooling water
.4g (given value of containment heat exchanger room to electrical penetration building).
room.
Loss of N07051 and 61 and LSRE09.
Floor Plate
- a. Metal floor plate between ventilation unit
.4g (given value of containment and clean-up demin pit, at personnel lock building).
area.
Loss of MO7070, MO7064 and N07068.
Footnotes:
(8)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
(2) Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
(
81 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity'(ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure' and Failure-Mode
- b. Second. level mezzanine floor plate in outer
.35g (given value of service building) electrical penetration room.
Loss _of SV4980 and 84, UT3180 and'84.and P1367.
Instruments Instrumentation mounted to wall in rod drive
.4g (given value of containment access area.
Loss of. containment level switches building).
LS3562, 3564 and 3565.
Junction Boxes
- a. JB-21 mounted to screenhouse wall.
.5g (given value of screenhouse).
Loss of PS789.
- b. JB-UPS-A mounted on top of UPSA battery
.35g (given value of service building).
charger cabinet. Loss of UPSA and LT3180 and 84, CV4180, PS789 and SV4984.
- c. JB-97 in sphere ventilation room (air shed).
.35g (given.value of service building).
Loss of N07072, Core Spray pump, M07066, N07080 and N07072, r
d.. Terminal box mounted to wall above the second
.35g (given value of service building).
level in the outer electrical penetration room.
Loss of LS3550, LT3171 and 75, LS3562, 64 and l
65, H07070 and 71, LSRE09, rod drive pumps, N07050, M07053 and 63, CV4180, SV4980, N07051 l
and 61, M07064, M07068.
l l
Footnotes:
l l
(8)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
(2) Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
E l
82 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode V:nt Line Lube oil tank vent line in outer electrical pene.
.35g (given value of ' service building).
tration room.
Loss of LT3184 and 80, SV4984, SV4980.
Metal Hatch Access hatch cover to the regen /non-regen heat
.4g (given value of containment exchanger room.
Loss of LT3175.
building).
Recire Pump Valve Recirc pump suction valve operator, MO-N003A,
.4g (given value of containment-I located over rod drive access area.
Loss of building).
containment level switches LS3562, 64 and 65.
Overhead Light Light suspended from ceiling in core spray
.4g (given value of fuel cask pump room.
Loss af NO7066, loading dock).
t l
Poison Tank Liquid poison storage tank at emergency
.4g (given value of containment l
condenser level. Loss of LS3550.
building).
I i
l Pipe Support Pipe and conduit support located at the north
.4g (given value of containment l
side of the emergency condenser level.
Loss of building).
LS3550.
Screen Safety screen mounted to floor, south of-the
.5g (given value of screenhouse).
diesel fire pumps.
Loss of diesel fire pumps.
l Loose Equipment
- a. Tools and equipment in rod drive access area.
.4g (given value of containment Loss of containment level switches LS3562, building).
64 and 65.
l l
l Footnotes:
(1)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area l
and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
(2) Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
l NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
i I
.-z 483 TABLE V-1 Assumed Capacity (ZPGA)
Component Consequences of Failure and Failure Mode
- b. Cabinets, desks and equipment in Room 441, 0.4g.(given value of containment Radiation Protection counting room in building).
containment. Loss of LT3175.
Steel Ceiling Steel ceiling plate in electrical penetration
.4g (given value.of containment room, inside containment. Loss of cables coming building).
into containment.
Vznt Unit Ventilation units across from the clean-up demin
.4g (given value of containment access area.
Loss of LT3184, building).
l i
l l
l l
Footnotes:
(3)See Figure V-1 for location of block walls.
(Note: block wall M100.PIS is in the fuel cask loading dock area and, therefore, not shown in Figure V-1.)
Failure of these components leads to one of the three initiating events.
l l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 l
coLunn Lines S
4 6
r I
I 1
Condensk
_.g 2
Es 5 00 8
i Luk E
20 o,i 5
L ks 19
~
8@
El
~
1 18 16 hhm
% 14 g,
l b
UMi T
3 a b es l
)
I 8,
9 15 11 C.
o 12 n.
g
~
FIGURE V-l.
PLAN VIEW OF NASONRY WALLS i
5" i
i
85 VI.
METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEISMIC " WEAK-LINKS" AT BIG ROCK POINT s
Three transients were identified in Section II as teing those transients which require sufficient systems and equipment to characterize adequately Big Rock Point operational response to a given seismic event. The list of systems associated with these three transients and the manner in which they interact was sufficiently complete to assure that all important plant system functions were identified regardless of the actual transient which might occur as a result of the earthquake. The three transients chosen were:
loss of offsite power; medium steam line break inside containment; and an ATWS.
In this section, the procedure by which the most fragile combinations of equipment given any of these transients can be identified will be described. These most fragile combinations of equipment are referred to as the " weakest-links" with respect to attaining safe shutdown following an earthquake at the Big Rock Point site.
The event trees developed for the purpose of this study were presented in Section IV and are similar to the event trees presented in the Big Rock Point PRA. The system functions important to safe shutdown of the reactor are identified in the event tree headings. As stated in Section IV, these headings differ slightly from the headings of the event trees presented in the PRA as, conservatively, they do not include those systems or functions which are not easily shown to be capable of surviving the earthquake. They also contain more detail than do the PRA event trees with respect to those functions which will most likely be required. Existing systems or sets of equipment were identified which will fulfill each function identified by the event tree headings. The logic by which each of these systems succeeds or fails also was extracted from the PRA in the form of fault trees. For any given sequence, a fault tree was applied to each heading in the sequence for which a system functionally failed. By combining the fault trees for each system failure and performing Boolean logic on this combination of trees, the dependencies between each of the systems in a sequence was identified and a listing of minimum combinations of all the failures which must occur to result in a particular reactor state was developed.
As an example, there exists in the loss-of-offsite power tree (at the end of Branch Point 10) a Sequence PEmc which defines a given set of system failures required to lead to a plant state in which inadequate core cooling occurs. The particular system functional failures which were assumed to occur in this sequence are makeup to the emergency condenser (Em) and core spray failure (C). Given that emergency condenser makeup depends on the FPS for its water source (just as does the core spray) there are some obvious dependencies between these two systems (core spray piping being a specific exarple).
The fault tree logic for emergency condenser makeup and core spray are presented on Pages 115 and 119 respectively in Section VII of this report. The definitions of the bottom events in these trees are NUO383-2628A-BA01 L
g ls L
86 I
presented at the end of that section.
It can be seen fras che fault i
trees that failure of either yard piping (PPYARDLS) or fire piping inside the containment (PP02LS) was sufficient to satisfy the logic of the trees and fail both systems. These two treca in Section VII were L
combined under an AND gate and Boolean logic was performed by use of l:
the WAMCUT code. The results of this exercise are presented in Table VI-1 l
of this section..This table contains then all combinations of all the l
failures (cut sets) which must occur to attain the plant state PEmC.
It can be seen that the yard piping and fire piping inside containment do.in fact show up as single events leading to _ the failure of both of
~ hese systems, confirming the dependency. Effectively, identification t
i of this dependency in this manner indicates that the occurrence of I
either of these single events following an earthquake by themselves are l
. sufficient to lead to_a plant state in which inadequate core cooling l-occurs. This exercise has been completed for all the system failures L
which occur in each sequence of the event trees presented in Section IV.
There exists a table of cut sets similar to that presented in Table VI-1 for.each sequence. More than ten thousand cut sets exist for the i
three-event trees as a whole with the size of the cut sets ranging from one to seven members.
In examining the event trees in Section VII, it may be noted that the detail of the trees has been substantially simplified over what exists j-
' n the PRA. As an example, the RDS tree was revised to include only a i
l single train _ of power supplies, sensors, actuation cabinets and depressurization valves because all four trains are essentially identical
.to each other in terms of their function, location and structural features.
In other words, if one train fails as a result of a seismic event this study assumes the likelihood of a similar failure in the other trains is quite high. Table VI-2~contains a list of components which were modularized in this manner. Components which may have a dissimilar seismic resistance (such as the two diesel generators) or have functional dissimilarities in the way they operate (such as the fire pumps and their power supplies) were not combined. Passive components and structures normally unimportant during these transients but whose failures may be made important as a result of ground motion were added to the trees (such as masonry walls).
l Additional modularization of bottom events was performed as needed as the fault trees were combined and run through WAMCUT. Some of the trees were so large that additional reduction in the size of the trees was required in order to prevent overwhelming the dimensioned storage capacity of the program. This modularization consisted of combining a set of independent bottom events beneath an OR gate into a single bottom event. Bottom events simplified in this manner were compressed everywhere that specific combination of events occurred in the trees i
being run. No bottom event was included in a compressed event identifier that occurred by itself elsewhere in the tree so as not to lose the ability to identify all dependencies between systems. The definitions of these compressed events were saved for later use in identifying the weakest-links in the seismic response of the plant.
NUO383-2628A-BA01 E
~...
87 l-f' Determination of the weakest-links after an earthquake requires knowledge L
of the seismic strength of the component and the response of the structure to which the component is mounted to ground motion. Given r
L these, a best estimate ground acceleration which will result in the i
failure of a given component located at a specific location in the plant can be determined. Applying _this accelerati,on to each component within a cut set, one can then determine the acceleration at which all members of a cut set will fail. This acceleration is the acceleration at which the strongest component in the cut set fails and represents j
the seismic resistance of that cut set.
Those cut sets which are satisfied at the lowest ground acceleration are the seismic weak-links L
at the Big Rock Point Plant.
Section V presented a table of failure modes and effects on all components for which a bottom event exists in the fault trees of Section VII. For each component a conservative ground acceleration was presented above which this study assumes the component fails. Some components have not been characterized in sufficient detail to estimate a ground acceleration at which they will fail. These components have been assigned an arbitrary capacity of zero g.
This approach artificially raises.the importance of these components for seismic events and allows a relative determination of the value of evaluating these components further.
(
ThE acceleration at which the most fragile of the weak-links is satisfied is representative of that size _ earthquake the plant can be expected to survive without sufficient seismically-induced failures to result'in l
core damage.
It_is these weak-links at which further evaluations or l
plant modifications should be aimed if any are necessary. Evaluation i
and modification of components in the more seismically' resistant cut i
sets produces little measurable benefit unless the weaker-links are
[
also addressed.
The fault trees for each of the system headings in the loss of offsite power, long-term cooling and medium steam-line break-event trees as represented in Section VII. The evaluation of the Big Rock Point Plant as it exists today using this methodolcgy is presented in Section VIII.
Evaluation of potential modifications of the weak-links identified by this method is also presented in Section VIII.
i l
i i:
l l
NUO383-2628A-BA01 I
.a
88 TJOBLE VI 1
Runt &l42 EMtAGENCY CONDENSEA MauEup ANO CORE $PAAY FAILURE 10/10/85 CUT SET 5 FOM GATE Austle htTH PAG 8A88LITY.GE.
5.00E-09 8.
8.00E-01 PNLC30L5 2.
l.00E-OI Mt00.la 3.
l.00E-05 SPEram 4.
8.00E-04 PP02L5 5.
1 00E-On CAANETST 6.
I.00E-04 PPFARDL5 T.
8 00E-On MasLOG e.
8.00E-Cl TURBLDG 9.
1 00E-02 avECIL5 VRE09L5 10.
8 00E-02 avECtL5 WALawAv 18.
8 00E-02 avECIL5 PPMTLC 52.
8 00E-02 avfCILS TRERM 43.
8 00E-02 PNLOO2L5 VRE09L5 14.
8 00E-02 PNL D02L 5 WALnway 15.
8 00E-02 PNLOO2L5 PPHTEC th.
8.00E-02 PNL D02L 5 TBEAM IT.
8 00E-02 PNLOO2L5 MlOO.28 te.
8 00E-02 PNLD02L5 CAANE25T 19.
l.00E-02 BEAMST YAE09L5 20.
5 00E-02 NEAMlf WALKWAY 28.
4.Out-02 BEAMET PPHTEC 22.
1.OOE-02 etAmti TbERM 23.
1.00E-02 31842h0 YNE09L5 24.
1.00E-02 3184240 WALKWAV 25.
l.00E-02 38842NO PPMTEC 26.
1.00c-02 31842ND T8EAM 2T.
8.00E-02 ADSPIPE VRE09L5 28.
1.00E-02 AD5 PIPE WALawAv 29.
8 00E-02 AU5 PIPE PPHTEC 30.
1.00E*02 405 PIPE T8EAM 38.
1.00f-02 PNLC20 VRE09L5 32.
4.UGE-02 PNLC20 WALawAv 33.
l.00E*02 PNLC20 PPHTCC 34.
8.00E-02 PNLC20 T8ERM 35.
4.00E-02 AL3550L5 PPHTLC 36.
I.00E-02 xEC5NELL PPMTEC ST.
8.00E-02 T8ERM PIIA07LS j
38.
I.00E-02 TutRM PNL3Y 1
39.
l.00E-02 TufAM CUBA 2bL$
40.
l.00E-02 T8ENM C05L5 48.
8.00E-02 T8ENM GRATPEA i
42.
l.00E-02 TBEMM PPMTCC 45.
8.00E-02 GAA5A PPHTLC 44 3.00E-02 MS,83 14 C1848 g
45.
1.00E-02 MS.13,14 M100.tf 46 8 00E-02 PNLD02L5 M5,83.14 4T.
1.00E-02 MS 13,44 PPOILS St.
1.00E-02 400.19 VP130tLS 49.
8.00E-02 M100.19 C8848 59.
8 00E-02 M100.19 MLOO.47 St.
l.00E-02 PNL602L5 M100 19 52.
l.00E-02 M100.tg PPotLS 55.
8 00E-02 PP3w4WL5 VPI30ILS 54.
8 00E-02 PP3m4mL5 04148 55.
4 00E-02 PP 344wt 5 M800.f7 56
- 1. 00. E - 02, PNLU02L5 PP3W4hL5 es a, a t
opne,e
~n n.y
. ~
s
~
'8k 54..
-Cit 48 s
59 8 00E-02 PP 5I6C L 5 M400.17 j
60.-
l.00E-02 PmLD02LS PPST6CL S 64.
4.00E -02 PP5T6CL5 PPOILS 62.
l.00E-03
. 4WECIL5 u7070L5
. E705tL5 63.
8 00E-03
. svECIL5 M100.17 A705tL5 64.
4 00E-03 avECILS CRahE3T
- N705tL5 i
45.
l.00E-03 avECILS FLAPLT E705tL5 66.
l.03E-03 avECILS R07070L5 a705tL5 I
67.
8.00E-03 avECILS 400702h0 x705tLS 68.
1.00E-03 RWECILS suitvL5
- L T 3 t e*L S 69 4 00E-03 avECILS BustvL5 LOTvL 70.
l.00L-03 MvfCit 5 SuitvLS 5LMEPRM 78.
8.00E-03 avfCILS C05L5 LT3te4L5 72.
4.00E-03 avECIL5 COSL5 LOTvt 71.
l.00E-03 avECILS C05L5 SLMEPRM 74.
4 00E-03 NVECILS C00LumIT:
LT3184L5 75.
8.00E-03 avECILS C00Lumti
- LOTvL s
j 76.
8 00E-0 3 avEC8L5 000LuMtf SLMEPRM 77.
6 00E-03 avECtL5 A0070220-LT 3 t e4L 5 r
k' 70.
l.00E-03 avECIL5 200162NO LOivL
- 79. '
t.00E-03 avfC8L5 40070240 SL ME PRM j
to.
1 00E-03 avfCIL5 H5PM07L5 LT3tP4L5 St.
1.00E-03 avfCILS H5PM07L5 LOTvL 42.
4 00E-03 avECILS H5PM07LS SL ME P RM j
43.
1 00E-03 avECILS MRE t 9L 5 LT3te4L5 I
84.
8.00E-03 avfCtL5 ARE19L$
LOTvt 85.
4.00E-03 EVECILS 4AE19LS SLMEPAM f
86.
l.00E-03 avECILS C8tvLIL5.
LT3184LS 87.
l.00E-03 avECILS CetvLILS LufvL l
80.
l.C3E-03 avECILS CetvLILS SL ME P AM I
89 L.00E-03 avECtLS Cit 48 M100.21 90.
l.00E-03 EvfCILS M100 17 M100.28 i
98.
1 00E-03 avECIL5 WPt30tLS Mt00.28 92.
1 00E-03 avECILS PPonL5 M100 28 I
93.
1 00E-03 EvECIL5 Citte CaakE25T 94.
l.00E-03 avfCILS M100.17 CAANE25T 95.
1 00E-03 EWECIL5 PP0tLS CaamE25T 96.
1.uJE-03 PmLD02t5 A7070L5 R705tLS 3
1 97.
1 00E-03 PktD02L5 Mt00.17 x705tL5 l
91.
8.00E-03 PhLD02L5 CashE3T M705tL5
]
99.
4 00E-03 Pkt002L5 FLRPLT M705tLS j
B00.
8 00E-03 P4LD02LS A07070L5' M705tL5 j
408.
4 00E-03 Pht002LS a00702ND E705tL5
'502.
4 00E-03 PMLD02L5 BustvL5 LT3184L5 403.
L.000-03 PNLp02L5 BU51YL5 L0ivL i
804.
1.00E-03 PeL002L5 BustvLS 5LMEPRM 305.
4 00E-03 PhtD02L5 C05L5 LT3te4L5 400.
l.00E-03 PhLD02LS C05L5 Luivl 4
{
807.
4 00E-03 PhlD02L5 COSLS SLMEPRM 1
409.
8.00E-03 PhLD02L5 C00LuhtT LT3tS4LS
- tot, t.00E-03 PNLD02LS C00Luh8T LOlvL
]
180.
8 00E-03 PhtDO2LS COOLUNIT SL ME P AM l
til.
4 00E-03 PNL D02L 5 RD070240 LT3804L5 j
882.
l.00E-03 Pht002L5 200702NO LOTvL
{
183.
l.00E-03 PhtD02L5 a00702N0 SLMEPAM r
584.
8 00E-03 PNL D02L 5 HSPM07LS
' LT3884L5 1
4 4
.,a,.-
-,.--s
..-, - - -,. - n v.--
C
' 0%
+
+
en
+
+
en we
+
en
> > e.
en we en e
en K J KJ K en wt + en en en J KJ K6 EJ K.n E.o E.a E ** ** =e =e en ett e en en en @ en en.6 t.0 K.a E.6 E.6 64 E4 m.e.a.J.0 J.6 4 d4 m4 54 E4 et 4 54 5 N N N N N N N.J.a J.J.
J J 4 54 m4 m4 E&
.a & 9.J &.e J &====== ce an== m J & W.a & e.J & W =J & W J & W s & e.J & e e e e w w w== =e e s e.J & 9.J & 9.J & a.J & e.J i
> w as > w e > w e art e e art c== > w== > w me > w =e > w.e a w== > su = > tas O O O O 2 2 2 trt e wt e art e =e > w = 3 w.* > w = > w a >*
> 1 m > E m o= E O O O O O O M e= E m > E e > E **== E e
- E M. = E m > E O.e.e.e.* g g a >O O O O O O M. >O., s. e= E.m > E m e-E, >a > -
OOO444 Em 0 J e= 0 e > 0.s r= > > *= *= r= e= 0 J e= O.a o= O _J e= O.J e= 0.a e O J e-O.4
>>> >>e O.J.OJ>0.
O J wt.J.s en.J J ma w w as a w a.J.J ee.J.a e J J in J.a na.J J en a.J wt.J.a wt E E E E v v v M u w m as a.J.J e.J.a wt.a.a en.J.J en J.a.
en d is e A ed O
- e. a= e= 0 O O en en wt en en en en en O
> e- >= O O O to en +
.a.a we en wt.J.e A en p= e.
J Z en e6 e4
====== 2 2 2 a J.8 eA en en J.J.A
>.J e4 > *=
.J Z e4 en we sememe2 2 2.J.e
.J en m > O N.6.J.0 2 2 g N N N * > >.J d.6enee =.*== en no en.6 =* m em O N.J.0 J
Z 2 2 N N N em > >
> 9e
.6.J.6 e me e O O e e e.a.4 J c e w.a > O..>..>..e= en en en.> 3 3 O O O O O O e e.e J J.a e e O J e e.os O e w J > O > > > wt te en 3 3 3 O O O O O c E E.e== ee > > > P= O 2 & O s e J J.s.,.a.4> > > E E E = = e>>>eOm.gC e > O 2 & O >.*.e.a.J.,a., J.J > > > E E E
& & w c4 w.e.e.* O O 4 er > 0 we ** en en vi ett O O O O O O & & & W w w =e.e
== 0== 0 a
ed ta a a a a e e > m.J O O 3 3 3 O O O O Q O O O O e na na z a er e e e== = & &.s O O O O 4 a > O en te ea rt e te O Q O O O O & & &.
& > = z.a O 3 3 3 3 O O O O O O O O O en w*er
=
Z Z as w es v v v as E o a e at 3 e a w y v v v v s es a Z Z Z M w w v v v v E > & u E sk et E v & eg a e a e v v v v w w er a w E Z Z eM en eM eA en en @ eh
.a J.J.J.a J J e oOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO6 N N N N N N N N > o.om se== > ese=to se==e.m.a=e-==n===e ee==es > e. e. e. > > m. 6. > em e-== 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 O O O O O O O O====== === === =* =* = = =* * =*== = =* = === === = = === =* =e== = ===== =* N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N ** N N
- OOOOOOCOEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEed4##deee##e## ##### #
J J a J.J.a A,e 444444444 44444 4444 4 444 4444 4 4 4 4g 4 as e e e.e e.e. e.e==.e. e e e e. e e e.e = e e.e.e.e.a e
e 22222222 w eaa w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w.e =e
==.
-s =s.e.
==.e.
= = *
& & & & & & & & s't e a a e e e a e e e S e e e e e C C 4 9 s e a e e a e a e a se e a at et m m m m m m m m e est a e m e at m m e e at m set as m m m m.4 est m m set m m m we m.4 m est m sse m m est m m m est m est at m e m m est et m m set at est at m at asi e see est m set at e m m m m e m set e OOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ee e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e o e e o e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e e o e e e e e e e e e e a e a w w w w w w w as w w w w tas w *as w er w ins ese nas w w w w JA w w asJ u w w w w w w w w w w w w w ies W w w w w w w w w w w w w.eu w ins w w &
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO3OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOt OOOOOOOOOOOOOO3OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOe
.e.oe am.o.e.e.e.ee se aus.oe.e as se.e se aus.e.ee = ao es as se.is.e.ee.ee se.o aus as.oo.s.ao.e aus ee se.ee me se.ee =.o.e.o.s me se =.e e
e e e e e o e e e e e e e e ee e e e e e e e e e e
e o o e e e e o e o e e e e o e o e e e
e e
e e
e as sus u es se.e = se = se e ee e e e e ee e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e s*8 set # urt e > e 8* **== N m # vt e em e e O.e N at d te e pe 6 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e en 9 O -e N at # ett e== er e e e e.d ** e. e O se N st e art e em e e O.e N== a urn 4*
.e
.e.e N she age N. N N N sm.e se e.e se se.e.e.e.e se.e se se = e.# # d.g e.a 4.e. aus se =ft e e e.n e.a se = en e e.e. 4 e g a e.a.e..e. em e N an m m m atat m msuean eee ee p
p= pm em *= >e
== e.e. =ao
.e e== =o e as o==
= me se =
se en me se e
.s
=s.e.e==.e.
+,
~ -
1.
.L.,
s%
H
+
O w
a b
t.
J N
n*
h 4 2 t
.~
a e
r r
7 t
e we e
e; e
e ve e
e
> e= e-1 No e
J KJ temmmeceeeeeeed EJ EJ Ea E a EJ KJ Emmeme+++@@edeJ KJ 4
K4 5NNNNNNNJJJJJJ4 54 M4 E4 54 54 m4 ENNNNNNNJJJJJd4 54-esteJ& e e e owwwmme mmmeJteJ&eJ&eJ&eJ&eJtedt e e e owwwmmmmmmedte
=>wm>wCOCO222cececem>wm>wm>wm >wm>we>wm>woOOO227*eceecm>wmi m > E m
- E O O O O 4 4
- O O O O O O m > E m > E m > E m > E m > E m = E m> E O O O O 4 4 4 C O O O O O m > E m '
>OJWQJmmmmmag>>>>>>>OJkOJ>OJ>OJmoJ>OJ>Cdummmagm>>>>>>>OJp-J Je J J e E E E E w o w w M u M u u s s W J J W J J W J J e J J e J Je J J e E E E E u v y w m u d w u J J W.
eep p
>>>OOOeee wee e
ec WeeJJJ
>J Wh>
JZeme mmmKZZJJJeeeJJJ
>J e>>
- JEwee,
.medom>ONJJJ 22ENNN>>>JJJmmm m e,4 m m > O n e J J J JJJuwm mme o w J m O > > > e d e 3 3 3 O O O O O O t t e J J J e' m m e PPPJJJG *CJe eJO
- OJe eJU o w J P-O>>>W Wom>>>fOmmdOm>OZEOhmmmJJJJJJ>>>EEEmm=
wwwmm==OmomOOOO4 s>OdedeceOOOOOO&&&Wwwmmmmom> > > < O m m e o m > O 2 & C. >o e @ m J mm O*Coccez*
@c museamm=4&m=&h m s JO O 3 3 3O O O O O OO O c e
- e a m m e s am m a E m m & > m g JC O 3 3 3 0 mMMuuuuRD&W2&MEQ&sWeseWWwuWWWEEZZZwwxuvuvFD&uK&WEutshamew
~ +
OOOOOOOOOOOOOwwwwwwwwwwwwWWWwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 2222222222222&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&O000000000 NNNNNNNNNNNNNwwwmmmmmmmmmmw=mmmw=ww mmmmmmmmmwomNNNNNaqNNNN d e # # # s e w e # f f e t & & & & & & & & & & & &^& & & & & & & & & & & & & E s & & & & & & w u v u u w J u u v emeneeeeeeeee@@m*W@@e@@e@w@@e@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@ e*@@ JJJJJJJJJJ 00000000000000000000000000000000DO2222E%Z222 mem==m=mmme==
m mm mm m mm m Ma mm e s s T a s a t a s s E W a s s s E m u s a s s a t u s s a t s a s & & & & & & & & & &
../
A m m a n A M m m m m A m m A A m m Am A
- P m A m m M m A m m M
- A m m mm A m n A m m A m m m m m m m a n A m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 00 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e e e a e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e o e e e ee o e e e e e o e e e eo e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e a wwWwwwwwwwwwWWWWwwwwwWWWWWWWWWWWWWwwwWWWWWWwwwwwWwwwWWWWw OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOuCO 0000000000030o0000000000 S 00 00 0 000 C C 00 0 0 0 0000000 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 00 00 00 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 C 00 0 0 e ee o e o e e o e e e e o e e e e ee e e o e e e e se o e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e o e e e e o e e e o e e mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmemmmmmmmmmwommmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 0 e e ee e e e e ee e e e e e ee ee e e e e ee e e e e e e e o e e e ee e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e eDO=NadeemePOmN*#eeme#OmN* dea >*PO=Nede4keecmN**et>S9*mN**
>>essemegegePPP@ perPDPOOOOOOOOOOmmmmm mmmm=NNNNNNNNNNammma mmmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
' 4 '}.
92 L
U,
235.
t.00E-03 PieLC20 C05L5 LOTvL
~
23G..
l.00t-03 PNLC20 C05L5 SLMEPRM 237.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 C OOL UN I T LT3184L5 239.
1 00E-03 PNLC2D COOLUNIT LOTvL 239.
1.00E-03 PNLC20 COOLUNIT
$LMEPRM 240.
8 00E-03 PNLC20 R00702NO LT3184L5 248.
1.00E-03 PNLC20 R00iO2ND LOTvt 242.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 R00702ND SLMEPRM 243.
1 00E-03 PNLClO H5PM07L5 LT3884LS 244.
1.00E-03 PNLC20 HSPMOTL5 LOTvt 245.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 HSPM07L5 SLMEPRM 246.
1.00E-03 PNLC20 XRE19L5 LT3184L5 247.
t.00E-03 PNLC20 ARE19LS LOTvt 248.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 ERE19L5 SLMEPRM 249.
l.006-03 PNLC2O CetVLILS LT3884L5 250.
1 00E-03 PNLC2O C0lVLILS LOTVL 251.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 C8tVLILS SLMEPRM 252.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 Cit 48 M100 21 251.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 M100.17 M100.21 254.
1 00E-03 PNLC20 VPI)0tL5 Mt00.21 255.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 PPOLLS M100 2%
256.
l.00E-03 PNLC20 Cll48 CRANE 25T 25F.
l.00E-03
.PNLC20 M100 17 CPANE25T l
25d.
1.00E-03 PNLC20 PPolL5 CRANE 25T 259 I.00E-03' AL 3550L5 PIIA07LS YRE09L5 260.
l.00E-03 NL3550L5 PflA07L5 WALKWAY 268.
1.00E-03 ELs550L5 PNL3V VRE09LS 262.
l.00E-03 AL 3550L5 PNL3Y WALKWAV 265.
l.00E-03 at3550L5 C8tA28L5 VRE09L5 264.
l.00t-03 XL3550L5 C8tA28L$
WALKWAY 265.
l.00E-03 AL3550L5 C05L5 VRE09L5 266.
l.00L-Os XL3550L5 C05L5 WALKWAY 207.
l.00E-03 XL3550L5 C05L5 LT3184L5 Joe.
l.00E-03 EL3550L5 C05LS LOTVL 269.
1.00E-03 AL3550L5 COSLS SLMEPRM 270.
1.00E-03 XL3550L5 GRATPER VRE09L5 278..
1.00E-03 AL3550L5 GRATPER WALKWAY 272.
1 00E-03 XEC5 HELL PISA 07LS VRE09LS 273.
l.00E-03 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS WALKWAY 274.
l.006-03 KEC5 HELL PNL3V VRE09L5 d
j 275.
8 00E-03 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y WALKWAY i
276.
l.00E-03 NEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 VRE09L5 277.
1 00E-03 NEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 WALKWAY 278.
6.00E-03 XEC5 HELL.
C05L5 VREO9L5 279.
8.00E-03 XEC5 HELL C05L5 WALKWAY 280.
1 00E-03 KEL5 HELL C05L5 LT3184L5 288.
1 00E-03 NEC5 HELL C05LS LOTvL 282.
1 00E-03 AEC5 HELL C05L5 SLMEPRM 283.
1 00E-03 NEC5 HELL GRATPER VME09LS i
284.
1 00E-03 xEC5 HELL GRATPER WALKWAY 285.
l.00E-03 GRA5A Pila 07L5 VRE09L5 286.
1 00E-03 GRASA PllA07L5 WALKWAV 287.
l.00E-03 GRASA PNL3Y VRE09L5 289.
l.00C-03 GRASA FNL3V WALKWAY 289.
4 00E-03 GRA5A CBIA2BL5 VRE09L5 j
290.
l.00E-03 CRA5A CetA28L$
WALKWAY 298.
8 00E-03 GRA5A C05LS YRE09L5 292.
l.00F-03 GRASA C05LS WALKWAY 293.
l.00E-03 GRASA C05L5 LT3884L5 j
294.
1 00E-0)
GRA5A C05L5 LOTvt 295.
1 00E-03 GR45A C05LS 5LMEPRM 296.
1 00E-03 GRASA GRATPER VRE09LS 297.
I.00E GRA54 GRATPER WALKWAY
4-
\\
-(
M
.3 k
i
'N I
l
\\
,y'i
't i yc en en tM nn tM en se e- >
- i, e6 *A e to en e.J E.a EJ E.J E.a Ka E =* =*== =e e um to tM te
.d.J.a.J.a.a 4 nd 54 K4 E 4 E 4 5 N N 0'es N N N N.J.J
=*==s se== =* ao S.J a. S.A & S.A & S.A & S.a & W.A & e e e e hJ w w me =*
trt e e art em um se > w== > taa =s > w =e > w== > w =e > w O O O O Z Z Z em to O O O O O O m > E m e= E m > E M a= E m e= 1 m > E O O O O 4 44OO
.4 > O.a e= O.J *= 0.A > O J== a o -e =* g a a P= P=
P= * *
- P= * ** O.a e-O.J nn.J =a to.A =s in =a.a to.J -d to E E E E u u u M M g\\
MM MM M M J.aen.a
' k te We t-to O h= to > O O O te na to na e e to to >.J.a =s to > -
se to na > > en > =* trt en >
a e te > *=
.J Z e4 te em **== *
- Z Z Z.a.A.J e to to J.J.a P=.a gn P=
.A 4 =* =e N.a 4 N N
.,3 4 as.J== N N.a e tM to N N.J== m
- O N.J.a.J Z Z J' N N N > > > a.J.J====== ** ** to
en.J
93OO e CP 3 no e e w P 3 e== **we3JJ *wO e w 8 9* O > > > t'P O 3 O O O O O O e e e.,a J J e e O.a e e.8 O e O W ** *** O O W F d O E O W O e O O Z O g =e== 02>OZ&QP==*=*'*#J.JM>> E E E =e =*== > > > f O e -e d O a > 0 8 4 4 & & -e w 4 =*== se g of 4.* P= === s a 4 & & =e E r= =* W.a O g en te I y g g C O g & EL EL W W w a== ** ** O== O -e O O O O W a== me O w a==
- O 4 w.A O O O O 4 w.a O O O 4 O O 4 5 >
O' OO to e to a a a e a e =* -e th & -e== & >==
>3>>E>3uuEu>2EN E E u > 2 & & E kJ M E u w E a " *Ef A *uuaaEZZZMMM uuuuE>&WE&ME tM is in -
6* e4 to s= r* e6 vt.. p toumtotoento6664 Weto46th e to e totM4Aente W J.J.J.a.a.J
.,s.a.J.J.J.J J.,o.,s.J
=B.J O O.a OO P *** O k O m >
OO a.J.A.o a.,s.,4.a.e.g.,A J.,o.J J r= P=
- p= P= #= P
=o se me ew me me N
.e se #gs me N.is seem@ NmetotPeo> P= P= P= P=
- F* P= > P=
- P= P= P P=P=P=P=P=P=P=
- P=
MO e eOnee *Cm e
- e * * * *.J e e.J et O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O Q 8"s o O O O O C 0 0 0 > >
m 88% O O 884 4 4 O O d d O O O O O O O== - O O== ** 4 4 4 4 4 4 g 4 4 4 g 4 4 4 as 4 g 4 444g444 4g44 44mm
e=====
.4.4 A &
- 0. =&..e =e
,e==.e.e 0 0.=.O O. O. O. O C s O O O O =* **==== *e== = me==== -======================= =e me =
- ==0
= e =e O O== = O
... a, &.
e
me
.e me y2
&&==-e=====em.==mieme.=.ome================e==*e=e e
> > E E > u u E E u u E 1 E E E E E & db C E & & & & & & & db & EL & & db & 4% dL & & ik & EL & 4 4L EL & dL db & EL db EL & 44 EL i
ne Wt e v4 to W9 to to to te Wt en to to tn na in W9 to to te em e to to te gm te to to e e ta GO C00 0000 O
OC00 C O.,s.a.J.a.,s.n a.,A s s a.a.J.J.o.a.o.o a.J.J.a.J J.a.a.a.a,,J J.J.J.J NasOOOOOOOOOOOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O O O C" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N N N ua E
- e to e to um e em e e en um e e art art ett um e e e e e em e e to e e e e e e tr4 se m
N N N N u,p eE ms N u mo me N u e e e e e e tJ E e e e.J K e e e oe O O > a O O O > z O O O O== 0 a O O O O
- w O O W5 er e Wt em e e e e e e to e e e e e e e e e em W6 eeeeseeeeee s
8't #85 m m m 889 ** s**
E w O O O Z w O O O O Z O w O O O O E w O O de ** at ** ** m * * ** #85 ** s's s't *n *** m at a s** *** sat *** ***J.a a J J J s.a.4 a.A.a.J J J.a J J.a.J J.'9
.O O & a me.e ch e =s =.==== &== 3== =e==
a m==.e a a A.J J,,a J J.a.J J J e.
EE&kEEE&p FEEE&EMEEEE&>EEM M MMMM Mh MMM W MMMM M M MM M MM MM MM M M MM MM g
at m ent ent e n m m est m ont e m ent g444++4g444gg4gggaggge44g 44+o44gg e
anest e sen m e n not e m ent
/ @ O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O t.1 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ee e e a e e e e e e e a e e e e s e e e e a e a e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e a e e e a w w w w w w w w w tes w w w as w w ens t.s e # w w w w w taa 4.s taJ w w.ns w w w au w.na w w w w w w w w w taa w w w w w w w te, w w w O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 3 3 O O O O O O r1 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O OCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO se**.e e me.ese** =eas=s.us** sus.ee se me.mo a=.o se se ms.e ame se a= m se.e.e aus.= se.oe se.ms.o e
.e.e.*.e e e o e e o e e e e o e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e em m se== as m ms se m =s e.e et se.mo 9 e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e G e e e o e e e e e 4 e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e
- O P Q em me 884 o tit 4t8= El P Q as N 84 g tm 3 pe g* @
f'* as N ** g W4 4== et @ O se N 89 g44 4 f= f (P C m *#
- g art 4 P= 9 @ Q asagg go p P 8 O O O O O O O O O O==.= =o==== =* =e== =e =e N N *** N ** N N me N N * ** #85 m ** s** 885 at ** ** *d4dee4 4 e o e tr* tr* to em N 8 e 884 set sat ** m *t m en m at est at m at at est est est est est a set em set est art est est at est et at est et m en at seg est et et at at== set est est set va set og afg at ses est i
o
L 9k 355.
8 00E-04
-XL3550L5 PNL3V CRANE 3T E705tLS 356.
8.00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y FLRPLT X705tLS 357.
8.00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y RO7070L5 M705tLS 358.
l.00E*04 XL 3550L5 PNL3Y Ru0702ND x705tL5 359.
l.00E-04 xLl550L5 PNL3Y BU5tVL5 LT3184L5 360.
1 00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y SuitvL5 LOf vL 36t.
1 00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3V Bu51YL5 SLMEPRM 362.
l.00L-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y CDOLUNIT LT3184L5 363.
1.00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y COOLUNIT LOTVL 364 1.00E-04 at3550L5 PNL3V COOLUNIT SLMEPRM 4
365.
1 00E-04 KL3550L5-PNL3V R00702ND LT3tS4L5 lbs.
1.00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL31 R007C2ND LOTVL 367.
.1.00E-04 EL3550L5 PNL3Y A00702NO SLMEPRM 363.
1.00E-04 XL 3550L5 PNL3V H5PM07LS LT3184L5 369.
.l.00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y H5PM07L5 LOTVL 370.
L.00E-04 XL 3550L5 PNL3V H 5 P M0 7L 5 SLMEPRM 375.
4 00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y XREt9LS L T 3184L S 372.
1.00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y 2REl9L5 LOTVL 373.
1.000-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y skEl9L5 5LMEPRM 374.
l.00F-04 XL3550L5 PNL3V C8tVLILS LT3184L5
- 375, t.00E-04 RL3550L5 PNL3V (81YLILS LOTVL 374.
l.00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y ColVLILS SLMEPHM 377.
1 00E-04 NL3550L5 PNL3V C1848 M100.2t 378.
8 00E-04 xL3550L5 PNL3Y M100.l?
MICO.21 379.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3V VPl30lL5 M100.21 383.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 PNL3Y PPO!LS M100.21 381.
l.00E-04 KL3550L5 PNL3Y CII48 CRANE 25T 382.
1 00h*04 KL3550L5 JNL3V M100.17 CRANEtST 3R3.
Le00E-04 mL3550L5 PNL3Y PPolLS CRANE 25T 384.
1 00E-04 ML3550L5 C8tA28L5 x7070L5 x705tL5 3e5.
1 00E-04 at1550L5 CelA2bL5 M100 17 a705tL5 386.
l.00E-04 xL3550L5 C8tA28L5 CN ANE 3T M705tLS lui.
l.00 F. -0 4 KL3550L5 CptA28L5 FLRPLT E705tL5 3es.
l.00E-04 XL 3550L 5 C#!A2BL5 R07070L5 M705tL5 389.
1.00E-04 XL3550L5 C8ta2DL5 ROO702ND A705tL5 390.
1 00E-04 XL3550L5 C8tA28L5 8051TLS LT3184L5 391.
l.00E-04 ML 355dL5 C8tA28L5 8U58VL5 LOTVL 392.
l.00E-04 RL3550L5 08tA2tL5 BustVL5 SLMEPRM 393 1 000-04 ML3550L5 CalA28L5 COOLUNIT LT3184L5 394.
l.00E-04 KL3550L5 C8tA28LS COOLUNIT LOTVL 395.
1 00E-04 ML3550L5 C8tA28L5 000LuNIT SLMEPRM 396.
1 00E-04 xL3550L5 C8tA28L5 R00702ND LT3184LS 397.
l.00E-04 4L3550L5 CdlA28L5 RG0702ND LOTvt 199.
l.00E-04 xL3550L5 CutA28L5 R00702ND SLMEPRM 199.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 CelA2bl5 H5PM07L 5 LT3484LS 400.
1 00C-04 KL3550L5 CulA28L5 HSPMOTLS LOTVL l
401.
8 00E-04 KL 3550L5 C8tA20L5 H5PM07L5 SLMEPRM i
402.
It00E-04 KL3550L5 C8tA28L5
- RE19L5 L T 3184L 5 40s.
1 0JE-04 XL3550L5 C8tA2BLS xREt9L5 LOTVL 404.
l.00E-04 RL3550L5 C8ta28L5 xRE!9L5 SLMEPRM 405.
l.00E-04 RL3550L5 C8tA28L5 C 8 8 ". i L 5 LT3184LS l
406.
l.00E-C4 xL3550L5 C8tA28L5 C8aVLILS LOTVL j
4 407.
l.00E-04 EL3550L5 C8tA28L5 C81YLILS 5LMEPRM 408.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 C8tA28L5 Cit 48 M100.21 409.
1.00E-04 XL 3550L5 CalA28L5 M100.17 M100 21 410.
l.00E-04 xL3550L5 C8tA28L5 VPI) OIL 5 M100.2t 4t%.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 CbtA28L5 PPolL5 M100.21 482.
l.00E-04
- L 3550L5 CatA28t5 C1848 CRANE 25T 443.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 CetalbLS M100.17 CRANE 25T 414 1 00E-04 xLJ550L5 C8tA28LS PPOIL5 CRANt25T 415.
l.00E-04 ut3550L5 C05L5 X7070L5 2705tL5 i
486.
1 00E-04 XL3550L5 C05L5 Ml00.tf x705tL5 417.
l.00E.14 xL3550L5 C05L5 CRANE 3T M705tL5
95 488.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 C05L5 FLRPLT M705tLS 419.
1.00t-04 XLl550L5 C05L5 RO7070L5 R705tL5 420.
l.0uE-04 xL3550L5 C05L5 R00702NO A705tL5 428.
4 00E-04 XL 1550L 5 005LS Cit 48 M100 24 422.
4 00E-04
- L3550L5 005L5 M100.17 M100.21 423.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 C05L5 VP t 30tL 5 M100.21 424.
l.00E-04 RL3550L5 C05L5 PPOLLS M100 28 425.
l.00E-04 EL3550L5 C05L5 Cit 48 CRANE 25T 426.
l.OnE-04 XL3550L5 C05L5 Mt00 17 CRANE 25T 427.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 COSLS PP0lLS CRANE 25T 429.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER M7070L5 x705tL5 429.
4 006-04 XL 3550L5 GRATPER M100.17 R705tLS 4 30.
l.00E-04 RL355065 GRATPER CRANE 3T M705tLS 438.
l.00E-04 EL3550L5 GRATPER FLRPLT E705tL5 432.
8 00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER R07070L5 M705tL5 433.
l.00(-04 XL 3550L5 GRATPER ROO702ND A705tL5 434.
l.00E-04 XL355ut5 GRATPER Bu5tvL5 LT3184LS 435.
1 00E-04 EL3550L5 GRATPER BU5!vLS LOTvL 436.
1 00E-04 RL 3550L5 GRATPER Bu5tvL5 SLMEPRM 437.
4 00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER COOLUNIT LT3184L5 438.
1 00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER COOLUNIT LOTvl 4 19.
1.00E-04 RL3550L5 GRATPER CUOLUNIT SLMEPRM 440.
l.00E-04 mL3550L5 GRATPER ROO702ND LT3tS4L5 444.
l.006-04 IL5550L5 GRATPER N00702ND LOTvL 442.
l.006-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER A0070dNO SLMEPRM 443.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER H5PM07L5 LT3884L5 444.'
t.00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER H5PM07L5 LOTvt 445.
I.Out-04 mL3550L5 GRATPER HSPM07LS SLMEPRM 446.
l.00E-04 KL3550L5 GRATPER XRE19L5 L T 3 884L S 447.
1 0JE-04 XL3550L5 GRAiPER MkE19L5 LOTvL 446.
8 006-04 EL3550L5 GRATPER KREt9LS SLMEPRM 449.
1 00E-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER CetvLILS LT3te4LS 450.
l.00E-04 XL3550L5 GNATPER C8lvLILS LOTvt 454.
l.00F-04 xL3550L5 GRATPER CSivLILS SLMEPRM 452.
1 00E-04 XL 3550L5 GRATPER Cit 48 Mt00.21 455.
8 00E-04 XL 3550L5 GRATPER M100.t?
M100.21 454.
1 00E-04 XL1550L5 GRATPER VPI30tLS.
M100.21 455.
1.00E-04 mL3550L5 GRATPER PPolL5 M100.21 456.
l.00E-04 RL3550L5 GRATPER Cit 48 CRANE 25T 457.
1.00E-04 XL 3550L5 GRATPER M100.17 CRANE 25T 458.
l.006-04 XL3550L5 GRATPER PPolLS CRANE 25T 459.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS A70 FOL5 M705tL5 460.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07L5 M100.17 2705tL5 468.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07L5 CRANE 3T
.x705tL5 462.
L.00f-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07L5 FLRPLT A705tL5 463.
4 00E-04 XEC5 HELL Pila 07LS R 07070L 5 x705tL5 464 l.00E-04 utC5 HELL PIIA07LS N00702ND E705tL5 465.
l.00E-04 xEC5 HELL PIIA07LS BU5tvL5 LT3884LS 466.
l.00E-04 KEC5 HELL PIIA07LS auSLYL5 LOTvt 467.
l.00E-04 XEC5HtLL Pila 07LS RU5tvLS SLMEPRM 465.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL Pila 07LS C00LuNIT L T 3 t S4LS 469.
l.006-04 NEC5 HELL PIIA07LS COOLUNIT LOTvt 470.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS COOLUNIT SLMEPRM 478.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS R00702ND LT3184LS j
472.
1.00E-04 NEC5 HELL Pila 07LS R00702ND LOTvt 473.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS ROO702ND SLMEPRM 474.
4.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS H5PM07L5 LT3tS4LS
s
~ 96:
475.
l.30E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS H5PM07L5 LOTvt 476.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL Pila 07LS H5PM07LS' SLMEPRM 4 7 F.
1.00E-04 REC 5 HELL PIIA07L5 NREt9LS LT3184LS 478.
t.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PIIA07LS ARE19LS LOTYL 479.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL Pila 07L5 XRE19LS
$LMEPRM 480.
4 00E-04 NEC5 HELL PIIA07LS C6tVLILS LT3184L5 484.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL Pita 07L5 C81VLIL5 LOTvL 4e2.
8 00E-04 EEC5 HELL
.PIIA07LS
'ColVLILS 5LMEPRM 443.
8.00E-04 NEC5 HELL PIIA07L5 C1148 M100 21 484 l.00E-04 REC 5 HELL PIIA07L5 Mt00.17 M100.21 485.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL Pita 07LS VPt30lL5 M100.21 486.
l.00E-04 MEC5 HELL Pila 07LS PP0$L5 M100.21 487.
1 00E-04 uEC5 HELL
. Pila 07L5 Cit 48
' CRANE 25T 488.
1 00E-04 NEC5 HELL Pila 07LS M400 17 CRANE 25T 489.
.l.00E-04 XEC5HkLL PIIA07L5 PP0lL5 CRANE 25T 490.
l.00E-04 stC5 HELL PNL3V M 70 70L 5 x705tL5 4
i 498.
l.00E-04 MiC5HtLL PNL3Y M100.17 M705tL5 q
4 492.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V CRANE 3T M705tL5 j
495.
s.006-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y FLRPLT M705tL5 494.
4 00E-04 skC5 HELL PNL3V R07070L5 M705tL5 495.
4 00E-04 mEC5 HELL PNL3V A00702ND M705tLS 496.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y BUSIVL5 LT3184L5 497.
4 00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V BustVL5 LOTvL 498.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL PNL3Y Bu5tVL5 SLMEPRM 499.
4 00E-04 NEC5 HELL PNL3V COOLUNIT LT3184L5 500.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y CDOLUNIT LOTvL 501.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL PNL3Y CDOLUNIT SLMEPRM 502.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V R00702ND LT3te4L5 903.
8 00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y ROC 702ND LOTyL 504.
l.00E-04 EEC5 HELL PNL3V R 00 702ND SLMEPRM 505.
l.09E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y H SPMOTL S LT3te4L5 506.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V H 5 P M0 7L 5 LOTvL SOF.
1 00E-04 ufC5 HELL PNL3V H5PMO7LS SLMEPRM 90s.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y XREt9L5 LT3884L5 509.
8 00E-04 XEC5HtLL PNL3V XREt9LS LOTvt 580.
8.00E-04 NEC5 HELL PNL3Y XMEl9LS SLMEPRM 518.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V C81VLILS LT3184L5 4
542.
I.00E-04 mEC5HtLL PNL3Y C81VLtL5 LOTvt 583.
1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3V C81TLILS 5LMEPRM 584.
1.00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y
-(1848 M100 21 i
585.
1.00E-04 mEC5 HELL PNL3v M100.t?
M100.21 I'
530 1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y WPt30tLS M100.21 587.
4.00E-04 MEC5 HELL PNL3Y apolLS MtOO.24 544.
1 00E-04 stC5 HELL-PNL3V Ctt4n CRANE 45T 519.
8 00E-Og
.aEC5 HELL PNL3V M100.17 CRANE 25T l
520.
l.00E-C4 XEC5 HELL PNL3Y PP0tLS CRANE 25T 521.
4.00E-04 sEC5HtLL C8tA28LS XF070L5 x705tL5 522.
8 00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8ta2bL5 M100 17 M705tL5 l
523.
1 00F-04 XEC5 HELL CBIA28L5 CRANE 3T M705tLS l
524.
l.00L-04 aEC5HtLL C8tA2bl5 FLRPLT E705tLS I
525.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL CetA2BL5 R07070L5 2705tL5 526.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL Co t A2BLJ.
R00702ND M705tL5 927.
l.00E-04 sEC5 HELL C8ta28LS BuSLYL5 LT3184L5 528.
1 00E-04 KEC5 HELL CatA28L5 805tVL5 LOTvL 929.
1 00E-04 NEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 BustYt$
SLMEPRM 530.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8tA2BL5 COOLUNIT L I 3 t e4L S 538.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8tA23LS C00Luhlf 10TYL 537.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL CBIA28L5 (COLUNIT-SLMEPRM 1
Sst.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL (8ta28L5 RD0702ND L T 3 t e4L 5.
534.
4 00E-04 aEC5HtLL CatA28L5 A00702HO LOTvt 535.
l.00E-04 x1C5 HELL CBRA28L5 Ruo702ND SLMEPRM 530.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL C8tA2BL5 H5PH07L5 LT5484L5
%57.
l.00E-04 afC5HF4L C8tA28L5 HSPM0745 (OTvt
l.00E-04 XFC5 HELL
'C8tA28L5 H5PM07L5 5LMEPRM 539.
1 00E-04 xEC5 HELL Cela2bLS MRE19L5 LT3184L5 540.
5.00E-04 NEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 XRF19L5 LOTvL '
548.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL CbtA28L5 XRE19L5 SLMEPRM 542.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 ColvLILS LT3184L5 543.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL CatA28L5 C6tvLILS LOTvt 544.
l.00E-04 REC 5 HELL C8tA2BL5 C 817t t L 5 SLMEPRM
~
545.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL CBtA28L5 Cit 48 M100.21 546.
- l. JOE-04 REC 5 HELL CBIA28LS M100.17 M100.21 447.
1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL CBIA2BLS VPI30lLS M100.25 548.
8.00E-og NEC5 HELL CBIA2BL5 PP0tLS M100.28 549.
1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8tA28L5 Cll48 (RANE25' 550.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL C8tA2bLS M100 17 CRANE 25T 551.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL Cb!A28LS PPotLS CRANE 25T 552.
1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL C05LS E7070L5 x705tL5 551.
1.00E-04 XEC5 HELL C05L5 M100.17 x705tLS 554.
l.00E-04 aEC5 HELL C05L5 CRANE 3T x705tL5 555.
L.005-04 XEC5 HELL C05LS FLRPLT E705tLS 556.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL C05L5 R07070L5 x705tL5 55f.
5 00E-04 xEC5 HELL C05L5 R00702NO M705tLS 558.
1 00E-34 REC 5 HELL C05L5 C1148 M100.21 559.
l.00E-04
' REC 5 HELL C05L5 Ht00.17 M100.21 S60.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL C05LS VP t 30lL5 M100.21 568.
l.00t-04 uEC5 HELL C05L5 PPott$
Miou.28 562.
4 00E-04 XEC5 HELL C05L5 Cll43 CRANE 25T 563.
8 00E-04 NEC5HELt C05L5 M400 17 CR**E25T 564.
1 00E-04 NEC5 HELL COSL5 PP0tL5 CRANE 25T 565.
1.00E-04 REC 5 HELL GRATPER x7070L5 E70SILS 566.
1 00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER M100.17 M705tLS 5 6 T.
1 00E-04 xEC5 HELL GRATPER CRANE 3T M705tL5 568.
t.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER FLAPLT x705tL5 569.
4.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER R07070L5 M705tL5 570.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRaTPER A00702NO E705tL5 571.
l.00E-04 xEC5 HELL Gd4TPER Bu$tvLS LT 3 t S4LS 572.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER 8V5tvL5 LOTvl 575.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER BustVL5 SLMEPRM 5F4.
1.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER C00LuMIT LT3884LS 575.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER COOLUNIT LOTvt j
576.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER COOLUNIT SLMEPRM 577.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER R00702ND L T 3184L 5 i
578.
1.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER R00702NO LOTYL 579.
l.00E-04 MEC5 HELL GRATPER R00702ND SLMEPRM 580.
8.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GNATPER HSPM07L5 LT3184L5 598.
l.00E-04 xEC5 HELL GRATPER HSPHO7LS LOTvL 582.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER H5PMOTLS SLMEPRM 583.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER XREt9L5 LT3184L5 584.
l.00E-04
. REC 5 HELL GRATPER XRE19L5 LOTvL 585.
l.00E-04 XEC5 HELL GRATPER NRE19L5 SLMEPRM 586.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER C8tvLILS LT3te4L5 587.
1.00E-04 XE45 HELL GRATPER CalvLILS LOTvt Sen.
4 00E-04 m:C5 HELL GRATPER CbtvLILS SLMEPRM i
589.
l.00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER Cit 48 M100.26 5 90.
1.00E-04 XFC5 HELL GRATPER M100 17 M100.21 598.
1.00E-04 str5 HELL GRATPER VPl30tL5 M100.21 592.
1 00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER PP0lLS M100.21 593.
1.00E-04 xEC5 HELL GRATPER Cil48 CRANE 25T 594.
1 00E-04 NEC5 HELL GRATPER M100.17 CRANE 25T i
98 595.
l.00E-04 ufC5 HELL GRATPER PPotLS CRANE 25T 596.
8.00E-04 GRA5A PflA07LS 47070L5 M7051LS 597.
1 00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07LS M100.17 M7051L5 599.
l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07L5 CRANE 3T M705tLS 495.
4 00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07L5 FLRPLT M705tL5 6 00.
l.00E-04 GRASA
- IIA 07L5 R07070L5 M705tLS 408 l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS R 00 702ND A705tL5 602.
4 00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07L5 8U$tVL5 LT3184LS 603.
l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS
$U51TLS LOTvt 404.
1 00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07LS BustvLS SLMEPRM 605.
8.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS COOLUNIT LT3te4L5 604.
1 00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS
-C00LUNtf LOTvt 607.
8 00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS COOLUNIT SLMEPRM 609.
l.00F-04 GRA5A Pila 07L5 R00702ND LT3184L5 609 1 00E-04 GRASA PIIA07L5 R00702ND LOTvt 680.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07L5 ROOF 02ND SLMEPRM 6tt.
8 00E-04 GRASA Pila 07L5 HSP M07L 5 L T3184L 5 612.
1 00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07LS H5PM07L5 LOTvL 689.
l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07L5 H5PM07LS SLMEPRM 654.
l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS AREt9LS LT3te4LS 685.
8 00E-04 GRASA Pila 07LS XREt9LS LOTvt 686.
8 00E-04 GdASA PIIA07L5 XREt9L5 5LMEPRM 6t7 l.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS C81VLILS LT3te4LS 485.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07L5 CB1VLILS LOTvL 689 1.00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07LS CBtVLILS SLMEPMM 620.
1 00E-04 CAA5A PIIA07LS Cit 48 Mt00 28 628.
8.006-04 GMASA PIIA07LS M100 17 M100 21 622.
8.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS VPI30tL5 M100.21 623.
1.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS PPOILS M100.21 624 l.00E-04 GRAsa PIIA07LS Cit 48 CRANE 25T 625.
8.00E-04 GRASA PIIA07LS M100.87 CRANE 25T 62h.
8.00E-04 GRA5A PIIA07L5 PPotL5 CRANE 25T 627 l.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V A7070L5 R705tLS 628.
1.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V M100.tr M705tL5 629.
4 00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V CRANE 3T M705tLS 630.
1.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V FLRPLT M705tL5 658.
l.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V R07070L5 X705tL5 632.
1 00E-04 GRASA PNL3V RD0702ND M705tL5 63).
8.00e-04 GRASA PNL3Y OU$1VL5 LT3184LS 634 l.00E-04 GdASA PNL3V BusivLS LOTVL 635.
l.00E-04 GRASA PNL3Y SU5tVL5 SLMEPRM l
636 8 00E-04 GNASA PNL3V CDOLUNIT LT3184L5 637 I.00E-04 GMA5A PNL3V COOLUNIT LOTvt 639.
8.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V COOLUNIT SLMEPRM i
631 4.006-04 GRA5A PNL3V R00702ND LT3184L5 640.
8 00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V R00702N0 LOTvL 648.
l.00E-04 GRASA PNL37 ROO702NO SLMEPRM 642.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V H 5 PM0 7L 5 LT3184L5 1
645.
l.00E-04 GRA$A PNL3V H5PM07L5 LOTvt i
644 l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V HSPM07L5 SLMEPRM 645.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3v RRE19L5 LT3184LS 646.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3Y RREt9L5 LOTvL 647 8.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V mRE19LS SLMEPRM 648.
1 00E-04 GdASA PNL3V C81VLILS L T 3 tS4L 5 649.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V CulvLILS LOTvL 650.
l.00E-04 GdAbA PNL3v C8tvLIL5 SLMEPRM 658.
8 00E-04 GRA5A PNL3v Cit 48 M100 21 652.
4.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V M100.17 M100.28 653.
l.00E-04 GRASA PNL3Y VP ! 30815 M100.28 654.
t.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V PPOtt$
M100 21 655
- l. ODE-04 GNASA PNL3V Lil48 CRANE 25T 656.
1.00E-04 GRASA PNL3V M400.17 CRANE 25T 65F.
l.00E-04 GRA5A PNL3V PPolt $
(RANFJ4T
f.
I i
99 ble.'
l.00E-04 BRA 5A Catc28L5
.nf370L5 a715tL5 659.
l.00E-04 GRA5A C8tA28L5 M100.17 3705tL5 660.
I.00E-04 GR Asa
-CutA28L5 CRANE 3T a705tL5 661.
5 00E-04 GRAsa C8tA28L5 FLRPLT E705tL5 662.
l.00E-04 GRA$A C81A28LS RQ7070L5 A705tL5 663.
1 00E-04 GRASA Cola 28LS ROO702ND x105tL5 ~
664.
l.00E-us GRASA Cula2nLS BuSitLS LT3184LS i
665.
l.00E-04 GRASA CBIA28LS Bu5tVL5 LOTVL i
666.
1.00E-04 GRASA CblA28LS SU5tvL5 SLMEPRM l
667.
l.00E-04 GRA$A Cula2BLS
'COOLUNIT LT3tS4L5 668.
8 00E-04 GRA54 08tA28L5 CDOLUNIT LOTvt 669.
l.00E-04 GRASA CulA2bl5 COOLUNIT SLMEPRM 670.
1 00E-04 GRA5A CBtA2tLS A00702ND LT3484L5 l
671.
1 00E-04 GRA5A
_C8tA28L5 200702ND LOTVL 672.
1.00E-04 GRA5A C8tA28LS R00702ND-SLMEPRM 675.
l.00E-04 GRAsa C8tA28L5 H5PM07L5 Lf 3tS4L5 i
674 5.00E-04 GRASA CbtAlbl5 H S PMO TL S LOTvL 675.
l.00E-04 GRASA CutA28L5 M5PM07L5 SLMEPRM 676.
l.00E-04 GRASA ChtA28L5 mREt9L5 Lf3184L5 l
-677 l.00E-04 GaASA CBIA28L5 ARE19L5 LOTvL l
678.
l.00E-04 GRASA CetA2BL5 AREL9L5 SLMEPRM 679.
l.00E-04 GRA$A Cela28LS CulvLlL5 LT3184L5 680.
4 00E-04 GRASA ChlA2eL5 081YLILS L0ivt tel.
4.00E-04 GRA5A C8tA28L5 C8tvLILS SLMEPRM e82.
3 00E-04 GRASA C8tA28L5 Cit 48 M100.25 681.
1.00E-04 GRASA CutA2BLS M100 17 M100.28 684.
l.00E-04 GRA5A C8tA26L5 VPt30tLb M100.21 685.
1 00E-04 GRA5A C81A2bL5 PPOLLS M100.21 686.
1 00E-04 GRASA C8tA28L5 Ctt48 CRANE 25T 687.
1 00E-04 GRA5A CBLA2bLS M100 17 CRANE 25T 68R.
Is00E-04 GRasa culA2BL5 PPotLS CRANE 25T
$89.
1 00E-04 GRASA 00$L5 x7070L5 x705tL5 099.
1 00E-04 GRA5A C05LS MLOO.17 K705tL5 o98.
l.00E-04 GRA5A C05L5 CRANE 31 M705tLS 692.
1 00E-04 GRASA C05L5 FLRPLT x7051L5 693.
1 00E-04 GRA5A C05LS R07070L5 x705tL5 694.
1 00E-04 GRA5A C05L5 RD0702ND M705tL5 695.
l.00E-04 GRASA C05L5 Cit 48 Mt00 21 696.
1 00E-04 GRASA C05L5 M100.17 M100 21 697.
l.00E-04 GRA5A COSL5 WPt30tL5 M100 21 69d.
1 00E-04 GRASA CCSL5 PPonLS M100 2t 699.
l.00E-04 GRASA 005LS Cll48 CRANE 25T 700.
1.00E-04 GRASA C05L5 M100.tf CRANE 25T 701.
1 00E-04 GRASA C05LS PPOILS CRANE 25T 702.
l.00E-04 GRASA GRATPER A7070L5 x705tL5 705.
1 00E-04 GRASA GRATPER M100.17 xT05tL5 704.
l.Ouf-04 GRASA GRATPER CRANE 3T x7051L5 70%.
I.00E-04 GRA5A GRATPER FLRPLT M705tLS 706.
1 00E-04 GRASA GRATPER Mu7070L5 M705tL5 707.
1 00E-04 GR AS A GRAIPER RD0702ND M705tL5 706.
1 00E-04 GRA5A GRATPER Bu5tVL5 L T 3 t S4L S 709.
l.00E-04 GRASA GRATPER BuitVL5 LOTvL 780.
l.00E-04 GRA5A GRATPER Bu51VL5 SLMEPRM 7tl.
1.00E-04 GRA5A GRATPER COOLUNIT L13184LS 742.
1 00E-04 GRASA GRATPER CUOLUNIT LOTvt 7t3.
l.00E-04 GRA5A GRaiPER COOLUNIT 5LMEPRM F14.
l.006-04 GRA5A GRATPER RD0702ND LT3184L5
O O
rA -
to We We e=>>
in We ta e
Wt vt ta e
e We in em E.a EJ E =D E ** ** =e ** *
- en e tM tM tA Wo J K ao EJ Ea E.e E.J KJ K en tM en tM en.0 E.J E.J KJ EJ s4 as 4 eg 4 etN N N N N N N.6.,n.ne.J4 et 4 m4 en 4 at 4 m4 me a
.,0.J 4
m4 s4 et 4 a4 es e. e.J & a a & a a es e e e e w W W== ======= m es a. e a e. e W== D W =e > W== D W.e J &== =*,n.,nJ. en s e, e s es e a & a J aw e.
> w== > w== D w== D W O O O O 2 2 2
- wt e e Wt== > w== > w== >e e6 e J e. e.J & e J &
==
> E m e.- E et a= E a > E O O O O 4 4 4 O O O O O m m E sei e-E m > E m m E a > g m m E e m g O O O O O m > E m e= E m > E m m. E m e.
> w wt e en vt e ** D w =e D w== > w =e D W== 3 O =J > 0 J > O.J > 0 -d==== === m a es > > > P= *= > 0 J > 0 d > c # *= Q.J e= O.J e= O a se O -e > P= P= > > > 0 J e= O e a f Wt.J.J to.J J tm.J
- to E E E E W W W W M M M M =d J to J.J to -4 J Vt.4.A Vt.4.A We.J -s Wt =d.d to M M M 8x sg me a WD J.8 WI ed J WB.A J W4 ed O O en We We We Wt tA P. in We C vt e te e= e= > O O O en to e e en tA to O e= e-== O O O to tr 2 2.J J.a to WD44 J -d.8
.a to e=
.a 2 We 46 44 J J.J =* *=== 2 2 2.J.4.a tA e to.a J.e em e=
N N e= a= em J.J.J======
=e== 44 ao to J M > O N.a.J -e **== ** 2 2 2 N N N > >= P=.A
- .J==== es.a M so J 2 toto Wt
- ==== 2 2 2 =a O O O O O P en en 8=
O N.J.J.J K 2 2 N N Ne5 >
o* >= 1 E E==== = > >J =J a e O.A e e =d O W J > O > > > c O O
> 4 O m = 4 3 =*
- 2 es O >== ** as M M a.3 3 3 O O O O O O e e e.J s.J O W =J > O > > > e e e 3.J.d.A P= >
330COOC d -d a P= >= P= 1 E E as -e me > > > e= 2 as O > *e==== 4 4 4
- 11 8 8 W9 W9 W4 E a m e 2 S =* =* & ew -e = & > a.J O O 3 3 3 & & & O O O O O O ta Wt We a e6 & es nas W W =* =* =* =e O== O =* O O O 4 es a= 0 ta to na = === 0 0 C O O O & es as w w w = =* ** O 4 s > Q ta to We =* ** =*
5 m Z Z Z M M M W tmp W W E D & W E & M V & E E e e S D D D W W W 5 E E E E Z M M O O O O O O ta te M W W W M Wte. 5 S e m e Q U W W W W E E E Z Z 44 te W9 to 44 to W4 Wt 46 to to 44 to WD 64 49 to en WD to to e4 en 5 el et af et E er et E er et a er er er er z g.J.a d # a -a J J O O O J J.8 8 e.a J.a J J w tes W taa w w w W of ens W w w es w tas w w =*==== =e==== **== N N N -e====== ee =e ** **== me me =J.J a.J OOO a
e e & e6 ew ew es ew & e6 & e esOOOOOOOO e e e E es a. a. e6
= = = =
NNN
>== e= e= e= e= >= e= e= o= e= o. > a= e a., > m m m est *t m s** M O O O M m *** e m m m m e a a m M m meOOOOOOOOOOOOMOOeeaeeeeae
- *eeaeeeee 444444444444 44 444 44444444OOO M N W 5 E T W W E E R E W W X 5 E E & & & & & & & & =* =* *e & & & & & & & & em & 864 -==== me======== 0 C O====== =
=
e =s ==
& ew & & =e =e== me =*====== ** =* === *e =* =* ae =*e 0 0 Q Q @ Q O Q d Q O O O @ Q Q O Q > > > JB D D D D E E E D D D D D D D D D D D D 3e > D W W W W W W W W E E E W W W W W W W W me==
OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOSOOQO N N as N N N N N N N N N N *w N N N N ae N N N N N N N N N N N ed NNNNNNNN 44 4 44 4444 444 at 4 4 4 4 4 e e e e e e e e to 46 to e e e o e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e e o e to to W9 e e e e e e e e Wt Wt W4 tA nn an en We We en Wt en We to en to en We O O 3 O O O O O J.e.a O O 3 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O J J 44444 4 444444 4 4 4 er 4 4 3 O O O O O O O Wee e O O O O O O O nOOOOOOO3 W s a s er a a et E g a 3 m a g a a g =e== === = -e== = 0 O O==== ========= O O O O.O O O O O O O O O O O O Wt em
- O O O O O O O 3 00 0 @O J O @ Q Q QO OO J OQ Q F E E E E E E E WW W E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E WWW F E F E E E F E
=====-e
-e===============0OO=========e
444444 44444444444444444444444444444444444444444 OO O O O O O O O O OO OO O O O O O O OO O O O O OO O O OO O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O e444 444444444444 ee e e e e e a e e e e e e e a e e e e e e e e e e e a e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e a e e e e a e e e e e e e e e e e nad W W W W ta# w Lee w naa ses %# tu tef W tM W W W W W tas W W W W *te tee W w W W *1A W W W w ua *44 w tad w w w W W tea w 46. W W te, ned has 4H W W W W W W W tad O O Q O O O O O O D C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O '3 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O c o o O O O O O O O O O O O O Ct OOOOOOOOOOOOOOcOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ee o e e e e e o e e e e e e e e eo e e e o e e e e e e o e e e e o e o e o e e e o e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e as as se se a= es se =e =s es -e as se =s -e.= ee =e.e.e -s =e se =e me =m sm =m =ea me aus ee==.m os.eo se==.e se e me -m =e as me =e en as s.e e=
s me as =e =e me me =e es as =e es eo e e e e e o e e e e e ee **
- e e o e e o e e o e
=s N m 4 urt d e.e e e e o e e e
@ 4 ee IP d om e em 8)
e e e o e G e G e e e e P $ = N 886 4 @ d ee e e e e e e *** 4 e W @ O== N 8e 4 Wt 4 em e P O =* N 84 4 4 m. e $ C = N m g t.P p e.e e@ @ =m N m 4 dt om e.= p.e -m me N N. p. N N. e= e N. p. e enN N ast m at a m est m. >at et 888 4444444
= = = e N
NN 4 4. p. p. W.t e. e.4 en ar.t e. a.t art e. m. e t 4 te W
W 4 et
- e. m. on p on p p
om e. om m. m. p
- p. en e. s
- a. e. e. p. a. en e 4 4 4 4. p. a. p. a= em 8* e en s. a. e.n 444 e
e a
- p. a a en e e, p. p. om o om e. e. om e p om e m
- rd.
LCh M
r e
e e
e--e-e
.a
.4 e
e e
e e
e e
e
.E4 K.9 EJ-EJ E4 Ed EJ KJ Ed Eweeped Ea EJ EJ EJ EJ EJ K
g4 at at at s4 s4 st 54 saadded at at at at at a4 e s e es e J.6 e J6 e J's t
- >. - D. e 4 6 8 J.6 e d.b e J.6 e J.6 - - - - - e J.L e J 6 e d t e J 6 e d.s e J 6 e J.a 6
.-D.-D
-D
-D
-D
-D
- e-D
-D.->.-3.->
-D.-D Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>EOOOOOm*Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>Em>E JmoJ>OJ>Os>CJhod>Ca>Os>CJkOd***>>>DJ>Oe>Os>Osmos>OJpOJ eJJedaeddeddedaeddedeeJeedJennunnJamedeJa+Ja+JJeddeJJe e
see
>>>Occeme ewe ec
>>>OOOpee
- - - E E E J J J e w e'e e d JewedJJee@>>>---EEEJJJ*eedJa@>
JEpee
> J J J - - - J e d - - - E E E N N % > > > J J d - - - J.m > O N J J J e e @ E 2 3 N N N > > > J J J J J J 1699JJa>>>.e- - - > > > - - - O O O J J J > > > E E E - - - > > > >O 333OOOOOctreJJJ J>O>>>JJJ333OcceOe s
E&OM------Jsd>>>RRR@@@->JJ t
..---eeeOOOQQOOOO&&&...---O4s>OdeeOOOOOOOOO&&&...-*.
essseme333---QOOOOcedesssesek ssOO337 tatoo 3ccommessseee E m m m w ww e s e E E E wwwa s s E E E m u m w ww w wm s s eem t & & wwu ss s E E E m u m www
>>>OOON>>>>>M>>>>>>>>
000
- - - N. g N. e.. e. e e.. e e.. e. d e g e w e e e N N N e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e mes s ee e e e e
aJJJJJJJ e e eJJJJJJJJJJaadas
$444444000000000000000000000--*-----000---------------
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000n000000
tattatst---ggatatagattsata w www w ww E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E & 4 t a t & E & E E E t t t tt a m & & & & & E t t 0000000003 00000000000000000000000 000000000000000 N. N. N N. N, N N N N. N. e p e eN N. N. N N. N N. N N N. N. N N N N. N. N. N e e c e. N. N. N.N N. N. N. N N. N. N N N N.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 J 4 J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,. N N. N. N. N00000sJJOOOOnOOOOOO,e 000 N
e e e e e
e e e ee e e
e e
o e 8 8 O O O O O c t3 0 e c e O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 0 * *
- O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
000-----------------------COO---------------
E S S E E E E E E E www S E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E w ww E E E E E E E E E E E E E E F e
W
.e 444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
- 18. I.. I.. I...... g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. C.
. I. w.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. J 00 000 O
0 4
N S. 8 S.88880888888888888888888888888888.*.888888888888 8
.........................e
.e
............e
>>E-N-te4ke@O-N*4ethe9Q-N*4*4k FOO-N***4>99M-N-te4km9O-SQ*
eeeeeeeeec&Pr@@@OOOOOOOOOO--==------NNNNNNNNNNam
>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>erseesseeeegeweegegsgersageneggs 3w L
l 102 TABLE VI-2 Major Components Modularized Due to Locational. Functional and Major Components System Structural Similarities Not Modularized Discussion Fire Protection MO 7070, MO 7071 (AC Core Spray Valves).
Electric Fire Pump AC and DC core spray valves System MO 7051, MO 7061 (DC Core Spray Valves)
Diesel Fire Pump were not modularized due to PSIG 11 A through H (Reactor Pressure) dependencies on different LSRE09 A through H (Reactor Level) power sources.
Fire pumps not modularized due to dependencies on different power sources.
-UPS A separated.from other UPS to account for EDG I
startica circuit dependency.
RDS UPS A-D Fensor Actuation Cabinets LT 3180 through 3183 (Drum Level)
LT 3184 through 3187 (Reactor Level)
RDS Timers PS 789 throu-h 796 (Fire Pump Pressure)
CV 4180 through 4183 (Isolation Valves) i SV 4980 through 4983 (Isolation Valve Air Supply)
SV 4984 through 4987 (Depressurization i
Valves)
Exclosure Spray PS 636 A and B (Containment Pressure)
MO 7064 (DC Encl Spray)
Enclosure spray valves not PS 7064 A and B (Containment Pressure)
MO 7068 (AC Encl Spray) modularized due to dependencies on different power sources.
Emergency MO 7053 and MO 7063 (DC Outlet Valves)
Condenser PSRE07 A through D NUO383-2628A-BA01
103-TABLE VI-2:
Major Components Modularized Due to Locational, Functional and Najor Components System Jtructural Similarities Not Modularized Discussion ~
Emergency Power Emergency Diesel Diesel generators not Generator modularized due to dis-Standby Diesel similarities in starting Generator circuitry (one automatic, one manual) and structures in which they are housed (one in the screenhouse, one on.a truck bed).
Past Incident Core Spray Pumps System 1A and 2A Bus f
CRD Makeup Control Rod Drive i
Pumps IA and 2A Bus F
l l
l 1
NUO383-2628A-BA01 a
m 104 VII. FAULT TREES This section contains the fault tree logic used to identify the structural weak-links following a seismic event at the Big Rock Point Plant. The trees are drawn for those systems identified as being important during an earthquake in Section III of this report. A fault tree is available for each system heading located in the event trees of Section IV.
The bottom events are described in the following table and include all components and dependencies defined in the failure modes and effects table of Section V.
The first four fault trees were used for determining cut sets leading to core damage during LOCAs and Primary System isolation failures (with MSIV fault tree). These four trees include Post-Incident System, core spray, Reactor Depressurization System and enclosure spray and included all dependencies on ac and de power sources, UPS and all shared system components..The remaining trees were used to evaluate the loss of offsite power and long-term cooling event trees and have had the ac, de and UPS power dependencies removed as these power sources are included in independent event tret-system headings. There are two emergency condenser makeup, emergency condenser valve, core spray, RDS and fire pump trees to account for the availability or absence of emergency power.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
105 POST INCI DE MT 5 YSTEM FAILU RE CLOCA)
P05T 3NCIDE NT SYSTEM
.w l
CORE SPRAY PlS CORE SPRA'i OUTSIDE FAILUKE gigNMEMT C ONTAINMENT h
^
7 I
l RI BLDG PP02.L5 PlPlNG V?t301LS NDHEAT CRAllE 75T FAILUR E NO FLOW REMOVAL EC5 HELL T
m m
PP03LS PP09W LS l
M100.19 CORE SPRAY PPOILS HXOtLS NJ FLOW N 100,2.0 PUMP MiOO.PI5 THRouGu FAILU RE SHELL SIDF m
m PUMP CONTAINMEllT OPER.ATION LEVEL 5
FAILURE IN0lt.AT10W T
m PM8ZL5 HSPr62L5 P
h 8,TA2i'
^
^
CB1A2ALS YLENEL Alk'0VCT!
t\\100.11 mf 00.13 LEGulP LIWLAS Tagtm mon 003A CPEPRm PLR6EAft if)ETHAT INSTi
106 FOST INCIDENT EVSTEfn FQiLORE cent A
VALV E FAILVRE S O
i Ma lobis MO 1050 rm r%
em r%
em em M010bbtS M160.Pl; MC10f0L5 Mito.Fis CB10 bbl 5 LputAs Cb1080LS TURE LDb HS70 bbl 5 OVRWDLT1 HS16tOLS LPNLAS GU52ALS BU5ZBLS P PHT tc.
CO2AIS L5 CB'LA7.BL5 M100.1 S MiOO.11 EMERGENC.Y AC. 2B 005 Lotta TER M m
}
[
Efu!Dras
$of$8[
( )
1 STAMD EY EMER6EUcY s
EMER OtESEL OtEssEL GEMEREToK C4NERATOR E
CBE06L5 EDbELDQ 506LS 506TRiLS KD6 Fun 5 so6tRuS PWLCiRLS E060At$
SCH DW 506 &4Tts c85D m M100.it EMLTEYS 1
._,,-.~ -- -,_
107 POST int.tDENT 545 TEM FAILV N cent 1ARD PIFIN6~-
LOWh TI AM FRMRE m
1 piping N O FLOW REENN0LilE G
A T
i FPYAROLS LOCA HOSE PP5CMMIS No Flow SCWMSSLG pgog CR AWE IT FIRE PUNPS W176TME PPGWCW Q
J I
ELECTL)C OIE5EL POMP PUMP m
PM6bl$
CbfH0(els h PWLC11LS ml00,t8 CRRNG!.T SC.H DW 4 olL$
SCHDW F1F9EL15 CCRM C RAWF2T CooLudir i
i PMLC0YLS
108 COCE SPRAY FAtLU t.E' (Lotg)
CORE SPRAY FAILUEE tN5IDE OUTSIDE CONTA1WmEN1 CONTAINMENT t
EC5 HELL CORE SPR Ay PP0155 ygtyg L
F RANE GT n
I i
AC ot V A LVES VALVES SWITCH E 5 VALVE i VALVE 8 SWITCHES E CABLES CABLES 5
CARLES
& CA SLF5 l
M0105tSF i
T ta T
tsarma nomen una tst me.n L5RE095P PSEMSF CD1811tSF FLAPLT TBf2M PSIG115F RE01249 R00702#0 SPEPRM SPEPRM RE092ND M100.ig TUULD6 CemE31*
M100,1f wggwm K07070$F TDERM W ALX WAV PPH18C 5"*
PLHTEt MIE13 FPHTit SrtPRM
_ __-_.__ - _ - - - _ -, _ _ -. _ -. - - _ - - _ - _ _ _ ~ _ -. _. _, _ - -
CORE SPEAV FAILURE cent
' CORE Sreer ranne OUTSIDE CON M0 FLOy P90355 yygging gg THRW VARD TUR8UX' PtPlW6 PIPIN6 FAILVRt m
m FPyARD55 NO FLOW Blocr.
PIPIN(a M
WALLS FAIL.VRE P
T T
m m.as evo w ss miol.13 ProST55 PPSCNHg 0 R0W MimN PPobtss SCNH55t(
[g[0 hlR k h 2.1 PUHrs PPsWCW G
I A
A
CO RE SPRAY FRILUat
, ont 110 1
POW 9 UMP
-s m
t RE EWITCilES P2.C1155 O
O
$T ECHOW t
i PMC1SF P1FdEL55 g
g NLC09 5 ys OVLEYW
^
mWil SCHDW T
(tMER ECRN I
PPMtS5
[k/$$
fg,yy 1
1 NT PM.COUS PNufl55 Ala A T
T UPSZND C00LIlNIT*
3em Zap sLmEPRM UPSINO SCHDW 1
DOW Tf6TCA6 FD$ctonP C6MPEGP COMrfer 31141M0 SPSPan SLmfrRM 5PEPRM i
em em CAC W5F cAhWE1T UP5sF EDSPlff UP5Clk LOTWL LTMNSF m400.UP5 TSUPIA M400.06 Emt.
fn160.18 R
NOT nmj(ABLE T6 RD5
CORE SPEAT ClLOGO sent 111 A
is aus oc
" E" g
KMORT TEmi 5
m T
EMEl% ENC 1 DIESEL
&GNFRATaR s
W j MiOSP oc unsF M10#.1 P UcemsF SF Mt00.19 h,1f MS PFWT SC Du.T5 UPSA l
T GOfJUE5$
EDG5F PNLC1855 E%8MSF E%BLE M100.it EMLTEE 5.LHDW
.-m M1(0.03 Ups,ASF Mi0f.ob 2SutA M140.41 UPEClKa M164.14 UPSZND M100.11 MSDO.it TURE M M106.01 M168.0%
l f
t b
1 t
RDS FAILVtE ILOCR) 112 RD5 FRILDRE Rit!L%
DN k
TVREL2 n
v iSQLATION TRKbET URLVE gocx v
C$41805F
[$
g VAL gtg
-s 2100.1f SV'41895F UP.LHb LOO. UNIT m1N,01 RAC.1.13F TOOLtEE LOTVL T
mi a urs Etswu.
stmrPam R E FIPE UP!;5F ISOP5A OPSINO mto,13 m12.5
/\\
5PEPRm TESTCAB Pamm UPS f
T RQ5Hol5T terner tomtemt.
CRTRWL FDSCtomP b
b UP5SF T
m m100.UPS SV '49105F EC5 HELL M100.11 R Ac1.15F st.nEPKri tofflPRfE.
LooLUNIT 31392.ND UPS2ND UPSCH(a SPGPRm IBUPSR LOTVL RM?tPE TOOLCRi&
RDSHotST l
u
RDS FAILVRTr unt SENSOR 113 CHANNELS PE55Utt UPS HEROSEF DRUml KK SE:150R3 LEyv.L f
P T
r VPS1F tm00,Uf3 Fi111 g=
- o LT31845F mico.UPS LT31105F miM.11 HSSOL5F UP57.ND RK1.iSF C.RRTPsR 31102ND RDSflPE
[-}
h 31141ND CRTRWL LUTW ComPEG9 SullEPRM ComPRmC.
m PF tiSF
.T6115H M100.1T 360PSR C00LUN ff ComPRmt.
SC.HDW ComPEGP CRMnf CR1RML MVFOTW At.SHTI.R FOR ROS Z CouTINUMICN kVER TO CDRE SYRAY FRILURE, LOCR
EN CLD50tt SPERY FRILVRE CLOCAI 1
ENCLMUE SPMY FALLUEE
~~
l CORE R10LOh SPGAV W RSLD(a VALVE 5 FD) LUTE T
T PP0ZSS M07069 4 N7H.R NEW ACTVAT10N CIRC.UlTRY EL5 HELL CIRCUlTRY 9
EUE M070leM 3VJITCHES A
-w HOMESF m100.19 H5 W TBERm T
T CB10LISF SPEPRM ysgq3p CAME75T ttpos 3r FFHT 8C FtRPLT p g 3g,ap WMD mWSF Pa%2ND M100.it SUREPRRt PI3lo15F
))$
SPEMH COOLUNIF P55mm.D UPSIMO N010lH5F NLD055 CB M4SF PNL00155 CRAW 37" TDERm m100,11 SPEFEM fmd0.it CEANE75T K070L45F FLKPLT l
NOTE
- TRANSTERS ORE TO C. ort! 19RNi WITH LOC.R.
EMERGEMCY CONDEN5EE mAEUP FRILURE l LOSP) 115 ENEREC.0NA mAugup
- FRILURE, RIBLDb VEC1 m
TURSUX F%iLURE 58RRY-FDLVRE r
m LE'lEL VALVE
/\\
PPD 7l5 E
E T
Ag INDIGTION rmLyg I
T WRE LEVEL
.-w
-w SVVEC1LS SPEPRM HSVECiLS CRANE 1ST T
T DNLD02LS PWL430LS BERM 1T R06PnFE FitA01LS 3\\MZND PNt410 PNL3Y 2100.15 C M R2&ts STEPRH C05L5 w
M100.*fE gg gg EB3550LS CRhlE15T mio0.1%
E15 HELL RERm PPSUP1 SPETRm 70'aTNK
EmE EENLY CONDER%R mALEUf" F AILDEB o.c&
116 A
PIPINb OUTSIDE E
CONmlNMF.NT O
I l
TORBINE POST Butt.DlWb LNC10GNT ISOLRBd SYSTEM l
O l'h f
BLOCK PPolL5 TVRBINE WALD PnPlHG BUILDINb m07012.
UNISOLABlJ t
T P7PDL5 m
m100.05 M100.1.)
IT04WL.S h
m100.14 Pm5ns PlflNb VPl. Wits miOS.11 PP0fet13 FAILVPE M100.11 m0101LLS fnio0.11 CB101215 m103.11 T
R01064L5 miOO,PIS PP03tS PNLD10L5 PPo9WLS PNLD07.L5 m100.11 LPNLAS mio0.10
- - + - -
- +,. -
.-p y--
,,.w.
,.-we
_-y-
-w-.
-,-,y q
p
EmEMENLY CONDENSEE mREEPup
( t.059)
W En E.fftEREEN0f 91. PONE.K FRILURE 117 EMER.tDND.
MAKEUP FAtLVRE RXGLDb VEtt toRFEfRRY TURELDb FAILURE FAILURE r
+
SWEC1L5 PP02.L5 WSVEC1L5 CRf)NE15T FNLD0115 PPVAROLS em DEAm1T e
31M IND '
'ML INDIGrloN M100.11 SPEPKM CitRNf15T PNLL36L5 RCS FIFE.
FNLC10 T
b\\
f\\
-~
L5]E6L5 6tGA e u tsass CRRAE")ST m100.13 EC.5 HELL TBERM PPSUP1 SPEPRM TUSTNK 1
s
EmERGENCf CONDENSER mFIG.UP WITH EMER6ENCY AL POWER FRlWRE c.ank 118 PlFINb OUTSIDE CONTRIMMENT A
i TURBINE post GUILDINb INCIDENT ISbtARE SYSTEM r
I DLblX VPO\\LS UNtsoLRELE WALLS PIPING MO7012.
ts ppgtygg IN1URE.BLD6
-~
7 m
M100.05 PP02LS 1
I M100.V pro 4Wti
[}
FIPINb VPl301LS Mio0.14 FPoST13 FAILURES Midb.11 PPoloCLS l
Mis.21 n$ns mT.11
]
ColollL5 m 100.18 R070(4fLS m 100.PL5 PNLDIOLS NLA ffD3tS Vro4WL5 Mio0.11 Mio0.2.0
C,URE' GPRAY FRtLVfE
( LOS F) 119 CORF SFmY FRILURE' w%
/\\
INSIDE R1BLDE
/C51\\
CONTAINMENT TURBlDb PP02tS E.0RE SPRRY REK. TOR CRANE 75T VALVE LEVEL FAltVRE5 1NGTRutIIEMII, O
O T
T DC VALVES
'AC \\lALVES
[h
[\\
L 4LS M100.18 T
T N
[
't St.mEPRR STEPRM
-s
,,,_s SWITCHES SWITCHES ggggt3 guayts LIRE 11LS C05L5 l
l LTRE 201.5 C010N1 M01051LS tsRsorts Rsmo26 c81ytits PPRTtc CB1051LS (N)
(
)
/
T
/
/s
/N M160.is sysrH m100.18 FNLC30t 115ERM 59EPRM
-w
'S i
'LSRE09tS MO 010L5 CEIOVLS P5tM1L5 PPHT(C R07010l5 REM 2RD mioo.18 R0010DD STEPRM SPEPRM TBERM i
m100.15 CRRHE15T Tune m PPHT4C CRrWE3T WAttWAV FLRFLT s
,-.--.r_
,,. _ ~,,
.-,_-.,__m y_._____,,,~..--__,,,_._.,,_.,_,##_-
<3
CORE SPRAY FRILURE c.ent 120 EORE SPRAY l
sis OUTSIDE' OF CONTalNmEWT
+
PP1RRDL.5 PlPIM6 OUTSitE OF Co mlWMENT A
Y P6ST TUR5ttlE INCJDENT BUILDINb SNSTEM i SOLAELE m
UN156LABLE PPblLS ELKg M 0701Z.
ts FRituRE WALL 5 FIPIMb
~
IMTVPS.E %
FAILL/RE h
b b
r-7 7
m100.05 PP03LS yp,3g,3
/N M100,13 PPo w LS
(
)
m 100,14 m100.2.1
[
M100.21 m100.19
-w N100.11
[
FPo3L5 m0707Zl5 FNLDIOLS PPO4W15 m100.10 C.B1012LS PNLDB215 MiM'il M10011 LPNLAS m100.18 m100.ft5 R010l.51LS f
l l
CORE SFRRY WITH L LOSP)
EMERGE *.Y AC 90WE.R FAILVRE 121 CORE SPRAY FRILVRE s,
t
\\
lNStDE RXBl.D6 CONTAINMENT TURBOLI:
\\
.m DC VALUES COMTMNMENT M010514 LEVEL.
TRMSm'TRS PP0115 i.
CERNE75T P
31191ND
~, T E
M01051LS
/\\
\\
L SWITCHE5 CB1061LS f
\\
T M100.12 n
^
i TBERM h
SPEPRM m1(0.W5 EA
-r giPFPe q
UP5ZND i
L5REMLS.
VENTUNT.
NE PSih11L5 R00fM41 3BUP5A REOO2.NO SPEMtM
/M00.1T C0fwG8P LTM19L5 W AL W AY LOTVL PPHTIC m106.11 5PEPRM C60LUNIT 1
4 f
r I
4 Y.
4 3
g 4
c y
.,.,---,.,---,-.y
_.,n-,
r
CORE SPEAY WITH EMERGENCY A(. POWER FA) LURE cent 122
/\\
OUTSID E ggg'g CONTRINENT O
I PPiARDL5 PlPl NG O
P TVRBINE POST BUILDING 1 NC10ENT 150LABLE SYSTEM y
- l0 R OCK TURE. BtD6.
Watt 5 PIPIMb UNISOLABLg M0707L CS FAILVRE
-r r
m106.05 M100.13 PPo4M5 YII" M100,14 FPOSTLS FIPl%
m106.lq PR%CL5 FAlLVRE m100,11 CRANEZST h
Mo'l01215 Mg00.P15 CB101115 M1oo.11 R070(eHL5 M100.'11 PNLDl0L5 P903l5 p g ts PPOWL5 LPNt.AS miOO.10 m100.11 t
7
RDS FA1 LURE (LOSP)
RDS 123 FAILV E R11lLDb AC.TUATION TRRINS T
ISOLATION TAR 6ET VALVES ROC.K m
t
[h
[h
[h
[h I\\
-~
-s
-~
~~
CV4110L5 SPCPRM SV9114LS FDSCmmP RDSPIPE SVH10L5 CRTRidL M100.11 TESTCP6 TOOLutib mim.11 3tNIND LOTVL ComPEGP UPSL5 tog,t; NIT KDSFIPg SLMEPRm SPEPtM CRTRWL m gM RVE11LS UP57.ND RAC1.1LS C00LWIT M100.UPS RD5Cym MW.E m mD W. m M180.M UPSCHb IBUP5A UP5CM N
Mi#'E M100.0E
RDS FAILVRE coat 12h gmg
- SibWCL, O
MANUAL M
5 RE T LEVEL em iShd9tS R0010lND PBRDSLS FPHTtC i
'S BUSl1LS TURatm CB11PBLS SPEPRm CC6t3 mico.it LKWA us L,
LT31:45 VEhitMr m100.0f5 LI31 COL 5 RD5 PIPE m100.01 HSSDLS CETTW!.
M100.14 34NZND L&InfN LUTVL GtHrfst CamNtmC.
St.M?mn SPErtm UPSIMD mio6.11 31502ND TBUP5A C07.UNtf P5b3LZN8
\\
RDS FAIWRE coni.
m s
mssue set %6%
A
-w INSTtumENT PE727 l
l 9^
1.T3111 em Vm (3
[nts me.w EETK\\WL CKAME?J CbmPEOP HVPoTNK (g)
ComPRmt AC5H1T H f
s, I
miOO.O!
TB7.15H 7
UPSIND SCHDW l
H5FM01LS C St3 MM M10A15 i
LIR619tS C00LUNiT ENW i
LTREZDL5 Fa010ZND ns W
LERE05LS PPH15C I
I CAWLn5 YML30lS LT.484L5 m116.11 E0mIEGP BusiiLS
'n)2LM m'iOO.01 trot'Juir CRTRwt.
M100.11 STURi UPS2ND L(nVL 31142ND ComrRifC StmDKM R05 PIPE E P5A M100.VPS Vi?NTUNT M10L19 SPETRM I
l I
inei.
- --- i-
EDS WITH (LOS7)
EMEK6ENCY AC POWER FAILURE 126 EDS FAILVE 1
1 ACTUATION RIBLE TRAIMS m
ISOLATION OFPRESS.
VALVES VALVES T
T f\\
[\\
[\\
f\\
r%
<~
sm.
,m.
CV4120L5 ConPWL SW919L5 781)f5R SV4910L5 CRTf,WL m100.18 cornPRNic m100.13 31892MD LATVL FDSCcoNP TBERM COOLUNIT SLfDEPRM TESTCAS miOO.VPS RDSPIE UPS2.ND ComPEGP m100.iat SPEPRH miO0,05
.M.PRM M100.0f
,-__,.-_,.,..-_.m.
__-....__,c
,-.,c
)
RDS WITH EME RGE tt.V AL POWER FAtluff 127 NITOMAT\\C ADVATi4N SENAL MSU FIRE PUMP LRVM C DISCHRAGE REAC. TOR PRESS. SWITCH LEVEL T
f f
I f\\
f\\
,4 em em em em PS781L5 CRTRWI.
H550uS W.TUMT mho,per CEAWE2.T ComPEGP LT31N15 RDSPIPE mico,og RYP0TMX ComPRmt LT51SOLS CRTRid.
mico.iy ACSHTCH M10014 31842ND cnMESP tnTVL 3BZ.iSH OPSZND GRRTPER CaMPRmL CurnEPRM SCHOW m100 V5 SPEFRm UPSZND m400.15 M100.if m100.01 "b180ZND IGUPSA C00LONIT CDOLUMlT i
'4 6
-n,
,-,--n.-
.-------.--w
n
EMERC=ENCY CONDENSER VALE FAILURE i LCt5M 128 EMERGENCY CONDENSER VALVES T
SVITCHES N01053 r
mosas
$(m AUTOMATIC MAMUAL RY PRESSURE ACTURTION g3gqg SWITCHES SPEPRM f
GR A ELSHELL
'N P
Pd5TNK psf 4E0 LS PFSOPl PNLC30LS M%0.ig HSELS PRESSURE l
SPEPRM INDICATION RDSPIPE
,m PSID290 SPEPRM EDG m100,13 C00LUNIT
q W ITH 095 FAILURT W/0 VP5 FALURE T
Pila 01LS pii g.gg CokHisi$
NMS SPEPRM SPEPRM CMG CMU PNL3Y PNL3Y M160.is MiOO41 6LUPn GKATPER FPHTEC PPHTit
EMERGENLY CONDEM5ER val.YE VIITH (LOSP) 129 EMERGE *.T ACPOWER fan.UEE ESEEENCY CONCO6ER.
VALVE 5 T
SWITC.H ES rT101053 O
-w i
207053LS AUTD mRTK.
M AMll A1.
CB105315 R1 BLD6 EY PRESSOE ACTURmm ml00.11 SWITCHS SPEPRm TBERM GRASar ECSHELL T
-y POSTNX PSKEDTLS PPSUP1 PNLC201.5 H OOSELS PRE 5SURE MiOO.13 INDICATION SPEPRM KD5 PIPE O
I I
F5102.5L5 A
SPEPRM EDG
\\
miOO.18 COOLUMIT m
f f\\
-w m
I EDGLS guntLS l
CBEDGLS MiOO.1%
E06 FUELS PPRT 4 C.
E06BLD6 TURBLDb PNLCiBLS SCHDW l
EDG15ATLS EMLTE%
FIRE Pump FRILU RE (LOSP) 130 N6 FLOW F150M stumuas em PFSCNNIS NO FLOW cRANEIT FRom HNP0ML Fille PUfnPS O
DESEL ELECTRK.,
FIMT FIRE Pump PUMP f
('14%L.h LBPH0Lt5 PNtLnLS TMQO.18 CRANEIT SCADW PM01LS ovtsyW F1RfEt15 SLHDN P W tLS CE MCIT PNLCelli PPENHL3 M100.15 SCEN C60LUNff
FIRE PUMP WITM (LaSP)
ENER6E*N AC POWER FAILURE 131 NO FLOW FROM SCREENROUSI I
PP5cMHSl5 DIESEL CRANE 2.T FtRE HNPOTNK Pump PPSWCW SCWHSEE PM01LS OVLEYW PTFVEtt5 5CHDW P1BATLS CRANE 2.T PHl.COM.5 PPSCN HSS M100A1 SCRM Cactuutt t
i
~.
POST INClDE MT 'SYSTEF\\ FA) LURE t LO5P) mST INCIDENT SYSTEM m
CORE SPRfiY Pl5 COEE SPEAY F#itt/RE FAILUKE' FAlu/EE OUT CON'T IN610F CM'1 1
1 T
f' EYELD6
[gr PIPIMb NO N0 HEAT FRILDRE FLOW REMOVAL m
m FPollS PF09WLS m400.10 CORE 51' RAY PPO LS Hi0iLS NO FLdW M100.iq Pump m100#i3 TWRV TVRbtOb FAILVRE SHELL SIDE T
VALVE TEANSFER To FAILVRES YhPD FlPIE LON6TEKM Pump CONTAINMENT p
p OPERAT10M LEVEL FAILURE T WOlC ATION t
L HOSE PPfAKDLS M07010 PM03iJ 1
HSPMoellS M010tato CGPMo2LS BU51AL5 C M A26tS m4co.ir LPNLA5
- YLEVEL ARDUCT1 M01080L5 i Mico.1s trouw B052.RLS I TDERM MON 003A C62AISLS serras m 6 mT1 WM 't MET)WT
- NST1 IM00.fl5 RS1010t3
^
CB1010L5 i
- hts ynjg5 uutis g
Cl!iloLLLS OVRHDLT1 HSibW1.5 LpNI.A5
~,
w em em RACf.415 MOO.UPS UPSLS (1110 6.1 1 U PS2ND 2 100.154 M100 01 4MCHG TORELDb i
t o
I 1
i
EMEKGENCY AC. POWER FAILUGE (LOSP) 13h EMERGENC.T AC IE MS LONG TERM i
r muststs E D Ca's Minil PPHTtC TURBLD6 i
STAND BY ED6 EDG
-J 506L5 506TRitS SDbTRitS
/
[\\
CBEDLLS T
T GO(aFVELS
^
SCbEAG E m LS PHLGELS CSE%IS E06BATL5 E06WELS miOOAf Eo6BL%
EHLTEMS SCMDW l
l I
i l
i I
+
l
mAiW STEAM 150LATION NALVE FAILURk (LOSP) 135 PRIAAKY 345.
150LATl6N FAlt.URE i
+
I
/\\
M010505F ASB\\
C&70505F
.15050tRm MiOO.15 TBERM SPEPRM TURBLDG RYBLDG I
,----,---,-.,,.n
C.RD mAKEUF FAttuas
( LOSP-LTL i 136 No CAEFUP FEOM CRD SYSTEM m
No mAVEVP YlIIO FAILVRES FRom CRD FILTEKS e
r l
PPCRDiL5 PPCRDLLS CRDFILLS N 0 MAKEUP FPCKU30 CRDPDLS FROM CRD ppt.ED*4 LS pumps PPCRDSLS l
mt00.01 t
T N0 MAKEUf POMP FRom OfERAT104 CONT.MSATE SX5.
FRILURE em CD 00t3 COSTLS 1
,t
/
m To TUR5LD6 m
O PMWl5 SFEPRM RSrtwas CADPDis CBPriot$
GRAT PER g
cazAzsL5 TEER#.
m100.it r%
m LI9EML5 G34 NET L7RE'ZDLS CACf,.ILS LEREoBL5 UP55F G?M llL5 ml00.UP5 f
bus 11 t.S miOO.II b
LC h.S ml00.tf SPEPRR
137 BOTTOM EVENT DEFINITION LIST 31CO2ND VENT DUCT.AND RCW PIPING 31842ND~
STEAM DRUM MIRROR ENCLOSURE & EMERG. LIGHT ACSHTCH CCW PUMP ACCESS HATCH IN SCREENHOUSE ROOF AIRDUCT1 AIRDUCT IN CORE SPRAY TEST TANK AREA CATCHGSS BATTERY CHARGER FOR STATION BATTERIES
-BEAM 1T 1 TON BEAM ON EMERGENCY CONDENSER LEVEL CUS1ALS AC BUS 1A BUS 1YLS PANEL 1Y BUS 2ALS AC BUS 2A BUS 2BLS EMERGENCY BUS 2B BUS 2BSS EMERGENCY BUS 2B C05LS AUTO THROWOVER PANEL C114A BUS 1Y,CO5LS,COOLUNIT C114B LPNLAS,RO7064,CB7072,M100.PIS,MO7072,PNLD10
-C114C PPHT&C,ROO702ND C110A BUS 1Y,COS,PPHT&C C414A C05, BUS 1Y,COOLUNIT C418A BUS 1Y,C05 C81017-RO7064,PNLD10LS C81013A GRAT2, WALKWAY C01013B BUS 2BLS,PPHT&C
'C81013C TBERM,GRASA C31215A GRAT2, WALKWAY C01215C LOTVLS,SLMEPRM C01215D HSSDLS,31802ND,31842ND,GRATPER C31215E SVVEC1LS,HSVEC1LS,BEAMIT C81215F MO7072,CB7072,M100.17,M100.PIS,RO7064,PNLD10 C81215G XL3550LS,GRASA,XECSHELL CD1315 VENT UNIT, ROOM 441 C813151 VENT UNIT, ROOM 441, COMPUTER EQUIPMENT CABNETS FDSCCOMP,TESTCAB CAC6.1LS RDS ACURATION CABINETS 5 & 6
'CAC6.1SF RDS ACTUATION CABINETS 5 & 6 CB1A2BLS 1A-2B TIE BREAKER CB1YLILS EMERG.COND. LEVEL INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER (BUS 1Y)
CB1YPBLS RDS PUSH BUTTOM CIRCUIT BREAKER (BUS 1Y)
I CB2A2BLS 2A-2B TIE BREAKER CB3550LS LS-3550 CIRCUIT BREAKER (PNL 1Y) i CB7050SF.
MSIV CIRCUIT BREAKER CB7051LS CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR MO7051 & 61 (MCC D01)
LCB7051SF CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR MO7051 & 61 (MCC D01)
CB7053LS CIRCUIT-EREAKERS FOR MO7053 & 63 CB7064SF CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR MO7064 (PNL D10)
CB7066LS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR MO7066 CB7068SF ENCLOSURE SPRAY VALVE CURCUIT BREAKER CB7070LS ~
CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR MO7070 & 7071 CB7070SF-CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR MO7070 & 7071 CB7072LS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR MO7072 (PNL D10)
CB7080LS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR MO7080 CBEDGLS EDG CIRCUIT BREAKERS
13E CBEDGSF EDG CIRCUIT BREAKERS CBPM02LS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR CORE SPRAY PUMPS (BUS 1A & 2A)
CBPM04LS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR CRD PUMPS (BUS 1A & 2A)
CBPM06LS ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKER CBPM06SF ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKER CBSDGLS CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR STANDBY DIESEL CDSTLS CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK COMPEOP COMPUTER, DESKS, PRINTERS IN COMPUTER ROOM COMPRMC COMPUTER ROOM CEILING TILES COMPWL COMPUTER ROOM WALLS COOLUNIT HEATING & COOLING UNIT OVER PANEL 1Y CRANE 25T TURBINE BUILDING CRANE CRANE 2T 2 TON TROLLY IN SCREENHOUSE CRANE 3T CLEANUP DEMINERALIZER HOIST CRANE 75T 75 TON REACTOR CRANE CRDFILLS CRD FILTERS CRDPDLS CRD PULSE DAMPENER CRTRWL WALL BETWEEN COMPUTER ROOM AND TELEPHONE ROOM l
CV4090LS CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMP SUCTION VLV CV-4090 CV4180LS RDS ISOLATION VLV CV-4180-4183 l
CV4180SF RDS ISOLATION VLV CV-4180-4183 DCBATSF 125V DC BATTERIE9 (STATION BATTERIES) t DCBUSSF DC BUS D01
(
DCLTS LIGHTS ABOVE DC BATTERIES l
ECSHELL EMERGENCY CONDENSER SHELL SUPPORTS I
EDGBATLS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES EDGBATSF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES EDGELDG EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM t
EDGFUELS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNDERGROUND FUEL TANK EDGFUSES EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNDERGROUND FUEL TANK EDGLS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATCR EDGSF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EMLTEYS EMERGENCY LIGHT AND EYE WASH STATION FDSCCOMP FILE DRAWER AND STORAGE CASINET IN COMPUTER ROOM l
FLRGRAT1 FLOOR GRATING OVER ROD DRIVE ACCESS AREA i
FLRPLT FLOOR PLATE AT CLEAN UP DEMIN ACCESS AREA GRASA WALKWAY GRATING AT STEAM DRUM ACCESS AREA GRAT2 FLOOR GRATING IN CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM GRATPER WALKWAY GRATING NEAR PERSONNEL LOCK t
HS7053LS HAND SWITCH FOR EMERG.COND. OUTLET VALVES MO7053 & 63 HS7066LS CONTROL SWITCH FOR MO7066 (C01)
HS7068SF ENCLOSURE SPRAY VLV CONTROL SWITCH (PNL C01)
HS7080LS HAND SWITCH FOR MO7080 (PNL'CO2) i HSPM02LS CORE SPRAY PUMP CONTROL SWITCH (C01) 1 HSPM04LS HAND SWITCH FOR CRD PUMPS HSPM07LS HAND SWITCH FOR FIRE PUMPS (FIRE PUMP CONTROL PANEL)
HSRDSLS RDS CONTROL SWITCHES (PNL C40)
HSRDSSF RDS CONTRCL SWITCHES (PNL C40)
HSSDLLS RDS HAND SWITCH DRUM & REACTOR LEVEL (PNL C40)
HSSDLSF RDS HAND SWITCH DRUM & REACTOR LEVEL (PNL C40)
HSVEC1LS HAND SWITCH FOR EMERGENCY COND. MAKEUP VLV SV4947 (CO2)
HX01LS CORE SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER HYPOTNK HYPOCHLORITE TANK IN SCREENHOUSE INST 1 INSTRUMENTS IN ROD DRIVE ACCES ROOM
)
ISOSCRAM MSIV CONTROL SWITCHES (UNDF.R VOLTAGE RELAYS) l l
l
139 JC21SH JUNCTION BOX 21 IN SCREENHOUSE JBUPSA JUNCTION BOX ON UPSA CABINET LEQUIP LOOSE EQUIPMENT IN ROD DRIVE ACCESS AREA LERE00LS STEAM DRUM LEVEL ELEMENT LIRE 19LS STEAM DRUM LEVEL INDICATION LOCAHOSE FIRE HOSE TO CORE SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER LOTVL-LUBE OIL TANK VENT LINE LPNLAS LOCAL PANEL AND SPHERE VENT ISOLATION VALVE IN AIR SHED LS3550LS EMERGENCY CONDENSER SHELL LEVEL SWITCH LSRE09LS RX LEVEL SWITCHES RE09 A-H LSRE09SF RX LEVEL SWITCHES RE09 A-H LT3171LS CONTAINMENT LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT3175LS CONTAIN;ENT LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT3180LS RDS RX LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT3180SF RDS RX LEVEL TRANSMITTER
.'TLT3184LS RDS DRUM LEVEL TRANSMETTER LT3184SF RDS DRUM LEVEL TRANSMETTER LTRE20LS STEAM DRUM LEVEL TRANSMITTER M100.01 BLOCK WALL #1 M100.03 BLOCK WALL #3 (UPSA)
M100.04 BLOCK WALL #4 M100.05 BLOCK WALL #5 (TOOLCRIB)
M100.06 BLOCK WALL #6 (UPSA & B)
M100.08 BLOCK WALL #8 (UPSA ?-
C)
M100.09 BLOCK WALL #9 M100.10 BLOCK WALL #10 (UPSA)
M100.11 BLOCK WALL #11 M100.13 BLOCK WALL #5 (UPSD)
M100.14 BLOCK WALL #14 (SOUTH OF STATION BATTERIES)
M100.16 BLOCK WALL #16 (WEST OF STATION BATTERIES)
M100.17 BLOCK WALL #17 (STATION POWER RM)
.M100.18 BLOCK WALL #18 (WEST WALL STATION POWER ROOM)
M100.19 BLOCK WALL #14 (STAIRWELL WEST OF STATION BATTERIES)
M100.20 BLOCK WALL #20 (LUBE OIL TANK RM)
M100.21 BLOCK WALL #21 (MACHINE SHOP TO TURBINE BUILDING LAYDOWN AREA)
M100.PIS BLOCK WALL IN CORE SPRAY PUMP ROOM M100.UPS M100.03,04,06,07,09,10,11,12,13 M13,5 M100.13 & M100.05 M17,PIS M100.17 & M100.PIS M19,20 M100.19,M100.20 M19,21 M100.19,M100.21 MS,13,14 M100.05,M100.13,M100.14 M8,UPS M100.08 & M100.UPS METHAT ACCESS HATCH TO REGEN-NON-REGEN ROOM MO7050SF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV)
MO7051LS CORE SPRAY VLV MO7051 & 7061 MO7051SF CORE SPRAY VLV MO7051 & 7061 MO7053LS EMERGENCY CONDENSER VALVES MO7053 & 7063 MO7064SF ENCLOSURE SPRAY VALVES MO7064 MO7066LS FIRE WATER TO CORE SPRAY HEAT EX VALVE MO7066 MO7068SF ENCLOSURE SPRAY VALVE MO7068 MO7070LS CORE SPRAY VALVES MO7070 & 7071 MO7070SF CORE SPRAY VALVES MO7070 & 7071 MO7072LS FIRE WATER VALVES AROUND PIS MO7080LS BYPASS VALVE FOR MO7066
m m
lho MON 003A RECIRC PUMP SUCTION VALVE MANUAL OPERATOR OVLEYW OVERHEAD LIGHT AND EMERGENCY EYE WASH NEAR FIRE PUMP BATTERIES OVRHDLT1 OVERHEAD LIGHT IN CORE SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM P7BATLS DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERIES
-P7BATSS DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERIES P7FUELLS DIESEL FIRE PUMP UNDERGROUND FUEL TANK P7FUELSS DIESEL FIRE PUMP UNDERGROUND FUEL TANK PBRDSLS RDS PUSH BUTTONS P2 SHIELD LEAD SHIELD COVERING PT-174 PI367SF ENCLOSURE. PRESSURE INDICATOR PIIA07LS RX PRESSURE INDICATION (CO2)
PM02LS CORE SPRAY PUMPS PMOCLS CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMPS PM06LS ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP PM06SF ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP PM07LS DIESEL FIRE PUMP PM07SF DIESEL FIRE PUMP PM7BATLS DIESEL FIRE PUMP BATTERIES PNLC09LS DIESEL FIRE PUMP CONTROL PANEL PNLC09SS DIESEL FIRE PUMP CONTROL PANEL PNLC17LS ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP CONTROL PANEL PNLC17SS ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP CONTROL PANEL PNLC18LS PANEL C18, HEATER, LIGHTS, BAT. CHARGER, MUFFLER,H2O TANK & HOIST PNLC18SS PANEL C18, HEATER, LIGHTS, BAT. CHARGER, MUFFLER,H2O TANK & HOIST PNLC20 PANEL C20 PNLC30LS PANEL C30 PNLC30SS PANEL C09 PNLD02LS DC DISTRIBUTION BUS D02 PNLD02SS DC DISTRIBUTION BUS D02 PNLD10LS DC PANEL D10 PNLD10SS DC PANEL D10 POSTNK POISON TANK PP01LS FIRE PIPING IN CORE SPRAY PUMP ROOM PPO2LS CORE SPRAY PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT PP02SS CORE SPRAY PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT PP03LS WELDED FIRE PIPING IN PIPE TUNNEL PP03SS WELDED FIRE PIPING IN PIPE TUNNEL PPO4WLS WELDED CORE SPRAY PIPING IN TURBINE BUILDING PPO4WSS WELDED CORE SPRAY PIPING IN TURBINE BUILDING PPOSTLS THREADED FIRE PIPING IN TURBINE BUILDING PPO5TSS THREADED FIRE PIPING IN TURBINE BUILDING PP06CLS VICTROLIC COUPLINGS ON FIRE PIPING IN TURBINE DUILDING PP06 CSS VICTROLIC COUPLINGS ON FIRE PIPING IN TURBINE BUILDING PP3W4WLS PP03 OR PPO4W PPST6CLS PPOST OR PP06C PPCRD1LS CRD PIPE FROM PUMPS TO NC-18 & CRD-11 PPCRD2LS CRD PIPE FROM CONTAINMENT TO PUMP SUCTION l
PPCRD3LS CRD PIPE IN PIPE TUNNEL PPCRD4LS CRD PIPE IN CONDENSATE PUMP ROOM PPCRD5LS CRD PIPE UNDERGROUND FROM CONDENSATE STARAGE TANK PPHT&C HEATING STEAM PIPE IN STATION POWER ROOM i
PPSCNHLS SCREENHOUSE FIRE PIPING
'PPSCNHSS SCREENHOUSE FIRE PIPING PPSUP1 PIPE SUPPORTS, NORTH SIDE OF EMERG.COND. LEVEL PPSWCW CIRCULATING WATER PIPING IN SCREENHOUSE l
I i
1h1 PPVARDLS CAST IRON UNDERGROUND FIRE PIPING PPYARDSS CAST IRON UNDERPROUND FIRE PIPING PS612SF PS-612 DIESEL FIRE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE PS615SF PS-615 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE PS6362ND VENT DUCT, ILRT PIPING, MONITOR & COLUMN OVER PS-636 PS636SF ENCLOSURE SPRAY VALVE PRESSURE SWITCH 636 & 637 A & B PS7064SF PRESSURE SWITCHES 7064 A & B (ENCLOSURE SPRAY VALVES)
PS789LS FIRE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE SWITCHES 789-796 PS789SF FIRE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE SWITCHES 789-796 PSID28LS RX HIGH PRESSURE SWITCH PSKG11LS RX PRESSURE SWITCHES PS1G11 A-H PSIG11SF RX PRESSURE SWITCHES PS1G11 A-H PSRE07LS EMERGENCY CONDENSER OUTLET VLV CONTROL SWITCH PT174SF ENCLOSURE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR PI-367 RAC1.1LS RDS ACTUATION AND SENSOR CABINET 1-4 RAC1.1SF RDS ACTUATION AND SENSOR CABINET 1-4 RDSCV2ND EMERGENCY CONDENSER SHELL, 2 TON WINCH RDSHOIST HOIST ON ECS LEVEL RDSLTLS LT3180,LT3184 RDSPIPE RDS PIPING OUTSIDE STEAM DRUM RE092ND RCW ABD SFP PIPING IN VICINITY OF RE09 SWITCHES ROO702ND I & C TRANFORMER & AC BUS 1&2 l
RO7064LS RELAY CONTACTS FOR MO7064 l
RO7064SF RELAY CONTACTS FOR MO7064 RO7070LS RELAY CONTACTS FOR MO7070 & 71 RO7070SF RELAY CONTACTS FOR MO7070 & 71 ROOM 441 ROCM 441, MISCELLANEOUS ECUIPMENT RXBLDG RX BUILDING (SHELL)
RXTURB RX BUILDING, TURBINE BUILDING l
SCHDW SCREENHOUSE DOOR WALKWAY l
SCNHSBLG SCREENHOUSE STRUCTURE SCRN SCREEN BEHIND DIESEL FIRE PUMP SCGBATLS STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES SDGBATSS STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES SDGFUELS STANDBY DIESEL FUEL TANK SDGLS STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR SDGTR1LS STANDBY DIESEL TRANSFORMER #1 SDGTR2LS STANDBY DIESEL TRANSFORMER #2 SLMEPRM SECOND LEVEL MEZZANINE IN OUTER ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM SPEPRM STEEL PLATE CEILING INNER ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM SV4894LS SOLENOID VALVE FOR CV-4090 SV4980LS RDS DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES SV4980-4983 SV4980SF RDS DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES SV4980-4983 SV4984LS RDS DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES SV4984-4987 SV4984SF RDS DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES SV4984-4987 SVVECILS EMERGENCY CONDENSER MAKE-UP VALVE SV-4947 i
TBERM TERMINAL BOX IN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM,SECOND LEVEL TESTCAB TEST CABINET IN COMPUTER ROOM TOOLCRIB TOOL CABINETS IN TOOL CRIB TURBDLG TURBINE BUILDING TURBLDG TURBINE BUILDING
[
UPS2ND VENT DUCTS, LIGHTS & PIPING IN UPS ROOM l
UPSASF UPSA BATTERIES UPSCHG UPS BATTERIES CHARGERS UPSLS UPS BATTERIES l
l
lh2 UPCSF UPS BATTERIES UVRE2BSF EDG UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY.
VENTUNT VENTILATION CABINETS WEST OF PERSONNEL LOCK VPI301LS CORE SPRAY CHACK VLAVES VPI-301 & 302 WALKWAY WALKWAY GRATING TO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM IN CONTAINMENT X3550LS.
LS3550,CB3550 X7050SF VALVE OF MAIN STEAM PIPE 4CB X7051LS MO7052,CB7051 X7053LS MO7053,CB7053 i
X7070LS MO7070,CB7070 X7072LS MO7072,CB7072 X7080LS MO7080,CB7080 XBERM TBERM,CPEPRM XBUS1YLS BUS 1Y,COOLUNIT XEUS2ALS BUS 2A,CB2A2B XC05LS COS, BUS 1Y,PIIA49 XCDSTLS CV4090,SV4894,CDST XCOMPRM COMPRMC,COMPECP XCRDLS CRDFILLS,CRDPDLS
'XECSHELL ECSHELL,POSTNK,PPSUP1 XEDGLS EDG,CBEDG,EDGFUE,EDGBLGD,PNLC18,EDGBAT XEDGSL EDG,CBEDG,EDGFUE,EDGBLDG,PNLC18,EDGBAT XEPRM LOTVL,SCMEPRM,L81215C XHYPO ACSHTCH, CRANE 2T,5CHDW,HYPOTNK,JB215H XL3550LS LS3550,CB3550 XLEQUIP-LEQUIP, MON 003A XLEVEL CONTAINMENT LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (LT3171,3175 & LS 3562,3564 3565)
XPM02LS PM02,HSPM02,CBPM02, BUS 1A,CB1A2B XPM02LS PM02,HSPM02,CSPM02, BUS 1A,CB1A2B XPM04LS PM04,HSPMO4,CBPM04 XPM07LS PM07,PM7 BAT,PNLC09,P7 FUEL XPP02LS PP02,31842ND XPP3,4LM PP03,PPO4W,M100.19,M100.20 XPP34&BW PP03,PPO4,M100.19,M100.21 XPPCRDLS PPCRD 1,3,4,5 XPSIGLS PSIG11,LSRE09 XRE09LS LSRE09,PBRDSLS,CB1YPB,RE092ND XRE19LS LERE08, LIRE 19,LTRE20 XRO7064 M100.17,RO7064,PNLD10 XSCHOUSE EMLTEYS,5CHDW XSCNHSS SCNHSBLDG,HYPOTNK, CRANE 2T,PPSWCW XSDGLS SDG,CBSDG,SDGTR1,SDGTR2,SDGBAT,SDGFUE XUPS UPSLS,UPS2ND,UPSCHG XVZOLS CV4180LS,SV4180LS XVEC1LS-SVVEC1LS,HSVEC1LS XWALL M100.09,M100.10,M100.11,M100.17 Y7066LS MO7066LS,HS7066LS,CB7066LS Y7080LS MO7080LS,CB7080LS,HS7080LS YHYPO ACSHTC, CRANE 2T,HYPOTNK,JB21SH YPM02 PM02,HSPM02,CBPMO2 YRE09LS LSRE09LS,PSIG11LS,REO92ND YUPS M100.UPS,M100.08,UPS2ND YPM02LS PM02LS,CBPM02LS,HSPM02LS, BUS 1ALS,CB1A2ALS
p I-143 LIST OF BOTTOM EVENTS 31802ND-
'O.'400 31242ND 0.400
-AC:HTCH 0.500 AIRDUCT1' O.400 BATCHGSS 0.350-
-BEAM 1T 0.400.
' BUS 1ALS 0.350 BU21 r_S 0.320 BUS 2ALS 0.350 BUS 2BLS 0.350
. BUS 2BSS 0.350 C05LS 0.350 C114A 0.320 C1149 0.350 C114C 0.320 C118
'O.320' C118A O.320-C414A
~ 0. 320 -
C418A O.320 CD1013' O.350
-CD1013A 0.400 CJ1013B:
0.320.
C]1013C' O.350 C]1215A O.200
'CC1215C 0.350 C81215D 0.350
.C31215E 0.350 CJ1215F 0.350 C]1215G 0.120-C81315 0.400 CD13151 0.350
..CABNETS 0.350 CAC6.1LS 0.350 LCAC6.1SF.
_0.350 CB1A2BLS-0.350-CJ1YFILS 0.320 CB1YLILS 0.320 CJ1YPBLS 0.000
'CB1YPILS 0.350
'CB2A2BLS 0.350 CB3550LS 0.350 CB7050SF 0.350 CB7051LS 0.350 C37051SF-
-0.350 CB7053LS 0.350 CB7064SF.
0.350'
-CB7066LS' O.350 C37068SFE 0.350 CD7070LS 0.350 CB7070SF 0.35C I
C07072LS.
0.350 C37080LS 0.350 L
J
,:n 383097S 0*CSO' 383GOSd O*CGO 38dW027S O*CGO 38dW0#7S O*CGO-38dW091S O*CGO 38dW09Sd.
O*CGO-3850975 O*CGO' 30C17S' O*690 3OWd3Od O*CGO
- 3OWd8W3 O*CGO 3OWdM7.
O*CGO-3007ONII O*CGO-3 BUN 3391 O*CEO
.38VN3E1 O*SOO 3BVN321 O'000 3 MON 3491 O*CCO 3803177S-O*#00 38Gd07S O' WOO 3818M7 O*CSO 3A90607S O*CGO 3At1801S O*tOO 3AWTBOSd.
O* POO.
- 0380133~
0 CGO 038nSSd' O*CSO
-0371S O*CCO
- 33SH377, O*130
-3008017S O*SOO 309801Sd O* GOO 3098709 O' GOC 3GOdn37S O*666 3003n3SS O*666
'30930S3S O*666 3097S.
O*SOO 309Sd-C*SOO 3W311AS O*SOO 3W713AS-O* GOO 3W173AS-O* GOO dGS33OWd O*CGO 31898VI O*tOO 3798011 O'kOO 37898011 O*tOO
'378d71
'O' BOO
~9BUSV O' WOO 98013 O*VOO
-98W1d38 O*tOO-HC4OGC7S O*CGO HS409975 O*CGO HS409OSd O*CSO HS40007S O*CGO HSdW037S O*CSO HSdWOt7S O*CGO HSdW047S O* GOO HS8051S O*CGO H58GSSd O*CGO HSS077S O*CGO-
091*O Sdn'8W 091*O WI'CI'GW 011*O
-IC'6TW 031*O OC'6TW OOt*O SId'4TW 091*O C'CIW 091*O Sdn*OOTW OOb*O SId'OOTW OII*O TE*00TW Oti'O 03*OOTW OCG*O
-61*OOTW OCl*O 81*OOTW-666*0 41*00TW OCG*O 91'00TW
~!
OCG*O ti'OOTW-091*0-CI'001W 042*O II'00TW OCC*O OT*001W OTC*O 60*OOTW OTC*O 80*001W OCC*O 90*00iW OCG*O GO*00TW OCG*O
- 0'00iW OC9'O CO*OOTW-OCC*O TO*00TW' OOW'O S7023817 00#*O
-dSbBIC17 009 0 S7b8tC17 OOV*O dSOBTC17 OOt*O S1081C17.
OOk*O S7G4TC17 OOb*O
-S714T217 00#*O
.dS603851 OOk'O S7603857 OOO*O S7G99CS7.
OOO*O S7t9GCS7 000*O S7392CS7 000*O 392CS7 031*O 570GGCS7 OGC*O SW7Nd7 OGC*O 1A107 -
666*O 3SOHV307 OGC*O S16T38I7 OGC*O S76T3837 OOb'O S780383T OOt*O idInO37 OOt*O DIDO 37-OGC*O USdn8P OOG*O HSir80 OOO*O WV83SOSI OOt*O T1SNI OOG*O NN10dAH
'OOt*O 57TOXH OGC*O E7133 ASH OGC*O dS70S3H 591
q 021*O S71Godd OG3*O SSMtodd 093*O S7Mtodd R
093*O SSCOdd j
093*O S7toddI l
OOt*O-
.SS3 Odd OOt*O S13 Odd OOt*O S7TOdd OOt*O MN1 sod 000*0-S740d7Nd OGC*O SSO107Nd OGC*O S70TG7Nd OG2*O
'SS3007Nd OGC*O S7 COG 7Nd
-OOt*O SSO137Nd-OOt*0-S70237Nd OOt*O 0337Nd-UOG*O SS8137Nd OOG*O S78137Nd OOG*O SSLID7Nd OOG*O S74137Nd OOG*O SS6037Nd OOG*O dS6037Nd OOG*O S76037Nd OGE*O A17Nd.
OOG*O 971084Wd OG3*O AS40Wd OG3*O S740Wd OG3*O dS90Wd 023*O 5790Wd-OOt*O S7tOWd OOt*O S130Wd' OOt*O S740VIId OGC*O JS49CId OOO*O G731HS8d 000*0.
. S75088d 666*O SS73nd4d 666*O S773nd4d OOG*O SSIV84d OOG*O S71084d:
OOt*O T170HMAO OOS*O MA37AO OOt*O UCOONOW OOt*O S708040W OOt*O S734040W OOO*O ASOLO40W OOO*C 5704040W OOt*O dS89040W OOt*O S799040W~
OOt*O dst 9040W 000*O S7tGO40W 000*O~
3SIGO40W OOO*O 571GO40W' OOt*O 3SOGO40W.
GOt*O IVH13W' 99T a
.=
~
l OSC*O
.W8d3W7S 091*O S738190S 091*O S118190S OOO*O S790S 000*0-
.S730390S-000*0' SSIV800S
^
000*0.
S1V800S 000'O S11V890S OOG*O
'N83S OOS*O 978SHN3S 00G*O MGHOS OEC*O 8801X8; OOV'O 9078X8 OOt*O It#WOOM OGC*O ASOLO408 09C*O S10404081 666*O dS#90438-666*O 57W90 COW 091*O ON004008
~~OOb *O ONZ6038 OOb*O 3dIdSGS
.OOr*O 5711508 OOP*O
'1SIDHS08' OET*O ONZA3508 OGC*O JST* TOV 8 OGC*O S71*IOV8 OGC*O dSW411d OOr*O' S74038Sd:
00#*O dSIT91Sd-00#*O S71191Sd OOk*0-S18ZOISd OOS*O dS694Sd-OOG 'O -
S7684Sd OOO*O
-dSk904Sd
'000*O dS9C95d.
000*O
-ON59E9Sd' OOS*O dSGI9Sd.
009*O dSE19Sd OOC *O SS08VAdd OOE*O S708VAdd' OOE*O MOMSdd'
/00#*O IdnSdd.
093*0-LSSHN3Sdd OSC*O S7HNDSdd OEC*O 341Hdd
'666*O
' S7GQ83dd '
OGC*O Sl#083dd-OEC*O S71083dd OOt *0 -
S73083dd
~
OOt*0:
S7T083dd OST*O S7391Gdd OGE*O 57MtMCdd OST *O;
- SS390dd OET*O S7390dd OSI*O SSIGOdd 19I L
J
=-
m g,.
../--
lh8
. j.f i,
% ': E...
- .SPEPRM 0.400-
- SVOS94LS JO.400.
SVO980LS
'O.400 SVQ980SF-
-0.400
.SVO984LS.
,0.400 i
SVG984SF-0.400-SVVEC1LS 0.400
'TBERM O.350 TESTCAB.
O.350
.TOOLCRIB O.000 TURBDLG
.O.320
- TURBLDG.
O.320f UPS2ND' O.130 UPSASF.
O.'350 UPSCHG-0.350
.UPSLS 0.350 UPSSF-0.350
.UVRE2BSF
-0.500
~VENTUNT.
O.400
~VPI301LS 0.000 WALKWAY-0.'400 X3180LS 0.400 X7050SF 0.350
'X7051LS 0.000
- X7053LS.
- O.000
-X7066LS 0.350 X7070LS 0.000-
'X7072LS 0.350 X7080LS 0.350
'XBERM 0.350
.XBUS1YLS~
0.320 XBUS2ALS
'04350 XC05LS.
O.320 XCDSTLS 0.250 XCOMPRM.
O.350 XCRDLS 0.400 XCV80LS 0.400 1
XDCPWR O.320 l;. XECSHELL
~0.120 XEDGLS 0.350
'XEDGSL-O.350
- XEPRM.
O.350-XHYPO O.200
'9' XL3550LS 0.120 XLEQUIP O.400 P;,.XLEVEL 0.400 di 'XPMO2LS 0.350 XPMO4LS:
0.350
- .:XPMO7LS 0.000
- XFPO2LS 0.400 XPP3,4&M O.120 XPP34&BW
'O.110
<XPPCRDLS 0.250 XPSIGLS 0.400
-XREO9LS.
0.400 6
. m q
4 1h9-
, 1XRE19LS
- 0.350:
r-
- XRO7064.
'O.350
't
'XSCHOUSE-
'O.500 i
XSCNHSS 0.200; XSDGLS-
.O.000
- XUP3 O.130.
XV!OLS 0.400-XVEC1LS 0.350 XWALL' O.310 Y7016LS 0.350 Y70;OLS 0.350'
.YHYPO O.500
.s 4
YPHO2 O.350
- YREO9LS 0.400
- YUPS-O.130~
i'
YPMO2LS O.350
[
[ \\,
kr i '
e 4
6 3
g.
?
I e
0; g
x 4
0 t.
f,
- \\;
0 --
.s a
y 4
1 v
a f 2'
/
7t,.
4 F
3
'h i
-.a.-
150 VIII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS A.
Introduction-Table 1, of this section contains the results of the event tree / fault tree evaluations performed using the methodology described in Section VI.
The_ cut sets presented in this table were limited to those whose capacities have been determined to be less than O'25g for reasons which will be obvious later. The cut sets were' ranked from the most fragile to those with the greatest capacity. The first column in this table contains the cut sets which were obtained for each' ground acceleration from 0.00g to 0.25g.
The cut sets are arranged to identify which initiating event (LOSP, LOCA or LTC) they arise from and the ground acceleration at which they fail.
For example, the first eight cut sets were obtained' from the loss of station power event tree, and each cut set fails at 0.00g.
The second column contains the originating sequence from which the specific cut set was obtained.
As an example, examine cut set #1.
~
X7053, Crane 3T; X7051.
PE C v
This. tells us that at 0.00g the emergency condenser outlet valves; M07053 and M07063 (modularized as X7053), the clean-up demin hoist; Crane 3T, and the primary core: spray valves M07051 and M07061 (codularized as X7051) fail'.
This combination of failures can lead to inadequate core cooling because both the emergency condenser va5v)es M07070 and M07071 are taken out by the hoist via cable (E
and the core sprays (C) are lost.
(The redundant core spray damage).
As stated in Section VI, the most fragile cut sets are those of which backfits or further analysis will be directed. Modification and analysis are'of little benefit unless the weaker links are also addressed. Backfits may take a variety of forms ranging from
. simple procedure revisions to major structural upgrading of plant,
structures and equipment.
In this section, an analysis of each of the cut sets listed in Table VIII-I will be presented. The analysis will include evaluations of the failure modes for each cut set and potential additional evaluations or backfits which could be performed to upgrade the cut set to a capacity at which it would no longer be
+
limiting. The discussion will begin with the weakest of the cut
~
. sets and continue up through those with the highest capacity.
4 There will be no attempt to identify an acceptable ground acceleration above which no additional work or evaluations are necessary. The discussion will end only when an overwhelmingly cost prohibitive backfit is identified such'as the modification or replacement of a 4
major structure such as the reactor enclosure or turbine building is identified. Clearly, backfits of this magnitude will not be censidered and limiting the benefit of discussion beyond this point.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
~
151 The purpose of this discussion will be to develop a logical framework-around which future decisions with respect to the need for performing seismic backfits and evaluations of the Big Rock Point Plant can be made.
9
.'NUO383-2628A-BA01 i
.a
1 152 B.
Results Table VIII-1 contains what can be considered the seismic weak links at the Big Rock Point Plant ranked from most to least fragile. A tabulation of cut sets exists for each of the three-event trees presented in Section IV; LOCA, loss of offsite power, and long-term cooling. Notice that the most fragile of the cut sets presented have assigned capacities of 0.0g.
This is not to say that these components have no seismic capacity but merely reflects the assumptions made in Section V conservatively assigning uncharacterized components an extremely low value of fragility. As one might expect, conservative assumptions were applied to what turned out to be some of the more important components resulting in their appearing in the most fragile cut sets. There is apparent value in ascertaining the capacity of these components, then.
During the LOCA, the important uncharacterized components include the core spray valves, the cleanup demineralizer hoist (which is assumed to impact the enclosure spray valves and damage the redundant core spray motor operator cables and piping if it fails), the tool cabinets in the tool crib (impacts the UPS batteries B and D), a
' vertical column in the electrical penetration room (PS6362nd fails RDS cables attached to a cross member), pressure switches PS636 and PS7064 (needed for the enclosure spray valves) and a lead blanket used to shield enclosure pressure transmitter, PT174 (may be used by. operators to manually actuate the enclorure sprays). During the loss of offsite power _ two additional items are included, the emergency condenser outlet valves M07053 and M07063 and the MSIV undervoltage relay contacts (IS0 SCRAM). The relay contacts are included only as an informational item, as it was discovered that should off site power not be lost, the MSIV does not receive an automatic close signal. However, further review of this item is presented as noted in Table 2.
No cut sets in the long-term cooling sequences were completely comprised of uncharacterized members.
Several methods are available for raising the assumed capacity of each of these cut sets. As the failure mode of the motor-operated valves is its potential impacting en surrounding structures due to seismically induced motion, an inspection as to whether such structures exist, an evaluation of the movement of these valves during the earthquake, or a backfit restricting the motion of these valves may be possible disposition for these components. An evaluation of the capacity of the cleanup demineralizer hoist or a modification restricting its movement such that it cannot travel over the enclosure spray valves are potential solutions to raising its capacity.
These solutions are presented as dispositions for these components in Table VIII-2.
Potential dispositions are presented for each cut set component at all accelerations up through 0.25g.
At this ground acceleration, the turbine building pedestal is assumed to NUO383-2628A-BA01 r
-m
~,-
e
153 slide and no further backfits or evaluations are suggested. Note that any one of the suggested dispositions can raise the capacity of a cut set; it is not necessary t.o consider them all.
This is due to the capacity of the cut set being equivalent to its strongest component.
In the next section an approach to selecting which backfits and evaluations are most effective in raising the seismic capacity of the plant overall is discussed.
E NUO383-2628A-BA01
154 C.
Conclusions Numerous backfits and evaluations are suggested in the previous section as potential dispositions for raising the cut-set capacities to levels at which they are no longer limiting. These dispositions.
vary in complexity from simple procedure revisions and changes to the logic models to significant structural reinforcement of large items such as masonry walls. In selecting which backfits are to be performed, if any, it is desirable to select those which are most pervasive in their effect on upgrading the seismic capacity of the plant and yet least costly in terms of capital expenditures and other resources. Cost-benefit analyses are useful in the weighing of one backfit against another during analyses such as these.
Unfortunately, the methodology used in this report does not easily lend itself to performing detailed cost benefit evaluations. The selection of potential backfits and evaluations which may need further consideration in closing out the seismic design review of Big Rock Point, therefore, will naturally be subjective, keeping in mind only that the greater the seismic capacity of the plant the less likely is the occurrence of a significant release given a seismic event.
Table 2 contains each of the components listed in the cut sets of Table 1, plus some proposed " fixes".
For the critical items in the 0.00g category the proposed " fixes" have been reviewed by the Technical Review Group (TRG) at Big Rock. These fixes, or similar fixes will be completed, and thus raise the ground acceleration of-these cut sets, which will eliminate all the 0.00g cut sets. For the items ranging from 0.110g to 0.25g the proposed " fixes" are for future consideration only. Additional analysis of the logic models may change the relative importance of these cut set members, or other solutions may be proposed. A future update to this report will include fixes for items in the next range of ground acceleration from 0.11g to 0.25g.
It may be decided that some of the items in the.lg range may not be economical to "fix".
However, all the items in this range will be evaluated.
In addition, the results of the reactor internals evaluation will be submitted as a supplement to this report, and should any items fall within the 0.11g to 0.25g range, they will be looked at for possible fixes.
NUO383-2628A-BA01
155 IAELE_V111:1
-THIS LIST IDENTIFIES EACH CUT SET DEVELOPED FOR GROUND ACCELERATIONS FROM O.Og
- TO O. 25g. THIS LIST ALSO IDENTIFIES THE ORIGINATING SEQUENCE FOR THE CUTSET.
gu1SgI ggDUgNGE_OBIGIN
- LOSP O.000g-**
1)X7053.
CRANE 3T X7051
'PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY 2)X7053 X7070 X7051 PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY
'3)TOOLCRIB X7053 PEvu:UPS & EMER COND VALVE PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS 4)TOOLCRIB ISOSCRAM PIU: UPS & MSIV PIR: MSIV-& RDS
- 5) CRANE 3T X7051 ISOSCRAM PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 6)X7070 X7051 ISOSCRAM PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 7)X7053 PS6362ND PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS 8)ISOSCRAM PS6362ND PIR: MSIV & RDS
- .LOCA O.000g **
- 9) CRANE 3T' MO7051 LC:
CORE SPRAY 10)MO7051 TOOLCRIB LC:
CORE SPRAY 11)MO7070 MO7051 LC:
~12)PS6362ND LR:
RDS LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 13)TOOLCRIB LR:
RDS
'14)PS636 TOOLCRIB LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 15)PS7064 TOOLCRIB LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY
- 16) CRANE 3T LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 17)PS7064 PBSHIELD LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 18)PS6362ND PBSHIELD LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY
- LOCA O.110g **
19)M100.21 LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY
- LOCA O.120g.**
20)VPI301 M100.20 LLp: POST INCIDENT 21)ECSHELL LLp: POST INCIDENT LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY LR:
RDS
15i.
\\
IABLE_V111:1
- LOSP;0.12Og **'
22)X7053' M19,20
.VPI301 PEvLp:EMER COND VALVE & POST INC 23)VPI301 _ M19,20 PEmLp:EMER COND MU L POST INC 124)ISOSCRAM'VPI301 M100.20 PILp:MSIV & POST INCIEENT
'25)X7053 M100.20~
M100.21 VPI301 PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY 26)ISOSCRAM M100.21 M100.20 VPI301 PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 27)XECSHELL-CRANE 3T X7051 PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY
.28)XECSHELL M100.20 M100.21
~VPI301 PEvC:EMER.COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY.
29)XECSHELL X7070 X7051 PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY
~
,30)VPI301 M19,20-XECSHELL-PEvLp:EMER COND VALVE & POST INC:
31)TOOLCRIB ECSHELL PEvU:EMER COND VALVE L-UPS 32)ECSHELL PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS 33)M100.20 VP1301 CRANE 3T X7051 PEmC:EMER COND MU & CORE SPRAY 34)M100.20' VPI301~
M100.21 PEmC:EMER COND MU & CORE SPRAY
- 35)M100.20 VPI301 X7070' X7051 PEmC:EMER COND MU & CORE SPRAY 36)XPP3,4&M VPI301 PS6362ND PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS 37)XPP3,4&M VPI301 RDSCV2ND PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS L38)XPP3,4&M VPI301 TOOLCRIB PEmR:EMER COND'MU & RDS 39)M100.20 VPI301 TOOLCRIB PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU
'40)ISOSCRAM RDSCV2ND PIR: MSIV & RDS
- LOCA O.13Og **
-41)M100.18.
PLLp: POST INCIDENT PLC: CORE SPRAY PLE: ENCLOSURE SPRAY PLR: RDS 42)MO7051 UPS2ND PLC: CORE SPRAY 43)UPS2ND PLR: RDS PLE: ENCLOSURE SPRAY
- ** LTC O.13Og **
44)M100.18 PQC: EMER AC POWER'& CORE SPRAY POR: EMER AC POWER & RDS PYR: CRD MAKEUP & RDS PUY: CRD MAKEUP & UPS PYLp:CRD MAKEUP & POST INCIDENT POLp:POSTLINCIDENT & EMER AC PWR PYC: CRD MAKEUP & CORE SPRAY
~
-_------_n,,
157 IGELE_V111:1
- LOSP 0.130g **
45)M100.18 PIF: MSIV & FIRE PUMP PDF: EMER AC POWER & FIRE PUMP PUEm:EMER COND MU & UPS ll PIDF:MSIV, FIRE PUMP & EMER AC PWR POEmR:RDS,EMER COND MU &
EMER AC PWR PIOC:MSIV, CORE SPRAY &
EMER AC PWP POEmLp: POST INC,EMER COND MU &
EMER AC POWER PEv0C:EMER COND VLV, CORE SPRAY &
k EMER AC POWER R
PEv0F: FIRE PUMP,EMER COND VLV &
EMER AC POWER PIR: MSIV & RDS PIOR:MSIV,RDS & EMER AC PWR PEvDR:EMER COND VLV,RDS &
!k PEvu:UPS & EMER COND VLV PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMP E
PIU: UPS & MSIV PEmR:EMER COND Mu & RDS PEv0Lp: POST INC,EMER COND VLV &
EMER AC POWER PEvR:EMER COND VLV & RDS PF:
FIRE PUMP PUO: UPS & EMER AC POWER PUQEm:UPS,EMER COND MU &
EMER AC PWR PEmLp:EMER COND MU & POST INC PUQF:UPS, FIRE PMP & EMER AC PWR PEvLp: POST INC & EMER COND VLV PILp: POST INC & MSIV PEvF:EMER COND VLV & FIRE PUMP POEmC: CORE SPRAY,EMER COND MU &
EMER AC PWR PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SFRAY PIOLp:MSIV, POST INC & EMER AC FWR PEmC:EMER COND MU & CORE SPRAY PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 46)UPS2ND M100.20 VPI301 PUEm:EMER COND MU & UPS 47)1SOSCRAM UPS2ND PIR: MSIV & RDS PIU: MSIV & UPS
s 158' M
10 ELE _V111:1-
'48)UPS2ND MO7053 PEvU:UPS & EMER Ci- ) VLV-L
'49)UPS2ND X7053 PEvR:5MER COND VALVE & RDS
!50)UPS2ND
-ECSHELL PEvu EMER COND VALVE & UPS PEvR:EMER COND VALVE.& RDSL 51)XPP3,4&M VPI301' UPS2ND PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS
' ** LOCA O.150g **
~
'52)PPO5!
LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 53)PPO6 LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY-
- 'LOCAJO'160g-**
L54)M100.13 LC:
CORE-SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 155)M100.UPS LR:
RDS
- LOSP..O.160g **.
56 ) M 100'.' 20.VPI301
.M100.UPS PUEm:UPS & EMER COND VLV 57)XPP3,4&M VPI301 M100.UPS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS
-58)1SOSCRAM M100.UPS PIU: UPS & MSIV PIR: MSIV & RDS
- 59)X7053 M100.UPS
. PEvu:UPS & EMER COND VALVE PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS;-
t_
60)M100.UPS XECSHELL PEvu UPS & EMER COND VALVE PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS
- LOCA O.200'**
61')PPSWCW.
LC:
CORE SPRAY LLp: POST INCIDENT LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY LR:
RDS 62)PPYARD LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY p
- .LOSP'O.2OOg **
63)M100.UFS PPSWCW PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS i
d-m
___,.-__m.m-a__
m m
m.,_____
159 182LE_V111:1 64)TOOLCRIB PPSWCW PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 65)UPS2ND PPSWCW PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 66)XECSHELL PPYARD PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & COR.E SPRAY
-67)X7053' PPYARD PEvC:EMER COND VALVE h CORE SPRAY
'68)PPYARD PEmC:EMER COND MU & CORE SPRAY
'69)PPYARD M100.UPS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS
'PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU 70)PPYARD PS6362ND PEmR EMER COND MU & RDS 71)PPYARD RDSCV2ND PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS 72)PPYARD TOOLCRIB PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU 73)PPYARD UPS2ND PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS PUEm UPS & EMER COND MU 74)PPSWCW PF:
FIRE' PUMPS 75)ISOSCRAM PPYARD PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 76)ISOSCRAM -PPSWCW PIF: MSIV &-FIRE PUMPS 77)ECSHELL PPSWCW PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS 78)MO7053 PPSWCW PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS
- LOCA 0.220g **
- 79) CRANE 75T.
LLpr POST INCIDENT LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY
- -LOSP 0.22Og **
80)XECSHELL CRANE 75T PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY 81)X7053 CRANE 75T PEvC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY
- 82) CRANE 75T PEvLp:EMER COND VALVE & POST INC PEmLp:EMER COND MU & POST INC PEmC:EMER.COND MU L CORE SPRAY 83)ISOSCRAM CRANE 75T PILp:MSIV L. POST INCIDENT PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 84)M100.UPS CRANE 75T PEvu:EMER COND VALVE & UPS PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU
_85)TOOLCRIB. CRANE 75T PEvu:EMER COND VALVE'& UPS PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS PUEm UPS & EMER COND MU 86)UPS2ND CRANE 75T PEvU:EMER COND VALVE & UPS PEvR:EMER COND VALVE-& RDS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU
f 160 L
1906E_ Vill:1
- 87) CRANE 75T PS6362ND PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS
- 88) CRANE 75T RDSCV2ND PEvR:EMER COND VALVE & RDS PEmR:EMER COND MU & RDS i
- 89) CRANE 75T PPSWCW PEvF!EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS
- LOCA 0.250g **
90)PMO7 PM06 LLp: POST INCIDENT LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY LR:
RDS 91)PPSCNH-LLp: POST INCIDENT LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY LR:
RDS 92)VPI301 PP03 LLp: POST INCIDENT 93)VPI301 PPO4 LLp: POST INCIDENT 94)PP03 LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 95)PPO4 LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 96)PMO7 TOOLCRIB LC:
CORE SPRAY LE:
ENCLOSURE SPRAY 97)UPS2ND PM07 LC:
- LOSP 0.250g **
98)M100.UPS PM07 PM06 PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 99)M100.UPS PPSCNH PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 100)TOOLCRIB PM07 PM06 PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 101)TOOLCRIB PPSCNH PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 102)UPS2ND PM07 PM06 PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 103)UPS2ND PPSCNH PUF: UPS & FIRE PUMPS 104)VPI301 PP3W4W XECSHELL PEvLp:EMER COND VALVE & POST INC 105)VPI301 PP3W4W X7053 PEvLp:EMER COND VALVE & POST INC 106)ISOSCRAM VPI301 PP3W4W PILp:MSIV & POST INCIDENT PIC: MSIV & CORE SPRAY 107)VPI301 PP3W4W PEmLp:EMER COND MU & POST INC FEmC:EMER COND VALVE & CORE SPRAY 108)PPO3 VPIC01 M100.UPS
"' PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU 109)PP03 VPI301 TOOLCRIB PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU 110)PP03 VPI301 UPS2ND PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU 111)PPO4 VPIC01 M100.UPS PUEm:UPS & CMER COND MU
x a
161 m
I ISBLE_Y111;1 112)PPO4' VPI301 TOOLCRIB PUEm:UPS-& EMER COND MU 113)PPO4 VPI301 UPS2ND PUEm:UPS & EMER COND MU
' :114 ) PMO7 -
PMO6
-PF:
FIRE PUMPS 115)PPSCNH PF:
FIRE PUMPS
' L 117)ISOSCR4M~PPSCNH",
PMO6 PIF MSIV & FIRE PUMPS 116)ISOSCRAM PMO7 PIF: MSIV & FIRE PUMPS 118) CRANE 75T PMO7 PMO6 PEvF:EMER COND VALVEL& FIRE PUMPS
.119) CRANE 75T PPSCNH' PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS 120)ECSHELL PMO7 PMO6 PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS 121)ECSHELL.PPSCNH PEvF:EMER COND. VALVE & FIRE PUMPS 122)MO7053' PMO7 PMO6 PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS 123)MO7053-PPSCNH PEvF:EMER COND VALVE & FIRE PUMPS
- LTC O.250'g **
124)CV4090 M100.UPS PUY: UPS & CRD PYR: CRD & RDS
~125)CV4090 TOOLCRIB PUY: UPS & CRD PYR: CRD & RDS 126)CV4090 UPS2ND PUY: UPS & CRD PYR: CRD & RDS 127)PPCRD3 M100.UPS PUY: UPS & CRD
~ 125)PPCRD3-TOOLCRIB PUY: UPS & CRD 129)PPCRD3 UPS2ND PUY: UPS & CRD 130)PPCRD4 M100.UPS PUY:~UPS & CRD 131)PPCRD4 TOOLCRIB PUY: UPS & CRD 132)PPCRD4 UPS2ND PUY: UPS & CRD 133)CV4090 CRANE 75T PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT PYC: CRD & CORE' SPRAY
'134)CV4090 VPI301 M19,20 PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT 135)CV4090 VPI301 PP3W4W PYLp:CRD L POST INCIDENT PYC: CRD L CORE SPRAY ~
136)PPCRD3 CRANE 75T PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT 137)PPCRD3 VPI301 M19,20 PYLp:CRD & POSTLINCIDENT 138)PPCRD3 VPI301 PP3W4W PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT 139)PPCRD4-CRANE 75T PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT 140)PPCRD4-
.VPI301 M19,20 PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT
- 141) PPCRD4 VPI301 PP3W4W PYLp:CRD & POST INCIDENT 142)CV4090-CRANE 3T X7051 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY
- 143)CV4090 VPI301 M19,21 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 144)CV4090 PPYARD.
PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 145)CV4090 X7070 A7051 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 146)XPPCRD CRANE 3T X7051 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 147)XPPCRD CRANE 75T PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY' 148)XPPCRD M19,21 VPI301 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 149)XPPCRD PPYARD-PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY
162 i'
10BLE_VIII:1 150)XPPCRD PP3W4W VPI301 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 151)XPPCRD X7051 X7071 PYC: CRD & CORE SPRAY 152)CV4090 PS6362ND PYR: CRD & RDS 153)CV4090 RDSCV2ND PYR: CRD & RDS 154)XPPCRD" - M100.UPS PYR: CRD & RDS 155)XPPCRD PS6362ND PYR: CRD & RDS 156)XPPCRD RDSCV2ND PYR: CRD & RDS 157)XPPCRD TOOLCRIB PYR: CRD & RDS 158)XPPCRD UPS2ND PYR: CRD & RDS
l 163 ISELE_V111:2 THIS LIST SUMMARIZES THE " WEAK-LINKS" THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN ORDER TO RAISE THE GROUND ACCELERATION AT WHICH CORE DAMAGE IS ASSUMED TO OCCUR.ALSO INCLUDED ARE SOME PROPOSED " FIXES" FOR THESE " WEAK-LINKS".THE PROPOSED FIXES FOR 0.000g ITEMS WILL BE UNDETAKEN.FOR THE ITEMS ABOVE 0.00g THE PROPOSED FIXES ARE FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION ONLY.
WEGE:LINE E1X1ESL o.0g TOOLCRIB 1.
PROVIDE TIP PREVENTION FOR CABINETS MOTOR OPERATED VALVES 1.
INSTALL IMPACT BUMPERS TO REDUCE 7051,7061,7053, JARRING OF MOTOR OPERATORS,OR MODIFY 7063,7070,7071 HAND RAILS TO REDUCE INTEP'ERENCE CRANE 3T 1.
RESTRICT MOVEMENT OF CRANE OVER MO7064 AND MO7068.(THIS FIX ALSO ELIMINATES THE CRANE FROM TAKING OUT THE CABLES FOR MO7070 & MO7071).A REMOVABLE STOP IS ACCEPTABLE FS6362ND 1.
STRUCTURALLY UPGRADE THE SUPPORT OF THE COLUMN IN THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM (A PROPOSED MODIFICATION HAS BEEN SUBMITTED)
'1 ISOSCRAM 1.
ALTHOUGH A PATHWAY IS AVAILABLE TO REACH 0.200G WITHOUT LOOKING AT THESE RELAYS THE PREFERRED PATH WOULD INCLUDE THIS ITEM IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRIMARY SYSTEM INTEGRITY.
FROM THE SCHEMATIC,THESE RELAYS ONLY CLOSE THE MSIV ON LOSS OF STATION POWER,HOWEVER WHAT HAPPENS IF STATION POWER IS NOT LOST DURING THE EARTHQUAKE 7(FOR FUTURE EVALUATION)
PBSHIELD 1.
PREVENT THE LEAD SHIELD FROM SWINGING INTO PT-174 PS636/PS7064 1.
RELOACTE THESE PRESSURE SWITCHES 0.1g AND GREATER VPI301 1.
ANALY7E THE EFFECT OF FLOW DIVERSION ON THE CORE AND ENCLOSURE SPRAY SYSTEMS 2.
PROVIDE FOR PERIODIC LEAK TESTING OF CHECK VALVES VPI301 AND 302
1%
IAhE_ Vill:2 M100.CO,M100.21 1.
ANALYZE THE EFFECT OF FLOW DIVERSION ON THE CORE AND ENCLOSURE SPRAY SYSTEMS 2.
REINFORCE THE BLOCK WALLS ECSHELL 1.
IMPROVE EMERGENCY CONDENSER SUPPORTS / ANCHORAGE UPS2ND 1.
THIS WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THE VALUE OF THE WEAKEST UPS ROOM WALL (0.160g)
BUT WAS ASSIGNED A VALUE OF 0.100g, THEREFORE SEE THE PROPOSED FIX FOR M100.UPS M100.19 1.
STRUCTURALLY REINFORCE THE NORTH BLOCK WALL IN THE STATION POWER ROOM 2.
RELOCATE THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AND CABLES TO A MORE SUITABLE LOCATION PPO5,PPO6 1.
IMPROVE BASKET STRAINERS, THREADED AND VITROLIC (PPST6C)
COUPLED FIRE PIPING IN THE TURBINE BUILDING M100.UPS 1.
STRUCTURALLY UPGRADE BLOCK WALLS 12 34 13 IN THE (M100.13)
UPS BATTERY ROOMS 2.
RELOCATE THE UPS BATTERIES PPSWCW 1.
DETAILED EVALUATION OF CICULATION WATER PIPING CAPACITY PPYARD 1.
MODIFICATION ALLOWING BYPASS OF YARD PIPING WITH FIRE HOSE CRANE 75T 1.
MODIFICATION STRUCTURALLY UPGRADING THE CRANE PMO6 t< PMO7 1.
ANALYZE THE RESPONSE OF THE FIRE PUMPS 3 PPSCNHS 1.
ANALYZE THE RESFONSE OF THE SCREENHOUSE FIRE PIPING PPO3 1.
ANALYZE THE WELDED FIRE PIPING IN THE PIPE TUNNEL PPO4 1.
ANALYZE THE WELDED CORE SPRAY PIPING IN THE TURBINE BUILDING CV4090 1.
ANALYZE THE RESPONSE OF CRD PUMP SUCTION VALVE CV4090 PPCRD 1.
ANALYZE THE RESPONSE OF CRD PIPING IN THE CONDENSATE PUMP ROOM AND PIPE TUNNEL
_ _ _ _. - - _ _..