ML20101B674

Proposed Tech Specs Bases 3/4.9.7, Crane Travel - Spent Fuel & Upper Containment Fuel Storage Pools

ML20101B674
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	05/29/1992
From:	ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20101B671	List: ML20101B668 ML20101B674
References
NUDOCS 9206040270
Download: ML20101B674 (2)

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. ~ Attachment to GNRO- 92/00C58

,. Page 1 of 2 1-l l*

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. d /4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS j . BASES 3/4,9,1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH

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i Locking the OPERABLE-reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position,

! as specified, ensures t.%t the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These

conditions reinforce t' e refueling' yocedures and reduce the probability of

inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and r exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

i 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATIM i Tha OPERABILITV of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant

monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition j of the core.

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j 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R00 POSITION

! The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE

! ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control 3 rod.

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( 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME

! The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement

ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assump-

! tions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.,9.5 COMMUNICATIONS l The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station i personnel can be promptly informed of-significant changes in the facility status

! or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure 7

vessel.

i-3/4.9.6 REFUELING E0VIPMENT The OPERABILITY-requirements ensure that (1) only the main hoist of the

!. refueling platform or the main hoist of the fuel handling platform will be used 4

for handling fuel assemblies within the reactor pressuru vessel,- (2) platform l hoists have sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and/or control

. rods, (3) the core internals-and pressure vessel are protected from excessive 3 lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting

! operations, and (4) a-fuel bundle is protected frc~ excessive lifting force j_ in the event it becomes stuck during lifting operh~lons.  ;

i-I 9206040270 920529 6 DR ADOCK 0500 GRAND GULF-UNIT I B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 88 i

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I Attachment to GNRO-92/00058 i Page 2 of 2 .

REFUELING OPERATIONS -

BASES j k 9.7 CRANE TRAVtt - SPENT FUEL AND UPPER CONTAINMENT FVEL STORAGE P0O The restriction on the movement of a nonfuel load defined as a heavy load in NUREG-0612 over fuel assemblies in the storage pools ensures that in the event 4 that this load is dropped (1) that activity release will be bounded by the activity

• release in the safety analyses, and (2) any possible distortion of the fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array.

3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9 1 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WA!ER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL AND UPPER CONTAINNENT FUEL STORAGE PG L l The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that suffich.mt water depth

, is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from

the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.10 CONTROL R00 REMOVAL i These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or a

control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specification provides for the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully

withdrawn.

344.9.11 RES10 VAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION An OPERABLE residual heat removal (RHR) system shutdown cooling mode train consists of at least one OPERABLE RHR pump and cne OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger train.

i The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop be OPERABLE and in operation or that an alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat

and rnintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140'F as required during REFUELING, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation would be available through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication and to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison in the event it becomes

necessary to actuate the standby liquid control system.

i The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops OPERABLE when there is less than 22 feet 8 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 22 feet 8 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. ihus, in the event a failure of the op vating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay

, heat removal or emergency procedures to cool the core.

< GRAND GULF-UNfT 1 B 3/4 9-2

! Amendment No. lQ  !

Safety Evaluation 015-92 l*

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