ML20095A540

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 75 to License NPF-58

ML20095A540
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	11/29/1995
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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ML20095A533	List: ML20095A540
References
NUDOCS 9512070176
Download: ML20095A540 (4)

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p UNITED STATES y

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U

wAsnimorow, p.c. sessweet SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO ANENDNENT N0.

75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-58 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUNINATING CONPANY. ET AL.

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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT N0. I l

DOCKET NO. 50-440

1.0 INTRODUCTION

L 30, 1995, The Cleveland Electric l

By letters dated March 24, June 9, and June L

Illuminating Comp.ny, et al. (licensees), proposed an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-58 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1

.(PNPP). The amendment would permit a one-time extension of the performance intervals for certain current Technical Specification Surveillance l

Requirements (SRs). Affected SRs include penetration leak rate tisting, valve i

operability testing, instrument calibration, response time testing, and logic system functional tests. The Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), issued on June 23, 1995, are unaffected by this request because the SR extensions will expire prior to the scheduled ITS implementation.

The lengths of the last refueling outage and the present fuel cycle will cause several SRs to become due prior to the next refueling outage (RFO-5) scheduled to begin no later than February 15, 1996. Performance of the SRs under i

conditions other than a plant shutdown either is not possible or would cause i

the plant to be placed in an undesirable configuration which may increase the probability of a plant trip.

Some SRs whose OPERABILITY requirements include Operational Conditions 4 and 5 l

are scheduled to be performed during the system outage windows that were established to provide " defense in depth." Performance of those SRs prior to scheduled system outage windows would result in extension of critical system outage times, and a corresponding potential increase in accident risk during shutdown.

2.0 EVALUATION

-In a NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) dated August 2,'1993, the extension of the Peach Botton Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 surveillance intervals from 18 to 24 months were evaluated. The one-time surveillance interval extensions that Perry is requesting are less than the six months granted in the Peach Botton SE. The longest surveillance interval extension that Perry is requesting to the latest scheduled beginning of the refueling outage is 51 days. The longest extension that Perry is requesting for certain surveillances to the scheduled end of the refueling outage is 159 days.

9512070176 951129 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P

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, Industry reliability studies for boiling water reactors (BWRs), prepared by the BWR Owners Group, show that the overall safety systems' reliabilities are not dominated by the reliabilities of the logic system, but by that of the mechanical components, which are consequently tested on a more frequent basis.

Since the probability of a relay or contact failure is small relative to the probability of mechanical component failure, increasing the logic system functional test interval represents no significant change la the overall safety system unavailability.

With regard to surveillance extensions for Rosemount transmitters, the NRC in its Peach Botton SE accepted the report, "30 Month Stability Specification For l

Rosemount Model 1152, 1153, 1154 Pressure Transmitters." That report i

supported the extension of the calibration interval for the transmitters from i

18 to 30 months based on a reduction in the drift allowance. The existing l

PNPP setpoint calculations for Rosemount transmitters and associated trip unit l

channels are bounding, and PNPP has adequate allowance in its calculations for l

30 month transmitter drift.

The PNPP reactor protection system (RPS) has redundancy, diversity, and independent trip systems such that a single failure will neither cause nor prevent a required reactor scram. Also, instrumentation failure is a small fraction of the scram failure probability. Therefore, a one-time extension of the RPS response time surveillance intervals is acceptable.

The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) instrumentation response times were reviewed by the licensee, and it determined that there were no failure modes

-which will affect the response time of the instrumentation loop which would not be detected by other surveillances such as channel calibration, channel functional tests, or other techniques. Based on the above, and the redundancy l

and diversity of the ECCS instrumentation, the NRC staff finds that a one-time extension of the ECCS response time surveillance intervals is acceptable.

ECCS undervoltage, degraded voltage, and tiring relays are also proposed to have their surveillances extended. An analysis of drift data for the relays i

j shows that the relay setpoints should remain within their allowable value range for the proposed extension period. Therefore, a one-time extension of the applicable relay SRs is acceptable.

Also, proposed for extension are some offsite and onsite electrical circuit SRs. These SRs involve normal to alternate circuit transfer and diesel generator testing. Four offsite power sources are available to provide power to the 4.16 kV emergency busses. The failure of any one offsite power source does not result in a total loss of offsite power to the bus. The diesel generators are tested monthly and quarterly to show operability. There have been no failures of the diesel generators to start and run since March 1991, and the last 2 performances of the 18 month SRs for the diesel generators resulted in no adverse findings. Therefore, a one-time extension of the 18 month SRs for the diesel generators and transfer circuit testing is acceptable.

Some radiation and leakage detection monitors are also included in the request for surveillance extension. The NRC staff has reviewed the provided monitors A

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drift data information and finds it acceptable for granting a one-time extension of the monitors surveillance intervals.

i Some containment and reactor coolant pressure isolation valves and a reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust valve were also proposed to have their leakage testing extended. The valves exhibited either no leakage or leakage significantly lower than the limits during their last test; therefore, a one-time extension for the next leakage test is acceptable. Some contalement isolation, emergency closed cooling water, and emergency service water valves were proposed to have their automatic actuation SR extended. These selves have redundancy in system performance and are periodically tested in a different manner during power operation. Therefore, a one-time SR extension is acceptable. Additionally, some radiation monitor, containment, sappression pool, and air valves are proposed to have their position indication tests extended. The last two surveillances for these position indications had no failures. Therefore, a one-time extension of the SRs is acceptable.

Some snubber testing is also proposed for extension. Snubber testing is an l

overall part of a ten year inservice testing program. The 18 month testing technical s >ecification requirement is mainly to ensure that testing is conducted tiroughout the ten year period instead of during one discrete time interval. Therefore, a one-time extension of snubber testing to accammodate the projected refueling cutage start and end dates is acceptable.

The annulus exhaust gas treatment system and the control room emergency recirculation system are also proposed to have their 18 month SRs extended into RF05. These systems are tested for operation every 31 days. Because the systems mechanical operation is assured, a one-time extension of the la month SR, that tests the complete systems logic, is acceptable.

f The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request for SR extensions la order to reach and perform the fifth refueling outage in a planned manner including safe shutdown considerations, and based on the above, finds the proposed amendment acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULT &llDH In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERAMON This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change to a surveillance requirenset. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards

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l consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 24919 and 60 FR 42612). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR i

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

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5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

J. Hopkins l

Date: November 29, 1995 l

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