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OCT 2 61983 MEMORANDUM TO: Region III Files FROM:
F. C. Hawkins, Reactor Inspector SUBJECI:
UPDATE ON ALLEGATIONS REGARDING COMSTOCK, BECHTEL AND ZACK CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AT MIDLAND (INDIVIDUAL Z)
On October 21, 1983, W. Key, A. Gautam and I met with Individual Z to take a sworn statement regarding his concerns.
The interview revealed that he was' a former employee of Comstock (Midland site), Bechtel (Ann Arbor), and Zack (Cicero). The issues he raised dealt with (1) improper deficiency trending techniques at Zack, (2) unqualified Comstock personnel performing engineering and quality functions, and (3) inadequate design and construction of instrument tubing and supports by Bechtel and Comstock.
Item (1) has been referred to the Division of Engineering, Management Programs Section.
Items (2) and (3) have been referred to the Division of Engineering, Plant Systems Section.
Individual Z has agreed to accompany Plant Systems personnel to the Midland site to point out the alleged hardware deficiencies.
The results of the inspection of items (1), (2) and (3) will be documented in Report No. 329/83-08; 330/83-08.
The interview also identified potential items of wrongdoing and NRC impro-priety.
Details of these issues have been referred to the NRC Office of Investigation and the Office of Inspector and Auditor.
F. C. Hawkins Reactor Inspector cc:
G. Roy L. Spessard AR. Warnick J. Harrison D..Danielson W. Little C. Williams W. Key 8400170274 840718 PDR FOIA PDR RICE 84-96
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Dear Co.missioners:
On behalf of Mr. E. Earl Kent, who the Gove....e.nt Accountability Project (GAP) represents as counsel, we reqcest that the Cw..issicn review this analysis of the serious mishandling of the NRC inspection / investigation into allegations raised by our clibnt of both specific and generic welding flaws at Sechtel constructed nuclear pcwer plants, garticularly the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations (SDNGS Units 1, 2, and 3).
Further, we request that there be:
(1) a legiti: ate i.Espection and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's welding defect cone.s, and (2) an investigation into the outrageous haniling of Mr. Kent's allegaticas by ancther governrent agency insgector general er independent NRC investigators answering directly to the Ccrmissioners; or (3) a request frcm the Ccnmissioners for a G.O investigatico into Regicn V's handling of this insge:: tion and the deliberate or inadvertent violation of hT inspection precedures and policies thrcr.2ghout the Region.
I.
BACKG:CLND The Govern ent Acconntability Project is a project of the Institute far Policy Studies; h*ashingtcn, D. C.
The purpose of GAP's Citizens and Lecal clinics are to broaden the understanding of the vital role of the public employee, corgerate eqplcyee, and private citzen in preventing waste, cor-Itption, or health and safety concerns. GAP also offers legal and strategic'
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~2-counsel to whistleblcreers, provi&sa unique legal education fer 1ra student interns and public policy stu!ents, brings reaningful ard significant refc
.t to the c,overrrent workplace, and exooses goverrtent acticns that are repres-sive/ wasteful or illegal, or that pose a threat to the health and safety of the American ptblic. ~
Presently, GAP provides a program of nulti-level assistance for governmmt enployees, corporate employees, and private citizens who report illegal, wasteful or inproper actions. GAP also regularly nonitors govern-mental reforms, offers expertise to Executive Branch offices and agencies, and state and local governmental bodies, and responds to recuests by Cong ess and state legi_slatures for analysis of legislation to rake goverrcent nere acx:ountable to the public.
In March 1982, GAP's Citizen Clinic became actively involved with the Midland Nuclear Power Plant. The Lcne Tree Ccuncil had requested GAP to pursue allegations frczn workers of major proble.ms at the Midland plant.
-c After our preliminary investigation, we cer: piled six affidavits which we filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982. One of these affidavits was frcxn Mr. E. Earl Kent; (Exhibit 1).
Mr. Kent's allegations included concerns about tw:) other ruclear p:mer plants that he had worked cn -- San Onofre in Califcrnia and Palisades, also in Michigan. In keeping with our policy of full disclosure, we included
- references to Mr. Kent's other allegations in his affidavit.
After several renths of no action, Mr. Kent made a personal trip to the NRC Region III headquarters to check on the status of the NBC investigation into his allegaticos. Mr. Kent was sa disturbed by the re-cepticn he received that he called the GAP cffice frcIn the first pay phone after he left the Region office.
I detailed his concerns, as well as cur cu.,, in a let.ter to the Regional Aininistrator Mr. James G. Keppler en Septexber 6,1982.' (Exhibl.t 2).
Mr. Kent also atte.Tpted to independently pursue his concerns about the San Onofre facilities upon his return to California. He contacted the utility, Southern California Edison, and also made direct contact with the i
site Ocality Control office in early and mid-Septecber.
Finally, after alnost two years of working within the industry ard regulatory systam, Mr. Kent agreed to talk to a reporter frcm the Ics Angeles Tires. The rep:cter had learned of Mr. Kent's allegations from the Alliance for Survival, a public interest organization in Southern California.
On Octcber 13,14, and 15 there were ninerous news stories about Mr. Kent's allegaticos at the three facilities.
(Exhibit 3)..
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_3 The day following the stories Mr. Kent was contacted by the Region V inspectors who had previously ignored, er re ai.ed ignorant, of his allegations. These NBC contacts cane after Mr. Kent had again offered his assistance and information on serious welding flaws.
Mr. Kent agreed to meet with the Rec [ ion V inspectors and drove tn meet with them on October 15, 1982.
In a lengthy discussion with Mr.
Kent it was decided that a prerequisite for any detailed contact with the NRC would be either a witness, a perscnal tape-recording, or the agreement by the NRC inspection team to adhere to the advice of Mr. Kent's counsel and provide copies of the unaltered tapes and a transcript of the sane iratediately following the meeting. Further, it was agreed that Mr. Kent should not sign'a statement until it had been reviewed by counsel.
Two days later two NPC inspectors a;peared at Mr. Kent's hone and insisted that he sign a 'five-page statement that they had prepared frcrn their notes of the Octcber 15 meeting. Mr. Kent revieaed the statsant, rrade changes, however, he wisely delayed signing the staterent prior to review by counsel.. (Dchibit 4).
J After our review of the statements, as well as receiving much nere detailed infonration frcra Mr. Kent, we inferred the Nr. - both Region III 1
and Region V - that Mr. Kent would be supplying an expcnded affidavit of his allegations.
He, and his counsel, also made it quite clear to then I
that this affidavit would be 'forthecrning after the tapes were received and reviewed.
i The tapes and the transcripts were alrest inpossible to cbtain.
Mr. Kent, after giving up cn the NPC's voluntary,ccnpliance, had to file a Freeirn of Infonraticn request.
(Ddubit 5).
The NRC IDIA offica contacted me on Noverrber 30 to apologize for the delay in the celivery of the tap 2s.
They were not aware of the fact that they had beer promised to Mr. Kent as part of the legal agreement bet' ween Regicn V investigators and hirself prior to the original interview.
The Of'fice 'of Investigations (OI) indicated that there had been a misunderstanding between OI and the IE Regional office about the "right of Mr. Kent to have the tape." In fact, it had been the basic groundrules of Mr. Kent agreeing to talk to the NRC without counsel present.
4 Meanwhile, Fegion V officials concluded their inspection / investigaticn into Kent's ally t.l e. Ulthout even the courtesy of notifying Mr. Kent or his counsel, Region V released their inspection report at a much p61icized j
press ccaference.
i 1/ The tape of the reeting and transcript are referred to in this letter as " transcript."
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l The sa.e day, Bechtel and Southern California Edis:n (SCI) also I
issued a press release discrediting Mr. Kent's allegatic.s, and nrning other potential whistlebicwrs frcm exposing inferratica. The Bechtel release sends a clear ressage:
It would seem.inascapable that another predact of the Kent affair should bh ' increased public skel6tidisn:
skepticis:n about the integrity
.and motives of so-called whistleblowers and skepticism abcut the anti-nuclear groups that use both whistleblewers and the rnedia.
Not until several days after the public pdess conference did GAP receive the November 30 inspection report. crthe transcript of the seven-hour meeting. Mr. Kent has since supplied us with in-depth infor: nation and apprcpriate, technical data frcrn the professional codes that describe and detail his concerns.
Independent welding engineers and other experts have revieaed Mr. Kent's allegations frczn the tech:acal application of his r: ore theoretical ecncerns.
On Dece:rber 14 and 15, and on March 24, 1923, GAP filed, on behalf of Mr. Fant, five Freedc:n of Inforration (FOIA) regeests for doctrentation which could shed substantial light en both the allegations therselves and hcw the NE ca.e to its cran swift conclusion.
The IDIA regaests were for the folheingbodies of inforration:
--TOIA regoest 82-614:
for the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigation into the release of a draft inspection report to a licensee in February 1982.
(Received).
--FOIA regaast 82-617:
into a De::erber 30, 1980 inspectien/ investigation by Pegicn III ancVor Region IV's vendor ins-Micri tea a into Syste s Control-1 Corporation and Magnetics, Inc. ~ (Referred to Departrent of Justice for prosecution.)
FOIA request 82-616: for all background infor:ratica into two 1980 i
Region III inspections at Midland.
(Feceived).
i FOIA request 82-618:
for all background inforratica connected with the Neverber 30,1982 "Special NRC Inspection at San Onofre." (Appealed).
--FOIA request 83-154:
for all doc =ents developed in the proces'ing s
of IDIA 618 (Received)..- -o The inforhabon'obthnM as a result of the FOIA request, the list of doctrents withheld, and the IDIA office's specific answers to questions have shed significant light on how the NRC's massive inspection effort Iranaged to totally discredit Mr. Kent perscnally and professionally, as well as fail to resolve Mr. Kent's allegations.
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Informaticn obtained further leads us to the conclusion that Pegica v
.itself (1) fails to reet even minimer. standards of inspection and investi-gation adequacy; (2) had seriously disregarded the laws and policies
- of the Freedcm of Inforraticn Act, (EDIA) 5 USC 552, the Destruction of Documents Act, and'the legislative-intsnt of both; (3) has violated Co.rrission policies regarding prior ccrmenication about inspection findings to utility personnel. The later finding potentially affects the adequacy of NRC inspections and investigations at all nuclear pcuer plants in Region V during the past 22 months.
II.
REQUEST IDR AN INVESTIGATION BY THE GOVEEN ACCDUNTING OFFICE INIO TriE NRC REGICN V IEh7 INSPECTION The Kent inspection effort is evidence of re;;ulation and enforcement at its worst. GAP urges the CcmTission to put the credibility of the agency at-large above ccrrait: rent to an internal investigatica section that has fostered a deep distrust among both agency e:rployees and the public.
We urge the serious consideration of the Co:: mission to voluntarily request an independent investigation of the inspection / investigation p licies in Region V by either the GAO or another gcVerr nent agency Inspor General.1 A review of the mishandling of the Kent inspection / investigation will indicate i
the ne ssity for im ediate reinspection effort.
NRC Reprt nt=bers 50-206/82-31, 50-361-82-31, dated Nove6er 30,1982, and 362/82-27 dated October 5,1982, document the results of inspections
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conducted in Septeder 1982 and frcm October 15 through Neverber 15, 1982 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations (ENGS).
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Ibcuments discovered through a thoroughFreedom of Information Search, Public Doctnents Room (PDR) search, and extensive interviess with Mr. Kent and other Bechtel enplcyees provide further details pertair.ing to Mr. Kent's i
allegations as well as the failure of the Regional office to conduct a j
minimally adequate inspection into his charges.
I A.
'I'he NRC insoection recort (" Kent recort") erovides inadecuate dccumentation. Our concerns about the Kent investigation can be divided
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2nto two categories. First, the allegations of generic welding problems within the Bechtel nuclear construction programs. Mr. Fent's allegations, l
although briefly outlined in the affidavit that Mr. Kent subrtitted through GAP to the NIC in June 1982 regarding the Midland plant, are cmplicated and technical.
In lay terms, we are finding that Bechtel welding codes, in scme instances, cb not meet the standards as set by the various professicnal associations. As you knew, cerrpliance with the professional codes is a baseline requirement of nuclear construction regulation.
lother government agencies have used this method to perform investigations' into their internal affairs when public credibility.and a fair investigatien 1
effort were required.
See Exhibit 6, Washincton Post account of the Departmer of Housing and Urban Develegnent (HUD) into the Inspector General of the l
Department of Agriculture.
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L The second category, although separate frcm the actual hardware issues,,is the question of the NRC's technical revie4 of the issues raised by Mr. Kent / For exa.ple, although Regicn V requested assistance frcm the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) 'o evaluate the te:Mical details of Mr. Kent's allegaticns, it ap,oears that, in fact, no indeoendent review was done.
Under the Freedcm 5f Information Act we requested and received the cramunications, notes, mercoranda, etc., that surrounded the issues raised by Mr. Kent. Review of these docnr:ents found a circular l
trail of verification.that simply relied on the industry - both Bettitel _
and Southern California Edison - to interpret and explain Mr. Kent's allegations away..We have found no evidence of independent analysis of review by the NRC.
TheKenEReport,issuedbyRegionVonNove-ber 30, 1982, ccmes to the conclusion that "no items of Non-compliance were identified."
(Report, i
at 1). This ccnclusion is allegedly based on 218 inspect. ion hours by three regional inspectors and investigators "of allegations concerning design inadequacies and defi,ciencies in inplementation of welding codes and standards" (Kent Report, at 1).
i Upon review of the docpnentaticn compiled by the agency as proof of its position, GAP discovered that regional inspectors / investigators only j
documnted - through tape recorded interviews - three of p 47 witnesses that were allegedly interviewed in their inspection effort.
These interviews
, ere of Mr. E. Earl Kent, Mr. Donald Martin, and Mr. Wocdy Lahr. Of these w
three intervicas, only the tape of Mr. Kent was transcribed at the request of his counsel, and _cbtained,only after an unacceptable delay (see pp 3-4 of this letter). The interview tune made up approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> of interviess i
j conducted by three inspectors / investigators. Of the interviews with the reraining 44 witnesses, no interview notes were kent, or such notes were destroyed, or the interviess were never conducted.
In the case of 14 of the witnesses, no intervice notes were kept, and 4
i the interviews were probably never conducted. Through the final responsa j
to our request through mIA 618, we were told that:
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"...the interviews mentioned in the report were cenducted ufilJe i
the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written j
staterents ot'her than the three that have already been provided to j
you were prepared."
'Ihe draft of Utis let.ter cbtained through MIA 164 (Exhibit 7) explains j
much more gra,uitically the reality of the casualness with which the NRC inspectors " gathered evidence" to dispecue Mr. Kent's allegaticns:
"the interviews mentioned in the report were conducted while the j
inspectors were walking through the plant..." (emphasis added) Exhibit 8.
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AThe Kent Report, Individuals Contacted, Page 1, Paragra;h 1, lists 33 Bechtel, Southern California Edison, University Mechanical Engineers and Constructors, as contacted. NIC letter March 21, 1983 frca J.M. Felton to Billie Garde in response to mIA 82-618 identifies 14 other individuals, previously defined in i
the Kent Report as "other individuals" as six pipefitters, one pipe fitter i,
supervisor, two welders, six Bechtel quality control welding inspectors.
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In fact, the gaestion of written intervieas of the Yent inspection rerains a key issue in our request for an independent i..vestigatica into the handling of this inspection effort.
Clearly the inferation cbtained fran all of the sources could have shed censiderable light on the adequacy of the inspection.
Yet, if the intervieas were conducted, there is no record of the statements at all.
If the Region V inspectors had not dccu mented any of their intervieas, the argtrent that regional Eclicy prevented retenticn of interview notes would :ossibly have some credibility; however, 1
the intervieas conducted of Kent, Lahr, and Martin all produced tapes, notes, and an interview information log. The lack of substantial evidence leads us to believe there is no validity to the Regional inspectors claim that Kent's allegations were "not substantiated."
The publid simply cannot be expected to accept the Fent report as an adequate inspection effort.
Nor, should the Comnissicn itself tolerate an inspectica effort that does not meet its cran inspecticn standards.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 1000'" Inspection Reports" states as its Policy (1005-02)
The basic policy is to provide a written record of inspections.
The primary purposes of the written rmd are to:
(1) p'rovide a basis for enforce, ment action and convey the results of the inspection to the licensee or vendor, and (2) provide inferration for management of the inspection program within'the Office of Inspection and Enforce:nent. Secendary purposes are to provide inforation to other NRC offices and to the general public.
That staterrent is further clarified in a March 8,1983 letter to 1
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chairran of the Subcn tr.ittee on Oversight ~
l and Investigations of the Cc:mittee of Interior and Insular Affairs fran NRC Chairran Nunzio Palladino, In response to the question:
"Does the Co::missicn require written i
su raries of meetings related to an investigation, but not with persons who are the subject of that investigation?" the Ccanissioner replied:
"NRC policy requires written sur.raries of meetings with repre-sentatives of organizations or individuals under investigation.
With respect to contacts with persons who are the subject of an investigati,:n or who ray have information relevant to the investi-gation (interviewees), it is NBC polf.c which relate i.c 1.Tc investigations."^ y to docc ent interviews
_MRC policies that differentiate between inspections And investigations do l
not appear to be substantially different in the docenentaticn requirerents.
According to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, Mr. Richard DeYoung, as explained at a public neeting (March 9,1983 re: Regionalization)
I&E inspectors keep " detailed notes of their interviras which can be used for enforcement considerations."
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-g-To illustrate the abuse of undocurented intervieas in the Kent report the following exanple is included:
In the inspection into Mr. Kent's concerns about the abuse of scribe marks en' piping for socket weld fit up reasure.ents (Kent Report at 6), the fol3owing explanaticn stands as the sole documentation of their inspection offort:
The inspector interviemd several pipefitters to determine if pipe / tubing cutters were erar used by them or others on their crews to rake. socket weld scribe rarks. The pipefitters stated that none of them had ever used pipe cutter er tubing cutters, nor..
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had t. hey ever seen one used cn site, or make the scribe marks used in socket weld fitup measurecents. All of the fitters intervieaed stated that they had received specific instructions, at the beginning of tneir enploynent onsite, that prchibited the use of pipe / tubing cutters for raking the socket weld fitup scribe marks. All pipe fitters interviewed had worked at San Onofre sin the 1974-1977 time period. Therefore, the inspector mncbv% that such use of pipe / tubing cutters was not an estabf.ishec practim arong the crafts.
Not only are there no interviews, notes, logs, scaries, or any other verification of what the above referenced pipefitters said, there is also no idea of how many pipe fitters there are at San Onofre, and how many i
pipefitters could have used pipe cutters. The inspector's conclusion does t
not stand up to the most genercras extension of inspection criteria. Unfortunately, the inspecters centinued their undocunented reap through unidentified prsonnel piscing together a ecx pletely unsubstantiated conclusion. Had the inspectors kept interview logs and smaries, it would be possible to rake an -
intelligent overview of the adequacy of the inspection interviews. However, as the undcc=ented dialogue indicates, the inspe: tors relied solely on the word of enployees who were not under oath, did not have to prcduce doctrrentation, did not have to sign a statement, did not have to even attach their nane (with l
or without a request for confidentiality) and are cc:pletely unaccounuble i
for thsir statements. Certainly nuclear whistleblcreers such as Mr. Kent would never be allowed the type of looseness used in this report to discredit serious concerns.
Even recre incredible is the flippant use of the term " interview" in the Kent report to establish the alleged "unsubstantiation" of Mr. Kent's cha.,.ges:
"To detemba the practices and criteria used by inspectors in the inspection process of socket welded' fittings, the inspector interviewed Welding Oaality Control Engineers (WCCE) and their Supervisors these interviews established that the ECEs did nob
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utilize pit gages in all cases to verify ca.eliance with the 5% of nominal wall criteria. These intervices also established that if the WQCIs observed cases tihere the scribe line locked excessively deep, a pit gage was used to dete=ine
..the depth of the ra:k and establish confomance with the 5% of ncadnal wall criteria.
The WCCEs and crafts personnel were "kncwledgeable" of acceptance criteria and limits in the cond:ctof their particular activities."
(Kent Report, at 6).
Other examples of the use of undocumented interviews clearly de onstrate that the NRC inspectors relied on the unsubstantiated infomation gained from other SCE/BechtgI employees to discredit Mr. Kent's charges:
" Discussions with cognizant Bechtel Quality Control inspectors inciicated that are strikes on the weld: ent are routinely renoved-as a matter of coursa because such welds dicontinuities inhibit weld examination."
(Report, at 19).
and "Bechtel perscnnel state that M&QS raintains several different editions of the procedures and specifications and that it is the responsibility of the appropriate site discipline project engineer to order that edition which is to be used at each particular. site."
(Report at 30).
'1he inclusion of unsubstantiated or undocumented interviews is an unacceptable inspection or investigation methcdology in any case. Wnen the subject of the investigaticn is the safety of a nuclear pcwer plant, the shoddy inspection practices utilized in this report are inexcusable.
C.
The search through the docments provided under 'the various Freedxt of Infor; ation Requests as well as a thorouch search of public doc a ents available in the Public Docments RocIn indicate that Recian V officials purposely or inadvertently violated the mIA, 5 USca552.
(1)
On Deceniber 14 we filed a Freed:m of Info Ination request for all doccents" prepared by U.S. Government enployees in connection with a Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Ins;:ection and Enforcs ent report dated Naverber 30, 1982 and entitled "Speci:1 :.cpcction of San Onofre #1, 2, and 3."'In particular Mr. Kent requests a.u earlier full or partiil drafts and/or preposed supple:ents to the report, as well as all records related to any deletions, from its fdmal versien."
O e
, On January 13, 1983, GAP received its first respense to EDIA 82-618.
The agency, in describing its anraer as a partial respense, prcr/ided 19 doceents -- many.of Wich were already public infernation.
On February 15, l' we received a further response. This provided 25 coctrrents.
It also gave us the first indication that there was a serious proble:n in the ability of the agency to provide the draft reports which we had recuested in our initial
- response. The letter stated:
"In your letter and in a telephone conversation with Carol Reed you requdsted inforration on drafts and final inspartion report.
Ms. Reed has contacted Region V and has been informed that no drafts of the report exist. The report was typed on a word processing rachine and when the drafts were corrected and the new versions proofed, the old versions were destroyed."
Through continuing conversations with IDIA office and Region V perscnnel involved with the inspection, it became in:reasingly clear that none of the substantiating doceents would be prcduced voluntarily under our IDIA repest.
That fear was confirmed by the final agency respnse received March 21, 1983.
h at letter stated:
"In a telephone conversation on March 10,1983 with Carol Ann Reed, you again inquired about the existenz of drafts of the report and also inquired about doctrentation for the interviews which were cenducted in addition to the Kent, Lahr and 1%rtin interviews. You specifically rentiened the reference to "several" interviews in the report.
"Mr. Bobby Faulkenberry, Deputy Regional Administration, Region V, was contacted by telephone on March 10, 1983, and he has info:med me that previous drafts cf the re;crt were destroyal at the time succeeding drafts were prepared. He also informed ne that the interviras nuntioned in the report were conducted while the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written statenents other than the three that have already been provided to you were prepared. He further stated in reference to the word "several" that the inspectors recall they talked to six pipe fitters, one pipe fitter supervisor, two welders, and six Bechtel quality control welding inspectors.
The inspectors' notes, which are not agency rec =rds and which are not required to be retaired by agency practice or procedures, were destroyed by the inspectors at the time the report was finalized."
he position was clarified in a conference call on March 23, 1983 between Washington IDIA officials, Region V officials and myself. At that time I requested a clarification of the incensistent ;csition taken on the existence of drafts of the Kent report and interview sumaries or notes of the other witnesses. Region V acknowledged that there, in fact, had been interview notes o
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. and sumaries prepared of some of the individuals contacted, but that i
these notes had been destroyed. They also indicated that there had been at least two final drafts of the report which were not destroyed ung i
after the public issuance of the final report en Dececber 10, 1982.
After an even nere 'therough reviEe of the raterials provided to us under MIA, we have determined that other docments ressensive to' cur request nust still exist in Regien V files. W have filed an appeal of the agency's FOIA decision on 618 today. Exhibit 9.
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(2) The destruction of agency docu: Tents relative to insoection efforts.
j The tr.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission Inspection and Enforce.ent Manual states in Section 1005-20 " Disclosure to the Public," the following I
in Paragraph 201:
"Except for certain safeguard inspections, all final i
inspction reports will be routinely disclcsed to the i
public. Althcugh draft inspection reports will not be j
disclosed cn a routine basis, they will be available to unrbers i
of the pablic t=en re:uest." (erphasis adied).
3 Clearly the agency's own policies do not make provisions for destructica y
of draft reports because the Regional Office has the' convenient use of a l
word processor.
.'Ij If this were an isolated incident, perhaps the Ccverment Accountability Project staff would not be as concerned about this cbvious violation of agenr, 3
policy. However, Mr. Falkenberry specifically irdicated on at least two occasions that the destruction of draft re;crts and inte:viet rotes was
" regional policy."
f (3) Release of draft retorts.
il Curiously, the other trajor item of concern about the inspe: tion and investigaticn policies of Region V also concern draft reports. But in the seccnd case the violation of agency policy centers around draft re;crts being given to licensees prior to the issuance of enforcecent action. This led, in at least one case, to the downgrading of enforcement action as a result of prior agency notificaticn.
IG1P has a confidential witness kho reviewed the report in draft form prior to issuance of the final agency report. Although our witness is not willing to go public at this time, he/she will agree to talk to govern::ent investigat who are looking into this if they are not NFC internal investigators.
O
I
' 2 4.
The inspecticn and investigaticn practices of Re-ion V m.:st be reviewed and brought u:xier cer. trol by the Cc:r.ission.
It is hignly suspect that the same inspectors and inyestigators who find it appropriata to share enforcernent irifornation with the targets of their investigations not even bother retaining inspecticn information a.5:out allegations of
. serious defects and construction flaws.
In this instance, Mr. Kent became i
the target of inspection / investigation rather than a source of inferraticn.
Region V has turned the NRCs inspection and enforce.ent policies into a i
charade.
1 D.
Inadequate Site 'Ibur Ch many occasions Mr. Kent volunteered to point out on both the ENGS and the Midland site areas where the welding problems were :rcst extensive.
One instance of this was during the October 15, 1982 interview. At that,
time, Mr. Kent was told that nuclear witnesses are not permitta:1 cn construction sites for the purpose of identifying prchlems. Finally on i
october 25, 1982, at the request of the KRC, Mr. Kent was pezmitted to tour the site to indicate the exact locations regarding the welding inadequacies.
The tour was virtually neritless. Mr. Kent was accx::panied by an NBC I
inspector, a regional NBC supervisor, and KRC investigator.and several
}
staff members of SCE and Bechtel. He was pezmitted to tcrar only a preselected i
Furthernore, Mr. Kent was denied the use of any inspection tools area.
including a ladder, fillet weld gages, notes, measuring eqaip ent, pen, pencil, etc.
If the NRC had wanted an illustrative site tour by Fr. Xe.t to identify
- specific exanples of problems, then they would have prcuided him with the necessary doctnents, equiptent, and tine. On the contrary, they provided him with a walk through tour which amounted to a public relations sham.
Even at that, Mr. Kent identified problers to both industry and NRC inspectors. These inclu*ed:
- transition slopes frcrn the body of nuclear valves (and other equiptent) to the connecting pipes were too steep an incline. The actual slope was I'
abcut a 45 degree angle, dereas the AS:G code raxi:r.:m at the tine the j
' contracts were signed, was less than 20 degrees maxinum.
4 Mr. Ka.nt.p:i,t:d out that IM JOINIS STILL EXIST AS PARTIALLY -
NELDED, INDOUBIEDLY IN T}OUSANDS OE' PLACES. MTl OF TiESE JOINTS DID 3
)
Nor HAVE THE REQUIRED END REILTS ON THE NELDS. SCRE ERE EVIN FOUND ON CRITICAL CX]OLING MA':ER PIPE SUPMRTS.
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Evidence of Malice and Deliberate Undemining of 10 C.F.R. Part 19
^
tr/ OI Investigator Omn Shackleten (Pacion V) and Ja es Foster (Recion III (1).10 C.F.R. Part 19 states:
~
The NRC is amending its regulations in regard to job protection for egloyees who provide inferration to the Conmission. These amendnents enphasize to exployers - that is, licensees, pemitteas, applicants, and their contractors and subcontractors - that temination or ccher acts of job discrimination against employees who engage in activities b.
fythering the purposes of the Atcmic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act is prohibited.
On Septernber 7,1982, Mr. Kent talked to Bechtel officials. On Septe ber 1 1982, SCE and Bechtel notified the NRC about the allegations and the.NRC resolutions. On October 6,1982, Region V was contacted by Mr. John O' Dell of the I,os Anceles Times regarding Mr. Kent's allegations. On Octcber 13, 1982, Mr. Owen Shackleton contacted Mr. James Foster, Pegion III OI. The ha 6 written notes of that teleccm (Exhibit 10) are'particularly enlightening and.shed light on the eventual outcome of the Region V investigation, and potentially the Region III investigation. A review of these notes are particularly disquieting. Scrne conrnents, listed belew, prove to be the basis for Mr. Shackleton's entire line of questioning with Mr. Kent at his Oc+h 15,1982 interview.
(2)
CcrTaents by Foster, as written by Shackleton (Attachment B-4' to IDIA 618):
a.
" Spent a great deal of time investigating Kent's allegations."
This is simoly not true. The only time Mr. Foster spent on Mr. Fant's allegaticas was during a March 1982 conference call and when Mr. Kent cam on his cwn initiative to the Region III office in August 1982 and spent apprcxirate <
two hours with Foster. Foster asked no gaestions regarding specific details or I concerns about Midland, beyond the affidavit provided to the NRC.
l Prior to that, the only Region III inspection into Kent's allegations was conducted in March 1982 by Mr. Kevin Ward. Three of the four issues raised
- before Kent left the Midland site were dis:nissed at the time, but are under a second review by Ragico III. Further, a large nunber of Kent's Midland allegations dealt with the untrained and uncertified welders, and with the refusal of Bechtel gc inspectors to identify the prcble:ns and issue corrective action (NCRS).
Both of these prcblems were stated recently in Mr. J. G. Kepple:
Ietter of Notification notifying Consumers Power Cocpany of a $120,000 fine against the utility as a result of a " quality assurance irnplementation breakdow:
i (b)
" People consider him strarsje.'
This statenent, possibly libelous, again ir: plies that Kent is sinply a trouble.u ker,regardless of the merits of his allegations.
- c. ".Mr. Kent Is Suroesed 'Io Be a Mel g Engineer.
This statement is neither relevantnor accurate. Mr. Kent holds a Diplcma.
in Structural Engineering, has had forty years of practical experience in engineering and welding.
(See sum.ary of Mr. Kent's es.perience.)
He was a ember of the American Society for Quality Control until his dismissal from Bechtel. Regardless, Mr. Kent is required by both federal law and industrial policy to report all violations of construction regulatiens.
It is both crude and inappropriate for the NRC to attack his personal qualifications, as the means to discredit his allegations.
d, Industry slander included in NRC investigative file.
The GAP investigation revealed evidence that the h7C actively sought or incorporated unsubstantiated inforratien regarding Mr. Kent.
In a telephone menorandum fmn O. Shackleton, Tom Bishop advised that Burns and Roe Engineers stated that:
" Kent was fired at Litton Industries because his performance was atrocious and he had high absenteeism.
When fired Kent made a seventeen-page telegram to President Ni.xon alleging that ships were sa full of faults they would trake a bunch of Navy widcws."
(Exhibit 11.)
GAP's independent investigatica into the Barns and Roe allegations reveal that their attack on Mr. Kent was itself doubtful. Burns and Roe are heavily involved withpany Bechtel construction projects, incitding San Onofre.
Suffice it to that it is obvious that the ccm ents suppled by Mr. Foster to Mr. Shackletcn poisoned the Region V investigation from the beginning. A review of Shackleton's questions is evidence that he first " destroyed" Mr. Kent, using techniques and gossip tidbits frcrn Fcster.
(See in particular the first 30 pages of the~ Transcript.M
'Ihe Kent inspection was Curtailed and Prejudiced at the Onset h F.
SCE and Bechtel Influence.
A reviea of the internal correspondence regarding the NRC's inspection of Kent's allegaticns gives chilling insight into the mindsat with which the SIC began the Kent investigation / inspection effort.
Examples are listed belcw:
l
- Meeting notes, 10/14/82, frczn a Region V meeting, state 'the following (Exhibit 12),.,
4 i
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_1/ The 257-page transcript of the NBC/ Kent neeting is available in the PDR l.
under EDIA request no. 618.
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(1)- Interview Kent for all his concerns.-
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(2) Need full investigative support.
(3) Technical positions in Pagion III and V have to be the sc.e.
(Engelken)
~
(4)
Have NRR reaffirm their position on the ASE Ccde.(e.phasis adde 5).
(5)
Call Fitzgerald/ Ward and discuss the matter with him. (Exhibit 12).
Report #82-27, Oct. 5, 1982, was the~ initial (pre-pablicity) NRC review of Southern California Edison's questions to resolve Kent's allegations.
The rep rt states:
'"n e inspector revieaed the licensee's actiens to resolve these allegations by discussions with licensee personnel and examination of cbetrnentation.
The licensee acpeared to have taken cer:prehensive investigation action and adequately addressed all issues. The licensee's investigation did not substantiate any allegation."
Unfortunate 1yr it is this cursory review of the licensee's self-examir.ation that provides the basis for the NT's, position'.
In a Ncnember 17,, 1982, Vero for Thcznas M. N:vak from William K. Johnston,
Subject:
Allegations by Earl Kent concerning adequacy of weld ents at San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3," the follcwing state ent confinrs the lack of independent analysis of Mr. Kent's technical concerns.
"Se review has included:
(1) inte: viewing the people wto accompanies Mr. Kent on a valk-thrcogh tour of the plants...,
i (2) repeating the tour and inspecting those welds which he pointed out were of concern to him, (3) review of the documents provided by the applicant de::enstrating co pliance with the
. applicable codes.
We conclude that there is no merit in the allegations made by Mr., Kent, and rec.w.e-d that no further action be taken. The Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) provided docunentation to refute the allegations by Mr. Kent. This doctraentation was gathered and assEblai without B?C having the specific allegations by Mr. Kent as emessed in his state::ents. The doctrrentation was thorough, and refuted all of the allegations."
'Ihe recent "Pequest for Technical Assistance," Octcber 29, 1982, fnzn Jesse L. Crews, Director, Divisica of Pesident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs to Mr. Darrell Eisenhut, Director of the Division of Licensing, states the inspection priorities of the NBC.
(Exhibit 13).
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the inspection priorities of t.he NRC.
(Exhibit 13)
"It is cr.2r intention to have a satisfactcry resolution on all 3,f the allegations by Mr. Kent prior to license issuance for
' San Onofre Unit 3, tentatively.estirated by Region V as Noverber 15, 1982. Your assistance in this time frare would'. be appreciated."
Ciniously Kent's inspecticn had a predetermined tineframe!
III. The specific technical concerns raised by Mr. Xent have not been adecuately investigated or they have been cbfuscated by NRC rhetoric which icnores key issues that Mr. Kent is raising about welding at nuclear pcwer plants.
The fo11cwing technical items are recorded in the order that they are includ in the "KEfr report" issued Noverber 30th by Pegion V.
After each allegation a review of the inspection's effort is provided. Tnis section of the analysis has been develcped by engineers frcrn several disciplines, as well as reviewed with representatives of the professional crganizations involved with Mr. Kent's code vio1'ation concerns.
Mr. Miguel A. Pulido, a nechanical engineer, served as technical coordinator of the evaluatica of the data provided:
A11eration:
4 8.a.
" Pipe fitters scretires use pipe cutters to rake scribe rarks for socket weld fit-up reasurements. These scribe rarks caused grooves in both stainless and carbon steel pipes about 1 inch back frczn the weld area.
I am ccn Ined that these grooves might cause stress raisers. These conditions exist cn socket welded fittings at ran&xn in Units Z and Y, and possibly a few in Units 1 and 2.
Contrary to the NRC conclusions, there is at least on case which substan-tiates this allegation in the NRC's CMn report.
"One' instance was identified, to the inspector, where a pipe cutter had been used to scripe a pipe."
This is a perfect exa:Tpla of what the allegation refers to. In this particalar case, a Ncnconformance Feport(NCR) No. F3330 was generatsi. The
' pipe in question here was A of the Auxiliary Feedeater Systan at Unit 3 and
)
has been repaired.....
Peor investigative practices are deconstrated in the additiant.1 response to <
"several of the fittings [ gator cnly reasured the depth of scribe ner this allegation. The investi SEGS has thousands of such welds and nore than several should have been inspect for notch depths. Ntraerous ccr: plaints have been rade by our organization about the NRd's lack of using statistical sa pling rethods to determine the ntrrber of items required to take an accurate sa::ple, and the techniques used to jtx5ge the results of that sanple.
. A large porticn of the response to the allegaticn' deals with the 5% criterf limit. Bechtel Engineers performed calculations to shcw that stress raisers cat This enti-by notches havihg this 5% depth would be within code design margins.
approach does not address the allegation. The allegation did not conte:d that. '
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"I am concerned that these grooves might cause stress raisers."
There is no question that they cause stress raisers.
What the NRC investigator ~sh~ uld have done is to inspect a o
reasonable sample"of socket welded fittings and examine all of those fittings to determine the depth of the marks (grooves or notches).
6 Allegation:
i 8.b.
"Bechtel designers use fillet welds on connections "of beams in pipe supports and tray hangers and do not weld all around the joint to restrain forces in all directions.
I feel this is a code violation.
No prototype tests to my personal knowledge were conducted to verify the adequacy of welds.
There-fore, the actual structural strength of the electrical tray hanger / tube steel welds used or the actual mate-rial at SONGS may not be truly known.
This also ap-plies to the pipe supports.
I also feel that the often partial joint strength (less than full joint integrity) and failure to weld all around the joint is a generic problem.
Unfortunately, and in my opinien, the codes do not always demand full strength. welding, whether all around or not."
This allegation concerns three separate issues:
(1) fillet welds; (2) the failure to weld 100% around the joints; and (3) prototype testing.
The NRC determined that these allegations were deemed to be " unsubstantiated."
Yet, the NRC Regional report deals only with the failure to weld all around joints and does not discuss either th fillet welds problem or prototype. testing.1/
The NRC report clearly refers to the NRR report
- as justification for Staff reso-lution of,the, allegations raised in paragraph 8 Yet, upon review, the NRR report deals only with the fillet weld and not with the failure to weld 100% around the joints.
Neither the NRC rkport nor the NRR review cites any professional codes which contradict Mr. Ken 1/ n fact, the report (p. 10) does substantiate Mr. Kent's I
allegation that no prototype testing was done.
"The alleger's con-tention that no prototype testing was conducted...was substantiated.
~
The Staff, however, adopts the judgment and explanation of the desig without question.
Yet, both the ASME and ANS professional codes we have reviewed clearly state that prototype testing is a requirement, not an option of construction engineering.
The Bechtel/stE explanat does not even refer to ASME/AWS codes, the codes that Mr. Kent p6 int out have been violated, but instead to the American Institute of Ste Construction (AISC) Manual.
And even the sections of the AISC Manua referred to as justification do not address the prototype testing allegations specifically, but discuss failure modes not welding L
requirements.
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ollsgations that failure to wald 100% around the joints not only violated the codes, but also the' health and safety requirements imposed by the NRC.
In essence, the NRC Region V and NRR Staff have taken a great leap of fa have put the judgment concerning dangerous code violations with seriotThe; implications for the safety of th'e public into the very hands of thost who have a direct interest in the vindication of their practices.
Mr. Kent's allegation is simply that welding all around the joint would make the weld integrity greater.
Bechtel engineers deter-mine weld adequacy by looking at average stress distribution across the joint instead of realistically considering peaks.
This aflegation takes exception to both code and implementation of the welding requirements by Bechtel.
Allegation:
8.c.
"The ASME Code requires adequate root penetration of fillet welds.
I recall that some of the vendor supplied welded hardware appeared to not have ade-quate root penetration.
The one vendor I recall is 4
"Zack," I believe a supplier of HVAC equipment.
I remember one instance on a piece of Zack hardware where a fillet weld with inadequate welding was iden-tified during inspection on site.
This instance was subsequently corrected by weld repair after installa-tion in the plant.
I do recommend that the NRC examine the beginning and end of fillet welds to assure root penetration at these areas and verify that all craters are filled, and conduct destructive testing of selected supports supplied by this vendor to 6eter-mine if other fillet welds and groove welds have ade-quate root penetration or other ccdes violations."
In this instance the Region V report takes a particularly sophomoric approach to discredit Mr. Kent.
Their response can be summarized as follows:
a mock exace: bated search of the SONGS vendor to find a "Zack Company."
Simply reading the transe.vipt of Mr. Kent's 7-hour interview reveals that = -" U20/ Reg'.on V and OI inspectors should have been well aware that Mr. Kent's 7.ack allegations were in reference to ques-tions they asked about the Uidland plant.
(Transcript, pp. 29-30).
Further, one of the reasons Mr. Kent did not sign the 6-page statement prepared by Region V investigators was because they had grossly mis-stated his factual allegations.
Mr. Kent has always been aware of the serious problems of welding done by the Zack Company in Midland, Michigan.
To misstate his clear knowledge is inexcusable.
Finally, although the Region V inspection would have the public believe that there were "no items of noncompliance or deviatioas identified" in relation to allegation Sc, nothing could be further from the truth.
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The Zack Company has caused innumerable problems in Region III.
. At Midland all Zack welders were laid off on P.ecember 2, 1982, and acal in May 1983, because they were trained by a testing agency not on the Approved vendors List (AVL).
The Zack problems at Midland Ted to a
$38,000 fine in 1981, and are now the subject of a major Region IV vendor inspection investigation, an Office of Investigations (OI) in-vestigation, and a Region III IE inspection.
It is unclear how many of the 218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br /> were spent on looking-for a Zack Company that didn't exist at SONGS.
Had the IE inspectors referred to the transcript in which the allegation was made, they coul have saved that time.
Al'lega tion:
8.d.
- i steel bracket would be placed, I was told, between a Unit 1 hydrogen line on trip for steam generator.
This was done because the hydrogen line had worn thin due to rubbing with another line.
I believe maintenance people at the site, who were working during the period when damaga due to the Unit 1 diesel generator fire was being corrected, would remember and be able to locate the design change and spacer.
I don't recall the exact location of the hydrogen line.
To the best of my recollection, there wasn't equipment within ten feet.
I don't remember if there was any nuclear safety-related equipment nearby,. and about the, potential for loss of human life and fire, should this line rupture.
I recem-mend NRC conduct an examination of this hydrogen line and make certain it has sufficient wall thickness to be safely operated.
Mostly likely, I prevented a.
major fire in Unit 1 and probably save the lives of several (or more) working here'"
Although the NRC concluded that there was no substantiation to this allegation, in fact, the report itself validates Mr. Kent's Concerns.
In thu course of the walkdown, the inspector identified the following:
i Four line supports were missing.
One support was not connected to the overhead anchor point and was hanging from the pipe.
The line was supported with baling wire at one point and with duct tape at another.
Mr. Kent's allegations clearly brought to the attention of both the utility and the NRC serious problems which require d repair and resolutions.
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Allecation 8.e.
"I am of the opinion that weld end returns are not required on Bechtel drawings.
This is in violation i
of ANS-Dl.1, Section 8, 1974 Edition, paragraphs 8.8.5, 8.8.6.1, and 8.8.6.2.
These conditions exist on detail's in many structural applications.
A two-page Bechtel Power Corporation table establishes that certain' pipe supports and other items must con-form to AWS Dl.1 requirements."
Mr. Kent contends that 'the word "shall" (see p. 12, fourth line, NRC Finding) in this case means that there is no prerogative to be used here.
Inspectors are given codes, rules and standards to inspect by.
In this case Mr. Kent had a two-page table.
Attached is a copy of that table (Exhibit 14 ), given to Mr. Kent by Mr. E. Puckett, Quality Control Engineer.
This table clearly calls out certain codes and specifications.
It does not allow for the substitution of Bechtel specifications.
The inspector stated (at p.14,1. 9) that:
It, therefore, appears that Bechtel specifications correctly assign code jurisdictional boundaries and provide for appropriate inspection criteria within those jurisdictional boundaries.
This, however, is not the issue.
Mr. Kent was inspecting in accor-dance with the two-page table, and identified numerous missing end returns.
Bechtel claims that it can confirm to the code and simul-taneously drop end returns, as long as they satisfy the intent of the code.
Bechtel further claims the intent of the AUS D.1.1 1974 8.8.6 code is best expressed by the AISC Construction Manual, 7th Edition.
In any event, Mr. Kent was an inspector, inspecting in accordance with the two-page table that was provided.
Under that criteria, he was right.
Obviously, he is not the only Bechtel inspector.
-In investigating this issue it is not clear how many other inspectors the NRC questioned or if any of the others had that two-page table.
A proper investigation would cover the important issues being raised here about implementation of the codes.
Allega ion:
j B. g.
"Bechtel generated (I was told) a 92 page MCR on electrical tray hangcrs.
I question whether the welds made on electrical supports prior to the NCR resolution were adequately or cor.pletely fixed."
Some history is in order in addressing this allegation.
Mr. Zent and Mr. Lahr found that the acceptance criteria for flare-bevel welds and the directions, i.e.,
drawings, were not clear.
There was such confusion that this sit hsima NCR was developed.
{
4A This NCR did result in a revision of Bechtel specifications (see p. 20) l to clarify the matter.
However, bp that point in time there were hundreds of welds that were not filled, ~i.e.,
flush.
Bechtel's calcu-lations (p. 21, para. 3) to determine if tEese incomplete, non-flush welds were theoretically acceptable..
They concluded, and the NRC concurs, 'that the existing conditions,could be "dispositioned." (Note that 15 tube steel supports were reworked as a result of this NCR,'
P. 21. )
Mr. Kent's allegation questions the adequacy of this disposition.
The NRC inspector examined 14 supports, and found 3 that were not filled to flush.
He concluded that this was acceptable since it was covered by the NCR resolution (p. 22, para. 2).
- However, 1)
If more supports are examined, it is likely that some are not covered by the NCR.
2)
In the entire " investigation" by the NRC there is no analysis performed independently of Eechtel on this p,oint.
The adequacy of the NRC's effort on this part is both substantively weak, and empirically flawed.
]
Allegation:
8.h.
"Bechtel has not, in my opinion, complied with the requirements of AWS D. l.1 (1974) edition), paragraphs 5.12.1. 5 (2). (b) and 8.15.1.3 regarding filling of open weld craters on tray hangers and other items to crossection of the weld."
The NRC simply restates the Bechtel position.
(See p. 23 of the.
Bechtel Paper.)
In essence, Bechtel's position paper admits that Mr. Kent's allegation is substantiated.
Their justification for not substantiating it is that cases that don't meet the code, i.e.,
"under filled,"' are analyzed based on conservative criteria.
Whether their analysis is conservative or not is not the issue.
Mr. Kent's concern is that the code is clearly being violated --
not that there is a degree of violation.
There is no analysis of the subject here by the NRC.
Again, the j
NRC simply resta+== Machtel's position.
Allegation:
8.i.
"Bechtel has not, in my opinion, removed all arc strikes or blemishes from base metal on pipe sup-ports or structural steel as required by AWS D1.1 paragraph 4.4."
In reality, the investigation performed by the NRC here really consisted of:
"The inspector examined portions of several safety-related piping systems and did not observe any are strikes."
(At p.25 i
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"The inspector could not find any are strikes in the field which had not already been identified and dis-positioned by Bechtel."
There is no indication of how many pipe supports were examined, nor the methodology of the examinations.
The remainder of the NRC response to this issue does not even address the allegation.
Allegation:
8.j.
"I observed instances where run off plates had not been use'd as required by AWS Dl.1 paragraph 4.6 on groove weld terminations.
I cannot recall any specific locations, but I do recall observing this condition on beam and girder splicas, as supplied by at least one' vendor."
The " investigation" in this case consisted of:
"The inspector examined several exposed strutural steel beams and columns and did not identify any instances of improper run-off plate use."
The remainder of the response simply mentions where and why run-off plates should be used.
In the opinion of the professional engineer'.s working with GAP on this report, this is not an adequate inspection. effort.
Allegation:
8.k.
"I believe that a spacer plate is missing on the upper inside door hinge of the Unit 2 containmen't personnel hatch because I observed a gap in the weld joint of about 1/4 inch.
I brought this to the attention of my super-visor (name) who also shared that belief.
I believe that by bringing this condition to the attention of my super-visor I had properly performed by duty to identify this condition.
I did not compare the drawing requirements to the installed condition in making this determination of a missing spacer plate because my supervisor had indicated to me that it was the vendor's problems to correct it and I had other work to do immediately."
Like many of Mr. Kent's other allegations this item has been clearly substantiated.
Bechtel's own audit (Exhibit 15) identifies a " gap" in the exact location that Mr. Kent identified the gap durin, his employment at SONGS some two years ago.
Clearly the item was an
.important oversight then,.and required both engineering analysis and l a revision in the design blueprints to justify not requiring rework.
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s; With this allegation, as with numerous others, the NRC has decided to discredit and dismiss Mr. Kent's concerns instead of honestly reporting that Mr. Kent brought a matter to the attention of both the agency and the licensee that required technical resold-tion.
Aklegation:
4 8.1.
"I believe that Bechtel has misinterpreted the require-ments of the ASME Section III welding standards regardin socket weld engagement length without initiating a code 2
case and obtaining appropriate code relief.
The ASME code requires a gap between the pipe end and the fitting of "approximately 1/16 inch."
I believe that the code
-should provide a more definitive acceptance criteria than merely "approximately 1/16 inch."
Clarification of this allegation is not necessary.
1/16 inch is the minimum acceptable from separation.
Yet a Bechtel memo which Mr. Kent has provided to his private attorney, Mr. Melvin Belli, allows this distance to become "0".
Allegation:
8.m.
"Bechtel Specification WQ-2, sheet 20, note 1, requires "shall not exceed 1/3 inch..
" re'garding maximum groo' weld reinforcement at Midland, Michigan's Twin. Nuclear Plant.
This requirement should read "shall not exceed 1/8 inch..." as required by the ASME Section III code 4
en groove weld reinforcement.
This 1/3 inch height may be, also, mistakenly implemented at San Onofre."
Mr. Kent's allegation in this instance is proven on page 25, part 3 where Bechtel admits the 1/3 inch is a " typo".
If Bechtel is not going to weld in accordance with the code, the appropriate professional society should make a determination as to the acceptability.
Aaepx an inch for 1/3 of an inch is a g>a that mistakenly denotes 1/8 of ood example of the type of error that cannot be tolerated in nuclear plant construction.
i Allegation:
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"The alleger indicated that Bechtel Power Corporation at the San Onofre-2/3 site allows:
(1) low hydregen wel-t rod to be in open air for eight hours prior to use; (2) that Bech'tel does not place low hydrogen electrodes in a
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drying / holding oven after removal from the hermetically sealed cans; and (3) that the Bechtel site procedures.a1 the issuance of weld rod upon removal from the hermetica sealed can."
Here Mr. Kent claims again that Bechtel is violating the code.
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Through tests Bechtel claims 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are justified, and the NRC l
concurs.
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Yet, tha coda allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
In order to determine if what Bechtel has done is acceptable, engineers advising GAP ~believe
. there would have to be a consultation with representatives from thc governing. code organizations.
4 If what Bechtel has done in unacceptable, then virtually every weld'oh the site-may be unacceptable.
j 8
Allecation:
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"The alleger, during the tour of the site on October 25, 1982, identified instances in the Low Pressure and High l
Pressure Safety Injection Systems and the Component Cooli
- Water System where he believed the tapering requirements
-of the ASME B&PV Code had been violated in the welding of piping to certain valves.
As examples of the concern the alleger pointed out two Unit 3 pipe to valve attachme welds which had a section on the valve body that approact
^
a 1:1 slope instead of the 3:1 slope that he believed should exist to conform to ASME Code requirements."
This is an important and relatively simple allegation to be resolved.
Mr. Ke?.t claims one thing and the NRC addressed another.
(See pg.166 of the Bechtel Position Paper.)
The diagram, which supports the NRC response, is simply not whz Mr. Kent is concerned about.
Instead, he is concerned that Bechte3 has been using the wrong number, possibly across the country.
This allegation is also substantiated, but disputed.
(Exhibit
)
The technical concerns listed above represent an overview'and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's allegations at San Onofre.
Our own review of the Bechtel and Southern California Edison justifica-tion discover that their efforts are largely defensive and avoid the key issues raised by Mr. Kent.
Unfortunately for the public, the NRC has chosen to regurgitate the utility's self-examination.
There can be no confidence in an agency that refuses to conduct even the minimum of independent analysis on serious technical concerns.
Therefore, we are requesting an independent technical analysis of the issues raised by Mr. Kent, as well as a second investigatior effort on behalf of the NRC by another agency.
It is not.enough for the NRC to accept Bechtel's justification of its own arrogant disregard for the professional codes that gover nuclear power plant construction.
To illustrate the dangers of thf the following excerpts are incorporated from an independent design and construct;jn verification program (IDCVP). at the Midland Nucle Powar Plant. a b/
'the Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units.1 and 2,.has Bechtel as the designer, engineer, and constructor'.
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x The first monthly report of the IDCVP audit of the. Auxiliary Feedwater System found several examples of Bechtel codes not meeting professional codes or contract specifications.
For example, TERA confirmed item report C-028 which states that:
} ' *The AFW tystem design maynot meet a B&W interface requirement that auxiliary fee'dwater temperature be at 0 F.
B&W's BOP criteria for AFW (Ref. 1) requir's e
1 east 40 a 400 F minimum AFW temperature.
Thi's criterion in consistent with the B&W document for reactor coolant system analysis (Ref. 2) which' is used in analysis of reactor coolant system componen'ts.
Bechtel calculation FM-4117-28 (Ref. 3) uses a 320 F temperature as a worst case winter temperature.
The recommendation contained in the original was implemented, but no addition analyses were identified.
Item C-045 states:
"1.
Manufacturer's recommended storage instructions require motor shaf t rotation every two weeks while motor is in storage (Ref:
Vendor Doc. No. 7220-M14-68).
2.
Bechtel procedure governing in-place maintenance (F-10-247) requires rotation of motor shaft every 90 days, exceeding the maximum duration between shaft rotations, as recommended by the vendor, by a factor'of 6.
And finally item C-046 states that:
1.
Pump manufaqturer's reco:.unded storage Instructions require pump to be stored,
under. vacuum with VPI crystals (dessicant) to maintain Relative Humidity at less ithan 50%.
2.
Bechtel Procedure for storage of pumps, Proc. !F-10-118, does not require vacuum nor humidity check per item 11 above.
4 3
Further to concern, review of. records indicates pump h' ave been open, subject to..
flooding s.other damage, s several NCR's, remain open against the AFV pump turbine These have been included as Exhibit'16.
1 IV.
Narbut Report In response to our FOIA request (614, we received an OIA investigation into alleged violations of NRC regulations by a Region V inspector, Paul Narbut, in the spring of 1982 concerning the' release of a draft investigation / inspection report.
Upon review of the OIA report ("Narbut report") it is clear that from at least 1981.
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to 1982 Region V had a policy about sharing draft inspection /investi-gation reports with licensees -- a policy that is in direct conflict with NRC regulations.
Although the resolution of that problem came y,
in an April 1982 memorandum to all Region V personnel from Mr.
Engleken. following the Hayward Tyler Pump incident in Region IV, a policy that was indirectly vicistin, years Region V managemegt had,,
the fact' remains that for almost bo, g federal regulations.1/
At a minimum this raises serious questions about the.judgnent and competence of the Regaional Administration.
However, even more serious is the way that OIA administrators handled the very clear findings contained in the Narbut report.
(Exhibit 17)
The Narbut case involves a draft inspection report being released to a licensee,-
specifically a draft inspection report tx) the Washington Public f
Power Supply System in April 1982.
However, other cases discovered in the OIA investigation included a Region V release of a draft report to Southern California Edison
" concerning security problems at San Onofre (SONGS) in March, 1982, which resulted in.-- apparently -- planned escalated enforcement action being dropped.
In a June 22, 1982 letter to Mr. James Cummings, Director of the Office of Inspector & Auditor, the investigator who directed the Narbut investigation registered his dissent about the' internal edit by his superiors.
(Exhibit 17)
"I am not questioning your authority in overruling me on this matter, nor do I feel that you were obliged to mention my views to the Cormission.
Howeve'r,.I do believe that the memo improperly states that there 'was unanimity in its recommendations... "
Details of the San Onofre Ca'se In the course of investigating the'Narbut case, CIA asked Region V staff whether they knew of other cases where draf t ' rep 6r't had been released.
The most detailed.
and significant ' example given by the NRC staff involved i
a March 8, 1982 release of virtually an entire draft in.spection report concerning safeguards deficiencies at the San Onofre site in San Clemente, California.
The i
i release occurred with the knowledge and approval of the Regional Enforcem,ent, Director (Allen D. Johnson), and the II An October 21, 1981 Procedure for Initia' ting, Conducting and
~
Reporting Enforcement Conferences " clearly directed Region V's
. personnel to provide licensees with a draft notice of violation in advance of any enforcement."
(OIA Report, page 48.)
This contradicts Section 04 of the IE Manual, Chapter 1025, dated April 17, 1981, that states:
" Advance copies of inspection / investigation reports provided to Headquarters in support of, escalated enforcement action should not be sent to licensee / vendors for review in accordance with this chapter until the documents initiating the enforcement action have been signed and issued."
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, cognizani Division Director (Gedrge S. Spencer).
Furthei-more, it took place at a time when escalated action was This particular fact is being actively considered.
important because NRC rules, as stated in the IE Manual, apparently indicate that no reports--drafts or final--
should be given to. licensees until after the enforcement action has been fully determines.
- In this case, however, it appears that a planned, s
escalated enforcement action was cancelled partly because i
of the release of the draft report.
Because ef a prompt written response by_ Southern California Edison to Region V's concerns, no escalated enforcement action was taken.
The matter is complicated because of a March 9, 1982 change in NRC's enforcement policy establishing somewhat different criteria for.wbot violations require civil penalties.
Nevertheless, prior to rel. easing the draft report, prior to meeting with the licensee and prior to receiving the licensee's responses to NRC's concerns, Region V staff had planned to propose a fine of $20,000.f, Conclusion The results of the NARBUT investigation into Region V's inspection policies, coupled with the handling of the KENT allegations, leave the Commission no choice but to take immediate strong action to restore public confidence in the NRC's Region V office.
This can be done only by an independent investigation of both Mr. Kent's allegations and the NRC inspection of his charges.
We look forward to the direction of the Commission on this item in the near future.
Sincerel h
C Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director a
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DISTRIBUTION:
FEBRUARY 2 6 1982 Docket Nos. 50-329/330 OM, OL LB #4 r/f DEisenhut hnaldi Docket Nos: 50-329 OM, OL o
PDR and 50-330 OM, OL WPaton MDuncan Local PDR
[
RLandsman SHanauer NSIC Glear RTedesco TIC Mr. J. W. Cook FSchauer RVollmer pargerp3eugpgijiso; Vice President ACappucci JKramer DIR ELIs Consuners Power Company JKnight RMattson 1945 West Parnall Road RHartfield, DA N
Jackson, Michigan 49201 OELD Un g,
- 6"
Dear Mr. Cook:
DESTI N2fE(9R1d
Subject:
Staff Concurrence on Removal of Surcharge from Borated
%' "M I DEP W" Water Storage Tank Valve Pits My letter of September 25, 1981, indicated NRC staff concurrence regarding your decision to place a surcharge loading on the valve pits adjoining the ring foundations of the Borated Water Stcrage Tanks for Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2.
By telephone discussions on January 26, 1982, by hearing testimony during the February 16 session, and by meetings on February 23 and 24,1982, the staff has been advised the results of the surcharge program.
The data provided the staff have included curves of settlement with time at various monitoring points marked on the pits.
On the basis of the settlenent behavior observed under the influence of the surcharge, the staff agrees that the future differential settlements between the valve pits and the ring foundation will be small and within the predicted differential settlement linits, which are enveloped in the structural analysis for the Borated Water Storage Tanks. Accordingly, the staff agrees with your decisic? to renove the surcharge for the BWST valve pits.
This confirms the verbal concurrence stated during the meeting with your staff on February 23, 1982.
Sincerely, Original Signed By:
F. Miraglia Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for for Licensing Division of Licensing e-MAR 5 1982 Y'
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ac roru sie no,somacu ouo OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ouscro mo-m
MIDLAND 1
Mr. J. W. Cook Vice President Consumers Power Conpany 194L West Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201 cc: Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Mr. Don van Farrowe, Chief Ronald G. Zamarin, Esq.
Division of Radiological Health Alan S. Farnell, Esq.
Department of Public Health Isham, Lincoln & Beale P.O. Box 33035 Suite 4200 Lansing, Michigan 48909 1 First National Plaza
- Chicago, Illinois 60603 William J. Scanlon, Esq.
2034 Pauline Boulevard James E. Brunner, Esq.
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jackson, Michigan 49201 Resident Inspectors Office Route 7 Ms. Mary Sinclair Midland, Michigan 48640 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Ms. Barbara Stamiris 5795 N. River Stewart H. Freeman Freeland. Michigan,48623 Assistant Attorney General State of Michigan Environmental Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Protection Division Consumers Power Conpany 720 Law Building 212 W. Michigan Avenue Lansing, Michigan 48913 Jackson, Michigan 49201 Mr. Wendell Marshall Mr. Walt Apley Route 10 c/o Mr. Max Clausen Midland, Michigan 48640 Battelle Pacific North West Labs (PNWL)
Battelle Blvd.
Mr. Roger W. Huston SIGMA IV Building Suite 220 Richland, Washington 99352 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. I. Charak, Manager NRC Assistance Project Mr. R. B. Borsum Argonne National Laboratory Nuclear Power Generation Division 9700 South Cass Avenue Babcock & Wilcox Argonne, Illinois 60439 1
7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 220 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Cherry & Flynn Region III Suite 3700 799 Roosevelt Road Three First National Plaza Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Chicago, Illinois 60602 l
Mr. J. W. Cook Commander, Naval Surface Weapon.; Center cc:
ATTN:
P. C. Huang White Oak Silver Spring, Marylard 20910 Mr. L. J. Auge, Manager Facility Design Engineering Energy Technology Engineering Center P.O. Box 1449 Canoga Park, California 91304 Mr. Neil Gehring U.S. Corps of Engineers NCEED - T 7th Floor 477 Michigan Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. Ralph S. Decker Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Frederick P. Cowan Apt. B-125 1
6125 N. Verde Trail Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Jerry Harbour, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Geotechnical Engineers, Inc.
ATTN: Dr. Steve J. Poulos 1017 Main Street Winchester, Massachusetts 01890 l
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