ML20126L010
ML20126L010 | |
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Site: | Three Mile Island |
Issue date: | 05/12/1981 |
From: | Zeigler D ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK |
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4 0 f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR ?IGULATCRY CCMMISSICN .
BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFITY AND !ICENSING BC ARD In the Matter of )
)
Metropolitan Edison Co. ) Docket 50-289
. . )
Three Mi'e Island Unit One
_ ) ,
TESTIMONY OF DR. DCNALD ZEIGLER CN EMERGENCY P' ANNING FOR THE THREE MILE ISLAND AFIA CC!M7fITIES i
"ISTIMONY CN BEFEF CF THE AICI NUCLEAR GRCUP REP?lSENTING YCF.K 8105 270 lq {.
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. The Geographical Review 110 i VOLuMC .~1 fG11UGYy,]001 Vu '.tm 113 EVACUATION FROM A NUCLEAR TECHNOl.OGICAL 114 DISASTER
- DONALD J. ZEIGLER, STANLEY D. BRUNN. and J AMES H. JOHN $0N JR. !
tih A unique peacetime technological disaster occurred in northeastern United States in the spring of 1979: an accident in a nuclear generating plant.
117 Because of the proliferation of nuclear power plants throughout the
!!9 world, the possibility of comparable disasters elsewhere increases. We chose ,
to examine one aspect of the 1979 American disaster: evacuation of the affected i
population. The nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) near liarri burg,
- ' Pennsylvania, on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, dramatically emphasized the i
need to broaden the range of evacuation studie. to include technological dis-i asters, particularly ones of nuclear origin. The crisis at Three Mile Island pro.
3 vided the first opportunity for an empirical examination of the evacuation pro-cess in the aftermath of an unexpected and unprecedented nuclear disa ter. We 24 ,
used it as a case study in order to seek a foundation for geographwal research in the nascent field of evacuation behavior and planning in response to te h-nological di . asters. Our objectives are to identify the spatial and temporal di-mensions of evacuation behavior among 1MI re idents, to offer a ionce;stual model of evacuation. decision making in response to a nuclear doaster, and to suggest the role for geographer . in evacuation planmng. Itecause of the unnioc-ness of the case study, we oiler generali/ations and model, to esplain tht decision-making process for nuelcar evas uation not as defmitive ionilu niin i but rather as hypothese , tor future studie ..
Joseph Hans and Thomas Sell compiled a liu or more than 500 natural and j
technological disasters that required evacuation .. iring the period 1%0 to 1973 '
l Their figures indicated that an average of almost 90.000 persons per year were forced to evacuate their homes because of hurricanes, floods, train derailment-
\
- We thank Cvula l'auer, director of the Cartography Lat or.it.ity University of Kentut kv. for ion.
Structing the graphier
' Joseph M llan* lr and Thorna* C. sell. Evacuaoun Risi - An taaluation (l..i Vewi= New U%
Environrnental Protecuon Agency. Ic4). pp 101 1.0 e Da. Zeictrit is an assistant professor of geography at Old Dominion University.
Norfolk. Virgmia 23508. Dit. BRUNN is a protessor of geography at the University 01 Kentucky, t.exmgton, Kentucky 40506. Du. lollNSON t% an as%IStadt prole %Or of geog.
raphy at the University of Califomia Los Angeles, California WO24, '
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'2 THE GEOCR AT'HICAL REVIEW involving toxic chemicals, and other types of disaster. Evacuations from tech-nological disarters accounted for only one fourth of the incidents listed by i
11ans and Sell. In terms of affected area and population each technological incident lacked the large->cale effect that characterized natural disasters? Part-t ly because of this limited scope of impact study of evacuation from techno-logical disaster ha . been neglected. Such evacuation has t raditionally been viewed as a mechanistic problem, merely a question of logistics. In this article we hope to advance under tanding of individual behavioral pattern 4 during evacuation from a lechnological aci,ident. This understanding will allow public othctab. and planners to base emergency evacuation de igns on documented behavioral responses rather than on assumptions derived from the experience of evacuations from natural disasters.
The data for this study, hereafter referred to as the Michigan State Univer-sity (MSU) studv, were obtained from a survey queshonnaire mailed to a strat.
itied random sample of 300 households in south central Pennsylvania approu tmalcly one month atter the accident at TMI. The sample included 176 households within lifteen miles of the plant and 122 households in Carksle.
Duncannon, and Lancaster, three communities beyond the fifteen-mile radiu-that we chose to include in the sample. Of the 2o7 que.stionnaires that reached their destinations,150 were completed and returned, a response rate of 56 percent. A detailed description of the survey design and a copy of the ques. ~
tionnaire appear in the final report on the TMI incident that we published elsewhere.'In this article we make reference to two other surveys of TM1 area residents, although the final results of each survey are yet to be published One survey was conducted by Mountain West Research for the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission (NRC), and the second was done by a group of geoc,ra-phers at Rutgers University.'
These three TMI studies provide the basis for examining the emergency.
planning process in general and evacuation planning in particular. Methods of flarry lioll Moore and others. Hefore the Wmd A Study of the Response he lluencane Carta, i b,a ter shadv No. l9 (Washmgton. D. C.: Nahonal Academy of Semnees National Research Coun.
cil, lu*ih 1homas E. Drabek. Soc al Processes m Dina<ter Family Fvacuation 4rtal Protems Vnl in. luhu. pp Vo-349; E. M Hed. Communication m Cn is Esplaining Lvacuanun Symooheatly.
t'ommioni. aron. Rescun i . Vol. 2.1975, pp. 24-4% Eart l Haker, predicung Reponse to Hurneane t
Wamings A Reanalym or Data from Four Studies. % 9 f.mereencen Vol 4. tu u.
Ronald W. Perry. Evacuation Decision Making in Natural Disasters. Stao Cmcreencre pp 9 24. and Vol. 4.197u pp 24 is
'itaniev D Hrunn. lame f l. John *on Jr , and Donald j. 'enden Final Report on a fuo il survey of ihree Wie island Area Reicent* (East Lansing. %ch.. %ennean 5 tate Univere . Department ut Geograpnv. lu 9t. pp ta.24
' Mountain West Rc* ear 6h.nI' e . Three %le island Telephone Survey Prelimmar) Report on Pro.
tedures and Finding
- by Qnthia B Flynn. prepared ror the Nuclear Regulato v Commission iWashmgtnn. D C.. L
- C.os emri;ent Printing Othee jurut w.untain West Researen. Inc . with 5ovial Impact Rewarch, ine.1he soaal and Leonomic Etiects of the Accident at 1hree M& laland 4 by Cy nthia tt Flynn and James A. Chalmers, prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commimon
'Washmaton. D. C.: U.5 Govemment Pnntma Othee. Twoi, and Aent Barnet. Jaraes Brosius 5u*an Cutter. and James %#chell. Re*ponses of impacted Populaonna to the 1bree %Ie Mand Nucle.ir Reactor Accident. An initi.il A%e ment. Ot citosen P.spcr W !! INew Brunswick. N J-Rutgers University. Department ut Geograpny.1979L The N.RC study was conducted by teleprione m July and August of 1979, and the Rutgers study was based on a quesnonnaire matied m Apnt of 1979 In general the results of the MSU. NRC. and Rutgers studies are nurually supportive:
maior differences are m the conceptualization and the spahal analvsis of evacuanon behavior and dension making, topics that are most fully developed in the M5U report.
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t EVACUATION FRoM NUCLLAR D!sASTER 3
- ech. coping with the consequences of nuclear disasters are certain to attract consid-J by erably more interest than they have to date for everal reasons. The TMl acci-gical dent demonstrated that " societies using nuclear power today must accept maior
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! accidents not only as a theoretical possibility of no prachcal consequence. but ano- l as a risk to include in actual planning ' The results of state and nationwide
>een oPi nion poll > conducted since the accident at TMI mdicate that supporters of l
tscle nuclear power. though now insisting on higher safety standards, still outnum-rmg ber persons who oppose it.'- Nuclear-generating f acilities m the short run, at lea ,t, will probably continue to oper:':e and to proliferate Oi the exi . tine and ibhc ated planned reactors in the UniteJ dtates,85 percent are uted witton snty mih ~
.nce
' of a metropohtan core and thus cast a nuclear threat over a large proportion el l
the population in the country ver- g, g, g g, y, trat-Our study of the Three Mile island evacuation was one of the hr*.t attempts g ,
to document the procen of evacuation under the threat or a severe technologn.al
- ,g, I disaster. We designed the questionnaire to ascertain whether the respondent l evacuated and ty identify the factors that influenced the decision. The results dius of the sun ey indicate that 53 percent of the population within twelve miles hed fg of TMI evacuated, while only 4 percent beyond this liniit lef t their h omes We propose a tentative model of the evacuatien Jeciuon makmg prose - and the spatia l outcome of tho e decisions (Fig. 1). ihe first quc* tion posed w a-hed whether even to con ider evacuation; 21 percent of the sample never consideret this question. The remainder considered evacuation, but only il percent of the ied.
. ample decided to evacuate. Several external con-traints on the flow ot deci.
.eg-sion3 existed. Some p tential evacuees were undoubtedly dissuaded froin len .
" r'o ing by temporal (when), spattal (where), and operatmnal (how) constraints -
,, 'Ihe relationships in the diagram should thus be mterpreted to present a y tem
, 'g , or interlocking decisions rather than a series of unrelated option- 1:urther re.
I search on evacuations from nuclear and other technological disa3 ers may sue gest rettsion and refmement of the decision making model and, perhaps even onn more importantly, may help to identity the critical factor. that miluent e Jhe
{"I i decision m.iking protes ..
,",'[,[ Two spatially distinct population group were identified on the ba o . ot ana their reaction to the 'I MI mcident. One group, s umposed ol man iduals w ho l* remained in their usual place of residence durmg the criso., may be called the residual population, the other group, compriwing the individuals aho d e-
, nen ' parted, is the redistributed population or evacuee.. The MMU tody toond no l ' statistically significant differences between these two groups in terms or oc-r cupation, neome, age of household head length of residence in -outh central
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l n ii n ', Pennsylvania, and political ideology. Similarly the NRC study found that dit-l hnd i ferences m income, education, and occupation had no signincant bearmg on l ,',[" i an mdividua!'s decision to es acuate.
!and Bem Soref en Nuuear Power ihe \n wer flut Hes ame i Qae-uon si , \ oi - rF- ,i 1*
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wn, Robert C %: htil. Putske up'n.cr . nd %w'c.ir i' ewer H rore c.nd A rt " T h res \lm - ana pi R aur. i - Re-ource, ter the Futua tanuarv- Aprii 'u ep i
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-3 Spatial Outcome of the g , Decision-Making Process
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When Should We Return 7 Fic.1-Evacuation decision making.
Beginning with the study of the population affected by Hurricane Carla studies of natural disasters have repeatedly confirmed the hypothesis that a family is the unit making the decision about evacuation.' Evacuees from sud den natural catastrophes typically leave the hazard zone in family groups remain together during the crisis. The results of our survey suggest that while the majority of evacuees left in complete family unitsonthe , proporti of partial
- Moore and others. footnote : .itxive, p
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EVACUATION FROM NUCLE AR D!sAsTER families fleeing the diraster was larger than would be expected irom the con- !
clusions of natural-hazard research, in charting the basic patterns of evacuation r l behavior and in planning many phases of the evacuation procen the concept I
of an evacuation unit, as opposed to the individual or the f ami_ly. may best serve as the fundamental analytical entity We define an evacualmn unit as a j single individual acting alone or a group of individuals aetmg in unison during the evacuation process. Because the members of a household may be unable to agree on a decision or on procedures, a single household may generate several evacuation units. In the MSU -urvey, partial famihes composed one-
' third of all evacuation units, but in the sample communitow bevond inteen miles from the plant, evacuation units were more likely to be partial tamilies than complete families. Within six miles of the plant, complete families out-numbered partial families by more than three to one. The high percentage of i partial famihes evacuating the TMI area may be accounted for by the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the accident itself and by the inability of either individuals or public officials to gauge accurately the magnitude of the malfunction at the plant.
In his study of the sudden and unexpected impact of the Denver Good of 1%5. Thomas E. Drabek demonstrated that evacuation is not always the result of a simple scenario in which families receive a warning. seek to confirm the l danger, and decide to evacuate.'"instead he propo ed four -eparate evacuation i
! processes: evacuation by default, evacuation by invitation, evacuation by com.
promise, and evacuation by decision. Although Drabek's clas ification scheme i was specific to forced evacuation in response to a natural disaster, we propose
'a similar, but somewhat modified classification system specific to voluntary evacuation in response to a technological disaster. In terms of the response of families in the Three Mile Island area, evacuation seemingly resulted from three
,difrerent processes: evacuation by division,in which some members of a family decided to leave while other members decided to remain; evacuation by con-sensus, in which the whole family decided that evacuation was the best course i
of protective action to follow. and evacuation by compromne, in which a dead-I lock was resolved by a dominant family member m favor ot evacuation. lia-i bek's model of evacuation by default would be applicable only m the event ot a forced evacuatmn.
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The principal factor motivating TMI residents to evacuate was concern about
! personal safety: 94 percent of the evacuees gave this reason ilable 10 Conflict-ing reports from governmental and utility-company official were another srit-ical factor. One-fif th at the evacuees indicated that the new media played a role in their decision. The NRC study also cited the perception 01 danger and l
the volume of confusing information as the maior reason- for evacoation "
ria. The reasons given by members of the residual population for not t v.icuatmy ta were varied (Table lit The most frequently gis en i spiananon w a thor no crJer ad-to evacuate wa issued. 'lhe NRC study also found ths re-porv to be tne mo-t nd i frequent argument for stayine,.'; The ewtence of many condictmg reports wa-iile __- . _ . _ . . . . _ . .
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('t'ne effied about talety Con:lirting reports from gowrnment and utilitv-company ottiaak Q[
Contla ting reports from urdits company nttioals 43 ConHn.o'g reports from government offical, :=
News media 24 l'veryone was evatuating 20 Orderni to evacuate 7 4
Source; MSU Survey, te: footnote 3.
L Tanth Il-HsAsoNS Foit Not EvAev Art %
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No order to ev.n uate was iwued . . . - -
100 mant soollating reports 62 No apparent reason to evnuare 42 Home was a safe distance from plant 1s l' ear of lootmg 11 No s hildren involved 24 Coul.f not leave tob or bo mew 2.1 ~
% one el e m area evacuaint 21 Needed to talte . ire of farm hvestwk in No plate to go o luo old to evat uate ri l lJ ndlf af ft'd 1
- buri c: MSU Suitey, test lotunote .1 the Accond most frequently cited reason for not evacuating. Paradoxically this was also the second most widely cited reason among the persons who cho e to evacuate. Contlicting information was thus used l'y some restdents to lustify a decision to leave and by others to iustify a decision to itay.
THE CLOCR Al'HY oF Evacuation FhoM TMl 1
On the basis of the redistribution of population in the immediate aftermath of the Three Mile Island disaster, we were able to defineate two distinct but nverlapping regions:
the zone of evacuation and the evacuation tield. The first zone comprises the areas left by the evacuees. and the second was the area to which the evacuees tied.
ZONE Olt EV A CU A TION '
The pattern of voluntary evacuation from Three Mile Island clearly reveals I a distance decay relationship that illustrates both the effect of governmental directive. and the evacuation shadow ohenomenon. The distance-decay func- ,
tion shows a sharp discontinuity approximately twelve miles from the plant ,
(Table !!!). Within a twelve-mile radius of the disabled reactor 53 percent of ,
r the sampic reported that at least part of the household evacuated. Beyond twelve miles, only 9 percent of the sample reported evacuation . The sharp
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i EVACUATION FROM NUCLEAR DISASTER 7 TAsts ill-DisTAucs Ano EvAcurno9 Rasrossa et act wt acs or ietsro%:%::
otuAset20NE HoVu HOLfM FRtsM WHR H t FHO%4TMl SOM E M EM BE R$ T V At'U4 l to I to 1 miln 55
- i. 4 to o mile > 8n 1 i 7 in u milo 31 10 to 12 mairs 47 .
!) lo 1.4 mde> 11 More than 1% nule% v l'otal sample 11
.4 arre: Nit U burvey. test tuotnote 1 discontinuity in the vicinity of twelve miles reveals the impact or iwo directiv'es issued by the office of the governor of Pennsylvania on Fnday, March 30. In the first, everyone within a ten mile radius was advised to remain indoors, an action known as sheltering. In the second, all pregnant women and preschool children within a five-mile radius of the plant were advised to evacuate. The '
first directive seemed to establish the critical evacuation boundary in the minds of area residents. Beyond the ten. mile limit the proportion of respondent > who l evacuated declined sharply.
- The evacuation shadow phenomenon is the term used to describe the ten-dencv of an otticial evacuation advi>ory to cause departure from a much 1.arger area than.was onginally intended. ine evacuation shadow cast by the publit announcement of a very limited evacuation order extended well beyond the zone 40 which the order applied, if only the persons advised to evacuate had left the area, the number of evacuees would have been limited to approximately l 2,300 preschool children ana pregnant women. Instead an estimated 144,(100 '
l persons, or 39 percent of the population, evacuated their homes in the area as far as fif teen miles from the plant." Although the evacuation-shadow phenom-enon may be a minor consideration in evacuation planning for natur.il ha/ards, the impact ot the phenomenon needs to be emphasized in planning for future nuclear accident. precisely because delineation of the geographical . supe of an invi3ible danger such as ionizin radiation is difficult for pubhc officials and private citizens to determine. In planning for an evacuation from a nuclear disaster, it can therefore be projected that any order to evacuate will cause the departure of residents not only from a designated zone but also from its penph-eries. The olanninq process should accomrnodate respon >es from the two area .
Ev ACUATloN Ftrl.D In order to ana!yze the spatial patterns of evacuation behavior, we asked each evacuation unit to indicate its de<tination. Taken together, these desti-i nations constitute the evacuation field of the >urve) re>por$ dens IFig. 2). Thu
, spatial pattern, as inferred trom the locations of the e sites. so.:uests a calm
! and orderly mosement rather than a hyaterical flight. livacuee- tied a median I
distance of eighty-fise mile > from Three Mile bland. In the NRC study the l median distance was found to be one hundred miles from the plant." In iom.
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parison with the lict of evacuatinna compiled by Hans and Sell. the median flight of evacuation from Three Mile Island is the longest on record. The longest
- median distance given in that study was eighty miles in response to Hurricane Ca rla in 19e l. "
Half of the evacuation units in the MSU survey chose destinations between
(, torty-five and ninety miles from the plant. We define the area .n these limits
! as the zone of perceived safety far from the nuclear site. The inner boundary of this zone, shown on Fig. 2 by a dashed line, suggests that the evacuees sought destinations far enough from the plant to put a territorial buffer between them elves and the source of pos3ible danger. The outer limit of the zone seems to imply a reluctance on the part of most evacuees to venture any farther than necessary from home. The zone of perceived safety represents the spatial out-i come of the tension between centnfugal forces generated by the perception of danger and centnpetal forces generated by the attachment to home.
I A strong directional bias. similar to that identified in studies of the intra-urban mobility process. appears to have influenced the configuration of the ,
" Hans and Sell, footnote 1 above, pp. $3-4
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evacuation field. Although only one of every ten evacuation units cho e des-
' - tinations in the quadrant southeast of TNI, almo>t half chose destinations in l the quadrant northwest of the crippled reactor. The directional bia* was the i I
[ consequence of several interrelated factors The mo3t important con >iderations !
seem to have been a preference for a 3ite upwind from the plant, a p%yi.hological' '
I attraction to the mountains in time of danger, and a reluctance to select a ,
1 destination in the more densely populated metropolitan area 3 to the east. These factors, and possibly others, require further investigation before behavioral !
-k r models of the evacuation site selection process can be constructed.
In addition to sketching the configuration of the actual evacuation field. we
' gej. attempted to delineate a potential evacuation field for all respondents. Everyone r
was asked to supply a choice of destination, if a presidential order had required V ,
a full evacuation oi the area. The map of potential sites-displays a galaxy of g destinations to the north and the west of Three Mile Island and an evacuation hollow, an area shunned by evacuees, around the reac. tor (Fig. 3) The maps l t
of actual and potential fields are similar in many respects, although the map of potential destinations has a less clearly dafined zone of perceived safety. The potential destinations were also more widely dispersed, and some were not shown on the map because they were as far away as Califorma. Ari/ona, and
, ! Florida. r f
EvacVATloN QUARTI H5 t-The homes of relatives and friends proved to be the preferred evacuation quarters among both the actual and the potential evacueen. The MsU survey
.found that 81 percent of the evacuees stayed with relatives and triends.1he comparable figure > were ~M percent in the NRC study and 74 percent in the Rutgers study." These proportions exceed tho e character tic ot evacuanon- -
from natural disasters. ~ Despite the ubiquity ot hotels and motel- in the evac-
~
uation field, their u e by evacuee. trom "lbree Mde Island wa limaed. in all likelihood, by the f:nancial strain that such accommodanon v.ould have im-nedian po>ed on family budgets. The use of the designated evacuanen helter m I h.r-ongest 3 hey, ten mder from the plant, might have been houted by the perten ed knal ricane - stwo of life in inas quaners and by the peneis ed locational stre** that evai-uees would have esperienced m a site 50 clo e to the threatemog reactor. Nu .
, tween mspondent in either the M5U or the Rutgers survey reported utili/ation or tho I limits public shelter in Hershey. and only one of the 1300 households surveyed m andary the NRC study used the evacuation ohelter."~lhe maximum number of per ons acuees who used the shelter in one day was estimated at only 160, a situation that rtween seems to confirm the finding that " shelter centers are used only if nothirg vise ,
seems l is available or if one cannot financially care for himself ""' A reasonable ion. !
,r than l clusion is that the low utilization of the sheher at flershey was partially the al out- l gjgg g[ "' Mountain We%4 Re can h. In6.. with Nnal imp.n i Mc can h. Inc , h=etnotr I alun e, p 17 .ina Barnes and others, toutnote 4 alwe. p.17 d Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p C and 'lhomas E. Drabek and 6th % llong .1 amihr-intra- in Disaster: Reaenons and Relatives, fournalat Afarnasc and t/m family. Vol. 30 Iws, pp 44L 451 of the
- Barnes and others, footnote 4 above, p t?; and Mountain We t Re carsh,Inc . with N,ual Imp.ai Research, Inc., toutnote 4 above p 25.
Hans and Sell, footnote 1 above, p. 52; and Mountain West Research. Inc. with Social impact !
Research, Inc., rootnote 4 above, p. 25
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POTENTIAL DESTINATIONS IN THE EVENT
. l OF AN ORDERED EVACUATION
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result of its location in the ten-mile zone from the reactor. Within ten to twelve miles of TM1,47 percent of the survey respondents evacuated.
The pattern of evacuation was influenced by both spatial and temporal processes (Fig. .I). In this diagram each pnsm of the cube represents the average ;
behavior of evacuees criginating in each of the six distance zones used in this analysis. The distance of the home from Three Mile Island was found to be directly related to the destination chosen by an evacuee. In general, persons living farther from the plant tied to more distant locations than did individuals living close to the plant. The same tendency was observed in the NRC study 3" This finding adds a new dimension to evacuation behavior that has not been previously observed or predicted, and .several esplanations may tentatively be offered. First, persons living closest to the plant were likely to be the most .
concerned about the safety of their homes and property. They were therciare inclined to remain as close as powible to home. Secund, only in the close*t distance zones were residents with high personal evacuation thresholds suf-Sciently motivated to abandon their homes. If these evacuees lived a few miles j
' Mountain West Rewaren. Inc.. with Gooal Irnpact Ref.earch. Inc.. footnote 4 above. p!"
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i l j i svActJATION FROM NUC1. EAR DISASTER ll ;
P SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS i OF EVACUATION 8 f is t-. r r 7 r r i / / r r r q{N -
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ividuals n. 4 pai,ai ana iemp..r.:. ai i . ,,n . ., naoorien studv. '
.ot been .
further from TMI, they probably would not have evacuated at ail. ' Third. re i-tvely be :
dent > who live far from the disabled reattor would be expected to shun evar 1e most uation sites in the closest zones because they would offer httle or no improvs;.
"*f'I0fC ment over the conditions of the home site. It can be hypothesized that evacuees
- CI"'**t originating at great distances from Three Mile li. land would include the eg-
.ld s > u t- ment of the population with low personal evacuation thre. holds that woulti
.w miles l consequently be likely to seek more dii. tant de tination .. Fourth, because evai -
uation units residing more than fifteen miles away were predonunantly women l~ and children, many constraints on evacuation might have les .ened.
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~ a .e _. [. 6,h N 12 THE crocnArHicAt navigw The temporal dimension of evacuation is along the third axis of the evac.
uation cube and represents the date and the duration of evacuation (Fig. 41.
The length of the hinges on which the prisms hang denotes the average du.
ration of evacuation while the position of the hinges denotes the average date of departure and return. The length of stay away from home among respon-dents ranged from one to sixteen days. but 54 percent of all evacuation umt4 .
returned home two to four days after departure. In the three-mile zone closest to the reactor,54 percent (none of whom had preschool childrent stayed away three to six days, and 42 percent (all of whom had pre.chool children) were
.ab ent nine to thirteen. days. As distance between home and plant increased up to the fiftcen mile radius, the duration of stay away from home derreased An inircase in the duration of evacuation was observed in respondents from the three < ample communities that were outside the rifteen mile limit.
't he maiories of evacuation unis (51 percenti lef t on Fnday, March '.0. two j
~'
days atter the accident and the beginning of what was termed the crisia re-sponse permd f'.An identical percentage was cited by the Rutgers study and the NRC study reported 35 percent." The departure of so many persons that das can probably be attributed to a combination of factors First. the governor %
heltering and evacuation directives were inued on Friday when a.erious con-
- ideration or a full evacuation tir<t became pubbr Second, two maior enn-
~
strainb. on evacuation were litted bei ause Friday is the end of both the work w vek' and lla -chad -
leave earhe than % . ekJ hvacuee, hs ing slo e to 'be plant were hkely ta
% hs ing in the ootlying commurittles Where w 7 percent u the evacuation urnt hving withm is mdes of the plant left en or before fnday. only one-third of the evacuation units living ten or more miles away evacuated on Fndar. All of the evacuees who reported leaving en Morklay lived ten or more mile f rom the plant.
A CONeTPTUAl. Monti or STuss-INovern EvaevATros
't he decision to evacuate from the Three Mile Islandmay ar be concep-tuatived as a behavioral adjustment to the stressful environmental conditions can ed by the sudden nuclear accident. Evacuation in anticipation of di . aster theretore becomes a stress-management technique whereby an evacuee move
- fnim one location to another m an effort to reduce the strain imposed by the perception of danger." The stress inducing factors during the TMI crisis were l l '
i the knowledge that radioactivity had leaked into the environment and. more importantly, the fear of an even larger catastrophe, that is, a core meltdown .
' Russell R. Dynes and others. Report or the Emergency Preparedne<< and Respon e Ta.k Force Staff Report to the l*readent s Cornmnsion on the Accident at Three Mile Island (War.hmeton.
D C.. U.S. Government Pnnems Offke.147% p. 43. Dynes divided the time after the accident
, the emergency-response penod trorn Wednesdav, March 28 to Fnday morning
. March 30. and the
- ensts response penod, begmnmg on Fndav rnorning, March 30 1
I "Researth.
BarnesInc. andluutnote others. tournote 4 aboce, p 17. and Mountam hest Research. Inc., with Soaalimpact 4 above. p 24.
, l I
' Stanley D. Brunn Spahal Causes and Consequences of tNvcho ocial Stress. m The Geography of Health and Onease tedited by John Nt Hunter. Chapel Hiil N t.'
' Department of Ceugraphy, tu?41. pp t%151 W Universov of North Carohna A. V Clark and \tanm Cadwallader. Lo-canonal D. Foster.trea and Rendennal The Geography of StreNtot t ility. Orrerec*rt .rnd Sch <rmr. Voi s.1971 pp 29-4 L Harold lem Vol. It. luN rp 10?-108. ana luhan Wolpert Micranon as an Adjustment to l-nvironmcotal *trr%%, forern.d of No, ad/ /**#er*
vol !2.1% pp W2-iO2 I
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l GENERALIZED PERSON AL STRESS CURVES i
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-j r... 5 t .cner.,h mt pa ..nal ,o e- m,ve-l at the plant. Only permanent relocation is a more radical adjustment to per-ceived risk than evacuation. Lei.s radical adaptations aurfaced among 1MI area residents, for example, moditications of the daily personal routine 3uch ai.
i remaining indoors and con . tant tuning to loi.al and regional new- -
I Ev ACU ATION-REsPoNst' TillO'silot.D .
! At any given distance trom Three Mile Island, the propensity of a hou chold to evacuate depends on the evacuation response thre> holds of individual lam-ily members and on the availability and the desirability of evacuation spiarter-at varying distances from the source of danger. The evacuation re ponse thret hold is that point along an individual's personal tress continuum when the decision to evacuate is made. Individuals with low thresholds will tend to evacuate even if they live far from the source of danger, while per.on . with \
high thresholds will evacuate only if they live very near that source. A . distante from the plant increases, the proportion of the evacuating population decrease.,
and the evacuating population includes an increased number of individual.
with low evacuation-respon.se thresholds. The tendency of persons with low thresholds to move farther from the stricken plant than persons with high thresholds helps to explain the pattern of evacuation-site selection with respect to the two distance variables presented in the evacuation cube (Fig. 4).
Generalized postaccident personal stress curves offer another temporal mea-sure of responses to the disaster (Fig. 5). The increased perception of stress on Fnday is apparent on both stress curves, but only the curve for the evacuee- 7 nses above the evacuauon response thre. hold. The preupituus drop in the j evacuees' level at perceived stre.s on Saturday was the result ot departing for
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a de tination that was con icered a safe distance from the t lant Consequently equilibrium was reestablished.
Evacuation may also be motivated by reasons other than the need to alle-viate stress. Some evacuees' stress curves may peak below individual evacua.
tion-response thresholds, an indication that the persons may have acquiesced in the decision by their family to evacuate, even though individually they I would not have taken the action. Forced evacuation by governmental author- !
ities and previously arranged plans to be absent would be other examples of t such a phenomenon. The stress curve of an individual may also rise above the '
evacuation response threshold, but evacuation is not an automatic result. For example, some individuals may have had no place to go, may have been con-fined to an institution, or may have had constraints imposed on their mobility by a job or other commitment.
The possible evacuation sites that a hypothetical evacuee might consider can be entered in a matrix of the search for evacuation quarters, which iden-tifies available options (Fig. 6). Personalized stress curves may be proiected along each axis of the matrix. On the basis of the map of actual evacuation destinations, the most desirable locations were between forty-five and ninety miles from the disabled reactor. The locational stresi curve therefore ap-pears to dip in this range and to demarcate a zone of perceived safety A personal or nonlocational stress curve, representing the total social and finan-m --v-y=+vmy.- -,y---r e-re-.----vew----wt-er-w--rw-,-.- c-* --w-*----e~-*+,+-ww+r-~e w e -- e , e + - - - - - + c-+--*
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eial strain perceived to be associated with various types of evacuation quarters, l was drawn to conform to the preferences expressed by survey respondents. l The curve peaks at public shelters and diminishes through motels, friends, and ;
relatives. Although the use of second homes and campgrounds would be lim-
, ited by personal circumstances, they are included as potential destinations.
EVACUATION SPACE-5EARCH M ATRIX .
In the space-search matrix the most desirable evacuation sites can be iden- ~
tified by protecting the " lowest" segment of each atress curve into the matrix.
The area, delineated in Fig. 6 by a .r.haded border, has three potential sites that would be open to this particular evacuation unit. The final choice under such circumstances would be made on the basis of nonlocatmnal fat tors that enter the selection process. While locational tactors would prevad to diwourage the e
selection of evacuation ite- either very near or very tar from the nuclear plant, j nonlocational factors would influence the selection of a specific Site in the geographical zone of perceived safety. Each individual would perceive the stress associated with location and types of evacuation quarters ditferently.
This personalized deension making schema is only a first attempt to analyze the thinking and the planning by which mdividuals and families search in the urrounding territory for an acceptable evacuation destinatmo.
I Tot GLounario u's Roi.L IN 15Mt RGLNei -RI.5 con =1; l't.AN NING
! Until the accident at Three Mile Island, emergency-response and evacuation planning received urprisingly little attention from either the Nuclear Regu-
, latory Coramission or government officials. Prior to the TMI accident, NRC had required nuclear plant operators to develop emergency plan only for the ta-cility itself and the surrounding low population zone. 'Ibe zone around TMl -
, extended only 2.2 mdes from the facility. At the time of the accident, no evac-uation plans existed for the local jurisdictions in the area. Although the three closest counties had five mile emergency response plans on fde, only one plan incorporated a fully developed course of action. Two emergency plans were I
developed for the state at the time of the accident, but neither one had been ;
approved by NRC,"
After noting the low priority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commi% ion had
- accorded emergency response planning, the President's Commission on the l Accident at Three Mile 1.sland recommended that emergency plans, includmg i
evacuation, be designed for existing and proposed nuclear power plants on the basis of alternative disaster scenarios for any given plant. Scenarios would l specity appropriate responses from state and utility-company officials on the
- bases of both the magnitude of the disaster and the distance of residents from I
the generating station. The commission considered a single evacuation plan based on a fixed set of distances and a fixed set of respnnses to be inadequate l " A thoeausth critique Je the plans in etteel on March b, lir u. and or the 4.14m pl.innmg dot u.
I ments th.at evolved in respon>c to the nuciear emergenes a in Dvne and others to itnner ll above l pr 101- led
' l he "rrsident
- Comne ssion on the W ident .it llirer \lile 1 1.md. 't he 'u cti .or t a..nu IN l Leg.nev ut TMt (Wasnmpun. (.) C C 5 Covrentnent Pnnting Ottice. !M pr "n -
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N' T HE ChoGR Al'HleAt. HrVIEW r
in view of the minimal attention to emergency response planning and the recommendation 'of the presidential commission to identify appropriate re-sponses for a range of conditions, there seems to be ample opportunity for geographers to contribute to the design and the implementation of emergency.
response plans for nuclear emergencies. The role of the geographer in emer-gency preparedness is considered most essential in the design of plans for evacuation and for delivery of emergency services. Espertise in spatial and locational matters is especially entical in response to nuclear. accidents and other technological disasters. Specific contnbutions of the geographer include a r-the identification of the areas to be evacuated on the bases of distancedrrand direction from the disaster site, the description of the population and settle, am ment geographies of the potentially affected areas as a basis for intelligent of decision making, the determination of the transportation routes that would be thr most suitable for an evacuation, and the establishment of the locations for tio evacuation shelters. Additional important contributions that geographers may hig make are the predictmn of the movement patterns of evacuees in order to C31 regulate the mass evacuation of an area and to plan for the delivery of emer.
ere gency services and supphes in the evacuation field, the creation of the networks
- tor the commumcation of disaster information and for the dehvery of emer-gency wernees in the /one of evacuation, and the ide.ati6 cation of the locations that would be most difficult to evacuate because of physical constraintt per.
onal immobility. or attitudinal resistances.
,TCF in additmn to the magnitude of the accident, other factors may require the art formulauen of contingency plans to cope with the insisible danger and de. up struction awociated with a nuclear emergency. Evacuation, particularly if it ma begins as a voluntary process, will vary according to the season of the year. the the day of the week, the specihe weather conditions, and the availabihty a of gra gasoline wupplies. Factors unique to the affected area will also need to be con. me sidered in anticipating the public response to an evacuation order, particularly ( 10 '
rural urban population mn, automobile ownership, ownership of campers, Nil vans, and second homes, available public transportation, proportion of the population confined to institutions, location of fnends and relatives, obstruc- rir Offt tions in the transportation network, and extent of cooperation among local int- ;
governments. A clear understanding of responsibilities and pnor planning of act appropriate emergency responses will help to facilitate evacuation from nuclear Suc and other technological disasters.
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DONALD J. ZEIGLER 5816 Roxbury Place, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23462 Tel. (804) 490-1060 Present Position ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY (1980-present)
Department of Political Science and Geography Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508 Tel. (804) 440-3845 Education Ph.D. (1980)
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 Grade Point Average: 3.94 Specializations: Urban Social and Economic Geography, Population Geography.
M.A. (1976)
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 Grade Point Average: 4.00 Specializations: Urban Social Geography, Economic Geography, Population Geography.
B.S. (1972)
Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania 17257 Grade Point Average: 3.43 Maj or: Geography. Minors: Social Science and Education. ,
Teaching Interests Systematic: Economic and Urban Geography, Geography of Energy, Population Geography Regional: Geography of the United States and Canada.
Methods: Research Design, Quantitative Methods, and Field Techniques in Geography Prepared to Develop: Geography of Social Issues, Geography of the Future, Geography of Technology, History and Philosophy of Geography, and Geographic Education Research Interests Major: Urban financial geography; Impacts of high energy costs on metropolitan settlement patterns and processes; Technological hazards and evacuation planning; Geopolitical fragmentation and its impact on metropolitan America.
Minor: Growth and decline in the American metropolitan system; Patterns of population redistribution in the United States, Suburbanization of the central city and the citification of the suburbs.
2 I
/ l Experience ASSISTANT PROFESSOR (1980-present), Geography Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508 Responsib111 ties: Currently teaching economic geography, geography of energy, cartography, and introductory physical geography; serving on the Geography Curriculum Committee; departmental representative to the Ph.D. in urban services policy committee.
RESEARCH ASSISTANT (1980), Center for Environmental Quality Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 Responsibilities: Assisted in organizing a series of com= unity and state level energy workshops and in preparing preliminary and final reports of the workshop project for the Michigan Energy Administration.
TEACHING ASSISTANT (1977-1979), Department of Geography Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 Responsibilities: Taught economic geography (2 terms); assisted in field techniques in geography (5 terms); assisted in geography of environ-mental quality (1 term) .
ARCHIVES ASSISTANT (Summers 1978 and 1979), State of Michigan Archives Michigan History Division, Department of State, Lansing, MI 48918 Responsibilities: Organized newly acquired archival record groups and manuscript collections; wrote finding aids to facilitate public access to primary source materials.
GEOGRAPHER (1976-1977), Geographical Statistical Areas Branch U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC 20233 -
Responsibilities: Applied the concepts of Census Geography to the estab-lishment of statistical areas in the Southern states; analyzed statis-tical and cartographic documents to prepare and revise census tract plans in cooperation with local planning agencies; coordinated the enumeration district program for the South.
INSTRUCTOR (1976), Department of Geography University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881 Responsibilities : Taught economic geography (2 terms); directed a tutorial in geographic education; served as University College advisor.
TEACHER (1974-1976), Social Studies Department South Kingstown High School, Wakefield, RI 02879 GRADUATE ASSISTANT (1973-1974), Department of Geography University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881 TEACHER (1973), Social Studies Department Hershey Senior High School, Hershey, PA 17033 DEPARTMENTAL ASSISTANT AND CARTOGRAPHER (1970-1972), Department of Geography Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, PA 17257
3 Research and Publications DISSERTATION ,
1
" Central City Credit Ratings: Regional Patterns and Spatial Correlates,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Geography, Michigan S: ate i
~ University 1980. (Advisor Stanley D. Brunn. Committee Members: ' Joe l
.T. Darden and Ian M. Matley.)
THESIS
, " Selected Quality of Life Indicators and Demographic Characteristics of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Rhode Island,1976.
-(Advisor: Gerald H. Krausse. Second Reader: Henry J. Warman.)
ARTICLES:
" Human Settlements in Sparsely Populated Areas: A Conceptual Overview,"
in R. E. Lonsdale and J. W. Holmes, eds., Human Sectiement Systems in Sparsely Populated Regions: The United States and Australia. New York:
Pergamon Press, 1981. (With S. D. Brunn; forthcoming.)
" Evacuation From a Nuclear Technological Disaster," The Geographical Review 71 (January 1981): 1-16. (Principal author; with S. D. Brunn and J._H. Johnson, Jr.)
"Geopolitical Fragmentation and the Pattern of. Growth and Need: Defining the Cleavage Between Sunbelt and'Frostbelt Metropolises," in S. D. Brunn -
and J. O. Wheeler, eds., The American Metropolitan System: Present and Future. New York: . Edward Arnold, 1980. pp. 77-92.
' "The Regional and Environmental Social Studies: Frontiers for Geography and the-PCGE ," The Pennsylvania Geographer 13 (July 1975); reprinted December 1976.
. " Federal Support for Public Education: A Rationale," Kappa Delta P1 Record ;
12 (October 1975). !
REPORTS.(Co-author)
Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents. ;
East Lansing, Mich.: Department of Geography, Michigan State University, August 1979. 218 pp. (With S. D. Brunn and J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents.
East Lansing, Mich.: Department of Geos,raphy, Michigan State University, May 1979. (With S. D. Brunn and J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
i REPORTS (Contributor)'
Energy and the Adaptation of Human Settlements edited by H. E. Koenig and
. L. M. Sommers. East Lansing, Mich.: Center for Environmental Quality, i Michigan State University,1980. pp. 16-19, 22-25, 28-40, 43, 123-129.
L-_._-,_....._.~.._-._._,-.---._._.___.______.~___._.__ - -
6 PAPERS l
" Changing Regional Patterns of Central City Credit Ratings: 1960-1980,"
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ' Southeastern Division, ]
1 Association 1980. of American Geographers, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 24, "From Three Mile Island to Worlds End: Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster," Paper presented,at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania October 11, 1980, Council for Geography Education, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, i
"The Spatial Correlates of Municipal Bonds: A Geography of Assigned I Credit Ratings," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,. April 23, 1979.
FIELD TRIP GUIDE l
Environmental Land Use in the Cumberland Valley. Field trip booklet written for the annual. conference of the Pennsylvania Council for Geography Education Pennsylvania, held at Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, May 1, 1971. 80 pp..
FILM. STRIP SERIES (Consultant)
_Seeing ' the' New England States , Coronet Instructional Media, 1975.
Media Interviews ~
Radio:
Television: WELM, WKAR,. East Lansing, Michigan, on the Three Mile Island survey,1979.
East Lansing, Michigan, on the Three Mile Island survey,1979.
1 Accivities, Honors, and Memberships Professional Organizations:
Association of American Geographers (since 1968)
Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers (since 1980) !
National Council for Geographic Education (since 1967) j Pennsylvania Council for Geography Education (since 1970) i Undergraduate' Activities and Honors:
Bachelor of Science with Honors )
Gamma Theta Upsilon, Omicron Chapter, President Theta Geography Club, President !
l College Geography Clubs of Pennsylvania, State President Kappa Delta Pi (honorary education society)
Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges 1972 Graduate Activities and Honors:
Graduate Office Fellowship, Summer 1980 Graduate curriculum Committee, 1980 Visiting Chinese Geographers Reception Committee, 1979 l
l
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