Text

Associated Circuits Analysis
	ML20100A028
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/30/1984
From:	; LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20100A017	List: ML20100A028; W3P84-3325, Forwards Associated Circuits Analysis, for Review,Per Util 840517 Commitment.Study Addresses NRC Concerns Re Spurious Actuation Raised During Fire Protection Special Safety Insp 50-382/84-20 on 840409-13;
References
	NUDOCS 8412030429
	Download: ML20100A028 (100)
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ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS I

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT. COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 le

_ ESSER 30. m.

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L TABLE OF CONTENTS o

Lau 1.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 1

1.1 Introduction 1

2 1.2 Purpose 2

1.3 Scope 1.4 Definitions 2

I 1.5 Discussion 3

2.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - INDIVIDUAL PLANT FIRE AREAS 10 2.1 Identification of Equipment 10 2.2 Determination of Essential Cables 10 2.3 Determination if a Single Fire Can Cause a Loss Of Safe Shutdown Capability 10 I

2.4 Results 11 3.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - ISOLATION PANEL FIRE 12 3.1 Assumptions 12 3.2 Methodology 12 3.3 Results 12 4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE 14 4.1 Discussion 14 I

4.2 Assumptions 14 4.3 Methodology 15 I

4.4 Results 17 5.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - CONCLUSION 19 I

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LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO.

DESCRIPTION 1.5-1 Systen Review 1.5-2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Equipment List 2.4-1 Impacted Safe Shutdown Components-Individual Plant Area Fires 3.2-1 Essential Co::.ponents - Isolation Panel Fire l

3.2-2 Non-Essential Components - Isolation Panel Fire 3.3-1 Balance of Components Interfacing with Isolation Panel j

lW 4.4-1 Control Roo=/ Cable Vault Fire - Results ATTACH 3EST NO.

I A-1 Sa ple - Failure liodes and Ef fects Analysis I

A-2 Sample - Cable Dispositioning For I

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L 1.0 ASSOCIA_TED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 1.1 INIR0DUCfl0N 10CFR50, Appendix R and Branch Technical Position AFCSB 9.5-1 require protection of safe shutdown capability to ensure that at least one means of achieving and naIntaining safe shutdown condit f ons is available during and after any postulated fire in the plant.

LP&L previously analyzed a full spectrum of postulated exposure fires involving in-situ and transient combustibles to ensure that the necessary systems and components are available to achieve and nalntain safe shutdown regardless of the location of a plant fire, with or without the availability of offsite power. This analysis, as documented in Appendix 9.5A of FSAR Subsection 9.5.1, was evaluated and found satisfactory in I

the Waterford-3 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG 0787) as supplemented.

During the week of April 9-13, 1984, the NRC conducted a Fire Protection Audit at Waterford-3. This included a review of the originally submitted associated circuit analysis. The NRC defines associated circuits as those which have a common power scurce with safe shutdown equipment, a common enclosure with safe shutdown equipment, or whose spurious i

operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability. During the audit, the NRC indicated that they did not concur with the previously I

approved FSAR assumptions in regard to the last category of associated circuits. As a result, LP&L committed to perform an analysis to consider the effects of fire-induced spurious maloperations. The analysis was to be plant-wide and was to include the effect of a total Control Room fire. Any corrective actions required as a result of this analysis are to be completed prior to start-up following the first refueling outage as agreed upon at the LP&L/NRR meeting in Bethesda, MD on May 2,1984.

This report addresses the concerns raised by the Fire Protection Audit on I

associated circuits. The report is discussed in four sections:

1)

The Associated Circuits Analysis, which contains the overall approach and information common to all the postulated fire conditions, 1

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Tha Individual Plent Fira Are:c, 3)

The Isolation Panel, and a

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The Control Room /Cabic Vault.

1.2 PURPOSE To identify circuits whose fire-induced maloperation can cause safe shutdown equipment or non-safe shutdown equipment to malfunction such that safe plant shutdown could be adversely affected.

1.3 SCOPE The Associated Circuits Analysis shall evaluate the effects of spurious I

signals (i.e., hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground) on the operation of systems / equipment / components required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The following items shall be considered within the scope of this analysis:

1)

All systems / equipment / components required to maintain hot standby conditions; 2)

All systems / equipment / components required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions; 3)

All systems / equipment / components not required for safe shutdown but whose circuits when subjected to a fire induced maloperation may affect the operation of safe shutdown equipment.

The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary components which provide a high pressure / low pressure interface boundary have been previously analyzed and are discussed in Appendix 9.5A of FSAR Subsection 9.5.1 and are not I

within the scope of this report.

1.4 DEFINITIONS 1.4.1 Maloperation 9

The failure of a component to perform its proper function due to hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground induced by a fire.

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1.4.2 Syurious Actuation i

The postulated fire-induced maloperation of a component.

1.4.3 Hot Standby l

A plant operational mode, as defined by the Technical Specifications, l

where the reactivity condition (K,ff) is less than 0.99; the percent of rated thermal power (excluding decay heat) is equal to zero; and the average reactor coolant temperature is greater than or equal to 350*F (Mode 3).

1.4.4 Cold Shutdown A plant operational mode, as defined by the Technical Specifications, where the reactivity condition (K,ff) is less than 0.99; the percent of rated thermal power (excluding decay heat) is equal to zero; and the average reactor coolant temperature is less than or equal to 200*F (Mode 5).

D 1.4.5 Exposed Circuits A circuit which is not protected in accordance with the requirements of Subsection III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

1.5 DISCUSSION 1.5.1 Assumptions The following assumptions have been applied to the Associated Circuits Analysis; a description of more limiting assumptions specific to the individual analyses is provided in the appropriate sections of this report.

1.

No single active failures occur; 2.

No other plant accidents are assumed to occur except as precipitated by the postulated fire; 3

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A defense in-depth epproach shall be taken as dictated in Appendix R.

However, it is assumed that the postulated fire

[O stsrted and is net vrempt1r extiesuished b7 the cembieetien ef automatic suppression and detection systems or manual

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Systems shall be analyzed considering the availability of either on-site or off-site power, whichever produces the most limiting effects; i

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For each fire area where exposed circuits provide automatic functions, assume all such automatic functions are retained or lost (whichever produces the worst-case results) regardless of whether such loss is derived from open circuits, hot shorts or shorts-to-ground. Consequently, detrimental effects resulting from automatic functions operating as designed will be considered; 6.

Although all co=ponents whose maloperation could possibly affect h

essential systems are analyzed, only one spurious actuation is considered to occur at a time; I

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'f a fire causes electrical shorts or overloads, protective devi'as are assumed to function properly except for those affe cted by the postulated fire; 8.

For _omponents required to achieve and maintain HOT STANDBY, manual operation of equipment (i.e., valves, switches, circuit bres ers, etc.) shall be considered an acceptable means of operr. ting equipment and isolating systems provided it can be demcastrated that sufficient time and manpower is available; 9.

Ic croponents required to achieve and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN, manual operation of equipment (i.e., valves, switches, circuit breakers, etc.) shall be considered an acceptable means of operating equipcent and isolating systems. In addition, the removal of fuses, lif ting of conductors, addition of jumpers, replacement of cable, etc., are considered acceptable. Also, 4

L selected cquipm:nt replecrmint (e.g., v21va, pump, contrci switch, instrument, etc.) shall be considered acceptable if the replacement can be accomplished within appropriate time restraints. The above repairs must be achievable prior to the maloperation causing an unrecoverable plant condition; i

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Local operation of cold shutdown equipment, where available, is assumed possible since the postulated fire is assumed to be

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extinguished prior to commencement of COLD SHUTDOWN; I

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Application of stray three phase voltage to a damaged three phase feeder is considered a noncredible event.

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One train of equipment necessary to achieve HOT STANDBY has been protected or relocated, as identified in the Safe Shutdown Analysis, so that it is free of fire damage by a single fire.

1.5.2 Approach The analysis is performed such that the following performance goals are met when a fire is postulated concurrent with the availability or unavailability of off-site power:

(1) Reactor Reactivity Control (2) Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory Control (3) Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (4) Reactor Heat Removal

( 5) Process Monitoring (6) Supporting Functions 1.5.2.1 Reactor Reactivity Control 9

In accordance with the technical specifications, the reactor reactivity control function will provide sufficient shutdown margin to ensure that:

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The reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 3

The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are contro11abic within acceptable limits, and The reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

The two means of reactivity control are control rods and soluble boron addition from the Refueling Water Storage Pool (RWSP) or the Boric Acid Make-up Tanks (BAMTs) using the charging path.

I 1.5.2.2 Reactor Coolant Syetem Inventory Control The reactor coolant system inventory control function will ensure that suf ficient make-up inventory is provided for:

Reactor coolant system fluid losses due to reactor coolant system leakage as allowed by the technical specifications, Pressurizer heat losses, and Shrinkage of the reactor coolant inventory during cooldown.

Adequate performance of this function can be accomplished by maintaining reactor coolant level within the pressurizer. Make-up inventory is provided from the RWSP or the EAMTs through the charging system.

1.5.2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor coolant pressure control ensures that (1) reactor coolant system integrity is maintained by preventing overpressurization, (2) fuel cladding integrity is protected by restricting cooldown to within the nucleate boiling region and (3) sufficient sub-cooling margin is provided to prevent void formation within the reactor vessel.

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u RCS pressure can he maintained by controlled energization of tha pressurizer heaters or by controlled use of the charging system.

Overpressurization of the RCS is prevented by the pressurizer safety valves. Af ter depressurization, when the RCS is aligned with the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS), overpressure protection is pro /ided by SDCS suction relie f valves. RCS pressure-temperature limits are I

maintained by controlling cooldown. Adequate subcooled margin is achieved and maintained by controlling the cooldown rate using the RCS pressure and temperature instrumentation, and by maintaining RCS inventory control.

I 1.5.2.4 Reactor Heat Renoval I

The reactor heat removal function is capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified I

acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. Following a reactor trip with an assumed loss of off-site power, decay heat is initially removed by natural circulation of the RCS, heat transfer to the main steam system through the steam generators, and operation of the main steam Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). The emergency feedwater system (EW) will supply feedwater to the steam generators. Feedwater may be supplied to the steam generators by the motor-driven emergency feed pump or by the eteam turbine-driven emergency feed pump.

I After cooldown to shutdown entry conditions, the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) is used to establish long-term core cooling by rejecting RCS decay heat thr augh the SDCS heat exchangers.

I 1.5.2.5 Process Monitoring I

The process monitoring function is capable of providing direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform I

and/or control the previously identified functions.

Various process monitoring functions are available to achieve and maintain the reactor coolant make-up, pressure control and decay heat ip removal functions adequately. Maintenance of Hot Standby requires that 7

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I pressurizer icvel and RCS pressure inst runnentat ion be available. RCS temperature is maintained during Hot Standby by proper decay heat removal g

via steam generatora and main steam ADV's.

In the natural circulation mode of operation, the difference between the hot-leg and cold-leg wide range temperatures (T -T ) provides a direct Judication of a natural h c circulation condition.

RCS pressure is maintained by monitoring RCS pressure and hot-leg temperature (T ) instrumentation and by manual control of the h

pressurizer heaters. Maintenance of pressurizer icvel is achieved by monitoring pressurizer level instrumentatton and manual control of charging flow.

Maintenance of Hot Standby also requires the control of the secondary system to compensate for variations in the primary system performance.

Steam generator level and pressure are available to ensure adequate monitoring of controlled decay heat removal. Steam generator level is achieved by regulation of EW system flow, based on steam generator level indication. Steam generator pressure is monitored by controlled manipulation of secondary system pressure.

The transition from HOT STANDBY to COLD SHUTDOWN can use the instrumentation discussed above.

1.5.2.6 Support Functions The systems and equipnent used to perform the above functions require miscellaneous supporting functions such as process cooling and ac/dc power.

For the purpose of the fire scenarios, the various systems required to provide support to safe shutdown equipment or systems include:

The emergency power systems, including the diesel generator system and subsysteps, 1

The Component Cooling Water System, and The HVAC systems for areas containing safe snutdown equipment.

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I 1.5.3 Methodology _

l The Associated Circuits Analysis (ACA) was performed utilizing a multi-discipline approach identifying all individual components which interface with or are integral to essential systems required for safe shutdown on a fire area by fire area basis _. All plant systems, whether classified as non-safety related or safety related, interfacing with either Safety Train A, B or A/B, are within the scope of this review, l

Plant systems and individual components are identified as follows:

Essential to achieve and/or maintain safe shutdown (E) a.

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Non-essential but can have an effect on safe shutdown as a result of a spurious actuation or maloperation (NE*)

Non-essential having no effect at all on safe shutdown (NE).

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Each essential (E) system and each non-essential (NE*) system is analyzed component by component to determine what effect each component can have on an essential system or train. Table 1.5-1 identifies plant systems as E, NE* or NE.

Table 1.5-2 itemizes all the E and NE* components considered in this analysis. This Table 1.5-2 lists the equipment that can be used to meet the performance goals discussed in Subsection 1.$.2; NE* components are labelled as essential; support functions are listed for each component and both are treated as essential.

If component maloperation or spurious actuation can be damonstrated to have no effect on safe shutdown capability, it is documented as such and no further action is required. However, if this cannot be demonstrated, investigation into related circuitry and cabling commences. Pelated circuitry shall be identified to determine which cables can or cannot cause a spurious actuation or maloperation of the components when analyzed for a hot short, open circuit, and a short-to-ground. Cables that are fire-protected or those that are in the fire zone that have been determined not to be capable of causing a maloperation are appropriately documented and no further action is necessary. Those cables that can cause a component maloperation are then analyzed as discussed in Sections q

2.0, 3.0, and 4.0, to determine if any postulated fire condition can v'

cause a loss of safe shutdown capability.

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.I 2.0 ASSOCIATE.D CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - INDIVIDUAL PLANT FIRE AREAS 2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF EQUIPFINT The systems identified as needed for safe shutdown performance goals are reviewed for E,' NE*, and NE camponents. The interface between safe shutdown systems and the balance of the plant systems is also reviewed for E, NE*, and NE components. The spurious actuation of each identified component is postulated individually and its effect on safe shutdown analyzed. This review is documented as a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. A sample of this analysis is documented as Attachment A-1.

2.2 DETERMINATION OF ESSETIAL CABLES I

Any component identified as E or NE* is analyzed to determine which cables may cause a spurious actuation of the component. The routings of these cables are then identified to determine the fire areas that these cables traverse. Fire protected segments (i.e., wrapped) of these cables are also identified. A sample of cable identification and dispositioning is documented in Attachment A-2.

2.3 DETERMINATION IF A SIN 3LE FIRE CAN CAUSE A LOSS OF SAFE SHUTDOA' CAPABILITY The effects of fire-induced component and circuitry failures on system l

function and on cverall safe shutdown capability is propagated using fault-tree logic models. The fault-tree logic models are based on structured modeling techniques and information sorting capabilities that l"

Boolean logic models offer. The logic models include safe shutdown r

systems, HVAC systems, electric power systems, component cooling water I

systems, essential chilled water systems and differentiates between hot standby and cold shutdown equipment.

The fault-tree logic models are developed in three stages:

(1) Component c

L Fault Trees, (2) System Fault Trees, and (3) the Master Fault Tree.

Component Fault Trees are identified f or each E and NE* component.

Failure of each component to ac' ieve its required safe shutdown state u

following a fire condition in the plant is the component fault-tree's top V

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l event. The fire areas traversed by the cables serving a component are l-inputted into the component f ault tree. A f ault tree for each system

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required for safe shutdown is developed with the top event being failure of the system to achieve its function (s) required for safe shutdown. The component fault trees are linked to the system fault trees. Connections to support systems are also reflected in the system fault trees. The system fault trees are linked to the master fault tree, which groups the systems by their function required for hot standby and cold shutdown.

I Instrumentation required for monitoring the successful operation of each system is included in the logic such that a system is deemed incapable of I

performing its function if proper operation cannot be verified.

The plant safe shutdown capability is protected against single spurious maloperations (single failure criterion). Hence for the worst-case scenario, the exposed cables in each fire area are all assumed to open circuit. Each cable is then subjected to a fire-induced worst-case spurious signal on a cable-by-cable basis. An iterative computer process I

is utilized. An analysis of the fault trees determines if any single fire can cause a loss of safe shutdown capability. If there is such a h

fire, the fault tree analysis output is reviewed and cables and components involved are identified.

2.4 RESULTS The results of the analysis yielded few conditions in which additional protection (i.e., wrap) due to spurious signal generation concerns is considered necessary. Most concerns can be mitigated by certain operator actions (e.g., selector switch operation or manually opening or closing a valve). Final determination of corrective actions will be accomplished subsequent to an area by area review to assure that only a reasonable number of operator actions are eventually established.

Procedural revisions identifying the required operator actions, and the installation of additional wrap will be accomplished prior to startup following the first refueling outage. These actions will provide the additional level of protectiun needed to preclude the detrimental effects induced by spurious actuations during a fire condition in any plant fire area.

Fafer to Table 2.4-1 for a listing of the Safe Shutdown components adversely affected by spurious signals in individual plant fire areas, 11

3.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - ISOLATION PANEL FIRE O

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In addition to the assumptions listed in Section 1.5.1, the following additional assumptions are applicable:

1.

Total burn-up of the Isolation Panel - complete loss of all internal circuitry; 2.

Components whose circuitry interfaces with the Isolation Panel are subject to the worst-case spurious signal (i.e., hot short, open circuit, short-to-ground).

3.2 METF0D0 LOGY A mect anical systems approach is used to analyze the effects of a fire I

condition in the Isolation Panel. Every relay in the Isolation Panel is considered individually and the circuitry and equipment associated with each particular relay is identified. This establishes the equipment that interfaces with the Isolation Panel. This equipment is evaluated to determine those components whose operability is needed to achieve and mintain safe plant shutdown (E) and those components that are related to I

the plant shutdown process (NE*).

A failure modes and effects analysis (Table 3.2-1 and 3.2-2) is performed on these E and NE* components to determine if their spurious actuation would prevent safe shutdown.

3.3 RESULTS The analysis identified ninety-six (96) components interfacing with the isolation panel. Essential components (E) needed for safe shutdown of the plant are listed in Table 3.2-1.

Components that are associated (NE*) to the plant shutdown process are listed in Table 3.2-2.

The lI balance of components interfacing with the Isolation Panel not related to the plant shutdown process; that is, they are not essential nor associated components are listed in Table 3.3-1.

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The analysis indiuites that there is no interface between the Isolation I

Panel and the main power supply feeders. Hence, a fire in the Isolation q

d Panel cannot be the impetus for the loss-of-offsite power supply to the plant. However, the analysis is viable regardless of whether offsite f

power is availabic or unavailable.

As indicated, there is no interface between the Isolation Panel and the main power supply feeders; however, the panel does interface with the tie-breakers bette a buses SA-SAB and SB-SAB. Therefore, the SAB bus is c

de-energized by opening the tie-breakers at the switchgear to minimize operator actions.

A worst-case fire in the Isolation Panel affects only some of the plant's safe shutdown coqonents. The bulk of the plant's instrumentation will be available after a fire condition in the Isolation Panel and will provide timely indication as to the extent which spurious signals may be affecting plant conditions.

The evaluation of safe shutdown components and the analysis of hot I

shorts, open circuits, shorts-to-ground determined that the fire in the Isolation Panel may spuriously actuate or inhibit operation of the equipment identified in Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-2.

Manual control of safe shutdown equipment will be available after implementing a hardware and procedural modifications.

In the unlikely event of a significant fire in the Isolation Panel, operator action would be necessary to isolate the panel and to ensure control of essential equipment so that an orderly safe shutdown may proceed. The operator actions require manual operation of valves, switches and circuit breakera.

In conclusion, the present protection features installed in and around the Isolation Panel (including redundant ionization detectors in each compartment, fire retardant barriers between each compartment, and ionization detectors and automatic suppression external to the panel) in conjunction with the completed analysis and a commitment to install I

hardware modifications and to establish appropriate procedures for a fire induced loss of this panel demonstrate an equivalent level of protection to that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

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l 4.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 13ALYSIS - CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAUI.T FIRES 4.1 DISCUSSION l

10CFR50, Appendix R and Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 require protection of safe shutdown capability to ensure that at least one means l

of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions is available during and af ter any postulated fire in the plant. In the Control Room and Cable Vault areas of the plant, it is not really practical to protect all redundant safe shutdown systems (cables) against the adverse effects of fire or fire suppression activities. Thus, tne rules require an independent alternative shutdown capability that will not be disabled by fire damage to associated circuits.

Fire protection criteria for the cable vault area was accomplished by reviewing the area for identification of electrical train "A", "B" and "AB" cable routing. As a result of our original Safe Shutdown Analysis which precluded effects of spurious signal actuation, essential "B" train cables were rerouted to bypass the cable vault area. This protection, in h

addition to the in-situ fire protection systems (fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system) already designed for the area, affords the protection of safe shutdown equipment as mandated by Appendix R.

In our original Safe Shutdown Analysis it was assumed that a deleterious Control Room fire would be limited to a single control panel.

As a result of the Appendix R audit (4/9-4/13/84), the Control Room / Cable Vault areas were to be specifically included in the reanalysis of essential and associated cables to ensure that alternative shutdown capability is independent and electrically isolated considering the effects of fire-induced maloperations.

Further, the effects of a Control Room fire were to be reanaly ed without limitation to one control panel (i.e., a total Control From fire).

4.2 ASSUMPTIONS In addition to the assumptions listed in Section 1.5.1, the following additional assumptions are applicable:

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Total burn-up of the Control Room and the Cable Vault - complete loss of all circuitry exposed to the fire; EO 2.

Components whose circuitry interfaces with the Control Room /Cabic Vault are subject to the worst-case spurious sianal (i.e., hot short, short-to-ground, open circuit);

3.

Af ter detection of a fire, which necessitates evacuation of the Control Room, it is assumed that reactor trip can be accomplished from the Control Room prior to this evacuation.

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Essential control functions emanating from the Control Room will be isolated or transferred to appropriate locations outside the I

Control Room prior to damage due to fire.

4.3 METHODOLOGY To determine the effects of a fire on the control circuit, it was assumed that any of the following electrical faults may be induced in the portion of the control circuitry that is exposed to the fire:

a-Hot shorts I

b-Open circuits c-Shorts-to-ground For the circuitry impaired by the postulated fire, corrective measures are recommended for remedial actions.

This review is based on the actual installation of the instrumentation / control circuitry as categorized below:

A.

2ndicators required to monitor plant conditions during the plant shutdown process.

A number of parameters which were considered critical for the monitoring of the plant conditions during the process of the plant shutdown were selected from the existing Auxiliary Control Panel LCP-43. During this review process electronic equipment 15

u and interface cables serving these parameters were reverified to be located entirely outside of the Control Room / Cable Vault lience, the display of these parameters on the Auxiliary area.

Control Panel LCP-43 would not be impaired by fire in the Control Roo=/ Cable Vaul t area.

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Essential safe shur.! ova equipment that is provided with control stations at the Auxiliary Control Panel LCP-43.

For the purpose of this analysis, the power distribution channel B was selected for operation. Power distribution channels A and AB are manually de-energized.

I The routing of all cables of the selected equipment is reviewed to ensure that the operation of the existing transfer switches, I

transferring points of control from the Main Control Board to the Auxiliary Control Panel LCP-43, would isolate the entire circuit from the Control Room / Cable Vault (CR/CV) fire areas.

Where the operation of the transfer switch alone will not result in a complete isolation from the Control Room / Cable Vault, the component is identified for further corrective action in order to ensure equipment operability.

C.

Essential equipment that does not normally require operator action but requires isolation from the Control Room / Cable Vault to perform its proper safe shutdown function.

The routing of all cables of the selected equipment is reviewed and additional isolation switches will be added to the existing transfer switch bays in Auxiliary Panels to provide a means of isolation for that portion of the control circuit that may be exposed to the fire.

In cases where the operation cf the isolation switch would result in a loss of the equipment's control function, additional means of control along with instructions for operator's actions will be provided so that the functional control of the equipment can be regained.

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D.

Associated equipnent Associated equipment is not required for the plant shutdown process; however, maloperation of this equipuent may af fect the proper operation of the safe shutdown systems.

Routing of control circuit cables of associated equipment is revicued to determine the effect of a fire in the Control Room / Cable Vault area on each individual associated component.

Those components whose maloperation will affect safe shutdown are identified for further corrective actions.

In accordance with the above methodology the Control Racm/Cabic Vault analysis included a review of the E and NE* systems and components. This approach ensured that one train of safe shutdown systems / components would be electrically isolated and independent from a Control Room / Cable Vault fire-condition with the implementation of some additional isolation

< switches, cable reroutings and procedural modifications.

For a fire-condition that necessitates evacuation of the Control Room, the reactor is tripped from the Control Room. Control of the plant is transferred to the auxiliary shutdown panel and other local stations.

Isolation switches are utilized to isolate the effects of the fire-condition on E and NE* safe shutdown equipment. The 6.9 kV buses and the train "A" and "A/B" power distribution systems are de-energized and isolated from the "B" power distribution system. Safe plant shutdown is then accomplished in an orderly and timely manner.

4.4 RESULTS This analysis took a conservative approach that all cociponents whose control circuitry interfaces with the Control Room / Cable Vault has the potential to spuriously maloperate. Tabic 4.4-1 identifies those components whose operability will be adversely affected af ter a fire-condition in the Control Room / Cable Vault. Table 4.4-2 identifies safe shutdown components that will not require additional modifications following the Control Room / Cable Vault fire for one of the following reasons:

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l (1) Component's control circuitry will ba isolated from the CR/CV fire af ter operating an existing transfer switch I

(2) Component's control circuitry is located outside the CR/CV fire l'

areas (3) The CR/CV fire has no adverse effect on the component when its control circuitry is subjected to a spurious signal.

I In conclusion, the present fire protection features in conjunction with this completed analysis and a commitment to implement hardware and procedural modifications prior to start-up following the first refueling provides adequate defense-in-depth for a fire-condition in the Control I

Room / Cable Vault and complies with the alternative shutdown requirements of Sections III.G.2 and III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50.

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5.0 ASSOCIATED CLRCULTS ANALYSIS - CONCLUSION hl Considering the etfects of fire induced spurious maloperations, the f) results of the Waterford 3 Ascociated Circuits Analysis as illustrated, indicate a safe plaat shutdowa can be accomplished af ter implementing hardware / procedural codifications, for any of the postulated fire I

The analysis used conservative assumptions and a systematic conditions.

approach. This provides the necessary assurances against fire-induced system interactions and equipment maloperations.

The corrective actions, required as a result of this analysis, win include the installation of isolation switches, cable reroutings/ wrapping and some manual operator actions (e.g., selector switch operation, I

opening circuit breakers, etc.).

Final determination of corrective actions will be accomplished subsequent to a composite area by area review. This will ensure that only a reasonable number of operator actions will be relied on following any postulated fire condition in the plant. These hardware modifications, including the revised procedures, will be implemented prior to start-up following the first refueling as was previously agreed upon. Given the conservatism of the analysis' assumptions (i.e., loss-of-offsite power, total loss of all control room components, worst-case spurious signals, etc.) and the existing fire I

protection features installed throughout the plant, the schedule for implementing station modifications is commensurable with any risk to the public health and safety.

In conclusion, this commitment to implement hardware and procedural modifications resulting from this analysis in conjunction with the present fire protection features provides the mandated defense-in-depth for any fire-condition in the plant and complies with Sections III.G.2 and III.L of Appendix "R" to 10CFR50, as appropriate.

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19 I

TABLE 1.5-1 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY I

WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS - SYSTEM REVltM

)

Reg'd for Not Req'd for Not Reg'd Hot or Cold Hot or Cold But Can Shutdown Shutdown Af fect Reg'd System Post Fire (E) Post Fire (NE) Syntems (NE*)

Station Grounding Part Part Part Safety Related 125V DC Part Part Non-Safety Related 125V DC Part Part Part X

Switching Station Startup Transformers X

X 6.9 kV Safety Related 4.16 KV Part Part Part Non-Safety Related 4.16 KV Part Part I

Safety Related 480V Part Part Non-Safety Related 480V Part Part Safety Related 208/120V AC Part Part Non-Safety Related 208/120V AC Part Part Safety Related Inverters & Dist Part Part Non-Safety Related Inverters & Dist Part Part Safety Related Heat Tracing X

Non-Safety Related Heat Tracing X

Annunciator X

I Environmental Monitoring X

Seismic Monitoring X

FHB RAD Monitoring & Computers X

RCB/RAB RAD Monitors & Computers X

Process & Effluent Rad Monitors &

Computers X

Misc RAD Monitors & Computers X

Rad Monitor RG 1.97 X

Computer Battery Room X

I Fire Detection X

i Instrument Air Part Part Station Air X

Nitrogen Part Part Part l

1 l

l l

l

?

t Page 2 of 5 F

TABLE 1.5-1 (Cont'd)

L Req'd for Not Req'd for Not Req'd Hot or Cold Hot or Cold But Can pr3 LV Shutdown Shutdown Affect Req'd System Post Fire (E) Post Fire (NE) Systems (NE*)

{

Carbon Dioxide X

X Hydrogen F

Treated Water X

Demineralized Water X

I Portable Water X

Plumbing X

l SUMP PUMP Drainage X

Intake Structure Equipment X

Circulating Water X

Turbine Bldg Cooling Water X

CCW Dry Cocling Tower X

CCW - RCB Part Part CCW Balance Part Part I

Auxiliary Boiler X

Auxiliary Steam X

Emergency Diesel Generator X

Turbine X

Containment Cooling RCB X

Shield Bldg Ventilation X

Annulus Negative Pressure X

Containment Vacuum Relief X

Controlled Atmosphere Release X

I Airborne Radioactivity Removal X

Hydrogen Recombiner & Analyzer X

CEDM Cooling X

Turbine Bldg HVAC X

Misc Area HVAC X

Cable Vault & Switchgear Area HVAC Part Part I

Control Room, Computer Room HVAC Part Part RAB Normal Ventilation X

Controlled Ventilation Area HVAC X

1 Chilled Water Part Part Supplementary Chilled Water X

l

Pagn 3 of 5 TABLE 1.5-1 (Cont'd)

{

Req'd for Not Reg'd for Not Req'd Hot or Cold Hot or Cold But Can V

Shutdown Shutdown Affect Req'd System Post Fire (E) Post Fire (NE) Systems (NE*)

Primary Makeup Water Part Part RC Pumps, Motors & Vessels Part Part Pressurizer & Quench Tanks Part Part Reactor Head Vent System Part Part i

Charging & Letdown Part Part Boric Acid Makeup & Chemical Feed Part Part i

Post Accident Sampling X

Primary Sampling X

Gaseous Waste Management X

Liquid Waste Management X

Solid Waste Management X

Resin Waste Management X

Laundry Waste Management X

1 Waste Concentrator X

Solid Waste Mgmt Post Startup X

RCP Oil Collection X

Filter Transfer X

Portable Solidification X

Compactor Facility X

Interim Solid Waste X

Portable Demin Taps X

Additional Waste Tankage X

l OSC Transfer Shield X

Boron Management X

Boric Acid Concentrator X

Refueling Water Part Part Part Containment Spray Part Part High Pressure Safety Injection X

l Low Pressure Safety Injection Part Part Safety Injection Tanks Part Part Fuel Handling & Storage X

g P

Fuel Pool Cooling & Purification X

l Page 4 of _5_

TABLE 1.5-1 (Cont'd)

Req'd for Not Reg'd for Not Req'd Hot or Cold Hot or Cold But Can Shutdown Shutdown Affeet Reg'd System Post Fire (E) Post Fire (NE) Sys teins (NE*)

{

Engr Safety Features Actuation Part Part Control Element Drive X

Excore Nuclear Instrumentation

~

S/U Channel Part Part i

Excore Nuclear Instrumentation Safety Channel Part Part I

Incore Nuclear Instrumentation Part Part

!<ovable Incore Nuclear Instrumen-tation X

Plant Protection X

Reactor Regulating X

Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring X

Reactor Power Cutback X

1 Condensate X

Ccndensate Transfer & Storage Part Part Condensate Polishing X

Feedwater Part Part Feedwater Pump & Turbine X

Aux Feedwater Pump X

1 Emergency Feedwater X

Chemical Feed X

Secondary Sampling Part Part 1

Steam Generators X

Blowdown Part Part Main Steam Part Part Extraction Steam X

Heater Drain Vents X

Air Evacuation X

Lube Oil Batch Tank & Transfer X

Feed Pump Lube Oil X

Turbine Litbe Oil X

l Seal Oil X

Page _ 5 of 5 I

l TABLE 1.5-1 (Cont'd)

Req'd for Not Req'd for Not Reg'd Hot or Cold Hot or Cold But Can Shutdown Shutdown Affect Req'd O

Post Fire (E) Post Fire (NE) Systems (NE*)

System

-V l

Gland Seal X

Electro Hydraulic Fluid X

Turbine - Turbf ne Controls X

Gen - Hydrogen Gas X

Stator Coil k'ater X

l GEN & 25KV X

Main Transformers X

Unit Aux Transformer X

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WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS IMPACTED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS / INDIVIDUAL PLANT AREA FIRES HS/CS REF NO./CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PROBLEM AREA COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT 1/701 CCW Pump "A" to "AB" RAB 15 HS/CS If valve cannot be closed, CCW Pu:np "A" may Discharge Isolation Valve overload and trip.

CC 126A 2/1551 EFW Flow Control Valves RAB 15 HS If valve (s) fails open, the possibility exists for 1552 EFW 224A and EFW 223B RAB 8B overcooling the ECS.

If valve fails closed - less RAB 5 of one of the reduncant EFW flow paths.

EFW Flow Control Valves RAB 7B HS Valve controls may inadvertently transfer to EFW 224A and EFW 223B LCP-43 thereby disabling the M/A stations in the Control Room.

3/852 CCW Makeup Pump B and RAB 15 HS/CS If valve fails open, water inventory from the CSP 859 Valve CMU 524B will slowly be pumped to a drain.

2373 4/1059 Essential Chilled Water RAB 15 HS/CS Valve fails open and can short circuit chilled System Recirculation RAB 2 water directly from the Discharge Header to the Valve CHW 129B Suction Header.

5/1069 Essential Chilled Water RAB 15 HS/CS Valve fails open and can short circuit chilled System Recirculation RAB 23 water directly from the Discharge Header to the Valve CHW 129AB RAB 2 Suction Header.

RAB 8A RAB 6 RAB 17 RAB 8C 1

6/1079 Switchgear Air Handling RAB 7A HS/CS Loss of cooling to Switchgear Area resulting in 1081 Unit AH-25 Train "B" elevated temperature.

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REF NO./CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PROBLEM AREA COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT

(

7/1551 EFW Flow Control Valves RAB 7A HS Valve controls may inadvertently transfer to 1552 EFW 224B and EFW 223A I4P-43 thereby disabling the M/A Stations in the h

Control Room.

l

?

t EFW Flow Control Valves RAB 23 HS If valve (s) fails open, the possibility exists for i

EFW 224B and EFW 223A RAB 8A overcooling the RCS.

RAB 6 40 8/294 Pressurizer Auxiliary RAB 7A HS If valve fails open and both charging line b

Spray Valve CVC 216A RAB 6 isolation valves are closed, the potential exists for inadvertent spray and RCS depressurization.

@,.4 i

9/381 Charging Line Isolation RAB 7A HS If valve cannot be closed, the pressurizer N i Valve CVC 218A RAB 6 auxiliary spray valves may be ineffective because h

the charging flow will go into the primary loop instead of up into the pressurizer.

10/285 Pressurizer Heaters RAB 7A HS Preferred method of pressurizer pressure control unavailable to operators. Charging flow still 286 available for pressure control.

A 287 e

288 s

289 I

290 f

291 292 p

?

11/851 CCW Makeup Pump A and RAB 23 HS/CS If valve fails opea, water inventory from the CSP 859 Valve CMU 524A RAB 16 will slowly be pumped to a drain.

12/1049 Essential Chilled Water RAB 23 HS/CS Valve fails open and can short circuit chilled i

System Recirculation RAB 2 water directly from the Discharge Header to the A

Valve CHW 129A RAB 8A Suction Header.

RAB 6 Q

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LOUISIANA P

& LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 i

ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS I

IMPACTED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS / INDIVIDUAL PLANT AREA FIRES HS/CS REF NO./CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PROBLEM AREA COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT

)

13/295 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray RAB 5 HS If valve fails open and both charging line Valve CVC 216B RAB 7 B isolation valves are closed, the potential exists for inadvertent spray and RCS depressurization.

14/382 Charging Line Isolation RAB 5 HS If valve cannot be closed, the pressurizer i

Valve CVC 218B RAB 7B auxiliary spray valves may be ineffective because the charging flow will go into the primary loop instead of up into the pressurizer.

15/541 SDCS LPSI Flow Control RAB 32 CS Ability to regulate shutdown cooling flow rate 542 Valves SI 138B and SI 139B from Control Room may be lost.

16/518 Safety Injection Pumps "B" RAB 32 CS If neither valve can be closed, reactor 519 Mini Flow Isolation Valves coolant water can be pumped into the RWSP.

SI 120B and SI 121B 17/612 Containment Spray System RAB 32 CS Valve fails open. Inadvertent opening of this Isolation Valve CS 125B valve will divert primary water to the Containment Spray Header when in the Shutdown Cooling Mode.

18/592 RCS Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling RAB 32 CS Inadvertent closure of valve will stop flow to Isolation Valve SI 407B LPSI Pump.

19/539 SDCS Heat Exchanger "B" RAB 30 CS Loss of capability to regulate amount of shutdown Bypass Valve SI 129B RAB 39 cooling flow passing through Heat Exchanger.

RAB 8C RAB 8A 20/558 Isolation Valves SIT 1B RAB 7B CS If valves cannot be closed or tanks cannot b:s 570 and SIT 2B RAB 8B depressurized, delays will he encountered in Valves SI 331B and SI 332B RAB 5 reaching the Shutdown Cooling entry window.

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LOUISIANA R & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3

/

ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS IMPACTED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS / INDIVIDUAL PLANT AREA FIRES l

HS/CS REF NO./CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PROBLEM AREA COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT 21/597 RCS Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling RAB 8B CS Inadvertent closure of valve will stop flow to Isolation Valve SI 407A LPSI Pump.

22/552 Isolstica-Valves SIT 1A

,PAB 23 CS If valves cannot be closed er tanks cannot be 564 and SIT 2A RAB 6 depressurized, delays will be encountered in Valves SI 331A and SI 332A RAB 7A reaching the Shutdown Cooling entry window.

RAB 8A I

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P P ga 1 cf 3 TABLE 3.2-1 LOUISIANA POWER & LICHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS (E)

ISOIATION PANEL FIRE CO?f0NENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MEANS OF OPERATOR DESCRIPTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS H'tt Standby Volume Control Tank Closes None

- Valve position indication Reactivity Contrc.1 and Discharge Va. 2CH-V123AB

- VCT level indication RCS Make-up can a.till be (CVC-183)

Opens May drain VCT affected from the borated water in the RWSP.

Rsfueling Water to Opens None

- Valve position indication RWSP is the preferred Charging Pump Suction

- RWSP level indication source for maintaining V2. 3CH-V121AB Closes None - Ioss of one Reactivity Control and (CVC 507) path of boration RCS Make-up. The gray-ity flow path from BAM tanks is also available post-Isolation Panel Fire.

Garging Pump B Operates None l

- Charging flow indicator Does not operate Ioss of boration

- Garging pressure indi-l capability and RCS cator make-up.

- Pzr. level indicator CCW Pump B Operates None

- CCW header Does not operate Ioss of cooling water pressure to the safe shutdown - CCW header flow indicator A Spurious Signals components.

- Various temp. indicators Analysis shows that no spurious signals can cause a trip of pump.

Giller Compressor B Operates None

- Chilled water tempera-Does not operate loss of cooling water ture, pressure and flow supply air handling indicators.

units; gradual rise in space temperature containing safety-related equipment.

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Pige 2 of 3 TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MFANS OF OPERATOR DESCRIPTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS STA. Service Transformer Breaker closes None

- Pzr. pressure indication 3B32 Feeder (Power to

- Breaker position indica-Pzr. Proportional Heaters Breaker opens Ioss of preferred tion Time for corrective act-i Bank No.2) method of RCS

- Heaters amps indicators ion is not critical.

pressure control.

- Pzr. temperature indica-Charging system can be tor used for emergency RCS pressure control.

Otilled Water Pump B Operate None t

(3B-SB)

N/A Does not operate N/A A Spurious Signals Analysis shows that fire in isolation panel has no effect on chilled water pump.

Cold Shutdown SI Tank Isolation Closes None Valves (4-one on each tank)

ISI-V1505RTHA Won't close upon demand - Possible release

- Valve position indication Valves can be manually (SI-331A) of SI tank con-

- SI tank pressure operated with existing ISI-V1506TKlB tents into RCS

'.. Mica tion handwheel.

(SI-331B)

(extra borationel

- Pzr. pressure indication ISI-V1507TK2A

- Pressure in SI (SI-332A) tank may be "trans-ISI-V1508TK2B mitted" to primary (SI-332B) system. Primary system g be maintained at ap-prox. 600 psig.

Shutdown cooling pressure interlocks would then prevent shutdown cooling suc-tion Isolation Valves from opening.

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TAtLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MFANS OF OPERATOR DESCRIPTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS RCS Icop 1 Shutdown Cooling Isol. Valve Will not open upon Shutdown Cooling flow - Valve position indication ISI-V1502B demand from RCS Loop 1 to (SI-401B)

LPSI Pump B not established.

Opens when not required N/A - (See Remarks)

Power is racked out to valve ISI-V15028. No credible spurious signal can cause inadvertent operation. See Table 8.3-2.

Valve position indication RCS Ioop 1 Shutdown Will not open upon Shutdown Cooling flow Cooling Isol. Valve demand from RCS Inop 1 to ISI-V1501B LPSI Pump B not (SI-405B) established.

Opens when not None RCS Isolation Valve required.

ISI-V1502B maintains primary system integrity.

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TABLE 3.2-2 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS NON-ESSENTIAL COMPONEhTS (NE*)

ISOLATION PANEL FIRE COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MEANS OF OPERATOR DESG IPTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS Hot Standby Letdown Stop Closes None

- Valve position indication Valve ICH-F1516A/B (CVC 101)

Opens Ioss of primary

- Letdown line flow indi-i system inventory by turning control Beric Acid Makeup Does not operate None

- Pumps status indication Isol. Panel fire shut-down mode is with flow Pumps A & B Operates Possible unregulated path from RWSP to boric acid injection charging pump suction valves.

Charging Pump A Does not operate None

- Par. level indicator Charging Pump B provides

- Charging flow indicator reactivity control and RCS Operates Increase rate of RCS make-up.

make-up.

Chirging Pump AB Does not operate N/A N/A Charging Piump B provides i

I reactivity control and Operates RCS make-up. The power bus SAB is de-energized rendering charging Pump AB inoperable.

Boric Acid Make-up Opens None

- Valve position indi-Control Va. 3CH-FM172AB cation Boric acid pumps to (BAM 141)

Closes None

- Concentrated boric acid be secured.

flow indicator l

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E Page 2 of 4 TABLE 3.2-2 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MEANS OF OPERATOR DESCRIPTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS Reactor Water Make-up Opens None

- Valve position indication Volume Control Tank Control Va. 7CH-F115

- Primary make-up flow isolated (discharge valve (PMU 144)

Closes None indication closed) from charging pump suction header.

Isolation Panel Fire f

shutdown mode is with the 1

RWSP flow path directly to charging pump suction.

Reactor Water Make-up Opens None

- Valve position indication Volume Control Tank iso-Stop VA. 3CH-Fil748 (CVC 510)

Closes None

- Primary make-up flow lated (discharge valve indication closed) from charging, pump suction header.

Isolation Panel Fire Shutdown mode is with the RWSP flow path directly to char. :e pump suction.

HPSI Pump A D

not operate

'.one HPSI Pump B

- Pump status lights The power

,AB is de-HPSI Pump A/B Operates

.* - Charging

- HPSI header pressure energirea readering HPSI

~ tem is preferred pump AB inoperable.

a, cans of reactivity control and RCS make-up.

)

CCW Pump Header Opens 2 Pumps Operating:

- Valve position indication CCW Pump B will supply Isol. Valves no detrimental effect suf ficient cooling water 3CC-F109AB (CC-126A) 1 Pump Operating:

to the components re-3CC-Fil3AB (CC-ll4A)

A&B headers of system quired for safe shutdown.

3CC-F110AB (CC-127A) interconnected single 3CC-Fil4AB (CC-115A) pump approaches runout 3CC-F111AB (CC-1278) condition 3CC-F115AB (CC-115B) 3CC-F112AB (CC-126B)

Closes None

- Valve position indication l

3CC-Fil6AB (CC-Il4B) l i

W W

D Page 3 ef 4 TABLE 3.2-2 (cont'd)

COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MEANS OF OPERATOR DESCRI PTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS

)

CCW Pump A Operates None

- Pump status lights Does not operate Insufficient flow of CCW Pump B will supply cooling water if head-sufficient cooling water er valves are open to the "B" components required for safe shutdown.

CCW Pump AB Operates N/A

- Pump status lights ne power bus SAB is de-energized l

I Does not operate N/A rendering CCW Pump AB inoperable.

Otiller Compressor A Operates None

- Compressor status lights WC-1 (3A-SA)

Does not operate None The redundant chiller

{

compressor B will provide adequate area cooling for "B" train safe shutdown equipment.

Chiller Compressor AB Operates N/A

- Compressor status lights WC-1 (3C-SAB)

Does not operate N/A Chiller compressor B will provide adequate area cooling for "B" train safe shutdown equipment. De power SAB is de-energized rendering Otiller AB inope able.

Chilled Water Pump A Operates N/A N/A P-1 (3A-SA)

Fire in isolation panel Does not operate N/A N/A will have no effect on operability of chilled water pump.

)

Chilled Water Pump AB Operates N/A N/A he power bus SAB is P-1 (3C-SAB) de-energized rendering Does not operate N/A N/A Chilled Water Pump AB inoperable.

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I Page 4 of 4 TABLE 3.2-2 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT SPURIOUS DETRIMENTAL EFFECT MEANS OF OPERATOR DESCRI PTION ACTUATION ON SAFE SHUTDOWN IDENTIFICATION REMARKS Chiller Water System Closes None

- Valve status lights Spurious actuation can Header Isolation Valves only close valves, c.ich 3AC-F142A Does not close Should Chilled is preferred position 3AC-F149A Water System A l

3AC-F144A fail to operate and l

3AC-F136A the header isolation l

3AC-F143B valves do not isolate 3AC-F1503 system performance 3AC-F135B will degrade.

3AC-F151B Stat. Service Breaker closes None

- Breaker status lights Pzr. Proportional Heater Transformer 3A32 Bank No. 2 available to

[

Feeder (Power to Pzr.

Breaker opens None control RCS pressure

/

Proportional Heater following a fire Bank No. 1) condition in the Isolation Panel.

Cold Shutdown RCS Inop 2 SDCS Will not open upon None

- Valve position indication RCS Isop 1 SDCS/LPSI B Isolation Valve demand can bring plant to ISI-1504A (SI-401A)

Cold Shutdown.

Opens when not required None Power is racked out to valve ISI-V1504A. No credible spurious signal can cause inadvertent operation.

RCS Ioop 2 SDCS Will not open None

- Valve position indication RCS Isop 1 SDCS/LPSI B Isolation Valve can bring plant to ISI-1503A (SI-405A)

Opens when not required None Cold Shutdown.

RCS Isolation Valve 1sI-V1504A maintains primary system integrity.

MISCELLANEOUS Control Room Air Handling Operates None Unit AH-12 (3B-SB)

- Control Rs. Temperature Does not operate Gradual temperature indicator rise inside control

- AH-12 status indication room.

- Human senses (operator discomfort) e

g Page 1 of 2 I

TABLE 3.3-1 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGliT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UN)f No. 3 r

L, BALANCE OF COMPONENTS INTERFACING WITil_Iy01ATION PANEL Equipment is not directly related to the plaa L ohutdown process. Failure of this equipment to operate properly will beve no inplication on the overall safe shutdown of the plant.

I CWD No.

Component Descri tion l

908 Toxic Chemicals Detection System 990 Instrument Air Compressor A 992 Instrument Air Compressor B 1005 Safeguard Pump Room A Cooler All-2 (3A-SA) CVAS 1006 Safeguard Pump Room A Cooler All-2 (3C-SA) CVAS 1077 SWGR Area AH-25 (3A-SA) Vent Dampers 1081 SWGR Area AH-25 (3B-SB) Vent Dampers 1094 Computer Room Air Handling Unit AII-31 i

1097 Annulus Negative Pressure System Exhaust Fan E-19 1099 Annulus Negative Pressure System Dampers 1105 RAB Normal Exhai.st Fan - E22 (3A) 1107 RAB Normal Exha ist Fan - E22 (33) 1109 RAB Normal Exhm 't System Dampers 1110 CVAS Isolation Valves 1111 CVAS Isolation Valves 1

1113 CVAS Exhaust Fan E-23 (3A-SA) 1114 CVAS Exhaust Fan E-23 (3B-SB) 1123 RAB HVAC Equipment Room IIcating Coil EHC-55 (3A) 1124 RAB HVAC Equipment Room Heating Coil EHC-55 (3B) 1127 Containment Purge System Dampers 1128 Containment Purge Isolation Valves 1129 Containment Purge Isolation Valves 1139 CEDM Cooling Unit E-16 (3A) 1140 CEDM Cooling Unit E-16 (3C)

Page 2 of 2 TABLE 3.3-1 (Cont'd)

CWD No.

Component Description

()

1141 CEDM Cooling Unit E-16 (33) 1142 CEDM Cooling Unit E-16 (3D) 114 5 CEDM Cooling Units Inlet Valves 1160 control Room Exhaust Fan n-34 (3A-SA) 1161 Control Room Exhaust Fan E-34 (3B-SB)

I 1163 Control Room Exhaust Fan E-42 1164 Control Room Exhaust Fan E-42 Discharge Danpers 5

1165 Control Room Air Handling Units AH-12 (3A-SA) 1228 FHB Vent System Air Handling Unit AH-14 1230 FHB Vent System Exhaust Fan E-20 (3A) 1231 FHB Vent System Exhaust Fan E-20 (3B) 1234 FHB Vent System Emergency Filtration Unit E-35 (3A-SA) 1236 FHB Vent System Emergency Filtration Unit E-35 (33-SB) 1248 Cable Vault Area Exhaust Fan E-49 I

1510 SG No.1 Feedwater Isolation Valve 2FW-V823A 1526 SG No. 2 Feedwater Isolation Valve 2FW-V824B 1530 Condensate Storage Pool Make-Up Va. 6CD-1393 1646 Steam Line No.1 Isolation Valve 2MS-V602A 1661 Steam Line No. 2 Isolation Valve 2MS-V604B 1663 Control Room Exhaust Fan E-42 2685 FHB Isolation "A" Airborne Radiation Monitor 2688 FHB Isolation "B" Airborne Radiation Monitor I

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TABLE 4.4-1 Page 1 of 8 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPAhT WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIONS / ASSOCIATED CIQCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REMAPJCS REF WO/CVD CO*PONDf? DESCRIPTION COMPONFNT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DLT TO LOSS OF COMPONENT 1/1042 DC "3" Room Vent System HS DG "B" Room space temperature could gradually

Hs above equipment Dagers qualification temperature.

2/1043 DG "3" Room Exh. Fan HS DG "B" Room space temperature could gradually rise above equipment E-28 (3FSB) qualification temperature.

3/1055 Water Chiller "B" HS loss of cooling water supply to air handling units; gradual rise in Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Compressor WC-1 (3B-5B) space temperature containing safety-related equipment induced electrical faults 4/1058 Water Chiller "B" HS Ioss of cooling water supply to air handling units; gradual rise in Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Recire. Pump P-1 (3B SB) space temperature containing safety-related equipment induced electrical faults

- See Ref. No. 16 i

5/1079 SWGR Area "B" Air Handling HS Cradual temperature rise in SWGR Area "B" Component already protected I

Unit AH-25 (3B-SB) from the effects of fire-l induced electrical faults i

6/1541 Bnergency Feedwater Pump HS None - E W "B" pump will provide adequate Emergency Feedwater.

Enhancement provides opera-tional flexibility Turbine Governor Valve 7/518 SI Pump *B" Miniflow CS Ioss of LPSI pump recirculation flow. LPSI pumps cannot be Valves provided w/ handwheel -

I

/519 Isol. Valve 2SI-V8015 guaranteed to be available for Shutdown Cooling.

can be manually operated

& 2SI-V8028 8/1008 Safeguards pump Room "B" HS Crsdual temperature rise in Safeguard Pump Roon "B" LPSI pump may Incal Cooler AH-2 (3D-SB) be subject to space temperature higher than EQ temperature.

9/1015 CCW Hz *B" Iocal Cooler CS Cradual temperature rise in CCW Ex *B" Room.

AH-24 (35-SB), Temperature Control Valve 3AC-TM643B 10/1018 shutdown Cooling Hx B CS Cradual temperature rise in Shutdown Cooling Hz B Room.

Incal Cooler AH-3 (3FSB) and Temp. Control Va. 3AC-TM5178 11/1059 Chilled Water Sys. "B" HS Chilled Water System could short circuit - possible degradation of Recire. Valve cooling water supply to air handling units.

3AC-FM1308 12/1122 RAB H&V Equipment HS Cradual temperature rise in RAB H&V Room.

Room Exh. Fan E-41 (3B-SB) and Dampers & Heaters

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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COV2AhT Page 2 of 6 WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIOhS/ ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF NO/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONTXf DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DCE TO LOSS OF COv20NENT T E CJ G 13/1081 Swgr Area "B" Air HS Cradual temperature rise in SWCR Area "B" Room.

See Ref. No. 5 1080 Handling Unit 2912 AH-25 (3B-SB) Despers, and Temp. Cont. Va. 3AC - TM1893 14/2334 4KV Bus Tie 3A3s - 3AB3S HS Ensures de-energiration of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AB" Breaker powered components from spuriously actuating.

15/2477 480V Bus Tie 3A31S -

US Ensures de-energitation of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AB" 3AB31S 3reaker powered components from spuriously actuating 16/2374 Diesel Generator "B*

RS Potential to trip DG "B".

Component is already protected from the effects of i

Bsergency Stop fire-induced electrical faults l

17/2391 Diesel Generator "B" HS Erratic sequencing of loads on DG "B".

Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Sequencer Test & Display induced electrical faults 18/2388 4KY Safety Bus *B" HS Potential trip of "B" safety components.

Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Undervoltage Test induced electrical faults 19/2390 480V Safety Bus "B" HS Potential trip of *B" safety components.

Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Undervoltage Test induced electrical faults 20/2377 Diesel Generator "B" HS Ioss of onsite "B" power supply Component is already protected from the effects of fire-Breaker induced electrical faults 21/2382 4KV Bus Tie 3B3S-352 HS Potential to overload DG "B".

C-m ent is already protected from the elfects of fire-Breaker induced electrical faults 22/2399 Sta Service Transformer HS Ioss of Wet & Dry Cooling Tower "B".

Component is already ptotected fro:n the effects of fire-35315S Feeder Breaker induced electrical faults 23/2397 Sta Service Transformer HS Ioss of 480V *B" train components.

Co:nponent is already protected from the effects of fire-35315 Feeder Breaker induced electrical faults

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D f~ U LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Page 3 of 8 WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIONS / ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF N0/CWD COPPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT REMARKS 24/2398 Sta Service Transformer HS Ioss of one method of RCS Pressure Control.

Component is already protected 3B32S Feeder Breaker from the effects of fire-(Power to Pzr. Proportional induced electrical faults Heater Bank No. 2) 25/2384 4KV Bus Tie 3B3S-3AB3S HS Ensures de-energitation of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AB" powered components from spuriously actuating.

26/2502 4807 Bus Tie 3531S-3AB31S HS Ensures de-energiration of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AB" powered components from spuriously actuating.

27/2534 Computer Secondary Feeder HS Ensures de-energization of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AL" powered components from spuriously actuating.

28/2409 4KV and 480V Safety Bus "AB" HS Ensures de-energization of the "AB" power train. Prevents "AB" 2411 thdervoltage Test powered components from spuriously actuating.

29/2332 4KV Bus Tie 3A3S-3A2 HS Ensures de-energization of the "A" power train. Prevents "A" powered components from spuriously actuating.

30/2367 Diesel Generator "B" voltage HS Loss of DG *B" monitoring instrumentation. Potential to impact DG Component is already protected Indicator "B" operation.

from the effects of fire-induced electrical faults 31/2367 4KV Bus 3R3S Voltage HS Ioss of DG "B" monitoring instrumentation. Potentialto impact DG Indicator "B" operation.

32/2376 Diesel Generator "B" Day HS None - Alternative alarm available.

Local indicator is.4 Tank 011 Invel available. Howeve:/ local alarm (located in JG Room) remains available.

33/1551 Steam Generator No. 1 HS Ioss of Reactor Heat Removal monitoring instrumentation.

Invel (Wide Range) 34/1552 Steam Generator No. 2 HS Loss of one of two EFW flow paths to SC 2 or valve goes full open EFW Control Valve with potential for overcooling RCS.

2FW-V853A 35/1552 Steam Geneestor No. 2 HS Ioss of Reactor Heat Removal monitoring instrumentation.

Invel (Wide Range) l

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I LOUISIANA POWER & LICHT COMPANY Page 4 of 8 l

WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIONS / ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF N0/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHITTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT REMARKS 36/278 Steam Cenerator No. 1 HS Ioss of Reactor Heat Removal monitoring instrumentation.

Component cables routed Pressure independent of CR/CV.

Additional Circuit Modifications necessary to ensure long-term power supply to indicatur.

37/278 RCS Hot Irg 1 HS Ioss of RCS monitoring instrumentation.

Component cables routed Pressure Indicator independent of CR/CV.

l Additional Circuit Modifications necessary to ensure long-term power supply to indicator.

j 38/594 RCS/SDCS Isolation Valve CS Ioss of "outdown Cooling flow path.

See Ref. No. 56 ISI-V1501B Hyd Pump Motor Component cables routed independent of CR/CV.

39/1137 Containment Fan Coolers Sys CS Containment temperature and pressure could rise above Tech Spec Valves 2CC-F157B2, 2CC-F161B2, limits.

2CC-F156B1, 2CC-F16081, 3CC-TM1498 40/537 Shutdown Flow Control CS Ioss of Shutdown Cooling flow path.

2xistir.;; Transfer Svite n valve 2SI-FM348B will isointe cor.pc.nent from the effects of CR/CV fire.

41/802 Aux Component Cooling Water HS Ioss of Wet Cooling Tower B.

Pump B 42/852 Component Cooling Water HS Decreases amount of condensste available to EFW system.

Equi pent not req'd for safe sha&wn, however, to Makeup Pump B preclude 6 :risestal effects, corrective action should be taken 43/591 SDCS Isolation valve CS Ioss of Shutdown Cooling flow path.

See Ech No. 47 ISI-V1501B (Interlock with Pzr. Pressure) 44/590 SDCS Isolation Valve CS Ioss of Shutdown Cooling flow path.

ISI-V1502B

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W LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Page 5 of 8 WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIONS / ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF N0/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONENT 3ETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO IASS OF COMPONENT REMARKS 45/375 Garging Pump B HS Ioss of RCS Reactivity & Pressure Control.

Component is already protected from the effects of fire-induced electrical faulta.

46/360 RWSP e Garging Pump HS IAss of preferred borated water flow path. Gravity feed from Boric Suctl_ Valve 3CH-V121AB Acid Make-up Tanks available.

47/288 Pressurizer Backup HS Degradation of RCS Pressure Control.

289 Hester Bank No. 4 No. 5, 290 No. 6 i

48/357 RCS Hakeup Water Stop HS Decrease in boron concentration of charging flow if Vol. Cont.

Valve 3CH-F117AB not isolated.

49/380 Charging Pumps Headers HS Loss of charging flow to RCS.

Shutoff Valve 2CH-F1529AB 50/499 S.I. Recire. Return Line CS Loss of Shutdown cooling flow via any of four drain lines.

Drain to Reactor Drain Tank valve 5SI-F1563 51/1537 EFW Turbine Steam Line Drip HS Partial loss of steam from SG 2.

Leakage would be minimal.

Pot Drain Va. SMS-V716 HS RCS natural circulation cooldown cannot be assured. Prevents equ..-

Post CRICV fire, the 6.9 KV 52/2246 Standby Transformer 1A Bus 3Al Feeder Breaker ment powered from the Non-safety 6.9 KV Bus from spuriously actuat.'ng. Bus 3Al will be de-energized disabling the following equipment:

Reactor Coolant Pump IA 5

Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Condensate Pump A Condensate Pump C Circulating Water Pump A Circulating Water Pump C 53/2256 Standby Transformer 35 to HS RCS natural circulation cooldown cannot be assured. Prevents equip-Post CRICV fire, the 5.'s KV Bus Bus 381 Feeder Breaker ment powered from the Non-safety 6.9 KV Bus from spuriously actuating. 331 will be de-energized dischling tha following equipment.

Lese:cr C:.olant X:p 13 imetcr C:c;znt hi:3 23 C.r.c.cu.aa L:.p 5 Cire 1 ning.: r N.; 3 Circulating A tar Pump D

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r'a r-- u-j TA 4.4-1 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Pags 6 of 8 WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED HODIFICATIONS/ ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF N0/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHITTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT REMARKS

'54/929 Steam Line 2 Sampling HS Partial loss of steam from SG 2.

Leakage would be minimal.

Isolation Va. 2MS-F715 55/934 RCS Vent to Quench Tank HS/CS Partial loss of RCS inventory.

Valve 2RC-E-2562B 56/1538 EFW h rbine Steam Line HS Partial loss of steam from SC 2.

Leakage would be minimal.

Dnergency Drain Valve 3MS-V685 57/1645 Steam Line 1 Alternate HS Partial Ioss of steam from SG 1.

Leakage would be minimal.

Drain Va. 2MS-V671 58/1646 Steam Line 1 Isolation 1647 Valve 2MS-V602A 59/1660 Steam Line 2 Alternate HS Partial loss of steam from SG 2.

Leakage would be minimal.

Drain Va. 2MS-V664 60/1661 Steam Line 2 Isolation HS Loss of secondary side heat sink.

1662 Valve 2MS-16048 61/703 CCW Pump B Header HS/CS Ioss of CCWS B train due to unpredictable operation of CCW Pump B.

Isolation Valves 3CC-F111AB and 3CC-F115AB 62/799 Dry Tower B Isolation HS/CS Ioss of DCT B.

Valve 3CC-B203B 63/799 Dry Tower B Bypass HS/CS Loss of DCT B due to flow bypass, Valve 3CC-B2628 64/826 Chiller Coolant HS/CS Valve opening will result in loss of CCWS inventory to ACCWS.

827 Selective Valves Ioss of chiller cooling water with resulting increase in ambient 828 System B temperatures.

3CC-F273B, 3CC-F275B 3CC-F277B, 3CC-F279B 65/922 S.G. No. 1 Sampling Partial loss of inventory from SG 1.

Leakage would be ain'aml.

Isolation Valve 2SL-F602

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G TABLE 4.4-1 Pags 7 of 8 4

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 REQUIRED HODIFICATIONS/ ASSOCIATED CI1CUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAULT FIRE ONLY REMARKS REF N0/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION CO DET DETRIMENTAL EFFF.CT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO IDSS OF COMPONENT Leakage would be minimal.

66/923 S.G. No. 2 Sampling Partial loss of inventory from SG 2.

Isolation Valve 2SL-1604 Leakage would be minimal.

67/929 Steam Line 1 Sampling HS Partial loss of steam from SGl.

Isolation Va. 2MS-F714 68/607 Containment Spray Isolation HS None - Potential for inadvertent spray of containment.

Valve 2CS-F306B 69/610 Containment Spray Pump B HS/CS None - Potential for inadvertent spray of containment.

Ioss of shutdown cooling flow in cold shutdown.

70/2318 Diesel Gen. A HS Spurious start of DG "A".

2319 Control Fever 71/1167 Control Room HS/CS Increase in Control Room temperature resulting from Air Handling thit AH-12 fire could overheat chilled water system.

(3B-SB) 72/

Back-up Dnergency Feedwater HS Valve goes full open. Potential for overcooling to Steam Generator No. I the RCS.

Control Valve 2FWV852A 73/

Condensate Storage Pool HS Loss of CSP long-tern level indication.

Imvel Indicator LI-CD9013AIS 74/

Emergency Feedwater to Steam HS Loss of long-tern EFW flow indication to SG No. 1.

Generator No.1 Flow Indicator FI-FWB330AIS 75/1074 Chilled Water System HS Degradation of Chilled Water System B train.

Isolation Valves 3AC-F1355, 3AC-F143B 3AC-F150B, 3AC-F151B Power to Cabinet CP-49 is cut 76/716 CCW Heat Exchanger "B" HS/CS Loss of ACCW/WCT, B train.

,ff.

thus temp. cont.

Temp. Cont Va. 3CC-TM291B valve 3CC-TM2918 will assume open position.

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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPAhY Page 8 of 3 WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 REQUIRED MODIFICATIONS / ASSOCIATED CIROUITS ANALYSIS CONTROL ROOM / CABLE VAL ~i,T FIRE ONLY HS/CS REF N0/CWD COMPONENT DESCRIPTION COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT Mv.2333 1

77/552 SI Tank 1A Disch.

CS Discharge of one or more SITS into RCS.

SIT valves can te unually Va. ISI-V150STK1A closed.

558 SI Tank 1B Disch.

Va. ISI-V1506TK1B

$64 SI Tank 2A Disch.

va. ISI-V1507TK2A

$70 SI Tank 2B Disch.

Va. ISI-V1508TK2B 78/819 Wet Tower Cross CS loss of safety-related water supply in Wet cooling Tower A basin Valves can be manually Tie Va. 3CC-F284A to backup Wet Cooling Tower B basin.

operated and would only be and 3CC-F265B required during periods of extended HS operation.

l 79/1546 SG #1 Primary FFW HS Ioss of one of two EFW flow paths to SGl.

Utilize Redundant Parallel Isolation Va.

Flow Path.

2FU-V848A 80/1548 SG #2 Pae'-esp EFW HS Loss of one of two EFW flow paths to SG2.

xe Redundant Parallel 4 Fath Isolattoe 2FW-V84 M l

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Page 1 of 2 TABLE 4.4-2 l([

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS (E)

ISOLATION PANEL SIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AVAILABLE - POST CR/CV FIRE REF/CWD C_0MPONENT DESCRIPTION REMARKS 1/382 RCS LEG 2A Charg. Shutoff Viv 1CH-E2504B 1

2/295 Pzr Aux Spray Viv ICH-E2505B 1

3/292 Pzr Proport. HTR's Bank-2 1

4/585 Shtdn Line Warm-Up Viv 2SI-V346B 1

5/592 Shtdn Loop 1 Suct Isol Viv 2SI-V326 1

6/535 LPSI Pump B 1

7/520 LPSI Pump B Miniflow Viv 2SI-E1588E 1

I 8/586 Shtdn HT. Ex. B Isol Viv 2SI-V305B 1

9/587 Shtdn HT. Ex. B Isol V1v 2SI-V308B 1

10/538 Shtdn Temp Contr Viv 2SI-FM349B 1

11/541 Shtdn to Ieg 1A Flow Contr Viv 2SI-V1549Al 1

l 12/542 Shtdn to Leg 1B Flow Contr Viv 2SI-V1539B1 1

13/301 Letdwn Cont Isol Viv 1CH-F2501AB 1

14/327 Volume Contr Tnk Disch'Viv 2CH-V123A 1

15/337 Boric Acid Tnk A Gravity Feed Viv 3CHV106A 1

16/342 Boric Acid Tnk B Gravity Feed Viv 3CH-V107B 1

I 17/917 Sampling Line Isol Viv 2SI-F623B 1

18/918 Sampling Line Isol Viv 2SI-F1569B 2

19/859 D.G.B Stand Pipe Level Control Valve 3CC-E641B 2

20/1002 Charg. Pump B Cooler AH-18 (3B-SB) 3 21/1014 CCW Pump B Cooler AH-10 (3B-SB) 3 22/1021 EFW Pump B Cooler AH-17 (3B-SB) 3 23/1137 Cont Fan Cooler D CCW Inlet Viv 2CC-F156B1 3

24/1137 Cont Fan Cooler D CCW Outlet Viv 2CC-F160B1 3

25/1551 Stm Gen 1 Emerg FW Primary Contr Viv 2FW-V851B 1

26/1547 Stm Gen #1 Emerg FW Back-Up Isol Viv 2FW-V847B 1

27/1549 Stm Gen #2 Emerg FW Primary Isol Viv 2FW-V850B 1

28/1533 Emerg FW Pump B 1

l

.g Pagn 2 of 2 TABLE 4.4-2 (Cont'd)

REF/CWD C0!!i'ONENT DESCRIPTION RDIARKS 29/1536 Emerg FW Pump AB SG2 Stm Shut-Off Viv 2MS-V612B 1

1 30/709 CCW Pump B 1

31/848 Shtdn HT Ex B CCli Outlet Viv 3CC-F131B 1

32/781-795 Dry Tower B Fan 1 - 15 1

33/811-818 Wet Tower B Fan 1 - 8 1

34/1135 Cont Cooler B 1

35/1136 Cont Cooler D 1

36/2359 D.G.B Fuel Oil Transf Pump 3

37/2091 Class 1E N Back-Up Viv 3NG-::t,71-2 2

1 2

38/2093 Class 1E N Back-Up Viv 3NG-E671-4 2

2 39/2095 Class 1E N Back-Up Viv 3NG-E671-6 2

1 2

40/2097 Class lE N Back-Up Vlv 3NG-E671-8 2

2 i

Notes:

(1)

Component's control circuitry will be isolated from the CR/CV fire after affecting the appropriate transfer switch (2)

Component's control circuitry located outside the Control Room fire zone (3)

The Control Room / Cable Vault fire has no effect on the component's control circuitry I

I I

I

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3 F

CLIENT LOUISIANA POWER & LIGilT COMPANY PROJECT WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 SUBJECT SPURIOUS SIGNAL GENERATION ANALYSIS SYSTEM MAIN STEAM SYSTEM NUMBER 78 EQUIPMENT DETRIMENTAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR EFFECT ON SYSTEM /

REQUIRED TO AFFECTED HOT COLD SPURIOUS SIGNAL PLANT'S ABILITY TO MITIGATE SPURIOUS SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT STANDBY STANDBY ACTION SIIUTDOWN ACTION SYSTEMS 2MS-FM630B Yes No Operates None (MS116B)

Does not operate Loss of heat removal 2MS-FM629A DG A&B (SSA 02)

Remaining (opens, closes) capability via S.6.2 EFW Pump A CCWS A&B (SSA 04)

EFW stop and EFW Pump B ACCWS A&3 (SSA 0402) control 2FW-V849A CWS A&B (SSA 0403) valves either 2FW-V853A fail open or remain opera-or tional 2MS FM629A DG A (SSA 02)

Ditto EFW Pump A/B CCWS A (SSA 04) 2MS V611A ACCWS A (SSA 0402) 2FW V849A CWS A (SSA 0403) l 2FW V853A Nitrogen l

EFW T&T Valve EFW Gov Valve I

l E

M M

M AQ FW ATTACilMENT EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED CLIENT LOUISIANA POWTR_&_LT_GJIT COFIPANY 2

PROJECT _WAJERFORD SES Ut{LT._N_Q 3

SUBJECT _S_PJLR_IOUS SIGNAIMRAIION ANALYSIS SYSTm Main Steam SYSTEM NUMBER 78 EQUTPMENT DETRIMENTAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR EFFECT ON SYSTEM /

REQUIRED TO AFFECTED llOT COLD SPURIOUS SIGNAL PLANT'S ABILITY TO MITIGATE SPURIOUS SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT STANDBY STANDBY ACTION S11UTDOWN ACTION SYS_TEMS 2MS-V670 No No Opens None Normal valve position, (MS 120A) trap prevents steam loss Closes None Possible buildup of water in Main Steam line. Safe shutdown will not be impaired if available valve 2MS-V671 will open on high water level in drip pot.

l i

EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED CLIENT __ LOUISIANA POWER & LICHT COMP C PROJECT UATFRFORD RER UNIT NO.

~4 SUBJECT RPURTOUS SICMA1_ C7'ERATION ANAT.YRIS SYSTEM Main Steam SYSTEM NUMBER 78 EQUIPMENT DETRIMENTAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR EFFECT ON SYSTEM /

REQUIRED TO t.FFECTED HOT COLD SPUkIOUS SIGNAL PLANT'S ARTLITY TO MITIGATE SPURIOUS SUPPORTING 20UIPMENT STANDBY STANDBY ACTION SilUTDOWN ACTION SYSTEMS 2MS-V463 No No Opens None Normal valve position, Trap prevents steam loss (MS-120B)

Closes None Possible buildup of water in Rain Steam line. Safe shutdown will not be impaired, if available valve 2MS-V664 will open on high water level in drip pot.

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ATTACIDIENT A-2 KDUIST A>'A POWER & LIGilT COMPANY k\\lERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 60CIAIED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS N:

SliUrDOWN COOLING SYSTEM:

NUMBER 60B ASSOCIATED ESSENTIAL FFCTED DRAWING CABLES /

NON-ESSENTIAL lU1ly1_ENT _,

REFERENCE COMPONENTS (E) (NE)

REMARKS l.1-V1539el CWD-542S 30542G - XB NE l

I-13SB) l l

CWD-542S 30542H - XB NE l

Information Only CWD-542S 30542J - XB NE CWD-552S 30552A - SA E

gt-VISOSTKIA f.

E ~

CWD-552S 30552B - SA E

CWD-552S 30552N - SA NE Spare Heaters are h6 I not required.

',IN I

CWD-552S 30552C - SA E

-al l,

I CWD-552S 30552D - SA E

i;!

CWD-552S 30552E - SA E

i Only one cable is ir scrdce at a time

[

CWD-552S 30552F - SA E

based on transfer

. z.

switch position.

l l

CWD-552S 30552G - SA E

l CWD-552S 30552H - SA E

CWD-552S 30552M - SA NE This circuit providt I

indication only when valve power is lost or disconnectec CWD-552S 305525 - SA E

CWD-552S 30552J - SA NE Information only.

I A. I I

I I

ML20100A028

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