ML20128F073
| ML20128F073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1993 |
| From: | Wharton L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9302110236 | |
| Download: ML20128F073 (50) | |
Text
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k_g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES l 0 c;ASHINGTON. D. C. c0$s5 I
February 8, 1993 l
Docket No. 50-483 LICENSEE: Commonwealth Edison Texas Utilities Electric Company Union Electric Company Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Westinghcuse Representative
SUBJECT:
UTILITY SUBGROUP TECHNICAL APPROACH TO MODIFY OR DE'.ETE THE BORON D1LUTION MITIGATION SYSTEM On December 15, 1992, a meeting was held at the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss the deletion or modification of the Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS). Representatives from Commonwealth Edison, Texas Utilities Electric, Union Electric, the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, and one representative from Westinghouse, presented the NRC staff with their proposed modifications to the analysis of boron dilution events at their respective nuclear plants. The proposed modifications would enhance plant system alarms and operator action and thereby eliminate the BDMS function.
The meeting opened with a brief introduction of attendees and a summary of the meeting agenda. The licensees expressed their opinion that an inadvertent baron dilution event is not a safety-significant event. The licensees stated that there had been no inadvertent criticalities to date and that fuel damage was not anticipated from an unmitigated inadvertent boron dilution event.
The licensees discussed the inadvertent boron dilution event scenarios and summarized the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) and Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) indicators for a boron dilution event. This discussion was followed by a brief description of the BDMS and the associated Standard Review Plan (SRP) acceptance criteria. The licensees expressed their concerns with the current analysis methodology for the BDMS during plant modes 3, 4, and 5. These concerns included numerous problems with the inverse count rate ratio (ICRR) versus boron concentration curves, instrument uncertainties with " flux doubling" setpoint, and faster dilution rates due to extended cycle lengths. On the other hand, slow dilution rates could also render the BDMS ineffective.
The licensees' proposed alternative to the current boron dilution event analysis methodology entailed enhancement of plant system alarms and operator action. The licensees outlined the typical analytical results obtained from their proposed alternative dilution analysis methodology for plant modes 3, 4, and 5 and also discussed the necessary implementater actions. The implementation of these suggested modifications wouh. vary based on plant-specific system design configurations.
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j February 8, 1993 in summary, the licensees felt that compliance with the SRP acceptance criteria, based on the existing BDMS analysis methodology, imposed impractical restraints on plant operations. The licensees reiterated their position that an inadvertent boron dilution event was not safety significant and that the -
proposed alternative to the current boron dilution analysis methodology were consistent with the SRP guidance.
The NRC staff voiced several concerns regarding the operator response times associated with the proposed alternative boron dilution analysis methodology.
The staff acknowledged that plants without the BDMS surveillances in their Technical Specifications could consider a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to effect the proposed plant modifications. The staff committed to review the licensees' proposed alternate analysis and assess.its feasibility.
On February 4,1993, a telephone conference was held to discuss the staff assessment of the licensees' alternate proposal for the boron dilution mitigation system. The discussion addressed generic and plant specific licensee submittal issues, the NRC licensing review and approval process, and the submittal and review schedules. The NRC staff has determined that the proposed methodology is feasible. Texas Utilities has committed to providing a technical specification amendment request for Comanche Peak, Unit 1, associated with the boron dilution system by late April 1993.
L. RYyn"a"rd ha"r' ton,# Project Manager Project Directorate 111-3 Division of Reactor Projects ll!/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosures As stated DISTRIBUTION Docket File GCrant, EDO NRC & Local PDRs EJordan PDill-3 Reading AAttard TMurley/FMiraglia RElliott JPartlow LKopp JRoe KMarcus JZwolinski LPhillips-JHannon- HRichings PKreutzer DSkay LRWharton PWen RJones ACRS(10).
0GC Heeting Summary File
- Region 111. DR- < //
OFFICE PD3-3:LA PD3-3:PH/r>, BC:SRXB PD3h:fD NAME PKre@fk LRWharton/krm/bj RJones
- JHannon DATE : /# /93 2 /r /93 1/29/93 4 /h3 0FFICIAOlECORD DOCUMENT NAME: G:\CALLAWAY\ MEETING.BDM
- See previous Concyr ce
. 100
e ATTENDANCE LIST PLANTS: Braidwood, Byron, Callaway, Commanche Peak, Wolf Creek l DATE: December 15, 1992 Tony Attard NRC/NRR/SRXB Robert Elliott NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIll-3 ,
John Hannon NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIII-3 Larry Kopp NRC/NRR/SRXB Karen Marcus NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDill-3 Larry Phillips NRC/NRR/SRXB Howard Richings NRC/NRR/SRXB Donna Skay NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIV-2 Peter Wen NRC/NRR/0GCB Ray Wharton NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIII-3 Dan Redden Commonwealth Edison Terry Simpkin Commonwealth Edison James Boatwright Texas Utilities Electric Co.
Bob Dacko Texas Utilities Electric Co.
Al Passwater Union Electric Co.
Sui-Sang Lo Union Electric Co.
Dave Shafer Union Electric Co.
Bert Yates Union Electric Co.
Steve Love Westinghouse Representative Jin-Shou Hsell Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
Steva Wideman Wolf Creek Nuclear Operatirig Corp.,
p, -
1 PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF.
BORON DILUTION MITIGATION SYSTEM ISSUES 4
i 1
t I
PRESENTATION
SUMMARY
i I. PURPOSE ]
II.
SUMMARY
OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INADVERTENT BORON DILUTION EVENTS ,
III.
SUMMARY
OF -INADVERTENT BORON DILUTION EVENT SCENARIOS IV. DESCRIPTION OF BORON D'ILUTION ,
MITIGATION SYSTEM V. EVENT ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA VI.
SUMMARY
- OF CURRENT z ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY VII. BDMS ANALYSIS CONCERNS VIII. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO -- ANALYSIS r
METHODOLOGY IX. TYPICAL ANALYTICAL RESULTS
- X. ACTIONS REQUIRED--FOR IMPLEMENTATIONL XI.
SUMMARY
2
.1 I!. PURPOSE :
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF - THE INADVERTENT-BORON DILUTION- E EVENT IN MODES-3, 4, & 5 -
CONSISTENT WITH STANDARD. REVIEW PLAN GUIDANCE USE CVCS INSTRUMENTATION UNAFFECTED BY -LARGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM UNCERTAINTIES REMOVE CYCLE SPECIFIC DEPENDENCIES: .
SECONDARY SOURCE LOCATION- --
CORE CONFIGURATION: RESTRICTIONS 3
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4 JOINT EFFORT f
COMMONWEALTH EoISoN -(BYRON /BRAIDWOOD)-
TU ELECTRIC -(COMANCHE PEAK)-
UNION ELECTRIC (CALLAWAY)
WOLF CREEK (WOLF CREEK)?
NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
WESTINGHOUSE I'
l l-4
II.
SUMMARY
OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INADVERTENT BORON DILUTION EVENTS NSAC-183, " RISK OF PWR REACTIVITY ACCIDENTS DURING SHUTDOWN AND REFUELING" LOW INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY NO INADVERTENT CRITICALITIES TO DATE SELF-LIMITING EVENT INHERENT REACTIVITY FEIDBACK MECHANISMS NO FUEL DAMAGE EXPECTED FOR UNMITIGATED EVENT NOT A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUE ,
5 i-
+
III.-
SUMMARY
OF-INADVERTENT BORON -
t DILUTION EVENT SCENARIOS:
CVCS OPERATION REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) :-AND- .
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) (NORMAL LINEUP) FORM CLOSED. ,
SYSTEM REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM. PROVIDES WATER TO COMPENSATE-FOR LEAKAGE OR; SHRINKA,GE-DURING COOLDOWN-DURING PLANNED'BORATION OR-DILUTIONL ,
EVOLUTIONS, ADDITIONAL'. WATER-ADDED: -
FROM RMWS; LETDOWN DIVERTED TO- HOLDUP. ;
TANK- TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT:-VCT/RCS
-VOLUME 6
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REACTOR-MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM 0PERATION. ,
BORIC ACIo (7000 PPM) MIXED WITH
- REACTOR MAKEUP WATER (O PPM)
REACTOR OPERATOR SETS BORIC ACID- FLOW RATE REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM ,
CONTROLS FLOW RATE FROM REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STORAGE TANK SUCH THAT TOTAL FLOW RATE AND VCT-WATER LEVEL ARE MAINTAINED l
l i.
7 l
I _ _ _
e i.
INITIATING EVENT SCENARIO:
FAILURE IN REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM:
BORIC ACID FLOW CONTROL VALVE DRIVEN CLOSED, AND/OR; RMWS FLOW CONTROL VALVE DRIVEN FULLY OPEN; ALARMS INITIATdD ON BORIC ACID
- FLOW DEVIATION OR TOTAL MAKEUP FLOW DEVIATION FLOW DEVIATION ALARMS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATE RMWS l
l ALARMS INITIATED ON "HIGH VCT t
WATER LEVEL" OR "CVCS DIVERT ~TO-l HOLDUP TANK" l
8 l
l
i
SUMMARY
OFLBORON DILUTION INDICATIONS: ;
CVCS ALARMS INCLUDE: 1 VCT HIGH WATER LEVEL VCT HIGH PRESSURE BORIC ACID FLOW TO BLENDER
- DEVIATION FROM PRE-SET FLOW TOTAL MAKEUP FLOW DEVIATION FROM PRE-SET FLOW HIGH CHARGING FLOW ALTHOUGH NOT AN ALARM, THE AUDIBLE CLICKS FROM THE BORATION/ DILUTION FLOW- TOTALIZERS ALSO PROVIDE INDICATION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM-OPERATION 9
s.
, .9., , - . ,
NIS ALARMS INCLUDE:
(WITH THE REACTOR SUBCRITICALI SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON - " FLUX-DOUBLING" HIGH SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX AT SHUTDOWN ALTHOUGH NOT AN ALARM, INDICATED-AND RECORDED SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX COUNT RATE-ALTHOUGH NOT AN ALARM,
-AUDIBLEE SOURCE- RANGE NEUTRON FLUX COUNT RATE 9
i 10 1
il
IV. DESCRIPTION-0FLBORON DILUTION MITIGATION SYSTEM INTENDED TO DETECT INADVERTENT- BORON DILUTION EVENTS BY COMPARISON OF ONE--
MINUTE AVERAGE OF SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX TO NINE PREVIOUS ONE-MINUTE AVERAGES IF AVERAGE INCREASES BY.A FACTOR OF TWO (FLUX DOUBLING),
INITIATE ESF ACTUATIONS:
ISOLATE DILUTION SOURCE BY RE-ALIGNING CHARGING PUMP SUCTION FROM VCI TO REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) 11
ICRR CURVE SHAPE AFFECTS TIME OF
" FLUX DOUBLING" AFTER START OF DILUTION TIME DELAYS BETWEEN ACTUAL " FLUX DOUBLING" AND DELIVERY OF HIGHLY-BORATED WATER INTo RCS BDMS ALGORITHM VALVE STROKE TIMES CHARGING FLOW RATE CHARGING SYSTEM PURGE VOLUME 12
. V. EVENT ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- THROUGH AUTOMATIC ACTION, NO LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN
- OR - r GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES FOR OPERATOR ACTION BETWEEN FIRST ALARM AND LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN
- OR -
GREATER THAN 30 MINUTES BETWEEN EVENT INITIATION AND LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN 13
A o ; Ao -.p ..A.,p M A .%Ah2,a_e,.D s 4 e._...A.++m. e k_ . . _ Awa4 .4 e 4
OR -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROL DILUTION SOURCES b
1 f
f 14 ,
, -- - - --y, e -
VI.
SUMMARY
OF CURRENT ANALYSIS.
METHODOLOGY FOR MODES 3, 4, AND 5 SEPARATE ANALYSES PERFORMED FOR EACH MODE OF OPERATION AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF BDMS CALCULATE TIME-DEPENtcNT RCS BORON CONCENTRATION USE MODE-DEPENDENT MIXING VOLUME MAXIMUM DILUTION FLOW-RATE USE CURVE OF INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO-(ICRR) VS. BORON CONCENTRATION TO PREDICT TIME OF BDMS ACTUATION 15 L
a- _ _ _
BASED ON RCS boron CONCENTRATION, CALCULATE TIME BETWEEN ACTUAL
" FLUX DOUBLING"AND LOSS OF SHUTDOWN-MARGIN COMPARE THIS TIME DIFFERENCE To BDMS DELAYS; IF GREATER THAN BDMS DELAYS, EVENT ACCEPTANCE CRITERION IS-SATISFIED 16
4 VII. BDMS ANALYSIS CONCERNS BASIC SHAPE OF ICRR CURVE VS. BORON CONCENTRATION IS SENSITIVE TO CORE RELOAD DESIGN AND SOURCE LOCATION
- FOR SOME CONFIGURATIONS, ICRR CURVE SHAPE PRECLUDES TIMELY PREDICTION OF FLUX DOUBLING ICRR CURVE OBTAINED AT 557 F AND USED AT ~68 F L
17 l
l
INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTIES ASSOCIATED WITH " FLUX DOUBLING" SETPOINT ARE LARGE; ANALYTICALLY ACCEPTABLE BDMS SETPOINTS MAY BE OPERATIONALLY IMPRACTICAL CONCERNS EXACERBATED BY EXTENDED CYCLE LENGTHS WHICH REQUIRE HIGHER INITIAL BORON CONCENTRATIONS (RESULTS IN FASTER DILUTION RATES)
FoR Slow DILUTION RATES (FLUX DOUBLING TIME GREATER THAN 10 MINUTES); BDMS MAY BE INEFFECTIVE; HOWEVER, SUFFICIENT TIME EXISTS FOR OPERATOR ACTION 18
TO COMPENSATE FOR LARGE UNCERTAINTIES AND UNFAVORABLE ICRR CURVE, MUST
-RESTRICT MAKEUP RATES; ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROL DILUTION SOURCES IN
SUMMARY
ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS RESULT IN REAL OPERATIONAL IMPACT WITH NO REAL INCREASE IN PLANT SAFETY e
19
VIII. PROPOSED REVISIONS T0 m ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY j ANALYSES HAVE SHOWN THAT MIXING !
VOLUME IS DEPENDENT ON WHAT PUMPS ARE-OPERATING (RCPs, RHR) t IF ONE RCP IS OPERATING, :
ESSENTIALLY ALL OF THE-RCS CAN.BE
.h CREDITED AS THE MIXING VOLUME
-r
< E.G. MODE 5 MIXING VOLUME WOULD -
1 INCREASE FROM ~3400 FT TO
- ~9700 FT 1 l
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e wv + www. E ,,.e wwe-w--* e m e,y'm> -e--+-<-er, ..vy---
v - --h ---w .. , ~ 'em,.-e--,~v- . - - - ,e- ,-.-*~wi. ,,,J.E-3--c- ----~r,+-- we'
4 DEPF.NDING ON SPECIFIC SCENARIO UNDER CONSIDERATION, CREDIT ONE.0F THE i
NUMEROUS ALARMS AVAILABLE IN THE .
CVCS TO INITIATE OPERATOR ACTION l
)
\
MOST PROBABLE ALARMS ARE BORIC s
ACID FLOW DEVIATION; CVCS DIVERT, :
AND VCT HIGH WATER LEVEL SIGNIFICANTLY LESS POTENTIAL FOR CYCLE-SPECIFIC VARIANCE IN CVCS- i ALARMS THAN FOR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) 1 ALARMS
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21
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1 INCLUDE ALLOWANCES FOR:
TIME TO OBTAIN ALARM (VCT HIGH .
WATER LEVEL)
PURGING CVCS PIPING OF DILUTE- .
WATER a VCT/RWST. VALVE SWITCHOVER (OPERATOR ACTION)
WHEN NO RCP IS IN OPERATION, ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROL DILUTION.
SOURCES, JUST AS CURRENTLY REQUIRED FOR MODE 6 .
DEMONSTRATE THAT ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA _ ,
4 l
ARE SATISFIED n
l l
22
i LICENSING CONSIDERATIONS ,
VCT LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND FLOW ,
DEVIATION INSTRUMENT LOOPS ARE " CONTROL GRADE" NOT SINGLE FAILURE PROOF MANY DIVERSE ALARMS AVAILABLE SLOW DILUTION RATES MAY BE MASKED-DURING PERIODS OF RAPID RCS COOLDOWNS OPERATOR RESPONSE TIME IS LARGE
- 1 DIVERSE ALARMS AVAILABLE-l -
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IX. TYPICAL ANALYTICAL RESULTS WITH PROPOSED ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY TYPICAL ASSUMPTIONS:
INITIAL VCT LEVEL AT " AUTO MAKEUP START" LEVEL CREDIT " LETDOWN DIVERT" ALARM AT LEAST ONE RCP IN OPERATION MAXIMUM DILUTION FLOW RATE BOUNDS MOST SLOWER DILUTIONS MAXIMUM COOLDOWN RATE PER TECH SPECS MODE-SPECIFIC CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION WITH MODE-SPECIFIC INITIAL BORON CONCENTRATION AT 1.3% SHUTDOWN ALL-Rocs-IN WITH MOST REACTIVE ROD STUCK OUT OF CORE 24 I
._________.__.m___.__m_____ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _
0 .
F TYPICAL RESULTS {
TIME AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR RESPONSE: l k
~ 17 MINUTES MooE 3 (557 F ~> TAVG > 350 F)
MooE 4 ~ 19 MINUTES P (350 F > TAVG > 200 F)
MODE 5 ~ 26 MINUTES (200 F ~>~ T AVG )
25 i
... t X. ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLANT-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS ,
APPROPRIATE LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGES
.h ENHANCE CVCS ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURES f
ALERT OPERATORS OF POTENTIAL FOR INADVERTENT BORON-DILUTION CONFIRM DILUTION EVENT THROUGH OTHER INDICATIONS; SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON FLUX INDICATIONS .
OTHER- - CVCS INDICATIONS .
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RESCALE VCT HIGH LEVEL OR LETDOWN DIVERT VALVE POSITION ALARM SETPOINTS TO PROVIDE ADEOUATE EARLY ,
WARNING FOR ALL MODES OF CVCS OPERATION ENSURE ADEQUACY / FREQUENCY OF CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS T
27
.A
- 4. ,
XI.
SUMMARY
INADVERTENT BORON DILUTION EVENTS REPRESENT VERY LITTLE RISK DUE TO LOW CONSEQUENCES W
USING EXISTING ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY- f WITH BDMS, COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARD.-
REVIEW PLAN IMPOSES IMPRACTICAL RESTRAINTS ON PLANT OPERATIONS PROPOSED ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY-CONSISTENT-WITH SRP GUIDANCE.
REQUIRES A CHANGE IN THE LICENSING BASIS
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