ML20137A237
| ML20137A237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1985 |
| From: | NRC - ADVISORY PANEL FOR DECONTAMINATION OF TMI UNIT 2 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NACTMI, NUDOCS 8601140249 | |
| Download: ML20137A237 (237) | |
Text
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O UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OR'GINAL IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO: 1 ADVISORY PANEL ON THE M"O2d DECONTAMINATION OF TMI UNIT 2 O
LOCATION: HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA PAGES: 1- 160 DATE: THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985 yo lggj gss Y
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ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
th~ Official Reporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700 NATIONWICE COVERACE l J
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UNI 1:ED STATES- =i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY PANEL ON THE N-020 I DECONTAMINATION OF TMI i UNIT 2 i
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LOCATION: HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA PAGES: 1- 160 DATE: TRURSDAY, UECE'4BER 12, 19859-Y'kYNND h I)O I I $ D b $ $ l0 T
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, LNC. l O
% Official Reporters l 444 North Capitol Street 5 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347 3700 NATIONWICE COVERACE
1 CR25283.0 1 FIELD /sjg I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ADVISORY PANEL ON 4
THE DECONTAMINATION OF TMI UNIT 2 5 Holiday Inn 23 South Second Street 6 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania ,
7 Thursday, December 12, 1985 .
l 8
The meeting of the Advisory Panel convened at 7:00 p.m.,
t 9 Joel Roth presiding.
1C -
PANEL MEMEBERS PRESENT:
11 '
- MIKE MASNIK
!' TOM GERUSKY
() 13 l- TOM SMITHGALL .
i Lt JOEL ROTH l
$ JOE DiNUNNO g, ELIZABETH MARSHALL NEAL WALD sf GORDON ROBINSON 18 ,
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2-3 l1 1 MR. ROTH: Good evening, ladies and
)
2 gentlemen. To those of you who generally attend 3 the meetings, you will notice I am not Chairman 4 Morris. He was not able to be here to night.
5 The opening will be remarks by me. Joe 4
6 DiNunno, who attended a meeting of the panel last 7 month, will go over what was discussed.
8 Then GPU will have a presentation on the 9 status of defueling; and following that, we will 10 have public comment on anything that has occurred 11 prior.
12 Then we will have a break; and then we (g
~
U 13 will go straight to the Aamodt's presentation, 14 which, basically, we have programmed for two 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
16 Then there will be public comment 17 following their presentation.
i 18 A VOICE: I am very fed up. The last 19 time you said it would be fair; you would give us t
20 the opportunity to go first. And it really 21 disturbs me greatly that I rushed to get here 22 tonight.
23 MR. ROTH: You made that clear. And now
- i 24 can we continue?
25 There was a meeting November 19 with the f
1 i )
4 1 Commissioners. I was not there; but Joe DiNunno,
.{'{]}
2 a panel member, has said he will at least fill you 3 in on what occurred.
4 MR. DI NUNNO: There were a number of 5 matters discussed. And I think in some way there 6 were two rather substantive things that came out 7 of the discussion.
8 one, if you recall, this panel has heard 9 presentations on the subject of criticality, the 10 actual monitoring of the fuel removal to make 11 certain that criticality does not occur.
12 The. operations right now are being
~
13 controlled by concentrations of boron, which are 14 kept in the cooler water to make certain that the 15 criticality does not occur. This subject came up 16 again.
17 The outcome, in any case, was general 18 acceptance of all the analyses; and all the people 19 have looked at this. Their determination was that 20 this appears to be safe and very conservative.
21 Since the Commission has an advisory 22 panel with expertise in this area, it was decided 23 they would refer this to the Committee of Reactor
.' o 24 Safeguards to take a look ut it as an independent 25 unit. And as I understand, this is now being set 1
= _ _
i 5
l up, and I think Mr. Travers can comment on that a
-(} 1 2 little later. !
3 There was reaffirmation of the concept 4 that this panel, indeed, should serve as a conduit 5 of information dealing with radiation effects.
i
. 6 Again, a reaffirmation, if you will, 7 that we are not a review body in terms of
- 8 independently trying to assess the presentations 9 made before the group but rather as a conduit for i
10 seeing that that type of information is delivered 11 to those who are studying these problems and to 12 you the members of the public who are interested
, D.
13 in hearing it. So that was another matter that 14 was brought up and discussed again.
15 The subject of delays in the schedule 16 was mentioned as a potential concern; the fact
! 17 that the removal of fuel in the process associated 18 with it seemed to have encountered some delays 19 beyond that which had been predicted. This 20 brought up the question again of whether the 21 Commission should mandate some sort of schedule l
22 for this operation.
! 23 The idea of a schedule was not one which
( 24 anyone during the discussion really advocated 25 particularly, but it still left an uneasiness that
6 the program should be kept on as expedited a r))} l 2 schedule as seemed to be reasonable to achieve.
3 The concept of due diligence came up.
4 The Commission did recognize the fact that GPU had 5 a responsibility to all of us and to themselves to 6 see that this cleanup process did proceed with due 7 diligence.
8 The question of what represents due 9 diligence is a rather vague one; but the idea was 10 a constant surveillance of what was going on at 11 the site should be made, particularly on the part 12 of the regulatory staff, to act as the eyes and
_O 13 the ears for the commission to make certain that 14 GPU was doing everything that seemed reasonable to 15 keep the cleaning up of the plant on schedule.
16 They made, as a result of the meeting, a 17 chart. And the group here representing the 18 Commission is to report back to you on this 19 subject, wheth?r due diligence in their view is 20 being exercised on the part of the plan.
21 Those were the three rather significant 22 things that came out of the meeting.
23 MR. ROTH: Any other panel member wish
( 24 to make a comment?
I 25 (No comment.)
1 I
7 1 MR. ROTH: I have a few questions. And
)
2 the first is the status of the polar crane 3 enforcement.
4 MR. TRAVERS: The staff has completed 5 the action on both, and the latest one involving 6 the hand brake mechanism and has sent a proposed 7 enforcement paper to the Commission.
8 When they will complete their review, I 9 can't say; but on December 4 Bill Dircks signed a 10 Commission paper that sent up the staff's view on 11 that.
12 MR. ROTH: But no time frame at the CD 13 present time?
14 MR. TRAVERS: Normally they are asked to 15 act within a reasonable time, but they never seem 16 to accomplish that.
17 MR. ROTH: Can you fill us in on the 18 replacement status of Mayor Reed from Middletown?
'3 19 MR. TRAVERS: We have proposed, after 20 consulting with Chairman Morris, a name to the 21 Commission. And Chairman Paladino is circulating 22 that name among the five Commissioners. I expect 23 we will hear comething in a week or two on that.
k 24 MR. ROTH: The third issue would be j 25 harassment or alleged harassment of Mr. Parks.
8
( 1 And the licensee I think has appealed that. Is 2 that true? 3 MR. TRAVERS: Yes. The NRC issued a . 4 proposed notice of violation on October 12, 1985. 5 The licensee responded on October 21, 1985. The 6 staff is. currently reviewing the licensee's 7 response. We expect to complete that review by 8 Jane Axelrad's group by the first of the year and ! 9 send up to the Commission a recommendation on i 10 whether or not to hold firm on the proposed 11 penalty, reduce it, or negate it. l 12 MR. ROTH: Do you remember what that 13 penalty was? 14 MR. TRAVERS: 864,000. a 15 MR. ROTH: Are there any questions 16 towards Bill? 17 (No response.) i 18 MR. TRAVERS: A couple of things I might 19 note while I have the opportunity. 20 The NRC staff learned recently that 21 there are going to be some high-level changes in 22 the Commission. Chairman Paladino has announced 23 when his term expires June 30 of next year, he .(), 24 will leave Government service. , 25 The other high-level change that will
\
9 i 1 occur sometime in the spring is that Bill Dircks, ({ ) 2 the Executive Director of Operations, announced he 3 will retire from Federal service in the spring. 4 In response to a couple of things that 5 Mr. DiNunno had made mention of, the staff has G arranged to speak before the ACRS concerning the 7 criticality issue. The full ACRS is scheduled for i 8 either the 13th or 14th of February of next year. 4 9 MR. ROTH: And your appointment? 10 MR. TRAVERS: Lastly, I have been
; 11 appointed, and I think we have communicated that 12 or Mike has to the panel, to replace Bernie (D,
13 Snyder, who when he was director, sat in Bethesda. 14 I will continue to sit up here at the 15 site, a natural evolution of shifting the program t 16 office to the site. i 17 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 recently underwent the organizational 19 restructuring that Frank Morale had mentioned. 20 The office is now the Three Mile Island Cleanup 1 21 Project Director. 22 Essentially, we are the same group; and 23 we have representatives in Bethesda to help us get ( 24 coordinated with the other technical staff. We 25 needed to do this to support our regulatory (
10 1 oversight at the plant. ({ } 2 MR. ROTH: Thank you. 3 Any further questions or discussion? 4 (No response.) 5 MR. ROTH: The defueling presentation. i 6 Is that roughly a half hour? j 7 MR. STANDERFER: It won't even be a half 8 hour long. ! l 9 What I have is a diagram of the schedule 10 and a short video tape of six or seven minutes, a 11 video tape of the work in the vessel. 4 12 I have been asked throughout the year (,()
- 13 concerning funding from EEI. As of this week, we 14 have received $27.5 million this year. That 15 exceeds the $25 million annual commitments so they 16 are running ahead of their contributions.
17 What I have here is a diagram of the 18 defueling activities to date and projecting ahead 19 for the next two months or three months. i
- 20 The start of defueling operations was on 21 October 30. We made two entries on the 30th and
! 22 31st to rearrange some of the equipment in the 23 vessel to allow the installation of some of the (en-s 24 defueling equipment that was installed in this 25 period here.
i 11 Again, more work to adjust parts of the ({]} l 2 damaged core and to adjust parts of the defueling 3 equipment. And in this period here, the system to 4 transfer fuel from inside the reactor vessel to 5 the outside storage pool was finally tested. And 6 again, the approval to start actually loading fuel 7 was obtained on the 12th of November. 8 For that week we loaded some fuel; but 9 we found that the fuel elements that had fallen
; 10 over the debris bed were a tangle, which made it i
11 difficult getting our tools in. ,. 12 So at the end of the week, we decided to 13 take a three week period to go in and cut off the 14 fuel element pins that were sticking up. In other 15 words, cut the grass before we started raking the 16 grass, if you want to look at it this way. 17 That was done during this period, 18 interrupted by a change in the hydraulic oil in 19 this period. And we didn't work over the 20 Thanksgiving holidays. And we were wearing 21 respirators during the month of October, and it 22- did limit the time that they could work. l 23 This was done as a precaution until we 1 (h 24 could determine that we didn't have an airborne 25 problem. And throughout the month, we found it l . . . .-- - . . -. . . - - - _ _ -
12 1 was not needed to wear the respirators. They were {} 2 no longer used after November. 3 This allowed longer periods of time, 4 work periods. We were making two approximately 5 four-hour entries per day over the month of 6 November. We have now started to make three 0 7 four-hour entries per day this week. 8 We are evaluating the ability, as we 9 nove into production, to go to four, four-hour 10 entries. The support activities are open on a 11 24-hour-a-day basis. The night shift makes 12 preparations for the next day's shift. A number
.D 13 of maintenance activities that are incompatible 14 with defueling are done on the night shift.
15 This week we started to load fuel again. 16 On Monday we assembled in a pile all the material 17 we thought we could load into canisters. On 18 Tuesday we loaded the first canister. That is the 19 last day shown on this chart. 20 On Wednesday we had one four-hour entry; 21 and then we had equipment problems we had to 22 correct. Today we are operating about 11 hours in 23 containment. b 24 As a matter of fact, the third shift is 25 in today; and they wc*e loading the third fuel
13 canister, and that was practically loaded when I
-]} 1 2 left work today.
3 We will continue to load those end 4 fittings through this week and next week. Then 5 during Christmas week, we have scheduled < geriod 6 for performing a number of inspections and 7 sampling. 8 One is to get further video inspection 9 of the bottom of the reactor vessel under the core 10 support assembly. There are a number of samples 4 11 we have to take, and we have scheduled no 12 defueling during that week. c0 13 The last two days of December and the 14 first two days of January, the New Year week, we 15 will be operating the defueling vacuum system for i 16 the first time to ensure it works properly. We 17 then project a nine week period through the first 18 week of March where we will load fuel canisters to 19 remove the debris pile down to what we call the t 20 hard layer. 21 At that point in time the Department of 22 Energy has a special sampler which has been 23 delivered to the site and is set up in the turbine ( 24 building (phonetic). It will be installed in the l l 25 vessel, and that will allow drilling of samples
14 1 from what we call "the unknown portion of the ({]) 2 core." 3 That also has the ability to drill a 4 number of holes, which will aid in our future 5 defueling. This is a makeable schedule, but 6 optimistic. 7 On the first of January we will 8 re-evaluate this date. I believe that is 9- makeable. It may be a month later, but we are 10 talking in the March time frame to complete this 11 phase and turn the platform over for the sampling, 12 which is a month's period. ' V:_ 13 I will be glad to answer any questions i 14 on that, and then I will show the video tape. l 15 MR. DI NUNNO: Are you running at I 16 radiation levels for the worker at what you had 17 projected? 18 MR. STANDERFER: Lower. The avetage 19 radiation exposure per hour on the work platform i 20 has varied from as low as seven and a half to 21 eleven with an average of nine MR per hour. And l 22 that is lower than the 15 MR allowed by ' 23 regulation. - r0 ss 24 With the exposure running less than 10 , 25 MR per hour, we see no problem with radiation
. - . ~ r _ _ , , . _ _ _ . _ . , _ _ , . . _ _ _ . , , _ _ . - __,, . . - . _ , - _
l 15 l 1 exposure to delay the work. r] } l 2 MR. DI NUNNO: Is that the reason why 3 you are able to work more hours? 4 MR. STANDERFER: No. We have two crews. 5 They began with -- incidentally, we 6 train on Sunday. Normally, we train on Sunday and 7 work six days straight. So it is a seven-day work 8 period. . 9 They were entering the building, each 10 crew entering the building once and then doing 11 some other training during the other half of the 12 day. This week we started with Crew A enteting h, 13 first, Crew B entering, and then Crew A entering 14 again. Then we would switch that to where Crew B 15 would make two entries and Crew A would make one
- 16 entry. As we get more skilled, we may be able to
- 17 have each crew make two entries per day, for a 18 total of 12 hours.
19 What we found this week is while fresh, 20 the first four-hour entry goes well. During the 21 second four-hour entry, the crew is a little 22 fatigued. We may have to change that to a 23 three-hour entry, k 24 We are determining what is a practical 25 workday for the workers.
l l 16 ((} .l . MR. DI NUNNO: Are you seeing any change 2 in the radiation level as a function of moving the 3 fuel around? 4 MR. STANDERFER: No change. 5 As we move canisters'out, there will be 6 periods when the radiation is higher. 7 MR. ROBINSON: How many members in the 8 crew? 9 MR. STANDERFER: We started with eight 10 members in the crew early in the defueling. That 11 included five defuelers and one of the licensed
.. 12 operators, who wouldn't be there, and an engineer
~
13 and a radiation specialist. Now we are down to - 14 four members in a crew. 15 You can only work one or two tools at 16 one time, so four is a good-sized crew. And a 17 radiation specialist is in there part of the time. t 18 MR. WALD: Can you -- what becomes of 19 the canister once you fill one? 20 MR. STANDERFER: There is a holder in 21 there that holds five canisters. When five 22 canisters are filled, the operation is stopped. 23 We rotate the platform back to a neutral ( 24 position. We have a machine that then can lift 25 that canister up into shielding in the air and j i
17 l move it over to the deep canal in containment and ('{ } 2 puts it into that canal water. 3 From there, there is the normal fuel 4 transfer equipment which lays it down, passes it 5 through two block valves in the containment wall 6 into the fuel storage cooler on the other side of 7 the wall outside of containment. 8 Then it is lifted up by a similar 9 machine and moved to one of the fuel storage 10 positions in the fuel storage pool. We are now 11 projecting April, early May to be able to make the 12 first shipment. CD 13 The Department of Energy will be making 14 their -- the shipping casks are practically done, 15 and we will be doing an integrated test with their 16 shipping casks with our loading equipment. That 17 is where that stands. 18 MR. ROTH: I have a question pertaining 19 to your on target of the defueling. Basically, 20 there was a certain amount of slippage from July 21 to October? 22 MR. STANDERFER: Yes. I 23 MR. ROTH: Now, after approximately one ( 24 and a half months of activity, do you see still 25 the 18 months as a realistic time? l
18 1 MR , STAND ERF ER : The July date was a
' {])
2 target; and then we put together the schedule that 3 said September 10. And the delay from beptember 4 10 to the end of October was because of delivery 5 from one supplier. We had defueling would take 12 6 to 18 months. With the experience to date, I am 7 now believing the 18 months rather than the 12 8 months. 9 In March we will have unloaded between 10 20 and 25 percent of the core by weight. So that 11 would be over a defueling period of about three
- 12 months loading -- unloading about a quarter of the b..L 13 core. Now, some of this work will go a little 14 faster than some of the later work, possibly.
15 We also will demonstrate sometime in 16 this period the ability to vacuum the material 17 from the bottom of the reactor vessel. And I 18 believe that is largely vacuumable. And if that 19 is true, that will go fairly readily also. Then 20 the question is how difficult will it be to unload l l 21 this area which is unknown to us? 22 But I currently project finishing the 23 defueling in the first or second quarter of '87, 1 24 which is the 18 months side of the 12 to 18 l l 25 months.
19 ({}
^
1 MR. ROTH: And if you see a change in 2 that, I would assume everyb.ody would be informed? 3 MR. STANDERFER: I will update you on I 4 this basis at each meeting. I t 5 MR. ROTH: Any other questions? ! 6 (No response.) i 7 MR. STANDERFER: I would like to show a [ 8 short video tape. It is not narrated, but I will ; 9 make a few comments.
- 10 (Film running.)
11 MR. STANDERFER: Again, First Activities [ 12 On The Work Platform. You can see this is the (32) that they are working through. i 13 slot wherm -- . 14 There are two cranes on the work platform, and you [ 15 can see the men. In this case it in in November i 16 and they are in respirators. l \ 17 Again, this is one of the long-handled 18 tools being adjusted. And we have put handles on , i f 19 these tools like submarine telescopes. And there i 20 have been upgradings to make the tools easy to use ! l 21 and more efficient. 22 Now, this is looking down to the core. !
- 23 This i= one of the end fittings; and this is a
( 24 hook tool that you can lift such a fitting with. 25 Again, some fuel pins and end fittings.
20 l This is a spider element. This.is an end fitting ({}} 2 that was pulled loose from a number of pins that 3 were loosely connected. And there is one pin left 4 hanging from it, and that will break off in a 5 minute. 6 PANEL MEMBER: What is the maximum 7 height? 8 MR. STANDERFER: Full fuel elements l 9 would have to be cut in half. 10 Here is -- this will twist off in a 11 minute. Again, another end fitting. 12 These are the same pictures that the J.:) - 13 operators actually see as they are operating. 14 This is a vice grips tool holding a pin, and we 15 will drop this pin into the fuel container. This 16 is a funnel to the fuel container. I j 17 Normally, we are going to load the pins 18 into a side-loading degree bucket; and they will 19 be loaded as a package rather than being loaded 20 individually like this. But we were checking out 21 all of the tools at this time. 22 Again, the top of a fuel canister. And 23 this is a funnel that is put on top of the fuel i 24 canister, which is removed when a lid is put on 25 and an end fitting will be loaded in. :
21 1 It starts a little crooked, and it is (}]} 2 straightened and actually pushed in because this 3 funnel has a little smaller internal dimension 4 than the fuel can it fits on. 5 MR. DI NUNNO: What is the dimension of 6 the end fitting? 7 MR. STANDERPER: Eight and a half inch 8 square, and it weighs about 25 pounds. 9 At this point we have decided rather 10 than to unsuccessfully unload those, we will go in 11 with our large cutters and begin cutting the pins.
, 12 And you see the cutters are cutting pins. There 13 are a couple of shots.
14 This is a similar kind of tool that the 15 firemen use to cut into cars. And you see the -3 16 cutting of the fuel pins, and that operation went 17 on for about three weeks. 18 The material that is being cut is fairly [ r 19 hard, and we have had to replace jaws on the i 20 cutters. We have successfully done that and i 21 successfully repaired tools. So we have had no l 22 problems with these tools so far. l 4 23 That was from a camera -- that last shot ! (] 24 was from a camera mounted on the tool. We have 25 gone to mounting the camera right on the tool so j
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22 we could do it with one operator. Before we had (}}) 1 2 two operators, one with the tool and one with the 3 camera. 4 Now, again, these are some shots panning 5 over the debris bed after we had pretty well 6 completed cutting the pins. This was taken the 7 end of last week and is the condition we are now 8 starting to load fuel from. That is the film. 9 MR. ROTH: Does the panel have any 10 questions? 11 MR. GERUSKY: What are the contamination 12 levels on the tools after you are finished
\J 13 cutting?
14 MR. STANDERFER: The cutting tool there 15 read about 1 R per hour at a foot, and at fairly 16 high beta levels. 17 Now, that is not so high that you can't 18 actually make minor adjustments at arm's length. 19 The beta levels, of course, would cause, if you 20 weren't properly gloved, would cause beta smears, 21 but not so high as we can't handle. l 22 We are installing a new station in 23 containment, and that will further shield the ( 24 maintenance operation. So they will be reaching l l 25 into a water bath. 1
23 r{} 1 MR. G ERUS KY : You mentioned earlier 2 that -- I believe you said that the dose rate on
- 3 the top was 10 MR per hour. What is the exposure 4 of the personnel?
5 MR. STANDERFER: That is average 6 exposure. That includes entry into the defueling 7 platform and exit, plus the work on the platform. 8 You read the individuals; and at the end of four 9 hours, all four or eight of them, you add them up 10 and divide it by the hours and get an average 11 exposure per hour per person. l I 12 MR. GERUSKY: What is the highest? 13 MR. STANDERFER: One day an average of 14 11.3, a few days over 10, but mostly 8 and 9. 15 MR. GERUSKY: What is the highest 16 individual exposure now? 17 MR. STANDERFER: I would guess 600 or 18 700 MR on the highest worker. These workers will 19 end up working this task once every six weeks. It 20 is a rotating shift. 21 MR. GERUSKY: One rem per quarter? 22 MR. STANDERFER: Yes. Although the NRC 23 limit would be 3, but the company operates with a () 24 limit of I rem. l 25 MR. ROTH: Are there any members of the l _ _ _ - .. ~. . . , . - - _ _ _ - . - _ - . - _ _ _ - - -___- --. ._. _. . _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ .
24 1 public who would like to ask a question? (} 2 FRANCINE TAYLOR: How high was the beta? l i
. 3 MR. STANDERFER: I would have to get 4 that number. It was about five rad per hour, a 5 beta reading on the surface of the metal.
6 Remember these tools are actually 7 manipulating and cutting fuel. 8 MILDRED STREAMr I would like to note, 9 is krypton being released every day; and if so, 10 how high? 11 MR. STANDERFER: We noticed no krypton 12 releases; although, I would expect there are small .D 13 amounts of krypton being released. But it is not 14 high enough. 15 I would expect thete are minute amounts l 16 of krypton present during this operation. 17 MILDRED STREAM: Is there 131 iodine? 18 MR. STANDERFER: 131 iodine has a half 19 life of eight days, so that was all gone about 20 three or four months after the accident. 21 We currently have principally Strontium 22 90 and Cesium. That is all contained down in the i 23 water. l ( 24 AL MANIK: If I understood correctly, 25 the shipments will take place in April or May? l r
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25
'; ]) 1 MR. STANDERFER: I believe the equipment 2 will be ready to begin the shipping in the late 3 spring.
4 AL MANIK: Can we have a discussion on 5 the shipment before it is shipped and not after it 6 is shipped? Is that agreeable with the panel? 7 MR. ROTH: If you want to stick around 8 until 10:12 tonight, we will be discussing our 9 future agenda. 10 AL MANIK: I will stick around. 11 MR. ROTH: Any questions? 12 MR. SMITHGALL: I guess I missed the 13 defueling update. But I guess my question was the 14 one I had in Lancaster. How successful are you 15 with your loading operation? 16 MR. STANDERFER: As I summarized, the 17 first month was one of learning how to use the 18 tools, operating in respirato.s that we are now l 19' out of. 20 We had a number of problems with the 21 clutter and the tangle that was there. We stopped 22 trying to load fuel for about three weeks and went
- 23 into an operation of cutting fuel and trying to
( 24 essentially mow the grass so we could rake the l 25 grass.
26 We started loading fuel again this week.
!{ ) 1 2 On Monday we assembled a pile of material that we 3 believe we could load. On Tuesday we loaded one 4 canister. On Wednesday we had equipment problems 5 that limited the entry to 4 hours rather than the 6 12-hour entries. And as I left tonight, they were 7 loading the second canister.
8 So once we had sized material and cut 9 down material, we found that we can load the 10 material as we expected. 11 MR. SMITHGALL: How full are you loading 12 the canisters? V> 13 MR. STANDERFER: To the top. 14 MR, SMITHGALL: You are not having 15 problems taking irregular pieces and placing them N 16 in long cylindrical canisters? No problem filling l 17 them up? i 18 MR. STANDERFER: No. Although the one 19 loaded Tuesday was all end fittings. So that l 20 total canister had a couple of hundred pounds. 21 MR. SMITHGALL: You do project now 22 seeing the need to have more canisters because of 23 not being able to load them fully, therefore, I ( 24 having more shipments? l t l 25 MR. STANDERFER: We are currently
27 1 projecting 280 canisters. I can't really answer ({]) 2 your question until we get more experience in, 3 say, January or February as to the packing 4 density. 5 MR. SMITHGALL: I guess my question is, 6 When you get to the area you are not familiar with 7 and you have to cut material apart, as you started 8 to do, you don't get nice neat packages that you 9 can stack neatly into the configuration of your 10 canisters. 11 And therefore, the amount of canisters 12 you will need will change a little bit and you 13 will need more shipments down the road. 14 MR. STANDERFER: That would possibly 15 happen. And we could come under the 280 also. 16 There is some room for lower loaded canisters. 17 There is pressure on us from the 1 18 Department of Energy side. The fuel pool they 19 have allocated for this work, they have allocated 20 us enough space on 280 canisters. They can i 21 accommodate more, but they would rather not.
- 22 So they will also be keeping the i
l 23 pressure on us to try and load to maximum density. 24 MR. ROTH: Any other questions? 25 (No response.) l 1
28 l KAY PICKERING: I have concerns about ({'} 1 2 the water that is used in the different processes. 3 I could see there that everything that 4 was done there is under water. 5 MR. STANDERFER: Yes. 6 KAY PICKERING: Could you just briefly 4 7 tell us what the circulation plan for that water 8 is, and then also what other water is being used? 9 MR. STANDERFER: The defueling will use 10 three different water compartments. There is the 11 water in the reactor vessel itself; that in the 12 deep end of the pool in containment; and that in
.O ~
13 the A fuel storage pool in the fuel storage 14 building. 15 All these waters are borated to 5 16 million parts to prevent criticality. Each of 17 those systems have connections to a purification 18 system, which we can filter that water and put it 19 through ion exchangers. 20 KAY PICKERING: Separate water, or are 21 they the same? 22 MR. STANDERFER: There is -- the filters 23 are in separate locations. The ion exchangers are ( 24 pcrt of a new system which is installed. And 25 water is piped out to that ion exchanger and piped
, _ _ _ . . - __ - . . . _ - , . . . , - . . . . - _ _ . . ~ . _ - - , - , - - - . . . - _ . , - . . - . , _ - , - - -
l l 29 1- back. ' ((~} 2 Then we have the regular SDS System that 3 was installed several years ago. And this water 4 can also be piped to the SDS System. 5 KAY PICKERING: So the water is reused? 6 MR. STANDERFER: And we wouldn't be 7 processing it any more than necessary, because i ! 8 that takes time and uses up materials and requires 9 additional waste disposal steps. So it will be 10 processed as necessary. 11 The visibility is much better than they 12 thought it would be; so we haven't had to filter LO 13 the water as frequently as we originally thought.- 14 KAY PICKERING: That is one of the 15 determinations on how frequently you filter? i 16 MR. STANDERFER: Yes. We want to filter 17 water so we have adequate or good visibility. And 18 we want to keep the, mainly, cesium low enough so ! 19 it doesn't contribute to the exposure of the 20 people. l 21 KAY PICKERING: Are there other tasks 22 being done, any washing? 23 MR. STANDERFER: Well, there are a (L> 24 number of tasks being done. For example, we 25 opened up the cover off of the pressurizer Tuesday
30 i
]
f(]) 1 night. 2 We got our first look inside of the 3 primary system there. We have done measurements 4 outside and believed there was little fuel inside, , i 5 from radiation measurements. 6 The inspection last night indicated that l 7 was true. And so it is another indication that i 8 defueling of the primary system will not be as l f 9 large a job as originally intended. 10 We have been doing decontamination l t 11 tasks. If you are familiar with removing the 12 concrete surfaces, that went on in certain areas ! 13 of the containment building. So we have l l t 14 successfully done work in parallel. l 15 KAY PICKERING: One of the reasons for ! i 16 asking the question is that people have called our : 17 office and reported seeing increased numbers of ( i 18 trucks, water trucks. l r 19 They don't know where the water is ' 20 coming from or going, but they believe it is l 21 coming off of the island. There is a concern in 22 the public as to what is being taken off of the 23 island. ! l i ( 24 MR. STANDERFER: The only water trucks j 25 that leave the island are sewage; and we just l i
. .,. -_.,-- ., - , - - . _ - - - , ~ - . - , - _ - . - _ . - - - , - _ - _ _ - - . . - _ _ - , - , , . , - - - - , , - _ - - . - . - . - - . _ - - - - , . - . _ . , , - - - -
l 31 ({} 1 completed a sewage treatment plant on the island, 2 which is going in service this spring. 3 MR. BEDELL: Every so often when the 4 Met-Ed coal plant in Reading, the Titus plant, is 5 down and not manufacturing their own demineralized 6 water, we are shipping demineralized water to 7 i them, to Titus, for their use. 8 It is shipped in the same kind of tank 9 trucks that ship milk. We do that every six or 10 eight months, whenever Titus is in need of 11 demineralized water that they are unable to 12 produce themselves. 13 MR. STANDERFER: Unit 2 doesn't do that,'
- 14 so I didn't know that was happening.
l 15 KAY PICKERING: And the sewage? 16 MR. STANDERFER: We have a contractor 17 who has picked up sewage over the years. That 18 will continue until our new sewage treatment plant 19 is put in service this spring. Then we will be 20 treating our own sewage on the island. 21 MR. ROTH: We are really running on 22 schedule, and we normally break for about 5 23 minutes and take 10 minutes. 1 ~ j 24 How about if we take a 5 minute break, i 25 and maximum 7 minutes, so we can get started right
32 1 away. ({]) 1 2 (Brief recess from the record.) 3 MR. ROTH: Tom Smithgall has asked for 4 one minute. He has a question to address to Bill 5 Travers. 6 MR. SMITHGALL: I missed your 7 presentation. I want to ask you a few questions, i 8 Do you feel that GPU is in compliance as 9 far as occupational exposure is concerned? 10 MR. TRAVERS: Generally? f 11 MR. SMITHGALL: Yes. 12 MR. TRAVERS: Yes. There have been
. () '
13 instances in the past, and we brought them to your 14 attention, where they haven't been. But they i l 15 haven't been very frequent. And as of today, they 16 are in compliance. 17 MR. SMITHGALL: In line with that, these 18 are some of the documents we have. Could you ! 19 comment on GPU's practice of surveying 20 high-radiation areas? 21 Have they changed their method of 22 surveying those? I got the feeling that they had 23 changed from contact measurements to ( 24 full-body-dose measurements. l 25 Am I correct on that? ,
33 ({} l MR. TR AV ERS : I guess I am not familiar. 2 I could look at it during the meeting and get back 3 to you. . 4 MR. SMITHGALL: And as far as 5 compliance, just general questions here as far as ! 6 waste disposal and classification. Do you feel 7 good on that? , 8 MR. TRAVERS: We review it on a daily 9 basis, and they are in compliance as far as we
- 10 know.
l 11 MR. SMITHGALL: And my final one. l 12 I would like to ask -f or -- a lot of the 13 information comes across my desk on this one, a i 14 lot of exemptions. ! 15 Would it be possible for the staff to 16 provide the panel with a listing of that? I ! 17 believe I asked this question of Mike, and he said i 18 that there is a Systematic Evaluation Derformance 19 Report that is being compiled at this point in
- 20 time. !
- i l 21 MR. TRAVERS
- It is called a Systematic 22 Assessment of Licensee Performance. It is in the 23 process of our assessment based on all of the 24 things that transpired during that time frame.
1(] 25 ,And it is done for all applicants across the l l E_________.. _ _ _ . _ -.. __..._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
34 i (] } 1 country. 2 In answer to your first question, we l t 3 will be glad to provide you with a list. And I f f 4 think you are asking for a list of any areas where 5 the NRC staff or Commission has given GPU 6 exemption from requirements? 7 MR. SMITHGALL: Yes. I woul'd like to I 8 see the Systematic Assessment of Licensee ! I 9 Performance forms also. f I 10 MR. TRAVERS: I think that's the kind of l i 11 thing that we will certainly be providing to you l t 12 in the matter of course. !
'.b $
13 MR. ROTH: At this time, Marge and j i 14 Norman Aamodt will give their presentation. [ ! 15 MRS. AAMODT: Thank you, Chairman and l l
?
16 the committee, for giving us this opportunity. lt 17 When I called it ou.. study, there were [ F i i i 18 many citizens, residents in this area who worked ' 19 with us in this study. We seem to have gotten i f 20 into the position of bringing this before the NRC. 4 21 I believe it was through my interest f 22 that the study was initiated; but I do want to i 23 recognize there are many people in this audience ~ k 24 tonight who helped with this study. 1 i i 25 The State study in no way disapproves l t i
- . _ _ . _ _ _ __ .,.__.._>____,__...._. .___.... _ __ _ _. _ _ ... _ .. _ _, _ ~_ _,.. --_._ _ -.. _ .,_ ...._._,_ _ ,.,.. _ .,
35 1 our study, which showed a significant increase in (} } 2 cancers downwind of the accident. 3 The State did an incredible study of the 4 present THI area population, many of whom were not 5 in the TMI area at the time of the accident. 6 Nearly 50 percent of the 5-mile radius residents 7 at the time of the accident have moved away from 8 the area. 9 The State could have followed the 10 population who resided within the 5-mile radius at ' 11 the present time. The State interviewed this 12 population shortly after the accident and has 13 followed it until the present time. 14 The State has that data, and that would 15 have been more convincing data than that provided 16 in the cancer report. It is reasonable to assume i 17 that had the data shown no increase in cancer 18 effects, the State would have provided it. 19 The State's report on cancer mortalities 20 is flawed, in addition, by not -- the State's l 21 report on cancer mortalities is, therefore, flawed 22 by having excluded the population at the time of 23 the accident that moved away and having includhd (] 24 the population that moved in since the accident. 25 The State also eliminated cancer
36 1 mortality data for the year 1984, a year when the
/(]}
2 State. admits that cancers caused by the accident 3 could be seen. Mortality data is available on a 4 continuing basis, and surely available for the 5 entire year of 1984 by the time the State released 6 the study in September of this year. 7 The State's exclusion of 1984 and 8 inclusion of 1979 as post accident years was a 9 biased and indefensible decision. The State 10 enlarged the numbers of residents in the 5-mile 11 area by 50 percent by including residents from the 12 10-mile radius, ( . .O 13 Any effects from the accident unique to 14 5-mile residents -- and that was a premise of the D 15 State's original census -- are obscured by the 16 addition of 10-mile residents. 17 The stated approximately 64,000 18 population in the 5-mile radius, approximately 19 46,000 did not live in the 5-mile radius the time 20 of the accident. 21 In fact, we have just found that the 22 64,000 population has been exaggerated by 7,000. 23 With the help of a credible librarian, we have now 24 determined, using the same 1980 census that the 25 State claims to have used, that the correct i
37 population for the State's artificial 5-mile (}{} l 2 radius is closer to 57,000. This is nearly a 20 3 percent error. 4 The Gtate made a similar overcount -- 5 I'm sorry a 13 percent error. The State made a 6 similar overcount in population it regarded as the 7 10-mile radius. The librarian found that the J 8 total number of townships included in the State's 9 artificial 10-mile radius was overstated by 20,000 10 persons. 11 MR. ROTH: Excuse me. Are you quoting 12 from Evelyn Lyons from Millersville? c0
~~
13 MRS. AAMODT: Yes. 14 MR. ROTH: I just wanted that for the 15 record. Do you have with you an extra copy for 16 the record? 17 MRS. AAMODT: Yes. 18 The effect of these errors in the~ 19 population count are both in the same direction, 1 l 20 which makes it appear deliberate and which caused 21 the figure for expected cancers to be too high. 22 This figure of expected cancers is 23 further flawed by the use of national figures for ( 24 cancer expectancy, 166 mortalities per 100,000 25 population.
38 {}} 1 We found in the townships west of the 2 plant within the State's 5-mile radius that the 3 three sigma figure was 153 cancer deaths for 4 100,000 population and that the average was only 5 about 130, 6 The State did not correct for incorrect 7 resident's recording on death certificates. 8 Persons who died away from their residences at 9 nursing homes, a hospital, or relative's residence 10 would most likely be missed. We ran into this 11 problem in obtaining death certificates for our
,,es 12 study, but we overcame it.
Q.) 13 Where the State did do a follow-up study 14 on morbidity of 10-mile radius women pregnant in 15 1979 of their children, we had some questions, as 16 did the Panel, about whether there was an age 17 adjustment of the expected figure. ! 18 The State now has provided information l 19 which indicates that the expected figure was age i 20 adjusted, and that the average age of these Three 1
- 21 Mile Island pregnant women was 29 years.
l 22 I didn't receive that information until l _ 23 I got here this evening. I rather clearly ( 24 remember a figure, an average age figure for Three 25 Mile Island pregnant women which was younger than
l l 39
/}} 1 that, I believe around 24 years.
2 MR. SMITHGALL: At tne meeting in 3 Lancaster, you say that Miller said 24 as opposed 4 to what he has given us in documentation of 29? 5 MRS. AAMODT: I believe it is in a 6 report I' read, and I will try and find that. And 7 if I can, I will forward that to you. 8 I bring it up after I read that this 9 evening -- I thought I might not bring it up until 10 I had that information firmly in hand. 11 But I bring it up because I called Dr. 12 Matthew Zack of CDC, who was one of the reviewers
;O 13 of the State's report. I asked him whether he had 14 taken the age, average age, of the mothers into 15 account in reviewing the State's figures.
l 16 He said he wasn't given any of that 17 information. And that if the average age of the 18 mother's was substantially lower than the average 19 age of women in general in the 10 to 40 age range, 20 that this rate would have brTa an alarming rate. 21 Dr. Zack alsc 'tah 3 he was not given 22 enough information to make his own judgment 23 relative to the State's conclusions. He did not ( 24 know that the population that moved in since the 25 accident had been included in the study or that
1 l 40 the 5- and 10-mile radii had been extended beyond r{'] 1 2 their physical boundary. 3 We received, as did the Panel this 4 evening, the State's letters from t' heir reviewers, 5 from their peer reviewers. I think maybe Norman 6 wants to comment on that. 7 MR. AAMODT: I think it is very 8 difficult not to respond with some evidence of 9 bias myself. 10 MR. WALD: Did we receive it? 11 MR. MASNIK: Yes, we did. 12 MR. AAMODT: It appears to me that there 40 13 were two people gave written responses. I would 14 like to comment on one of those two responses. 15 It sounds very good, the list of 16 reviewers, the Oakridge National Laboratory. The 17 responder from the Oakridge National Laboratories, 18 Kroyce Jones, comments, "I am of very limited 19 knowledge in epidemiology. This letter repeats my l 20 few simple telephone comments, and there were only 21 two." l l 22 And Margie spoke to Dr. Zack, who I l 23 believe is a credible reviewer. And Dr. Zack is b 24 very quick to respond that his review was cursory; 25 that he was not given the data to make a l l
41 meaningful review; that he did not know that the {]) 1 2 population which was impacted was not followed, 3 but that the population that was studied was an 4 ersatz population, a blend of half people who had 5 never been there at the time of the accident and 6 the remaining half who had not left, who were 7 presumably the people least affected. 8 I think that the State's claim that 9 their study received peer review is a very hollow 10 claim. D 11 MRS. AAMODT: I would like to note that 12 Dr. Tokuhata sent the letter out for peer review 13 on February 19 and got a repay from HEW's reviewer 14 on February 20. He sent it by Express Mail. The 15 reviewer had less than half a day for his in-depth l 16 review. 17 The State found that there was an excess 18 of cancer mortality of areas downwind, which 19 included our study areas. The State eliminated 20 the cancer mortality for 1984 and added a period 21 of 1979, which was before the accident, and 22 expanded the population and still came up with a 23 more than doubling of cancer mortalities over ( 24 those expected. 25 The State's tabulation of radiogenic r
42 cancers in living residents of the two townships (}{} 1 2 of our survey areas showed from a 20 to a 60 3 percent increase in lung and colon cancers and 4 lymphomas. 5 But the State dismissed this 6 relationship from the -- dismissed this as a 7 relationship to the Three Mile Island accident on i 8 the basis of a theory advanced by the Baer 9 Committee that cancer induction to a stage of . 10 diagnosis takes a long period of time, in excess J 11 of five years. 12 The Baer theory is primarily based on ' (- \ 13 exposures to X-ray and, I believe, a 14 misinterpretation of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima i 15 data. I hava some slides. 16 This is a slide showing the increase of l
- 17 cancer in the bomb victims in the years after the 18 accident. As you can see, there is a reference 19 there to an official study that was done in Japan.
20 You can see that there was a distinct upturn in ' t 21 deaths from those particular kinds of cancers,
- 22 which means that the diagnoses must have occurred 23 within a year or two after the detonation of the h 24 bomb.
25 MR. DI NUNNO: I can't see that at all.
43 1 But as I recall, these arguments have been ({}} 2 advanced many times in the past. They have always 3 been that the exposures were magnitudes higher - 4 than data that statisticians are working with in 5 drawing some of their conclusions. 6 So can you tell me, are you dealing with 7 exposures there that are abnormal? 8 MRS. AAMODT: I don't think -- exposures 9 is not my subject. My subject is latency. We are 10 saying we don't know what the exposures of the 11 people at Three Mile Island were. 12 We are saying is it possible, not 13 knowing the exposures, that cancers could have 14 occurred that quickly? 15 MR. DI NUNNO: I understand. But I am 16 trying to understand what correlation you are 17 trying to represent from exposures that -- at 18 least to indicate what exposure levels we are 19 talking about. Those are quite high. 20 MRS. AAMODT: We don't know what the 21 exposure levels were of the particular victims 22 that were represented on that chart. 23 We certainly know the exposure levels of (] 24 the people that are not represented on that chart l 25 who went to their graves are much higher. These
l l 1 l 44
}{} 1 are people who survived the bombing, had a cancer 2 that was diagnosed very quickly after that time 3 and died.
4 And as you can see, as this relates to ' 5 when there was a bomb, within three years there 6 was a distinct upturn in deaths. The sharpest 7 increases took place in those organs known to 8 selectively concentrate isotopes dominant in fresh 9 fallout; namely, the rare earth isotopes 10 (phonetic) and iodine. These are the pancreas, 11 the prostate, the thyroid glands, the ovaries, and 12 the liver. D 13 MR. AAMODT: The point'is, right here is 14 when the bomb was dropped; and here we are just a 15 matter of a few years later, and we are already on 16 an increasing curve, 17 The issue here is this, that the study 18 has been denigrated, I think, most frequently and 19 with the most attempt at force by saying that it i 20 is not possible for cancers to develop in this ! 21 period of time from the exposures -- from any 22 exposures which might have occurred at Three Mile 23 Island. 24 What Margie is demonstrating is that 25 indeed latency periods can be very short. We have
45 1 also surveyed some of the leading people in the ((}} 2 field of latency in the induction of cancer across . 3 the United States and to some extent across the 4 world. 5 And the consensus of those who don't 6 have an ax to grind is that, first, nobody knows 7 what minimum latency periods are. And if you will 8 notice, every statement that George Tokuhata of l 9 the Department of Health and others have made has 10 been weasel worded by saying it is not likely that 11 there would have been cancers. l 12 The point Margie is making is no one can 13 say that there was not adequate time for the 14 cancers which were observed in the study to have 15 been developed because of exposure to radiation at i 16 Three Mile Island. That is the whole point. 17 MRS. AAMODT: If you look at the top of 18 the graph, you can see all sites are average 19 there; and you can see where it suddenly takes 20 off. 21 MR. WALD: What I can't find here in the 22 caption, these are trends in age-adjusted death 23 rates in Japan for cancers of selected sites from ( 24 a study by a group of Japanese investig.ators on 25 cancer mortalities from 1899 to 1982.
46 l I am trying to find the relationship of (}^} 2 this to any radiation exposure on Hiroshima or 3 Nagasaki, because there is nothing on here that 4 shows this is anything other than Japanese data in 5 all of Japan. 6 MRS. AAMODT: I would say -- I will look D 7 that up. I am sure that it is in the body of the 8 report. I am sure in the body of the report it 9 does make that point. 10 MR. AAMODT: I think it is suggested by 11 the fact that we have generally level curves over 12 a protracted period. And then increasing curves 13 beginning the year after the bomb was dropped.
- 14 MR. WALD
- (inaudible) don't start until 15 then, if you notice.
16 MR. AAMODT: It is interesting that it 17 also rises at a steeper but -- 18 MR. WALD: These are global. These l l 19 happened in many countries about the same time, if 20 I am not mistaken. 21 MR. AAMODT: Sure. We will provide you 22 with the material. 23 MRS. AAMODT: I spoke with Dr. Renwu at 24 the Elton Jones Science in Lake Placid. He is l 25 doing basic research on latency in the Petri dish. i l
47 l ({} 1 And he said that he can -- he has cancer 2 cells in a matter of -- cells that turned to 3 cancer in a matter of six weeks. 4 Now, he referred me to Dr. Paul 5 Natasham, who is at the Laboratory of Pulmonary 6 Function Toxicology, National Institute of 7 Environmental Health Services in Triangle Park. 8 Dr. Natasham has been working on cancer 9 development. And he manipulates a number of 10 variables, promoters essentially, of cancer as 11 well as depressing the immune system. 12 And he has produced cancer in the rat in 13 a period of abe,ut five months, and in 15 weeks 14 with hamsters. And I think that this graph shows 15 that. 16 MR. AAMODT: I guess you will have to 17 take our word for it. 18 MRS. AAMODT: What you have at the 19 bottom, the base line, is time and months. And it 20 begins two, three, four; and you can see they were 21 even at two months getting some cells. And then 22 there is a jump to more recognizable cancer at 23 about four or five months. l( 24 And he has different kinds of lesions 25 that he is looking at, metaplasias and carcinomas
, . , _ . , _ _ . .,.m , _ _ ,_
__ ,._m, ______,__%__..,,r.
48 1 and so forth. ({]} 2 MR. GERUSKY: Was radiation the source?
- 3 MRS. AAMODT
- No. He used chemicals. I 4 am talking only about latency. I am not talking 5 about anything else. I am talking about what is 6 minimum latency period. I am addressing this 7 issue in isolation, i
8 So there is -- now, there was -- the 9 effect of the immune system is something Dr. 10 Natasham is very much interested in. As I said, 11 this is one of the variables he manipulated. 12 Dr. Andrew Baum got in touch with me in (O 13 February. He.had a hard time. The NRC told him l 14 that they didn't know who we were and didn't have i 15 any idea about the health study that we had done. 16 But he found us through the Coatesville post 17 office, although we were then living in 18 Parkesburg. l l 19 Dr. Baum has taken 12 blood samples i ! 20 randomly selected from the Three Mile Island area 21 in relation to his work on psychological stress. 22 He now has some concern that what he 23 interpreted as a stress reaction in the blood '( 24 could have been a radiation reaction. In any 25 case, it is rather outstanding data.
1 I 49 1 He compared the blood samples from Three (]} 2 Mile Island to Delaware subjects; and he found 3 that the THI residents had fewer B lymphocytes, T 4 lymphocytes, T helper cells, and T suppressor 5 cells. And this was a significant difference from 6 the control group. 7 MR. AAMODT: I think the point should be 8 made clearly that without exception in every one 9 of the samples that he drew, this was the case. 10 And I would just like to comment to you
- 11 just the basic exercise of probability. What are
_ 12 the odds if there were only a small number of (f!) 13 people who had suffered immune system depression, 14 which is what Dr. Baum found around Three Mile 15 Island? 16 What are the odds that, if you drew 12 17 samples, that all 12 would have shown that l 18 suppression? It is astronomical. 19 MRS. AAMODT: There were 20 blood 20 samples taken. He didn't take more because of the 21 problems of carting them back to his laboratory 22 and the cost of doing that and so forth. 23 MR. WALD: Did he say when he took the 24 Delaware ones? 25 MRS. AAMODT: Yes. I only have the
50 1 1 abstract. I intend to get the whole study. ! (}' } 2 He took them from a group of people 3 living near a hazardous toxic waste site in 4 Delaware. 5 MR. WALD: Did he say when? 6 MRS. AAMODT: I think not too long after 7 the accident. It was reported in January-February ) 8 of 1985 in the Psychomatic Medicine Journal. 9 MR. AAMODT: You are asking the samples ! 10 in Delaware? 11 MR. WALD: Right. Because if they .1 ! 12 weren't done at the same time, it leaves a . (h
- 13 question.
14 MRS. AAMODT: I have a feeling he would ! 15 use rather good research techniques. b 4 l6 MR. AAMODT: What he found is the i i 17 control samples showed people generally had pretty l i 18 good functioning immune systems. 19 And what he found was every individual l 20 he tested, every single one, shortly after the
- 21 accident at Three Mile Island had severely 22 depressed immune systems.
23 MR. WALD: I understand. You mentioned k 24 transportation of the samples. 25 If the controls weren't handled at the l
- - . ~ - _ _ _ _ _ . - . - -
/
51 l t ((} 1 same time in the same way, that leaves it 4 2 uncertain as to whether he controlled for j 3 transportation and the stresses and all. 4 MR. AAMODT: Dr. Baum has a pretty good 1 5 reputation, better I think than the Pennsylvania 6 Department of Health. 7 MRS. AAMODT: There was also a study 8 done, if you are aware, of the State studies on l 9 pregnancy outcomes and how they have claimed that 10 there is no significant difference in the 11 pregnancy outcomes at the time of the Three Mile 12 Island accident. )(. 13 There is a researcher at the 14 Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus in l 15 Middletown, Pennsylvania, Dr. Winston A. Richards, 16 Ph.D., associate professor of math and statistics, l 17 who sent a study he did and he presented to the 3 18 International Congress on Technology and 19 Technology Exchange in 1984 and which he sent to 20 Chairman Paladino. I 21 His conclusion is that infant mortality i l' 22 for Dauphin County becomes significantly above 23 average by 1980. And he also concluded that death (] 24 from leukemia, while average in 1979, is above 25 average in 1980 And deaths from cancers for the
52 ages 45 to 64, while average for 1968, became (] } 1 2 decidedly significantly above average for 1980. 3 So I haven't looked into the study in 4 detail. I haven't studied it in detail, but I did 5 want to present to you the fact that there are 6 other people who are doing studies on Three Mile 7 Island who are not in agreement with the State i 8 Health Department. 9 MR. AAMODT: I think there is an order I , 10 on that one. And that is this study was sent j 11 to -- this letter and this paper was sent to 12 Chairman Paladino. yD 13 He wrote to Chairman Paladino. He said, l 14 How about letting me look at this? This is what I 15 have done already. There is something out there. 16 And although it is required by law that I. { 17 documents bearing on the restart procedure be 18 circulated among the parties, that letter was not , 19 circulated among the parties during the heat of i 20 the conflict when it would have supported our i l 21 view. l l ! 22 And we received it only through the use ! 23 of the Freedom of Information Act, which b 24 incidentally, is where we got the bulk of the 25 information which runs contrary to what the NRC
53 { 1 told us. 2 MRS. AAMODT: We are waiting right now 3 for a study from the NRC which their public 4 document room did not have it. 5 This is a memo from the Inspector 6 DeYoung to someone in the headquarters in 7 Washington. It was listed as one of the 74 8 studies on which the NRC staff depended to refute 9 our study. 10 It is the iodine measurements after the 11 time of the ad hoc committee's iodine 12 measurements, the ones through April. And we will 13 go into that a little more later on.
; 14 But just the point of withholding 15 information, the NRC staff then refused to provide 0
16 the public document room with the document, saying 17 it was only for the Commission and I would have to I 18 proceed legally to obtain it. 19 And I do have a Freedom of Information 20 Act -- a Freedom of Information request for that 1 But I just recently -- within the NRC 21 document. l 22 records there are some very high iodine 23 measurements for the middle of April that have () 24 been just totally overlooked. 25 MR. G ERUS KY : I'm sorry. I disagree. I
54
' g(]) 1 was taking those measurements.
I 2 MRS. AAMODT: I will show you my data 3 later. 4 MR. GERUSKY: I have the data in my 5 office, and so did EPA have the data in their 6 office. I don't know w'ay you are -- the data is 7 available. 8 MR. AAMODT: They refused to give it to I 9 us when we asked for it. 10 MRS. AAMODT: Here is the CDC memorandum 11 I got from -- by the Freedom of Information Act, 12 I then found this same data was in other
'~
13 documents, but it was just like treated as if it j 14 were nothing. 15 When I got this, this kind of ticked my 16 interest. Here they are reporting that there was 17 100 pCi/mm cubed per hour measured in air samples; 18 and this was around the middle of April. It was ! 19 measured for several days, I believe it says in l 20 there. 21 MR. AAMODT: Margie, let me read this -- 22 MRS. AADMODT: Okay. , , 23 MR. AAMODT: -- telling about a 24 conversation he had with Charlie Cox. i 25 "In the past few days some air samples
- = _ - . . _ - - . . - . - _ --
I t j 55 i by NRC exceeded 100.pCi/mm cubed per hour. ((]) 1 ! 2 However, this maximum permissible concentration is l 3 based on a yearly environmental exposure held I j 4 constant at this hourly level. Samples before and l l 5 after the elevated readings earlier this week were 6 considerably lower; and by this AM, with the 1 7 installation of new charcoal filters, have become 8 nondetectable. This is not a significant problem, ! 9 therefore, according to Charlie." 1 4 10 MRS. AADMOT: It is per millimeter i 11 cubed, which is a very small sample and a very l i 12 high concentration. j CO 13 MR. GERUSKY: It is not a small sample. j 14 MRS. AAMODT: I then got -- went to -- i 15 and this is reported in the NRC documents. And it } 16 is reported in their status report to the i 17 Commission refuting our health studies saying j 18 there weren' t any significant emissions. l 19 It is also in the Roganmen Report. And l j 20 it makes a very (inaudible) evaluation of it. I 21 sent it down to a biogeneticist in Philadelphia, f 22 Dr. Bruce Molholt, who works for the EPA and has i 23 been cooperative with us on a number of occasions. ; } (] 24 And this is what he says about it. He l :
- 25 says -- here is a memorandum to me from Dr. !
r
- - - _ . _ _ _ - . - _,.._-,,-..m--.-,_,..._,._.._~.,___..-..-_-.--_ .- . _ . , - . . . . _ . _ , . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _
56 Molholt, June 14, 1985. "You mentioned that you i ((]) 1 2 obtained a memorandum from Henry Falk, M.D., of 3 the. Center for Disease Control, dated April 20, 4 1979, in which the iodine-131 levels in the air 5 had been measured in excess of 100 pCi/mm cubed I j 6 following the removal of iodine filters on 14 7 April 1979. This is a considerable burden of 8 radionuclide contamination from the public health l 9 perspective, equivalent to over 100 million pCi j 10 per liter, and hence, for example, 25 million 11 times in excess of the standard for radon gas exposure." 12 D 13 He goes on to say -- to equate this j 14 exposure to the dose for inducing thyroid cancer. ' 15 He says it is over 25 times the dose that would be i i 16 needed to induce thyroid cancer, and uses as his i t 17 reference a book by Dr. Bertel. l 18 MR. AAMODT: The reason this is a little 19 out of order is we are going to discuss the 1 l 20 neonatal hypothyroidism. ! 21 MRS. AAMODT: I was going to bring that I 22 out under a topic which I have later on in our 23 presentation, which was to show you that -(1) we b] 24 don't know what the dose was to the public and (2) l l 25 what information we do have indicates that there L_ . _ - - _ _ - - _ - _ - _ - - _ . . . _ _ . - . -
. . - _ _ _ _ . . ~ . . - - - - _....
57 1 could have been considerable dose. {} 2 This is TMI over there, and this is 3 showing Lancaster County. And what I am trying to 4 discuss at this part of the presentation are the { 5 State studies of pregnancy outcome.
- 6 We know people by their reputation. The l
l 7 State's studies on pregnancy outcome have also r 8 been exceedingly flawed. i 9 This is a slide of the hypothyroid cases
, 10 in Lancaster County in 1979. When this excess was i
11 seen, the Advisory Committee, Health Committee, i 12 Dr. Tokuhata has begun to study these cases.
- 'l ,( )
! 13 This~was a ten-fold increase for 4 14 Lancaster County. There are 3,500 births per year 15 in Lancaster County. And the expectation is about l 16 .7 or less than 1. These cases were studied ! 17 clinically. l 18 Dr. Tokuhata studied four of the six 19 cases. There were actually seven, but these are
- 20 the six that occurred after the accident. There i
j 21 were seven for the year. One occurred before the , i ! 22 accident. I have plotted the six that occurred 23 after the accident. s>v 24 Dr. Tokuhata studied four of the cases ; 25 clinically. Two of the cases he thought were l
58 1 likely associated with genetic defect. He then ({]) i 2 assumed, since these two cases were Amish, thac ! t l 3 all of Lancaster County had a propensity to 4 { 4 genetic aboration (sic). l 5 As you can see in 1980, the year of the r l ! 6 venting, there were still a number of cases, four; 7 which calls into question the assertions the i i l 8 iodine was not emitted at the time of the venting. i l I 9 In 1981 it went down to 2, 0, and 1 are 10 the average for those three years, about as I 11 expected. 12 When Dr. Tokuhata made his presents: ion !.() : 13 to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, he %as I l i 14 cross questioned by Dr. Molholt. Dr. Molholt i 15 completely destroyed Dr. Tokuhata's reasoning, and i { 16 the Licensing Board said that they could not i l 17 accept Dr. Tokuhata's expertise in radiogenetics. ! l l 18 This is our chief officer in the Health i l 19 Department who is doing these studies. i 20 I think it is interesting, too, that l 21 there is a line -- 1 l 22 MR. GERUSKY: I am sorry. I can't sit j 23 here. Dr. Tokuhata is not a radiogeneticist; he i 24 is an epidemiologist. And that is what he was f i
,25 talking about. Dr. Molholt is not an .
i l l
59 1 epidemiologist. He doesn't know what he is
< {])
2 talking about. 3 There are lots of problems with this 4 data. And I think the information concerning the 1 5 iodine is completely out of order. 6 The one memorandum on some data, that is t 7 misinformation that was reported by a telephone 8 call. If you want to know the iodine data, come 9 into my office and we will give it to you. 10 MRS. AAMODT: You mean you will quarrel 11 with 100 pCi? 12 MR. GERUSKY: Yes. That is an incorrect CO 13 number. That was a telephone call. 14 MRS. AAMODT: It is in the Roganmen 15 Report. It is in the status report that the NRC 16 just released in August of '84. I will provide 17 both those references to this committee. 1
- 18 MR. GERUSKY: If you would like the 19 iodine data, you come into my office, because I 20 have it all.
21 During that time frame I was up 24 hours i l 22 a day reviewing that data, because I was very i 23 concerned about iodine releases from the plant. ( 24 That is why they put the new filter system in. i 25 MRS. AAMODT: Sir, all I can say is, Why
.- - . _ - _ - _ _ _ .- . - - ~ . . - . _ .
60 i would the NRC have published in a status report ({ } l l 2 of -- i j 3 MR. GERUSKY: We published it. It is 4 available. 5 MRS. AAMODT: No. What I am saying is i
, 6 in 1984 --
i 7 MR. GERUSKY: Look at all the data; i
- 8 don't look at selective data, j 9 MRS. AAMODT
- In August of 1984, the NRC ;
) 10 staff provided a status report to the Commission 11 saying that there wasn't enough radiation that got 12 out. co ~ 13 But they said there was a release in the j 14 middle of April; that we measured some air samples l 15 of 100 pCi/mm cubed. I didn't pick that up then. i l 16 I didn't recognize the significance of it until i 17 sometime later. But the NRC and the Roganmen 18 Report are not quarreling with the CDC memorandum. i 19 What I am saying is you have this 20 release and you have this data and you have an ! 21 explanation for why it occurred that doesn't f 1
- 22 fit --
that doesn't hold up. And I am saying, ; 1 i 23 here is another example of the Health Department's I l 24 inadequate studies. 1
- 25 MR. GERUSKY
- It wasn't the Health
! i
61 Department that was doing the monitoring. We ((]) 1 2 were. I can provide you with the data. 3 MRS. AAMODT: They were studying it. 4 MR. GERUSKY: And there was no iodine in 5 the environment that was of any consequence. I'm 6 sorry. ( 7 MRS. AAMODT: You mean you quarrel with 8 the NRC's report of iodine? 9 MR. GERUSKY: I am not quarreling with
; 10 the NRC's report of iodine. I am saying there was
. 11 no iodine in the environment of any consequence, i 12 less than what we found during fallout levels two 13 - years before. 14 MRS. AAMODT: Is 100 pCi/mm cubed of any 15 consequence? 16 MR. GERUSKY: I don't know where that 17 sample was taken. I think it was taken at the i 18 stack release point. It had to be. 19 MRS. AADMOT: No. It was off site. It l 20 says so in the NRC documents. 21 I will send that document to this , 22 committee. It is a publicly available document, i 23 and it was put on the docket in August of 1984. ( 24 So it is not one that didn't have the advantage of 25 all of your data. i
62 I would appreciate that we
]{} 1 MR. AAMODT:
2 would not lose sight of what we are talking about. 3 MR. G ERUS KY : I am not losing sight of 4 it, sir. 5 MR. AAMODT: We can legitimately dispute 6 the validiti of data. But there are two points we 7 were making. 8 One is that the Commission, in arguing 9 before the Court of Appeals that really there is 10 no reason to look at iodine and radiation and so 11 on, referred to this report and kept it from us. 12 The other one is -- (O 13 MR. G ERUS KY : That has nothing to do 14 with the epidemiology data or the data about the 0 15 iodine in the environment. 16 MR. AAMODT: We infer from that that 17 perhaps, just perhaps, when you said "I have all 18 the data on iodine," maybe there is a little bit 19 you don't have. 20 MR. GERUSKY: No. 21 MR. AAMODT: You must admit there is a 22 little bit you don't have. 23 MR. GERUSKY: No. ( 24 MR. AAMODT: And then the other point 25 that we are making is this: I do teach l L
i 63 l probability and statistics, and I have looked at l {} 2 the State of Pennsylvania and its neonatal 3 hypothyroidism data for a number of years. 4 The odds of finding six cases in a row i 5 are mighty slim. 6 MR. GERUSKY: But there are odds? 7 MR. AAMODT: You bet there are. i' MR. GERUSKY: They didn't say there were j 9 not? 10 MR. AAMODT: Absolutely. 11 MR. G ERUS KY : They agreed with you that l 12 the Lancaster --
~
13 MR. AAMODT: Sensible people look at 14 odds. And the odds are enormous -- 15 MR. GERUSKY: That is why it was 16 evaluated independently. 17 MR. AAMODT: They are not evaluated 1 18 independently is precisely our argument. 19 MRS. AAMODT: My argument is the reason j 20 that the State gave for dismissing those cases 21 does not hold up. It disappeared. 22 MR. G ERUS KY : It didn't disappear. 23 There is no more iodine out there than there was 24 before. 25 MRS. AAMODT: If it was genetic I
i 64 (T3
-%J 1 aboration (sic) among the Lancaster County l
2 residents, aren't they having babies anymore? l 3 They still have 3,500 babies a year. The Amish 4 still have about 900 of those. 5 The two cases among the Amish were 6 exactly in proportion to the number of births. i 7 Dr. Tokuhata should have known that. He either 8 knew it or should have known that the two Amish 9 cases were exactly in proportion to the rest of 10 the population. There were two Amish cases. 11 There are 900 Amish births. There are four other 12 cases.
- D 13 The Amish do have genetic defects.
14 There are problems because of intermarriage but 15 not hypothyroidism, obviously, or it would have 16 kept up. The Amish are not having any fewer 17 babies. And the reason I am telling you -- my I 18 point is only that the reason he gave was not a 19 valid reason. He should have known better. l 20 The Three Mile Island Public Health Fund 21 is trying to get the pregnancy data to reanalyze l 22 it. Dr. Tokuhata went to the Public Health Fund 23 and tried to get their funds to do his follow-up () 24 study on cancers or on the 5-mile radius for l l 25 health effects. l i __m .,._ - _ - - - _ _ ._ _ , _ _ . _ _ . . _ ., _. . , _ . . . _ _ . . . . , . _ . . . ~ _ . ___
65 And the Three Mile Island Public Health ((]) 1 2 Fund turned him down. He complained to you in 3 November of 1984 about that; and Dr. Cochran said, 4 "You know we had our reasons." The reasons were 5 that they did not agree with the way Dr. Tokuhata 6 conducted the health study. 7 And in fact, this is what Dr. Susser and 8 Hatch say in their prospectus before the Court. i 9 "Despite problems in research design and 10 analysis," and they explain the problems above. 11 The raw data from an earlier study of
,._q 12 fetal loss after the Three Mile Island accident
' kN 13 suggests that the population of early pregnancies . 14 was, indeed, adversely affected in a matter 15 consistent with radiation damage. 16 Now, that is not saying it was radiation 17 damage; but that is saying that it does indicate 18 that and that further research was needed. It was 19 also saying there were problems in Dr. Tokuhata's 20 research design and analysis. 21 And I would simply say to you, Why? Dr. 22 Tokuhata is an epidemiologist. This is an area i 23 where he should have expertise. ( 24 MRS. AAMODT: I am going to give you one 25 additional piece of evidence of the incredibility
66 , i of the Health Department before proceeding to our
}{} 1 2 study. This is concerning the across-the-board l 3 denial for health data to independent researchers.
- 4 The Three Mile Island data is uniquely 5 locked up in the Health Department, as Dr. Wald 6 indicated at your October meeting, but not for the 7 reasons stated by Dr. Wald.
i 8 The Health Department, in taking this 9 action, leaned on the advice of CDC that a 10 considered the Three Mile Island data uniquely l 11 sensitive, and the UCL -- I mean the Civil ) . 12 Liberty's Union, that was concerned that personal (h 13 injury claims and benefits might be jeopardized i f 14 this information is given to agencies. 15 The idea was that the data would be of 16 particular wide interest and that more caution 17 might be needed to prevent its misuse. But the 1 18 idea was not that the data should be denied to 19 legitimate researchers. And that is what has i j 20 happened. When this data is of particularly wide i 21 interest, it is even more unacceptable that it is l 22 denied to independent researchers. l 23 Now, the Health Department has specific ( 24 policies which are designed to facilitate 25 provision of data for legitimate research
.,..-.-yv.-.,,.,.-..-,-,y e-----w-w--meew w - , --*----rr
~ _ . __
67 1 projects; and I am well aware of those policies, (~{} J l 2 because I am trying to access the s!ealth 3 Department'c pregnancy data. 4 The confidentiality is not a bar. The 5 researcher merely has to agree to keep the 6 information confidential, and a signatory is a 7 sufficient bind for that. So here is another 8 . question of the Health Department's actions 9 concerning the pregnancy data. 10 I also want to talk about the study of 11 pregnant outcomes in the 10-mile area residents 12 following the accident. Those outcomes for 1979 {.. ~ 13 and the year following were not compared with base 14 line. statistics that the Health Department had on i 15 pregnancy outcomes for Three Mile Island area 16 residents. They were instead compared with 17 pregnancy outcomes for the following year, a year 18 when pregnancy outcomes were impacted by the 19 venting. 3 20 I can't imagine when the Health 21 Department had appropriate base line statistics. 22 In 1975 a study was begun by the Health Department 23 of Three Mile Island area pregnancies. That 24 pregnancy data was completely concealed. Many 25 independent researchers who wanted to get this I
68
,'}} 1 pregnancy data didn't even know it existed until I 2 told them about it. . 3 And the State Health Department finally 4 came out with that data. But they printed it in 5 such a way that you cannot separate out the 6 preaccident pregnancy outcome. Why? Wouldn't it 7 have been ideal for them to have appropriate base 8 line data to compare the 1979 pregnancy outcomes?
9 What kind of a study did we do? We did 10 an intelligent study. We looked for the effects 11 of the impact in the path of the impact. If you
, 12 were evaluating the effects of a twister, you look l- ~
13 where the broken trees are, not where there is no 14 damage. 15 We heard about two streets where many 16 residents had reported physical symptoms 17 associated with high-dose radiation. And they had i 18 i reported that on the first days of the accident 19 before they even knew there was an accident. 20 We went to those streets to inquire 21 about those experiences and the present health of i 22 those residents. We added a third street about 1 23 which we knew nothing except its physical l 24 characteristics. It was also west of Three Mile 25 Island with a high elevation and with an
69 unobstructed view of the towers. ({]) 1 i 2 We found the same effects here as on the l 3 other two streets. People had experienced 4 physical effects at the time of the accident. 5 People now had severe health problems, including 6 cancers. We now had three discreet samplings of 7 what we believe was people in the same universe. 8 We did an honest and accurate study. 9 The State verified the cancer mortality by 10 providing death certificates. I am ticked to see l 11 that the State claims we didn't give them the age 12 and the sex. 4
) -
l (~ i 13 They gave us the death certificates, l 14 twelve of them in October of 1984. We met with 15 them then in December of 1984 and provided all of 16 the information that they needed. 17 MR. AAMODT: This column and that column ' l 18 is the age and sex. The Department of Health was i
- 19 given this a full year before their report was 20 issued. .
l 21 And in that report they had the ' 22 unmitigated gall to slander us and say we did not 23 give it to them. On that kind of ethical base you i 24 would put your trust. I 25 MRS. AAMODT: But remember, they gave us I l I
- .-- ,. . - - - . ____,,,----_--__----.-...,-n_. ,,--.--,-,,-,_--.._y-,,m,.m-- . ,
70 i(}]) 1 this data first. They gave us the death 2 certificates, and then we gave it back to them in 3 this list. l 4 Three Mile Island Public Health Fund 5 verified our population base. It was actually 6 through the Health Fund that we got the death 7 certificates. Here is their letter, Dr. Cobb and ) 8 Dr. Jonathan Berger. 9 The Health Department is asserting that 10 we skipped around the areas to pick up cancer 11 deaths and left out other residents that we should
- 12 have included. The Public Health Fund did not 13 find that so.
14 In fact, we revised down the number of 15 people in our study because where they said where 16 we hadn't reached a home, we had added in too many 17 people. And that we had overestimated, not 18 under-estimated our population. I 19 MR. AAMODT: I think the point should be i 20 made that the Pennsylvania Department of Health 21 does not quarrel with any of the deaths. All of 22 these cancer deaths occurred. They have played 23 enormous games to try and prove that the rate ( 24 really isn't very high. 25 MR. SMITHGALL: I think in the letter it
l 71 (]lg 1 did state that it was the interpretations of Cobb 2 and Berger and not the Three Mile Island Public 3 Health Fund. 4 MRS. AAMODT: Well, the Three Mile 5 Island Public Health Fund assigned Dr. Cobb and 6 Dr. Berger. The Court, Sylvia Rambo, received a 7 copy of the study; and she then sent it down to 8 the Public Health Fund and said, Would you look 9 into this? The directors came to our home, two of 10 them did. 11 And when the NRC Commission asked us to
-y s, 12 nominate someone to verify our data, we then asked (V
13 Dr. Cobb if he would do that. He came to my home 14 because we didn't hear from the Commission to get 15 the data. And then the Public Health Fund decided 16 they would work through Dr. Cobb, and Dr. Berger 17 went ahead and verified the population base. 18 There was some question. We wanted that 19 letter that day. We knew they had verified it. 20 Dr. Berger and Dr. Cobb felt it was unfair not to l l 21 give us the letter since we had cooperated with 22 them, and they knew what we had was true. And 23 they couldn't get a vote of.the entire group, so ( 24 they went ahead as individuals and gave us that 1 25 letter.
72 {}} l MR. SMITHGALL: Thank you. 2 MRS. AAMODT: After the Health 3 Department put out their report, I contacted a man 4 who lives in Area 3. The Health Department 5 claimed that there were 71 people, not 54 as we , 6 had said. 7 I didn't tell this man when I called him 8 what the Health Department said; but I said, You 9 have lived there a long time. He had lived there 10 14 years. He is a businessman, dependable person. 11 I said, Could you possibly make a rough drawing of 12 your street and a count of the people that were R.y-y) 13 there at the time of the accident and send it to 14 me at the Barclay Hotel. We are having a press 15 conference there tomorrow. 16 He sent it by Federal Express and I had 17 it then for the press conference. He said there 18 were 50 people, as best he can estimate, and not 19 71. There is no hotel on that street. It is a 20 chort street. , 21 MR. AAMODT: This is our data. 22 Incidentally, the effect of that was to reduce the 23 rate by 30 percent. ( 24 MRS. AAMODT: I must say I called the 25 NRC to ask them whether the Health Department
73 1 would produce those maps that they showed you of ({]) 2 the other two areas, the red areas and the blue 3 areas, so that we could see where they thought we 4 should have surveyed. 5 The Health Department claims that they 6 couldn't locate those slides for us tonight. They 7 are misplaced. 8 We have no way to settle this issue with 9 the Health Department. It is in the best interest 10 of the people in this area that this issue is 11 settled, except through this committee. I hope 12 you will provide a time for the Health Department (O 13 to come and for us to directly -- I see Mr. 14 Gerusky is shaking his head no. 15 I can't imagine that Dr. Tokuhata is 16 intimidated by a layperson, as I am called. I l j 17 can't imagine that he would be so intimidated that 18 he would not want to appear here. 19 Here are statistics. We presented them, 20 not for six years as the Health Department says, ' 21 but we presented the statistics themselves. We 22 presented the tabulation for 1979 through 1984, 23 We did man analysis for 1980 through 1984, k 24 eliminating 1979, since that was the year of the 25 accident. There was just one cancer death in our
74 L (}} 1 area in 1979. < 2 This represents a rate that was seven , l 3 times that expected for that area. We developed 4 appropriate base line statistics. The Health ; 5 Department did not do that for their study. We ; i 6 used the statistics for those townships for those I 7 areas that we got from the Health Department, and 8 -we based our rate on those appropriate statistics. l 9 MR. AAMODT: I have a comment. ; t 10 First, we used for our expected rate, as [ 11 I indicated, the three sigma number for expected p. 12 cancers, not the average, but three sigmas. So l' 13 there would be no possibility of being criticized
?
14 for having chosen too low a number. > t 15 And the base population that we used was 16 the two townships in which our streets lay. So ; 17 this was data that did not need adjusting for age l 18 and sex and so on. It had to be very close. It l 19 had to be represencative. l 20 The other point is I read through all of l
- 21 the critiques that, after all, there are cancer '
22 clusters. You go to this town, and you will find , 23 seven cancers suddenly appear here this year and i 1 i 4} 24 five cancers appear over there somewhere. , 25 How does that argument change when you j b
- - , - - --< 7--- . . , . - . , ,,-.,,,,,..v,- , , .- . . - - . , , - -
75 average the number of cancers over four years? It
,(}]} l 1
2 is amazing how the clustering effect becomes not 3 so significant. I 4 We have averaged data over four years. 5 There was not one single year in the 15 years for 6 which we had data for these two townships where
-7 the rate exceeded the expected number, which is 8 1/7 of what we got; not one year in 15.
9 This is very valid data. It is 10 statistically very valid. We are not 11 epidemiologists, but we are honest researchers. 12 And it is terrible to make this accusation. 13 MR. G ERUS KY : Can you explain what you 14 are comparing now? You are comparing the i 15 published data against published data? 16 MRS. AAMODT: This is our data. i 17 MR. GERUSKY: Against what data? 18 MRS. AAMODT: This is the data gathered 19 by the citizen survey. l 20 MR. AAMODT: No, that is not what they 21 mean. 22 MR. GERUSKY: You said 15 years of data. I l - 23 MR. AAMODT: We got from the State of t ( 24 Pennsylvania -- we got the vital statistics for l 25 the two townships in which our streets lay, -
76 analyzed them, ran averages, calculated sigma for
/}{} 1 2 various -- we looked at it every way we could look 3 at it and took the most conservative approach we 4 possibly could with the State's data to determine, 5 based on the State's data and the history of these 6 people who had been looked at before the accident, 7 how many people you would have expected to die of 8 cancer. And the number was 1/7 of the number we 9 got.
10 MR. GERUSKY: I think you are missing 11 the question. 12 Are you comparing the State's data or (~t~ 13 the published data for the townships for the year 14 .in question with the 15 years ahead; or are you 15 comparing your data for that year in question to 16 the 15 years previously? 4 17 MR. AAMODT: Perhaps there is a 18 misunderstanding of what we did here. 19 MR. G ERUS KY : I am trying to understand 20 it. 21 MR. AAMODT: We did not analyze the 22 whole township. Maybe it is worth reviewing this L 23 briefly. ( 24 MR. GERUSKY: I know what you did -- the 25 information you presented on the one year. But
l i 77 1 you are now comparing the Pennsylvania data i (~(]) 2 against something, and I don't know what you are 3 comparing it against. 4 MR. AAMODT: What this group of people 5 did who did the survey was they had heard of cases 6 of people having red skin, other radiation effects 7 like that. And as God is my judge, we didn't know 8 of any cancers or cancer deaths. 9 Some people in the group may have, but
- 10 we didn't.
11 MR. GERUSKY: I don't think there is any 12 question -- CD 13 MR. AAMODT: But in any event, we had i 14 that information. So this group went out to two 7 15 streets where they knew of that. So out of these 16 however many thousand people there are in the l 17 population -- I don't recall. It was 20,000 some 18 or something. They surveyed two sets of 19 households. So they looked at about 500 people, 20 400 or 500 people, something like that. A little 21 less than that. 22 They looked at these two streets. They l l 23 were of particular interest to them as they were (] 24 winding up those two streets because they had 25 something unique about them in addition to the
78 fact that the people there had had red skin and (]{} 1
.2 metallic taste and things like that the first days
. 3 of the accident. They were on hilltops, high 4 elevations with a clear eyesight of the towers at 5 Three Mile Island.
6 So as Margie was leaving one night -- 7 and incidentally, Margie received her training 8 from Paul Ohmstead, who is the father of modern 9 statistical quality control; and I was taught by 10 him. So we are not without understanding of 11 statistical method. 12 I wanted to point that out. 13 MR. GERUSKY: I am still trying to get 14 an answer to the question of what you are
- 15 comparing. I know what you did.
16 MR. AAMODT: As they left, Margie said 17 Here is another hilltop road. We don't know 18 anything about it, but it was in line with one of l 19 the others. Let's take a look at it. 20 That was Area 1 -- Area 3. That was 21 Area 3. So these are the people they looked at.
- 22 The people who are listd there, nobody else. They 23 lived in those townships,
,( 24 We found out what was the description of 25 that universe in which that subset lay. And l l
79 knowing what the universe was, we said we had a (} } l 2 reason to predict validly the characteristics of 3 that subset. We did. We said the cancer rate 4 should be 1/7 of what it was. It is as legitimate 5 as can be. 6 MR. GERUSKY: That is questionable, but 7 I understand what you are doing. 8 MR. AAMODT: Beauty is in the eye of the 9 beholder. 10 MRS. AAMODT: The very fact that we have 11 three samples all saying the same thing.
-~ 12 MR. AAMODT: It is statistically so
( valid, it would make an honest statistician sick 13 I 14 to see what happened to this study in the hands of 15 the State of Pennsylvania. 16 MRS. AAMODT: I have a letter here 17 written to Dr. Coldwell saying that our study, 18 although with somewhat small numbers -- it is not l l 19 really small numbers. l 20 Dr. Ohmstead used to say a sample of ten i 21 well chosen is adequate. They didn't destroy more 22 telephones at the Bell Telephone laboratories than 23 they had to. He devised the test for small 24 sampling techniques. 25 I worked for him while I was at the Bell
80 1 1 Telephone Laboratory. He was very sensitive to (J]} 2 what you could find out from small samples. 3 I was rather impressed that we found the ;
- 4 same thing with all three samples.
5 MR. AAMODT: Statistically it was very 6 impressive, terribly impressive. 7 MRS. AAMODT: We knew that people had 8 these effects that are described as high-dose 9 radiation effects. Dr. Denton described them as 10 high-dose radiation effects when Mayor Reed, who 11 was then a Representative, wrote and said hundreds 12 of people are reporting red skin, blisters on { 13 their lips, loss of hair,' graying of hair, these 14 kinds of things, in the early days and weeks of 15 the accident. Would you investigate? 16 Dr. Denton said, No, because not enough 17 radiation got out to cause those high-dose 18 radiation effects. That is right. That is what 19 he said. I have the letters here if you would 20 like them for your record, both Representative i 21 Reed's letter and Dr. Denton's reply. 22 If the State wanted to do a good study, l r 23 a valid study, they would have gone out to look at ( 24 these people who had reported these effects to see 25 what their health was now and to look in the areas l
. _ _ - _ , . . _ = _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ 1_ _ _ . . _ . _ , . _ . _ _ - , . . . _ , . _ _ . , _ . . . _ , . . . . _.,
81 where these people resided. ((]) I 2 The Governor's hot line received 3 thousands of calls of people reporting these kinds 4 of symptoms. The State knew about them, but 5 nothing was done. 6 Here we are showing them our statistics. 7 We showed them in a manner that was a valid 8 manner. We said we compared them to appropriate 9 base line statistics. It was a five year period
, 10 from 1983 to 1984 (sic). And we showed the ratio 11 of overexpected to be seven.
i 12 There was a cancer rate in those areas 13 of 1,097 cancers per 100,000 rather than the 130 - 14 to 153 expected. i 15 Now, the State has also claimed that we 16 didn't say when cancers were diagnosed. 17 MR. AAMODT: Before we leave that, can l 18 we add one thing to be sure it is clear. 19 The State doesn't quarrel with those 20 20 deaths. They_ don't even quarrel with the number ' 21 of households. What they did do is they went to 22 Area 3 and said there are half again as many 23 people there, and there aran't. ' (] 24 They went to Area 2, and they said there 25 are almost twice as many people there; and there
3 82
- F}}} 1 weren't. Then they said we can justify doubling 2 your base.
?
3 And when they got done, they turned that l 4 number seven -- one more thing. What they did was ; f 5 they went down to include a period of time before ; s 6 the accident; and then they dropped 1984, which is ! 7 when they said one would begin to see cancer I 8 effects from the accident. ! 9 And having done all of those things, ! 10 they did manage to knock that 7 down to 2.3. They j i 11 justified by taking Area 2 and turning that number ; i 12 into about 500 this way. They said, Well, j 13 obviously, those Aamodts and all the other people 14 who went out there and did the surveying, they : 15 knew where the cancers were. ! i t i l 16 So theo limited themselves to that ! 17 street where the cancers were. And, of course, l 18 they confirmed the validity of their accusations l l 19 by calling us and talking to us, didn't they? No, 20 they didn't. l 21 They had our phone number. They could j 22 have been in contact with us. They never talked i 23 to us, f i i 24 They even ignored the report that we i i 25 sent them that fleshed out the report. The first !
83 (}} 1 report went in very hurriedly because it was 2 needed in the restart proceeding. 3 We had a great deal of information. 4 They had all that. They ignored that entirely. 5 Then what did they do? They went down 6 and said that Area 3 or Area 2 -- there are a 7 bunch of other streets there. They went down the 8 hill and around. 9 So they dug out their data; not, mind 10 you, the Cancer Registry that they had, not the J ] 11 data on the people who lived there the time of the 12 accident which they had. But they went through ,I 13 their census data to find out who is living there 14 now, half of whom didn't live there at the time of 15 the accident. 16 And by means of a paper search, they l 17 couldn't find any cancers there. Do you know if ( l 18 we had done that study with a paper study, we 19 wouldn't have found 20 cancers either. 20 And on that basis they said, Look at 21 those crooked Aamodts. 22 MR. GERUSKY: They didn't say that. 23 MR. AAMODT: They sure did. What they k 24 said was our study wasn't valid because we went to 25 the street where we knew the cancers were. l
84 1 MR. G ERUS KY : That's right. That's what ({]) 2 they said. They didn't say, Look at these crooked 3 Aamodts. 4 MR. AADMOT: Did they say we went where 5 we said we did? 6 MR. GERUSKY: I don't agree necessarily 7 with the Health Department. 8 MR. AAMODT: I hope you don't. 9 MR. GERUSKY: But the point is that that 10 is not what they said. And let's not make it out 11 to be worse than it was. 12 MRS. AAMODT: They said it couldn't
'~
13 really be an innocent thing that we would have by 14 chance picked the three streets where the only 15 cancers in that whole area occurred. That is what i 16 they said. l 17 Now whether that is as slanderous as we , 18 interpreted it, I don't know. I would have to ask 19 other people. We are always a little more 20 sensitive when things are about ourselves. 21 MR. ROTH: There is a quote, and I would 22 like to put this into the record. , 23 "When we looked at the data and compared i k 24 it to our own, it appeared that this was something 25 less than dispassionate, objective attempt to get , i
. - - . - - , - ,......_--,n - , ,
. __ - - - - -. - - . . = - - - .. _ - - - - -
85 l the facts." That is the quote.
~}}
2 MRS. AAMODT: I find that insulting. 3 MR. ROTH: My point is it is not really ! 4 serving the purpose at this time to really -- it t 5 is in the record. I think you are just using up 6 time. 7 MRS. AAMODT: What we did was reported 8 all the evidence, as is the practice of ethical
- 9 scientists, and then we hypothesized the most i
10 reasonable explanation for this evidence. 11 These were areas downwind. There were 1 12 physical effects there at the time of the accident 13 that were considered high-dose effects. And I
- 14 would invite you to read the affidavit.
15 These affidavits were prepared where t 16 there was a particularly unique and vivid i 17 experience where someone had been outside; in the l 18 one case where a man had been out for just an 19 hour. It was misting. The wind was in that 20 direction that evening. He went in and had 21 tingling skin and reddening of the skin.and other 22 classical symptoms, nausea. 23 He went to his doctor the next day. The ,( 24 doctor said, those are all high-dose radiation 25 effects, but it couldn't be from Three Mile Island
- - --, _ ,,.-n-- --n ,...--,-e-rn,--.----,--r~m-m-r m s w a n---,- --w_,
86 : because not enough got out. (}{} l 2 So this is -- this is -- these 3 affidavits have been prepared, and I wish you 4 would read them. There is a dentist's affidavit. 5 He doesn't live right in the area but very close 6 to the area, maybe within a quarter of a mile of 7 Area 3. He was nauseous and dizzy the first two
; 8 days of the accident. He didn't know there was an 4
9 accident and had 75 fogged films, dental films. 1 10 He made this quite well known. He saved the films 11 for a number of years. 12 The NRC never came near him to request ! 13 those films. The NRC did do a film study. They 14 chose five points, five places. And we will show l 15 you that right now in a map. I will get a little 16 bit off track just to show it to you so we don't r i l 17 have to come back to it. This was the NRC's film l 18 study. 19 When you gentlemen were down -- ladies 20 and gentlemen were down with the Commission last 21 month, I saw Commissioner Burnthal in the record , 22 again saying, You know, I am very much interested 23 in physical evidence that there was radiation in 1 24 the area. And he said that back in August of l 25 1984. Couldn't we go and look? There would be (
-_--,c
... ..-m .---,-._g. . . - . - - _ _ , , - . . _ _ - . _ - . . -,,,.s. __-._.m. . , ~ , . , . - , , , , . - , . . _ - . , ,,.w._..y- y , _ ~ _ - - - - .
87 traces in something. And Dr. Denton said, Oh, we ((]) 1 2 did a study like that. We did a film study. 3 We immediately got the film study, and 4 Norman critiqued it. We then gave this back to 5 the NRC, our critique. We didn't hear very much 6 more about the film study except that Dr. Denton 7 did say to you last month that he knew there was 8 this study of physical evidence, this film study. 9 This is where they looked. There were 10 five points chosen. Do you see where they were 11 located? There was a dentist who had 75 fogged 12 films. There was a store in Goldsboro, the 13 general store, that had fogged film. They didn't 14 ask there. 15 If you were going -- if I were going to 16 do this film study and I had the resources of the 17 NRC or HEW who did this, I would have gone to all 18 the dentists in the whole area and written them 19 letters and said, Did you have any fogged film? 20 Could you provide it? , 21 From that they could have plotted where h 22 the plume went, rather than just randomly choosing 23 five areas in that vast area out there. They did 24 find one specimen of fogged film, but then they 25 discounted it.
88 1 MR. AAMODT: They said after all,
}}
2 something must have happened to it because they 3 didn't know what the shielding was for any of 4 them. 5 They did a film study, but they didn't 6 even know the shielding effect. There was no 7 record of what type of buildings they were in or 8 what kind of boxes they were in. But there are 9 five samples out there that didn't show any 10 fogging. 11 And because five samples didn't show 12 more than a little fogging, is the way they put
'O 13 it, the conclusion was fascinating. It is~the 14 same thing that comes back all the time, just like 15 when you say "I have all the iodine data." They l 3
16 said because nothing got out, what'we got is i 17 consistent with what happened. So it was a valid ' l
- 18 study. !
i 19 That circular reasoning appears and l 20 reappears. At this point I just can't help but 21 throw in, Mr. Gerusky, that from four-thirty to 22 nine o' clock in the morning you have pitifully 23 little data about what got out. i ._. 24 MR. GERUSKY: We were talking about 25 iodine on Easter weekend. I am the first to admit i [
?
t 89 1 that we don't have data up until eight o' clock f (~{ } 2 that morning. But there are a lot of
- 3 environmental monitors that were still there and l l,
; 4 were there during --
j t 5 MR. AAMODT: Not at eight o' clock in the l I 6 morning. ( 4 , 7 MR. GERUSKY: Yes, there were, before ! 8 the accident. And were recording the data as it j 9 was released. I 10 MRS. AAMODT: You mean the 20 TLD's, a 11 number of which were not working, most of which ! 4 12 were on the inside? :
~
13 MR. AAMODT: None of which were in the !- 14 areas we surveyed.
; 15 And the helicopter --
the GPU claimed l 16 that the helicopter went at 7:48 and called back i 17 readings to you at about that time of no radiation 18 levels there. And later on GPU disclaimed it. f 19 We find that the first off-site surveys l l 20 were by truck at 8:30 in the morning. And the 21 helicopter left at nine. I 22 MR. ROTH: It is really difficult to ! 23 have both of you talking at the same time. I know i ( 24 Tom can really stand up for himself. I am not f l 25 concerned for that. i
- - - - - .- _ , . -. . - . - -.. - - - ....- - - . . - . -.. - . . .~ - .._ - . - .
90 f( } 1 But I think it is difficult for all of 2 us up here and for the lady over there to get it 3 down. So, please, one at a time. 4 MRS. AAMODT: I would just like to ask a 5 question. Did the helicopter make a survey 6 between seven-thirty and eight o' clock? 7 MR. G ERUS KY : I don't know. It has been 8 a long time. The first data I got -- we were 9 ready tc evacuate the people on the West Shore 10 until we got the data, 11 We had called and alerted to begin 12 proceeding.to evacuate the West Shore based upon l - ,.
~~
13 estimated iodine rates on the West Shore. 14 The data that we got back from the 15 survey teams of GPU indicated there wasn't. Our 16 survey teams we sent out, and we didn't find any 1 17 radioactivity over there. 18 An awful lot happened that first day. I t 19 When I took my depositions, it was within a year ; 20 of the accident. It has been a long time. I : 21 don't remember. 22 MRS. AAMODT: The first deposition was 23 in May, just a few months after. And you said you , 24 called off the general emergency because -- 25 MR. GERUSKY: We didn't call off any , l L
91 1 general emergency. We didn't ask for an {]) 2 evacuation. 3 MRS. AAMODT: You didn't call on a 4 general emergency because -- 5 MR. GERUSKY: We didn't ask for an 6 evacuation. 7 MRS. AAMODT: Because you had gotten 8 data back from a helicopter surveying the West 9 Shore. 10 MR. GERUSKY: No. We had a helicopter 11 fly in an air sample that was taken from the West
. - 12 Shore to our laboratory to verify whether there 13 was iodine on that sample or not, and there was 14 not.
15 MRS. AAMODT: Well -- 16 MR. G ERUS KY : It was a field 17 misinterpretation of data. There is an awful lot 18 you don't know about this. If you want to talk 19 about it, we can talk about it. 20 MRS. AAMODT: We can't get into an 21 argument of whether -- 22 MR. GERUSKY: Surely don't make -- j 23 MRS. AAMODT: I don't want to get into ( 24 that now, because I think it is pretty well agreed 25 that Dr. Lea has looked into all the dose 1
l 92 l assessment studies; and he has indicated that l{} 1 2 th'e r e is no real conclusive data on dose 3 assessment. 4 There are windows. And we will show you 5 later on where the windows are and where our 6 survey areas are. I just want to say that the 7 State was wrong in saying we didn't say when the 8 cases were diagnosed. We said when 12 of the 20 9 were. We didn't have information on the others. 10 Some of the people had moved away; some 11 were a single person in a family that were dead. 12 And so we could not get their information.
~O 13 As you can see there, we said that four 14 tumors were diagnosed prior to the accident, Cases 15 1, 2, 3, and 8 that relate to the death 16 certificate and that the following cases were 17 diagnosed after the accident.
, 18 Whether they were diagnosed before or 19 after the accident doesn't mean that the death was 20 not caused by the accident. If the immune system 21 is depressed, cancer progresses rapidly to 22 termination. Although the cancer was not 23 initiated by the accident, it doesn't mean that ( 24 the death wasn't caused by the accident. 25 If the accident reduced -- by impact on I
93 the immune system, reduced the immune system (* 1 2 functioning and the death -- the cancer came to a 3 rapid termination because of that immune system 4 depression, the death can be related, therefore, 5 to the accident. 6 If a bus comes along and runs into 50 7 people, nobody goes out to check and see whether 8 some of those people were about to die the next 9 day, to see whether the bus company is 10 responsible. 11 MR. WALD: Are you suggesting that 12 radiation therapy shouldn't be used for cancer _O 13 patients? 14 MRS. AAMODT: I think there is a real 15 question here in my mind now. And we know of 16 someone right now who is getting it. 17 We understand that they give a very 18 high-dose radiation therapy; there is a regression l l 19 of the cancer; then the person suddenly goes down, 20 the cancer returns like gang busters; and the f I 21 person's life is terminated. So maybe tnat is , 22 exactly what we are seeing with radiation therapy. , 23 Maybe we are seeing a depression in the i k3 ) 24 immune system. The cancer is destroyed. But when 25 the immune system is destroyed, what cancer is
94
-1 left returns.
(-}{} 2 MR. AADMOT: I think besides -- 3 MRS. AAMODT: I have been doing a lot of l 4 thinking about this. And I really -- when we went 5 out to do this survey, when I heard Commissioner 6 Bennick, who was the Chairman of your group, 7 retire and speak before the NRC Commission in 8 Washington just before he retired, he said, There 9 are so many people who are attributing cancers in 10 the Three Mile Island accident -- to the Three 11 Mile Island accident -- Three Mile area -- to the
! 12 Three Mile accident, I really was almost 'id_
13 embarrassed by that comment. 14 I did accept at that point official 15 latency period. I frankly was totally surprised ( 16 by what we found, flabbergasted by what we found. 17 I did not expect to find even initiated 18 cancers from the Three Mile Island accident. Here 19 are the ones we found that the State says we 20 didn't say anything about cancer morbidity. These 21 are the 26 cancers we found in living persons in 22 those same survey areas. I 23 MR. AAMODT: Before you go on to that, I ( 24 would like to respond just slightly further to 25 Neal. l
-n.~--c.,.-..
f 95 (j]} You said, Does that mean we shouldn't
~
1 2 use X-ray therapy? I think that illustrates 3 another point here that maybe we should have 4 clarified. 5 We are not talking about X-ray exposure 6 to the people at Three Mile Island. We are 7 talking, first, about gamma radiation, which has a 8 different -- 9 MR. WALD: I said radiation therapy, 10 gamma radiation, cobalt-60. 11 MR. AAMODT: All right. But we are 4 12 talking about an entirely different inventory of cD. 13 radioactive materials here that may have been out i 14 in the environment because of the accident. 15 I think that is the point we ought to 16 bear in mind. In fact, I don't think there is i l 17 anybody who can accurately say just exactly what l 18 it was the people were exposed to, except that it l l 19 might have been very serious. l
- 20 And what we are suggesting is that we l
! 21 ought to look more closely to determine whether or 22 not it was. 23 MRS. AAMODT: We think there is some ( 24 evidence from -- and I have an NRC document with 25 me that.shows that there were transuranics on the j I r
?
l-.- -. .;,,...--. _ ,,
l 96 l l filters very early in the accident, which would be (] } l 2 alpha radiation. 3 Here the cancers and tumors in living 4 persons -- the first time we went around we had 5 19. People did not want to tell us about their 6 cancers. When I went back just to the homes of 7 the 19 to get the permission from these people for 8 the Public Health Fund to look into medical 9 records, I found an additional seven tumors or 10 cancers in those same groups that people were 11 reluctant to tell me about. 12 It was in a young person, and they
.O 13 thought it would hurt the person's job 14 opportunity; and they would not give them to us.
15 So these were the cancers, and this is how they 16 clustered in the families. i 17 MR. WALD: Am I correct -- it is hard to 18 see from here. But are there any leukemias there? 19 MRS. AAMODT: No. 20 MR. WALD: And how many thyroid cancers? 21 MRS. AAMODT: There is a thyroid tumor. 22 I will read you what there are. There 23 are ovaries, breasts.
- I(
i 24 MR. WALD: I have it now. So one l l 25 thyroid and one leukemia. ; I
97 1 ({) 1 MR. AAMODT: And there is that same -- 2 MRS. AAMODT: Remember, we don't have 3 everything here. We found it very difficult to 4 get -- I would say the cancer mortality data -- 5 the cancer mortality data was quite easy to get. 6 People told us about a death. That was final. 7 But it was quite difficult to get people 8 to discuss their deficiencies, as they considered 9 them, I am sure, at this point. 10 So I don't think we have everything in i 11 the cancers in living. persons. One woman stood at
,._S 12 her doorway with a lump that was so large in her s 'sJ ~
13 right arm telling me that everything was all right 14 until I finally got the courage to say, Is that a , 15 lump in your arm? 16 She has recently gone to the doctor. I 17 have kept in touch with her and encouraged her to 18 go to the doctor. It appears as though it was l 19 benign. I didn't call back, though, to get the l l 20 diagnosis on it. l 21 Another, a man, a man whose wife died of 22 leukemia and whoFa daughter had ruptured valves in 23 her heart, spontaneously ruptured. And the i l 24 neighbor across the street had a ruptured spleen. l 25 The man in Area 1 had ruptured valves in his
98 {}} l heart. And so we found five cases of that in the 2 survey area. 3 This man lost his wife, had his daughter 4 very ill, his son moved away; and he finally told 5 me once when I called him that he had a lump in 6 his spine, but he wasn't going to have anything 7 done about it. We don't even have that on this j 8 chart. I don't believe. 9 So people didn't tell all their 10 problems. They weren't seeing doctors many times 11 for their problems because they were frightened to 12 do so or just discouraged. 13 So here we have the clusters in 14 families. We have 11 abnormal outcomes within 19 i 15 pregnancies and very substantial anomalies in 16 flora, which we had evaluated by an expert in the 17 field, Dr. James Kunkle, 34 years in the field of l l 18 studying ionizing, effects of ionizing radiation j
- 19 on plants, t 20 Also a professor from Rutgers University 21 and formerly of the Brookhaven Laboratories, who
, 22 said that the range and types of plant I 23 abnormalities that we brought to him, which he ' ( 24 studied for ten hours, were of the kind that could j 25 be caused by high-dose beta radiation for a period i
99 of 24 hours. (}{} l 2 We, therefore, made the hypothesis that 3 fit the evidence, which was that high doses of , 4 radiation had passed over these areas; that the 5 people were the biological meters of radiation in
- 6 the environment; and that the health effects that 7 occurred subsequently were due to these high doses 8 of radiation.
9 There were other health effects which we 10 didn't quantify but which were reported and noted
, 11 in some cases, like skin rashes.
l 12 There were windows, as I said, in the CD 13 radiation detection system. And we have shown the 1 14 areas where we surveyed and their relationship to 15 those windows. 16 This is from Dr. John Bea's study. He 17 studied all the data. I am sorry that is kind of 18 messed up; but if you look, you will see where ! 19 Area 1 was. Area 3 was actually further back, but l 20 the viewgraph ended at that point. Area 2 is in a i 21 window. Area 1 is at the edge of a window, and ! j 22 Area 3 is somewhat at the edge of a window. I i [ 23 11 R . GERUSKY: The dark areas are your 24 windows? 25 MRS. AAMODT: Yes. ! f i
100 1 MR. AAMODT: I think the window is a {} } 2 very subjective thing because of its relationship 3 to time early in the accident (inaudible). 4 MRS. AAMODT: But the NRC measured some 5 rather large releases of radiation outside the 6 plant; but we believe they weren't properly 7 interpreted. 8 After I presented our study at the TMI 9 Health Fund Dosimetry Conference last November, a 10 Dr. Monty Grimes, who is a chemist from Colorado 11 who has done a number of studies on radiation 12 effects in victims, became very much interested. '(h 13 She said, I don't really believe this; 14 but I somehow or other believe you. And she did a 15 very great amount of work using the data that was 16 available and came to some rather startling 1 17 conclusions. 18 There was a measurement on the ground 19 under the plume of 365 millirems. There were r 20 measurements of 3,000 and 1,200 millirems from 21 helicopters. These readings -- as I say, the one : 22 was a shine reading on the ground and not in the : 23 plume. The others were in the plume. (] 24 But in each case, the major proportion - l 25 of that release was beta radiation. Therefore, '
i' 101 4 the beta part, which was most of it, needs to be l(}{} l 1 2 2 multiplied times ten to come to the factor, the ! I 3 quality factor or the dose, the biological dose to 4 people. 5 So if you take 3,000 -- 6 MR. GERUSKY: No. I'm sorry. Quality 4 7 factor for beta is one. 8 MRS. AAMODT: It's ten. 9 MR. WALD: One. 10 MR. GERUSKY: It is one. 11 MRS. AAMODT: One what? 12 MR. WALD: One. .b 13 MR. GERUSKY: One. I
- 14 MR. WALD
- It is the same as X-ray or 15 gamma.
16 MR. AAMODT: Beta? i l 17 MR. WALD: Yes. 18 MR. AAMODT: I disagree. There is a 19 good deal of evidence to the contrary. 20 MRS. AAMODT: Dr. Grimes says the 21 quality factor of beta radiation is ten times the 22 quality factor of gamma radiation. 23 And that the standards are on X-ray. (] 24 And so that the standards for radiation exposure 25 when exposed to beta should be -- there'is a
-_ .2___..._.__..._..._-_.-..
102 1 difference of a. factor of 100. (}}} 2 MR. GERUSKY: No. 3 MRS. AAMODT: I see even in the ad hoc 4 committee they used a four times multiplication. 5 Dr. Grimes says ten times, and Dr. Bumble 6 (phonetic) says ten times. 7 MR. G ERUS KY : The ad hoc committee says 8 what? 9 MRS. AAMODT: The ad hoc committee says 10 that releases that are beta releases and measured 11 in roentgens need to be multiplied by four. 12 MR. GERUSKY: To get the rad dose. i~. ~O 13 MRS. AAMODT: To get the rems. - 14 MR. AAMODT: To get the tem dose. 4 15 MR. GERUSKY: Same thing. That is 16 because of the measurement system, not because of 17 the quality factor. 18 MRS. AAMODT: That's right, yes. That 19 is because of the measurement system? 20 MR. GERUSKY: Yes. 21 MRS. AAMODT: But then there is a l 22 quality factor. l 23 MR. GERUSKY: Which is one. The quality 24 factor is one. ; E 25 MRS. AAMODT: I don't think so. But we i ! t I _ -
,_ - _I
103 ! will look into that. ({ } 1 2 MR. AAMODT: This is one thing we don't 3 have to argue about. 4 MRS. AAMODT: Let me read to you what 5 Dr. Grimes says. 6 MR. GERUSKY: First of all, we agree 7, with you that those numbers are real, the reported 8 numbers. And therefore, the beta doses in rads 9 are equivalent to four times as much. That is 1 10 fine. I don't have any problem with that, the 11 numbers. 1.2 I was on the radio and on the telephone i(I:) 13 getting the data from the helicopter reporting 14 those numbers. I don't have a problem with that 15 number, and the data is solid. Twelve hundred is 16 the number that caused the panic on Friday. 17 MRS. AAMODT: But the problem was that 18 you assumed that that was going to be disbursed. 19 MR. GERUSKY: It was. 20 MRS. AAMODT: How about the people -- 21 but the NRC says in their document that the winds 22 were very gentle and the plumes were very narrow 23 and the plumes moved very slowly. l( 24 How about the hilltops where we surveyed 25 that were directly in the path of those plumes? l
104 (}gg 1 MR. G ERUS KY : That is why the 2 helicopters were up there.
! 3 MR. AAMODT: But the people were there, 4 too; and they were subject, then -- someone who 5 was at the center line of the plume was subject to 6 the intensity of that plume.
! 7 MR. G ERUS KY : But not 1,200, because 8 1,200 is at the top of the stack, directly at the d 9 point above the stack. 1 10 You cannot have the same concentration 11 as you go out across the river. There is no way. 12 MRS. AAMODT: You may not have gotten
; eo~~
13 the highest concentration because you were 14 measuring with a helicopter, which can blow the i 15 plume away. i 16 But even if it was only 1,200 millirems, 17 and mostly beta, you would have to multiply times 18 4 or 3,000 millirems. You have to multiply times i 19 4. You are 12,000 millirems. That is 12 rems. 20 MR. GERUSKY: At the point of -- 21 MRS. AAMODT: Twelve rems. And if a 22 person -- f 23 MR. GERUSKY: -- density. ( 24 MRS. AAMODT: If a person were sitting 25 out there for several hours --
105 ((} 1 MR. G ERUS KY : What? Sitting on the 2 stack? That would be a real problem. I agree 3 with you. 4 MRS. AAMODT: No, sitting on a mountain 5 top a few miles away in the path of a narrow 6 plume. 7 This is what Dr. Grimes says, "This 8 means that early plumes from the TMI accident 9 touchdown gave an exposure - " and plumes don't 10 stay up all the time. They sometimes come down, 11 "-- gave an exposure of at least 15 rems an hour 12 on an average or 105 rems an hour maximum. The 13 early plumes could have had much higher radiation 14 levels, but there was insufficient data to 15 estimate the exact levels." 16 And she goes on to say down here "This 17 means that people exposed from early plume 18 touchdowns received about 300 rems. And this is 19 quite consistent with the health effects reported 20 in the Aamodt study." 21 This is someone who has taken the data 22 that was there, just as I said as to the iodine 23 data, the 100 pCi/mm cubed, it stood there in the ( 24 reports. Nobody interpreted it correctly. Nobody 1 25 put the significance on that number until for some l l i i
- I 106
((} 1 reason or another it ticked my interest, and I l 2 sent it down to Dr. Molholt. 3 MR. AAMODT: I think there is one point 4 that should be added here that you are unaware of 5 and I think is very important. 6 Dr. Grimes was one of the team hired 7 that was under contract with the EPA to study the 8 effects of releases at Rocky Flats. 1 9 And the methodology she developed to
; 10 determine what the concentrations were on the 11 ground because of releases from the weapons plant 3
12 there was precisely the methodology she employed i - l 13 here. She is a credible researcher, renowned in ! 14 her field for what she had did. 15 We will have, I am sure, ample i f 16 opportunity in the future to test her credentials
- 17 in this particular matter. But it is her view, i 18 and she is the most credible person with regard to l f 19 the technology of the touch down of plumes and the l l 20 effect on people that, perhaps, many of us know !
l 21 of. [ l . l 22 MR. GERUSKY: Talk to an air pollution ' i 23 control engineer if you want to know information j (_ 24 plumes and about release from the stack. 25 MR. AAMODT: You know what really l I
107 intrigues me when you make that comment is why in G) 1 2 the world the NRC and the EPA following the Three 3 Mile Island accident didn't do a thorough study of 4 the effect of touch downs of plumes? And they 5 were not done. l 6 MRS. AAMODT: They assumed not much got 7 out. So they assumed they could use a dispersion 8 model since not much got out. 9 I want to just show you -- 10 MR. GERUSKY: That is not true. 11 MR. DI NUNNO: You have to allow some 12 interruption. You get so outrageous with some of ] 13 the statements you are making, that as a scientist 14 you really have to object. 15 At least to make clear to the public, we 16 are listening to you very carefully because that 17 is your privilege and that is what we are here 18 for. 19 But it shouldn't be interpreted that 20 everything you are saying is being accepted as 21 credible to us as a scientist. It is not. 22 I don't know when you want us to cut in 23 and say, Hey, you know as a scientist we think you ( 24 are a bit shaky here in your observations. 25 I don't want to do that because I don't
108 1 want to interrupt your presentation. But you are r{} 2 sitting here talking to somebody. We have done 3 plume studies. 4 I have directed these myself. We have 5 done tracer studies, many tracer studies of t 6 which -- l l 7 MRS. AAMODT: Could you refer me to your 8 study on the Three Mile Island accident? 9 MR. DI NUNNO: We have done studies at 10 Southern California Edison where they were 11 concerned about the plume coming down on the beach t 12 where people were because of some unusual ! lI 13 meteorological conditions there. , i 14 There were tracer studies done where we I l ! 15 released tracer materials from the sources of i i I 16 release and with different meteorological towers I i 17 actually measured where these things went and { , I j 18 compared the measurement results with the ; IS predicted measurements over the predicted f , 20 calculations. 21 So these touch down phenomenon are not , I l 22 new -- [ 23 MRS. AAMODT: I am not saying they are ; 24 new to the -- 25 MR. DI NUNNO: Of course not.
. - - - _ . _ . . . - _ . _ . . _ _ ~ . _ . - . . - _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . - - - - , _ .
109 (}} l MRS. AAMODT: I am saying they are new j 2 to Three Mile Island. Where were they -- 3 MR. ROTH: Hold it. Hold it. Time out. 4 We are doing it again. 5 We are approaching ten minutes to ten. 6 And we talked about two hours, and we are really 7 quickly approaching that time limit. 8 MRS. TAYLOR: Well, you didn't even -- 9 MR. ROTH: I don't need to hear from 10 you, Mrs. Taylor. Just let me talk. 11 We want you to have the freedom to say > 12 what you want to say; and at the same token, I 13 am -- I can see why Arthur i s not here tonight. i 14 I am trying to balance this whole thing, 15 since I was one of the ones who was probably more
~
16 critical of Dr. Muller. And that is why I am i i 17 trying to keep quiet. 18 But in the same token, I have a feeling ! 19 that we are getting a little bit away from what 20 you wanted to say. At the same time, I think the i 21 panel members have every right to question as we 22 questioned Dr. Muller. 23 And what I want to make you aware of i s (b 24 your time is really running out. There are 25 members of the public who said they wished to make
- - - - ,-m , , , . - - - - - - , - . = - - . , , , . , - - , , . _ . - - , , - . -
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"t 110
, ({ } 1 statements. And then we want to get this done.
2 MRS. AAMODT: Why don't we just do this? 3 I want to say that I have j ust three more things l 4 very, very briefly to put on. 5 These are plumes from the NRC's own 6 investigation of the accident, j
! 7 MR. ROTH: Before you do it, I would \
8 like to let Joe finish what he was saying, his 9 statement on that. And then you can finish. ,. 10 MRS. AAMODT: Okay. 11 MR. DI NUNNO: I don't want to belabor 12 the point. I think I have made it.
, (G
j 13 But you certainly -- we want to hear 14 what you are saying. What I would like to hear,
- 15 and what I think would be most useful to all of 16 us, I am not so much concerned with your quarrels 17 with the State and what they did to you and what
) 18 they didn't. You may have a legitimate complaint l 19 about their not cooperating and so forth, i i 20 But what I am interested in is what 21 facts you have, what you have dug up, and why you 22 think some cf the things that have been presented 23 are not consistent with your own findings. ( 24 Now, that would be most helpful, I l 25 think.
111 l MRS. AAMODT: Well, I think we did do (( ) 1 2 that. We told you how we think the State 3 Department -- 4 MR. DI NUNNO: There are many things you 5 have done. 6 MRS. AAMODT: Our study was presented to 7 this committee in October of 1984. We did not go 8 into that in detail. We did present you our 9 table. And I think we gave you our study 10 protocol. We went to those three roads, and that 11 is what we found. And we stand by that. 12 The Health Department did not disturb cD 13 that. They verified our data. The Three Mile 14 Island Health Fund verified our data. l 15 We are trying to show you -- you are 16 saying -- everyone is saying, But it couldn't have 17 happened. It happened, but it didn't happen. It l 18 happened, but it is not significant because they 19 knew where the cancers were. Then they say the l 20 cancers couldn't be related to the accident 21 because there isn't enough latency period. 22 And they are saying that the ones 23 diagnosed before the accident couldn't be -- ( 24 were -- had no effect -- the accident had no l 25 effect on those. l
I 1 i 112 People told us, you know, Mrs. So-and-So (]{} l , 2 had breast cancer for eight years; and two months 4 j 3 after the accident she suddenly died. She was 4 stabilized. l 5 My father had prostate cancer for six or j 6 seven years. As soon as the accident happened, he 7 died. We got that from people. My husband had 8 prostate cancer. It was stabilized. Those were 9 the cancers before the accident. 10 I didn't believe it at the time, but I l 11 do now after I have studied a little more about , ,_ 12 the immune system. t - 13 We are trying to give you some of the l 14 arguments as to why the arguments against our l l 15 study are not valid arguments. I also wanted to I 16 give you this data to chow you that we really l 17 don't know what got out, that the NRC's argument 18 that the people couldn't have had red faces 19 because nothing got out just doesn't hold water 20 because this thing did get out. 21 And I want to show you quickly -- three 22 plumes quickly. The middle plume was the plume to 23 the west / northwest, which is where two of our l( 24 study areas were. 25 The first plume -- this really isn't the i
113 1 first plume, because they admit the first plume ('{}} 2 was at 7:00 in the morning. And as I said, there 3 were not surveys of that. It wasn't until 4 eight-thirty that the survey teams reached the 5 West Shore. 6 This is what the NRC calls the first 7 plume in its study. And it says, "The licensee 8 failed to perform radiation surveys in the first 9 plume until 2230 -- until actually -- let's see. 10 That was ten-thirty at night at Kunkle School, 11 more than five hours after the plume appeared to 12 have been established. 13 Then on the second plume, this you will 14 notice -- that was to the north. And then this l 15 you will see is to the west / northwest. The 16 licensee failed to perform any radiation surveys 17 in the second plume appearing in two hours. This 1 18 is over our area. 19 Then the third plume -- 20 MR. GERUSKY: What was the time on that? 21 It was at the top right, but I couldn't 22 see it. 23 MR. AAMODT: 340 to 540 -- on 3/29 -- 24 0340 to 0540. l 25 MR. GERUSKY: Thank you. l t
114 i 1 MRS. AAMODT: There were no surveys {a
- 'JTl 2 performed there, and here is the -- the surveys 3 were performed in the third plume beginning at six 4 o' clock in the morning in Goldsboro, where the 5 result of radiation level of 30 millirems s
6 beta-gamma, and most of that -- most of that was 7 gamma, 20 was gamma. 8 So there was -- the main point is that i 9 the secor.d plitme -- there were no surveys in that. i 10 That was over our -- i 11 M. R . DI NUNNO: What was the time again? 12 MR. GERUSKY: What was the time? 13 MR. AAMODT: It was 0340 to 0540, 14 MR. GERUSKY: Same day? l 15 MR. AAMODT: Yes. 16 MR. G ERUS KY : I want the last one. The 17 one that has no data. 18 MR. AAMODT: No. This is the one that 19 has data. 20 MR. GERUSKY: Oh, okay. 21 MRS. AAMODT: I think we can conclude i 22 there. And if you have any questions, I hope you 23 will read the affidavits. These people -- I was i ( 24 so impressed with this. This was not my first 25 order of business in the spring of 1984.
I l 115 ({} 1 We had purchased a home in Lake Placid, 2 New York. And we were hoping to sell our farm. 3 And our lives got completely turned around because 4 of this Three Mile Island health issue. 5 And I spent all my time full time on it. 6 And believe me I wouldn't be wasting my time on 7 something that I thought was made up or 8 incredible. 9 These people are hurting in the areas 10 where they were impacted. And they are really 11 hurting. And several people are hurt in families. 12 I think that being the citizens committee, somehow 13 or other we need to resolve this. We need to i 14 resolve our differences in a forum with the Health 15 Department. 16 We need to come here and ask them l 17 questions. And they need to ask us questions. 18 And we need to find out whether something can be 19 done about these citizens and their concerns and 20 their personal injuries. 21 MR. WALD: Can I ask a couple of 22 questions? 23 MR. ROTH: Sure. ( 24 MR. WALD: When you say something needs 25 to be done, I have been wanting to ask you what
i 116
;;~( } 1 your view is, if you have any knowledge of the 2 proposed studies which have now been funded by the 3 TMI Fund to look at adverse pregnancy outcomes and 4 also to look at adult and childhood cancers, the 5 pattern of adult and childhood cancers in the 6 Three Mile region by Dr. Susser and his colleagues i
7 at Columbia University? 8 Have you any knowledge of those proposed
- 9 studies?
1 10 MRS. AAMODT: I am aware of that. 11 MR. WALD: Are you satisfied with the 12 proposed --
!(] 13 MRS. AAMODT: Very satisfied with the 14 choice of researchers. But I am very dissatisfied 15 that the Health Department has not willingly and 16 readily given the pregnancy data to these I 17 researchers who plan to have a study out in 18 February of 1986.
19 They still haven't decided whether to i 20 give the data to them. 21 MR. WALD: That wasn't my question. My 22 question was about the design of the proposed 23 study. l (] I 24 MRS. AAMODT: I haven't even seen the j 25 protocol for the study. i
117 1 And I understood that I would be 4 t'~{]) l 2 included on that panel, and I have not received 3 any letter from the Public Health Fund on that. i 4 I am anxious to be included on that i l 5 panel, because I have spent full time educating 6 myself on the subject. I am very willing to give i 7 my time. ! l 8 MR. WALD: You should ask Dr. Berger to l 9 send you copies of the proposal, because I think 1 10 perhaps this will move things in a direction that
- 11 is more successful than further arguments back and i
, 12 forth about your initial study and the State C,O j 13 Health Department's study. This hopefully should i l 14 be a more definitive study than either of them. 1 i 15 MRS. AAMODT: But will they be -- l 16 MR. WALD: I do have to say this about l 17 the data that was collected on the population, j 18 which I referred to last time, as you pointed out. 19 At that time, which was the end of March 20 and the beginning of April of 1979, I didn't see l 21 the Civil Liberty's Union or any other group other i ! 22 than the census Department and the State Health i 23 Department. 24 And as they were collecting the data, I ( 25 subsequently, it was locked up. And these were l l
118 And the Census Department
}{} l the only two agencies.
2 said that the data was privileged and confidential 3 and had to be locked up. 4 This was back at the very beginning 5 before there were any legal claims or anything 6 else. And that is the basis -- I was there. And 7 that is the basis on which I am saying it was 8 locked up, because of the agency's request. It 9 was a requirement. 10 MRS. AAMODT: All data is locked up. 11 Isn't that the way? But why is it so uniquely I 12 locked up, I think, raises a question. (.
- 13 MR. WALD: Well, I think all census data 14 is treated that way by the Department of the 15 Census which collaborated in collecting the data.
16 Another question I want to ask is about 17 the erythema which you mentioned. The level of 18 radiation which produces erythema is about at 19 least 300 rads; for more penetrating radiation, i 20 even higher. 21 And it is interesting that that level is 22 also the generally accepted lethal dose for a
; 23 population where if everybody got 300 or 400 rads, t
24 there would be 50 percent fatalities. 25 Have you looked at mortality in this l
119 (}} l population? Have we lost 50 percent of the people 2 with erythema? 3 MRS. AAMODT: No. But your premise is 4 possibly shaky in that Dr. Brannigan from the NRC 0- , 5 told us that a dose of 100 rems would cause 6 erythema. 7 And so I also believe that there is a 8 difference between local dose and whole body dose. l 9 And it would be'a whole body dose that would cause 10 the deaths. 11 But this we believe was a local dose, 12 from a particular deposition. We think this was l CD 13 ' beta particulates or alpha particulates that were l 14 released from the reactor. And this kind of dose 15 would cause local erythema. And that is what f 16 happened. ! l 17 People's whole bodies were not red; l f 18 exposed areas were red. For instance, the woman ! 19 in Affidavit 6 who went out on her porch had a ! 20 little kerchief around her head, and she had a 21 house dress that was curved at the neck and short 22 in the sleeves. And it was only in those areas l 23 that she got erythema. She still has this () 24' discolored skin. You can go see her. Dr. Kirk 25 was to see her. He saw her discolored skin. She ! t i
,-,--,,,, inn,-------,,c.,_,en_.n~,-+,, --- ,c..- -,nn,~~~~-+-v.,, w-v-nn-~ - - - - , .
120 l has cysts that reappear on her skin. (]} ! 2 MR. WALD: That is not a characteristic i 3 of radiation induced erythema. It i 4 characteristically comes and goes in waves over a 5 few days to a few weeks and disappears, i ! 6 MRS. AAMODT: I think we are making -- i 7 we have to separate our thinking on what is 8 characteristic. Nothing ever happened like Three 4 9 Mile Island before. j
- 10 Why would a researcher go out and have
. 11 preconceptions? That to me would be poor 12 research. I don't understand this. ! ' ( 13 MR. WALD: Alpha, beta, gamma radiation i l 14 never happened before? j 15 MRS. AAMODT: No. That's -- that's -- , 16 the combination, cinergistic action (phonetic) -- l 17 chemicals that got out of the plant. ! 18 This was -- this -- we don't know what l 19 got out"of the plant. There are hundreds of -- of i 20 kinds of material that could get out of the plant. , f 21 MR. WALD: The curve that you show to be i i 22 Japanese was (inaudible) fallout, and that's the l i 23 same thing. l 24 MR. ROTH: Please, one at a time. 25 MR. AAMODT: Is fallout the same as the v.-.- - . . . - . - .-m----. ------..------.,.m .,-----.r.w, .e,--- ..--...--...--------.--,---e._. - - - --------.---.r.~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - , - .
i l 121 1 1 inventory of the nuclear reactor?
'(])
2 MR. WALD: Alpha, beta, and gamma. 3 MR. AAMODT: You know the inventory is.
; 4 not the same.
5 MR. WALD: Yes, it is. 6 MR. AAMODT: I don't even think anybody 7 knew what the inventory was that got out. 8 MR. G ERUS KY : It is a weapon. It is a 9 nuclear fuel. It is fission. It is the same 10 thing. It is inside a reactor; it is slightly 11 different. 12 MRS. AAMODT: Slightly different?
<D 13 MR. AAMODT: But I would like to make a 14 comment also along the points raised here. .
,! ~ l 15 There is another issue I think here that 16 is terribly important. We talk about the i 17 erythema. And we have heard reasons, again based 18 on judgments, about how, Well, it really couldn't 19 have happened. I worked at Bell Labs for many 20 years and -- ) 21 MR. WALD: Excuse me. That is not what 22 I said. I am accepting the erythema. I am asking t 23 about other things -- . ( 24 MR. AAMODTt But we are -- 25 MR. ROTH: Wait. Wait. We are doing it 4 l s
122 r}) 1 again, folks. We are not in a living room just 2 discussing. We are trying to get this on a 3 transcript. It is impossible to get it on a 4 transcript when we do this. 5 MR. WALD: One would look in localizied 6 erythema for other signs of radiation effect. For 7 instance, if the erythema is on the face, 8 presumably the lens of the eye is in the exposed 9 area. i' 10 MRS. AAMODT: We got those reports of 11 sweaty -- looking for -- 12 MR. WALD: Cataract induction -- excuse 13 me. Can I continue? 14 MR. ROTH: Please let him finish. 15 MR. WALD: Cataract induction is at 16 about the same threshold as erythema. And this 17 would be another end point then to consider in 18 these thousands of cases of erythema. 19 I am just asking whether you know of any
- 20 that has been done? And let me ask another 21 question or a comment.
22 The types of cancer that you have 23 identified are not the types -- as you know, ( 24 leukemia is the first to appear in a radiated 25 population. And there seems to be a deficit of
I 123 leukemia. You made points about iodine, and yet J'} l 2 there is only one thyroid cancer. 3 The pattern of the disease, the latent 4 period, however you look at Petri dishes, has been 5 established on the basis of epidemiologic studies 6 of human beings exposed to radiation under a 7 variety of circumstances. And the latency is 8 agreed on by a whole spectrum from Dr. John Gofman 9 on the one hand to whomever you want to name on 10 the other hand. 11 I come back to the fact that alpha and 12 gamma and beta radiation, regardless of whether it (D. 13 comes from a power plant or a fission event out in 14 Nevada at a test site or a bomb at Hiroshima, 15 there are only certain physical events that take 16 place with these types of radiation. 17 And there is no reason that one can, on 18 any scientific basis, discount the fact that the 19 pattern which has been established in humans in 20 these many studies is not the pattern that is ! i 21 being described here. l 22 Now, that is not to say these things 23 didn't happen. But whether they happened in
-f l kJ l
24 relation to the radiation exposure is the kind of 25 question that we are talking about.
124 And I think the further epidemiologic ({ } l 2 studies that Dr. Susser is going to carry out 3 should be extremely useful, because they will be 4 moving further into time. They wouldn't be cut 5 off by the fact that the data from the Cancer 6 Registry didn't start until such and such a year. 7 I think maybe we will get some 8 resolution then. But I wanted to at least go on 9 record as concurring with my colleague on the 10 other side of the table that, yes, we came to hear 11 what you had to say. But I don't think it would 12 be fair for the record to in any way imply that, 13 because we didn't argue or discuss, that we agreed 14 necessarily with yout conclusions. 15 But I think the investigation is 16 certainly warranted. And it~is being continued by 17 the proper source, the Three Mile Island Fund. So 18 I am hopeful we will get to a resolution 19 regardless of the issues between you and the 20 Pennsylvania State Health Department. 21 MRS. AAMODT: Not only that, it is also 22 between the NRC. And it is an important issue to j 23 the citizens here that they don't have to depend (] 24 on the Public Health Fund, and they should be able 25 to depend on agencies to protect their health and l
125 { 1 safety. 2 I think that is important, because the 3 Health Fund has only so much money; and when that 4 is gone, it will be gone. 5 MR. WALD: But that is for research. 6 The NRC is a regulatory agency. And regulatory 7 agencies are not in the research business. 8 MRS. AAMODT: Well, they did the film 9 study and -- o 10 MR. WALD: No, they did not do the film 11 study; the Public Health Service did the film _ 12 study. CD 13 MRS. AAMODT: Yes, but they did it for 14 the NRC. It is listed as an NRC-HEW. But then 15 the Health Department does research studies. 16 And so I think it important that they do 17 good research studies. People can't constantly be 18 fighting in the courts for money to do their own 19 health studies, i 20 Did you know of the work of Dr. Petcow 21 in Canada, who found that the cell exploded with 22 3,500 rads of radiation? It took that much 23 radiation, which was good news. '( 24 And then he introduced a little bit of 25 radioactive sodium, just a little, tiny bit; and
126 l the cell exploded at 3/4 of a rad. (]} 2 MR. WALD: The work that I know of that 3 Dr. Petcow has done was not with cells, but 4 artificial membranes. And I have trouble with -- 5 perhaps I am biased as a physician, but I am 6 interested in human cells and human people. 7 And artificial membranes and plants i 8 don't carry as much weight with me because of my 9 own particular background. But his was artificial 10 membranes. 11 MRS. AAMODT: But it illustrates a 12 principle, though, of different kinds of actions. C.O 13 That is why I think that some of our 14 preconceived ideas maybe just don't fit the 15 circumstances here. 16 But let me open it for any more 17 questions, because I know we are getting late. 18 MR. ROTH: Anybody else on the panel? 19 MR. DI NUNNO: I have one along Dr. 20 Wald's line, only in the sense of trying to or l 21 suggesting that you perhaps want to go a little i l 22 further in one direction that you are probing. 23 And that is the matter of latency versus stress.
] 24 I think from what I heard, this was gone over just 25 a bit too fast, too quickly for me.
l .
127 1 The argument that you seem to be
<( }
2 advancing is that the latency that has been 3 claimed for these effects is not supportable; that 4 it can be much faster than the predictions. 5 But it has been pretty well established 6 that radiation effects are observable as a 7 function of the stress levels. What you see in 8 the way of radiation effect at 5,000 millirem, for 9 example, or 500 rads is far different from what 10 you would see at 5 millirem. 11 This relationship -- you haven't in your 12 research, I don't think, developed that argument c.0 ~ 13 very well. I think that it might be more 14 effective if you had something that -- if you are 15 going to counter all the experts who have 16 developed these relationships over the years, if 17 you are going to counter that scientific body of , 18 evidence, then I think this an area of 19 investigation that you would have to develop much 20 further it would seem to me. 21 MRS. AAMODT: I think Dr. Natasham is 22 doing that work. We are just beginning to
- 23 scientifically approach what is a minimum latency
() 24 period. Dr. Natasham is manipulating a number of 25 variables to see how they affect the latency
128 {} 1 period. We don't know all the variables. 2 I am just suggesting that one of the 3 variables in Dr. Natasham's study, which did 4 reduce latency, was also present in the Three Mile 5 Island population. And that was the reduction of 6 the immune system. There maybe were other 7 variables. 8 There were several people in our study 9 who smoked. And Dr. Tokuhata said, well then they 10 didn't get the cancer or couldn't have gotten it 11 from Three Mile Island; then they got it from 12 smoking. 10 13 Dr. Radford's work indicates, and so did 14 Dr. Natasham's, that smoking is a promotor of 15 cancer, that smoking tobacco can be an initiator 16 of cancer; it can also be a promotor. Maybe the 17 cancer was started by the smoking and promoted by 18 the radiation or started by the radiation and 19 promoted by the smoking. 20 Those are all possibilities. But they 21 don't mean that because a person smokes and is 22 exposed to radiation that you can rule out 23 radiation as a factor. It is too simplistic. l ( 24 And that is what I am saying about your 25 proposition on latency. It is too simplistic.
129 1 Number 1, the bomb data does not support
]}
2 the Baer Report, the Baer philosophy of a long 3 latency period. I showed you that from that 4 Japanese study. The cancers rose three years -- 5 the cancer deaths -- 6 MR. WALD: That was all of Japan. That 7 was the whole Japanese population. That wasn't i 8 Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You didn't show us that. 9 MRS. AAMODT: Well, I think that the 10 bombs had a large impact on the whole of Japan. 11 Radiation doesn't stay in one place. What was the 12 environmental factor that suddenly caused cancers (. ' 13 to take off in 1948 in Japan, that steep rise? 14 I am just saying that I can't accept the 15 Baer Report on this bomb data because there is 16 other evidence. There is also medical aspects of 17 the bombs, the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs. This 18 was something somebody sent me a week or so ago, l l 19 and I forgot to bring it with me. [ 20 There were leukemias diagnosed in a l I 21 year, not five years. 22 MR. WALD: I guess I have to comment on
- 23 that because I spent three years in Hiroshima ;
( 24 carrying out the leukemia studies. And I reviewed 25 every case, ; l l
1 1 i 130 1 And the record is very clear that there
}} .
2 was no increased incidence of leukemia in ! 3 Hiroshima or Nagasaki until it started to rise 4 about two years after the bombing in 1947. j 5 I reviewed all of the slides. And as ' 6 far as all of Japan showing the same thing, it did 7 not because we used another city for comparison i 8 purposes which didn't show that -- ' 9 MRS. AAMODT: Two years, was it? Two 10 years you say? 11 MR. WALD: The latent period was at , 12 least two years. 1
.C ~'
13 MRS. AAMODT: But everyone was saying 14 five years. That is what Dr. Tokuhata said in his ! r 15 report, that you needed a minimum of five years l l 16 latency period for leukemias to show. r 17 MR. WALD: I don't know whether he said 18 average or what; but I would say that the minimum 19 latent period, the increased incidence in the 20 various populations that have been studied, begins l 21 no earlier than two years. 22 The average latent period in Hiroshima ; 23 and Nagasaki was about ten years; but the minimum, r b(b 24 where you begin to see cases, is no earlier than 25 two years. l
131 l MRS. AAMODT: We are making progress {} 2 because we were told five years and ten years. 3 MR. WALD: I testified -- and I think 4 John Gofman says two years also, as a matter of 5 fact. 6 MRS. AAMODT: Most of the other Baer 7 hypothesis is on X-ray, X-ray treatment of 8 arthritis of the spine, these kinds of impacts. 9 MR. WALD: The Japanese were not 10 X-rayed. 11 MRS. AAMODT: No. I know. I know. But 12 I am saying two years, but not five years. (. . 13 MR. ROTH: I would like to, if we can, 14 sort of tail off. Is there any other panel member 15 at this point? 16 (No response.) 17 MR. ROTH: Are there any members of the 18 public who still wish to talk? 19 (Hands are raised i n the audience.) 20 MR. ROTH: One person. Okay. I'll tell 21 you what. Bill Kirk, I guess you're a member of l l 22 the public tonight; so you would certainly have a l 23 chance. (] 24 What I would suggest at this time is, if 25 you could tie it together in like two minutes, and
~ . - . , _, y - . - . .
132 i then have the public have a chance to have their (} } 1 2 say. I did promise Al Manik that we were going to 3 discuss our agenda at 10:12, and I think we are 4 past that; and I apologize. 5 So you have about two minutes to tie it 6 up, and then members of the public; and then we 7 wi' 1 do our thing. 8 MR. AAMODT: The last two sets of 9 questions put the problem and the issue in 10 perspective. 11 It was mentioned that we might continue 12 with our research in an area. I think that a CD 12 wholly inappropriate response, because it is 14 neither our desire nor our intent or wish in any 15 way at all to continue with research in this area. 16 We didn't get in this because of our 17 desire to do research. We have come to you 18 because we perceive a need on the part, as Margie 19 said, of the Government agencies to do their job. 20 They are -- the agencies do have a 21 responsibility to the public to do research, 22 because they are charged with public health and 23 safety, i 24 Erythema was discussed at some length; l 25 and I thought it interesting, the observations l
133 that you made, Dr. Wald, that if you looked at the (} } l 2 first erythema and if you could see these effects 3 in the eye, that you would have a basis to say 4 that perhaps they were radiation induced. 5 The issue that really stands b' fore all 5 of you today and has stood before us since the 7 time that we became involved is this. That no 8 member of this -- of the State Government or the 9 Federal Government looked at the eyes of a person 10 who had erythema. 11 There has been no one who has made an 12 objective scientific study, study, not (. 13 observations, not reliance on education and 14 background and experience and deduction. 15 But there is no one who has made a 16 scientific study of the human bodies that give 17 some cause for concern to determine whether or not 1 18 they were impacted. 19 And then, Dr. Wald, you raised the 20 enormous specter that has been before us for these 21 five years; and that is indeed the latency period 22 might be two years, three years, four years. The 23 average latency period might be something like b 24 ten. 25 MR. WALD: For solid tumors is a minimum l . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . , _ . . . _ , _ . _ . . _ . _ , . _ _ . _ , _ _ _
134 l of ten.
/{ 1 2 MR. AAMODT: Right. And maybe we are 3 seeing the early two' year, three year, four year 4 cases. What will the average number be?
5 I think you owe it to the people of this 6 area to get our governmental agencies to make a 7 definitive answer, not the kind of a crackpot 8 response that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 9 just finished. That was no kind of a study. 10 You people are scientifically -- you are 11 technically trained. You know as well as I that, 12 when you study a population that is only half of 13 what you say it is, that it is not a valid study 14 of that population. And that wasn't the only 15 deficiency in the study. 16 But the fact of the matter is that the 17 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania officials have known 18 since March 29 -- since March 28, whatever day it 19 was, the day of the accident, that literally 20 hundreds of people complained of that red skin, 21 metallic taste, extreme diarrhea, all things which 22 are suggestive of radiation exposure. 23 And the official response of our Federal i 1 I (J 24 Government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and j 25 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has simply been t I l l
135 1, blandly to say it couldn't have happened. l ([]7 2 Not one of those people was examined by 3 a physician under the auspices of the Commonwealth l 4 of Pennsylvania or under the auspices of the ! 5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 6 And I think you people have a deep 7 obligation to get that job done. That is why we i 8 are here, not to do further research. 9 MR. WALD: I probably shouldn't say 10 this, since the head of the Health Department of
- 11 my own county is sitting in the audience; but I 12 wouldn't trust the regulatory agencies to do
' Q~v i 13 research, l 14 I would trust the universities. We have 15 Columbia University, and that is why I mentioned i 16 that study. I think it's important. l l 17 MR. AAMODT: But it's time, you see. l l 18 That's the point. And if there is really l 19 something going on out there, next year some more - 20 people will have died who didn't have to. And on i 21 whose hands is their blood? ! 22 MR. WALD: I'm not sure I know the cure j 23 for cancer. [ ( 24 MRS. AAMODT: Dr. Natasham was finding, l 25 for instance, that vitamins A and E were f
136 1 inhibitors. ({ 2 MR. WALD: I don't want to get into that 3 subject. That really is out of our bounds. 4 MRS. AAMODT: People can certainly seek 5 early diagnosis and removal of tumors. 6 MR. ROTH: Did you get a transcript of 7 the Panel's meeting with the Commission last 8 month? 9 MRS. AAMODT: Yes, I did. 10 MR. ROTH: Then, as you see, there was a
- 11 fairly large discussion. I'm just bringing it out
.^
12 to say that, yes, a lot of things.you are saying
<O ~
13 are being transferred down to the Commissioners. 14 That's all I wanted to say, and that I l 15 wanted to thank you very much for making this i i 16 trip. I know it was a long trip, and thank you 17 again very much. 18 Now, I would like to go to, please, the 19 public. 20 JANE LdE: Jane Lee, Etters, 21 Pennsylvania. My original plan of attending chis 22 meeting was to cover follow-up on the last 23 discussion at Bethesda, Maryland. But there were ( 24 so many interesting things that arose this 25 evening, and I am sure that the Aamodts wanted to _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ - . _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . ~ , _ _ _-
137
~ /(]) 1 cover everything; that's just impossible.
2 But I would like to point out to those 3 who challenge the Aamodts on the leukemias, that 4 Marge and I did an interview with one local doctor 5 in the same area we are talking about. This 6 doctor revealed 11 leukemias, and he had one 7 before the accident. That's the first thing I 8 want to say. B 9 The second thing I want to address to 10 Tom Gerusky. Tom, are you aware of the 11 investigative report that is available through the
. 12 NRC, it's an NRC investigative report, on the 13 April 14, 1979, changing of the filters and 14 release of the off-site radioactive iodine?
15 MR. GERUSKY: Yes. 16 JANE LEE: You have the entire 17 investigative report? 18 MR. GERUSKY: No. 19 JANE LEE: Okay. I will send you a copy 20 of that. 21 That clearly reveals that what happened 21 at that time was 20 filters were removed by the i 23 employees, and there was a time element there of
,q
%.)
] 24 30 hours before the filters were replaced again.
25 MR. GERUSKY: That is correct.
, --- , , , , , - - - - - - , - - - , , , - --,v- w+
138 f']) 1 JANE LEE: Okay. And, therefore, there 2 were noble gases coming off site -- 3 MR. G ERUS KY : There were radioiodines 4 being released. 5 JANE LEE: I beg your pardon. 6 MR. GERUSKY: There were radioiodines 7 being released. And we were monitoring them. And 8 I was very -- 9 JANE LEE: Oh, I understand that. I 10 understand that. But that was exposure -- 11 unnecessary exposure to the population. That was
.,es 12 in April 14, 1979.
13 I don't want to quarrel with you becsuse 14 I only have two minutes. t 15 MR. GERUSKY: The filters had to be i 16 replaced. 17 JANE LEE: Okay. I have one question I 18 want to address to the two gentlemen who were here 19 talking and who were having a heated discussion 20 with the Aamodts on the latency period. I would 21 like to propose a scenario to you. 22 We're talking about cumulative doses for 23 the past 70 years, gentlemen, in this country, t - l 24 where the first p r o c e s sin g" pla nt began in l 25 Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1911, where 250,000
139 tons of radioactive waste is now buried, .(}}) 1 i 2 We're talking about the diagnostic 3 X-rays over that period of time. We're talking 4 about the bomb tests. We're talking about the 5 mining, the milling, the processing plants. We're i 6 talking about releases from a normal operating 7 reactor, of which we have now over 80 reactors 8 emitting krypton and tritium. 9 We're talking about the X-ray machines 10 that were in the shoe stores during the 40's and 11 the 50's where the children were X-raying their i 1 ,fs 12 feet over and over again in the stores just for
. Q3 .
- 13 fun. We're talking about all the dental X-rays.
t 14 And if you couple all this with stress, 15 then the latency periods of the last 10 to 20 16 years or the latency periods that are suggested by I
- 17 the professionals, which are still supposed to be 18 10 to 20 years, disintegrates under the sheer 19 weight of the cumulative doses to the general l
l 20 population. I 21 Additional insult to this present TMI , 22 population from a nuclear reactor which reached 23 over 5,000 degrees and released radioactive (] 24 transuranics and radioactive noble gases with a , 25 mixture of chemicals, gentlemen, which has to be f i
^
140 1 factored in, can have a substantial effect in
?{~}
2 lowering the latency periods. 3 Professional rigidity on latency periods 4 will ultimately discredit those who continue to 5 insist on 10, 20, 30 years on the latency period. 6 That is my comment. Thank you. 7 BILL KIRK: I had not intended to say 8 anything tonight, but there are several things 9 that' we have talked about that I have some 10 knowledge on. 11 One had to do with the iodine in April _f- 12 of 1979. I have had an opportunity to go through b.b 13 the data files in some detail on that. 14 EPA was monitoring at something like 30 15 locations for iodine at that point in time. We 16 had over 100 plus samples in April. Seventy of 17 those were positive for iodine-131. The highest 18 reading was about one and a half picoeuries per 19 cubic meter. I recall seeing a reading on the 20 Met-Ed sample of about 13 picocuries per cubic 21 meter in that same time period. 22 With regard to Dr. Tokuhata and the 23 hypothyroid data, I have read a report of a se]tct kc0 w 24 medical committee that reviewed those data. It l 25 was not Dr. Tokuhata's conclusions alone. They l l l
141 1 were a committee, including endocrinologists and 2 thyroid folks who reviewed it. 3 Reviewing the literature, which I did 4 when I got into this iodine thing, it indicates 5 that for a dose to the mother's to be sufficient 6 to cause hypothyroidism in an infant takes about 7 10 mil 11 curies. 8 The maximum credible body burden you can 9 get out of all the data that we've gone over is 10 something in the order of 5 to 10 nanocuries in a 11 person, which is a factor of about a million lower 12 than that necessary to cause hypothyroidism, which I.) 13 ' leads me to doubt hypothyroidism being caused by 14 iodine releases. 15 The cataract idea for checking up on i 16 doses of 100 rads or so has some possibilities in 17 that radiation cataracts are not the same as 18 senile cataracts. 19 And I suspect that any opthalmologist 20 that would have seen any of these type of i 21 cataracts would have noted that there was 22 something different and would have brought it to 23 somebody's attention. This may not be the case. ( 24 Jan Bea, last spring revised his initial 25 report and in it -- that he gave a talk at a l
142 seminar here in Middletown and put out a news t} ) 1 2 release at the same time in which he said that he 3 now believed that the highest possible dose he 4 could support was about 30 times the official 5 quote, unquote, estimates, which would be a ,. 6 maximum dose of about 3 rems. 7 And in that same news release he said 8 that could not account for the cancers that had 9 been reported. He is not denying the possibility 10 that the cancers are there, and he specifically 11 indicates that he thinks there is a chemical 12 possibility. But he doesn't believe the radiation i-13 has possibilities in that. 14 With regard to Dr. Molholt, Dr. Molholt 15 is employed by EPA in a super plenum (phonetic) 16 operation in Philadelphia. He has nothing 17 whatever to do with the radiation operations in 18 EPA. 19 And it is my understanding he has been 20 specifically directed not to enter into this
- 21 discussion up here in his capacity as an EPA l
22 employee. I wanted to -- there was an implication 23 of the EPA endorsement of his opinions, and that r, O' 24 is not the case. 25 One final thing. I think the problem
i I I 143 l that the Aamodts noted about comparing data on how ((]) I 2 well the cancers were ferreted out in a particular ; i 3 population can be applied directly to their data i T f 4 in that they are comparing with data in which the l 5 same faults of not ferreting out all of the f I . [ 6 cancers that existed in the population. l t 7 '2h e same problem existed in the data ( 8 with which they compared, that they are saying the I 2 9 State (inaudible). In all probability, if someone { i 10 had been as thorough in looking at all the people I J r i 11 that had died in those townships, there would have ! l 12 been a higher number of cancers reported and a I
- tO 13 higher expected number.
' f l 14 MR. ROTH: Okay, who else? Who else? ! 15 FRANCINE TAYLOR: I am Francine Taylor, f l
- 16 Lancaster. I think that we as human beings should I 17 owe a debt of gratitude for two people, with help i !
; 18 of other people -- and I certainly want to mention e I
19 Jane Lee was very involved, extremely, and the [ l 20 people who live on the West Shore who have . l 21 suffered, are suffering, and, unfortunately, are I 22 going to continue to suffer, that it took citizens ! i 23 to point out to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, f ( 24 to the State of Pennsylvania, to any agency and f 25 news media and everybody what should have been i
144 taken up immediately. (}}) 1 2 Dr. Karl Morgan said that it was l 3 unconscionable that it took 12 hours for the first 4 helicopter or airplane to go up after the 5 accident. He knew and other people knew that 6 there were not only windows, but the LTD's, most j 7 of them weren't working. 1 8 And you people, and I know the people 9 who live on the West Shore for sure know that 10 there certainly were dosimeters out there. There 11 were the people. There were the plants. And 12 there were the animals. 13 And no agency looked at it thoroughly. 14 I am not going to condemn everyone. But why 15 didn't you, the ones who are on the agencies, why 16 didn't the Nuclear Regulatory Commission do it? l 17 Did they know that something terrible happened, t 18 and they wanted to quickly cover it up? , 19 And it took Norman and Margarie Aamodt 20 and Jane Lee and Helen Hocker and Mary Osborne and 21 Bill Peters and Jean Trimmer, these people who are 22 blood and flesh, and other people who are no 23 longer with us. ( 24 How many victims do you people want? 25 Not just you, I am talking to humanity. How many
145 victims? How many children? How many fetuses are (} ) 1 2 going to be dead because of the nuclear industry? 3 I am talking as a mother who lost a 4 child. I am talking as a mother who has a four ! 5 year old and a seven year old. I am talking to i 6 every human being. 7 Yes, maybe Japan had an increase, maybe i 8 the whole Japan had an increase after the bomb. i 9 But we are a small planet. Radiation goes i 10 everywhere. [ 11 Three !!ile Island affected the Three i 12 Mile Island area, but it also affected upper New I 13 York State. It affected Canada. It affected even F 14 Wales. Everybody in the world has heard of Three 15 Mile Island. ; 16 I have friends from China. I have i 17 friends from Australia. They have posters that 18 say " Hiroshima and Three Mile Island, no thanks." 19 What Margarie and Norman Aamodt -- and 20 they have done this with no money coming in from 21 anybody, with no thanks, with only the State 22 Health Department, who did not allow us to even l 23 come in during the press conference that they 24 held, wouldn't -- barred Jane Lee and Mary i 25 Osborne. And that's -- so that's right, yes. You
146 () 1 owe two full hours to Margarie and Norman Aamodt, 2 and you owe the people to come here and tell you 3 about their experiences. 4 I have met people who had sunburn, who 5 have eye problems. At the same time they still 6 have those eye problems. I know of seven children 7 who were intrauterine during the accident who have 8 cataracts. I saw this one child just one month , 9 ago, and it was one too many to see. Seven. 10 Her mother was pregnant during the 11 accidenc, pregnant during the accident, waiting 12 outside the airport for her husband who was coming
~
13 on a plane. She waited three hours outside the 14 airport. She happens not to live in the Three 15 !!ile Island immediate area. She lives in the t 16 Lancaster area, but she was there. That child was 17 born with multiple birth defects, cataracts. 18 And I have a son who is just a little 19 bit older than that child. I just want to let you 20 know, people, this is for the children. If we 21 won't have any healthy children born, what are we 22 going to do? Are we going to continue as a 23 civilization, as a human race? We are talking ( 24 about the children and those who are yet to be 25 born.
147 (' 1 BEVERLY DAVIS: This is just a
)
2 procedural question, but at Lancaster I understood 3 there were a lot of questions raised for Dr. 4 Muller. Whenever the questions were raised, the 5 answer was always, well write to the Health 6 Department. 7 And I understood Mayor Morris to say 8 rather than every individual writing to the Health 9 Department getting these answers, I will ask Mike 10 Masnik to make a list of the questions, and the 11 answers would be attached to the transcript. 12 I am not sure whether I misunderstood 13 that, but I didn't see anything attached to the' 14 transcript. If that was, in fact, a project that 15 was done, I think that should be corrected. 16 MR. MASNIK: I was directed to ask any 17 questions of Muller that were from the Panel, i 18 which was done. I do not recall being instructed 19 to attach it to the transcript. ; 20 However, when I did receive the reply to 21 the questions, I did give them to the panel 22 members. 5 23 MR. ROTH: What I'm trying to ask is, k 24 what Mike is saying at this point is not what you I 25 understood, is that --
148
/
]) 1 BEVERLY DAVIS: That's not what I 2 understood. I thought that those questions were l 3 going to be taken down by Mike and that the 4 answers which were raised during that period were 5 going to be put in the public record.
6 It seems to me that what I am 7 suggesting, if that was not the understanding, is 8 that that is an appropriate way for this panel to 9 develop a record which the NRC would examine. i 10 If that was not true, if I 11 misunderstood, I would like to make a suggestion 12 at this point that the questions which have to be 13 in that transcript at this point be assembled and 14 those answers be responded to in an attachment in 15 a future transcript, this one or one in the 16 future, at least.
- 17 MR. GERUSKY
- I did send the transcripts
! 18 over to the Health Department for them to review 19 and to answer the questions. I don't know what 20 the procedure was going to be on the answers. l 21 MR. MASNIK: I can certainly attach the 22 answers that I received from the Health Department 23 on the questions that were asked to this
.. ~A 24 transcript.
25 MR. SMITHGALL: There was a letter -- we
149 ( ) I have gotten copies of it. Mike wrote at end of 2 October and received back the middle of November 4 3 responses to my questions and Dr. Cochran's 4 questions. 5 Whether that is the entire list that we 6 had at that point in time, I don't know. But we 7 have gotten that. And I guess that November 18 8 letter can be attached, Mike? 9 MR. MASNIK: Yes, which I will attach to 10 tonight's transcript. 11 KAY PICKERING: As one who has worked in l
-;e3 12 the TMIA office.since before the TMI accident and
( $_) T ) 13 ever since then, I have received calls from I 14 medical people and talked with doctors, nurses, L.s 15 who have seen those kinds of things which you are 16 talking about. 17 Some people have wished to remain' l 18 anonymous; some people are keeping their own l 19 records. There are doctors in neonatal, for 20 instance, practices who are putting together their 21 own records who are very, very concerned. 22 But the overall -- and my background is 23 a nurse. I am an RN with a BS. My impression 24 over the years is that the medical profession is 25 not talking. They are not talking to any public ' ; i
150 ( ) 1 health officials, and they are not even talking to 2 each other. They won't. 3 And there has to be an initiative. And 4 the initiative must come from their peers, from 5 the Pennsylvania Medical Society, the county, the J 6 Health Department, the universities. It is not ; 7 going to come from local health professionals. l 8 I also have seen young children with 9 cataracts. A little girl in Middletown who left 10 the area and whose parents went and had their car 11 and their belongings taken with a Geiger counter. I 12 She ended up in the hospital, she was so sick with 13 d'i a r r h e a . And where she evacuated to, they said 14 they have no explanation for her problems. Just i, 15 recently she has developed cataracts. She shows i 16 all the symptoms that have been discussed. 17 There are young people and older people, f I 18 middle-aged people, exactly the kinds of things , 19 you talked about. And they're there. But nobody l 20 is asking questions, and nobody is looking. And 21 the people who know aren't going to say. 22 MR. SMITHGALL: Do you think that Dr. ; 23 Susser will get results on that? Do you think the 24 Public Health Fund's questioning on that -- 25 KAY PICKERING: I have a lot of doubt --
.~ . -. - - . __. . -
1 I l 151
;}[])
1 I don't doubt the good intentions of Columbia 2 University. But I personally doubt that that 3 study is going to be able to come up with anything 4 because of the problems in getting the data and 5 cooperation with the people that they need to work 6 with. 7 The money allotted doesn't give them the 8 people power to do what is actually needed. 9 MR. WALD: They have Judge Rambo behind 10 them, too. 11 KAY PICKERING: I don't agree with that. 12 I've talked with Judge Rambo. Judge Rambo O,e3 J : 13 oversees. She does not implement, and she does 14 not administer. 15 MR. GERUSKY: I would like to make a 16 comment on what the Health Department and what the 17 State Government does with personal health i l 18 problems. 19 ' Personal health problems in this state 20 and any other state of the country are legally the 21 a r'e a of the private practitioner. And these are 22 personal health problems that are being brought to 23 the Health Department. 24 They do not have teams of physicians to 25 go out and talk to people and verify individual
152
) 1 personal health problems. They have to look at 2 broad numbers and statistics. They are looking at 3 population groups. They are trying to handle 4 many, many different problems. They are not 5 trying to handle the personal health problems.
6 I am not sure that is the way it ought 7 to be, but that is the way it is. I have referred 8 people who have contacted me about their concerns 9 about TMI and their personal health problems to 10 the Health Department. And they said, We can't do 11 anything. 12 They don't have the authority. They
'~~
13 don't have the responsibility. They don't have 14 the funds or the people to do anything about this 15 person's individual problem. 16 And if there was a way to change that -- 17 the whole medical system, I guess, in this country i 18 needs to be changed because that -- the medical 19 system is screwing up the problem. 20 We can't worry about individuals except l 21 to let the private practitioner worry about that 22 person. When the individuals together may ! 23 constitute a problem. And if the doctors don't (b-rh 24 tell the Health Department that there is a 25 problem, you are never going to find oin t about it.
4 153 r ]) 1 So it's a -- I don't think you can blame 2 the epidemiological people and the Health 3 Department for doing what they have been doing 4 forever and doing what their responsibilities are. 5 I don't say that that's what they ought 6 to be, but that's what they are. 7 MRS. AAMODT: Can I just say a word 8 here. Dr. Leeser found elevated empyocele levels 9 in many of the blood samples he took after the 10 Three Mile Island accident. And he made that 11 public. 12 And I've talked to him personally on the 13 telephone. He was visited by, as he calls them, 14 middle level scientific types from GPU, who told D 15 him, You can't be finding this. Give it up. He 16 was essentially persecuted. That man is retired. 17 He had a quadruple bypass operation. j 18 The GPU and the NRC held a conference to 19 tell the doctors, you can't -- don't think l l 20 anything that you see in your patients is due to l 21 radiation. Not enough got out. They backed them 22 up. There is persecution in a doctor that will 23 speak out. The doctors are afraid to. I' c# 24 I went into a veterinarian's office, and i 25. he started telling me about leukemias in cats and
154 ( ) 1 rashes in dogs following the Three Mile Island 2 accident. And then when he found out I was doing 3 research and my position -- at first he thought I 4 was an official. And then when he found out I was 5 a citizen, he didn't want to talk to me very much 6 anymore. 7 But the doctors are afraid really to 8 take a position because it is an unpopular l 9 position, and the NRC told them that nothing got i i 10 out. So I think that is the problem. The 11 doctors, I think, would have been reporting more { i 12 if there was an openness in the Health Department ! t t 13 to come forward. l ! 14 MR. ROTH: I think there was one more i 15 question. 16 DEBBIE DAVENPORT: Debbie Davenport, 17 Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. I ! 18 One of the problems here in not 19 identifying that there was an overall problem 20 caused by the accident is that people can't be I ! 21 treated or they may not be followed effectively. 22 And as long as this information remains tainted, i 23 sort of held back -- I think it had it's . (- 24 beginnings in military things. And so this is the j 25 way things have come to be now.
155 (j) 1 But I think we have to find a better way 2 of looking at things now because we have to help 3 people here. At one of the Penn State courses, a 4 woman stood up and got furious; and she had tears 5 in her eyes. And she said, You shouldn't be 6 studying this now. You should be helping us. 7 There are people who have financial and 8 medical coverage needs in these areas, and they 9 are not being help. And when you have more than 10 one family member with a cancer or a death in a 11 family, it is just very difficult for them to get 12 by. 13 Now, there may be just a few, or there 14 may be many of these people. But without openness 15 and without peer pressure or pressure from above 16 in the medical profession or an effort to inform 17 them in a open way, this will continue; and more 18 people will die. 19 I think especially children should be l 20 followed who had symptoms. And that doesn't have l l 21 to be a frightening thing. I know we had people 22 who took DES in pregnancy. Their children are 23 followed, and we are used to that. ( 24 I just think this should be looked at in 25 a more general way. It is a political thing. And
l 156
,j 1 I think we have to look at it as a health matter 2 so these people can be helped if they need it.
3 MR. ROTH: Okay. I think that ends the 4 public comment. I just would like to take this 5 minute again to say to members of the public, 6 particularly, that for the last five years we have 7 asked for your input. We have asked, and we have 8 said to you that if you let us know in advance, we 9 will give you the time that you really need and 10 want as long as it is on the subjects. 11 And so all I am doing is responding to
,3 12 the number of dismay and things I've seen in the "d
13 audience tonight. I as one person was not 14 contacted by anybody to say they wished to speak 15 tonight. The Mayor's office I called today. They 16 had not been advised of anybody. And I am asking 17 Tom for the first time, did anybody -- 18 MR. SMITHGALL: No. 19 MR. ROTH: Right. So nobody. So really 20 if you would do that -- because for five years 21 we've asked you to do this. Just say, Look, we 22 would really like 5, 10, or 15 minutes on thin 23 subject; and it is there. ?
.O L'.'> 24 But to come in and then be nailed down l
25 to two and a half minutes, I can understand what
l 157
'( l you are going through. All I am saying is, if you 2 just say it in advance, we can put it on the plan; 3 and we will plan for it. If you do not wish to do 4 it, I understand.
5 All right. That is that. We now have 6 panel business to do that I promised Al Manik we 7 would get to before. And I'll do this quickly. 8 Suggested agenda items for the future -- 9 and this is a list that was compiled, I guess, 10 last month. 11 Implications of the strontium-90 12 calibration mistake by a utility; canister
~
l 13 fabrication, canister QA program, the status of 14 that; the off-site radiological monitoring 15 program; and any realignment due to the TMI-l 16 restarting; a DOE presentation on the shipping, 17 the t r a n s po r ta t i o r. , the routes, the security, the 18 frequency, which we can do in the future; the 19 burial of high specific activity from Epicore 2; 20 the filters at the commerical burial sites. 21 No. 6, the polar crane hand brake i 22 mechanism, the OI report on that; and probably to l 23 invite Ben Hayes up to give the results of that
' h- 24 investigation.
25 And last, but certainly not least, if
. . _ , . - ~
158
'{} 1 Bob Freedman is still here, and TMI-2 safety 2 advisory board meetings and all that. So that is 3 what we have.
4 Al, does that answer your question, I 5 hope, about -- 6 MR. MANIK: Very good. 7 MR. ROTH: Thank you. A compliment. 8 Please put that down that we got a compliment. 9 The next question would be whether to 10 meet in January or February. 11 MR. SMITHGALL: I would like to add the 12 schedule compliance to that. All I have is as one 13 of the topics, whether they stay on schedule with 14 the cleanup. 15 MR. ROTH: The major question I guess 16 that was discussed down in Washington, too, was 17 whether we should have a meeting in January or 18 skip January and go to February; and I was going 19 to take it from the Panel here tonight of what 20 their wishes are. 21 MR. WALD: I would be in favor of 22 February. We would less likely have a 23 transportation problem. L 24 MR. ROBINSON: I would second that. i 25 MR. ROTH: In other words, I am not l l
159 ({) 1 hearing anybody press for January? 2 MR. SMITHGALL: Does the Panel feel 3 there is anything that they see on the schedule 4 that would need a review in January as opposed to 5 waiting for February? 6 MR. WALD: On the contrary, the report D 7 from the ACRS, it won't take place until January. 8 So we would be in a position to hear something 9 about it if we meet early in February. 10 MR. G ERUS KY : We may have more 11 information about the casks and the scheduling. 12 There are so many things that should be coming due (. 13 at that time. 14 During the Christmas and New Year's 15 time, the reactor activities are down and a lot of 16 things are not going on. I think February is a i 17 much better time. 18 MR. ROTH: I guess te have a decent 19 agreement on 'ebruary. The only other question I i l 20 would then ask is, Is Thursday night still the 21' best night, or are there other nights that people 22 would prefer? 23 MR. WALD: For February Wednesday is r-k}g- 24 okay. But from then on I am teaching until April l 25 on Wednesday. l l
160 () 1 MR. ROTH: Looks like we will meet at 2 least on Wednesday in February, and we will do our 3 own lobbying for further dates after that; so that 4 second Wednesday -- 5 MR. MASNIK: The second Wednesday would 6 be the 12th. 7 MR. ROTH: The 12th of February. Is 8 that a holiday or -- 9 MR. SMITHGALL: It's the middle of the 10 week. 11 MR. ROTH: Okay. February 12, 1985, 12 will be the next meeting. r
$ 13 adj ournment?
Is there a call for an 14 MR. SMITHGALL: Yes. 15 (Hearing adjourned at 11:00 p.m.) 16 17 18 19 l 20 21 22 23 (. 24 25 l
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY PANEL ON THE DECONTAMINATION OF TMI UNIT 2 DOCKET NO.: PLACE: HARIISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA DATE: THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1sigt) (TYPED) Official Reporter ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. Reporter's Affiliation O I
- i. .. .
Information from 1980 Census of Population Reports ( c compiled by Evelyn Lyons, Millersville University Librarian .. DAUPHIN COUNTY 0 - 5 miles Londonderry - 5,138 Lower Swaratara -6,772 conewago - 2,471 LANCASTER COUNTY 5 miles Conoy - 2,309 West Donegal - 4,862 Mt. Joy - 5,128 YORK COUNTY 0 - 5 miles Newbe rrytown - 10,047 Fairview - ~11,941 Conewago - 4,979 East Manchester - 3,564 TOTAL FOR THE 5 MILE RADIUS - 57,211 bnOPHIN COUNTY 5 - 10 miles
- Londonderry - 5,138 Lower Swartara - 6,772 Conewago - 2,471 Swatara - 18,796 Susquehana Twp.- 18,034 Lower Paxton - 34,830 .
South Hanover - 4,046 Derry - 18,115 Harrisburg City - 53,264 CUMBERLAND COUNTY 5 - 10 miles Lower Allen Township - 14,077 i LANCASTER COUNTY 10 miles conoy - 2,309 i West Donegal -4,862 Mount Joy - 5,128 East Donegal -4,063 () . l
YORK COUNTY 10 miles 1 f Newberrytown - 10,047 Fairview - 11,941 Conewago - 4,979 East Manchester - 3,564 Warrington - 3,586 Dover - 12,589 Man cheste r - 7,637 Hellam - 4,507 Springettsbury - 19,687 TOTAL FOR THE 5 to 10 miles radius - 27 D,8ff). 9 i TMI 5 & 10 miles Radius Population numbers
~
PA. Health Department U.S. Census Dis crepan cy Per Cent S les 64,897 57,211 7,686 13% m es 289.930 270,442 19,488 74 1 I l I) .
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4 UNITED STATES
- o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
% ,,,,, M November 22, 1985 l
l l
Dear Advisory Panel Member:
The next meeting of the Advisory Panel is scheduled for December 12, 1985, at the Harrisburg Holiday Inn, 23 South Second Street, Harrisburg, PA. The meeting will start at the usual time - 7:00 PM and run to 10:00 PM. Marjorie and Norman Aamodt have agreed to present to the Panel the result of their health study and also to critique the State of Pennsylvania studies. The licensee will also inform the Panel of their progress in the early defueljng effort. Enclosed is correspondence between Dr. Muller and me, addressing both Tom Cochran's and Tom Smithgall's requests for additional information on
- the State of Pennsylvania studies.
Looking forward to seeing you December 12, 1985.
% Sincerely, I wJs. .
l Michael T. Masnik, Ph.D. Panel Liaison TMI Program Office i
Enclosure:
As stated
i l 4 October 30, 1985 Dr. H. Arnold Muller ~ i State Health Secretary - Pennsylvania Department of Health i P.O. Box 90 , Harrisburg, PA 17108 l
Dear Dr. Muller:
I would like to thank you on behalf of the Advisory Panel Members and the meribers of the public for your presentation at the October 16, 1985 Three Mile Island Unit 2 Advisory Panel Meeting. At that meeting two members of the Panel had expressed the desire to obtain some additional infonnation about published. the cancer mortality and morbidity study your Department recently , l l ' Dr.-T. Cochran ' requested copies of written correspondence between your Department and the acknowledged experts who critiqued your study. Mr. T. Smithgall had several questions pertaining to the Mother / Child , i Registry discussed on Page 22 of your Department's report. He requested the median age of the sample of 3.582 mothers. He also asked if that sample of mothers was age adjusted. Additionally, he requested the ages of ' the four mothers of that sample at the time they were diagnosed as having cancer. - If you would respond to me directly on the above requests for additional P i . information. I will make the distribution to the Advisory Panel Members.
- Again, thank you for coming to the October 16, 1985 Advisory Panel heting.
Sincerely. l t
/s/ ,,,
Michael T. Masnik, Ph.D. Technical Assistant Three Mile Island Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
..'FICIAL RECORD COPY
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ytattl) 0f Dc;gy, N g& b4,, Department of Health M AR RISSUMG (717) 787-6436 November 18, 1985 Michael T. Masnik, Ph.D. Technical Assistant Three Mile Island Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dear Doctor Masnik This is in response to your October 20, 1985, request for the information asked for by two members of the Thrae Mile Island Unit 2 Advisory Panel at their October 16, 1985, meeting in Lancar.4ter. With respect to Dr. Cochran's request for copies of written [ correspondence between the Department of Health and the physicians and scientists who reviewed and commented on our study, there was very little in the way of written communications with the reviewers. Most of the com-O munication (discussion) actually took place by telephone.: Copies of formal
\'j written correspondence are enclosed. The reviewers were sent copies of draft versions of the report, given time to review them and contacted by . - telephone for conunent.
In response to Mr. Smithgall's questions concerning the Mother / : Child Registry segment of the reports (1) the median age of the mothers when this study was conducted was approximately 29.5 years: (b) the expected number of cancer cases was age-adjusted using National Cancer Institute's SEER program age-specific incidence rates for females in the 10-44-year age groups and (c) the ages of the four nothers at the time they were diag-nosed as having cancer were 31, 32, 32 and 39 years. I trust that the above information will satisfy your needs. Sincerely, f--} Q r w d D LA A M r H. Arnold Muller, M.D. i Secretary of Health Enclosures P.o. Box 90. M AR RISSU RG, P A 17108
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(@) Dr. charles Land Dep rtment of Health MAmmiSeURo 717-787-5264 February 19, 1985 Dr. Ibbert Miller Chief, Clinical Epidemiology Branch National Cancer Institute-NIH Iandow Building - Rocrn OC41 Bethesda, MD 20205
Dear Bob:
As I talked to you on the phone the other day, my staff (Special Studies Section) has just a:mpleted their first draft of the cancer study around 'IMI. I have not yet had enough time to review this draft thoroughly.
- While I am carefully going over this material myself, I thought I would ask you to review and offer ocmnents and suggestions. I will need your response as soon as possible; therefore, I am sending this draft by Federal Express.
My quick oczments on this draft (findings): Although there is some difference (statistically significant) between observed and expected cancer deaths when very small, selected areas are considered separately O/ (areas we would not usually select for this type of study; but we did look into these areas sinply because of the Aanodt's allegation), I don't think there is any eviden to support the allegation. % is seems to represent one of many similar situations where small-area statistics mimic the apparent existence of a cancer cluster. (a) Cancer death data do not tell the time of diagnosis, (b) Except for leukemia, one may not expect to see any increase in radiogenic cancer within 5 or 6 years. (c) We already know that for scrne i of the cancer patients, diagnosis was made before the a m W nt. We are attempt-l ing to get similar data for other cases. I do plan to re-arrange the format of this report starting with our own independent study and then present Aamodt's survey area as an addendum or critique. - Please keep in mind, this is confidential at this stage. If you have any questicns about these attached tables, feel free to call me at (717)787-5264 between 8:00 AM and 4:30 PM. Wank you for your prcrnpt response. With best personal regards. . 1 Sincerely George K. 'Ibkuhata, Dr.P.H. , Ph.D. Director Division of Epidemiology Research A a. s Q e.o sox so. waanissuno.ra moe l l l
Same letter 'Ib: g\Mg IIllSg'
, 1) Dr. Bobert Miller M/g
- 2) Dr. Troyce Jones
- 3) Dr. Paul Sheehe
- 4) Dr. Charles Iand gepartment of Health N AR RISSU RG 717-787-5264 i
March 13,1985 Dr. Robert Miller Chairran, Clinical Epidemiology Branch Landow Building, Rocrn 8C41 National Cancer Institute-NIH BetM cMa, MD 20205
Dear Bob,
We have enclosed a final draft copy of " Cancer 2 rtality and Erbidity fIncidence) Around 'IMI" for your use.
'Ihank you for taking the time to review and ccrment on this inportant study. We have attenpted to incorporate as many coments and suggestions frcxn the reviewers as possible, which seemed to have a coman denominator.
If you have any additional ccanents or questions, feel free to contact me.
. Sincerely, O--
GeorgeK.Tokuh,o , Dr.P.H., Ph.D. Director Division of Epidemiology Research GKT:ald . Enclosure i i
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. CAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY ms, omet son OPERATED SV MARTM MAm(TTA ENERGY SYSTEMS. MC.
March 1,1985 George K Tokahata, Dr.P.H.,Ph.D. Director Division of Epidemiology Research Department of Health Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , Post Office Box 90 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 Dost George: This letter repeats my few olaple telephone comments on the draft report pertaining to cancer risk in the three areas selected by Aamodt. Your department has certainly done an excellent job of putting Aamodts' claims into proper scientific perspective. The draft report is clear, concise, and well written.
. I an of very limited knowledge in epidemiology, but it wonid be interesting to quantify the level of increased risk from cigarette smoking for the individual cancer data described in pages 13-15. ,
The reader has to read to the end of the report to know the outcome. There is ' good logic for this style of communication, but for some readers it might be helpful to preview the outcome at the beginning perhaps in an abstract. i l i r t
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i G. K. Takthsta 2 March 1,1985 l l
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It might be helpful to the non-epidemiologist to place more emphasis on small i area statistics and what 19/20 and 99/100 really mean relative to a random ! draw. Also explain that for many areas it is always possible to find the ! 1/100 if one searches enough. All of this paragraph is for communication with a broad, but not necessarily scientific, audience. ( l: Np comments are almost trivial, but I wish to thank you for the opportunity to preview the result cf this important study, { j l Sincerely, cv Troyce D. Jones i Research Staff Member Health Effects and Epidemiology Health and Safety Research Division
! TDJ:sm '
l
Enclosure:
Manuscript c c': File - TDJ I l ! i l i e I i i ! I i i [ i i
, , _ _ . _ , , - _ . - _ ,______,_.._____.____,,__,,y...,,,_,._,,~,, , -_--me,-e,m._,, - - .
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' \*- February 20, 1985 N;ti nalInstitutrs cf Hzatth NIti:nti Cancsr instituta B:th:sda, Maryland 20205 George li. Tokuhata, Dr.P.H., Ph.D.
Department of Ilealth PO Box 90 Harrisburg, PA 17108
Dear George:
Your draft report on the TMI cancer study arrived this morning. On the basis of the literature to date on radiogenic cancer, the only neoplasm that would be detectable, were the population exposed to a high enough dose of radiation,is leukemia. Because the dose at TMI was so low, no cancer, not even leukemia should be expected. Most of the cancers observed in the area are not known to be induced by radiation: lymphoma, prostate, ovary and adrenal. Even multiple myeloma is doubtful, and surely does not occur excessively within 20 years of ex-posure. Everyone can assemble clusters from personal experience - at work, at church, at school, in the neighborhood, etc. It should not be the function of any health agency to check out such random occurrences, and I am sorry you had to investigate such a claim.
, Sincerely,
/3 4-Robert W. Miller, M.D., Chief Clinical Epidemiology Branch i 8C41 Landow Bldg National Cancer Institute Bethesda, Md 20205 ,,
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- E CASHINGTEN, D. C. 20555 t 8 i
% , , ,.o# November 22, 1985
Dear Advisory Panel Member:
The next meeting of the Advisory Panel is scheduled for December 12, 1985, at the Harrisburg Holiday Inn, 23 South Second Street, Harrisburg, PA. The meeting will start at the usual time - 7:00 PM and run to 10:00 PM. Marjorie and Nonnan Aamodt have agreed to present to the Panel the result of their health study and also to critique the State of Pennsylvania studies. The licensee will also inform the Panel of their progress in the early defuel.ing effort. Enclosed is correspondence between Dr. Muller and me, addressing both Tom Cochran's and Tom Smithgall's requests for additional information on
- the State of Pennsylvania studies.
Looking forward to seeing you December 12, 1985. Sincerely, nr &. . Michael T. Masnik, Ph.D. Panel Liaison THI Program Office
Enclosure:
As stated i
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TABLE 10s 08 SEMED Als EXPECTED laseEIEB 0F OIAGNOGED RADIOGENIC CANCER CASES BY PRINARY SITE IN A SELECTED FDUR NINOR CIVIL DIVISI006 AREA 1 WITH SEPARATE DATA FOR FAIlWIEW AND NEWERRY TDWNSHIPS, JULY 1982 - JUNE 1984 , ALL Aressi Fairvlaun/Neuberry Top. Fettview Township Neoberry Township Retto Retto Retto Retto Primary Site Obs.2) Esp.3I [0be./ Esp.] Obs.2) Esp.3) (Obs./ Esp.] Dbe.2) Esp.3) [0be./ Esp.] Dbs.2) Esp.3) [0be./ Esp.] T tet , 70 84.2 1.09 62 59.9 1.04 38 34.9 1.03 28 25.0 1.04 Esophague* - 1.1 - - 1.0 - - 0.8 - - D.4 - Stomach 2 3.0 3.67 2 2.8 0.71 1 1.8 0.63 1 1.2 0.83 Coton 18 11.4 1.58 15 10.5 1.43 8 , 8.1 1.31 7 4.4 1.59 Pancrees 1 3.0 0.33 1 2.7 0.37 1 1.8 0.63 - 1.1 - Lung 17 18.8 0.80 17 17.7 0.98 6 10.2 0.78 9 7.5 1.20 , Breast (Femete) 21 16.8 1.27 17 15.8 1.09 11 9.2 1.20 8 8.4 0.94 : Thyrold* 1 1.8 0.58 1 1.7 0.59 1 1.0 1.00 - 0.7 - Non-iiodgkin's Lymphomme 8 3.8 2.11 7 3.8 1.94 5 2.1 2.38 2 1.5 1.33 Huttiple Myelome* - 1.1 - - 1.0 - - 0.6 - - 0.4 - Leukasta 2 3.8 0.58 2 3.3 0.81 1 1.9 0.53 1 1.4 0.71 NOTES: Ill The four minor civil divleton area inct'udes Goldeboro and York Haven Boroughe end Fairviou and Neuberry Townships. Data for Goldsboro sad York Haven Boroughs are not presented in the table because the espected numbers for specific cancer altes are too esett for meaningful comperleone. The 3 reported Goldsboro cases include cancers of the colon [1] and female breset (1). The five reported York Haven cases include concers of the coton (1), fonets breast (3) and non-hodgkin's Lymphomme (1). The minor civil divleton of residence of one cancer case (colon] could not.be determined. 1 (2) Observed nimbers of diagnosed concer cases, Penneytvanta Concer Registry, Pennsylvente Department of Health. Incorrect residence information on Cancer Registry Report Forse has been corrected. * [3] Espected numbers of cases bened on age-sex distribution of the subject populettone (1990) and age-sex alte specific incidence retse from the Survettlance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program, 1978-1881. The foltootng sites (*) were not included in the SEER report for 1978-81, thus, date for the 1973-77 period mere used esophague, thyrold, and multiple myotone. 1 i e 5 (TABLE 10 DATA ARE DISCUSSED ON PAGES 19, 20 AND 210F THE TEXT.]
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Information from 1980 Census of Population Reports ' ( ; compiled by Evelyn Lyons, Millersville University N.s' Librarian
, DAUPHIN COUNTY 0 - 5 miles i
Londonderry - 5,138 i Lower Swaratara -6,772
- l Conewago - 2,471 i' '
l LANCASTER COUNTY 5 miles I .
!- Conoy - 2,309 j West Donegal - 4,862 t
Mt. Joy - 5,128 i YORK COUNTY 0 - 5 miles
, Newberrytown - 10,047 Fairview - 11,941 -
i Conewago - 4,979 ' East Manchester - 3,564 s TOTAL FOR THE 5 MILE RADIUS - 57,211 UPHIN COUNTY 5 - 10 miles - j Londonderry - 5,138
- Lower Swartara - 6,772 l
Conewago - 2,471
; Swatara - 18,796 l Susquehana Twp.- 18,034 1
Lower Paxton - 34,830 I I Scuth Hanover - 4,046 Derry - 18,115 Harrisburg City - 53,264
, CUMBERLAND COUNTY 5 - 10 miles Lower Allen Township - 14,077 I
LANCASTER COUNTY 10 miles conoy - 2,309 6 West Donegal -4,86? Mount Joy - 5,12t East Donegal -4,063
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i l - YORK COUNTY 10 miles s l Newberrytown - 10,047 i Fairview - 11,941 '
- Conewago - 4,979 i East Manchester - 3,564 Warrington - 3,586 j Dover - 12,589
. Man cheste r - 7,637 i Hellam - 4,507 l Springettsbury - 19,687 l
j TOTAL FOR THE 5 to 10 miles radius - 270,yT1 , i 1 l TMI 5& 10 miles Radius Population numbers PA; Health
~
~j' Department U.S. Census Dis crepan cy Per Cc- <
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, . . _ - l Smiles 64,897 - 57,211 7,686 13%
l m es 2 8'J . 9 30 270,442 19,488 7% e G f s
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I, LOCATION OF RESIDENCES OF NEONATAL HYPOTHYROIDISM CASES :r
, IN LANCASTER COUNTY.1979 POST-TMI ACCIDENT y ,
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;;; 222 Hin i bi2bthtow0 o '. Sporting Hill Sol 2 3 - Nc ,
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) Mount 40Y '" saiong - ' " ' l'*C"
- 6'Bareville 2 Nell h" York
# le3la Bainbridge 141 landiSVilB i op 222 13 \ ["
X Bamfordville
',- g i trinestown'MOUn h(Maytown C ,
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- lla* 21 < t 'I * . X Bird in Hand ] i:
q% M' i no n b),9d6 Martchester 46 , F*l F
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E d 0) , -[3dy, fountville A ..f ",, C 2 - Mr[.4 s96 [* ,, P radise .. i o , tw 1.am eter f anvillti ,,g! 8 H StraSbtJI '- ' NEONATAL HVPOTHYROIDISM CASES IN LANCASTER COUNTY 1 is Will0w 6 j ,$treet AllA0 8 Number i 4 MUSEUM Of i Year REIIO" 112 i MSNS n VAhlA I Conesidga / 222 ew 1979 ............... 7
}g j 1 lovidence cogg [
1980 ............... ale Harbor 1981 ............... 2 l$milhvill 3 ii 1982 ............... 0 4 . 1983 ............... 1 U 3I Y, Vill i' O 5 to 15 ' MIL ES . I I ' 1 SCALE i i i 600 000 !? 18 24 KILOMETRES 0
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* *'^^'" E*7 ' "'^". t ucxTios. xxo wetraan MORANDUM Pusuc HFAI.TH SERVICt CENTER rna tHMAu contact.
ll . i To The Record 84T0 April 20, 1979 s - i , ,
. raou : Eenry Falk, M.D.
l . susjtcr Conversation with Charlie Cox in Earrisburg concerning radioactive ,
- I todine in TH1 emissions !
ll
- 3 In the past few days some air samples collected by MRC exceeded 100 pCi/sua /hr.
l However, this maximum permissible concentration is based on a yearly environ-mental exposure, held constant at this hourly level. Samples before and ]l af ter the elevated readings earlier this week were considerably lower, and by this AM, with the installation of new charcoal filters, have become non-detectable. This is not a significant problem, therefore, secording to ,
. l; Charlie. ,
The reactor is now coolir.g down rapidly' (50* in past day!!) I The'l(RC and DER set up a whole body counter in Middletown available for testing residents near THI. 721 were tested by the evening of 4/19. No .I levels related to the reactor were detected in anyone. 9.however,had detectable but low levels related to redon daughters (possibly related to ll radium in drinking water, or conceivably to an old watch dial operation). All 9 were contacted and in!crued. A follow-up letter to all 9 was sent by Dr.EcLeod offering further information, etc. ij charlie will stay in Barrisburg at least another week until EFA has
- assuined all of the monitoring duties in its lead-agency role. .
!I gst Benry Falk, M.D. l a- - cc: Dr. Heath .i. Dr. Stein
- Dr. Nelson e .
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- . - . , . . .- , _ _ . , - , . . , . . . - - . - - - -- - . , , a ,T ". ~ ;", , .-.,,,r_, -
4 . To: Marjorie Aamodt .
~
I From: Bruce Molholt* h Re: Affidavits for Injunction Against TMI-1 Restart Date: 14 June 1985 , . i ' i I 4 i i i i , You mentioned that you had obtained a memo-randum from Henry Falk, MD, of Centers for Discese Control dated 20 April 1979 in which iodine-131 levels in air had
, been measured in excess of 100 pCi/m3 following the re- l , moval of iodine filters on 14 April 1979. This is a con- '
siderable burden of radionuclide contamination from the public health perspective, equivalent to over 100 million ' pCi/1, and, hence, for example, 25 million times in excess , of the standard for radon gas exposure. ; Obviously, in the case of iodine-131 exposure, the critical organ at risk is the thyroid gland. It is not ' obvious from Dr. Falk's memorandum how long iodine-131 levels exceeded 100 uC1/1 (I-believe his only reference'to time was ti for the "past few days"). However, assuming two' days' exposure l at this level (it may have been as many as six days between j April 14th and April 20th, 1979), an exposed individual would have inhaled over 4 Ci iodine-131. This dose is tl vastly in excess of that required to induce-thyroid cancer. I have appended the relevant chapter from Rosalie Bertel's Handbook for Estimatina Health Effects from Exposure to ' lonizina Radiation (August 1984). t l 1 1 O
....a-...-.-.--._,.. . . - . - - - - . .
m A ! 25d / i 257 f STEflNGLASS EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES CF FALLOUT j U 4 Similarly, anstudy of childhood leukemia in the Albany and Troy, N. Y., area 200 gggglll 4Ill1IIl1IIIIIIIIII which had received a localiicd rain-out of fresh fiss. ion products from a distant nuclear test, suggested a doubling of the m.cidence rate at external gamma doses a An .oy - of the order of 100 mr for those exposed in utero or shortly after birth. I Considering that the beta ray doses from internal emitters in certain key organs of the fetus and infant were 10 to 100 times as large as the external gamma 50 - - dose,t es o this finding is consistent with the doses observed to double the ~ , spontaneous rate in the case of diagnostic X rays to the early embryo' and fetus. - More recently, evidence has been obtained suggesting that a direct ~ dosc-response relationship exists also for adult leukemia mortality and fallout Live. and tuharv same5 radiation, but no such evidence-bas so far been available for other types of z cancers. Lung ,/ -- 3 10 -- g, ,/' ; it is therefore the purpose of this paper to present initial results of a - cpiJemiologic studies for large human populations exposed to low-level 2 ~ l radioisotopes from fallout so as to provide some indication of (1) whether a / ~ dose-response relation can be demonstrated for cancers other than leukemia at M .-
~
doses and dose rates encountered m the environment, (2) whether carcinogenic cffcers can be dccccred at such low doses not only for intrauterine exposure but
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also for low Icvel radioisotope exposures in adult life, and (3) whether cancers g -
. mn # f e
other than Icukemia can be detected and related to specific isotopes or el.asws of
. . 'is v3 tsotopes. s !
IlELATIVE CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS ON OlFFERENT OHGANS
. O' --
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, ,/ -
W/ ge - Since animal studies have shown that the rarc-earth isotopes dominant in the # - _ beta activity of fresh fission products such as cerium, lanthanum, and ystrium38 Tnv roid stead , / tend to seek out the glandular, lymphatic, and reproductive organs 8 3'3
- as well #
r' as the hone marrow, one would expect that the sharpest rises would be found in "' ~~
, ./ n I I
cancers of these target organs dring periods of heavy weapons testing. At the
- g , ,,y,,,,j,,gg];i;il IIt~
same time, cancer mortality should have risen much less or actually declined in ' ' aoS ig5o 1955 1960 organs that do not concentrate these isotopes, such as the storpach, the tongue. the larynx, and the skin, and from cancers where early detection and treatment VEAa have been relatively successful, such as cervical cancer. ' (a) I '"' **"'"' "' '#t##d That this hypothesis appears to be supported by the actual patterns of I n'. 3 Tecnds in ege adjuned death r*"'i 3" J *P'" I a sites. (a) & tale. (b) Female. (From Al. Sc8. Al. E"'iha, and . . cancer nwrrality is illustrated by the data for Japan, for which detailed data ! cancer Atortality in 18 Pan os99-1962), OcParsawa8
- Tohoku University, sendai, Japan,19651 Note stAug M b W,, j ,
Ibc doubling donc for the first trimester is determined from the data in Ref.12 as follows. Usmg the spontaneous incidence of 700 pe r million live leirths for 1943 to 1965 for l
unscrs anming chil.tren arradiated at any timc elu.eng intrauterine devclopment and die fact both bCfore and after 1945 are available. As shown m. Fig.1. reproduced (rom that I rad was foun,I to produce an aJditional 572:133 caws, the iloubling Jose for all j p.ficJs of gcuation is found to lec 1200 2 Joo mr. From Tabic 3 of Mcf.12, the relative risk 3 ;as the sharpest increases in cancer mortahty tatcs took plac m t unc , l fcr the first t rimc at er is larger than for all trimcaters by the facroc I orEans known to Sclectively concentrate isotopes dominant in fresh fal lout, (n.25 - 1.01/(I.4s - 1.00) = 15 times. Therefore, the doubling Jose for the first crimester is 8 namely, ahe rare-carth a.sotopes an3 todine. Aside from the bime marrow and g 020tvl5)or no s 20 mr. p spleen involved in leukemia, these organs are the pancreas, ER .
.. . . . . . . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ m _ . . -
I 258 259 ST E RNGLASS EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FALLOUT IIIIIIIIIl3IIIjiiiIjiiIlll l1I cnncentration in the environment is due to a declining incidence or to'an
- T ^"" .- increasingly effective program of early detection and treatment.
I
- It is therefore fortunate that detailed data on the incidence as well as the
- : - mortality rates for cervical cancer have recently become availshic for an area in so -
~
which measurements of radioisotope concentrations in the milk also exist for at Sionuch _
~
least the latter portion of the period studied.
~
thrus . !
~ I CERVICAL CANCER :
z 9 U to - Liver and toh.,y sur ges . Cervical cancer data are contained in the report of a study of cervical cancer in 11altimore recently completed by Kessler.8* The study encompassed all cases ! 5 fo 5 3
~
- of cervical and other uterine cancers hospitalized in the city of 112it;more among women under 60 years of age, classified by stage, for the time period 1950 to f
i B"*"
~ !
-- - 1969. (Table 1)
- ~ j Figures 2 and 3 show the data for the incidence of invasive cervical cancer
$ ~
E' '#9u8_A '"*j"'"#'... .8 / ,. d - and the mortality rates, respectively, for all cervical cancers in white wornen, for
$ uhom the level of medical care and mobility would be expected to be more 4 "O h 1 -
truiiem.a p,,/ / / at.o.tcr .amiant than ihai for nonwhite women. 3 - 7 1 Alm shown .nc the levels of beta sciivity measured in the precipitation in the Nrw Wnk ao a irss than 2em miles to the north, the closest area for which Y ta ,Y"" . - 05 - ef - wh meauncmenn hate I ren canied out over the longest period of time.3, It j _
/
w,3 [ounit that a displucment of 5 years, similar to the time for leukemia, seems
\ ' ' ,,, ./ y'o,,,,,
Pancreas to give the I cst correction for the time required before the incidence reaches its l peak Inliowing the arrival of the fallout. go'J~h5 - Inspection of these graphs reveals a number of important points: o.: IIIIll11IlIIIIll1Iil,IIIlllll 1.There was indeed an absolute rise in the incidence of cervical cancer after 10'0 the onset of nuc! car testing even though mortality declined, proving that uterine 3040 1945 1955 loco ' R canccr does not roptescui an cArcption to the f.cncral increaw of all cancers involving the male and female reproductive system sIter the omet of nuticar weapons testing as seen in the case of Japan. 2.The upward' changes in incidence occurred some 5 to 6 years after every
; ovary, the thyroid gland, and the liver. On the other hand, mortality for cancer nujor test series began, followed by renewed declines some 5 to 6 years alter the of the stonuch increased relatively little as did rectal and intestinal cancer, while cnd of each major test scrics.
cancer of the skin, the tongue, and the larynx actually declined after World l War !!* 1 3. The greatest period of excess cervical-cancer incidence and death occurred l 5 to 6 years after the onset of hydrogen weapons testing in the Pacific in 195 3, I.ung cancer, which also rose very sharply in the postwar years in Japan as in
; which began with surface detonations that led to very large incrches in beta ,
many other arcas of the northern hemisphere, presents a special case because activity in precipitation for the east coast of the United States.This was also the cther carcinogens and pollutants are known to act syncrgistically with radiation [ t period of most intensive weapons testing in Nevada, ubich led to the rain-outs in m the case of the lung;it therefore will be discussed separately, j the Albany and Troy, N. Y., arcal' during the spring and summer of 195 3. The only nujor cancer that showed a sharp daline in mortality is that of the j 4. A second peak of cancer incidence and death followed the sccond utcras, and here the factor of early detection and treatment would be expected to play a sigmficant role. In fact,carly detcetion of cervical cancer can lead to a atmospheric test series of 1961 to 1962, which included both low altitude high rate of small yield tc;ts in Nevada and luge yield hydrogen weapons tests in the Pacific Thus, it is of particular interest to study whether the observed ion. and Siberia and resulted in a second peak of beta xtivity m the pr drama tic r n in mortality in the face of rises in fission-product g
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F e). 1i # b) Notary M le My C elen Espires Mar 85,1989 ' New Cveberland. Pa. Cornberland Comty i
C "& Q orn f resan Y M , is irreversible witnout thyroid repixement dunny ti
. ..nsequences of a nuclear accident.
Back in Harrisburg. we knew that a large release of first two years of life. It is said that without treatme radioactive iodine into the atmosphere from a nuclear the intelligence quotient drops daily until seve retardation results. It is obviously of paramount power reactor would result in the public's inhaling, ingesting. or otherwise absorbing amounts of importance to alert the public and the medical radioactivity which could produce acute, continuing, profession immediately to such an unusual cluster of or late thyroid effects among others. These effects cases. Unfortunately. a three month lapse occurred
- could range from mild thyroiditis to hypothyroidism to benign thyroid neoplasms, nodules, and cancer. Fetal C hypothyroidism associated with cretinism is of INFANT HYPOTHYROID CASES particular concern due to the inverse relationship IN g,NNS_Y,lgANIA betwech iodine uptake and age.
i Seventeen cases of hypothyroidism statewide were . , j reported in the nine months prior to the TMI accident ,2 I f3]3$g[-lt ! i with a concentration of cases in southeastern Pennsylvania where the population is most dense. The p 3 . l ,e , *
! map shows the locations of each case and the nuclear -
' ,./ / /' reactors in this state.
,% e le ' u'/ 7 i
i INFANT HYPOTHYROID CASES f _m. r )ey,,eh{e 4
. IN PENNSYLVANIA ~N '$ "- h' \ A
g (F0e a 9 M0esTse #3e*00) '
ut
- b
/ BEFORE TMI {",ho,
-(3/28/79) _f-
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w . /- - before the public and the medical profession were alerted to this unusual finding. Newsoron rowH
- g. J N- '3 \
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We'- ' j )Q (C- v f ?., that the health department haTnot even consid. the hkehhood of any hnkage between thyr-
'* cenciency and this unusual cluster of cases, For l ~ j $ p_' /w "7 %gj/.
- s. I ,,-
several days after the accident began, low levels of hi * ( ,
/*: radioactive iodine had been well documented in cow's i
milk on numerous farms all around Three Mile Island. l I 1
- ~ ~ - - - - - {*,*e,0, l%'2 This dilemma highlights the right of the people to know cTout the presence or absence of health risks fo_r On the next map, 27 cases of hypothyroidism themselves and their progeny.
occurred during the 9 months following the accident. Prior to TMi, I must admit that as a physician and The concentration of cases in Lancaster County academician,1 fou nd it all too casy to overlook the lac k
! of preparedness for the public's health in a nuclear immediately downwind of the TMI reactor showed 6 cases between June and November 1979. It is age. That is to say, I don't consider myself blameless estimated that 2,700 - 2,800 babies were born in for the present state of affairs. And as a physician, itis ,
Lancaster County during those 6 months. The also of interest and concern that medical and dental incidence of hypothyroidism is approximately 10 fold procedures contribute about 40%of the annual total of greater than expected during that period of time. Em background radiation. . though the numbers are mm11 ho rm aata warrant So now we come to the last serious issue. What further eoidemiological investigation for other happens in the event of those future nuclear possible causes such as hereditv,industrialor medical accidents? How do we protect the public's health?
~
Short of immediate cessation of all nuclear activity raqiation sources, and chemicals in the water sucolv o_r foodstuffs. It is definitelv premature to attributejhis which I think is well nigh impossible, the world must be cFustering to the acciam, at TMI. prepared not to repeat the mistakes of TMI but should Whatever the cause, the timely release of the be far better prepared than Pennsylvania is at the discovery of such an unusual clustering of cases is of present time. But let me warn that the people of the utmost importance to the public and the medical Pennsylvania are no better off and perhaps wors profession if we hope to stave off mental retardationin today than they were the day before the radi even one case of hypothyroidism which might not release at Three Mile lsland on March 28. There i have been screened. no medicallibrary. No bureau of radiatinn health. No Mental retardation f rom congenital hypothyroidism resources for radiation health prepardness.
w - - - t 42 P. NETTEstlEIM AND A. MARCHoK NEoPt.AsTic DEVELOPMENT IN AIRWAY EPITitELIUM 43 study involving more than 80 tracheas'was again far below that ofany other J type oflesion. Thus it is apparent that even many of the advanced lesions did ! not progress to invasive cancer. 2* - j
- 4. Discussion: TheSigmficance ofLesion Reversal
. l
$' The study on the development and fate ofcarcinogen. induced dysplasias in airway mucosa produced a number ofimportani fmdings Ihat lesions can 5* i
! develop 4/c novo for several months after an exposure; that they seemingly i
' persist for many months, self-sustaining; that the mild atypias are more i- common at early time points and the severe atypias become relatively more numerous tater even though the carcinogen has long been removed; and that
[ all types of dysplasias can regress if no further carcinogen exposure occurs, a I " the less sesere lesions regressing first. What this study could not solve, . however, are the questions regarding the progenitor-progeny relationship i of the lesions to each ogher or any of the lesions to invasive cancer. Probably i 7
~i _ i4_ s e a as the most important fmding is the clear demonstration of regicssion oflate, i carcinogen-induced, dysplastic lesions. This conclusion is supported by ;
Fio. 20. Incidence of specif8e es ns heas at different times after carcinogen similar observations in humans, following cessation of smoking (Auerbach ! ge hea in order to normalaic fac desferences [P] ;h*,'**",'[ *'* ,, [po,,,,., points ,cpreseni mean number of each sype oficsion per nachea. Approaimately 50 trachea 5 Pc' time P i"' goy Agg ges, ns e mbined 2 SE;(a) cf al. 1961,1962,1977)and in experimental animals showing regression or lack of progression of skin papillomas (Burns et al.,1976) and hyperplasG: squamous metaplasias with istsie or no atypsa; tO) squamous metapaanas wn'unoderate anypaa liver nodules (Ohmori et al.,1980; Teebor and Becker,1971; Wi!!iams, 1980). IOI'd'*"#*d '*"
" 'N*n$auw a ar n as )in\v'e e as; t ) cu ua e The regression of histologically recognizable dysplastic lesions raises a fu'r o"r'iide n 28 monih tumor induction study (each invasive carcinoma counted as one number ofimportant qufstions regarding the presumed neoplastic precur- ,,,,on). trrom Topping M.19N.)
s r status of such lesions. It is conceivable that the dysplasias are chrom _e disturbances of cell differentiation and replication unconnected with d#E ces of atypia (Table V). Their numbers increased for 4 months in the cancer. They may be manifestations of sneral independent types of tissue ure With time after exposure, the damage produced by agents whic;. have toxic as well as carcinogenic fetv f uency o y us I o wiih severe atypia (designated ad. pmperties..They might be abortive forms of neoplasia, which, because of vanced lesions in Table V) increased while the lesions with only mild atypia intrinsac cellular mechanisrns (e.g., replicative suic:de) or extrinsic mecha-decreased. Figure 20 displays the data from the same experiment in terms of nisms (e.g., host defenses, madequate capillarization) did not persist or mean frequency of the different lesions per trachea. It is evident that from 4 progress. On the other hand, the fact that such lesions can regress may not be months after the end ofexposure on, the total number oflesions decreased. at allincompatible with their preneoplastic nature,if the terin preneoplastic This must mean that some of the lesions are regressing. Both the mild as well
.lcsion is urd to denote a cohort of cells at incrrwd nsk to become as the moderate dysplasias decreased in number. In contrast the advanced malignant rather than unalterably programmed to become malignant. The ~
lesions, which occur with the lowest frequency, remain constant, until at frequency and rate of conversion from the preneoplastic to the neoplastic least 12 months after exposure. Many of these also seemed to disappear state would probably be governed by a number of factors such as carcinn- ' during the subsequent 16 months (see Table 3 in Topping cf al.,1979). A n dose, presence or absence ofpromoting stimuli, permissive host conds- ! , low incidence of microscopic but invasive carcinomas was detected from 4 ons, etc. months on; however, the incidence was far below that of any other type of Another important consideration relates to the resolving power of histo-lesion. The data also showed that the cumulative incidence of invasive logic methods. A metaplastic-dysplastic lesion is only recognized once it carcinemas (9%) which was established in a 28-month tumor induction assumes a certain minimum size which we presume to be at least several
i
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km 1 2 d., 44aw 4'- rww ' CTS T ABSTRACTS
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i
! setivity. Indivitual case exam les will be subjects were readostr uleeted and th ue ? presented in more detail to illustrate the ruelta ser be a conservettee eatieste of ~
interaction between psychiatric sys;tems and the actual tasunological effect.
,. mastocytosis. -
/
;7 Whether the psychiatric manifestations re=
i
'i. sult frca systeste effects of histamine or 5 other products released from east cells, or * -
g, 3
,c . loesl acessmlatices of mast cells in the brain ,
9
'd is ur.known. These and other possible INFLUENCE OF CENTER. PHYSICAL CONDITION.3 ETA- ,
mechanisms will be discussed. ENDCRPRIN AND MOCD ON THE PERCEPTION AND EXPER.
,a In sta=sary, systezie mastocytosis may pre- 1ENCE OT PAIN. M.M. Singh.M.S.. Brown University e l. j j ser.s with psychiatric syzytoms in both ecant- Medical School. Providence. R.I. 02902.K.J. Cure- '
f tion er.d siood. In feet, several of these 18" *Ph.d. .J.O.Jenkins .Ph.D. .A. Mitri .Ph.D. .B .M. l , j patients were initially seen by psychiatrists Bunnell,Ph.D..tniv.CA. . Athens. CA. 30602 ) y, before accurate medical diag :osis was estat. The purpose of this experiment was to deter- i j
'a lished. It is therefore important for psych 1 eine whether gender and physical condition dif- ,
g I. atrists to be familiar with this disorder forentially influence stress-induced thanges in - [
'. which can be alleviated by specific medical plasma beta-endorphin (BE). mood state, and an- ;
, intervention. II"IP'I*"* I & I q Terry male and female athletes and non-ath- s. ;
i 1stes. aged 18-35,were tested before and af ter e ' i maximal exhaustion' treadmill stress test. Crose pressure pain (CPP) and 1scheele pain (IP) were
,'j f measured utilising a micrometer and blood pres.
(" INNUWE STAT 33 A3 A FURCTI0s CF CXp0s!C 3 TRESS AT THREE RILE 15LAED. E.4. Schaeffer, eure cuff / dynamometer.respectively. BE was maa- I' ' sured by radiotasuneassaw.and mood state via W. Be Einase. A. Baus. Ph.D.. C.P. Reynoida,
- 5.0.. P. Rikis. L.E. Davidaan, and I. the Profile of Mood State Questionnaire.
Results indicated 80 and CPP threshold and a Flealog. Delformed Servlees Ostveretty of y the Realth Scioeces and Saves Redical tolerance increased following stress testi n (gs.039.ga.0001.respectively).with females de-
%- Mi Research Imatitute. Betheeda. Basylend 2C414 hfga!
The present study investigated changee in monstrating hither threshold (pre gs.004.poste M g Aneuse states anaccieted with chreate atresa g4.049) and tolerance (pre: Es.001, post: g4 "jd' , l
&a e eenple of realdents living meer the .008). IP threshold and tolerance decreased (gg.021, g .039 respectively).with athletes ah ,
9 Three Elle Island Butlear Power Station j (TEll and a group of people living meer e tolerating more post-enercise pain than non- Q baserdaue tesic seate site la Delaware athletes (gc.001). Males' negative mood state J
; EDEL). Selivery leeunogleh=11e-A to-IgAl wee (tension. depression.anser.f atigue and conf u- .
; ,f alon) increased.while females' decreased (g4.03) seasured maseg stegle radia11aeusedifiq1on following esercise. Females' increased in post-le the TE! and DEL group to addittee ta ge #
, control group matched for ego, eas. diot' esercise levels of vitor ( d.006). Correlations y end esotteg. 41_se. blood assolea = e= (24.05) between pain.ecod and 3t indicated CPP s cellected free Ts! end the centrei ereun and sad IP tolerance was positivelv correlated with g g g N'
ao i were re417ted for total s. T. T-hainer. and '
- t sitively correlated aith fatigue. Pre-post p eoppreneer leeshoeften. asa taa ratio of changes in SE were positivslv correlated with .fI '
w
* *"[* ** ' *[
3 , t,",,,,,, pre a percent chanses in negative mood state
; Planned comparances of the 731 med DEL _ * ; subjects esta controle indicated that the N e results suggest males and females at i chrontes!!r stressed group had lower e-iga. hign and normal levels of phvsical condition e=l l
i tJ 73) e 2.35, a e 0,03. mane-whitney ' ""'"d d I U'""' IF ***" **"** ""d " "N 8" " " 'h"I*I'8*3 *u (at), affec-tute between Tur and centrole revuted that , j TNI realdenta had fewer B-lvanheettes. R tive state (mood). and ability to tolerate i j A 2.00 g 4 0.co2, T-1,anhoevtee, t esperimentally induced stress (pain tolerance).
- l
? - i.w, o( o.o16. T-ha ? nar cella. R I a 12.co, n e o.03*, and T-oupprueer ~
celle R e 1.co. m e o. cot . Depressed lymphocyte populettone as well as Models of Mental Health "Tainirs fer Fr. try (fl ; l depressed e-iga were related to elevated _ Care phvelsest & Ve!!datie- St;de I mrinary catecholamine and cortlaol levels. JJ St. rain. L2i 31se.
,.,j M. pan:*.s. J.Ece t L. T.eorge While the c!!ascal sign &ficaece of these A greficus report tc the Isrchesr*atic $0-l i findings among TE! and DEL residente boa est tiety described a taxe-cr / c* six re?tal *esit'. '
been utah 11.h.d. the r.aulta suggut that changea la asevne status during prolonged m = gr=gr g f,*,g, ,5 g y'an g, L , Wj' e esposure to stress parettel other .consultatien. canoas, pcst grad; ate specialla:at;; ..11ais:n.F*.ase h"t 16.IItr&t*4e.tute:.-
'l J
. phyelologice!. behavneral, and payehological changes. Although cauttee abould be this Elmi centract was dest = red to validate the Model twas usir a sta .dardi:ed irrtr:=er.t vna y'
(! l l e raademised ta:nnipe. ro rteen by otheses yre-esercised gives the small group ettee. dictarg dif fereeces ascr.g the .odel typs were l l 1- 1 l h Psychosomatic Medicine Vol. 47, No.1 Uan./Feb.1985) 85
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' l THE PENNSYLV NI A S,T ATE 'U NIVERSITY '
. THE CAYl'TOL'CAMPL'S
'{ i MIDDLETOWN. PENNSYLVANIA 17057 j ,
(717) 236-8939 November 12, 1984 i
- i Dr. Nunzio Palladino j Chairman
- . -
Nuclear Regulatory Cgmmission Washington, D.C.
Dear Dr. Palladino,
I ' For the past several years I have been study-ing the_ spatial distribution of cause of death for the C+=+= Dann=vivania using the statist 2cs provided by
. 67 a the Pennsylvania Department of Health. .The technique used is. described Jn the enclosed paper which was pre- -
sented at the International. congress on Technology and Technology Exchange meeting in Pittsburgh during October
, of this year. I have also discussed some of my findings with Dr.'Harkness at University Park.
The report '(copy enclosed) in the Sunday Nov. 1 lith Sunday Patriot News referred to the fact that the Aamodts of Coat'sville were sch'eduled to have a meeting l with the NRC which did not come off. This situ tion ' prompted me to write .this letter to you. f*believe is there is much vork to be done in the area of heaIDi l l statistics as my findings suggest, and I believe snat
- i my colleagues and I at Capitol Campus have the expertise i to design and complete a commissioned study.
You must long for the old days when you were Dean of the College of Engineering at Penn State and in- ! Ci!A I.hAN-R'.C3 s volved with the Faculty Senate, and when a major issue ' consisted of "What degree of Autonomy should be granted to Capitol Campus?" We are all impressed with the way (
'?
15 !C/ S4 U 16 - you are handling a difficult situation and we wish you : well. . I
, f
- j .
Sincerely, h I h4 - i r Winston A. Richards, Ph. D. ! Associate Professor of Math $ Stat. !
; i ! 11/23..To EDO for Appropriate Action..Cpy to: Chairman' 84-2008 i
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. N AN EQUAL oPPORT1:NITY L'NIVER$1TY + -
S t-l 1 PROCEEDI CS . 1 International Congress On i Technology & Technology ' Exchange
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L : Q Management Of Technology - And its Limitations - i M
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a- .l a Probability Map and its Rolo in investigativo
, ata Analysis (A Case Study)
Nlnston A. Ricnaics. Pennsylvarus State Umversity/ Capitol Carnous, Middletown, Pennsylvanis . l . l . 412.1 . , Abst-tet
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! ne information related to'i=fant deaths per thou.
A great deal of at*estion has been focused on the Southeentrsi Pe::sylva:ia regics since the occurence of sand live births for 1978 and 1980 is sic =arised in
- the nuclear accide=t at Ihree Ele Island nectricity Ishl* 1*
Power nonerst.ing Plant in Marcs of 1979. Ioday there both at the .05 levil of significance and ohr probab-is continuing discussion of the effects of this acci. 111 ties which were considered not signifi-ant. The maps ' dont on the population and the environment. The prow for the other causes of death vers s1=1h ny construct. ability oap is used to study the spatial distribution ed. taats 1 of several phenome=a at different points is time. , Amongst, those phenomena are i= fast sort,ality, deaths Tue uste answa the senastes tsat espertenced deats fron leuke_ia, hypertension a=d cancer. *
. rates per taeusand signi*Leantly below the espected value S t -W a* 1 c"1 Ete,I and these cat asportanced dasta rates signific. astir i
2 A great deal of attentics has been focused on our ""P* '1 * ** L*8 ** ** *va t!1* ** * *** ta area in Southcestral Pennsylvania since the occurrence ***" 8 8
- s3 - C*** "*
- of the nuclear accident at Three :<ile Isla:d Cecersti:4 ratu are not estes, ut senaertvuu sousuu are eeuta-Plast in March of 1979. "Duri=g this period of the so- ***
ci(ent at TMI (:tarch 25th to April 7th, 1979), the g w , s ex m e- c rtmi:rtewr osars i principal radioac-ive materials released yore Ionon-133 sarts or arwrs/isu trve stans l and Ienon-135 plus traces of Iodise-131.** Ioday ther, is continuiag discussics of the effe n s of this acci-dont on the populatics a:d environ =ent. As a :ssult, ! i decided to take a preli=inary lool: at, the health st,a-l tistics for the State of Pe:nsylvsnia that dealt with can,ne seaue taas rana ocearne nestas can ser ::.ma i infans =ortality for the year i=ediately preceding the t u trpeens u . , r u tas.eted se. i ' accident, Am,, and the year 1980 fonovi.ng Ce acci- , . I dont as van as death fnz cancer for speci.fic age court: n ero o t:tes., I eeunt: n ereeast:* ^ groups, death fron leuke ia as?_ hypertension for si=i= staarere .e4u se, . utenee, .so., j ods. Ihe State of Pe=sylvania has sixt/-seven counties suana .elasse e a.tagua .o129 s and is divided isto nine heal *.h regions. Caumhis Coun- **** """" ty lies is F.ecion IV. Three :'ile Islasd is l'ocated in the Susquena==a *.iver is lower Dauphin Cousty. We vi.n cre tert .e42n2 i examine the death raps provided by the Pe==.sylvania ruiadeleua .eune Depart,sent of Esalth fo: 11 counties, with special - '
.e13 ass emphasis placed on Region IV. Cheeur 3*ff**'*a 81122' vetdd The method of analysis esplayed is one sugges*ed ""
- by M. Choyncvaki in his article is JASA, Ju=e 1959,3 is l which he esplays a protability map for the study of the sucae nun alleenear .ezun
} spatial distribution of a phenomenon, in that case e, } st,udy of brain tumors is Pola:d. This method was ex,- :nassar .ostess wuumessa .o2:442 ' tended is the sense that not c=1y is the procedure ap- ******** *""" **** *""**
plied to the study of the cross-sectional phenomenon of . . the cause of death, but it is also used to ararine the ruladetpua .coasse longitudisal changes is the specific causes of death as *****"* **""* well. The asps are very affective in higt.lighti:q the different trussition patterns that are occ t. - ring. Susnin .88"" -
' , In adapta g this method, probability maps vers constructed shovi.ng the probability of the iscidence af We find Bradford and Bucks Counties experien ed a infant sortality per thousand live births in Per.ssyl- below averste death rate per thousand infants while n- "-
vania assu=isg that the incidence was the same for an* leghemy, Vaahington, T.rie, Crsvford, Philadelphia, cou= ties. The Poissen distributics was used for calcu- Chester and Jafferson Counties have above aversgo death lating the probahility of the gives number of i= fast istes for this period. In 1980 Bucks Countf conti:ved deaths per 1000 livs birth.s for each' county. 51=ce the to have a below aversce death rste for ista ts vtile probability of occurrence of as infant death was res.- Brudford had saved up to average. Chester had movoi sonably s=all, on an aversgo cf about n per thousa:d from axperiencing as above aversgo i= fact death rata and live births, the model appeared realistic. Similar Delaware had send frss aversgo to below aversge. Crau-aspa vere constructed for deaths from cancer, leukemia tard had moved from above average in 1978 to ave i and hypertension. 1950 and so had Jefferson County. Howenr Colu: Ihe maps havs three classificati:,nst sig.ificas* , . Dauphin Counties have sowed free experiencing as e 1fi- hL9eath rits per thWuidd tiene that is - ly below castly aversgo above deaths average oer 1000 deahs live births, per 1000 sig=both live births .~ ~~T t above 17.1 rage. The sonovi=g probability maps Ttlese facts
- 173 .
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, Cf the four causes of death considered, except i Probability tables for 1975 and 1980 that take a for the cause of death fan hypertension in vnich
! aloser look at Region IV which encompasses eight coun. Dauphht County appears to experience a decline in re-I ties and includes Oauphin County, in which Three !111e lation to the other counties, all other throe causes of Ialand is located, were also constructed. Findings for death show sigmificant rises over the perica consider =. ,
Ilegion IV with regs,is to leukemia, hypertension and ed. Infant mortality for Dauphin County while_avere.ge. ; ! **Neeceraresuasarisedintheconclusion.
. in 1975 to.comes_ significantly above avernge_ial900 .
l l Death from leukeata unile averuce in 1979 is very close i
. . Sh&LE 3 to above average in 1%0, and deaths free cance: for ' !
} smaza or prart nurus ass ansc rse tsonas:r..r ss zz a ages 4M4 while average for 1975 become doeidedly cia-nificantly above averste for 1980. Clearly the method.
' ! courrus suasetzame unst anz tsusn ology when applied as was done does identif problea , utaars ses:as zy regions. [ The probability maps therefere seem to be a ! tste meanirgful way to identify r*Cicus that de=orre in- l
, depth study, and Region IV appears to be one of those. )
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. taaeuter I tsse I 12.1 lu.9,etoI ts l .34ss 2. Pennsylver.ia Department of 1'.ealth, Heal *a Cata i l , tenaces l teet [ ,t.t
. q7.4sseeg 17 l .3192 Center, Health Profiles for Pennyv1va..it Counties' 1980 and 19d2, Daz .snurg, Pa.17102. .
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} ' l .- . . .. -_- . 2 Attechmsnt 3 Aamodt Motion, Revision 1 !! I I l I l, t 'I'.i i . P THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT i AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT ON THE HEALTH OF RESIDENTS AND FLORA IN THREE AREAS WNW: AND SW OF TMI BY
, ' Marjorie M. Aamodt ! Principal Investigator , i i .
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i Foreword I l
! l The author is appreciated of the investigative and other efforts ,l J
of Francine Taylor and Mary Osborn, without whose continuing and devoted
~
help this analysis of the citizen's health study would not have possible. . I The parallel wc,rh of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund to i verify tihe cancer mortalities and their provision of this information
! has been greatly appreciated. A letter of January 14, 1985 from Drs. John Cobb and Jonathan Berger, dereribing the Fund's pa:-ticipation, is provided following this foreword as well as petition to the Court t
requesting authorization to initiate a comprehensive followup of the Aamodt health study (see p. 3 of petition). I I O
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. _ . - . _ _ _ , . _ _ . _ *"" "N-s-e+.o-e , _
! ,1 P f% (s TABLE OF CONTENTS THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT ON THE HEALTH OF RESIDENTS AND FLORA IN THREE AREAS WNW AND SW OF TMI 4
$ M -
Foreword l.0 ABSTRACT ......................................... I 2.0 INTRODUCTICN ..................................... 1 i 3.0 THE HEALTH SURVEY ................................ 2 I* 3.1 METHOD ........................................... 2
; 3.2 RESULTS OF THE SURVEY ............................ 4 t 3.21 CANCER MORTALITY RATE ............................ 4 3.22 CANCERS AND TUMORS IN LIVING PERSONS . . . . . . . ...... 6 1 3.23 CANCER / TUMOR CLUSTER IN FAMILIES . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 9 1 3.24 OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS .............................. 10 l 3.241 (Pregnancy effects) ............................. 10 1 3.242 (Skin effects) .................................. 11
~
3.242 (" Ruptured / collapsed" organs) . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 11 j 3.3 STATEMENTS OF RESIDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED EFFECTS MOST
, REASONABLY ATTRIBUTED TO EXPOSURE TO HIGH-DOSE
- RADIATION ....................................... 12 f 4.0 RADIATION EFFECTS ON PLANTS ...................... 15 ip 5.0 DISCUSSION ....................................... 16
( 6.0
SUMMARY
.......................................... 19 Figures i 1 - DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AREAS SURVEYED . .3 , ;
2 - CANCER MORTALITY RATE ANALYSIS FOR THREE AREAS ; WEST OF TMI .................................. 5 ' 3 - VERIFIED DEATHS LISTED CHRONOLOGICALLY . . ....... 7 4 - CANCERS AND TUMORS IN LIVING PERSONS . . . . ....... 8 5 - CLUSTERS OF CANCER DEATHS AND CANCER / TUMOR - DIAGNOSES IN FAMILIES ........................ 9 l 8- " COLLAPSED / RUPTURED ORGANS" . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 12 i
-t 7 -
SUMMARY
OF UNUSUAL EXPERIENCES ON MARCH 28-30, 1979 ! i REPORTED BY RESIDENTS WNW OF TMI .............. 14 f l Affidavits - All identifications of names, streets, addree M expurgated. " 1 - (2 pages)
,. 2 -
(1 page) ; 3 - (1 page) j 4 - (1 page) 5 - (1 page) 6 - (2 pages) 7 - (1 page) 8 - (1 page) 9 - (1 page) Attachment 1 - NEONATAL HYPOTHYROIDISM CASES, LANCASTER COUNTY, 1979 - 1983 ; o APPENDIX A - RATIONALE FOR DERIVING BASELINE CANCER MORTALITY DATA FOR ; THREE AREAS SURVEYED WEST OF TMI i
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l i % 1.0 ABSTRACT Data collected from interviews with residents in three areas which were
- in the path of radioactive releases from the Three Mile Island accident demonstrate that cancer mortalities in these areas during the post-accident
,l, years 1980 through 1984 arejseven times greater than would be expected. Interviews with the residents in these areas have provided ' horror' tales of effects that are remarkedly similar .to those caused by exposures i from five!to one-hundred rems of ionizing radiation. i Analysis of flora growth abnormalities gathered in the same areas,. i geographically, led an expect to. conclude that these' abnormalities could 8
/
i have been induced by radioactive fallout from the Three Mile Island accident.
, Although residents have attempted to raise the issue of serious i
health effects in animals and people, no official agency has responded by undertaking a bonafide investigation, s
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The official publicly-stated opinion is that radiation releases at the time of the Three Mile Island accident were negligible. This opinion
. has, however, been challenged by a number of studies.
The most comprehensive of these is a review of all dose assessment studies by Dr. Jan Beyea under the auspices of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund. On Friday, March 30, 1979, three days into the accident, measurements 1 of 1200 millirems were made directly over the plant stacks with helicopters. l [ This demonstrated the presence of unheard-of amounts of radiation outside the i plant. However, the measurements taken from the helicopters were grossly I
i T
,. i optimistic. The helicopter blades forced the plume away from the O , measuring instrument.
l No dosimetry was on the ground in the areas that were surveyed for . t I health effects. The effects that the people experienced can serve as I a more reliable measure of radiation dose than extrapolations from plant releases and distant meters. The flora in the area can also i 1
; provide that information. In fact, the clue to the kinds of radioactive ! material released may still reside in the trees and soil. ! Following is a summary of the results of surveying a population t
ofapproximately450peopleinare[swhereradioactiveplumespassed in the early days of the Three Mile Island accident. I 3.0 THE HEALTH SURVEY
} 3.1 METHOD A group of women and men, several of whom had expertise in conducting surveys, went from door-to-door. An interview form, organized on the basis of infor 'ation provided by Dr. Carl Johnson of Denver, Colorado was used. (See Attachment 1,)
j Two areas (No. 1 and 2) were selected because information from other i - investigators 1/ had identified a high frequency of reports of erythema and metallic taste by the residents. A third area was chosen because it, . like the other two areas, was at a high elevation with an. unobstructed view of the Three Mile Island nuclear plants. Figure 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of these areas.
- The primary interviewers were Francine Taylor, Norma Ritterspach, Jane Lee and Marjorie Aamodt. Assisting were Joyce Corradi, Linda Barash, Sally Stephen
' Brenda Witmer, Marie Inslee, Paula Kinney, Susan Folta, Helen Hocker, Mary Osbo Erma Weaver, Cory Folta and Austin Ritterspach. l 1/ Eileen and Mitsuru Katagiri, work unpublished _ _ _,.-.__7 ,
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, FIGURE 1 - DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AREAS SURVEYED Area Direction from TMI Distance Elevation Above Sealevel 1 ~ West Nort'hwest 4 -6mi. 600-750' j, 2 Southwest 3 mi. 650' 3 Wes't Northwest 8mi. 900' Almost every household was willing to provide the information .
solicited. There were no refusals in Area 1, four in Area 2 and 2 in 1 i Area 3. The interviewers represented themselves as a group of citizens I i that were interested in health problems. . In view of the pioneering effort the survey represented, several
; excursions were made to interview residents outside 6f the: survey areas i
l *s s because their unique experiences came to.the interviewers' attention. These "outside" interviews were. helpful in drawing conclusions, however they were not added into the survey data.
; While the questionnaire did 'suggest' symptoms, the interviewers
.i 4 ;
found, without exception, that this did no more than remind the participant. 1 i All interviewers were of the opinion that the residents were conservative
! in their provision of information and that what was obtained was less than v
i , actually existed. For instance, a woman with an obvious lump in her arm did not mention it until the interviewer directly questioned her about it. l' . The reluctance to report diagnoses of tumors or. cancers in living persons, 4 possibly because of associated stigma, was apparent when, on followup, an , l' additional six tumor / cancer diagnoses, existing at the time of the survey, vere finally revealed. i I , e
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4 i 3.2 RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 9 The survey produced the following significant information: j a. a cancer mortality rate for the.. combined area seven times j greater than would be expected for the population surveyed, ,
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} b. a large number of tumors and cancers in living persons that were diagnosed iti the period 1979 ithrough 1984, af ter the Three Mile ,
Island accident,
, c. other health effects including. anemias-and skin rashes which i were diagnosed / experienced for the first time after the Three Mile i
Island accident,
-d. eleven birthing abnormalities in the nineteen pregnancies ! occurring lfrom 1979 through 1984,
- e. unexplained medical phenomena of collapsed or ruptured major organs occurring in four residents and a fifth person residing outside the areas.surveyedibut. in .a' west northwesd i sirection in a line with t .
i surveyed areas 1 and 3, ; i j f. first-hand accounts by residents of their experiences on March 28, 29, 30 and April 2, 1979, the early days of the Three Mile Island accident. I t 4 3.21 CANCER MORTALITY RATE . ( Figure 2 presents the cancer mortality rate analysis. The estimated l,
, numbers of persons in all households (the populatica) for the -areas surveyed was verified by the West > Shore School District surtey conducted about the same time and tax maps. The prior estimate of 457 persons was lowered to 433.
Eighteen . of the twenty cancer deaths reported were verified by death certificates obtained from the Pennsylvania Health Department. Two reported deaths were dropped; one (cancer) occurred before the accident (1978),and the other was
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.- . . . . _ - . = a w.: x _.s .a . . u u n ..:
I not attributed to cancer on the death certificate. (This latter one may be added in to the data if a check with the attending physician provides evidence j that. cancer was a cont,ributing cause of death.) One cancer death certificate was delayed because the place of death was a hospital and not the residence. A cancer death, not obtained in the survey (noone was at home)," was discovered in the followup, and the death certificate was obtained. Thus, twenty cancer deaths have been verified as occurring in the areas surveyed during the post-TNE-2 accident period. FIGURE 2 - CANCER MORTALITY RATE ANALYSIS FOR THREE AREAS WEST OF TMI i 1 i! Area , 1 3 2 All ' t . No. of Households 37 15 87 139 i No. of Households Contacted 34 13 53 100 Population of Area 111 54 - 278 433 I Cancer Mortalities 1979 - 1984 7 3 . 10
. 20 I
Cancer Mortalities 1980 - 1984 7 3 9 19 > Cancer Mortality Rate 1980 - 1984 Per 100,000 Population 1,097 Ratio of Cancer Mortality Rate for 1980-1984 Over Expected 7.13 > In figuring the cancer mortality rate, the single death for the year of ; , the accident was dropped, so that the post-accident period considered are the 2 calendar years 1980 through '1984. The baseline datum was derived as appropriate i ' l i a 1 for the rural areas where the survey was conducted. The rationale for this I i figure, 153.4 cancer deaths per 100,000 population, is provided as Appendix A.
- I i
The cancer death rate for the areas surveyed is 1,097/100,000 for the 4 -
; years 1980 through 1984. This is 7.13 times greater than the expected cancer death rate (2.6 expected, 19 found). The population base was large enough !
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i to provide a 957 level of confidence in the statistical analysis. , Figure 3 lists cancer deaths chronologically, providing year of death j and quarter, age, sex and diagnosis on death certificate except in case #13 i where the death certificate has not been viewed. For cases #9 dnd #10, the information was provided, telephonically, by the Pennsylvania Health i i Department and all causes were not obtained. The adian age at the time f of death was 54 years; sex was equally divided. The dates of diagnosis of j the cancersare not yet available. From the interview information, the l best determination that can be made is that four cancers were diagnosed l , i prior to the accident: cases #1, #2, #3, #8. The following cases were diagnosed after the accident: cases #4, #5, #7, #10, #12, #13, #16, #17, #18. i There is no information concerning the o,ther diagnoses. 3.22 CANCERS AND TUMORS IN LIVING PERSONS Figure 4 presents the number of cancer / tumors in living persons by area, approximate age, sex and location of affliction. There were 26 cases reported among the surviving persons in the households contacted, or i 298 persons. It is not expected that all incidences have been reported; finally reported' ~ , one case wasfaf ter more than afdozen contacts with the family. The reluctance
! ,7 appeared due to concern that this information might effect a career or other -plans. There was reluctance where a daughter hed , lost ovaries. .
i In that family, case #3, a second daughter is undergoing testing to determine
! whether leukemia is the cause of listlessness and high white blooB cell count.
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. . . _ . .. . .. . . . . ~ _ . . . . . . . - . .- . . . . . a : . : .. . . . .:. . ... .
{ i FICUPE 3 - VERIFIED DEAT!!S LISTED CHRONOLOGIC.\LLY i fa YEAR (Quarter) . AGE . SEX DIAGNOSIS, IMMEDIATE CAUSE, DUE TO OR AS CONSEQUENCE OF
?( \
C1 1979 (2) 49 F Respiratory failure, Metastatic Carcinoma of breast
' 2 1980 (2) 72 M Cardiorespiratory failure, Metastatic Carcinoma, Carcinoma of prostate j 3 1980 (3) 79 F Cardiac arrest, Acute Congestive Heart failure, Dehydration, .... Chronic Lymphatic Leukemia
- 4 1980 (4) 55 M Carcinomatosis, Carcinoma of the colon 5 1980 (4) 30 F Cardio-respiratory failure, Lymphoma of lower spine with metastasis 6 1981 (1) 71 F Carcinoma of Ovary with B..... Metastosis and Ascites
! 7 1981 (2) 63 F Cardiorespiratory Arrest, CVA, Metastatic Carcinoma of l of. breast i
l 8 1981 (3) 68 M Cardiorespiratory arrest, Metastatic carcinoma of prostate of prostate i 9 1981 (3) 45 F Melonomt i
! 0 1981 (4) 60 M Oat cell carcinoma 1982 (2) 53 M Cardiorespiratory arrest, Metastatic carcinoma of lung Ca rc i h.'iu. I n Hwra k sp W C 12 , 1982 (2) 48 F Malignant Brain Tumor (Astrocytoma) l 13 . 1982 (3) 50 F ' Leukemia l
14 1982 (3) 71 F Cardiopumonary arrest, metastatic cancer, undetermined etiology [ 15 1982 (4) 51 M Multiple Myeloma 16 - 1983 (4) 48 M Cardio-respiratory failure, Metastatic Brain, Cancer, Lung Cancer l. t 17 1984 (1) 46 M Cardiopulmonary Arrest, Lung cancer, COP 2, ll l - Esophageal Bronchial Fistula i: Metastatic Maligant Melatoma 4 18 1984 (2) 65 F 19 1984 (4) 77 M Hepatic coma, Adenocarcinoma Colon & Liver Met 20 , 1984 (4) 77 M Hyper bilirubinemia, tumor, probable carcinoma f I . h... :f pancreas, obstructive jaundice 1 t
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. I i Thrst p2rsons had not sought m dical ettention at th2 time of'ths interview. These data wculd suggest a continuing cancer mortality rate far in excess of that expected for.this population. Although the date of diagnosis was not obtained, nineteen of the afflicted had certainty that the tumor / cancer , was first noticed after 1979. In three cases where the throat was involved i j (all cancers) and the growth on the vocal cord, all persons were non-smokers. ' l-i l
- j FIGURE 4 - CANCERS AND TUMORS IN LIVING PERSONS j Area Number Sex / Age Site j 1 8 F/ Ovaries
; F/22 Breast i
M/38 Muscle, shoulder M/44 Colon ' M/48 Shoulder, Spine M/25 Vocal cord M/63 Eye, Skin F/65 Breast 3 6 F/40 Liver F/48 Uterus F/32 Breast F/57 Breast F/54 Lymph M/55 Spine - 1 2 12 F/20 Breas t F/43 Breast F/43 Breast F/39 Upper Arm F/40 Uterus - F/62 Thyroid M/64 Colon F/67 Blood, Spleen, Skin M/67 Skin, Throat j M/70's Throat, Lung { M/70's Throat, Jaw 1 F/70's Leg t All 26 i i 1
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t .1 s i 3.23 C NCER7 TUMOR CLUSTERS IN' FAMILIES in families The clusters /of cancer deaths and cancers / tumors in the living i appears extremely unusual and warrants investigation. The clusters l l suggest a common exposure rather than a genetic predisposition since - t ,
, two cases (#8, #9) were not blood-related. In cases #3 and #6, the', diagnoses most obvious with'in a family were made no more than six months apa,rt.t The/ factor that the family clusters had in conanon was location; the next most coninon factor was that one, both or all in a cluster were outside during the early days of true
- the accident. This was/for case #1 (both outside all day). case #2 (one outside),
t i I case #3 (one outside all day), case #7 (both outside all day), case #8 (both f outside all day), case #9 (both outside most of day). 'The persons in case il
, were in an open-sided building, but under the cover of a roof; these persons I ! experienced the plethora of symptoms (metallic taste, eryth'ema,t. lost of hair, diarrhea, nausea described in Affidavit 1). Some of these symptoms were reported in the other cases, however this information was not uniformly pursued by the interviewers. Where one person was outside, th,e hypothesis' _ s I i ;. hat this person carried radioactive pardculate material into the house and, in this way, those persons who remained indoors were also impacted.
j _ , _ . FICURE 5 - CLUSTERS OF CANCER DEATHS AND CANCER 7 TUMOR DIAGNOSES IN FAMILIES Case Relationship in Family g _ Affliction i ',* 1 Father, Son, Wife 48/25 (Lump vocal Cord)(Iumps, Shoulder, Spine)(Skin)
; 2 Father, Daughter 44/22 (Colon Cancer)(Breast Cancer) , - 3 Father, Daughter 38/19 (Muscle Cancer)(Tumors Ovaries)
- i 4 Father, Son, Daughter 72/46/40 (Cancer Death),(Cancer Death)(Liver Tumors)
! 5 Mother, Daughter 57/32 (Breast Cyst)(Breast Cyst) 6 Mother, Daughter 43/20 (Breast Cyst)(Breast Cyst) , 7 Husband, Wife 64/65 (Colon Cancer)(Cancer Death) 8 Husband, Wife 67/67 ('. kin, Throat)(Leukemia Spleen & Skin Cancer)' 9 Husband, Wife 770/70 (Throat, Jaw Cancer)(Skin Cancer) 10 Husband, Wife 50/50 (Lump on Spine)(Cancer Death 1 Leukemia) e i
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I i l l 3.24 OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS 7 as first occurring after 1979
; Other health effects reported in the survey areg_s s/were most i
notably five cases of anemia, an unquantified number of skin d'.sorders j of'several distinct types and, among nineteen pregnancies between 1979 - 1
.j and 1984, eleven abnormalities. In addition, there appeared to be j of .
j a categoyy_/ traumatic illness which have been designated, for lack of 4 j a more scientific determination, as " ruptured / collapsed organs". This i to be noticed t phenomena occurred with sufficient frequency (4 in the survey areas _f i to i aDA/a f flict. per, sons who reported tfie' full range of radiation-related i symptoms during the first three days of the TMI-2 accident. (These persons provided affidavits 1 and 6.) , 3.241 The eleven birthing abnormalities (nineteen pregnancies) were as follows: one defect, five miscarriages (one with fetus outside womb), one stillbirth, three non-elective Caesarean Sections, one premature birth. All occurred since March 1979; the birth defect and pregnancy termination with fetus outside .the uterus occurred in 1979. - One would expect. to sees 5% birth defects and a 12% spontaneous abortion rate. (defined as a l pregnancy loss dur.ing the first six months of pregnancy). The observed i
; events of these kinds (6) were twice the expected (3.1). (
1 The number off C sections su'g gest an area of investigation that was eliminated by design from the pregnancy'. outcome study undertaisen by the Pennsylvania' -
?./
l Health Department. Important data may have been overlooked since i a veterinarian, practicing on the west shore, noted a fourfold demand in pigs for C sections in 1979. These and other important animal data were 2_/ "Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Accident and Pregnancy Outcome", George K. Tokuhata, Joyce Kim, Jane Bratz, Pennsylvania Health Department
i t i ! i ! j m i dismissed by the official agencies because whole body counts did not indicate f radiation relationship and no other cause suggested itself.31 It appears to i be a gross error that caused the animal problems to be handled rather 1 ' lightly. The attribution of crippling and other deformaties in cattle to
, I the sudden occurrence of a selenium deficiency in the soil is remarkable. -~] . l
,j The decrease in symptoms after the addition of selenium to the cattle diet I t
- t
^}, was considered confirmatory whereas there was also a correlation with the amount of radiation released from TMI. . j 3.242 The reports of skin problems were remarkable but difficult to
, , greying and loss of hair -
quantify , They included tingling skin./ reoccurring rashes (most frequently I 't , j on the face and arms), erythema ;,at the time of the accident and a 'few f reports since, sprays of cysts, red spots, " bruise-like" marks, darkened skin, [ j \ l sensitivity to the sun, blister on lips and in the mouth, open sores, [ i '! t l melanoma and other skin cancer. There were also reports of dogs with ! i ! 3, blisters on their feet and bellies, and loss of hair. These phenomena f l i,
, have continued to be experienced but with a decreased incidence since the !
j ! accident at TMI. These symptoms are remarkably similar to those experienced li [ lj by victims at Rocky Flats and Hiroshima. l .l , 3.243 The cases of " ruptured / collapsed" organs are summarized in Tigure 6 .
,- by year of occurrence, survey area, sex, age and description of the f
.- r phenomena provided by the a'fflicted.
I. . t 3_/NUREG-0738, EPA 600/4-80-049 a i
*! ot all categories that now appear important were included in the interview.
t 9
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1
! All instances of the " pheno =cna" were in the WNW direction of THI.
O Two cases were in persons who had experiences on March 29 and 30 which appear to be high dose radiation effects. The following effects occurred, according to the afflicted, " spontaneously".
! FIGURE 6 " COLLAPSED / RUPTURED ORGANS" 4
l Area Sex / Age Afflicted's Description Year Occurred ' I
! 1 M/43* Aortic Valve Ruptured 1981 l 3 F/19 Lung Collapsed 1980 l 3 M/53 Spleen Ruptured 1983 3 -
F/29 Two Arteries to Heart Blocked 1984' (90% and 70%)
, WNW lBeyond l 1 & 3, Elevated F/55's** Kidney Collapsed 1983
*Provided Affidavit 1
, **Provided Affidavit 6
~' 3.3 STATEMENT OF RESIDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED EFFECTS MOST REASONABLY ATTRIBUTED TO EXPOSURE TO HIGH-DOSE RADIATION l Affidavits 1 through 7 present first-hand ac' counts of waat appears to
] .
be touchdown of plumes from TMI-2 on or near residents in the areas surveyed
! and three other locations, WNW of TMI. Figure 7 sunmarizes the experiences .
by affidavit, location from TMI,.and sex / age. O
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i 1 i I
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1
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- 4
.j . H . 4- . j There are several conunon factors. All persons were outside when their t .
]'- experience began (except the dentist who indicated that the door facing to j ., the SE was probably open). The experiences in the WNW direction from TMI 1
i a111 occurred on 'the first three days of the accident. There is a commonality
- i 3 of experiences: Metallic taste was mentioned by #1,2,5 and 7. Erythema, ,
,1 .
was mentioned by #1,2, and 6. Burning skin was mentioned by #1,2, and possibly l 4 .' Tearing and/or red eyes was mentioned by #1, 4. Nausea was mentioned I i by #1,2, and 5. Hair loss was, mentioned by #1 and 6. Imme'diate skin problems . were mentioned by #1 and 6. i I i '} . 1 ; o : 11 - , '! l i :' l I h e
} !
l t i r l l_ _ . - - - . . . . - - - . -- .
1 I 1 l 1 l 1 FIGURE 7 -
SUMMARY
OF UNUSUAL EXPERIENCES ON MARCH 28-30, 1979 REPORTED BY RESIDENTS k'NV 0F TMI 3 Affidavit Date Distance Sex / Age Experiences on Date, Subsequently () i 1 3/29-30 4mi. M/43 Metallic taste; very red face, neck, hands; - f nauseous, eye.s red and burning, felt like looking througn water, lips and nose blistered;- I throat and chest burning; taste of burning
~
galvanized steel,(severe diarrhea, hair loss on head, arms, legs and torso; sore that would - 3 not heal; spontaneous collapse of aortic valve.) 1
; 2 4/2 M/40's Outside in evening, light mist.6-7pm; j skin burning; face, arms and hands i reddened and remained red for about I 12 hours; metallic taste; nauseous; felt " funny" in head; saw doctor 24 hours later - found symptoms matched radiation induced.
3 3/30 F/40's outside on porch for a few minutes in
- af ternoon; heard " rain" in the trees l although it was.not raining; very still; no usual sound of birds. .
4 3/28 M/40's Eyes watering and burning after ten min, walk outside; eyes watered entire night;(problems with eyes: burning, red in appearance; red mark on side of nose, rash on forearms
] , ,
reocurring.)
'l 5 3/28-29 M/40's J Metalish taste; qu_ easy stomach; feltp 11
" funny"; X-ray film fogged (75, approx.)
1 in evening
} 6 3/30 F/55's Engulfed in wave of heat on porch /as rain
- momentarily stopped; face felt tingly;
, I within an hour face and arms pink; foilowing day skin darker pink, itch at front of scalp;
- two days later hard little lumps appeared 1
on forehead into hairline; scalp felt prickly
, and tingly; three weeks later many gray hairs accross front of hair; hair falling out;
,' subsequent weeks skin on forearms and neck darkened and scaled; (permanent discoloration of skin on forearms, neck and face; sensitive to sunlight; bruise easily; number of spots on face and chest - yellow centers; sudd loss of kidney function).
~7 3/28 F/40's Metallic smell and taste, very strong outside at 6 am. Not noticed a 8 am outside.
l
._ ,,._ _s- '
-2 . . - - - -
------ - ------ T l l l
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j
; 4.0 RADIATION EFFECTS ON PLANTS 1 1 Affidavit 9 was provided by James E. Gunckel who is a recognized f authority on radiation effects in plants. Dr. Gunckel's pioneer research i
~
d concerning ionizing radiation effects en plants was conducted at the
- q. -
'?- Brookhaven Laboratories and Rutgers University for 34 years. Three papers published by Dr. Gunckel are referenced at Attachment 3. i i i Dr. Gunckel examined plants and leaves provided by Mary Osborn of 1 Swatara, Pennsylvania. The flora were gathered in the area of her home, 1 NNW of TMI, approximately six miles. Other specimens were provided by , j a resident from her yard approximately three miles NNW of TMI. A farmer, 1 1 whose home and farm are located two miles NNW of TMI provided Affidavit 8 ,
, which describes the necessary changes in his farming practices since the i
accident. He can no longer grow clover seed, an experience, shared by i farmers in the area as far as 15 miles from TMI. He mentioned the absence of the bee which pollinates red clover since. the time of the THI accident. Dr. Cunckel thoroughly examined all specimens brought to him to rule out the ef fect of insects or disease. He questioned Ms. Osborn concerning the location of the specimens to rule out the effects of roadside spraying
~
I l and agricultural spraying. There were two sessions spanning about ten hours t j , that Dr. Gunckel devoted to examining specimens. He described the anomalies if t 8 as " entirely comparable to those induced by ionizing radiation -- stem l i faciations, growth stimulation, induction of extra vegetative buds and '3 stem tumors. He concluded that "it would have been possible for the types
, of plant abnormalities observed to have been induced by radioactive fallout l
ou March 29, 1979." This was the day when 1200 mr releases were measured ,
"N, at the stack, an indication of large' amounts of radiation being released ,
from the plant, however not a- reliable measure of the amount since the
.- ~.. . -- . - - - - . _. .- .
7._
i l . I 1
.j helicopters forced the plume away from the measuring devise.
Dr. Gunckel hypothesized the exposure of the plants as beta - 1 ray exposure from radioisotopes (P 32 , Zn65 , Ca45) l for twenty-four . hours. He raised a point about the relative " quality factor" of j gamma and beta radiation, which appears to a contrary to what is generally assumed but is incontrovertible oa the basis of experiments. he conducted. That is that beta rays are'at least at least a i quality factor of two in plants. j Dr. Gunckel has been provided with descriptions and pictures of dandelion leaves that are 31 inches long that were picked'this summer on the property where (Affidavit) I was working on March 28 and 29 of { 1979 and other flora effects. He believes that these anomalies are evidence of continued impact from radiation other than background. l 5.0 DISCUSSION it i { The suggestion that the cancers present in the areas surveyed were t
; initiated by radioactive releases from the TMI accident defies the generally accepted theory of a period of considerable latency following ,
exposure. We suggest that this theory is not viable in the present case. i We believe that the critical exposure was to beta and alpha particulates. and that the biological effects were similar to those described by Dr. Gunckel in plants. O
, . _ . _ - ma.e--m v +-an-mw~ * * ' " ~ ' ' " " ~ *
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_L Z_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ The hypothesis of particulate exposure is supported by the residents' I experiences on March 28, 29, 30 and April 2, reported in the affidavits. I' The suggestion that these experiences were not unique to the three study
}
j areas is provided by the letter of Representative Stephen Reed to the NRC i The days on which_these' - on August 8, 1979, provided as Attachment 2. experiences occurred were reported as the same days as those of the persons
- who reside'in the study areas, indicating a more exte'nsive impact than in the study areas, i. e. " hundreds" of calls were received by Rep. Reed. .
This number of reports of phenomena which are discrete in kinds -- metallic taste, tearing eyes, diarrhea, skin rashes -- reported by a large number of people cannot be dismissed as hysteria. In fact, the symptoms
! vere experienced before the occurrence or seriousness of.the accident was known. .
The fact that the types of experiences reported are those commonly f associated with radiation exposure and that they occurred at essentially the same time that.there were ' releases of.radiatioh from TMI-2 of undetermined amounts supports a conclusion that the experiences were i l radiation-induced. I The flora data also support that conclusion. Anomolies have been i found in other areas indicating that areas of insult are not solely 1 i*
; within the study areas.
t
).
Since the people and plants appear to have been the dosimeters, best
} the amount and kinds of radiation released.could be/ determined from tI this information. According to a verbal communication with Ms. Osborn (mentioned above), an NRC authority, Dr. Edward,Branigan estimated a l' dose in excess of 100 rems with errythemia. This again supports the 1
l
?
i
----,--.._.na.,.,.+,-.,.n. , . , - , , , , . ,.n., .;,,, , . _ ..
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4
, particulate theory since a dose in excess of 100 rems (whole body) would probably have resulted in some immediate loss of life. We are j not aware of such occurrences.
The soil sampling that has been done by the agencies was found j . . less than credible because of the uniformity of the reports. (Beyea Report) ij The agencies (NRC, EPA, DER) did sampling of. soil and water in the survey areas identified to them on August 30, 1984 and shortly thereafter. Some - of the results of this testing have been reported and interpreted as being insignificant or due to weapons testing. (Letters from NRC and EPA Travers to Aamodt, October 22,' 1984 and Kirk to Aamodt, October 31, 1984) t
! At that time, , testing had not been completed; the remaining results have ! 129 been promised shortly. None of agencies would agree to test for I as requested. Such a test would allow estimates of I that was released during the accident, a contested issce among experts.
Continued insult from the environment has been reported. In Area 1 i of the survey, residents cantinue to experience some of the same symptoms I reported as occurring for the first time at the time of the acci' dent. These experiences appear to be related to times spent out-of-doors. We believe that the Pennsylvania Health Department's records may unravel some of the mysteries. There have, however, been difficulties I. experienced in obtaining these records. , f The pregnancy data gathered in the study would lead to a vastly ,
~
arrived at t different conclusion 'than twat /i by the Pennsylvania Health Department. f The latter's conclusions of no significant increase in pregnancy-related 1
) problems was based on the comparison of pregnancies during the accident .and after the accident. The assumption of no exposure following the specific period,in 1979 of the TMI-2 accident to l' accident-related radiation is not supported by ourl hypothesis of .
see - p ... - - . - - - ma-e, yo,. -.A-.y,., ..m._m.e- - . - _ -e a ** . . we -
.. ; .. ~.-.. .. --.. ~ . . . - . . . . . - - - .
, radiation remaining in the environment. We are trying, as yet unsuccessfully, to obtain Dr. Tokuhata's raw data. In view of the verification of the cancer mortality data gathered from the interviews, 7
the report of 11 abnormalities in 19 pregnancies in the study areas, c . wewould not consider the pregnancy outcome a resolved matter. The . listing of " disruption of the menstrual cycle" in Representative Reed's letter as a frequently reported symptom would indicate an impact from the accident on the reproductive system. Despite the drop: in neonatal hypothyroidism iri Lancaster County '. from the high post-accident incidence.,_O.
~
to expected incideng /,'the explanation 5f consanguinity among the Amish fortheseven-foldgreaterincidencefollowingtheTMI-2accidenkhas not, as yet, been retracted by Dr. Tokuhata. A more valid hypothesis would appear to be that the Amish pregnant had a higher exposure than b other pregnant woman to the releases from the accident because of their Q sociological practices. Amish women farm with their husbands and were more likely to be outside than other pregnant women as early in the spring as the accident occurred. The Amish family keeps its own cows and fresh milk is consumed. l l 6.0
SUMMARY
L A study of health ' effects has been conducted with a population residing 4-
! at high elevations in areas where the wind blew during the early hours l
; of the accident at TMI-2. This study demonstrates:
E
'1' *
- l. a seven-fold increase over expected cancer mortality rate,
- 2. evidence of insult to this population, beginning March 28, 1979, f
j which caused symptoms typical of those expected from high radiation exposure,
! .3. evidence'of plant abnormalities, occurring only since 1979' which are related by a leading expert in radiation effects on flora to the
~
accident at TMI-2,
'[/. See Table ,(following ,pege) NEONATAL HYPOTHYROIDISM , CASES, 'j LANCASTER COUNTY, 1979 - 1983. ;
1
- 4. evidence of non-genetically induced coincidental cancers'
'1 within household groups exposed to the environment during the early days i of the accident, i
j 5. evidence of a doubling of expected human birth abnormalities i since the accident,
- 6. evidence of an excessive number of tumors within the surviving population, suggesting a continued gross elevation of cancer mortality rate, '
All of this evidence converges to support a hypothesis that severe radiation effects were experienced by the study population as a direct result of early, heretofor unconsidered early rele.ases from TMI-2 during the accident beginning-March 20 1979.
- l O
I t i i l \ 9 l
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AFFIDAVIT 1 I j On April 24, 1984, I, .
; N provided the following information in response to
- a questionnaire presented by Francine Taylor of Lancaster, Fa. and to I
Marjorie Aamodt in a subsequent interview that same day. I also provided Ms. Aamode with a letter which was addressed to Covernor Thornburgh and is dated November 19. 1981. I never received an answer j to this letter. The letter is attached to this affidavit and is to i be considered a part of it. ,] At the time of the TMI accident I was living at !.. nok far frqa my present home. This area is approximately four miles northwest of TMI Concerning my experiences following the accident at TMI: On Thrunday, March 29, 1979, I was working all day with my son in
]. our garage. The garage doors were open. That night when I took a shower, my face, neck and hands looked like I was at the seashore and got burned real bad. I felt nauseous. My eyes were red and burning. I felt like I was looking through water. Friday morning when I got out of bed, my
- lips and nose were blistered, and my throat and inside my chest felt like fire.
It tasted like burning galvanized steel. My son had similar experiences He was 22 years old at the time. On Friday we decided to evacuate. While packing our' truck, a township police of ficer, in a closed car, shouted
. over his loudspeaker systsa, " Bill, don't breath this air. Cet inside'"
We spent the first night in Mechanicsburg with relatives. We convinced 4 other family members to go with us and traveled to Front Royal, '.'s on [ Saturday. We stayed at a camp ground in Front Royal for about one week. During this time I experienced severe diarrhea which caused rectal bleeding We took one of our dogs with us, a German Shepherd, female. Following our arrival in Virginia, the dog passed only blood from the rectum and il 1
&leed from the nose and mouth. Since I felt that these conditions may have been caused by nervousness due to our flight, I gave her a sedative.
l When we returned home, we went in the garage first and found our male l! German Shepherd had died. His eyes were milky white. We had provided lj sbout 100 lb. of food and 50 gallons of water, however, he had only drunk water, about five gallons. It appeared that he had thrown up some of this
! water before he died. We had five cats that lived in a box on the back l porch. All but one was dead. All cats had milky white eyes. The one i living cat had one eye that was milky white: skin grew over this eye during i the following weeks. This cat lived for about six ag.nths after the accident.
j She'had kittens prior to her death. The kittens were born dead and hairless l I should also note that we noted a metallic taste when we entered our ha home after the evacuation. I My son and I have both experienced hair loss; mine was on my head, arms, legs and torso. This hair has regrown. My son lost hair on his arms
, and torso, which has also regrown. In 1981 a sore developed on my leg. ,. The sore remained for two years, healing af ter we moved to Florida The , effected area is still detectable as a faint discoloring. The skin was inflammed, open, and raised; the doctor's diagnosis was uncertain. Also in 1981 my wife, 3mmut, was diagnosed as having paroxysmal tachycardia
- and in 1982 as having an underactive thyroid. I have also experienced l problems with my heart. Although I had had a slight mummer prior to the
, accident, I had passed a physical required for racing cars. However, b December 1980 I needed to undergo an aortic valve replacement. I was 43 years old at the time.
The spring following the accident, our walnut trees did not produce any leaves, and there were no walnuts. There were no flies or other flying insects until July 1979. There were no birds, squirrels or pheasants i t I r
r ,_- _ I I - i The spring following the accident, our walnut trees did not i produce any leaves, and there were no walnuts. There were no flies j or other flying insects until July 1979. There were no birds, j squirrels or pheasants for about a year and one-half following the
! accident. I found a number of dead birds. A number of neighbors i died of cancer.
j In 1983, I felt that I could not continue to live in this i neighborhood, so close to the TMI plants. I sold my home and business
! at considerably less than its appraised value and moved to Florida.
However, we returned this year and are living in a new home at M ' M , near our previous home. We got homesick. My daughter and grandchildren live in this area, as well as other relatives, and *
-l telephone consunication with them was not sufficient contact. Ity son left with us for Florida and has stayed there.
- I had been in business in Fairview Township, York County, for '
twenty-two years. I operated an automobile sales and service shop. I was involved in community affairs as a justice of the peace and in politics as a comunitteeman. All of the above information was provided voluntarily, and I l attest to its truthfulness. pummmmmmmma w , i i r G-1 l 5 l . l 4 1 O
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-- l .. _. ._..~l....~ . -.
< - - . . . . . . . - . .- - ~ - - - - i - t i t AFFIDAVIT 2 on May 5,1984, I, N, provided the following information to Marjoria Aamodt at my place of residence on 6 - l
- My residence is approximately .7 -3 miles south west f
of THI and is at a high elevation, On Honday evening, April 2,1979, after returning from West Virginia where I had evacuated with my family, I werked outside on my camper from approximately 6 until 7 p. m. My family atayed inside. When my wife called me in for supper, my skin was burning. My face arms and hands were reddened and remained that way for Alkut/.2Mrs. ,I had a metallic taste. i
, I felt nauseous. I felt " funny in the head". I took a shower that i evening before going to bed. Since I had a head cold, I went to the l j doctor's the next day. I told my doctor about my experiences the i i following evening. Re read from a book what symptoms are related to )
radiation exposure. We noted that these symptons' matched what I had , experienced, however the doctor reassured me that nothing had come out ; of the. plant. Concerning the weather conditions on the Monday evening, 1 April 2, 1979, I remember that there was a light mist over the area. ! i ! i i, i Date Sworn { f t
\- l t
\, . i i r I r l l ? l ; r f P
.- . - - - . - - - - - - , - . . - - - . - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _, . - - _ . . . . . - - ..,w - .__m..---%..-..-
i AFFIDAVIT 3 I, provided the following inf,ormation to Marjorie Aamodt in a telephone conversation on June 18, 1984. I was ill with the flu at the time 6f the TNI accident. I was in bed most of the time. However, one day, which I believe was Friday, March 30, 1979, I was out of bed and decided to
.l shake out a throw rug. I went out on the porch. It sounded as if it ,
was raining. The sound appeared to be in the trees. I could not see any rain so I reached out beyond the porch roof to try to feel it. I did not feel any rain on my hands or arms. I was extremely puzzled,
, I was impressed by the stillness except for the sound of rain. There , , were no sounds of birds or other sounds to which we are accustomed. .
j This all seemed very strange, however I was too sick at the time to pursue the matter further, so I returned to bed. My certainty in
! dating this event on March 30, 1979 is tied to a telephone call I received later that same day. A neighbor called to tell me that my ; son had been taken from his school to Dillsburg because of the TMI accident, and she voluntnered to pick him up.
l i l I could never get the experience of the silence and the rain-like sound out of my mind. Subsequently, several of my friends told e ,
; se atout similar experiences at the same time. One of these friends is l
i I I and my sons remained during the accident. We would have l
} chosen to leave, however I am a widow, and I did not have I sufflencient financial resources to leave. i i
l l r Date----------------1 l l 9i
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i,.. 4
; AFFIDAVIT 4 J On April 28, 1984, at my home, M , I related the following experiences that I had at the time of the accident at THI. On Wednesday evening, March 28, 1979, !
unaware of any problems at the TMI plants, my wife and I were outside I in the evening to take a walk on our street. The walk' lasted "' l approximately ten minutes. That evening, my eyes began to water and ( burn. My eyes watered throughout the entire night. In the fall of 1982, I began to have problems with my eyes. My l . eyes felt like they wer'e burning. About three months after this 'I occurred I decided to see a doctor. At this time the skin around my 3 eyes was irritated and red, and there was a distinct red mark on the innerside of my nose. Although the redness around my eyes has disappeared, the mark on my nose has remained. i The first doctor appeared unable to help, and since I was
^j troubled about my eye condition, unique to me during my lifetime, I
,: saw a second doctor. I also'hyd a rash on my forearms which had come and gone since shortly after March 1979. This rash.is particularlynoticeable after showering and in warm weather. The
; dermatologist p escribed Prednizone.
I\ In 1981, my wife g was diagnosed as having fibroid tumors in her uterus. These tumors were large, but were successfully , removed in September of 1982.
.l l
I I believe that my skin conditions and possibly my wife's tumors are related to some exposure we may have gotten from the accident at-TMI. We were unaware of the problems there or any dangers to ourselves until several days after the accident. Actually, it was a TMI worker who is a neighbor and who evacuated early on..the first day of the accident who returned on the weekend to warn his neighbors to evacuate. I t
- l*
Dated----------------------- i l _ . . _ . _ . - - . .
AFFIDAVIT 5 I l On Friday, April 2T 1984, I provided the following information
- !' to brjorie Aamodt in my dental office in Dillsburg, Pa., lo*cated at I 104-206 Mumper Lane. This information concerned my experiences on j
' Wednesday and Thrueday, hrch 28 and 29,1979. On those days,'I ~!
'I discovered that the X-ray films in my dental office in Lewisberry, Pa. ; i were fogged. This office is located on the corner of Fishing Creek Rd. l and //t/Sanfriew8t. in a stone building # miles north west of TMI. '
} The 2ilm fogging can be described as alternately light.and. dark banding.
!! hereas the entire film. Approximately 75 films were " fogged". Thes2 films had been placed in a little container for easy access in the X-ray room. ' The X-ray room has an outvall of cinderblock and gypsum board. The fils ,, is #2 oral film, fast D film, 0.2 er exposure. The machine is marked 4 as 70 KV, 7.5 m. asps, 3/10 sec., for jaw exposure On Friday following, ' b rch 30, 1979, I posted new film outside the building each day for an entire week, however these films were not exposed: On Wednesday and Thrusday, hrch 28 and 29,1979, ~I experienced a metalish taste and a queasy stomach. I felt " funny" and expressed this feeling to my receptionist. At that time I had no knowledge of the accident at TMI. { i . I I { Date Sworn lI 'l ( t 9
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t 0: r
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- - . ._ - - - - .-- . ~ . . . . ~ . . . - -. -
i i . AFFIDAVIT 6 I,
~ provided the following information to Jane Lee and Marjorie Aamodt on May 11, 1984.
On Friday evening, March 30, 1919, I was standing on the front porch of my home. My home faces south. It was raining, and the wind was blowing. All of a sudden the cat' that had .been let out began to
' howl in a most unusual way. I had never heard a sound like that from l
this or any other cat. I called.the cat by name, however it did not i come home. ~ From the direction of the howling, I could tell that the
- cat was under the porch. I went over to the bannister and leaned ,
over to call the cat again. While standing in this position at the east side of the porch, I experienced a most unusual sequence of events. Suddenly, the wind' stopped; there was a movement in the limbs of the treen next to the porch, and a wave of heat engulfed me. The gust of heat brought the rain over me. Then the wind started again. This all happened in about one minute. I was so startled that I went in, taking the cat, who had by now come up on the porch. I wiped the i cat'.s wet coat and then washed my hands and face. My face felt tingly. About an hour later, I washed My face again and wiped my arms and legs with the towel. I noticed that my arms and face were pink. I applied a lotion because my skin felt tingly. On Saturday morning, my skin was a darker pink, and there was an itch at the front of my scalp. This was the only part of my scalp that was not covered by a scarf. When I went to church on Sunday, my friends commented that I looked healthy and sunburned. On this day, i hard little lumps, a little bigger than a pinhead appeared on my forehead and into the hairline. l On Tuesday, my scalp felt prickly and tingly, so I washed my i, hair again, shampooing it three times which is more than I !: customarily do. (I generally wash my hair once a week.) About three l weeks later, I noticed that a lot o,f gray hairs had appeared across the front of my hair. When I wa'shed my hair that week, my comb 9as full of hair. The next week, the' loss of hair increased. I called my hairdresser,6 who subsequently applied treatmerits which he believed would arrest the loss of hair. The hair loss did appear to stop. The gray hairs have siso disappeared, and my Khir is now uniformly brown as it was before the events described. In the subsequent weeks, the skin on my forearms and neck turned
- l. darker and was scaly. This condition lasted for several years.
There is however some permanent discoloration however it not prominent. My forearms were, and continue to be, very sensitive to the sun, becoming itchy with exposure. I try to avoid sunlight. I j have also noticed that if my arms are injured, the bruise will last { longer than was normal for me prior to the events described above. 3 8
~
i J - .
.s I
=
L i A number of spots have appeared on my face and chest. These appeared after the tiny hard bumps went away. Six of these spots, or pimples, remain. Some of the pimples have yellow centers. The size ; of these pimples appears to have diminished somewhat, and they are ! not sensitive, hot ever I am uncomfortable with this condition of my ; skin, unlike its condition prior to the events described above. {
- Of greatest concern to me presently is the loss of the function
' of a kidney. Toward the end of November 1983, I was in renal '
failure. My doctor described my condition as an unusual case. 'He *l l stated that one of my kidneys had died. I was in Holy Spirit i
, Hospital under the care of Drs. Bean and Eaton. I have not fully .
l recovered, and I have not been able to resume my customary social and l i household activities. l
' i j I live on a farm with my husband. We were not able to evacuate ,
l during the ar:cident, altibough I wanted to leave, because my husand
! would not ask anyone else to stay to do his job of caring for the l ' animals. Despite our continual attention to the cattle, we j experienced the first deformed calves ever born on our farm the following spring. The calves' heads hung to one side until they were [
i six months old. Their necks appeared twisted. I also noted that the Norway maple by our home had deformed leaves which were curled at tha ; edges. l e I l l l e i l l I
0 AFFIVADIT 'l I, 6 reside at ; six and one-half miles north northwest of TMI. This was also my residence at the time of the TN?. accident as well as that of my i i , ! .j husband, son and daughter. , On the morning of March 28, 1979, my husband was putting his , tools into his truck. It was six o' clock in the morning when he came - in to ask me to go out and smell the air. I wondered to myself whether it would be the Hershey chocolate smell or the aroma of 'j ' Capitol Bakers' bread. This time the air was different. The air. smelled like metal. It was overwhelming. I could taste metal in my
! It seemed as though as every taste bud in my mouth could I mouth. ' sense this metal. We were very puzzled.
Later that morning, at 8 o' clock, my son and I walked my daughter to the bus stop. There was no metallic smell in the air. I + l ______.----- , n . Da t e ------------------ - P l
.e I
t Y
,__,_._.__,__.._.,_._.__...._e_._. ,s.,-. -__ . _ . _ _ _ _
= .- - .
- .. - ~- --
AFFIDAVIT 8 I, M of provided the following information to Jane Lee, a neighbor, and Marjorie Aamodt at my agt home on on Monday, May 7, 1984 I provided this information voluntar y and attest to its truthfulness. Ny home is approximately 2 miles from the THI plants. My house faces in that direction and is north west of TMI. I have several trees in my frontyard. One of these, a maple at the south corner of the yard L. next to a wooden fence appeared to be affected by the accident at TMI. !
; This tree.is about So years old and is still living, however it has~ -
l
; undergone considerable changes. About a week after the accident, I
'l noticed that the leaves in the center of the tree were turning brown. . l The leaves then dropped off leaving a circle of defoliation about twelve feet in diameter. The next year the barked dropped off many branches. This caused these branches to die. About one-fourth of the limbs are '{ now gone. The top of the tree, which was the area that was affected 'l after the accident, now has few leaves. Two year trees, one a Keifer i. and the other a Harvest, both planted in the late 1920's, have died.
, 8tg trees had been good bearing trees prior to the accident, however l they a.ll produced dwarfed pears after the accident. The number j
of hears decreased also. Since the accident., I can no longer grow !j clover seed. because the clover yields so few seeds. In.198f,-the last s
- year I grew clover, .there were only 0-/o seeds per stem, whereas I .got l about TS-/.25 seeds per stem before the accident. This problem has affected other farmers in my area, but is not a problem on a farm in this ,
l area but at a greater distance from the TMI plants, approximately/2-6'mL les. l I attribute the decrease in seed production to the disappearance of bumble bees that pollinate clover. Last year we had no apples from our 3 trees. I
' One apple tree, in the yard, started ' going back' after the accident.
' Last year, it only had a couple of leaves, three blossoms and no apples.
The only crop that 'does good' is potatoes. We have had a number of i, problems with livestock including sows th'at did not come into heat. These !i sows were not born on my farm, but were purchased from a farm near here. 1 I was inside my houe on the day of the accident and stayed in most i of the time. I have a rash 'back of my 'eartand down.on the side of my face'
! ever since the Krypton venting began.
l! I have lived in this area all of my life and have farmed since 19tJl. . A&,A,,. nfe / cam ~ my ps /aes add j rfe gads obed. rss kyws' u iry aft, 4. 92,t aa mba ., i I
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, ! l l The Bulletin l of the Torrey Botanical Club Editor in-Chief: Jamn E. Cunckel
, a cm. i or.
Brodeewsm. NJ anse7 Cell L4 8294 1 4 May 11,195h ArrImIT 9 l, ,i i , l I have carefully examined a few specimens of casam plants collected shortly after the accident at 1MI and capared them with specimens collected i . more recently. The curmnt abnormalities are probably carried forward by i induced chrmosomal aberratima. There were a number of ananalies entirely i! caparable to those induced by ionizing radiatim - stem fasciations, gztwth stimulation, induction of extra vegetative buds and stem tumors. . Most of the stem abnormalities described in the literature, and in my own experience, are induced by relatively high doses of I or gamma rays extending over a period of.usually 2-3 months. Notable exceptions, however, are similar ,f asponses to beta ray exposum fra radioisotopes (P32, Znb, Cad) and for l only 2h hours. In other words, it would have been possible for the types , l of plant almoraalities observed to have bedt induced by radioactive fallout s
, en March 29, 1979 l'il In discussing the general biological effects of irradiation, see clari-fication may be helpful. In plants, the dose rate (e.g., ar/hr) is much mon important than total dose (e.g., ar/yr) in inducing abnormalities. Furthe r, the aquality factor" for gamma and beta radiation is not the same as generally assumed. In fact, I have incontrovertible experimental results to show that beta rays are at least a quality factor of two in plants.
l I am the world authority on modifications of plant growth and developnent ) induced by i oni is ng radiatt.ons, having researched this area for 3h years at the Brookhaven National laboratory and at Rutgers University. The thme review papers appended attest to my expertise.
. E .
James E. Dunckel , t eg4-Nyg- -t= w=--Mwv--w-'--e-"*7'wp-?*=-ret v- e=sw-e g e-.-W""wFN+4*WSepiy--*wwe& W e e ns i e e -e-m--OF-PMW.-e e,ww.r @ww- DA e -@ 4 ca9't6' 8g,--eW 1 r- -W N-y m '- --+T#E lY* *
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I ATTACHMENT N1
. Cas3 number !A A VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY HEALTH SURVEY 3
Date: t.ocation :
- 1. Have you been contacted by the Pa. Dept. of Health survey on 'D(I? When?
! .!. Family name Willing to participate? yes no
~f J. Family siembers m status sex UOh* 3/28/79M9!6H0 3/30/79
~j (doctor) .
l E f deceased, when? Onset of illness Diagnosis Dr. - 4
~} 4. Current address and phone no.:
l Address on 3/28/1979: -
'6 .l S. persons outdoors? m 3/28-hours 3/29-hours 3/30-hours I
i t I .
' b. If vacated the areas who M where when M--when returned
- 7/. Did anyone notice (indicate date, time, who)
- a. unusual atmospheric conditions ij
- b. metallic taste, smell
- c. eye irritation, burning
- d. skin'iritation, " , reddenino
- e. irritation of nose throat, chest
, f. experience nausea
- q. experience vomitina
- h. experience diarrhea
- 1. experience headaches J. develop hypothyroidism hyperthroidism
- k. within 2-4 wks unusual hair loss or color change
- 1. red spots under skin bleeding gums
- m. unusual bleeding i n. cancer form treatment doctor ,
ij o. later was there confirmed (doctor) anemia blood or thyroid disorder 1 l!
! g, women: If pregnant, date of last snenstrual period before 3/28/79 j Complications with pregnancy? stillbirth mis carriage , ,
premature birth Date of birth Wt. at birth !ji health of child since birth caesarcan section Date of birth wt. at birth i health ofchild since birth crib death i I 9,Ifistory of disorders in family tree (leukemia, cance rs , thyroid,etc.)
- 10. Animals. n ame ace in 3/79 inside/outside alive / deed health problems i
i _ l' ll. Additional comments 9
>1 Attachment 2 'l 9 1 l ' .i l l;-.-
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! Dangerous - i Properties of l! !E ndustria Materias ! ,! Fifth Edition , l,; N.lRVING SAX , Assisted by: ,l Marilyn C. Bracken / Robert D. Bruce / William F. Durham/ Benjamin Feiner/ ,{ Edward G. Fitzgerald/ Joseph J. Fitzgs.ald/ Barbara J Goldsmith / John H. Harley/ Robert Herrick/ Richard J. Lewis / James R. Mahoney/Jonn F. ocnmutz/ ' E. June Thompsor1/ Elizabeth K. Welsburger/ David Gordon Wilson f II !! I l* l l1 f VAN NOSTRAND REINI 7LD COMPANY am muasco _c=>.ungg wwm l
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RADIATION HAZARD 3 151 uce a considerable effect. Their specific ionization bone structure. After deposition. there is usu,itv a enn- 3 although not as Freat as that for a rs diation. t_inuous excretion of the isotope which gradually reduces preceding paragraphs have emphasized the ion- the amount nresent. De excretion rate of such materials n effects, particularly specific ionization. Many has been considered to follow much the same pattern as
, ary effects can be caused by the ionization the radioactive decay of an isotope. De time required !:
- s. It may disrupt molecules,it may destroy body by the body to eliminate one-half the total quantity it 7
. or the energy may merely appear in final form as contains is thus referred to as " biological half-life." Most I i t released within the absorber. Depending on the lo- of Ihe experimental data on excretion seem to fit a power , tion of the absorbing atom withm the molecule the function which is the resultant of a number of exponen- ; ' ization may or may not disrupt the molecule. If this tials rather than a simple exponential function, but the elecule is in a critical place within the cell, the cell, concept of biological half-life is still used in derivmg jt function, or its abdity to reproduce itself may be permissible levels.
Such body deposits may depend on many'physiolog-troyed. Many of these processes are seversible; that .I I damage caused by molecule disruption os cell destruc- ical factors both in the process of deposition and of excre- l on can be revened by the usual reparative mechanism cretion. For many years a high calcium diet was recom- { the body. This is confirmed by experimental data mended for radium workers, as it was supposed that a ich show that + fixed total dose serend nur nver
- large excess of calcium entering the body would reduce nod of weeks produces a smaller effect than the sam _e the amnunt of Ra deposition. Actually, the relative cose delivereo m a few minutes. However,in the case of radium deposition is a function of the ratio of radium a large acute dose or continued chronic overexposure, to calcium in the blood stream. Unics: the calcium level .i there is the possibility that non-reversible damage will of the blood is maintained at a very high value there will ,
occur. still be deposition of radium. De increase in the blood
'Another type of cell change which is possible is that calcium required to cut the radium deposition by even a the regulative functions of a tissue may be destroyed. In factor of three would be impossible to attain.
this case a carcinoma (cancer) may be produced. Al- Besides the bone structure, common sites of deposition though the mechanism is not fully understood, there is are the lungs and Ivmph nod *< fnr inhM "",and , direct evidence that continued insult to a tissue may specific organs for certain isotopes, such as the thyroid produce this result. De high rates of leukemia among for iodine and spleen for iron. logists, bone cancer among Ra dial painters, and A second conside ation is that certain organs or tis-cancer among miners of the Czechoslovakian, sues are more radiosensitive than others.The membranes t n, and U.S. uranium mines all point to radiation lining the bronchi are supposediv auite sensitive to ra-
- 1. as the causative agent. This irreversible damage in diation arvt this is the primary site of many lung cancers chronic radiation exposure was apparer.tiv cumulative attribu"A to inhaled radioactive material. De spleen _is
; snd the cumulative effects led to the tilne"r* also sensitive to radiation and relativelv emait aner<
h ' internal Emitters. The biological effects of radiation have produced more irreversible demane in that nrenn
, j from radioisotopes in the body are complicated by sev- than in other carts af the body.
~
I j , The orgar, most likely to be damaged because of the j j; eral whether factors. in working In any determination populations or in animal of experi-radiation combined effects. effects of concentration and radiosensitivity
. { ments, the following factors must be considered:(1) the is known as the critical organ for a particular isotope.
i 4 location of specific isotopes in the body, and (2) the In general, any cell in the process of division (mitosis) I I relative sensitivity of different tissues to radiation. is radiosensitive and for that reason a person is more ll The general effects of external radiation have been sensitive to radiation during his growing period than as j previously described but there are certain modifications an adult. I j in the consideration of radiation from internal sources. Radiation Injury The effects of radiation are nonsne- i ( The first is that different elements tend to localize in cific: i.e., other agents or diseases can cause the same
, different organs of the body, e.g., calcium or strontium damage: For example, it is impossible tn dietinrich
! in bone, iron in the red blood cells, and iodine in the between radiation-induced anemia and normally incident <
t thyroid. This is true for any material which is metabo. anemia. Other possible effects such as lung cancer, leu. i hred following either inhalation or ingestion. Of course, kemia, an'd bone cancer present similar difficulties.
; any not readily soluble substances will remain in the in any case. where the effects of radiation are being j lungs for long periods after inhalation. This means that studied. co_nclusions can only be drawn nn th- hn nf the total amount of such a radioactive material is not incidence of a particular tyre of damace above that nnr.
distributing its dose uniformly but rather is concentrat. mally occurring m a comparable population _. If tabu-ing its elfect on a relatively small fraction of the body. lations are made of incidence in a particular group,such
,,J'ost of the heavy metals tend to be deposited in the as chemical operators exposed to radiation in a process I
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%.- Attachmant 3 f t
State Represetative StephenReed's i.etter to the NRC -us-susu-se August 8, 1979 h Honorable Joseph M. Rendrie, Chairman i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossaission 3 Washington, District of Columbia lJ . J
Dear Chairman Eendrie,
'l; {
- I am entirely baffled by the apparent refusal of the U.S.
J Nuclear Regulatory Commaission to have extensively reviewed the 4 reports by hundreds of Three Mile Island area residents who, during March 28-31, 1979 primarily, and at times subsequent. experienced - { .l t (a) metallic taste in their mouth (b) metallic or Iodine-like odor in the air
.i
' (c) irritated and watery eyes (d) moderate or severe respiratory inflasunation (e) gastro-intestinal dysfunction and diarrhea
- i (f) disruption of the menstral cycle in females 3 (g) skin rashes (some appearing as radiation burns)
(h) sherp, abnormal pains in joints.
' The U.S. Public Realth Service and Pennsylvania State Dept.
of Realth are jointly con? acting a survey of TMI area residents to record medical hiete-iti so that the full health consequences of 'Dit' radiation releases in the next 25 years will be documented.
". hat as all fine and should be done. But why is there a complete l
dismissal by the NRC of any isusediate indications of exposure to levels of radiation higher than what were immediately thought the first dates of the accident *t Psychosomatically induced ailments are possible with some, but not with hundreds or even more persons and I suggest this matter has been conveniently laid aside. i The NRC is charged with ascertaining full details about the TMI accident. You are further charged with knowing the full effects i c.f even low level radiation on populations near to nuclear reactors. l'ailure to pursue the aforementioned reports from TMI area residents d a dismal failure of your most Laportant safety responsibilities j to the tens of millions of people living near reactors, not to men-tiin the people around TMI. ,j
- , I therefore recommend that all available expertise be applied
! to ascertaining the cause of these physical ailments associated with the TMI accident and a completely accurate public disclosure ,' made of its cause and the level of radiation or contamination that t people may have been exposed to. The inability of both Metropolitan Edison and the NRC to know even to this day (or at least to have disclosed if you actually do know) the levels of exposure is in
-' itself a major, most serious failing of pre-TMI accident obligations by both parties.
i And if it is determined that the exact cause of these physical ailments cannot be determined due to the lack of g 5 adequate research on the subject pre-TMI, then the public should know the extent to which we indeed are unprepared to deal with g nuclear plant emissions. e S Yours sincerely ,,
% , .. ? . !'y ',.y
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STEPHEN R. RZED State Representative 49 ee . - n -- - -- ,
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APPENDIX A - 1 I RATIONALE FOR DERIVING BASELINE CANCER MORTALITY DATA 1 FOR THREE AREAS SURVEYED WEST OF TMI 1, 4
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.i It has been suggested that the expected cancer mortality rate used
~
in the Aamodt motion of June 21, 1984 might not have been appropriate The Aamodts used an expected cancer mortality rate of 215/100,000, the
+
same as the state-wide mortality rate given in the Pennsylvania Vital - j Statistics, 1982. It should be noted that normalization of this rate
.l for age distribution was not necessary since the population age distribution for the study areas, as well' as the median age of 38, was essentially -
identical.
, The Aamodts elected to use the state-wide cancer mortality rate to provide the most conservative comparison with the rate observed in the study included in the Aamodt motion. This cancer mortality rate in rural areas is, as a general rule, significantly lower than in urban i areas and, therefore, can be expected to be lower than the state-wide average.
To provide a most realistic estimate of the cancer mortality rate
~
2/ expected in the study area, we have analized cancer mortality data for the townships within which the study areas fell as well as for l York County. Table 1 presents population enumerations and estimates. 'i Table 2 presents deaths and death rates due to malignant neoplasms. 4 Data is presented for the fourteen year period, 1970 - 1983. No data was available for 1984, the last year of the study described in the
- Aamodt motion.
From Table 2, it can be seen that both cancer number and rate for York 3/ and Township A trend generally upward over the fourteen year period, 1/ Center for Disease Control 7.eview, Letter of September 7,1984, Caldwell, C. to Mills, William A., Ph.D. 2/ Obtained from the Pennsylvania Department of Health 3/ Township where Areas 1 and 3 of health survey are located.
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4/ with considerable but reasonable scatter. Township B data shows more Q severe scatter, perhaps even some anomalous data points. This latter observation can perhaps be explained by the relatively high growth rate of Township B, 687. between the 1970 and 1980 census, compared with 297.
. for Township A and 157. for York County. .
The data was averaged for three four year periods, 1972-5, 1976-9 f..
; and 1980-3 and standard deviations @ calculated for death rate averages 'i for York County and the subject townships. The four year average was l selected to provide a realistic estimate of the death rate to be expected over the four year study period.
i i Data for the first two years (1970 and 1971) was not used to allow the use of only 4 year averages. .This decision to drop 1970 and 1971 can 1 be justified further on the basis that these data points were, on the i average, lower than those used and their absence would result in the calculated expected four year mortality' death rate being conservative. From Table 3 it can be seen that the township death rate averages are
! lower than the York County averages, reflecting the expected effect of i-urban areas (such as the city of York). The standard deviation for Township A j . is a little over twice the standard deviation for York County, reflecting I
the smaller data base for Fairview Township. The standard deviation for Township B is three times that of York County, also reflecting the smaller data base and, perhaps, a somewhat different statistical universe resulting from the relatively high growth rate of Township B from 1970 - 80. i+ The mean cancer mortality rates for the two townships are 119.5 and 140.5. The mean cancer mortality rate for the two townships conbined is 130, with a standard deviation of 7.8. The three sigma upper limit 4/ Township where Area 2 of health survey is located. [ i
on expected cancer mortality rate for the two townships combined is, therefore, 153.4/100,000 population. This number is higher than the combined cancer mortality rate for the two townships for any single year over the fourteen curs which were analyzed, let alone any four year period. It is, therefore, reasonable to ascribe a 99.7% confidence
~
l ~ level (corresponding to a three sigma variation in a normal distribution) i to an expected maximum cancar mortality rate of 153.4/100,000 for .j Townships A and B combined. ,
- 9 G
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,. i . Population Enumerations And Estimates
- For York County, Fairview Township and Newberry Township
.'. 'g 1970-1982 and 1983 Provisional
[. g York Fairview
- Newberry County Township Township *
- I-
{ -g 1970* 272,603 9,248 5,978 . s 1971 277,800 NA 9,[18[(1) NA 6,269 (1) - i i;
- 1972 279,3'00 NA 9,78'9. (1) NA 6,53~9 (1) i-g i973 282,000 9,627 7,078 !
1974 284,000 NA 10,530'(1) g4 f,099' (1) j; O 1975 285,600 11,032 7,120 !< g 1976 288,800 11,372 8,155 E : s 1977 289,000 11,355 8,503 O ;,
- , 1978 292,300 11,484 8,851 s
( '
', ,'g' 1979 295,200 NA 11.,717 '(1) NA 9.449 (I) t 4
19805 312,903 11,941 10,047
. 1981 NA NA NA
- g 1982 319,900 NA NA 1983 317,700 NA NA
- Enumerated population, all other years are estimated population. ~
, (1) Determined by h.iterpolation (Aamodts)
, g Note: NA means not available.
Source: PA Department of Health g State Health Data Center ' g T"ABLE 1
I Resident Deaths Due To fia lignant ticop l a sm.- 2: For York County,'Fairview Township and Newberry Township S g 1970 .i902 and 1983 Pravisiona1 I York Fairview Newberry '
,- g County Township Township Nurnber Rate Number Rate Number Rate ~,
r b g 1970 455 166.9 i10.9 6 100.4
~
1971 451 162.3 15~ g, NA 151.6 (1) 3
. NA 47.8 (1) . ;
,'- 1 *? ?2 494 176.9 13 NA 132.8 (1)i 4 NA 214.1 (1) i g 1973 466 165.2 13 135.0 12 169.5 I
; 1974 503 177.1 12 NA 115.'2 (1) 0 NA 112.5 (1) .
O 1975 550 192.6 0 72.5 10 252.13 ! g 1976 503 201.9 14 123.1 .10 122.6 1977 561 194.1 11 95.9 11 129.4 4 1970 595 203.6 12 104.5 11 124.3 g 1979 592 200.5 9 NA 76.8 (1)ii NA. 116.4 (1) 1980 587 IO7.6 " 21 175.9 0 79.6} i901 509 108.2* i3 100.9* i3 129.4* g 1982 620 196.3 10 150.7* 14 139.3*- i903 624 196.4 20 167.5* 11 109.5* O
=59AA onoulation was used to cornou te the ra tes.
.(ll_Detemi,ned by interpolation.
g Note: Rate per 100,000 population for each specified area. NA means not availabLe.
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,g Source: PA Department-of Health State Health Data Center e
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1 i, j TABLE 3
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) . i Area Average Population Average Cancers / Year Average Mortality Rate x d" Range of 3 @" 72-75 76-79 80-83 72-75 76-79 80-83 72-75 76-79 80-83 - I York j County 283,000 291,000 315,000 178.0 200.0 192.1 190 5.8 172.5-207.5 i Towhship , A 10,680 11,420 12,000 11.5 11.5 18.0 107.7 100.7 150.0 119.5 12.6 102.8-178.2 4 '? I ' Township 1 B- 7,090 8,680 10,100 13.0 10.8 - 11.5 183.4 124.4 113.8 140.5 17.7 '87.5-193.5 oy
* ~
i . Townships j-
. A&B 1
{ Combined 145.6 112.6 131.9 130.0 7.8 106.6-153.4 'I
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- _ _ _ _ _ _ , . - _ . _ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .._ ..__ _ -
c.-. ,. _ . _ . . . . _ . _ . , _ _, _ _. _ _ , _ _ ,. _ , _ _ _ , , , h,;_. 1 (LsttOr from Centero for Dcasoco Control
to Dr. Bruca Molholt,(sco under Aamodt FOIA requoct)paga 2) , provided
{ i G January 7. I W I, j . I ! .i
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control over the Nuclear the AAmodC A Cttdy . Upon l In reply to your December 17 letter, I have noabout our roservationareview ofabout Regulatory Commission's statemente I agree it expresses reviewing my letter (copy enclosed),and the interpretation presented in the
; the data collection, the analysis,those reservacions.
Aamodt report. I still have f point, I have no Those information aboutin thereconfirnat With regard to your first d dacs vero not Vere i cancer deathe after coepletionhow of the werestu the y. cancer desche reconfirmed? The question rossinst if the cancers were proven by tissue The Tt.I report.
- medical records reuiewed toh ascertain Three Mile island (THI) Accident?if the ca examination and diagnosed a h t e d afterwards.
Accident cannot be blamed as the cause of a cancereven though l before the Di! Accident, ident and date of diagnnets Even if some of the cancer cases were diagnose
! enc theories of human cancer relatively brief assume a lacent period between the acc(less ; development that 0 death <:ertificates (60%) the when l F.ven though M has reviewed 12 of 2 wee diagnosed with cancer, ot had, not ,
important data itemAlso, is when the patient A (40%) of the 20 concer desche have nview o
; the pacient died.
- according to your letter, even a re then chie~
d deaths were confirswd by medical recor s, I do agree that if all che increase. of {ouldbeastactacicallysignaticanth Penn*ylvania State Department l We have continued to colisborare likely exposed with c e populations (within $ a Health to follow-up the roostVe collaborated on 4past siedical and reprodu around the THE site. time opent in the ares, follow-up. about evacuacion, State Department of Ilealth has cootinued this i history. The O.
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li i j Page 2 - Dr. Bruce Holholt l should be reported to ; Finally, suspicions of an increased f requency ofio. since by law they aro disease ,I the Stata Department of Health for their evaluatCDC will help the Sta responsible. State requests it. Sincerely yours, Clyn C. Caldwell, M.D. A i
. Assistant Director for Epidemiology Chronic Diseases Division .l . . _ _ _ ,
Center for Environmental health - .. __. l' F.nclosure i cc:
,- Dr. Zack f Dr. Tokukata Dr. Mills l
i
.CDC: G :CDD:CCaldwell:dk:1/2/85: Doc. 6080D 4
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4
. ..h i - ,i PREDICTED PLUME LOCATION (1700-2400, MARCH 28) 1700-2400 i
3:28!79 l
- PREDETERMfNED RADIATION SURVEY AT PS d taic 315Pt#51 3 FACTOn h/01 PLUME POINT ran A staatt a:N5Patatt (m3f f te (w!MO DIRfCT! y eastAsttlif .45*), Q ,
=ceAtt:ta to A .tw setto or t m. 3g,. @ SURVEY PERFORMED ,
BY MET ED OURING STAT ED INTERVAL ON PA 441 3 TLD LOCATION ' (ROUTINE PROGRAM) 2.5 10 e g .5 2 s to 8 8 8 2.5 10 1
'2.5 10 38 -
36
, 1 = 10 5 4
l LONGVIEW ACRES 32 9)f@ EBENEZER h PA-441 CHURCH RD
@ KUNKEL SCHOOL
!_. 28 j TPKE EXIT 19 S
2 p NW 41
- i 22 3 20 0 1
ii b AIRPORT EXPY. 6 PA 230 18 tu b I h OLMSTEAD PLAZA 16 c O
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4 7-SHE EY 3 g 14S2 0 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 3 Figure !!-3-6 CROSSWIND DISTANCE,10 FT
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_ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . - _ . . . . _ _ ~ __ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ P .3 PREDICTED PLUME LOCATION (0340-0540, MARCH 29) ' w j ) PLUME ~i 4 a'msaat a!C DisPtasim Facion (vo) Fan 4 STASLt ATWC5P=(RIC CmO!II@ k 0340 0540 l 3/25f73 (wt=0 OIa(CT!m VAA! A81LitT .aS*) . ggga nCe 4Lt!!D TO A u!40 $ PEED OF 1 MPM. PREDETERMINED f!ADIATION SURVEY POINT 8 2.5 s 10 2.5 = 10 s
- @ SURVEYS PERFORMED 40 BY MET ED 2.5 = 10 s DURING STATED 2.5 m 10 s [ INTERVAL 39 E TLD LOCATION (ROUTINE PROGRAM) 36 1- 10 5 {
34 32 k 30 % WNW 51 e 28 p i 26 8 E l WlJW 41 + 24 I i - 2 22 g I z f 20 O 3 h O {
- WNW 31 , 10 16 14
WNW-21 12 WNW-11 =
i< gg A 8 I . GOLDSBORO h
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1281 E
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i 4 SHELLEY lSLAND 2 l 1081 14S2 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 CROSSWIND DISTANCE,10 FT 3 Figure !!-3-7 NV0thd AN i<
4
-~
' PREDICTED PLUME LOCATION (0540-0910, MARCH 29)
PLUME i l 0540 0910 1, ATOM 5kPERIC 0!$PER5!m FACTCR (s/Q) 270* # 29'79 i FOR A STABLE ATMCSPMERIC Cmolfim (W193 O! RECT!m VARI A8tLITY .45'), NCR."ALIZED TO A WIND SPEED OF 1 MPM. e PREDETERMINED RADIATION SURVEY POINT
@ SURVEYS PERFORMED '
BY MET ED DURING 40 2.5 = 10 s 2.5 = 10 e STATED INTERVAL 1 10 s 23 Me E TLD LOCATION 10 e 38 . 2.5 (ROUTINE PROGRAM) l 36 34 L. . 32 w.33__ i e 30 28 W- 41
@ WNW 41 [{
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20 g l i: O 18 S
, W- 31
- g 16 0 W-21 1
h 14 3 2 12 3 o 1
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10 { 3 WNW-11 EDLDSBORO 120' 6
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W 11 I 4
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SHELLEYISLAND
.jl N =
1001 14S2 14 13 0 13 11 13 14 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 11 12 CROSSWIND DISTANCE,10 FT 3 Figure 11-3-8 N.2 -
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M N h b, )>> te
!,4,3) k Aanodi Sney &s [RadiA>>pd bcAchn oss-
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Qc (Metropolitan Edison TLD Detection Perimeter) ( ,
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Shaded sectors indicate angular ranges for wind directions in which most of tne dose from a ground release of radioactivity would have been missed by the nearest TLD monitor. TLDs beyond 8 miles--those which were excluded from the official dosimetry analyses--have not been considered in defining the shaded sectors. Had they been, small sections of the shaded sectors to the North-s
) west and Southeast would have been deleted; Shaded sectors were calculated for " stable" atmospheric conditions; and would largely disappear for " unstable" atmospheric conditions.
+ p. l, &p a:ea,, f efr/N
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4, any of these predicted eyesures (escept PW the M&desesen espeewel eeutd have mutted in measwaWe leggig of the fiasm. Manismen egeewes preeceed from met density
!: alues measured en the erh 400 fiase sempfes attained at these the Pennerhenia
- sites are consistent with these predactions. The largest fes increase was memowed est the Middletown samples, while the rest of the sites had fag levels appromismately half that ed the Middletown samples. Note, L ;.w, that these net density increases aseene none ed that
~ density difference between 0 *F films and site films is dise to thermal effects. This -
.l assumption surely results in an overestimation of possible radiation espeewe at these sites.
0.5 1.4 1.e e.s N !I , .t t - t il g ll 3.5 w.Nes east j \ T of AI4ideNeto'wn
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\ , Figure 8. Adaptation of an isoexposure map of the TMI area from Reference I Fir 8re Ali !
on which are indicated the five sites from whkh Kodscolor 400 film was shenined for the i present study. The location of Middletown is indicated by the square symbes en the b
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mile indicator.
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+-{ i li 4 i [ APPENDIX B j I l l THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT i USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM FOR DOSE ASSESSMENT ! I i i . I J
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Norman 0. Aamodt, M.E.
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' =Wh- 99 4lfN 964+e _ ; -- - .M W 4 $>4 99 e44 9% wa+ %p,4,w w-
l - 'THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT AND USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM FOR DOSE ASSESSMENT
- Norman O. Aamodt, M.E.
; Analysis of photographic film could have provided a reasonable extimate of population exposure resulting from the TMI-1 accident.
1/ Only one such study was conducted and it was seriously deficient. J, To develop a meaningful dose assesstsent from the analysis of i photographic film samples at least four experizantal design criteria
!* urust.be met:
j 1. Sa=ple size with regard to angular distribution must be ' sufficiently large to assure the absence of " windows" through I which.a plume could pass undetected. . I
- 2. Sample size with regard to linear distance and elevation i
must be sufficiently large to assure that the effects of terrain on meteorlogically and topographically induced deposition characteristics are considered.
- 3. Radiation dose response must be known for film samples.
4 The effect of storage parameters on net density
~
of the developed film must be known. i
! The NES study gathered samples of photographic film from 5 locations i
(2 NW of. TMI,1 NE,1 E and 1 S of TMI) and from 8 locations in Rockville . . [- and Frederick, Maryland. The five sample locations in Pennsylvania are clearly inadequate to meet requirements 1 and 2 (above). 1 i 1/, HES Publication FDA 81-8142, Use of Photographie Film to Estimate
, Exposure Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Ralph E. Shuping
*This document may not be used for publication, except for used in government publications, without the express written consent of the author, ,
e e s wn.. . m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
i 2 i l The purpose of the 8 samples taken some 50 miles away in Maryland was explained by the author as " control films which had elevated fog levels".
- l. The HHS study defined the dose response to the sample films as O.025 net density (ND1 per 4 mr exposure. -
The HHS study made no effort to quantity the effects of time and temperature on ND. It did not consider sheilding effects. , While acknowledging, quite reasonably, that the study was "not-sensitive enough to establish the actual exposure at the site of collection", a the author leaps across logic and asserts that it "does rule cut exposures l much larg'er than those predicted by the Ad Hoc Population Dose Assess =ent Group." The data can be enlightening. The author assumes that the ND's of the Maryland sa=ples are the result of non-radiation induced effects. He then j concludes that all of the Pennsylvania data is free of radiation effects. j i (See p. 5 HHS Publications) Bowever, the author then goes on to note that film exposed to a distributed source of 2.7 mr 133 Xe distributed source exhibit a noticeable cyclical pattern and that one of the saciples (Middletown)
! exhibits such a pattern. The author thn points out that at least 4 mr was t
} needed to produce such a pattern. He then equivocates on the basis of the not high Maryland data (attr'ibuted to bgI/ demonstrated to be caused by natural
] aging) and admits that he doesn't have the foggiest idea of what's going on 4
' by concluding that "it is possible that the periodic patterns on the film may
~
2/ have been caused by thermal fogging , natural background 'adiationr or maybe _oniv an artifact." (Emphasis added.) Clearly this study is meaningleJs due
- l to exceedingly. inadequate methodology.
,2,/ vhich is not cyclical in nature since thermal exposure is uniform!
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3 The significance of this failure to pursue a potentially fruitful i approach to dose assessment can be seen by examining affidavit 5 of the 3/
- Aamode study.~ The signator, a dentist, attests to the fogging of oral film stored behind a cinderblock and gypsum wall within his of,fice on ,
i March 28 and 29. Beginning on March 30, when he first became aware of i the fact that an accident had occurred at Three Mile Island, he posted , t i new film outside his office each day for a week. No fogging occurred. The dentist also points out that on March 28 and 29 he ' experienced a 1 '! metallic taste, a " queasy" stomach and a generally " funny" feeling which l he related to his receptionist. On March 28 and 29 he "had no knowledge of the accident at. TMI." l Any reasonable mind would infer that the dentist and his oral film suffered a radiation insult in the March 28/29 timeframe. It is a fact
, that the early release (s) from TMI-2 passed in the general direction of i the dentist (NW). It is not unreasonable to infer that these releases were of.a. magnitude to cause the effects the dentist swests occurred.
Had the NHS study been a serious and responsible attempt to accurately determine the doses attendant to the TMI-2 accident, this dentist's data would have been considered with all other appropriate data available in the
;* TMI environs. Rather, HHS relied on the Ad Ho,c Coussittee's (unjustified) finding that population dose was negligible and provided one more unjustified paliative to the concerns of residents of the THI area.
{ 2/ Attach::ent 3, Aamodt Motion of January 15, 1985 e 8 a
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