ML20134N292

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Provides NRC W/Final Results of Byron/Braidwood Containment Spray Design Review.Documents That Resulted from Effort Listed
ML20134N292
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood  
Issue date: 11/13/1996
From: Graesser K
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20134N295 List:
References
BYRON-96-5183, NUDOCS 9611260251
Download: ML20134N292 (2)


Text

.

Commonwealth I dison Company llyron Generating Station t

4450 North German Church Ho.nl ll) ton.11. 61010 9701 Tel H15 234-5 4 4 i November 13,1996 LTR:

BYRON-96-5183 FILE:

5.17.700 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-001 Attention:

Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Byron /Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Containment Spray System Design Review

REFERENCES:

Meeting with NRC Region lll on 7/29/96 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC with the final results of the Byron /Braidwood Containment Spray (CS) Design Review. Attached are copies of the Byron /Braidwood Containment Spray System Design Description, UFSAR Draft Revision Package,10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation, Containment Spray System Design Basis Matrix, CS representation drawing CS-1, Nuclear Design Information Transmittal BYR 96-209. These documents represent the current Byron /Braidwood Design.

History: Byron /Braidwood Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.2.2.d requires verification "At least once per 5 years" that the Containment Spray System eductor is capable of delivering 55 (+5, -0) gpm of 30% NaOH by flowing a water equivalent flow rate of 68 to 74 gpm through the test taps. During the performance and subsequent review of the Braidwood Unit 2 Spray Additive flow test, concerns were raised as to the correctness of the testing methodology. The flow indicator was calibrated for 30% NaOH.

However, the flow test conditions used water as the testing medium and no correction was made to the indicated reading. At that time, the same testing methodology was being used at both Byron and Braidwood Stations. Subsequently, Problem Identification Forms (PlF) were generated to ensure that prompt corrective actions were initiated. This led to Operability Assessments being completed at both Stations due to the identified condition. As a result of the Operability Assessments, a joint Byron /Braidwood Containment Spray System Design Basis Review was initiated. Listed below are the documents that resulted from that effort:

1. Byron /Braidwood Containment Spray System Design

Description:

This document provides a general description of the Containment Spray System Design and reflects the most recent information.

2. Containment Spray System Design Basis Matrix: This documents cross references

^

E O[] Og the design parameters of the CS system to the appropriate calculation or requirement.

j h

9611260251 961113

/

PDR ADOCK 05000454 p

PDR p:\\sec\\byrltr\\96-5183. Doc A Unicom Company

Offics of Nucle:r R: actor R:gulation November 13,1996 Page 2

3. UFSAR Draft Revision Package: This package provides the updates to the UFSAR as a result of the Design Basis Review effort.

4.

10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation: This is the Safety Evaluation for the changes to the UFSAR.

5. CS representation drawing CS-01: This drawing is a representation of the Byron and Braidwood CS system.
6. Nuclear Design Information Transmittal BYR-96-209: This document provides the required testing conditions to satisfy the requirements of TS 4.6.2.2.d.

==

Conclusions:==

The Byron /Braidwood Containment Spray system, which consists of a spray subsystem and an additive subsystem, serves to mitigate the consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident or a Main Steam Line Break inside containment. This is accomplished by performing one or more of the following functions: pressure suppression, heat removal, fission product removal, mixing of containment atmosphere, and sump chemistry control. Even though the Byron /Braidwood CS eduction control valves may not have been set at their optimum position, fission product removal and pressure suppression capability were not compromised. This conclusion is supported by Revision 2 of the Standard Review Plan Section 6.5.2 which deleted the requirement for immediate initiation of caustic addition to the spray. To ensure that the optimum eduction valve setting is used in the Technical Specification Surveillance, Nuclear Design information Transmittal (NDIT) BYR-96-209 has been transmitted to the Station Systems Engineering Department for incorporation into the surveillance procedure.

The attached documents are transmitted for your review per a request of the NRC Region 111 Regional Administrator.

K. L. Graesser Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Power Station KLG/cb i

i Attachments i

cc:

A.B. Beach, NRC Regional Administrator -Rill G.F. Dick, Jr. Byron Project Manager - NRR S. D. Burgess, Senior Resident inspector - Byron l

Office of Nuclear Safety - IDNS p:\\sec\\byrttr\\96-5183. doc 2