ML20117L568

Forwards Classification Scheme Provided in NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2 for Site for Review & Approval

ML20117L568
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	08/29/1996
From:	Mccollum W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9609170054
Download: ML20117L568 (115)

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, DukeIbwer Compat!! ,

WwatR. AlcCor.u21,Je Catau ba Nuclear Generatiort D< partment Vicel' resident 48% ConcordRoad (8m)33132x oftge Yurk, SC29745 (8tu)8313126 Fax l

DUKEPOWER August 29, 1996  !

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l Document Control Desk U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Site, Docket Nos. 50-413/50-414 Submission of Section D, Catawba Nuclear Site Emergency Plan - Adoption of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 Classification Scheme l

Duke Power Company is submitting the classification scheme l provided in NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, for Catawba Nuclear Site.

Approval of the submittal is requested prior to final implementation. A table showing the disposition of NUMARC/NESP-

! 007, Rev. 2 Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels (EAL) in the Catawba EAL submittal is enclosed. A BASIS document is provided which cross-references the initiating conditions described in the NUMARC document. A copy of the classification procedure is also enclosed. This procedure has been reviewed by the state and local governments within the plume exposure EPZ. ,

l Their. concurrence letters are enclosed. If there are any l l questions regarding the submittal, please contact Gary L. i Mitchell at (803) 831-3235. j Yours truly, )

W.R. McCollum,- .  !

Vice President l Encl.: 1) Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels (EAL) in the Catawba EAL submittal

2) Catawba Emergency Plan Section D

3) Catawba Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01  !

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4) State and County concurrence letters j i

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. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 29, 1996 Page - 2 cc: (w/ attachments)

Mr. Stewart Ebneter Regional Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Commission r Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323  ;

1 NRC Resident Inspector e

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. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 29, 1996 Page - 3 bec: S. R. Christopher (w/ attachment)

E. M. Kuhr (w/ attachment)

M. E. Patrick (w/o attachment)

Electronic Licensing Library (w/o attachment)

EP File

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ENCLOSURE 1 l

Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 l Initiating Conditions and Emergency Action Levels (EAL) i in Catawba EAL submittal l

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, Catawba Nuclear Site  ;

Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number )

Recognition Category A l

AUl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.1-1 and -2 '

AUl/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.1-3 and -4 ;

AUl/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors  !

AUl/4 Deleted -- Catawba does not have real time dose assessment AU2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-1 AU2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-2 AU2/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have dry fuel storage AU2/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.U.2-3

, AA1/1 Abnomial Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-1 and -2 AAl/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.1-3 and -4 AAl/3 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors AAl/4 Deleted -- Catawba does not have real time dose assessment AA2/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-1 AA2/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-2 AA2/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-3 AA2/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.2-2 ,

AA3/1 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-1 AA3/2 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.A.3-2 l ASl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-1 ASI/2 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors ASl/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-2 ASl/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.S.1-3 AGl/l Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-1 AGl/2 Deleted -- Catawba does not have perimeter monitors AGl/3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-2 AGl/4 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.3.G.1-3 l 1

_.___.__m_._.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 ICEAL in Catawba EAL Submittal l

! NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category F i - FPB Fuel /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.1

! FPB Fuel /2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.2 FPB Fuel /3 Deleted -- Core exit thermocouples are monitored as part of Critical i Safety Function (CSF) status. If the OAC is not available, manual l monitoring is done per F/0, " Critical Safety Function Status" and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /4 Deleted -- Reactor Vessel level is monitored as part of CSF status. If j the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is done per F/0, " Critical j Safety Function Status" and will be used to classify.

FPB Fuel /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.3 l FPB Fuel /6 Deleted -- Catawba does not believe additional indications are needed to j determine Fuel Clad Barrier status. Air sampling (PAGS) results are not j used, as containment monitors can be used to determine Fuel Clad

status.

I FPB Fueln Fission Product Barrier 4.1.F.4 j FPB RCS/l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.1 i FPB RCS/2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.2 f FPB RCS/3 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.3 Note: The classification procedure does j not provide site specific criteria that a steam generator is ruptured.

l Duke Power's philosophy is that diagnostic information of this type l belongs in the Emergency Operating Procedures. Once the Emergency l Coordinator / EOF Director determines that a steam generator is ruptured,

! the classification procedure can be used to determine the correct

classification.

! FPB RCS/4 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.4

! FPB RCS/5 Deleted -- Catawba does not believe additional indications are needed to l determine Reactor Coolant System Barrier status. Air sampling (PAGS) i results are not used, as containment monitors can be used to determine j Reactor Coolant System Barrier status.

j FPB RCS/6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.N.5 i FPB Containment /l Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.1

[ FPB Containment /2 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.2 FPB Containment /3 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.3 i FPB Containment /4 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.4 l FPB Containment /5 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.5 l

FPB Containment /6 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.6 Core exit thermocouples are monitored l

} as part of CSF status. If the OAC is not available, manual monitoring is I done per F/0, " Critical Safety Function Status" and will be used to i classify.

j FPB ContainmentU Deleted -- no additional indications needed j FPB Containment /8 Fission Product Barrier 4.1.C.7 4

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, Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 21C/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category H HUl/l Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-1 and -2 ,

HU1/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-3 i HUl/3 Deleted -- Catawba considers this redundant to Emergency Director Judgement HUl/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-4 HU1/5 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 HUl/6 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.1-5 HUl/7 Deleted -- Catawba believes no additional items are needed based on current EAL experience HU2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-1 HU3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.2-1 HU3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7 U.2-2 HU4/1 Fire and Security 4.6.U.2-1 ,

HU4/2 Fire and Security 4.6.U.1-2 and -3 l HU5/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.U.3-1 HAl/l Natural Disasters Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-1  ;

HAl/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-2 HA1/3 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/4 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HAl/5 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/6 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA1/7 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.1-3 HA2/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.1-1  ;

HA3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.2-1 HA3/2 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.2-2 HA4/1 Fire and Security 4.6.A.2-1 i HA4/2 Deleted -- Catawba believes no others Security Event EALs necessary based on current EAL experience HA5/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.3-1 l HA6/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.A.4-1 HS1/1 Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-1 HSI/2 Fire and Security 4.6.S.1-2 and -3 HS2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.1-1 HS3/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.S.2-1 HG1/1 Fire and Security 4.6.G.1-1 HG1/2 Fire and Security 4.6.G.1-2 HG2/1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, etc. 4.7.G.1-1 3

, Catawba Nuclear Site Disposition of NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 IC/EAL in Catawba EAL Submittal NUMARC IC/EAL Catawba EAL Recognition Category and EAL Number Recognition Category S SUl/l Loss of Power 4.5.U.1-1 SU2/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.1-1 SU3/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.2-1 SU4/1 Deleted -- Catawba has no failed fuel monitor. Reactor coolant sampling is used to determine fuel clad degradation.

g SU4/2 System Malfunction 4.2.U.3-1 SU5/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.4-1, -2, and -3 SU6/1 System Malfunction 4.2.U.5-1 and -2 SU7/1 Loss of Power 4.5.U.2-1 SA1/1 Loss of Power 4.5.A.1-1 SA2/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.A.1-1 SA3/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.A.2-1 and -2 SA4/1 System Malfunction 4.2.A.1-1 SA5/1 Loss of Power 4.5.A.2-1 SSl/l Loss of Power 4.5.S.1-1 SS2/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.1-1 SS3/1 Loss of Power 4.5.S.2-1 SS4/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.2-1,-2, and -3 SS5/1 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.S.3-1, -2, and -3 SS6/1 System Malfunction 4.2.S.1-1 SGl/l Loss of Power 4.5.G.1-1 SG2/1 and 2 Loss of Shutdown Function 4.4.G.1-1 f

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O ENCLOSURE 4.1 Catawba Nuclear Sito FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX ,

Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table below.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT loss situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Unusual Event (1 - 3 Points) Alert (4 - 6 Points) Site Aree Emeroer ev (7 General Emeroency (11 - 13 Points)

- 10 Points)

. Any Potential Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of the . Loss of both NCS . Loss of any three barriers NCS and Fuel Clad

. Any Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of Fuel . Potential Loss of . Loss of any two barriers and the Potential Loss of the Clad both NCS and Fuel third barrier Clad

. Potenial Loss of either the NCS or Fuel Clad and Loss of anyadditional barrier CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS- LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) LOSS-(4 Point (s))

1.Crttical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. CriticalSafety Funcilon Status

• ContammentBED = Not appicable

• NCS Integntyeed

• Ncs appfcable

• Core Cooling- e Core CoolirgRed orange e Heat Smkeed e Heat SmkRed 2.Containtnent Condrtions 2dfG1 Leak Rate 2. Primary Cooiant Activity Level e Contamment Pressure > 15

• Raput unexplamed decreasein

• Urusolableleak exceedng the

• GREATER THAN avadable e Nat apphcable

• Coolant Actnnty GREATER THAN 300 pCl/cc PSIG corf.amment pressurelodowng capecay of one chargmg pump makeup capacity as Dose Equivalentlodne (DEI)1-131 initial bcrease in the normaldiargog mode indcated by aloss of NCS

• H2 concentration > 9% mthletdoenisciated, subcoolmg.

• Contamment pressure or sump

+ Contamment pressure greater level response not consistent than 3 psig uthless than one wth LoCA condnions.

tuA tram of Ns and a VXCARF operatmg.

C ENCLOSURE 4.1 Catawba Nuclear Site FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX .

CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (3 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s)) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Point (s))

(1 Point (s)) (4 Point (s)) (4 Point (s))

1ContainmentimesumYaLvesStatus AfterContainmentisnistion. 1 SG Tube Ruoture 3. Contamment Radation Monitoring Ashanno e Not appbcable

• Contanmentisolahanis

• Pnmary-to Secondaryleak rate

• Indcation that a SGis Ruptured

• Contanment radianon nmtor 53 A or 538 readng >117 Rh incomplete and a release path exmeds the capacty d one and has a Nordsolable tramcontanment ensts chargng purmin the normal secondaryline fault chargng mode wthletdown isolated.

• Inscation that a SGis ruptured and a prolonged release d contammated secondary coolant is occumng hem the aPected SG to the enwornent

4. Containment Radiation Mon!toring 4. Emergency Coordinator! EOF Director Judgement

• Not apphcable

• Release d semndary side to e Not applicable

• Unplanned Validinpll alarm . Any mndnan,61dudng inability to monitor the bamer, that in the opnan atmmpheve with pnmary to on EMFs 38,39, or 40 d the Emergency Coo'$natorEOF Director indcates LOSS or secondaryleakage GREATER POTENTIAL LOSS d the fueldad bamer.

THAN Tech Spec allomable

5. Significant Redoective Inventory in Contamment

+ Contsnment Rad. Monitor e Not applicable

• Any condtort indudng inabdity to monitor the bamer, that in the opmion EMF 53A or 53B d the Emergency Coordnator EOF Drector indicates LOSS or Readng 0 time sncc POTENTIAL LOSS d the NCS bamer.

shutdont

> 470 Rh 0 0- 0.5 h-

> 170 Rh 0 0.5-2 tr

> 125 Rh 0 2-4 hr

> 90 RW 0 4 - 8 hr

> 53 R4r 0 > 8 hr

6. Core Coolina

+ Core moling-RED pathis

• Not apphcable indcated for > 15 mitt

7. Emerasney Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement

. Any condnan,indudng inabity to nmtor the banw, that in the opnon d the Emergency Coordnator! EOF Drector indcates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS d the mntainment bamer.

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required 4.2.A.I Unplanned Loss of Most or 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Shutdown Within All Safety System Significant Transient in Technical Specification Annunciation or Indication Progress Limits in Control Room With Either:

(1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant (NCS)

System Leakage 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications

O Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.1U.1 Any Unplanned Release of 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of 4.3.S.I Boundary Dose Resulting 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or Imminent from an Actual or Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Release of Radioactivity Imminent Release of Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE Radioactivity that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits 200 Times the SLC Limits or 500 mrem CDE Adult 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 for 60 Minutes or Longer for 15 Minutes or Longer Thyroid for the Actual mrem CDE Adult Thyroid or Projected Duration of the for the Actual or Projected Release Duration of the Release 4.3.U.2 Unexpected increase in 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation or Airborne Fuel or Loss of Water Concentration Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.A.I Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection 4.4.G.I Failure of the Reactor Protection System System Instrumentation to Protection System to i Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Trip and Manual Trip was Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection NOT Successful and There Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint flas Been is Indication of an Extreme System Setpoint IIas Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Challenge to the Ability to Exceeded and Manual Trip Was NOT Successful Cool the Core Was Successful 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function in Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or Maintain Ilot Shutdown 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That IIas or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.I Loss of All Offsite Power to 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite and Onsite) AC

'Ihan 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold Shutdown Or i Refueling Mode i 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Shutdown or Refueling power source for greater Mode for Greater than 15 than 15 minutes such that Minutes an additional single failure could result in station blackout

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.I Fire or Explosion Within 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Protected Area Boundary the Operability of Plant Vital Area Loss Of Ability to Reach Not Extinguished Within 15 Safety Systems Required to and Maintain Cold Minutes of Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown Detection Shutdown 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting Which Indicates a Potential the Operability of Plant Degradation in the Level of Safety Systems Required to Safety of the Plant Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area i

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.1 Control Rcom Evacuation 4.7.G.I Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the flas Been Initiated and Which in the Judgement of Protected Area Plant Vital Area Plant Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Flammable Gases Deemed Flammable Gases Within a Which in the Judgement of Detrimental to Safe Facility Structure Which the Emergency Operation of the Plant Jeopardizes Operation of CoordinatorEOF Director Systems Required to Warrant Declaration of Site Maintain Safe Operations Area Emergency or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown 4.7.U3 Other Conditions Existing 4.7.A3 Control Room Evacuation Which in the Judgement of flas Been Initiated the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert

1 i

l ENCLOSURE 2 Catawba Emergency Plan Section D

. o Catawba Nuclear Site D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM +

Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an alternative methodology for the development of Emergency Action Levels. Catawba Nuclear Site will use the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergeny I action levels. l The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of l

emergency events.

D.I.a UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of this class is to provide notification of the emergency to the station staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.l.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The purpose of this class is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-1

Catawba Nuclear Site D.l.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency is to:

1. Activate the offsite response centers

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious.

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.I.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public

2. Provide continuous assessment ofinformation from onsite and offsite measurements

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authoritSs Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-2 l

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Catawba Nuclear Site l D.2. INITIATING CONDITIONS The initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D-4. A classification procedure (RP/0/A/5000/01) will be used to classify events as they occur. I Specific response procedures are in place which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.  :

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs: (C.1 or C. 2 or C. 3 or C. 4 or C. 5 or C. 6 or C. 7)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

4.1.C.1 Critical Safety Function Status Containment - RED indicates containment conditions which may challenge the containment integrity. Therefore, this condition represents a potential loss of the containment barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.2 Containment Conditions Containment pressure above 15 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

A containment hydrogen concentration of 9 volume percent is sufficient to expect that my ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At some initial containment pressures, this pressure rise may exceed the capacity of the containment. Therefore, this level of hydrogen in the containment represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Containment heat removal systems are actuated at the high-high containment pressure setpoint of 3 psig. At least one train of Containment Spray (NS) and one Containment Air (VX) Return Fan (CARF) should be actuated at that time (the CARF with a 10 minute delay). A failure to actuate the design basis heat removal capability or assure proper containment mixing represents a degradation in the control of the D-4

Catawba Nuclear Site containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Thus, sump level or containment pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity, or some other containment pressure boundary failure.

4.1.C.3 Containment Isolation Valve Status A fter Containment Isolation Actuation i

Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment i atmosphere to be released from containment is a loss of the containment barrier. j l

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item. I i

4.1.C.4 Steam Generator (SG) Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage Secondary side releases to atmosphere include those from the condenser air ejector, SG Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), atmospheric dump valves, faulted steam lines, and main steam safety valves. Steam releases,in combination with primary to secondary leakage, constitute a bypass of the containment and, therefore, a loss of the containment barrier.

l The appropriate classification can be determined in combination with the SG Tube l Rupture EAL under the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) barrier.

There is no " Potentia' Loss" EAL associated with this item.

l 4.1.C.5 Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment These values indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated 4 with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of NCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less D-5

Catawba Nuclear Site than 20%. This amount of activity in containment,if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.

By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and NCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be recommended.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: If EMF-53A and EMF-53B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/06, " Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

4.1.C.6 Core Cooling Core Cooling - RED for greater than 15 minutes in this potential loss EAL represents imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to reactor vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be, ineffective.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.7 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

D-6

Catawba Nuclear Site REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (NCS) BARRIER EALs: (N.1 or N. 2 or N. 3 or N.4 or N.5)

The NCS Barrier includes the NCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

4.1.N.1 Critical Safety Function Status NCS Integrity - RED indicates NCS pressure and temperature conditions which may challenge the Reactor Vessel integrity. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potentialloss of the NCS Barrier.

There is no " Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.2 NCS Leak Rate Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the NCS by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. If letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the NCS barrier is considered lost.

4.1.N.3 SG Tube Rupture Small Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. If letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain nonnal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

D-7

Catawba Nuclear Site A tube rupture with an unisolable secondary line fault is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers. In conjunction with containment barrier bss #4, this condition will result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling System. Determination of the " uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. These conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers.

4.1.N.4 Containment Radiation Monitoring An unplanned valid Trip II alarm on EMFs 38,39, or 40 indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. This reading is not valid without a corresponding i decrease in NCS inventory and increased makeup rate to the NCS. The Trip II i setpoint is selected to ensure compliance with Selected Licensee Commitment 16.11- l

6. The indicated loss of reactor coolant is identification of a loss of the NCS barrier.

This reading will be less than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier EAL #3. Thus, this EAL would be indicative of a NCS leak only. If the radiation monitor reading increased to that specified by Fuel Clad Barrier EAL #1 f ml t damage would also be indicated.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.5 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in demmining whether the NCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the mability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

D-8

. - ._- =- - . .. . --

Catawba Nuclear Site FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (F.l or F. 2 or F. 3 or F. 4) l The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

i 4.1.F.1 Critical Salcty Function Status j

Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad j damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is i under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier, j Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core j uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication ofloss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level

The value of 300 Ci/cc Il31 equivalent coolant activity is well above that expected

for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount

! of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

There is no equivalent " Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring A reading of 117 R/hr on EMF-53A or B is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). This value is higher than that specified for NCS barrier Loss EAL #4. Thus, this EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

There is no " Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: If EMF-53A atid EMF-53B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/06," Alternative Method for determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

D-9

l i

l l Catawba Nuclear Site l

l 4.1.F.4 Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, BASIS INFORMATION FOR TABLE 4 l

1 l

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l l l l

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l D-10

e .

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT l

4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition.

In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU2 D-11

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT l

l 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control l Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION L! VEL:

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety sy.tems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF l Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

This Initiating Condition (IC) and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. " Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes )

scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Quantification of "most" is arbitrary; however, this  ;

judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency 1 CoordinatorEOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

I i

i This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.  !

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU3 D-12 1

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All  !

l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: {

l 4.2.U.31 Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

)

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike. Escalation of this IC to the Alert levelis via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU4 i

l i

D-13

1

, Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT l

4.2.U,4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation) l Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.41 Unidentified leakage 210 gpm 4.2.U.4 2 Pressure boundary leakage 210 gpm

)

l 4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage 2 25 gpm l I

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g.,

mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, " Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SUS D-14

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate l with offsite authorities.

l BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary i for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with affsite authorities. The loss of i offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the l condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.  !

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU6 l

D-15

l Catawba Nuclear Site l

l SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ALERT 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non. Alarming Indicators Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

l

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators tissociated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Either of the following:

• A significant plant transient is in progress.

• Loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift ManagerEmergency CoordinatorEOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

D-16

Catawba Nuclear Site Refer to Operations Procedure OP/l(2)/A/6700/03," Operating with OAC Out of Service."

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC. Loss of the OAC in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation. )

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA4 l

l l

D-17

Catawba Nuclear Site SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

ANI)

b. A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring, independent of the OAC Critical Safety Function Status Tree program, of any one of the following Critical Safety Functions:

e subcriticality e core cooling a heat sink e containment BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

D-18

. . . . . - . = . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

O Catawba Nuclear Site "Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, SS6 l

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l D-19

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Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.1-1 a. A valid TRIP 2 alarm on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 AND

b. Failure of the release path to automatically isolate AND

c. The liquid radioactive release to the environment exceeds two times the SLC limit for 60 minutes or longer.

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 2 1.08 E+04 cpm for 2 60 minutes.

4.3.U.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

4.3.U.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for 2 60 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

D-20

Catawba Nuclear Site d

M Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

4' Unplanned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncon' rolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes.

The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B. Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 3

(ODCM) using most restrictive dispersion coefficient 3.51E-5 sec/m . Worst case annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/23,

" Investigation of Unusual Radiological Occurrences" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2,01/92, AUl D-21

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

1

! OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All l

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

l 4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area radiation monitor (EMF) reading increases by a factor of 1000 over normal levels.

BASIS: '

1 l Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

l l

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary; thus, impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via I EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff. A )

threshold value of 6 inches is used to allow time for mitigating actions to successfully l terminate the inventory loss. Credit should not be taken for inventory additions to maintain level above the 6 inch threshold. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

l EAL 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation l in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of l safety of the plant. This EAL escalates to an Alert if the increases impair safe operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AU2 D-22

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or  !

Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All  ;

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

)

4.3.A.1-1 a. A valid TRIP 2 alarm on radiation monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 AND

b. Failure of the release path to automatically isolate AND

c. The liquid radioactive release to the environment exceeds 200 times the SLC limit for 15 minutes or longer. 1 4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of 21.08 E+06 cpm for 215 minutes.

l 4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for 215 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

NOTE If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL and the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term " Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

D-23

O Catawba Nuclear Site This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/ year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-?0.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) using most restrictive dispersion coefficient 3.51E-5 sec/m 3. Worst case annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/23,

" Investigation of Unusual Radiological Occurrences" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AA1 l

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l 1

D-24

1 Catawba Nuclear Site

)

1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT  :

1 l

4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will

, Result in the Uncovering ofIrradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All i

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-15 2 EMF-4 I

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation l 1 EMF-42 l 2 EMF-42

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge 1 EMF-17 2 EMF-2 l

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39 4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level < 95 % after initiation of NC system make-up AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel AND KF-122 cannot be closed.

D-25

_ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . -.-_.--... _ _ - _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ . . . . . . . _ - _ _ - --- . _ _ _ _- -

i I Catawba Nuclear Site 1

i; 3

l BASIS:

1 l This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage. There is time available to take

! corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert j Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation,if appropriate, would occur via  !

Abnormal Rad Level / Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director l Judgement. I

!. l j

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2,01/92, AA2 1

-f l

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3 l i

e 1

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4.

i 4

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D-26

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Catawba Nuclear Site l

AHNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT l

ALERT 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All l l

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: l 4.3.A.31 Valid radiation monitor reading indicating greater than 15 mR/hr in the control I room or PAP.

4.3.A.3 2 Valid radiation monitor reading of >5 R/hr in a plant vital area.

i BASIS: l Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

l This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to 1 operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to i maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AA3 D-27

Catawba Nuclear Site ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L 21.08 E +07 cpm.

4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on worst case average annual meteorology, a sixty minute release duration, and design unit vent flow rate.

Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate. Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, ASI D-28

l l

Catawba Nuclear Site l

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H 21.72 E +04 cpm.

4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid l at the site boundary.

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on worst case average annual meteorology, a sixty minute release duration, and design unit vent flow rate.

Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate. Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AG1 D-29 l

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an I Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

l 4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist titat lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here becausa failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator (s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor suberitical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-30

s . .

Catawba Nuclear Site l

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

J OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

! Mode 6 (Refueling) 4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: 1 i

4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or I Component Cooling (KC) l l

AND 1

Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 F. l BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17 " Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, NCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, " Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SA3 j i

D-31

l o \

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode I (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was r20t successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Suberiticality CSF-RED.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is accessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS2 D-32

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.2-1 Core Cooling CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-2 Heat Sink CSF-RED 4.4.S.2-3 Subcriticality CSF-RED BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS4 i

D-33

l Catawba Nuclear Site l l

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That IIas or Will Uncover Fuel in the l Reactor Vessel. l i OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.3-1 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

1 AND  !

b. Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-2 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND l l

b. Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range level less than 11% and decreasing i after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-3 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage may be imminent due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via radiological effluent IC.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS5 D-34

. Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reac+or power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

• Core Cooling CSF-RED e Heat Sink CSF-RED BASIS Automatic and manual trii are not considered successfulif action away from the reactor control console is required to trip 1 reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC auf its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of activo fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition.

Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by D-35

o Catawba Nuclear Site design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.

This equates to a Heat Sink-RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges occurs during or following a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design, core damage may be imminent. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SG2 I

l 1

i 4

D-36

Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND l

b. Each emergency diesel generator is supplying power to its respective l essential bus.

BASIS:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of l safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SUl D-37

o .

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICAHILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.2-I The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related busses: EBA and EBD both < 112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both < 109 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling l operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

" Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a 1 result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert is via

" Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU7 D-38

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) l Mode 6 (Refueling) l No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.1 1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS: j Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including ,

Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency,if appropriate,is by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0182, SA1 D-39

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standhy)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.2-1 The following condition exists:

AC power capability has been degraded to one essential bus powered from a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of:

SATA SATB ,

ATC  !

ATD D/G A ):

D/G B BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, " Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure  !

could result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with l

a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its essential busses. Another l related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from the unit main generator, or the loss of  ;

onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, " Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SAS D-40

.= - -- - . _ . . - .- . _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ - _ - _-__

l Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE ANEA Eh1ERGENCY 4.5.S.1 Losi of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Alode 2 (Startup) hiode 3 (Hot Standby) hiode 4 (Hot Shutdown) i Eh1ERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

1 4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND 1 l

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes. l l

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity; thus, this event can escalate ,

to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, " Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS1 D-41

Catawba Nuclear Site LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related busses: EBA and EBD both < 112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time ofloss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a

General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SS3 4

D-42

l Catawba Nuclear Site l l

LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All(Offsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL,:

4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

1 AND l

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to maintain hot standby 1

AND

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

• Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOTlikely.

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and containment.

The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

D-43

Catawba Nuclear Site Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one essential bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier rnonitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator / EOF Directorjudgement as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SG1 l

D-44

Catawba Nuclear Site i

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS l

1 UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.1 Fire or Explosion Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the followise areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alann.

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

Central Alarm Station (CAS)

. Doghouses

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Turbine Building

. Service Building

. Interim Radwaste Building 4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area l boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structure or equipment.  ;

BASIS:

EAL 1: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alann is not spurious.

D-45

Catawba Ni lear Site i

EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the protected area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially l imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to l assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of '

evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

Escalation to a higher emergency class is by," Fire Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown". l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HU2 l

i D-46

Catawba Nuclear Site FIHF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.U.2-1 Security confirmed bomb device discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas.

l 4.6.U.2-2 Hostage situation / extortion i 4.6.U.2-3 A violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled area.

BASIS:

The above situations represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

A civil disturbance is to be considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure i

site personnel or damage plant property,

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, HU4 j l

l D-47

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRFJEXPI,OSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affectiny ::he Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or hiaintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING AIODE APPLICABILITY: hiode 1 (Power Operation) hiode 2 (Startup) hiode 3 (Hot Standby) hiode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. CAS

. Doghouses

. FWST AND

b. One of the following:

• Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

• Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

D-48

Catawba Nuclear Site BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be

considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of

, smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities of smoke and heat are j observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a i lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

l Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA2 s

D-49

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRF/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITV EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or hiaintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: hiode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Afode 6 (Refueling)

Eh1ERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.2-I The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. CAS

. FWST AND

b. One of the following:

. Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance e Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of i

{

) D-50

Catawba Nuclear Site a

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

! observed. The inclusion of a " report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a

lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires / explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire / explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire / explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire / explosion and to discriminate against minor fires / explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs. l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA2 e

t I

l D-51

l l

Catawba Nuclear Site FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.31 Intrusion into plant protected area by a hostile force.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. A civil disturbance which penetrates the protected area boundary can be considered a hostile force. Intrusion into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA4 1

D-52

. . 1 l

l l

Catawba Nuclear Site l

FIRF1 EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant Vital Area. l OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.1-1 Intrusion into any of the following plant areas by a hostile force:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building l

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS l 4.6.S.1-2 Security confirmed bomb discovered / exploded in a vital area.

4.6.S.1-3 Security confirmed sabotage in a plant vital area.

BASIS:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in I the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to the Vital Area. l

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OU92, HS1 4

D-53

Catawba Nuclear Site FLP/F/ EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Loss Of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.G.1-1 Loss of physical control of the control room due to security event.

4.6.G.1-2 Loss of physical control of the SSF and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) due to security event.

BASIS:

This IC encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of vital area required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HG1 '

D-54

l Catawba Nuclear Site ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " strong motion accelerograph".

4.7.U.1-2 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " Peak shock annunciator".

4.7.U.1-3 Report by plant personnel of tornado striking within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

4.7.U.1-5 Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EALs 1&2: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored " Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a " felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthe,uake based on a consensus of control room operators, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentation occurs.

EAL 3: A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

D-55

Catawba Nuclear Site EAL 4: Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, helicopter, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Alert.

EAL 5: Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen I

cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the I missiles generated by the failure or by the radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the Radiological ICs or Fission Product Barrier ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HU1 ,

l NOTE: NUMARC EAL #5 moved to Fire / Security Recognition Category l

l D-56

Catawba Nuclear Site j NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect safe operation of the plant.

4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

HASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.).

Gases within the owner controlled area that are below life threatening or flammable concentrations do not meet this EAL.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HU3 D-57

. . j l

Catawba Nuclear Site i NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY l l

UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency i Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.U.3-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF l Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. l l

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HUS l

l D-58

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTIIER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETV ALERT 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.A.1-1 Valid seismic accelerations greater than the operating basis earthquake (OBE):

0.08 g horizontal OR 0.053 g vertical.

4.7.A.1-2 Tornado or high winds:

Tornado striking plant structures within the vital area OR sustained winds 2 74 mph for > 15 minutes.

4.7.A.1-3 Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle crashes or other catastrophic events causing visible structural damage on any of the following plant structures:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pumphouse

. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

. Doghouses Central Alarm Station (CAS) 1

)

D-59

Catawba Nuclear Site BASIS:

EAL1: Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude (> OBE) can cause j damage to safety functions.

EAL 2: Based on the available instrumentation ( 90 mph maximum range) and the FSAR design 4

basis. which is 95 mph Wind loads of this magnitude (74 mph hurricane force winds) are approaching speeds that could cause damage to safety functions.

l 1

EAL 3: This EAL is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. This list of areas includes areas containing i

safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, l consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing l safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of l the plant.

i

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01192, HAl i

D-60

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown. l OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION 1 EVELS:

4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel, j l

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for above EALs:

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. RN Pumphouse

. Control Room

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS 1

l HASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems / components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 0992, HA3 D-61

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: i 4.7.A.3-1 Evacuation of the control room and control is, or is in the process of being, established from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) or the SSF.

l HASIS: l l

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain NCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HA5 i

1 i

D-62

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, OH92, HA6 D-63

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the ASP or the SSF within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the determination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event,if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HS2 D-64

l

. l Catawba Nuclear Site j NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS  !

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All

. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. '

l BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HS3 d

r D-65

Catawba Nuclear Site NATURAL DISASTERS. IIAZARDS AND OTIIER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICAHILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate:

e actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment OR e potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guideline levels outside the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUM S CC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, HG2 D-66

1 ENCLOSURE 3 Catawba Procedure RP/0/A/5000/01,

" Classification of Emergency" 1

, RP/0/A/5000/01 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY l

1.0 SYMPTOMS l l

1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the  ;

public.

1.3.2 Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

1.4 General Emergency 1.4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

1.4.2 Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelme exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

I

\

i

~ RP/0/A/5000/01 l Page 2 of 2 l 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

)

2.1 Detennine operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred pnor ,

to any protection system or operator action initiated in response of the event.

l 2.2 If the plant was in Mode 1-4 and a valid condition affects fission product barriers, then proceed to Enclosure 4.1.

2.3 If the condition does not affect fission product barriers, then review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.

2.4 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Levels listed, l then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

2.5 Implement the applicable Emergency Response Procedure (RP) for that classification and continue with subsequent steps of this procedure.

Notification of Unusual Event RP/0/A/5000/02 Alert RP/0/A/5000/03 l

Site Area Emergency RP/0/A/5000/04 General Emergency RP/0/A/5000/05 3.0 SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To escalate, de-escalate, or terminate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosures J.; through 4.7.

3.2 Refer to enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declar. tion Guidelines, as needed.

4.0 ENCLOSURES 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 Systems Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power 4.6 Fires / Explosions and Security Events 1

4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions l Affecting Plant Safety l 4.8 Definitions / Acronyms 4.9 Emergency Declaration Guidelines l

l

RPMA500001 Enclosure S.1 -

Page 1 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table below.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

No'r 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMislNENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT Loss Situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Unusual Event (1 - 3 Points) Alert (4 - 6 Points) Site Aree Emeroency (7 - 10 Points) General Emeroency (11 - 13 Points)

. Any Potential Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of the . Loss of both NCS and Fuel Clad . Loss of any three barriers NCS

. Any Loss of Containment . Any Potential Loss or Loss of Fuel . Potential Loss of both NCS and Fuel . Loss of any two barriers and the Clad Ctad Potential Loss of the third barrier

. Potenial Loss of either the NCS or Fuel Ctad and Loss of any additional banier NOTE: Take highest points for each barrier and add together in chart below. Do not take more than one number for each barrier. "Not applicables' are included in this table as place holders only, and no points are assigned.

Containment TOTAL POINTS NCS 1-3 Unusual Event 4-6 Alert Fuel Clad 7-10 Site Area Emergency 11-13 General Emergency Total Points

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.1 -

Page 2 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS-(1 LOSS -(3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS-(4 LOSS -(5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS-(4 LOSS -(5 Points)

Pobt) Pobb) Pobb)

1. CrtucalSelety Func5on Status 1. Crincal Salsty Funcilon Status LCritical Safety Func9en Stahs

• Contamment*ED e Not appicable e NCSIntegntyRed

• Not applicable

• Core Coo 6ngOrange + Core CoolryRed

• Heat Smkaed

• Heat SokBed 1 Containment Conditions 2. NCS Leak Rate 2. Primary Cooient ActMtv Level

• Contamnent Pressure > 15 e Rapid unexplamed decreasein + Unisolableleak exceedng the e GREATER THAN available

• Not ap# cable o Coolart Acimty GREATER PSIG contammers pressure fotomng capactlyof one chargingpump makeup capacey asindcated THAN 30C pCi/cc Dose irstel merease in the normaldiagng mode by a loss of NCS subcoohng. Equivalert lodne (DEQ F131

+ H2 concentratxm > 9% mthletdown isolateti

• Contamment pressure or sump

• Contammert pressure greater levelresponse not consstert than 3 psig uth less than one wth LOCA conditons.

tut tram of NS and a VXf, ARF operateg.

L.Containmert isolation ValvetStraNIELContainment Isolation 3. SG Tube Ruoture 3. Containment Radiact Monitoring Ashmbon e Not apptcable

• Contammert isolation is

• Pnmary* Secondary leak rate + Indcaton that a SG a e Not appbcable

• Contamment radanon monect intximplete and a release path exceeds lhe capacay of one Ruptured and has a Non- 53A or 538 vendng >117 Rtr from contamment exists chagng purgin tie normal isolable secondaryline fault chargng mode wth letdown isolated

• kidcanon that a SGis Ruptured and a prolonged release of contammated secondary coolartis occumng from the anecied SGio the enwonment

4. SG Secondary $1de Reiessaylth PrhteSecondary Leni tage 4. Containment Radiation Monitoring 4. Emeroency CoordinatordEOF Director Judooment e Nct apphcable e Release elseconda'y sede to e Not apphcable

• Unplanned Valid Trp I alarm

• Any condt!an includng mabikty to monitor the bamer. that m the opston at atmosphere uth pnmary to on EMFs 38. 39 or 40 the Emergency CoordnatoriOF Orector inciates LOSS or POTENTIAL secondaryleakage GREATER LOSS of the FuelCad bemer THAN Tech Spec allowable LND

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.1 -

Page 3 of 3 CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX CONTAINMENT BARRIER NCS ' BARRIER FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -(5 Points)

(1 Point) (4 Points) ~ (4 Points)

Nye Inventory in Containment 5. Emoqpener CoordinatorEOF Director Judgement

• Contanment Rad Monitor o Not appkable Any condton, bdudng r.at@y to monitor te barner, mar b me gnon d me EMF 53A or 53B Emergency CoordnatorEOF Dwedor becates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of Rea&g 0 nme ance me NCS bamer.

shuttbut

>470 Rtr 0 0-Of hr END

>170 Rtr 0 0.5-2 tr

>125 Riir 0 2-4 hr

> 90 Rtr 0 4 8 hr

> 53 Rtr 0 > 8 hr

6. Cars Ce9 Hog

. Core coorrg MD pam is e Nd appicatde becated for > 15 min.

7. Emeroency Coordinator / EOF Director Judaement

• Any condton, bdudng mability to marvtor the bamer, that in the opnon d the Emergency CoordnatorEOF Drector indcates a LOSS or POTENTIALLOSS of theContammentbamer.

EllQ

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000/01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 -

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 1 of 2 ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY UNUSUAL EVENT END

1. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown 1. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety 1. Inability to Monitor a Significant Within Technical Specification Limits. System Annunciation or Indication in Transient in Progress.

Control Roo.n With Elther:

OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 or e Plant is not t:rought to required operating (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming

• The following conditions exist mode within Technical Specifications LCO Indicators Unavailable.

Action Statement Time. Unplanned loss of most (>50%)

OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 annunciators associated with safety

2. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

System Annunciation or Indication in The following u,s uuvn= exist the Control Room for Greater Then AND 15 Minutes. Unplanned loss of most (>50%)

annunciators associated with safety A significant plant t ansient is in OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 systems for greater than 15 minutes. progress.

e The following conditions exist AND AND Unplanned loss of most (>50%) in the opinion of the Operations Shift loss of the OAC.

annunciators associated with safety ManagerEmergency systems for greater than 15 minutes. CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of AND the annunciators orindicators AND requires additional personnel inability to provide manual (beyond normal shift complimer4) to monitoring, independent of the OAC in the opinion of the Operations Shift safely operate the unit. Critical Safety Function Status Tree ManagerEmergency program, of any one of the following CoordinatorEOF Director, the loss of AND Critical Safety Functions:

the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel EITHER of the following: e suberiticality (beyond normal shift compliment) to e core cooling safely operate the unit

• A significant plant transient is e heat sink in progress. . containment

3. Fuel Clad Degradation.

= Loss of the OAC.

OPERATING MODE: ALL E!E e Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than the E!E Technical SpecMication allowable limit

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A!5000M)1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.2 -

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

4. Reactor Coolant System (NCS)

Leakage.

OPCRATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 e Unidentified leakage 210 gpm o Pressure boundary leakage z 10 gpm o identified leakage 225 gpm

5. Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

• Loss of all onsite communications capability (intemal phone system PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

. Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling. NRC FTS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

ENE

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000/01 .

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3

• ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or 1. Any Unplanned Release of 1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an 1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an Liquid Radioactivity to the Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to Actual or Imminent Release of Actual or Imminent Releast of Environment that Exceeds Two Times the Environment that Exceeds 200 Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Times the SLC Ilmits for 15 TEDE or 500 mrem CDE Adult mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE Longer. Minutes or Longer. Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Duration of the Release. Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MCDE: ALL e a. A valid TRIP 2 alarm on radiation . a. A valid TRIP 2 alarm on radiation monitor EMF- 49L or EMF-57 monitor EMF- 49L or EMF-57 . A valid indication on radiation . A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of2 1.08 E+07 morutor EMF-36H of2 1.72 E + 04 j AND AND cpm cpm

b. Failure of the release path to b. Failure of the release path to . Dose assessment team calculations . Dose assessment tesm calculations automatically isolate automatically isolate indicate dose consequences indicate dose consequences j greater than 100 mrem TEDE or greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or AND AND 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at site boundary. the site boundary,

c. The liquid radioactive release to the c. The liquid radioactive release to the  !

environment exceeds two times the environment exceeds 200 times the . Analysis of field survey results or . Analysis of field survey results or SLC limit for 60 minutes or longer. SLC limit for 15 minutes or longer. field survey sampies indicates dose field survey samples indicates dose consequences consequences e A valid indication on radiation monitor . A valid Indication on radiation monitor greater than 100 mrem TEDE or greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or EMF- 36L of 21.08 E+04 cpm for 2 60 EMF- 36L of 21.08 E+06 cpm for 21 5 500 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at the 5000 mrem CDE Adult Thyroid at minutes. minutes. site boundary. the site boundary.

.* Gaseous effluent being released exceeds . Gaseous efflud being released exceeds Note 1: These EMF readings are calculated Note 1: These EMF readings are calculated two times SLC 16.11-1 for 2 60 minutes 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for 2 based on worst case average annual based on worst case average annual es determined by Radiation Protection 15 minutes as determined by RP meteorology, a sixty minute release duration, meteorology, a sixty minute release duration, (RP) procedure. procedure. and design unit vent flow rate. Calcutations by and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual the dose assessment team use actual e Liquid effluent being released exceeds . Liquid effluent being released exceeds meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate. meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate.

two times SLC 16.11-6 for 260 minutes 200 times the level of SLC 16.114 for 2 Therefore, these EMF readings should not be Therefore, these EMF readings should not be as determined by RP procedure. 15 minutes as determined by RP used if dose assessment team calculations are used if dose assessment team calculations are procedure. available. available.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/500041 -

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3 '

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Note: Note: Note 2: Note 2:

If the monitor reading is sustained for the time if the monitor reading is sustained for the time if dose assessment team calculations cannot if dose assessment team calculations cannot period indicated in the EAL gag the required period indicated in the EAL 30d the required be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor be completed in 15 minutes, then valid rnorutor assessments (procedure calculations) cannot assessments (procedure calculations) cannot reading should be used for emergency reading should be used for emergency ba completed within this time period, be completed within this time period, classification. classification.

declaration must be made based on the valid declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading. radiation monitor reading. END ENQ

2. Unexpected increase in Plant Radiation 2. Major Damage to irradiated Fuel or or Airborne Concentration. Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of OPERATING MOOE: ALL Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel e Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than f} inches in the OPERATING MODE: ALL reactor refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by e An unplanned valid trip it alarm on water, any of the following radiation monitors:

e Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge pool and fuel transfer canal with all 1 EMF-15 irradiated fuel assemblies remaining 2 EMF-4 covered by water.

Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation e Unplanned valid area EMF reading 1 EMF-42 increases by a factor of 1000 over normal 2 EMF-42 levels.

Reactor Building Refueling Bridge gNQ 1 EMF-17 2 EMF-2 Containment Noble Gas Monitor 1 EMF-39 2 EMF-39

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000M1 -

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.3 ~

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY e Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed rnakeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will becorne uncovered.

• NC system wide range level <95 %

after initiation of NC system snake-up AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel AND KF-122 cannot be closed.

3. Release of Radioactive Material or increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

+ Valid radiation monitor reading indicating greater than 15 mR/hr in the control room or PAP.

. Valid radiation rnonitor reading of >S R/hr in a plant vital area.

LND

l .

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000/01

( EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS Page 1 of 2 l

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY gND

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1. Failure of Reactor Protection System 1. Failure of the Reactor Protection Instrumentation to Complete or initiate Instrumentation to Complete or initiate System to Complete an Automatic Trip an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a en Automatic Reactor Trip Once a and Manual Trip was NOT Successful Reactor Protection System Setpoint Reactor Protection System Setpcint and There is indication of an Extreme Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip Challenge to the Ability to Cool the WAS Successful WAS NOT Successful. Core.

OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3 OPERATING MODE: 1 OPERATING MODE: 1

= The following conditions exist . The following conditions exist . The following conditions exist Valid reactor trip signal received Valid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip signal received u or required, received or required. required.

AND AND AND Manual reactor trip from the control Manual reactor trip from the control Manual reactor trip from the control room js successful and reactor room wpg nQt successfulin reducing room was not successfulin reducing power is less than 5% and reactor power to less than 5% and reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing. decreasing. decreasing.

2. Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold 2. Complete Loss of Function Needed to AND Shutdown. Achieva or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

EITHER of the following conditions OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3.4 exist

. Totalloss of ND and/or RN and/or KC = Core Cooling CSF-RED . Core Cooling CSF-RED AND . Heat Sink CSF-RED . Heat Sink CSF-RED Inability to maintain reactor coolant . Suberiticality CSF-RED E temperature below 200 F.

g_N,,Q

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RPMA500041 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT AIART SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

3. Loss of Water Levelin the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel OPERATING MODE: 5, 6

• Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLtS) decreasing afterinitiation of NC system rnakeup.

+ Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range levelless than 11% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

• Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

EtlQ l .

o ,

h

. t CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000M)1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.5 i LOSS OF POWER Page 1 of 1 USUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Loss of AII9ffsite Power to 1. Loss of All.Offsite Power and Loss 1. Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss 1. Prolonged Loss of All f0ffsite and Essential Busses for Greater Then of All Onsite AC Power to of All Onsite AC Power to Onsite) AC Power.

15 Minutes. Essential Busses During Cold Essential Busses.

Shutdown Or Refueling Mode. OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 i OPERATING MODE: 5,6, No Mode . Prolonged loss of all offsite and

. The following conditions exist . Loss of all offsite and onsite AC onsite AC power as indicated by-  ;

. Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by-Loss of offsite power to essential power as indicated ty Loss of power on essential buses t buses ETA and ETB for greater than Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 ,

15 minutes. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB. minutes.

ETA and ETB.

AND AND AND AD Each emergency diesel generator is Failure to restore power to at least Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) l supplying power to its respective Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes. fails to maintain hot standby.  !

essential bus. one essential bus within 15 minutes.

2. Loss of All Vital DC Power. AND

2. Unplanned Loss of Reauired DC 2. AC power to essential busses Power During Cold Shutdown or reduced to a single power source OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 At least one of the following Refueling Mode for Greater than for greater than 15 minutes such conditions exist 15 Minutes. that an additional single failure . The following conditions exist could result in station blackout. . Restoration of at least one ,

OPERATING MODE: 5, G Unplanned loss of both unit related essential bus within 4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 busses: EBA amd EBD both <112 hours is NOTlikety.

. The following conditions exist VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109

. The following condition exists: VDC. . Indication of continuing Unplanned loss of both unit related degradation of core cooling busses: EBA amd EBD both <112 AC power capability has been based on Fission Product VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 degraded to one essential bus AND Barrier monitoring.

VDC. powered from a single power source AND for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but Failure to restore power to at least N gN,,Q one of: one required DC bus within 15 Failure to restore power to at least SATA SATB minutes from the time of loss.

one required DC bus within 15 ATC ATD minutes from the time of loss. D/G A D/G B ENQ KNQ ENQ l

e ,

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/OfA/5000/01

• EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Fire or Explosion Within Protected 1. Fire or Explosion Affecting the 1. Security Event in a Plant Vital Area. 1. Security Event Resulting in Loss Of Area Boundary Not Extinguished Operability of Plant Safety Systems Abil ty to Reach and Maintain Cold Within 15 Minutes of Detection. Required to Establish or Maintain Safe OPERATING MODE: ALL Shutdown.

Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

• Intrusion into any of the following plant OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 areas by a hostile force:

e Fire in any of the following areas not

• Reactor Building

• Loss of physical control of the control extinguished within 15 minutes of control

• The following conditions exist

• Auxiliary Building room due to secunty event.

room notification or verification of a a Diesel Generator Rooms control room fire alarm. Fire or explosion in any of the following

• Control Room

• Loss of physical control of the SSF and areas:

• RN Pump House ASP due to security event

• Reactor Building

• SSF

• Auxiliary Building

• Reactor Building

• Doghouses EIE

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• Auxiliary Building

• CAS

• Control Room

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• RN Pump House

• Control Room

• Security confirmed bomb

+ SSF

• RN Pump House discovered / exploded in a vital area.

• CAS

• SSF

• Doghouses

• CAS

• Security confirmed sabotage in a plant

• FWST

• Doghouses vital area.

• Turbine Building

• FWST

• Service Bldg. END

+ interim Radweste Bldg. AND e Report by plant personnel of an One of the following:

unanticipated cuplosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible

• Affected safety system damage to permanent structure or parameter indications show equipment degraded @bu= rice I

e Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Note applies to Mode 1,2,3,4,5,6.

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

. - ~ _ ..

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000M11

• EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.6 FIRE / EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS Page 2 of 2  ;

UNUSUAL EVENT gy SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. Confirmed Security Event which Fire or Explosion Affecting the 2.

Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Level of Safety of the Plant. Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: - All 6 e Security confirmed bomb device s discovered within plant Protected Area and outside Vital Areas.

• The following conditions exist Fire or explosion in any of the fonowing e Hostage situation / extortion e A violent civil disturbance within the

• Reactor Building owner controlled area. . Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• Control Room

• RN Pump House i

• SSF

• CAS

• FWST AND Oneof thefollowing:

. Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

. Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

3. Security Event in a Pla".t Protected Area.

i OPERATING MODE: ALL e Area by intrusion into plant Protected a hostile force.

E!E

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/0/A/5000/01 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 1 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena 1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena 1. Control Room Evacuation Has Been 1. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Affecting the Protected Area. Affecting the Plant Vital Area. Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Judgement of the Emergency Established. CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

• Tremor felt and valid alarm on the " strong . Valid seismic accelerations greater than, OPERATING MODE: A'_L motion accelerograph*. the operating basis earthquake (OBE): . The following conditions exist

. Other conditions exist which in the e Tremor felt and valid alarm on the ' Peak 0.08 g horizontal Control room evacuation has been Judgement of the Emergency shock annunciator *. OR initiated. Coordinator / EOF Director indicate:

0.053 g vertical.

• Report by plant personnel of tomado AND (1) actual or imminent substantial core striking within protected area boundary. . Tomado or high winds: degradation with potential for loss cf Control of the plant cannot be containment, o Vehicle crash into plant structures or Tomado striking plant structures established from the ASP or the SSF systems within protected area boundary. within the vital area within 15 minutes. OR OR e Report of turbine failure resulting in casing sustained winds 2 74 mph for > 15 2. Other Conditions Existing Which in the (2) potential for uncontrolled radonuclide penetration or damage to turbine or minutes. Judgement of the Emergency releases. These releases can generator seals. CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant reasonably be expected to exceed

. Turbine failure generated missiles, vehicle Declaration of Site Area Emergency. Environrr' ental Protection Agency

2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases crashes or other catastrophic events Protective Action Guideline levels Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation causing visible structural damage on any OPERATING MODE: ALL- outside the site boundary.

of the Plant. of the following plant structures:

. Other conditions exist which in the EIS OPERATING MODE: ALL . Reactor Building Judgement of the Emergency

. Auxiliary Building Coordinator / EOF Director indicate actual e Report or detection of toxic or flammable . FWST or likely major failures of plant functions gases that could enter within the site area . Diesel Generator Rooms needed for protection of the public.

boundary in amounts that can affect safe . Control Room operation of the olant. . RN Pump House E!@

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP/QfA/500001 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 2 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY e Report by Local, County or State Officials 2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases for potential evacuation of site personnel Within a Facility Structure Which based on offsite event. Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations

3. Other Conditions Existing Which in the or to Establish or Maintain Cold Judgement of the Emergency Shutdown.

CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event. OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL = Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that

• Other conditions exist which in the will be life threatenina to plant personnel.

Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate a e Report or detection of flamrr.cble gases potentialdegradation of thelevelof safety within a Facility Structure in concentra-of the plant. tions where lack of access to the follow'og plant structures will affect the safe END operation of the plant

. Reactor Building

. Auxiliary Building

. Diesel Generator Rooms

. Control Room

. RN Pump House

. SSF

. Doghouses

. CAS

CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE RP10/A/500001 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Enclosure 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS, AND OTHER CONDITIONS Page 3 of 3 AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

3. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

= Evacuation of the control room and control is, or is in the process of being, established from the ASP or the SSF.

4. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency CoordinatorEOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE: ALL

+ Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator / EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and thatincreased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

END

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 1 of 3 DEFINITIONS / ACRONYMS ALERT- Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

BOMB- A fused explosive device CARF - Containment Air Return Fan CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

EPA PAG - Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for exposure to a release of radioactive material.

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components.

EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.

1 FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FUNCTIONAL - A component is fully capable of meeting its design function. It would be declared INOPERABLE if unable to meet Technical Specifications.

GENERAL EMERGENCY- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective l action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

1 HOSTAGE - A person or object held as leverage against the site to ensure demands will l be met by the site.

l HOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals present in a PROTECTED AREA without authorization that may have or have threatened to use force in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

l IMMINENT - Expected to occur within 1-3 hours.

RP/0/A/5000/01 ,

l Enclosure 4.8 Page 2 of 3 INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges / panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INOPERABLE - A component does not meet Technical Specifications. The component may be functional, capable of meeting its design.

INTRUSION / INTRUDER - Suspected hostile individual present in a PROTECTED AREA without authorization.

LOSS - A component is INOPERABLE and not FUNCTIONAL.

s PROLONGED - A duration beyond normallimits, defined as " greater than 15 minutes" or as determined by the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator.

PROTECTED AREA - Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence.

RUIrTURED (As relates to Steam Generator)- Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

S ABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

J SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the protected area, in which Duke Power Company has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments SECURITY EVENT - A security related emergency situation for which prompt response by the Security Force, immediate action by plant personnel, and/or assistance from offsite agencies may be required to apprehend intruders and mitigate the effects of or prevent radiological sabotage.

0 RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.8 Page 3 of 3 SUSTAINED - A duration of time long enough to confirm that the CSF is valid (not momentary).

TERMINATION - Exiting the emergency condition.

i TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE) - The sum of external dose exposure to radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine).

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNUSUAL EVENT- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1 ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment impartant for nuclear safety. Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been authorized to be in that area.

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.9 Page 1 of 2 EMERGENCY DECLARATION GUIDELINES THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS TO BE USED BY THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR IN ASSESSING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

• The Emergency Coordinator shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.

• The BASIS Document (located in Section D of the Catawba Nuclear Site Emergency Plan)is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

• If an event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, the event with the higher classification ,

will be classified on the emergency notification fort.; Information relating to the problem on the other unit will be captured on the emergency notification form.

• If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

• The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at (Mode 1-4) hot shutdown or higher. An event that is recognized at cold shutdown or lower (Mode 5 or 6)

. shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix. Reference would be made to i the additional enclosures that provide emergency action levels for specific events (e.g. severe weather, fire, security).

• If a transient event should occur, the following guidance is provided. )

1. Some emergency action levels specify a specific duration. For these EALs, the - j classification is made when the Emergency Coordinator assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e. condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

i

2. If a plant condition ex<.eeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is excee Jed, the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower Severity EALs, if an /, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3. If a plant conditu e xceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g. as a result of routine log or record review) and the condition no longer exists, an emergency shall NOT be declared. Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow-up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

RP/0/A/5000/01 Enclosure 4.9 i

Page 2 of 2

4. If an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification, the Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g. Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the an-shift personnel via activation of the Emergency Response Organization. The following are applicable:

a. For UNUSUAL EVENTS, the condition shall be reported. The event may be terminated in the same notification or in a follow-up notification.

b. For ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, ar.d GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.

DETERMINATION OF " EVENT TIME" (TIME THE 15 MINUTE CLOCK STARTS)

1. If plant conditions require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), increased emphasis shall be given to evaluation of plant conditions for  !

determination of EAL(s) when "kickout" of the diagnostic procedure occurs. " Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined.

2. If plant conditions do not require implementation of EP/l or 2/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Inje'ction), and conditions of a specific EAL are met, the " Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined.

- 3. The time the event is classified shall be entered on the initial emergency notification form.

MOMENTARY ENTRY INTO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION If, while in an emergency classification, the specified EALs of a higher classification are met momentarily, and in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator are not likely to recur, the entry into the higher classification must be acknowledged. Acknowledgment is performed as follows:

If this condition occurs prior to the initial notification to the emergency response organization and off site agencies, the initial message should note that the site is currently in the lower classification, but had momentarily met the criteria for the higher classification. It should also be noted that plant conditions have improved and stabilized to the point that the criteria for the higher classification are not '

l expected to be repeated.

4

- , -. 1

l 1

l l

ENCLOSURE 4 State and County Concurrence Letters

. i i Dube Pou'er Company

, ITU Box 1006 Charlotte. NC 282011906 DUKEPOWER November 21,1995 Mr. Billy Ray Cameron Mr. Stan McKmney NC Division ofEmergencyManagement SC Emergency Preparedness Division Mr. Bob Phillips Mr. Cotton Howell Gaston County Emergency Management York County Emergency Preparedness Mr. Wayne Broome Mr. Larry Dickerson Charlotte /Mecklenburg Emergency Mgmt. Iredell County Emergency Management Mr. Rick Spake Mr. Charles Moody Lincoln County Emergency Management Catawba County Emergency Management Gentlemen:

Duke Power is required by 10CFR50, Appendix E, Part IV.B, Assessment Actions, to discuss and agree upon Emergency Action levels (EALs) prior to implementation. Duke Power is proposing to convert to Emergency Action Levels based upon guidance contained in NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, which was approved by the NRC in Reg. Guide 1.101 Revision 3 in August 1992 as an acceptable substitute to the EAL Guidelines contamed in NUREG-OtiS4, Appendix I. These EALs are used as criteria for determmmg the need for notification and participation oflocal and state agencies and for deternumng when and what type of protective measures should be considered outside the site boundary.

I have provided the procedure (s) containmg the proposed NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, based Emergency Action Levels for McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Site (as appropriate for your agency), and ask that you review this dac-+ Upon completion of your review, please sign and return the attached sheeti ndic=*ing your concurrence with the EALs and providing any comments you may have. Please provide your response by December 1,1995.

If you have any questions, please call me at (704) 382-3151 or Gary Mitchell at (803) 831-3235. m Yours truly, f

'% As Tina Kuhr Nuclear Emergency Planning Consultant Attachment

-mme

Gije 9 tate of Bautly Garolina IRiliturg Eepartment OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL 8TANHOPE S. SPEARS u4 m oc w ant me awrwroewenat December 11,1995 Mr. Gary Mitchell Emergency Planning Manager Catawba Nuclear Station -

4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 SUBJEC 995 Catawba Nuclear Station EAL Review.

(j.r l

Dear . itch 11:

Enclosed is this agency's review and signature document for the subject EALs. Thank you for i the opportunity to comment.

Have a wonderful Christmas holiday.

.re -

fi P Tim Murphy Area 2, Coordinator l

l o

SMM:TM:tm C \TEXTOISMEMOCNSEALITR - "

Emergency Preparedness Division Rutledge Building 1429 Senate Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 (803) 734-8020 Fax (803) 734-8062

Review of Prooosed Emernency Action Imels (EALa) based uoor NUMARC/NESP 007 Rev. 2 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Imels for MeGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classification and protective action rex- = = M ons.

j g

)

N  : stan M. McKinnney. Director Agency: S C Emergency Preparedness Division

. Date: December 12. 1995 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Imcis for McGuue/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree thtt they are adequate for event classi6 cation and protective action rwwiradations except for the followmg canments:

COMMENTS:

Name-

^8ency:

Date:

e d

Beview of Proposed Emergency Action Levels 1E&)

based ucon NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev 2 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Act2on Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that dicy are adequate for event clanification and protective action recommendations.

Name: -- l Agency:h h5f. Of, d .

om: !2 M /9s ..

I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action i.evels for McGuise/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classifit.ation and protective action recommendatioits except for the following conunents:

COMMENTS - - . . - -

i Name: _ . . _ __ __

)

Agency: __ _ __

Date: . , _ . _ . _

l

Review of Prooosed Emernency Action Levels EALs) based uoon NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event clusification and protective action ICCommenAntions_ ,

Name: A k Agency: $1 om So . $m. k4 p{/

Date: Odl > / 8, /99'b I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classification and protective action recommendations except forthe following comments:

COMMENTS: 1 1

l l

Name:

Agency:

Date:

. . . . - . . . . . - . . - - . . . . - _ = _ . . - _ . - . . _. _ _ -

Review of Proposed Esauzy Action Levels EALs) based upon NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classification and protective action rg ....er h+ ions.

Name:

Agency: ,/0 l 4 (ou~h

.. Date: 1)-rF-fr I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site  ;

and agree that they are adequate for event classification and protective action rve - -r ** ions except for the followmg comments:

COMMENTS:

i I

l Name:

Agency:

Date:

i l

Review of Pror>osed Emernency Action Levels EALs) based uoon NUMARC/NESP-007 Rev. 2 I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classi6 cation and protective action reconunendations.

Name: MN Agency:dLAR/a b -[ h )c)Gy EM O 5

Date: II 2l' P*/ 9(

I have reviewed the proposed Emergency Action Levels for McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Site and agree that they are adequate for event classification and protective action recommendations except for the following comments:

COMMENTS:

l Name:

Agency:

Date:

a l

l

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