IR 05000259/1985043
| ML20135F228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1985 |
| From: | Jape F, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135F208 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-85-43, 50-260-85-43, 50-296-85-43, NUDOCS 8509170199 | |
| Download: ML20135F228 (5) | |
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' Report Nos.: 50-259/85-43, 50-260/85-43, and 50-296/85-43 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street ' ' Chattanooga, TN 37401 Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52, "
and DPR-68 Facility Name: Browns Ferry i Inspection Conducted: August 12 - 16, 1985 Inspector: M, rI, h H. L. Whitener ~ .9-8 - M 6~ v Date Signed Approved by: /L444 - [[ F.JapdfSectionChief(/ f Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
I SUMMARY l i Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours on site , I in the areas of reviewing the local leak rate program, witnessing fuel handling, ' and followup on licensee event reports.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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' . < REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Lewis, Plant Manager
- 0. Mims, Engineering Supervisor R. Burns, Instrument Supervisor M. Miller, Refueling Coordinator, Operations B. Morris, Compliance
- K. Mulling, Mechanical Engineer (LLRT Coordinator)
R. Hunkapillar, Operations Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included local leak rate test personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Paulk
- C. Patterson
- C. Brooks
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 16, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The inspector identified one concern regarding source range monitor (SRM) count rates.
When a decrease in neutron multiplication in the core allows the count rate to decrease below the normally specified operability limit of 3 counts per second, the current Technical Sp9cification 3/4.10 contains conflicting requirements.
This matter will be reviewed within the NRC and discussed further with the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
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5.
Fuel Handling Activities - Unit 1, 2, 3 (60705, 60710) On August 15, 1985, the licensee began fuel assembly movements to unload the Unit 1 reactor core.
This is an unloading operation only, with the fuel being removed from the reactor vessel and stored in high density fuel
storage racks in the spent fuel pool (SFP).
The inspector reviewed portions of the fuel handling procedures and selected prerequisite tests and observed a portion of the fuel movements as described below.
a.
Documents Documents or portions of documents pertinent to the core unloading which were reviewed during this inspection included: (1) Technical specification 3/4.10 relating to core alteration, refueling interlocks, core monitoring and crane operability checks.
(2) G0I-100-3 relating to activities required prior to and during fuel handling.
~ (3) TI-14 relating to special nuclear material handling and account-ability including the fuel assembly transfer forms which specify the "From" and "To" positions for all fuel assembly movements.
b.
Activities The inspector reviewed and/or observed certain r.ctivities to verify that license requirements were being implemented.
The sampling of activities verified included: (1) The mode switch was locked in " Refuel" position and the key re'oved.
m (2) The SRM count rate was greater than 3 counts per second.
(3) The refueling interlocks functional surveillance test was performed.
(4) Core monitoring instrumentation rod block logic functional surveillance tests were performed for the source, intermediate and power range instruments.
(5) Communication was established between the control room and refueling floor.
(6) Current, approved procedures were in place and in ush in the control room and on the refueling floor.
(7) Tag boards in the control room and on the refueling floor were maintained curren.. . - _ _ _ _ _ .. . __ .. _ _. _ -_. _ . - ..
(8) Fuel transfer was verified by operations and QA including sign off of the fuel transfer steps in TI-14.
l (9) SR0 was assigned to the refueling floor and present in area of activity.
i (10) Refueling crew certification of training was current.
(11) All control rods were fully inserted and electrically disabled I with no control rod maintenance in progress.
(12) Incore lighting was adequate.
( . (13) Cleanliness in the refueling areas was maintained.
The inspector identified no deviations or violations related to the fuel handling operations.
One concern which was identified during the inspection related to maintaining an indicated count rate greater than.
, . ' 3 cps (defined as the limit-of counter operability) on the SRMs i throughout the fuel handling process.
In the special case of core
unloading, Technical Specification 3/4.10.B appears to allow the SRM ' count rate to become less than the operable limit of 3 cps while at the same time indicating that the SRMs are required until the core is unloaded.
In that the Technical Specification appears ambiguous the inspector stated at the exit interview that the intent of Specification 3/4.10.B will be reviewed within the NRC and discussed further with licensee management.
This matter is not expected to impact the licensee's unloading schedule.
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I 6.
Leak Rate Testing - Units 1,2,3,(61720,90712,92700) The licensee has reported on several areas where the Browns Ferry local leak rate test program is not in strict compliance with the requirements of
l Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.
These areas concern valves tested in the wrong i direction such that test results could be non-conservative, valves tested i using water instead of air, and valves which are not routinely tested
because they were previously identified as system isolation valves but which ! also function as containment isolation valves.
Certain of the above s ' problems were identified in March 1985 which resulted in the shutdown of Unit 1 (LER 50-259/85-008).
An engineering evaluation to review all plant i isolation valves for conformance with Appendix J requirements was initiated l and -resulted in identification of certain additional deviations from a l strict and literal interpretation of Appendix J requirements (LER 50-259/ ! 85008, R1 and LER 50-259/85036).
Units 1, 2 and 3 have remained in cold shutdown during the evaluation period.
. As a result of the engineering evaluation, the licensee has developed a l program for corrective action and isolation valve testing which will be i presented for NRC evaluation in a meeting with NRR and Region II representa-tives on August 28, 1985.
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, ' i The presentation will include: [ } a.
Identification of those isolation valves which are not tested in j literal conformance with Appendix J requirements.
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Alternate techniques used to assure leak tight integrity of components ! identified in item 1 above and technical justification for these ' , alternate methods.
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Components and systems which will be modified to meet Appendix J , requirements.
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Proposed schedule for any necessary modifications for Unit 1, 2, and 3.
e.
Review of the design basis for Browns Ferry isolation valve testing.
1 The inspector discussed the nature of the items identified with the licensee
and agreed that a meeting with NRR and Region II representatives was i appropriate.
A detailed review of each penetration isolation valve and , planned modification was deferred until the above issues are resolved.
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