ML20135B645
| ML20135B645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135B553 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-96-19, 50-457-96-19, NUDOCS 9703030144 | |
| Download: ML20135B645 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000456/1996019
Text
-
-
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION lli
Docket Nos:
50-456, 50-457
License Nos:
PF-72, NPF-77
Report No:
50-456/96019;50-457/96019
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison (Comed)
Facility:
Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
RR #1, Box 84
Braceville, IL 60407
Dates:
October 19 - November 29,1996
Inspectors:
C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector
J. Adams, Resident inspector
D. Rich, Resident inspector
T. Tongue, Reactor Engineer
T. Esper, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Approved by:
Roger Lanksbury, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
1
9703030144 970218
ADOCK 05000456
0
.
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-456/96019;50-457/96019
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and
plant support. The report covers a 6-veek period of resident inspection.
Operations
The inspectors concluded, from discussions that occurred during the PORC meeting,
-
that the importance of the pressurizer manway and tae reactor head vent pathways
were understood by management and the reduced inventory evolutions were well
planned. However, in the case of the first draining evolution the blockage of the
pressurizer manway vent path, the creation of a loop seal on the reactor head vent
pathway, and miscommunication that resulted in the exclusion of an additional
drainage verification method from the procedure indicated that this evolution was
not well executed. (Section 01.1)
The inspectors concluded that during the performance of a turbine valve exercise
-
that the nuclear station operator (NSO) demonstrated poor control of reactivity,
failed to perform steps of the annunciator alarm procedure for the Average
Temperature (Tave)/ Reference Temperature (Tref) deviation alarm, and failed to
comply with the " Operating Logs and Records" procedure. The inspectors also
concluded that the unit supervisor failed to provide the proper oversight during the
event. This licensee identified and corrected event is being treated as a Non-Cited
Violation. (Section 04.1)
Maintenance
The inspectors observed the performance of low voltage closure testing and
-
lubrication of a 480 volt DS series breaker. The inspectors concluded that the
maintenance was performed in accordance with the procedure and was closely
supervised. (Section M1.1)
The inspectors concluded that the surveillance activities observed during this
-
inspection period were performed in a competent and well controlled manner.
(Section M1.2)
The inspectors concluded that BwAP 100-21 was inadequate in that it did not
-
require a review of the surrounding area for the potential to introduce foreign
materialinto a safety-related system resulting in a piece of scaffolding being
dropped into the suction bay for the essential service water system. The inspectors
concluded that this procedural deficiency was a violation. (Section M1.3)
The inspectors observed the installation of Unit 1C Steam Generator manways and
-
diaphragm plates and reviewed the associated procedure. The inspectors concluded
that the licensee failed to complete all steps of the installation procedure. The
2
_
_. __
_ _
_ _ _ .
.
___
.__
_
_ _ . _ _ .
.
-
-
inspectors also concluded that specific management actions to ensure procedure
i
compliance were ineffective in that an individual assigned to follow the work
procedure took no action when the procedure was not complied with. This event is
considered a violation of technical specifications. (Section M4.1)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an observed abnormal voltage
-
control indication on the 1B Diesel Generator. The licensee determined that
125 volts direct current (VDC) leads were reversed on the instantaneous
prepositioning (IPP) board. The inspectors concluded that the maintenance was
performed without the necessary documentation. This licensee identified event is
being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. (Section M4.2)
Enaineerina
,
The inspectors concluded that not documenting a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation
-
,
for returning the unit to service with the Unit 1 cold leg reactor coolant stop valve
,
degraded, demonstrated a lack of complete understanding of the 10 CFR 50.59
requirements. (Section E2.1)
I
The licensee observed cooler than normal temperatures in the Unit 1 essential
-
switchgear room. An investigation determined that control relay contacts were
configured incorrectly. The inspectors concluded that field documentation was
confusing and post modification testing was inadequate. This event is considered
an Unresolved item until the inspectors can assess the licensee's corrective actions
for previous instances of inadequate post maintenance testing. (Section E2.2)
,
While a system engineer's identification during a review of disconnected power
-
leads for two control room dampers of an inconsistency between the control and
instrumentation drawing and external wiring diagram was good and demonstrated a
i
questioning attitude, the failure to update the appropriate drawings at the time the
power was removed was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI.
This licensee identified event is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation.
(Section E2.3)
'
The inspector concluded that the system engineer's detection of electronic noise
-
effecting vibration readings on a diesel oil transfer pump was an excellent
observation since the vibration measurements initially obtained met the acceptance
criteria. The system engineer demonstrated an excellent knowledge of expected
4
system performance and a questioning attitude. (Section E4.1)
Plant Suocort
i
The inspectors performed a visual inspection of the high level spent resin tank
-
)
room. The inspectors found the room and the equipment in the room to be in good
condition. (Section R2.1)
i
1
'
3
___
.
.
l
.
The inspectors observed part of an emergency planning drill and concluded that it
-
,
provided valuable and challenging training.
(Section PS.1)
!
The inspectors reviewed physical security measures and procedures and conducted
-
interviews with security personnel on duty. The inspectors found security facilities
in good condition and personnel knowledgeable and professional. (Section S1.1)
i
i
'
l
4
l
l
_
-
..
.
_ - _ -
.-
- _ _
_ - - - - -
- -.
. .-.
. _ _ - -
-
Report Details
i
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 entered the period in cold shutdown for a scheduled mid-cycle outage. The unit
l
was shut down on October 12,1996, to perform inspections and maintenance.
2
Contractors performed eddy current inspections and the necessary sleeving and plugging of
l
degraded or defective steam generator tubes in all steam generators. The steam generator
i
maintenance required the plant operators to perform two reduced inventory evolutions for
j
the installation and subsequent removal of nozzle dams in the 1C Steam Generstor. This
was due to the inability to shut the C Loop Cold Leg Reactor Coolant Stop Valve. Unit 1
ended the period shutdown with plant operators making preparations for the unit's restart.
Unit 2 operated at or about 100% for the entire period.
,
b
1. Operations
'
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 Reduced Inventorv Activities
a.
Insoection Scope
The licensee lowered the Unit 1 reactor vessel water level to mid-loop to install
steam generator nozzle dams in the "C" steam generator because of the inability to
shut the "C" reactor coolant loop cold leg isolation valve. The inspectors attended
,
a preevolution plant operations review committee meeting and reviewed procedures
BwOP RC-4, " Reactor Coolant System Drain," Revisions 7 and 8, and 1BwOA
PRI-10, " Loss of RH Cooling Unit 1," Revision 56. These reviews were performed
using NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/113, " Reliable Decay Heat Removal During
Shutdown," Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal," technical
specifications, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The
inspectors also reviewed problem identifica. ion form (PlF) 456-201-96-2375 which
described problems with the reactor head "ert path during the drain down to the
reactor flange,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed the licensee drain the Unit 1 reactor water level to the
vessel flange level on October 19 and to the mid-loop region on Octob9r 21. The
inspectors verified that both shutdown cooling trains were verified to be operable
with only one train operating as required, redundant flow paths were available for
emergency inventory addition, and redundant vessel water levelinstruments and
core temperature monitoring instruments were operable and in service. The
inspectors also verified that there were no other outage activities ongoing that could
have affected shutdown cooling.
5
.
-- --
-
-.-
,
-
- .
. -
-
- - . .
-
-
.-
.
d
-
The inspectors attended the plant operations review committee's (PORC) meeting to
evaluate the drain down procedure. Committee members recommended that holdup
tank level be monitored during the draining process. Since the water would be
2
drained into the holdup tank, monitoring this tank's level would provide an
additional check on total volume drained from the reactor coolant system.
However, due to miscommunication, this recommendation was not incorporated
into the procedure. The inspectors discussed this issue with plant management and
administrative controls were subsequently implemented to monitor holdup tank level
prior to start of draining to a reduced inventory condition.
Prior to starting the drain down, a licensee inspector noticed that the pressurizer
j
,
manway, which had been opened to provide a vent path, was inadvertently partially
capped with a foreign material exclusion cover. This information was promptly
'
conveyed to the control room and the draining procedure was halted. The licensee
removed the cover and initiated an investigation of this event prior to recommencing
the draining procedure.
During the drain down to the reactor flange level licensee personnel noticed that
.
'
reactor vessel indicated water level reached 400 feet before the anticipated time to
drain the volume of water. However, the reactor vessel level instrumentation
p
system was still reading 100% in the upper head region on both level trains when it
should have been reading 100% in the vessel region. The licensee determined that
'
the hose connecting the reactor head vent to a collection bottle had slumped and
filled with water resulting in a loop seal. When the loop seal condition was cleared
j
reactor water levelindication rose about 4 feet. The licensee determined that non-
'
licensed operators had moved the hose and collection bottle prior to drain down but
.
had not secured the hose to prevent it from dropping below the vent valve level,
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded, from discussions that occurred during the PORC meeting,
that the importance of the pressurizer manway and the reactor head vent pathways
were understood by management and the evolution was well planned. However,
the blockage of the pressurizer manway by maintenance personnel, the creation of
the loop sealin the reactor head vent pathway, and miscommunications that
resulted in a desired verification of reactor water level draindown not being
incorporated into the procedure indicated that this evolution was not well executed.
\\
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Poor Reactivity Control and Failure to Follow Procedures
a.
Inscection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed a licensee finding of high average coolant temperature
(Tave) deviation. Tave deviation is the difference between the highest Tave channel
reading and what Tave should be for the existing power level, referred to as the
reference temperature (Tref). The Tave deviation annunciator alarm setpoint was
6
.
. _ - -
_
.
.
3 degrees F. The inspectors interviewed 2 nuclear station operators (NSO), the unit
supervisor (US) and the Shift Operation Supervisor and reviewed procedures 2BwOS
3.4.2.a-1, " Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems Monthly Valve Stem Freedom
Checks," Revision 8E1; BwAP 350-1 " Operating Logs and Records," Revision 8;
,
BwAP 300-1, " Conduct Of Operations," Revision 19; BwAR 2-14-D1 "Tave Control
Deviation High," Revision 7; licensee problem identification report 457-200-96-038;
NSO operating logs (Unit 2, Oct 1 - Nov 12,1996); and the annunciator alarm
summary print out (Unit 2, Oct 26,1996).
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed unit operating logs that stated that on October 27,1996,
Unit 2 power was reduced from 100% to approximately 75% as a prerequisite to
2BwOS 3.4.2.a-1. Inspector interviews with the operators indicated that the NSO
and US became concerned that axial flux distribution (Delta 1) was too high when
,
rods began automatically stepping out to compensate for xenon buildup, in
response the operators placed rod control in manual. The inspectors learned
through a review of plant data that the NSO made a series of dilutions to the reactor
coolant system in order to compensate for the continuing xenon buildup. However,
the inspectors determined through the data review and interviews with other
'
operators that the NSO did not accurately predict the necessary dilution volume and
did not allow time between successive dilutions for the plant to stabilize. This
'
resulted in an over dilution which caused Tave to rise above Tref and the Tave
deviation annunciator to then alarm. Tave deviation reached a maximum of about
6 degrees F and remained above the alarm setpoint for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 43 minutes. The
annunciator alarm procedure, BwAR 2-14-D1 required the operator to place rod
control in manual and match Tave with Tref. However, the alarm procedure was
not referenced or followed. The operators were concerned about Tave but took no
action to restore it to the normal range. The alarm condition did not clear until the
surveillance was completed and the ramp-up to full power was commenced.
Operator experience was a contributing factor to the occurrence. The inspectors
learned that the Unit NSO had about 10 months operating experience but had not
previously performed a significant load chance and the US had previously
supervised two similar load ramps. There v ere two experienced NSOs assisting in
'
the control room but their experience was r.at utilized.
The inspectors verified NSO logs recorded the power ramp-down and ramp-up and
performance of 2BwOs 3.4.2.a-1 but did not record any reactivity changes as
required by BwAP 350-1. The NSO logs did not document any difficulty in
controlling reactivity and did not document reactor operation with Tave higher than
normal.
The inspectors conducted a follow up review of the Unit 2 NSO logs. The
inspectors selected four evolutions that had been performed between October 1 and
November 12,1996, that required NSO log entries per BwAP 350-1, and verified
the required log entries were made.
7
_
_
. _ . _ . _ _
_ _
__
-. _.
.
.
The licensee performed the following corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the
event:
I
Changed BwAP 350-1 to require shift engineer and unit supervisor's
-
signatures indicating concurrence that log entries are appropriate for the
shift;
the NSO received additional training on performing reactor power changes:
-
the unit supervisor was counseled regarding management expectations for
.
-
maintaining operating parameters, utilizing the experience of the team,
informing the shift engineer of unusual conditions, and logkeeping;
management willidentify licensed operators needing additional training on
-
performing reactor power changes and make arrangements for training:
review the event with alllicensed operators to increase operator sensitivity
-
to reactivity control, to identify other evolutions that require additional
training or operator guidance, and to reinforce management expectations for
4
operator logs.
c.
Conclusions
4
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),
Technical Specifications, and the maximum Tave reached during the event and
concluded that the plant was not operated outside its design basis.
The event indicated a weakness in operator training in reactivity management and
performance of required actions for an alarming annunciator. The inspectors
concluded that both the operator and the supervisor were overly focused on a single
-
plant parameter, Delta l, during the evolution and unnecessarily operated with Tave
different than Tref. The knowledge of experienced NSOs on shift was not utilized
and the shift engineer was not informed of the event which indicated a lack of
teamwork. The inspectors considered the lack of meaningful log entries describing
an unusual situation to be poor watchstanding practice.
,
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established,
implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory
i
Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. TS 6.8.1.a applies to BwAR 2-14-D1 and
.
BwAP 350-1 and therefore, the failure to follow BwAR 2-14-D1 and BwAP 350-1
was a violation of TS 6.8.1.a. The inspectors concluded that the training and
counseling sessions and procedural change commitments made by the licensee
were adequate corrective actions. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is
being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section Vll.B1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (50-457/96019-01 (DRP)).
,
i
8
,
- - -
-
-
.. .
.-
_. .
- - .. -.-. -.
---
.._ - .~
.
<
.
2
<
.
l
11. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M 1.1 Inspection and Lubrication of A Westinohouse DS Series 480 volt Breaker
.
'
a.
Inspection Scope (62703)
The inspectors observed the performance of low voltage closure testing and
lubrication of the 28 auxiliary feedwater pump cubicle cooler fan breaker (Work
Request 960106199-01). The inspectors also reviewed the work request package
and discussed the work in progress with the electrician performing the task and a
system engineer supervising the task.
b.
Observations and Findinas
,
<
,'
The inspectors observed the following:
!
the operator assigned to remove the breaker from the cubicle checked the
-
work package to ensure the correct cubicle location, called the control room
prior to removing the breaker, and wore appropriate safety equipment to
perform the task;
'
the work package appeared to be adequate for the work performed;
-
the electrician had appropriately calibrated test equipment;
-
.
the voltage used for the closing test was in accordance with procedural
-
requirements;
,
the lubricants used were in accordance with the procedural requirements;
-
the electrician followed the procedure closely and documented each step as
-
performed;
the electrician was given clear guidance on how to apply the lubricant to the
-
breaker internals by the component engineer,
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the maintenance was performed in accordance with
the procedure and was closely supervised.
9
.-
. ..--
-
-
. - -
- . ~ - - - - - --
. . -
-..
---
-
-
I
-
M1.2 Surveillance Observations
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
.
BwVS 0.5-2.RH.2-2
Residual Heat Removal System Check Valve
-
Stroke Test
'
2BwOS 7.1.2.1.a.1-1
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Monthly
,
-
Surveillance
1
2BwVS 0.5-3.AF.1-1
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ASME
-
i
Quarterly Surveillance
"
2BwOS 3.2.1-940
ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance
-
2BwOS 8.1.1.2.a-1
2A Diesel Generator Operability Monthly and
i
-
Semi Annual
1 BwVS 6.2.1.b-1
ASME Surveillance Requirements for 1 A
-
Containment Spray Pump and Check Valves
1CSOO3A and 1CSO11 A."
'1
2BwVS 0.5-3.DO.1
Unit 2 ASME Requirements for Testing the Diesel
-
Oil Transfer Systcm.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors noted that all surveillances observed were performed in accordance
with the procedure. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their
assigned tasks. The inspectors observed equipment operation and verified
performance parameters were within allowable limits. The inspectors reviewed the
technical specifications and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for several of
these surveillances and found not discrepancies.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the surveillances listed above were performed in
i
accordance with the procedures and all acceptance criteria were met. The
inspectors found allinstruments in calibration. Operations provided good support
and no communication problems were observed. The inspector also concluded that
the procedures were well written and provided clear guidance.
M1.3 Foreian Material Exclusion (FME)
a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
'
The inspectors reviewed a licensee identified event of a scaffold pole dropped in the
essential service water bay at the lake screen house. The inspectors reviewed
BwAP 100-21, " Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)," Revision 0.1.
10
!
.
.
-
!
'
b.
Observations and Findinas
On November 7, workers were erecting scaffolding in front of the traveling screens
in the lake screen house. The structure surrounding each traveling screen
incorporates a slot about 8 feet long by about 6 inches wide inside the screens
j
apron to the essential service water bay below. The workers dropped an 8 foot
'
scaffold pole through the opening into the bay. The inspectors verified that there
l
were no strainers or screens to prevent the introduction of FME into the essential
service water system pump suction.
l
As an initial corrective action, the licensee installed temporary FME covers on the
i
traveling screens near the scaffolding. On November 7 the inspectors verified that
FME covers were installed on the traveling screen openings. The inspectors noted
that BwAP 100-21 did not specifically require FME protection during the erection of
,
The inspectors reviewed the design of the essential service water bay and
associated piping and found that due to physiced constraints, an 8 foot pole would
not be able to damage essential service water components or restrict flow.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the opening in the traveling screen housing could
allow the admission of foreign materialinto the suction of the essential service
water system.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities
affecting quality shal! be prescribed by documented procedures of a type
appropriate to the circumstances. The inspectors concluded that BwAP 100-21,
i
" Foreign Material Exclusion," was inadequent in that it did not require a review of
the surrounding area for the potential to introduce foreign materialinto a safety
system during performed work. (50-456/96019-02(DRP)).
M4
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Installation of Steam Generator (SG) Manways
a.
Inspection Scope (62703)
On November 18,1996, The inspectors observed installation of Unit 1 Steam
Generator (SG) primary manway covers and diaphragm plates for the "C" SG and
reviewed BwMP 3300-038, " Removal and hstallation of the Primary Manway Cover
on the Steam Generators," Revision 7.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Due to radiation protection considerations, the inspectors observed the maintenance
work on a remote video display. A maintenance worker also observed the work on
video display and followed the work progress with a field copy of BwMP 3300-038.
t
The maintenance worker was dedicated to ensuring that the procedure steps were
l
11
. _ _
_ _
_
_
..
~_.
_ _ . _ -
_
. _
. _ .
-
.
4
-
.
followed. The inspector was informed by the maintenance worker that quality
control (OC) coverage was continuous and that the QC inspector was at the work
site. The manways, hardware, and special tools were in good condition and
installation went smoothly. The procedure required installation of 2 guide pins
followed by the manway and bolts. The inspectors observed that the craftsmen
failed to perform Step F.7.d.4(f) of BwMP 3300-038, which required lubrication of
the female threads after removal of the 2 guide pins and prior to installation of ths
last 2 manway bolts. Neither the maintenance worker dedicated to ensuring
procedural compliance nor the QC inspector noted that this procedural step was
missed.
1
After the inspector informed the licensee of the missed step, a PIF was written.
,
The licensee consulted Westinghouse and it was concluded that since, per the
original procedure: (1) the bolts were lubricated prior to installation, and (2) after
torquing to final torque, the bolts were removed one-by-one, lubricated and
i
reinstalled. The procedure was changed to reflect that the female threads did not
need to be additionally lubricated.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors cono uded that specific management actions to ensure procedural
compliance were ineffective in that an individual assigned to follow procedure steps
in the work package took no action when the procedure was no complied with.
TS 6.8.1.a required that written procedures be established, implemented, and
maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
Appendix A. TG 6.8.1.a applies to BwMP 3300-038 and therefore, the failure to
follow BwMP 3300-038 was a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (50-456/96019-03(DRP)).
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's immediete corrective action to remove
the procedure step was adequate.
M4.2 1B Diesel Generator Voltaae Reautator Terminal Board Lead Reversal
a.
Insoection Scoce (92902)
On October 14,1996, a licensee's investigation found two leads reversed on the 1B
diesel generator instantaneous prepositioning board (IPP). In response to the event,
the inspector reviewed the 1B diesel generator operability determination, the
licensee's event investigation (NTS Item #456-201-96-2254), corrective actions,
work packages 960095577 01 and 960057260 01, and pages 16 through 18 of
the Alternate Replacement Evaluation (ME-P7), Number M-94-0597-01.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors concurred with the licensee's determination of operability of the 18
diesel generator. Reversing the polarity of the 125 VDC to the IPP board
continuously input the 4160 VAC reference signal into the voltage regulator.
Normally, the 4160 VAC reference signal was applied only during isochronous mode
1
12
l
.
-
1
-
!
operation. Since the diesel generators operated in the isochronous mode during
emergency operation, the voltage regulator circuitry would have responded exactly
as designed in the event of an emergency actuation.
The inspectors also concurred with the licensee's event investigation report that
identified two direct causes for the error. first, insufficient information was
provided in the work package. The inspectors found that the work package made
reference to evaluation M-94-0597-01 but the evaluation was not contained in the
I
work package. This document contained imoortant information required to perform
the terminations. The inspectors also verified that the work package included
[
design drawings that referenced terminations for the original IPP board and not the
i
new IPP board. The work analyst issued the work package without complete
i
instructions,
i
Second, the electrician that performed the work in the field lacked a questioning
attitude. The configuration was different between the new and old boards with
respect to the termination points and required the electrician to make interpretations
as to the correct point of termination. The electrician failed to question the need for
a field interpretations and relied on hand written notes found on one of the
drawings. The inspectors verified that these notes were incorrect.
l
The inspectors noted that the following corrective actions have been taken or
l
identified:
l
correction of the wiring error on the 18 diesel generator
l
check IPP board installation on 2A diesel generator
review outstanding work request for the IPP board replacement
i
on the 1 A and 2B diesel generators
l
discuss the event with electrical maintenance personnel
'
discuss the event with electrical maintenance work analysts
l
revise drawing 20E-1-4021 A
- revise drawing 20E-1-4092AL
l
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusions that the 1B diesel generator
was operable with the incorrect termination of leads on the IPP board of the voltage
regulator circuit and would have been capable of performing its design function.
The inspectors also agreed with the licensee's conclusion that neither the work
analyst nor the electrician used a questioning attitude in the completion of the work
package. The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed a good root cause
analysis of the event.
The inspectors concluded that adequate documented instructions and drawings
were not available to accomplish the installation of the IPP board for the 1B DG.
This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requirements. The
training and counseling sessions and the document revision commitments made by
the licensee were adequate corrective action. This licensee-identified and corrected
13
I
_ _ _
__
.
.
._
_ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _
_ __ _ _
.
-
.
violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section Vll.B1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-456/96019-04(DRP)).
111. Enaineerina
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation For Unit 1 Cold Leo Reactor Coolant Stoo Valve
l
a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
Repeated alarms occurred from the Unit 1 loose parts monitoring system on August
27,1996. The unit shut down to hot zero power on September 6,1996, to repair
two steam leaks in the containtnent and to try to identify the source of the loose
parts monitor alarms. The licensee identified at that time the source of the noise
was most likely the Unit 1 cold leg reactor coolant stop valve (1RC80b2% Unit 1
was restarted on September 9,1996. Unit 1 was again shutdown on October 12,
1996, for a mid-cycle outage to inspect steam generator tubes. During this outage
the licensee radiographed 1RC8002C and determined that one of the valve disc
guides had come loose and moved within the valve body. The inspectors reviewed
Safety Evaluation Check Lists (SECL)96-165 and SECL 96-165, Revision 1,
regarding the potential for a loose part in the Unit 1 reactor coolant system.
b.
Observations and Findinas
l
The inspectors observed that SECL 96-165 discussed the possibility of a broken
l
valve disc guide and stated that an inadvertent valve closure was not expected
because it would require the failure and dislodging of both valve disc guides. SECL
l
96-165, Revision 1, was written after the radiograph had shown that only one guide
had come loose and moved into the valve body. SECL 96-165, Revision 1, stated
that the failure of both disc guides was not a consideration because the radiograph
showed only one guide to be failed. However, the inspectors verified that the
l
licensee W not know what the failure mechanism of the valve disc guide was or
why a modification that had been installed to prevent the guide from moving into
the valve had also failed.
!
The inspectors were concerned that since the failure mechanisms of the valve disc
l
guide were not known how the licensee could be assured that the valve disc guides
l
would not failin a way that could result in the valve disc falling into the flow path
!
and result in a loss of coolant flow in the loop. SECL 96-165, Revit, ions O and 1
!
had not answered the questions required by 10 CFR 50.59 from the point of view
of returning the unit to service with 1RC8002C degraded.
Based on the inspectors concerns the licensee generated a 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluation based on returning Unit 1 to service with 1RC8002C degraded. The 10 CFR 50.59 review specifically stated that in order to break the disc guide the valve
would have to be shut. The broken valve guide was applying a force to the disc to
'
i
hold the other valve guide in place should it become loose. As long as the valve
14
,
l
,
.
,
-
.
guide remained in place the valve disc would not fallinto the flow path. The
inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and had no further concerns,
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that not documenting a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation
for returning the unit to service with 1RC8002C degraded demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. This was not a violation because
the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was completed prior to returning the valve to
service.
E2.2 Emeroency Safetv Feature (ESF) Switchaear Room Ventilation Fan MCC Relav
Confiauration Error
a.
Inspection Scope (92903)
On October 3,1996, operating department personnel observed cooler than normal
temperatures in the Unit 1 ESF Switchgear Room. The licensee determined
contacts on control relay CR1 had been installed incorrectly during a modification to
the ESF switchgear room ventilation system. This resulted in the ventilation
dampers not positioning properly as the room temperature decreased. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's Problem Investigation Report #456-201-96-
2207, drawings 1-4683D and 1-4659M, Field Change Request (FCR) #960052,
NEP-04-05, Revision 0," Design Change Acceptance Testing Criteria," and BwAP
1610-5, Revision 3, " Development of Modification Test." The inspectors conducted
interviews with the Electrical Maintenance Master Electrician, Electrical Maintenance
Staff Supervisor, root cause team personnel, and with site engineering personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors agreed with the licensee that the exact conditions that resulted in
contact reversal could not be determined. The inspectors also agreed with the
licensee's conclusion that inadequate post modification testing failed to identify the
incorrectly installed contact. The inspectors noted that this was the eighth
identified example of inadequate post modification testing in the last 2 years.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's planned corrective actions of tailgating the
maintenance workers, work analysts, site construction workers, and site and
system engineers about this event.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee identified the inadequate post-modification testing. However, the
inspectors were unable to come to a conclusion concerning the appropriateness of
the licensee's corrective actions considering the number of related events in the last
2 years. The inspectors planned to review previous events and modifications
l
,
15
l
l
-.
.-
.
-
- --- - - -
--
--_
-- -
. . -
I
l
-
^
.
.
recently completed or in progress to continue assessment of modification process
j
for programmatic problems. The adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions was
an unresolved item (50-456/96019-05(DRP)).
)
l
E2.3 Control Room Ventilation Damoer Hydromotor Had Disconnected Power Leads
l
a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
!
!
l
i
On November 11, licensee personnel observed that OVC075 and OVC073, the
hydromotors for control room ventilation dampers OVC140Y and OVC104Y
i
respectively, had the power leads disconnected. The inspectors reviewed PIF #456-
201-96-2620 and interviewed site and system engineering personnel.
I
j
b.
Observations and Findinos
t
,
i
During discussions with the inspectors, the system engineer stated that he had
noticed that Control and instrumentation Drawing M-2096 showed that power was
l
removed from OVC075 and OVC073 and that the schematic and external wiring
l
diagrams still showed power supplied to the two hydromotors. The system
engineer also stated that a Byron Field Change Request (FCR-F-34067), generated in
l
1984 during Byron station construction, removed the power to the damper
hydromotor and changed M-2096. M-2096 was a Byron /Braidwood common
l
drawing. The dampers controlled by the hydromotors control air flow to the main
control room.
Licensee personnel stated that no documentation could be found that approved the
same change to the construction of Braidwood Station. Licensee personnel
generated engineering request 9602195 to evaluate the lack of power to the
l
hydromotor. The licensee's evaluation was that power to OVC075 and OVC073
l
was unnecessary and Engineering Change Notices 000950E and 000951E were
l
issued to document the changes to the power supplies to the hydromotors and
l
update the appropriate drawings.
l
The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Sections 9.4.1,6.5.1, and 6.4.4 and concluded
that the system design as described in the UFSAR was unaffected. Section 9.4.1
stated that all automatic isolation and control dampers were driven by spring loaded
l
electric powered operators which fail safe on the loss of electric power. The
!
inspectors determined that the dampers were left in a fail safe condition.
l
c.
Conclusions
,
l
The inspectors concluded that by identifying the problem the performance of the
,
system engineer was good. The inspectors determined that the licensee's
corrective actions were good. The inspectors also concluded that the failure to
j
update all the appropriate drawings at the time the change was made was a
'
i
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI. This licensee-identified and
corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with
)
4
Section Vll.Bl of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-456/96019-06(DRP)).
4
16
l
..
.
..
.
-
.
l
-+
l
I
.E4
Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance
'
l
l
E4.1
Diesel Oil Transfer Pumo Vibration Measurements
1
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed the procedure and observed the performance of 2BwVS
0.5-3.DO.1, " Unit 2 ASME Requirements For Testing The Diesel Oil Transfer
j
System," Revision 1. The purpose of this procedure was to verify that the diesel oil
transfer pumps and discharge check valvas meet ASME Section XI operational
readiness pursuant to TS 4.0.5 (see Paragraph M1.2).
l
!
b.
Observations and Findinas
!
On November 14,1996, the inspector observed the performance of 2BwVS 0.5-
l
3.DO.1, "ASME Requirements For Testing The Diesel Oil Transfer System,"
Revision 1. During the pump vibration measurements on the 2DOO1PB pump, the
l
system engineer informed the inspector that the vibration measurements were
,
within acceptance criteria but were greater than expected. The inspector observed
i
all of the vibration measurements and noted that all the values obtained were within
the acceptable range. The system engineer informed the inspector that he
suspected the introduction of electronic noise and conducted an inspection of the
TEC-Smart Meter, cable, and vibration transducer. The system engineer noticed a
small break in the vibration transducer cable insulation near the amphenol
connector. The cable was replaced and the vibration measurements repeated. The
i
repeated vibration measurements exhibited the expected levels and were within the
acceptable range.
c.
Conclusion
l
l
The inspector concluded that the system engineer's detection of the introduced
i
noise was an excellent observation since the vibration measurements initially
obtained met the acceptance criteria. The system engineer demonstrated an
excellent knowledge of expected system performance and a questioning attitude,
l
IV. PLANT SUPPORT
R2
Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 Inspection of the Hinh Level Spent Resin Tank Room
a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed the licensee perform a visual material condition inspection
of the high level spent resin tank room. Licensee personnel had not entered or
,
inspected the room in about 5 years.
4
4
17
.
.
e9
.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed the licensee perform the inspection using a video camera
inserted into the high level spent resin tank room through a floor plug in the Unit 2
lower cable spreading room. The camera provided a view of all areas of the room
except for a small area behind the tank. Licensee personnel stated the unobserved
area contained no equipment. The room was adequately illuminated and a high
quality picture of the room was obtained. The inspectors noted that this was the
first inspection of this room in the 5 years and questioned the elapsed time between
inspections. The licensee stated that there was no door to the room and that a
shield wall must be disassembled to gain access. However, the licensee indicated
that they would perform an annual video camera inspection of the room and would
enter the inspection into their surveillance data base for scheduling.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors found the room and the equipment contained within to be in good
condition. The inspectors observed no indications of component or tank leakage.
P5
Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P5.1
Ememency Preparedness Drill
a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed an EP drill from the simulator and the Technical Support
Center (TSC).
1
b.
Obsewations and Findinas
'
On . November 20, inspectors observed the station response to an emergency
preparedness drill from the simulator and TSC and noted that it challenged the
participants. Response in the simulator was deliberate with teamwork characterized
by mutual backup, clear communications, and thorough use of procedures. Actual
problems, such as the failure of telephone equipment and real time sampling from
the high radiation sampling system added realism to the drill. Training value in the
simulator was also enhanced by simulated equipment malfunctions and out-of-
services, which greatly complicated operator action, but also by the delay of
exercise termination until the plant was in the final stage of cooldown.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the drill's scenario was well developed and
l
challenged participants. The simulator operating crew's in-depth self-critique added
l
greatly to the training value of the exercise.
18
l
l
.
.
.
_. _ . _ _
_ _ . _ _ _ .
. . _ _
_
. . _ - . _ _ .
-
I
e
l
-
-
l
1
-
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments
a.
inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed physical security measures and the " Security Control
Center Procedure," BSP-12, Revision 4 and observed security operations in
progress. The inspectors interviewed the security administrator, assistant security
administrator, and three security personnel on duty.
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspectors observed operations and alarm response from the Main and
Secondary Security Control Centers (SCC). The monitoring, alarm, and
communications equipment was in satisfactory condition and security personnel
were proficient in the operation of the SCC. Administrative requirements (BSP-12)
such as shift briefing sheets and communications checks were adhered to.
Response to an interior door alarm was satisfactory. Security personnel were
l
familiar with procedures for abnormal situations postulated by the inspectors.
Ths inspectors observed the expeditious removal of construction equipment from
fne lake screen house protected area and the prompt restoration of the security
barriers following equipment removal. The inspector observed that the security
statOng for the evolution was sufficient to maintain access control to the lake
screen house.
1
c.
Conclusions
i
Security facilities were in good condition and personnel interviewed were
knowledgeable and professional. Routine operations observed went smoothly,
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
at the conclusion of the inspection on November 29,1996. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
19
-
-
- - - -
.. .
_--_-
-. -
-
--
~ . . .
. -
- . - _ _ _
!
.
@
.f
er
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
- H. G. Stanley, Site Vice President
- T. Tulon, Station Manager
- H. Pontious, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
,
W. McCue, Support Services Director
R. Flessner, Site Quality Verification Director
i
R. Byers, Maintenance Superintendent
l
l
D. Miller, Work Control Superintendent
- T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
l
H. Cybul, System Engineering Supervisor
- J. Meister, Engineering Manager
- D. Cooper, Operations Manager
l
M. Turbak, independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
i
- M. Cassidy, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
!
l
NRC
R. Lanksbury, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
- C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector
- J. Adams, Resident inspector
i
- D. Rich, Resident inspector
i
i
l
I
IDNS
'
l
l
- T. Esper
l
- Inoicates those attending the management meeting on November 29,1996,
l
i
l
l
}
20
l
.
.
.
-.
-
.-
- ----.
..
-
. - . -
- - .
.
- . . . . _
-
. _ _
_ - . _ - .
_-.
1
-
.
s
j
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
I
,
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
l
lP 62703:
Maintenance Observation
'
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
,
IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance
IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
j
j
IP 92904:
Followup - Plant Support
- !
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
J
Opened
50-457/96019-01
NCV failure to follow procedures
50-456/96019-02
inadequate procedure
50-456/96019-03
failure to follow procedures
50-456/96019-04
NCV failure to provide adequate instructions
50-456/96019-05
inadequate modification testing assessment
50-456/96019-06
NCV failure to update appropriate drawings
Closed
50-457/96019-01
NCV failure to follow procedures
50-456/96019-04
NCV failure to provide adequate instructions
50-456/96019-06
NCV failure to update appropriate drawing
21
. .~ - .
- .
. _ . . ~ . - . . -
=
-
- - - - - ~ . - - - -
- -
- - -
-
- - . - -
e
,
]
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
j
1
!
j
Action Request
i
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Engineered Safety Features
.
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
'
FCR
Field Change Request
1
IDNS
lilinois Department of Nuclear Safety
IPP
instantaneous Prepositioning
.
Motor Control Center
'
Non-Cited Violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSO
Nuclear Station Operator
Public Document Room
PlF
Problem identification Form
Quality Control
Security Control Center
SECL
Safety Evaluation Check List
1
]
Tave
Average Temperature
Tref
Reference Temperature
TS
Technical Specification
)
Thermal Sciences Incorporated
)
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved item
US
Unit Supervisor
VAC
Volts Alternating Current
VDC
Volts Direct Current
Violation
22