ML20114B915

Control of Heavy Loads TMI-1, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20114B915
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/27/1984
From:	Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML20114B906	List: ML20114B915
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-08086, TAC-8086, TER-C5506-397, NUDOCS 8501290634
Download: ML20114B915 (22)

Text

. ..._ _ _ _ _ l TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET NO. 'iG-289 FRC PROJECTC5506 NRCTAC NO. 08086 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-0341-130 FRCTASK ,397 t

Prepared by .

Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency inereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this soport, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

. Anw Prin'cipal Autfd/r V d f

• Department Director Date- $4/S'I Date: trinity Date-FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER '

LIVISION OF ARVIN/CALSPAN 12 0634 850111 20th and Race Streets. Phila.. Pa.19103 (215) 448-1000 P

ADOCK 05 y

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t TER-C5506-397 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTICN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review '. . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . -. . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . .- . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1' General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . ' 14 3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . . 17 3.2 Interim Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 REFERDiCES . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 19 l

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l TER-C5506-397 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (Office of Muclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the Nnc.

• Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

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1. INTRODUCTION

.l.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at General Public Utilities Nuclear's (GPUN) Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI Unit 1) . This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1],

Section 5.1.1 '

o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licenteng criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads, and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting

information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling ,

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systems at nuclear ~ power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical k tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines. identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that for load handling systens in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a' load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptatly amall. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria,

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{ A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their j,

probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

1. define safe load travel paths through pr'ocedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical,. heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel.or safe shutdown equipment i

2. provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 l of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a_ program be i

initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

e 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND i

j Cn June 26,1980, . the NRC issued a letter (3) to GPUN, the Licensee for TMI Unit 1, requesting that the Licensee. review provisions for handling and. ,

l- control of heavy loads at TMI Unit 1, evaluate these provisions with respect -

l to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an . independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.

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TER-C5506-397 GPUN provided the initial responses to this request on February 17, 1981 (4),

May 4, 1982 [5), February 21, 1984 [6], March 15, 1984 [7], August 16, 1984 (8], and November 11, 1984 [9]. All information received has been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.

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2. EVALUATION  !

l This section presents a point-by-pointi evaluation of load handling provisions at TMI Unit I with respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of .NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information.is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of comp).iancer including recossmended additional action where appropriate, is presektad. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

A 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the safe handling of heavy loads. They are

identified under the following topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Randling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane operator's Training

! Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design. l These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling systems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. - The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and an independent evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

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TER-C5506-397 2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems

a. ".

Su'a mary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal identified the following load handling systems to be subject to the ger,eral guidelines of NUREG-0612:

o reactor building polar crane o fuel handling building overhead crane.

Re.maining handlirig systems have been excluded on the basis that they do not carry heavy loads or that heavy loads are not carried in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or equipment required for safe shutdown. .

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's identification of load handling sys ems subject to the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 is acceptable.

Exclusion of the remaining handling systems is consistent with the cuidance of NUREG-0612 based on justification provided by the Licensee.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1))

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential' for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the shutdown reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe equipment.

The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Suneary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions f-The Licensee stated that load handling procedures in the reactor and fuel handling buildings include equipment layout drawings which clearly identify safe load handling areas for the designated loads. The safe load paths are Ti ---

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chosen to minimize the potential safety hazards due to impact of a' heavy load. : Any deviation from an approved procedure or load path requires that the revision be approved by the Plant Review Group and the Operations and Maintenance Director.

In lieu of physical markings, the Licensee intends to use a signalman who will inspect the load pathway prior to movement to verify it is clear of obstructions,

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Safe load paths have been developed and implemented in a manner consistent with that specified in Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612. Deviations from approved load paths are reviewed in an acceptable manner and use of a ,

signalman is an acceptable alternative to physical marking of building floors.

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures'(Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2))

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment...These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of loads the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee identified the following procedures for heavy loads lif ted in the reactor building (1504-4) installation of transfer canal seal plate and flood line cover plate (1504-7) closure head removal (1504-8) reactor upper plenum removal (if04-15) removal of core support assembly (1506-1) reactor upper plenum installation  ;

(1506-2) closure head installation i (1506-8) storage of transfer canal seal plate and flood'line cover' plate {

(1506-13) reinstallation of core support assembly (1509)  : reactor vessel missile shield handling

'(1508-1) incore instrumentation.-

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TER-C5506-397 The Licensee stated that these procedures satis'fy the requirements of Guideline 2 and contain the followings identification of proper handling equipment, defined load handling areas, precautions and prerequisites, training and qualification requirements, inspection verifications, prior-to-use inspections, supervisory requirements, and steps and proper sequence to be followed.

For the fuel handling building, the crane operating procedure (RP 1507-2) has been revised to require use of an' approved procedure for heavy loads -

handled within this region.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion 4

j Procedures in use at TMI Unit 1 are satisfactory on the basis that they I

contain information and guidance consistent with that identified in Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612.

I 2.1.4 Crane operator Training (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)]

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes'[10)."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Maintenance procedure MP-1406 " Crane Operator Qualifications" has been i

implemented for training and qualification of crane operators and complies with guidance provided in ANSI B30.2-1976. Training is conducted by both the training and maintenance department staffs and consists of classroom instruction and practical-factoes training. Annual retraining of operators'is ~

being developed to ensure that operators maintain satisfactory knowledge and skill levels.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion i

Training and qualification of crane operators at TMI Unit 1'is performed d

in a manner consistent with that specified in Guideline 3 of NUREG-0612.  !

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TER-C5506-397 2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612,' Section 5.1. l(4) ]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 ~ Pounds ~(4500 kg) . or More for Nuclear Materials' [ll] . ' This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy. loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section

- 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the inter-vening components of the special handling device (NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.l(4)]."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions -

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, The Licensee identified the following special lifting devices currently

! being used in the reactor building: .

o head and internals handling fixture with extension o turnbuckle pendants and head lifting pendants o internals handling adaptor o internals indexing fixture pendants. .

Although detailed design specifications-are not available from the original design, the Licensee has performed a detailed stress analysis of each device which indicates that all members and welds of each device satisfy the i

design stress criteria (inclusive of dynamic considerations) of ANSI N14.6-1978.

1 A comparison of as-built weld sizes to design sizes revealed that some of j

I the welds were smaller than the design specification. An analysis by the Licensee has been performed to determine if. existing welds comply with ANSI design safety factors. Evaluation of these welds was performed by comparing existing welds with original B&W calculations (32-1145001-00) for the TMI-2 head and internals handling fixture. Results indicate that the head and internals hand'11ng fixture meet the safety factor of 3 required by NUREG-0612, based on the following information: I

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1. One percent dynamic load factor was estimated for the crane design. l

2. Actual handling fixture weld sizes were used in the evaluation. '

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3. Unit 1 and Unit 2 handling fixtures are identical in all respects with

. the exception of weld sizes.

For the fuel handling building, special lifting devices for the spent fuel shipping casks and resin casks will be provided when shipments are anticipated. Appropriate procedural changes will be made to ensure that these devices will comply with ANSI N14.6-1978 before they are used.

To ensure that these devices provide continued load handling reliability, the Licensee made a commitment to implement an inservice inspection program so that all load bearing welds will be examined over a 10-year period, using standard inservice inspection techniques for periodic inspections.

b. Evaluation Although not originally built in accordance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, it is apparent from information provided by the Licensee that these devices will provide a degree of load _ha'dling n reliability consistent with that provided by the ANSI standard. Stress analyses performed and evaluation of undersized welds indicate that all devices satisfy design margins that are specified. Commitment by the Licensee to perform nondestructive examination (NDE) of load bearing welds over an inservice inspection period is also acceptable based upon the controlled environment and limited frequency of use of these devices,

c. Conclusion Design of special lif ting devices at TMI Unit 1 and programs which assure their continued reliability are consistent with guidance identified in Guideline 4.

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5)I ~

• Lifting devices that are not. specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings'

[12). However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces the on. . . . ..... . . . . - . . . - . . _ - _ - . . . - . - .  :, . . . . _

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maximum static and dynamic load. 'Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes .

with.which they may be used."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

. Guidance for the selection and use of. slings is provided in load handling

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procedures and maintenance procedure (MP) 1408- 6, which details prior-to-use inspection requirements. MP 1408-6, based on ANSI B30.9-1971 and other' ANSI standards,_ identifies sling examination and acceptance criteria for continued use. Individual load

• handling procedures require:that all slings be inspected

- prior to use. Selection of slings is based upon static loading. By analysis, i

' dynamic load factors have been Setermined to be less than 74; therefore, the

Licensee concluded that the additional dynamic load will have a minor effect a

and may be disregarded.

b.. Evaluation and Conclusion Selection and use of slings at TMI Unit 1 are satisfactory on the basis

that programs and procedures in use are based upon criteria contained in ANSI I ' B30.9-1971. Further, dynamic joad considerations may be disregarded on the i

basis that these loads are a minor percentage of the overall static loads.

!- 2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612,

! Section 5.1.1(6)1 "The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with j Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the i

exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use '

when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI.B30.2 for periodic inspection and_ test, or where frequency of crane use is less f.

than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane 7

inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during i refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power -

l_ .opration. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be L

performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections,_ tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their i

use.)." ,

i a. Summary of t,icensee Statements and conclusions

! Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2 has been invoked and reviewed by GPU Nuclear at -

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.TMI Unit 1. Implementation of the requirements of this standard is in progress in all applicable areas and is to be completed prior to reactor operation.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Inspection, testing, and maintenance of cranes at TMI Unit 1- are considered to satisfy the criteria of Guideline 6, on the basis that the program is based upon ANSI B30.2-1976, 2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline - 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1. l(7) )

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travell'ing Cranes' [13). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Both the reactor building and fuel building cranes were built in accordance with EOCI-61 " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes," prior to the issuance of CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976. However, existing design of both cranes has been evaluared against the more restrictive requirements of CMAA-70, as summarized in the following paragraphs:

1. Torsional forces. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the. horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis '

of the distance between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the force vector.

BOCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated with reference to the girder center of gravity. For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this review), the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements. Such is not the case for nonsymmetrical girder sections (e.g., channels) .

Nonsymmetrical girders were not used on either crane; therefore, torsional forces are not an issue.

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l TER-<5506-397 2.. Longitudinal stiffeners. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1 specifies (1) .the maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the

' location and minimum moment of inertia for such. stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. -Both cranes satisfy the requirements for. maximum h/t 4 ratios, minimum moments of inertia, and stiffener. location.

3. Basic allowable stresses. EOCI-61 is more conservative than CMAA-70 for allowable tension, compression, and shear stresses if b/c is less than 38 (b is distance between web plates and c is the thickness of l the cover plate). Both cranes satisfy CMAA-70 criteria.

4.- Fatique considerations.- CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides ..

j substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating l

} allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints I under repeated loads. EOCI-61 does'not address fatigue failure.

-since the number of cycles for any crane number is expected to be less than 2000, cycle . fatigue failure is not expected to be of l consequence for either crane.

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5. Hoisting rope. CMAA-70 , specifies a 5:1 hoisting rope' safety factor i for the rated load plus bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope. Rope safety factors for the main and auxiliary h'oists of j both cranes exceed 5:1 and are in compliance irith CMAA-70.

! 6. Drum design. CMhA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires thati the drum be -

A designed to withstand combined crushing' and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load, '

bending and crushing loads, with no stipulation that these loads be-

cousined. Standard design practices of the manufacturer of both cranes (Whiting) consider combined loadings.

7. Drum design. CmA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. Drum groove depth and pitch on both cranes comply with the recommendations of CMAA-70.

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{: 8. Hoist brake design. CMhA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist

holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than i mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor

torque. 'EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without-regard to the type of control brake employed. . Eddy current control braking is used for both cranes, and brake torque rating is greater than 125% of the hoist motor torque.

9. static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantiai.

. guidance for the use of' static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. Both cranes use DC

(- magnetic control systems and CMAA-70 concerns are not applicable.

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i 10. Restart protection. CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not.

equipped,with spring-return controllers or momentary-contact '

pushbuttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted I

until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. Pendant

} controllers for both cranes have spring-return pushbuttons'in accordance with CMAA-70. Cab control switches for the fuel handling building crane will be modified to install spring-return pushbuttons. '

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion i

j Although not originally built in accordance with' CMAA-70, it is apparent .

fr am the Licensee's review and evaluation of CMAA-70, that many .of the more restrictive design features were incorporated by the original manufacturers.

Therefore, design of the fuel handling building crane and the reactor building

crane is considered to be consistent with that specified in Guideline 7. .

2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES

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The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be' implemented

at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no

heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist ~

l to ? educe the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training ~and Guideline 6, Cranes 4

(Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interin measures cover the following criteria:

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1. Heavy load technical specifications i 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over-the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, j Section 5.3. (1))

i "Licensas for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof -

overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include

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. a' specification comparable to Standard Technical specification ~3.9.7, -

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' Crane Travel ~- Spent Fuel. Storage. Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy.the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0612)."

a. Susmary of Licensee Statements and' Conclusions TMI-l Technical Specification 3.11.6 limits the movement of loads in excess of 3,000 pounds over the spent fuel pool by the following administra-tive controls: (1) the center of mass of loads is maintained below an

~

elevation of 348 feet (surface edge of the spent fuel pool); or (2) the center

, of mass is maintained at such a distance from the edge of the spent fuel pool

. hat, should a load be released, the center of mass of the load would be at.

least 6 feet from the edge of any pool containing irradiated fuel.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Technical specifications implemented to limit movements of heavy loads over spent fuel in the spent fuel pit are consistent with those identifieil in Interim Protection Measure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative Controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5) )

" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...

can be accomplished in a short time ' period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0612]."

s. Susmary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Susanaries of Licessee statements and conclusions are contained in

,- discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2,

. 2.1.3, and 2.1.4.

b. Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations Evaluations, conclusions, and recomunendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2,

_.2.1.3, and 2.1.4.

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. 1 TER-C5506-397 .

2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core- [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (6)I

"...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personne1'fot the handling of heavy loads ove r the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."

4

a. Evaluation

• TMI Unit i review of procedures outlined in General Guideline 2 is considered to be performed in sufficient detail to be acceptable. Inspections performed in accordance with General Guidelines 4, 5, and 6 are sufficient to satisfy interim protection measures. Crane operator training programs outlined in General Guideline 3 are sufficient for this interim protection measure.

b. Conclusion Licensee actions to satisfy general guidelines requirements are sufficient to meet the requirements of this interim measure.

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TER-C5506-397

3. CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at TMI Unit 1. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection-(NUREG-0612, Section 5.3). ,

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage egaipment l

required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator . training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at TMI Unit 1 can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 IlfrERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has established certain measures (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) that should be initiated te provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy.

loads will be performed in a safe nanner until implementation of the general guidelines of ,NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of w ._ _ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,

J

TER-C5506-397 heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator trainings and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. Actions needed to satisfy NUREG guidelines for safe load paths.have been previously addressed in Section 3.1 of this evaluation. Evaluation of the information provided by the Licensee indicates that the Licensee substantially complies with the staff's measures-for interim protection.

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, 4. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants

1 if NRC

2. V._Stello, Jr. (NBC)

Letter'to all Licensees

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, May 17, 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (MRC)

Letter to H. D. Hukill (Met Ed)

Subjects' NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel at TMI-l NRC, June 26, 1980 -

4. H. D. Hukill (Met Ed)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Subject:

Response to NRC Pequest for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads at TMI-l Metropolitan Edison, Feb. 17, 1981 -

5. H. D. Hukill (GPUN)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (UNSRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads May 4, 1982

6. H. D. Hukill (GPUN)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (UNSRC) l

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads February 21, 1984

7. H. D. Hukill (GPUN)

Letter.to D. G. Eisenhut (USNRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads March 15,_1984 I 8. H. D. Hukill (GPUN)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (USNBC)

)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads August 16, 1984

9. Cask Drop Analysis for Fuel Handling Building Metropolitan Edison Technical Data Report No.142, Rev.1.

Metropolitan Edison, May 13, 1980 i

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