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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION veasweeston.o.c. asses JAtt 141923 Docket Nos: 50-329 and 50-330 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
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THRU:
Elinor G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Eranch No. 4 Division of Licensing FROM:
Darl S. Hood, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
ASSIGPMENTS FOR MIDLAND OL CONTENTIONS By Appendix 1 of the enclosed Memorandum and Order (Rewritten Contentions of M. Sinclair) dated December 30, 1982, the Licensing Broard identifies, rewrites and rentsabers the admitted contentions for the Midland OL hearing.. IRC sponsors for each contention are marked on the enclosed copy' and are tabulated on Enclosure 2.
Schedules for filing of testimony will be established later. We are sending this table to responsible reviewers by copy of this memorandian.
If there are quer.tions, I can be reached at X28474.
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%Q Darl S. Hood, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page s'
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LBP-82-Il8 4
j UhlTED STATES OF AMERICA h
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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Before Administrative Judges:
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Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Or. Frederick P. Cowan o
I Dr. Jerry Harbour e
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80-429-02 SP In the Matter of' J
J Occket Nos. 50-329 Ot.
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
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50-330 OL
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(Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
Occket has. 50-329 OM
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50-330 OM December 30,1982 MEMURANDUM AND ORDER 3
(Rewritten Contentions of M. Sinclair)
A.
In our Special Prehearing Conference Order, dated February 23, 1979, we accepted a number of contentions of intervenor Mary Sinclair (nuncered 28-57)3./ or purposes of discovery, subject to their being f
rewritten following the completion of discovery and the issugnch in some cases of further staff reports. We also rejected two contentions as written (numbered 6 and 7) but permitted them to be resubmitted after discovery.
1 1/
The numbers referred to are those appearing in the contentions as submitted, modifieo to eliminate cuplicate numbers after 45 by
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'j numbering consecutively from that point on. All accepted contentions have been renumberto as indicateo in Appendix 1.to this Memorandum and
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Order.
In the future, contentions should be identified through the renumbered nomenclature.
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2-1 Ms. Sinclair submitted rewritten versions of various of these
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earlier contentions on August 12,1982(numbers 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 40,
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45, 50 and 52) and September 20,1982 (numbers 6, 34, 37, 43, 57 and, in a separate filing, 56).
She has withdrawn other contentions of those which were eligible to be rewritten. The Applicant responded to these contentions l.
on September 3 and 30,1982 (2 filings on September 30). The Staff filed its responses on September 10 and 30,1982. As permitted by Board orders, Ms. Sinclair responded to the views of the Applicant and Staff on October. 4 and 15,1982.
l In our Memorandum and Order dated September 17, 1982, we accepted contentions 28 (Water Hanner) and 30 (Steam Generator Tube Degradation), to v-which neither the Applicant nor Staff had any objection. We re now renumbering these contentions as Sinclair contentions 3 and 4, respectively~
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(see Appendix 1 to tnis Memorandum and Order).
At the evidentiary hearing on November 22, 1982, w announces our rulings on the remaining rewritten contentions (Tr. 9854-72). We stated that we would issue a further written opinion explaining the grounds for our rulings. We do so here.
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1.
Contention 6 I,'
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This contention asserts that, as a result of certain specified deficiencies in the construction QA/QC program, the Midland r h
f acility fails to meet applicable requirements a'nd the QA/QC program has a
q f atied to detect such vioiations. The Staff of,fers no objection to this contention. The Applicant objects to two assertions which, it claims, are
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l open-ended allegations without basis or adequate specificity. The Applicant 3
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also objects to two subparts' of the content' ion on the ground that the aj contention ignores the Applicant's resolution of the matters 1.n question.
1 We are accepting this contention with two sentences revised
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(Ms.
to eliminate the open-ended assertions to which the Applicant objects.
al Sinclair offers no objection to one of these revisions.) The Applicant's l
objections to the two subparts cannot be accepted at this time, inasmuch as
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they go to the merits of the contention. Houston Lighting anc Power Co.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAb-5'90, 11 NRC 542, j
547-49.(1980).
In its revises form, this contention is renumbered as
)
'Sinclair contention 1 (see Appendix 1).
2.
Contention 31 gu at <.J,,
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,e-i This contention relates to Anticipated Transients Without
'Scran ( ATWS).
It sets forth several reasons why that event allegedly could l
occur at Midland. The Applicant opposes this contention primarily on the 1
grouno that ATWS is the subject of a pending rulemaking, citing Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station), ALA8-218, 8 AEC79(1974). The Staff offers no objection to this contention, to the extent the ' contention seeks to litigate the Applicant's conformance with current regulatory requirements relating to ATWS (in particular, ) 15.6 of the Sta*dard Review Plan).
In her reply, Ms. Sinclair explicitly states that the contention seeks only to question the Applicant's conformance with existing
- requirements.
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In our Prehearing Conference Order dated August 14, 1962, LBP-82-63, we pointed out that O
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j-When a matter is involved in rulemaking, the Consission may elect to require an issue which is part of that rulemaking to be heard as part of that rulemaking.
- IL Where it does not impose such a requirement, an issue l
is not barred from being considered in adjudications being conducted at that time.
1j 16 NRC _, _ (slip op., p. 21). The Applicant here concedes that the i;
Federal register notice initiating the ATWS rulemaking (46 Fed. Reg. 57521, November 24,1981) does not explicitly bar Licensing Boards j
A from taking up an ATWS issue. But it claims that the Douglas Point line of cases includes no such requirement.
In b words, as we understand the Applicant's view, once a matter becomes the subject of rulemaking, it is n
barred from consideration in licensing adjudicatory proceedings.
- i We disagree with the Applicant's reading of the Douglas P.g. int ti:'
line of cases..In all of the cases cited by the Applicant, the subject t]
matter of the rulemaking was a matter which, in the absence of a j,,'
modification of the rules (through the pending rulemaking or otherwise)
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could not have been consideree tnrough adjudication. Thus, Douglas Point,
ll involved the adjudicatory consideration of the environmental effects of e
N certain aspects of the uranium fuel cycle (in particular, waste disposal).
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A rulemaking on that subject was completed on April 22, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg.
k 14188,14191), when the Conmission promulgated the;. predecessor to its 3@
current Table S-3 (see 10 CFR $ 51.23(c)). Prior to that time, Appeal Board a
1.f rulings (which had explicitly been permitted by the Conmission to renfain in is
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1 effect during the rulemaking) precluded' consideration of such fuel cycle
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
(Vermont Yankee huclear Power
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Station),ALA6-56,4AEC930(1972); id,., ALAW-179, 7 AEC 159, 163-64.
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Mi qW (1974); Consumert Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALA8-60, 5 AEC 1
261 (1972); Long Island Lighting Co. (Sh.oreham Nuclear Power Station),
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'fy ALA8-99,6AEC53(1973). The Douglas Point ruling relates to the 7'
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consideration of fuel cycle issues prior to the adoption of Table S.3.
The 1
lj Appeal Board's statement that' Licensing Boards "should not accept in individQal license proceedings contentions which are * *
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general rulemaking" (8 AEC at 85) must be read in that context. We construe
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the Douglas Point line of cases, therefore, as standing for no more than that, during a rulemaking on a particular subject, there shall be no
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different consideration of. an issue (absent Ccumission direction to the contrary) than there would have been in the absence of the rulemaking.
i It'is well established, of course, that the Commission hat' authority to determine whetner a particular. issue shall be decided through a
q rulemaking, through adjudicatory consideration, or by both means.
F.P.C.
- v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 42-44 (19o4); Un'ited States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.192, 202 (1955).
[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."
p N.L.R.5'. v. Bell Aerospace Co.
416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974). See general ib d'iscussion in Douglas Point, supra, 8 AEC at 84. In the exercise of that
- f, j 'u authority, the Connission may preclude or limit the adjudicatory v,l ~
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!h considerption of an issue during the pendency of a rulemaking, and in the
!. 0 ih past it has on occasion done so. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 g
!j (October 25,1979) (the,so-called " waste confidence" proceeding).
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'whether a particular issue must be considered through.rulemaking or
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adjudication, the ch'oice becomes one of policy. Policy questions of this-
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sort are for the. Commission to make (e_.g,., through notices of rulemaking)
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but are beyond' the scope of authority delegated to Licensing Boards.
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. Where--as in the case of ATWS -the Commission has not limited the Licensing s}
Boards' authority to hear an issue, a Licensing Board cannot decline to hear j
such an issue just becausd it happens to involve a matter involved in 53 Cleveland Electri'c Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power rulemaking.
'j P1 ant, Units 1 and 2), LSP-82-1A, l$ NRC 43 (1982).
We will therefore consicer the ATWS issue under the same standards as woulo have governed 7
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cons-ideration of that issue prior to the rulemaking.1/
In electing this course of action, we note that we are 4
l avoidiiig an understrable effect which adopting tne Applicant's reading of
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Douglas Point necessarily would entail. Namely, where conformance with a i:
safety stancard has been a litigable issue, the consideration by the
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1 Commission of changes in that standard would, unoer the Applicant's reading, completely reseva the conformance issue from adjudicatory consideration.
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The Commission routinely considers changes in many of its safety and j
environmental standards. Thus, adoption of the Applicant's position would j.
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Since ATWS particularized standards appear'in the Standard Review Plan
. 0, and not in a specific regulation (other than general coverage in the J.i General Design Criteria,10 CFR Part 50, 9pendix A), the particular
'.j ATWS standaros may be modified, upon proper showing, at the behest of an applicant or other party. See Perry. LBP-62-1A, supra.
Ms. Sinclair here seeks to lit 9 ate on'y conformance witn current f)
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i likely have the effect of removing many significant and tracitionally i
acceptable issues from' adjudicatory consideration.1/ Absent c} - -
explicit direction from the Commission, we are unwilling to sanction this result, which we view as inconsistent with the NRC's regulatory framework.
We are therefore admitting contention 31. We are rewording
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it to clarify certain statements to which the Applicant directed our 1
attention. The contention-as accepted has been renumbered as Sinclair q
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contention 5 (see Appendix 1). (
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Contention 32. f.W y
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This contention relates to reactor vessel fabrication and l
potential embrittlement and pressurized thermal shock. The Applicant anu f
NRC Staff object only to that portion of the contention unich referencedT memoranous of Demetrios Basdekas,. on the ground that this portion is so vague that it lacks the requisite specificity, basis and nexus.
In her reply, Ms. Sinclair adknowledged that the Basdekas quotation is not specific j
to Midland and amended her contention to omit tha reference. As so amended, we admit the contention, renumbered as Sinclair contention 6 (see Appendix 1).
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Co_ntention 34.
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,j!i As we read this contentton, it raise's' certain questions
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concerning (1) pipe supports, and (2) restraints (including snubbers useo
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j for component restraints). The Staff offers no objection to this y
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The Appl.icant sought to have Ms. Sinclair's revised
- new contention 7 p) rejected on the same basis. We ceclined to do so.
LBP-82-63, supra.
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That contention is being renumbered as Sinclair contention 18 (see Appendix 1).
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!j contention. The Applicant objects to the portion concerning the use of snubbers as component supports, on grounds of lack of specificity (and in particular because it parallels the wording used in tne 1978-9 version of the contention)..The Applicant opposes the remainder of the contention on I
the ground that it represents
- a new contention not accompanied by an adequate showing of good cause for lateness.
d In her reply, Ms. Sinclair claims that the contention,is reasonably specific. She also indicates that, through discovery, sne obtained information relating to the operability of snubbers as a component of the pipe support system, and that the contention represents a " fair development" of the is' sue from its initial formulation in 1978. We agree..
We note, with respect to the Applicant's reference to unchanged wording #
since 1979, that in our 1979 Special Prehearing Conference *0rder we did not reject this cont 9ntion for lack of speciticity; rather, we grouped it with others raising generic safety issues and, recognizirig continuing developments in this area, required all such contentions to be rewritten after aiscovery.
1 We are renumbering this contention as Sinclair contention 7 f
(seeAppendix1).
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Contention 36 //
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This contention raises several ques'ttons concerning systems f
interaction at the Midland f acility.
TheApplicant'objectsonlytotklast two sentences of the dontention. The Staff objects to the last sentence.
The next-to-last sentence claims that the Staff, in its SER,, '
has failed to require a comprehensive pr'ogram to evaluate systems I
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1, interaction. The Applicant claims that it in fact has proposeo such a j
program, although it appears in other documents. This objection goes to the merits of the contention and cannot be given credit at this stage of the l
I proceeding. Moreover, as Ms. Sinclair points out, the SER explicitly states that the Applicant has not described such a comprehensive program (SER, p.
)
C-12).
As for the last sentence, the Applicant aid Staff oppose 'it because it is based on the affidavit of Mr. Howard, portions of which are to be litigated in conjunction with another contention (renumbered Sinclair contention 15); and also because it' lacks specificity, since it does not pinpoint tne portions of the Howard affidavit on which it is based.
In her reply, Ms. Sinclair identified the particular pages of that affidavit j
bearing on the allegations of this contention.
I We accept this contention in its entirety, but with the last sentence limited to the particular segments of the Howard affidavit identified by Ms. Sinclair. We have rer umbered this contention as Sinclair contention 8 (see Appendix 1).
6.'
Contention 37
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This contention questions the current design criteria for the postulation of pipe breaks. Both the Applicant and Staff point out that the l
basis cited relates to ECCS performance during small break LOCAs and has 1
l nothing to do with piping design. They also assert that, if ECCS performance is sought to be challenged, the co,ntention is untimely, without I
adequate justification phrsuant to 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1). We agree with these claims and reject the contention.
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Contention 40 j This cdntention deals with the lack of adequate environmental I
.l qualification methods to satisfy the requirements for safety related equipment.
It relies on a statement in the sex indicating that
'l environmental qualification is still an open_ item. The Applicant first i'
asserts tnat the contention shoulo be rejected because it raises a question
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of law as to applicable environmental qualification standards. The 2
AppIicant also claims that, if c5nformance with current standards is being
.j questioned, the contention lacks specificity, in that it f ails to point out the respects in which the environmental qualification program is deficient.
f The Staff opposes the contention on the latter ground.
i Ms. Sinclair replies that she is not making a legal challWge and is questioning only the Applicant's ability to meet current I
J requirements. She stresses that tne SER states that the Applicant has not
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provided the Staff with adequate information to enable the Staff to evaluate I
the environmental qualification program, and that in such circumstances her claim that the Applicant has not demonstrated that its progran meets current 3
NkC r'equirements follows logically. We agree and accept the contention, to 3
the extent it asserts that current requirements are not satisfied (renumbered as Sinclair contention 9. see Appendix 1)..Once the Staff has s
evaluated the Applicant's environmental qualification program, and prior'to
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the cormencement of hearings on this issue Ms., Sincl,atr will be required to
..j define more specifically the deficiencies (if any) which she perceives in the program.
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Contention 45 T*
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This contention alleges that asserted deficiencies in control l
cables can cause a loss of offsite power.
The Applicant objects because of s[
failure to state a basis with reasonable specificity--j,.e,.. a lack of showing how control cable deficiencies (dealt with by the newspaper article 1
1, cited) could have any effect on the reliability of off site power. The Staff opposes the contention for lack of clarity. We reject it for both those 9
reasons. We note that, in her. reply, Ms. Sinclair referred to a number of 5
instances where electrical malfunction can result in a loss of offsite power, but she did not demonstrate how control cable deficiencies (were they
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to exis't) coula affect offsite power..Her ' assertion that there will be 4(re than usual snow and icing on elevated onjects such as power lines d9es not accomplish this purpose; in any event, claims regarding snow and icing will
,j be 11tigsten under revised contention Si (renumbered as Sinclair contention e
11).
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9.
Contention 50.
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/4 This contention asserts that u6cupatlovial esposures of workers cannot be controlled because of quality control f ailures built into the heating, ventilating and air conditioning system.
It cites the j,
disclosures of. employees of the Zack Co. (the HVAC subcontractor).
The Applicant does not object to this. contention. The Staff indicates that it lacks particularity in that, except for Dean Darty, none d
of the Zack Co. esployees have been identified.
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We admit this contention; but, we note that, in resol,ving the contention, the heretofore unidentified Zack Co. enployees will have to be T
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l specified. he renumbe'r this contention as Sinclair contention 10 (see Appendix *1).
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- 10. Contention &
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As the Applicant points out, tnis contantion, etch questions the reliability of the emergency onsite diesel generator, as well as the '
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fuel oil and service water lines entering std. exiting tne diesel generator building, overlaps issues already' being litigated in the soils portion of i
ll tnis consolidated proceeding and hence is redundant. Ms. Sinclair agrees i
that, if all issues regarding the r,eliability of the emergency onsite diesel l
j generator are to be litigated, there would be no need to litigate contenti,on 52.. We reject the cont'ention on the ground that no issues are presented,v" l
here dich are not being litigated elsewhere.
(We decline to base this l
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, rufing on the Staff's response,. which in our view goes to the merits of the f
contention.)
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This contention was cunditionally accepted by us it, our 1973
.s Special Prehearing Conference Order. But at the prehearing conference in i
1 August,1962, Ms. Sinclair withdrew this contention because of a similar one i
4 being advanced by Ms. Stamiris. When it appeared that Ms. Stamiris'
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contention might be rejected, Ms. Sinclair sought'to resubmit her i
e contention. The Staff indicated that it would not object on timeliness l
N grounds, and neither the Applicant 'nor Staff have advanced timeliness l
objections.
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The contention asserts that, should all AC power be lost to l
the Midland facility, station blackout co'uld occur; a variety of bases are
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assigned. Although these bases are not identified by number, the Staff has divided them into 8 bases and has numbered then consecutively. The Staff offers no objection to the. contention insofar as it is supported by bases 1, 5, 7, and part of 8.
The Applicant objects to the entire contention, either
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for vagueness or because of coverage in the soi.ls hearings.
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l At the outset, we reiterate that station blackout requires a
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loss of both offsite and onsite power simultaneously. We have considered 1
each basis in the context of whethef it in con,tunction eitner with other
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bases o a total loss of offsite power coulo result in station blackout
..r (Tr.9866). We will treat each bas,is in the order identified by the Stai'f' The first basis concerns ice storms and the effect of ice 4
formation.on cables, power lines ano otner equipment. The Staff ' offers no objection to this basis, and the App 1'icant o@oses it on the merits 3
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(arguments which we cannot accept in determining admissibility of a contention). he accordingly accept it' as a basis for the mtio.v. (We n
j are modifying the last 5,entence to clarify its applicabilit)
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" exterior safety related" equipment " associated with" the diesel generator "4
building.)
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The second basis, opposed by the Staff as well as the f
- j Applicant, raises questions with respect to i.he ability of the diesel
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generator building to withstand ice and snow loads. As we pointed out in i
rejecting a somewhat similar contention advanced by Ms. Barbara Stamiris, li L
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The coupling of alleged building failure with j
station blackout presumes the negative outcome of the not-yet,-completed OM proceeding (an outcome dich, on its own, would prevent issuance of an operating license, if not-corrected).
LBP-82-63, supra,' 16 hRC at _ (slip op., p. 33(a)). For this reason,'we reject basis 2 as.a permissible basis for this contention.
The third basis questions the adequacy of the combustion air intake and exhaust systems for the diesel generator building, because of d
asserted QC railures of the Zack Co., the subcontractor that installed the systems. The basis is opposed by the Staff and App 1tcant because, they claim, it raises the same QA questions which are already the subject of 1
i admitted. contentions (Sinclair rentsabered contentions 15,'16 and 17, see Appendix 1). In her. reply, Ms. Sinclair agreed to litigate the issue unde'r y
those other contentions. However, as the Board observed during the hearing, the condition of the mechanical components of.the combustion air intaker and
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exhaust systems (raised by this basis) is not necessarily coextensive with I-the acceotability of the-Zack QA program (raised by contentions 15-17) (Tr. '
I 9866-68). Moreover, the Board was recently notified about problems which y
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_ may exist with respect to 'tne. diesel. genar.ater exhaust.,pipirs See letter.
dated Octcher 28, 1982, from James E. Brunner, CPC, to Licensing Board; see l
f.
also Nonconformance Report M01-5-2-16o, Rev.1, dated November. 30, 1982, transmitten to the Board and parties by letter dated December '14,1982 from Mr. Brunner. These conditions might contribute to station blackout. In
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these circumstances, we are accepting for litigation the third basis of this contention.
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Jg o The fourth basis relater to misrouted cables; it is founded on. testimony presented earlier in this pr.gceeding. As the Staff points out,
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,j that issue is not yet closed and will be heard in later hearings on the QA i
program. Moreover, the claimed relationship to station blackout is -
impermissibly vague. We therefore reject basis 4 for these reasons.
.ti The fifth basis claims that offsite power lines share a s
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j comon corrider and could be affected simultaneously by heavy icing. The a
Staff *does not object to this basis; the Applicant does not mention it
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specifically. Since the allegations, if proved, identify a situation which might contribute to station blackout, we accept this. basis.
l Mrj The sixth basis suggests tnat there should be a specific time
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requirement during which the plant must be capable of.accomodating a E
station blackout. We are unaware of any such requirement imposed by HRC j
rules or requirements. For that reasori, we reject the basis as a matter of g
5 law. We also note that Ms. Sinclair nas inade no showing that tne time
,within which decay heat will be removed in the event of station blackout is j
inadequate.
4j The seventh basis, which is not opposed by the Staff, seems
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'j 'lI to raise a turbine missile issue; it claims that the placement and
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orlentation of each turbine generator is unfavorabl'e and could adversely t
1 1
affect the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system. No nexus to station
'A
'i blackout is supplied, and we are not aware of how the. allegations would 9j relate to station blackout. We are thus rejecting this basis.
3 The eighth. and final basis identifies 7 loss-of'-offsite power
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7 events at other reactors. With' respect to the first 6, no nexus of,the i y. 9...
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events to the Midland facility is provided; indeed, in only one case is the nature of the event set forth, but the detail is insufficient for us to a
ascertain,its relationship to Midland. With respect to the seventh event, j
j we agree with the Staff that the contention is alleging that, as happened 'at
- 1
-l Big Rock, severe weather conditions increase the likel'ihood and the duration l-
.l -
- of a loss of offsite power. Limited to this event, we accept thi.s basis as _
support for the contention. (We are deleting the paranthetical reference to the effect of weather cond.itions.gt.gagrgency planning, as it has nd bearing _
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]
on this contention. Those conditions may, however, be pertinent to Sinclair 25 1
contention 2, as renumbered.)
In her reply submitted on October 15, 1982 (at pp. 4-5),
3 Ms. Sinclair' referred to several other events at other-reactors (Rancho la l
- W i
Seco, Turkey Point 3 and 4, and Oconee) whien, she cl. aimed, could occur at Midland and contribute to station blackout. We were not sure of the relationship between these reactors and Midland, particular.ly with respect
}
to the' similarity of the respective diesel generators. We therefore requested the Applicant and Staff to brief this question (Tr. 3870). We did s
d not establish a specific date for such briefs, and we have not yet received
.j
,j then.
It is possible that the referenced events could constitute a further p) basis (or an addition to basis 8) for this contention. We are' deferring 4-
,j ruling on this matter until receipt of briefs. The Applicant and Staff (and s
- tq other parties if they wish) should fils such, briefs by Monday,. January 24, l
1983. Thereafter, we will determine whether the cont'ention should be
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.j 17 ri As for now, we are accepting this contention to the extint we
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have indicated.
It is renumbered as Sinclair contention 11'(see
,j Appendix'1); the bases which we are admitting (1, 3, 5, and part of 8) have.
Ij been redesignated as bases 1-4.
- 12. Contention 57.
This contention questions the adequacy of the electrical j
system. Neither the Staff nor Applicant objects to the contention insofar 3
as its scope is limited to fire protection (rather tnan extending generally 2
4
- j to accident conditions). Ms. Sinclair agreed to this limitation, and we are l
l accepting the contention as so limi'ted. We have modified the contention to reflect this limitation -(see Tr. 9870-71) and have renuntered it as Sinc 1, air
^'
I contention 12 (see Append'ix 1).,
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8.
In our February 23, 1979 Special Prehearing Conference Order, we rejected Ms. Sinclair's proposed contentions 20 and 21 as impermissible
).
challenges to the Commission's fuel cycle rule (Table S-3,10 CFR
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51.23(c)). Thereafter, as a result of the April 27, 1982 decision of the Lj U.S. Court of Appeals in Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. NRC, 685 m
(
F.2d 459 (D.C.Cir.1982), which raised questions concerning the validity of citrtain aspects of Table 5-3, Ms. Sinclair resubmitted a contention which
]j challenges Table 5-3.
Because of our expectation,of Consission guidance on i
how to deal with fuel cycle questions in licensing proceedings, we deferred n,
'j ruling on5the contention'at the Aogust 1982 prehearing conference.
Ij LBP-82-63, supra, 16 NRC at (slip op. pp.,11-12).
On Septenber 9; 1982, Ms. Sinclair again resubmitted her Table 5-3'
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contention, citing an August 16, 1982 Memorandum Order of. the Cc"t of.
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Appeals on this same sihject. The App 1tcant and Staff recomended that we continue to defer ruling _ on the contention pending issuance of the policy.
- statement.
i The policy statement on fuel cycle matters was issued on
?
October 29, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 50591 (Nov. 8,1982). Copies were transmitted to the Board and parties by the Applicant on Noventer 4,1982 and by the Staff on Novecher 5.
In its transmittal, the Applicant moved that Ms. Sinclair's fuel-cycle contention be dismissed. We heard oral argument on this motion on November 20, 1982 (Tr. 9654-83).4/ The Staff supported dismissal of the cont;ention on the basis of the policy statement. Ms. Sinclair (supported by Ms. Stamiris) challenged tne validity of the policy statement on the basis of its inconsistency with the Court.,r.
decision, and they sought either acceptance of the contention or, if we believed the policy statement required dismissal, a statement by us of our s sagreement witn the policy statement.
We do not believe it would be appropriate for us to c. ament on the validity of the policy statement or the adequacy of Table S-3 in its current 1
form; among other things, we are not sufficiently knowledgeable of the
!~
5 underlying record in the Table S-3 rulemaking or before the Court of' Appeals A,
l to render any coment that would be meaningful. We, also note that the
]
mandate of the Court of Appeals on the Table S-3 decision has not issued. and if
<l' 4/ We granted the_ Staff's request to permit it 'to file a further ' statement
- 4 on this matter (Tr. 9683). Thereafter, the Staff advised the Board by, telephone that it did not wish to file such a statement.
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will not' issue for some time, inasmuch as the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
. We agree with the Applicant and Staff that the policy' statement requires that we. consider the current Table S-3 as being.in effect; that we consider fuel cycle issues only in that context; and, as a result, that Ms. Sinclair's proposed, fuel cycle contention be dismissed as an impermissible challenge to that rule.
In accordance with the policy statement, our decision in the OL proceeding, and any license authorization which may eventuate therefrom, will 'be subject to the outcome of the s
judicial proceedings in this matter now before the Supreme Court. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2),
ALA8-704, 16 NRC _(Decenter 8,1982). As we have indicated previously,,f
-+
should fuel cycle questions of the type sought to ne litigated oy Ms. Sinclair become litigable prior to the conclusion of this proceeding, we will permit Ms. Sinclair to resubmit her fuel. cycle contention without regard to timeliness (assuming she does so within a reasonable time after any statement by the Comission which might permit such issues, to be considered by us).
C.,
In Appendix 1 to this Memorandum and Order, we are setting forth and renunbering all contentions accepted for the OL, phase of th'is proceeding J
and not abandoned or dismissed. These contentions' include those :.onsidered
~
in our 1979 Special Prehearing Conference Order, our August,1982 Prehtaring Conference Order (L8P-82-63), our Septenter 17,'1982 and October 29, 1982 (L8P-82-95) memoranda and orders, and this Memorandum and Order. Excluded i
~
from this listing are co'ntentions being dealt with i.lha._5qLis nortion of '
A thisproceeding--1.e_.;thoseofMs. Stantris dealt with in our Prehearing t
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-I contention 24, and the. single contention of Mr. Wendell H. Marshal 1.
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, In Appendix 2 to this Memorandum and Order, we are setting forth
,l corrections to the portions of the transcript of November 22,1982 (Tr %54-72) in which we announced our rulings on Ms. Sinclair's rewritten contentions.
.j 1
For the reasons stated, it is, this 30th day or December,1982 i
ORDERED "j
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1.
That Ms. Sinclair's rewritten contentions 6, 31, 32, 34, 36, 40,
- /
50, 56 (in part), and 57 (renumbered as contentions 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,cII
(
(
and 12), to the extent indicated herein, are hereby. accepted.
2.
That the Applicant and Staff (and.other parties.that wish to do 4
so) file briefs with respect to renumbered contention 11, as described on k
page 16, supra, ny January 24, 1982.
4 3.
That Ms. Sinclair's rewritten contentions 37, 45 and 52 are hereby Q
reiected.
4.
That Ms. Sinclair's giroposed fuel cycle contention is hereby v
M dismissed and her request dated September 9, 1982 1s denied.
M.
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That transcript changes set forth in Appendix 2.are hereby
. I N.
adopted.
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FORTHEdTOMIC'SAFETYAND LICENSING BOARD p
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C1arles Bechhoefer, Chapmah ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE J
Appendices:
1.
OL contentions 2.
Transcript corrections, pp. 9854-72
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APPENDIX 1
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OL Contentions p &-
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Sinclair Contention 1 (formerly original contention 6)
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Serious and repeated deficiences in the quality-assurance / quality
-control program for hidland' demonstrate that construction of the f acility has consistently f ailed to meet applicable requirements, and that the quality assurance / quality control program has failed to i
detect these violations and assure proper corrective measures.
l
)
~
Deficiencies in the quality assurance / quality control program at Midland include the following:
,3~
P a.
Violations of regulatory procedures
- ~
According to an inter'nal NRC memorandum from R. 8. Landsman, Soil Specialist, to W. D. Shafer, Chief, Midland section, dated August 24, 1982, the Applicant has violated the Board's Order of April 30, 1982, by going ahead with construction activities in direct violation of a recuirement to ootain prior NRC staff approval. That example indicates that the Applicant has engaged in deception.
b.
Alteration of Weld Radiographs W
According to IE Bulletin No. 82-01, Rev 1, Supplement 1 (August 18,1982), alterations have been discovered in ati least four i
sets of piping weld radiographs for piping supplied to Midland by ITT s
Grinell Industrial Piping, Inc. of Kernersville, North Carolina.
These radiographs were altered over a period o'f six years. As a result of the alterations, the quality of the welds is unknown.
It is a
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?5'j doubtful that all of the affected welds can be identified and corrected since some may no longer be accessible for inspection.
This is a violation of Criteria I, II VII,'IX, X, XI, XV, XVI, and XVII of Appena1x B to 10 CFR Part 50. hot only has the Applicant permitted the installation of noncomplying materials, it has
- 4 failed to assure that its supplier has an effective quality assurance
- l i
program as well. This extended f ailure in an area crucial to reactor safety raises serious questions about the existence of deficiencies in all vendor-supplied items.
i c.
Defective Welds in Contrb1 Panel e
i According.to I&E Information Notice No. 82-34 ( August 30,
- ^
.f 1982), Midland Units 1 and 2 contain defective welds in the main
~
trol panels that were not prevented or detected' as ' required by' the con quality assurance progra:n.
d.
Faulty welding, piping, and electrical installation The following demonstrate quality. assurance / quality control (plk)
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f ailures in a broad range of areas. They demonstrate, generally, that ya']
the Applicant was incapable of preventing or detecting construction it failures through its quality assurance program. To the extent that the
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- 3. -
Applicant discovered such failures,.it was throug,h highly unusual p;
reinspections, which are not a normal part of the quality assurance f
program, and which cannot be relied upon to assure reactor safety:
1.
Non-Conformance Report of June,19,1982, dich is a part 1
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of the reinspection to which the Applicant has committed, states that
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66 weld joints were non-conforming out of 146 reinspected.
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Report on Safety Concern and Reportability Evaluation (June 21, 1982) discussed welding defects that were discovered during reinspection of a sample of installed vendor supplied structural beams.
The report states, "The location of all [ defective] beams is not kn6wn, 4
but the sample included beams in the Aux 111ary building and both i
containments...The safety impact of weld f ailure is unknown due to the 4 ^
diverse functions and locations of approximately 2,4v0 beams."
1 uality Action Request (QARF 175) closed out August 24,
- j -
3.
Q 1982, indicates that an " increase of approximately 164% has been experienced in the area of (welding)' deficiencies."
4.
Non-Conformance Report, closed out on August 26, 1982, states that ' contrary to ASME requirements, radiographs submitted by f#
^
Craven Energ,y Systems displayed :nottlings in the vertical weld seams af the borated water storage tanks, a safety related building.
4 5.
The NRC has identified (Inspection Reports 50/329/82-07 and 50/330/82-07) defective installation of pipe supports and restraints (NRC response to I'nterrogatories, p. 4),127 defiltencies, 287,due to defective wel.ds were reported.
6.
According to Applicant's response to Inspection Report i
82-07(Aug.13,1982) in the Hanger Report ( Aug. 9,1982), results of
'. l H.},
the reinspection showed tnat out of 123 hangers inspected, only Sh%,
f were acceptable.
i 7.
According to Applicant's May 5,1982, report of the exit meeting of April 23, 1982, the reinspection conducted by Applicant of piping hangers that had previously been ' inspected and accepted by.
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Bechtel QC revealed that 43.9% of the hangers' inspected were a
j identified.as non-conforming.
(Attachment 15toAug.13,19b2 i
Report)-
8.
In its August 30, 1982, letter to the Applicant, Region 2
III stated that while the Applicant's response identified corrective actions taken or planned to be taken regarding the 56 defective hangers identified in Applicant's reinspection, Region III has "no confidence
~
that the remaining hangers have been installed in accordance with the original drawings and specifications."
9.
The Safety Concerns and Reportability Evaluation 7.
(June 17,1982) states that the minimum wall thickness of Piping Class ELB utilizes materiais ~of a different allowable stress'(17,500 psi)
[#
than the specifications for fittings (15,000 psi).for this class cf l.
piping.
I 10.
Inspection Report 81-23, July -26,1962, discussed, in addition to rodent damage to insulaticn, a multitude of discrepancies in the penetrations such as: " conductor insulation cracking at j
module-conductor interfaces; cracks in the module epoxy insulation;
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inadequate crimping by use of. Improper sized lugs, improper crimping, f[.
loose terminations, and use of the wrong crimp; butt splices improperly l
crimped which could be easily pulled apart and were covered with
..j questionable insulation; and loose coaxial cable connections." These' have not been prevented or properly detected by Applicant's quality 1
c.;
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- Sinclair Coritention 2 (formerly original content on 27) i Recently discovered informa' tion indicates that the Advisory j
omittee'on Reactor' Safeguards conditioned the acceptability of' the present Midland site for the project on the existence of a highly effective evacuation system. However, no adequate evacuation plans exist. Aerial surveys of traffic conducted during the construction i
permit stage of these proceedings, and taken during shift changes,,
indicated that evacuation in an acceptable time 'cannot be accomplished.
Further, relying on the evacuation plans of Dow Chemical Company is inadequate. During the evacuation f,ollowing the recent chlorine leak, evacuation procedures were chaotic and all comunications were either i
jamed or ineffectual.. In fact, at an NRC conference held in Midland,
~
Michigsa on September 8,1978,' both the County Road Comission and the Midland Planning Commission admitted that they have not considered evacuation routes. As a result, the findings required by 10 CFR 1
5 50.57(a)(3)(i) and 5 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
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Sinclair Contention 3 (formerly original contention 28)
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Contention 3 deals with the water hammer probles of pressurized This problem is identified as one kh. water reactors of the Mid1and type.
Me the unresolved safety issues applicable to Midland 1 & 2 in the SER, C-4.
Sabcock and Wilcox (B&W) plants with an internal auxiliary feedwater (AFW) feed ring of the same design as Midland in recent events, have snown, a marked susceptibility to internal damage of the feed ring as a result of water hammer. From this, reduced cooling in the steam generators could occur a a result of inadequate AFW flow following loss of normal feedwater flow.
(NRC Response to
..c Interrogatory 7) Since this effect involves critical safety systems, the Task A-1 report (Jan.,1980) states that systematic review procedures in the OL review process will require the Applicant to:
- 1) address potential water hamner problems in various systems;
- 2) demonstrate that there are adequate design features and operating procedures to prevent damaging water hammer events; and 3) expano tha
.p.
c; preoperational testing program to insure that these design features and j
operating procedures do prevent damaging water hamer events.
However, the SER does not indicate that these ' criteria have been v
4 met by the Applicant. As a result of.this omission, the finoings M
'j required by 10 CFR lb 50.57(a)(3)(1) and 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
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__Sinclair Contention 4 (formerly original contention 30)
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The degradation of stem tube integrity due to corrosion' induced
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wastage,. cracking reduction in tube diameter, and vibration iriduced ft acks is a serious unresolved safety problem at the Midland nuclear, plant.
It is admitted that the chemistry of the cooling water is
,1 critical to prevention of stean tube f ailure (NUREG-0886). However, the fact that th'ese plants depend on cooling water from the cooling pond increases the likelihood of corrosion and poor water chemistry c
because the DEIS states that the plant dewatering system will first be discharged to the cooling pond. (DEIS at 5-2). Th means that many wastes, including radioactive materials from leaks and spills on the rea'ctor site, can enter-the cooling pond ar.d disrupt the chemistry of i
,.f
'Therefore, due to this. contribution 'of an undetermined the pond.
l amount and quality of ground dewatering inflows to the cooling pond, i
~
the NRC's bland assurance that corrosion is unlikely due to the lack of solium thiosulf ate, is unsatisfactory.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 9.J.)
In fact, due to the contribution of groundwater, the SC is net fully aware.of the likely constituents of the cooling pond, and the findings required by 10 CFR {b 50.57(a)(3)(1) and SU.57(a)(6) cannot be
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.ngj made.
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Sinclair Contention 5 (formerly original contention 31),
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steam system, makeup and purification system, non-vit'al electrical i;!
power systems, and the integrated control systems, can lead to j
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1 Anticipa1ied Transients Without Scram (ATWS). (NRC Response to' s
M Interrogatory 10.c) Since there have been no routine inspection and quality control standards applied to these non-safety systems, and the general _ quality control during construction of even safety related g
systems has been so poorly done (amply documented in the record of j-these hearings), there is an even greater probability of ATWS at
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Midl and. However, this scenario has not been analyzed in the SER.
--n Furthermore, B&W reactors, such as tne Midland reactors, experience the largest pressure rise and thus are the most difficult to modify to -
'1
~
achieve adequate safety margins to prevent ATWS events. (NUREG-0460, April, 1978, p. 46).Therefore, the findings required by 10 CFR r
i l '50.57(a)(3)(1) and 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
Sinclair Contention 6 (formerly original contention 32) Ox Y There is no assurance that suitable safety margins can be meintained throughout the design life of the Midland Plant with the materials used for reactor vessel f abrication.
This maices the Midlano i,
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reactors unusually susceptable to reactor embrittlement ar.d to pressurized thermal shock (PTS). For example, an investigation following the severe PTS at the Rancho Seco reactor indicated tnat the j
limiting material in the Rancho Seco reactor vessel was fabricated u
]:
using tne same weld wire and flux m; the limiting mater 41 in the fj Midland reactor vessel' beltline and has equivalent chemical composition n
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and fracture toughness properties. This indicates that the Staff's
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conclusions concerning the Rancho Seco reactor vessel beltline
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d materials. (NRC respo'nse to Interrogator,y 11.e) Furthermore, a i
!j memorandus to the Midland file, dated June 14, 1977, by G. S. Keeley of 1
' Consumers Power Co. and sent to S. H. Howell, et al., described a memorandun which A. J. Birkle had written to R. C. Bauman on March 22 1977, on the status ~ of Midland NSSS-12 reactor vessel girth weld fracture toughness. (Discovery Response, Consumers Power Co.) This J.
memorandum pointed out that there was "a chance' that the MSSS-12 reactor vessel could have a low level of fracture toughness at the operating temperature after 10 years of operation." The low level was with reference to the 50 ft-lb upper shelf criteria of 10 CFR 50, i
' Appendix G f H.
It also indicated that this could possibly be
.V corrected by annealing the vessel wnich is r.ot now a vi.able approach
~
although an EPRI R&D effort is underway.
. These points, as well as the fact that the Midland nuclear plants 2
1 were designed over a decade ago, and contain the same defective 1
material as the Rancho Seco nuclear plant means that findings' required
^
by 10 CFR s 50.57(a)(3)(1) and 50.57(a)(6) cannot'be made.
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Sinclair Contention 7 (formerly original contention 34) f,;
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The installation of pipe supports and restraints has been deficient, such that there can be no assurance that the public health '
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In particular, ii
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consideration of actual and potential snubber malfunction.
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(b)
Inspec' tion Reports 50-329/82-07 and 50-330/82-07 identify extensive deficies cies in installation of pipe supports and restraints.
(NRC staff response to' Interrogatory 13.b. p. 4). The Applicant's j
response to the Inspection Report was determined to be unacceptable.
(Letter, J. A. Mooney, to J. G. Keppler, dated August 13, 1982, file 0.4.2, Serial 17572 and letter, R. F. Warnick to J. W. Cook, dated y
August 30,1982.)
As a result of these deficiencies, the findings required by 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3)(i) and 5b.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
4 N
~ ',
s linclairCantention8(fortrerlyoriginalcontention36)
Systems interaction, identified as an unresolved safety probles
}* k, P epplicable to Midland in the SER (C-4), has special significance at i
Midland because tne most serious, accidents resulting from systems
't interaction failures have occurred in 8&W reactors. The serious events gi.
and their special problems with systems interaction include the following:
j'
- 1) The persistent operator disbelief of high. temperature data from incore thermocouples and system RTD's was
,j one major, out of many, causes for thd TMI-2 accident.
7 i.-
This disbelief was based on the rationale that the a
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. detectors.
(NUREG-0600, p. 10, and " Daniel Ford, p
Three Mile Island, Thirty Minutes to Meltdown")
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the case of the high temperatures, acceptance of the j
' temperature data as valid might have prompted a higher H
i; high-pressure-injection flow rate and a reluctance to l
subsequently depressurize the plant to use the core flood tanks. (NUREG-0600,p.11) This is one example of non-safety related equipment impacting on safety
^
systems.
~
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- 2) At Crystal River, an accident on February 16, '80, is I
i of interest becar:e of systems interaction where the j-integrated control system input, the PORV positioning, the instruments used for manual control of ECCS and N
^
the entire non-nuclear instrumentation (MNI) power y~
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sup' ply depended.on one 24 VDC line within the NNI power supply i'
system.
(NUREG-0667) j.
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- 3) At Davis-Besse I on April 19, 1980,' maintenance
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activities allowed an elimination of redundant power j
supplies that were supporting the decay heat removal p
function. Concurrent construction activities caused.
the loss of working power supply and subsequently
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. decay heat removal was lost for over two hours.
(USNRC I&E Information Notice 80-20, May 8,1980) (NRC
[
Response to Interrogatory 15.e)
In spite of this repeated history of systems interaction problems at B&W reactors, the staff SER specifically fails to require a.
l
' comprehensive program to evaluate all systems which could interact.
(SER at C-12[reover, the apparent use of non-safety grade
'. i
' materials for safety grade functions at Midland, as specified on the listed pages of the Howard affidavit, significantly increases the risk of adverse system interactions. (Howard affidavit, pp. _11,12,13,16,
- s 17 and 18.)
i
,p Sinelair Contentio; 9_(formerly original contention 40)
Contention 9 deals with lack of idequate qualification methoos to satisfy the requirements for safety related equipment.
Cohtrary to NaC Response to Interrogat,ry 19(a), a Comiss' ion decision in the UCS Petition for Emergercy and Remedial Action 3
(CLL 81-21, May 27,1980),11 NRC 707, requires that all plants under s
licensing review must meet the equivalent of the IE.5E 1974 Standard in j
order to satisfy GDC 4 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A).
In fact, the SER L4 L!'
admits that this standard has not been met. (SER, pp. 3-36) Thus, v.
absent further action,'the findings required by 10 CFR l
l6 50.57(a)(3)(1).and 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
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jhk Sinclair Contention 10 (formerly original contention 50) 4,,,,4 The occupational exposure of regular workers or transient workers t
at the Midland nuclear plant cannot be controlled as the NRC Response j
to Interrogatory 29(a) states, becaue of the extensive quality control failures that the disclosures of Zack Co. employees and Dean Dartty i;
e j
indicate have be,en built into the heating, ventilating and air I
conditioning system at tne Midland nuclear plant. Therefore, the i
findings required by 10 CFR 56 50.57(a)(3)(i) and 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made.
Sinclair Contention 11 (formerly original contention 56)
There is no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that the I
^
idland facility can be operated safely during. a loss of all AC power k'
d*pY and r,esulting station blackout, for the following reasons ~:
to_ g I
4 yf 1.
FES 4-10 states that " ice storms are not uncomon in the vicinity of the site." Furthermore, p. 5-6 states that because of the heavy fogging from tne cooling pond, "during cold weather formation of ice on elevated objects also y
increases." This means that the cables, ' power lines and '
other exterior safety related equipment associated with the a
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would normally be expected.
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To the extent that the Zack Co. was responsible for the I
design, constrdction and installation of the conbustion air intake and exhaust systems for the DG8, these cannot be 4
relied upon to function properly due to the well documented Zack quality control failures.
The Staff's cone'usions that the design of the combusion air c.
intake and exhau'st system is_ acceptable (Ibid./ SER 3.9.3 and 9.5.8) does not take into account the extensive disclosures made about Zack's quality control breakdowns on the HVAC system provided by Albert Howard in duly,1982, after the SER
+.
was issued in'May, 1982. (Also see contentions 15,16 and i'
^'
r 17.)
Therefore, Staff's assumptions for tnese statements are base'd on i'alse and incomplete data, and the resolution of there
.;tems remains uncertain.
0 3.
Two start up transformers are to provide redundant,
'i independent sources of off site power to the.4160-VESF Duses 0"
3:
U of both Units 1 and 2.
While the lines for'these f
I h
/
transformers have independent rights of way, they do share a common corridor near the Midland plant (SER 8-4). This means that they could both be affected simultahecusly by the heavy C.-
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icing that can be expected. in the vicinity of the cooling
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pond, according to FES 9-19.
4.
In Applicant's response to Sinclair's " Discovery Question for
]-
Consumers Power Co. on New Contentions Accepted August 14, s
- ]
1982".(Interrogatory I - Contention 3.a), tne LER's from Palisades and Big Rock were included which were a part of tne
.=
k record used for the severe accident probability assessment 0
g report NUREG/CR-2497 (June,1982), " Precursors to Potential
'i Severe Core Damage Accidents:
1969-1979, a Statws Report."
(
Seven of the 9 events, reported involved a loss of off site
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power. One avent, dich occurred at Big Rock, was caused by
)
an intense winter storm - rain changing to heavy snow and
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ice. High winos caused lines to sway, causing what is 4
i i
referred to as "gt.11cpt1g conductcrs" in which line' faults
\\i occurred as the lines move relative to one another. The line j
' was de-energized for -approximately two hours until repairmen, 1,
who were hampered by considerable blowing and orifting of a
snow, could make essential repairs.,
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Sinch all these adverse conditions that can affect the perfor.mance of the 068 and the redundant emergency power systems which must operate
)
- J-to prevent station blackout we present at Midland, the findings
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required by 10 CFR $6 50.57(a)(3)(1) and 10 CFR 96 50.57(a)(6) cannot be made on tlie basis of this information.
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Sinclair Contention 12'(formerly original contention 57) (CJdt N i
d There is no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that the i
eletrical system at Midland will function adequately because:
y 1.
It is vulnerable to damage by fire.
In late 1975, it was f
learned that Becht'al--the architect-engineer for the Midland project--
had tolerated cases where non-safeguard cables routed in safeguard 1
raceways had terminated and a new non-safeguard cable (same circuit) had been continued in a different safeguard channel's raceway. So far as. appears, at that time Bechtel took no corrective action to prevent recurrence of that problem and was unable to give positive assurances that other cables did not similarly violate the single failure criterion.hther, in-September and October 1978, a fire test of a full-scale vertical cable tray array demonstrated that the.
conf,iguration of fire protection features used in the test would not be acceptable for application in nuclear power plants. The final test reports of several tests condteted for the NRC fire protection research program have not yet been issueo.
(NRC Response to Interrogatory 36.a). There is no assurance that the same cable problems, and the same inadequate fire protection features, do not exist at Miclar.d.
b
- h There can be no reasonable assurance that the electrical systen at 3-Midland will function adequately under fire conditions.
lf; 2.
According to an affidavit by an anonynous. electrician at ther plant, there were seri.ous quality control lapses in the electrical systems that he installed. For example, where,a cable design called
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fo, th,ee shielded..,,s of i.. auge.1,e. the cabie seop _ 1d use 4
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e 6-stranded.16-gauge wire wjth the shielding around the entice bundle.
(Midland Daily News,' July 28, 1982). Thh enuld result in a waker 7 signal than necessary through the wires, a..d it could contribute to the.
likelihood of shorting, which could disrupt service and pose a fire 4
hazard.
^
Sinclair Contention 13 (formerly revised new contention 3) o The assessment of the likelihood and severity of " severe i
accidents" (or class 9 accidents) in the DES is inadequate in that it lies for nethodology and probability of occurrence of severe accidents on.the Rasmussen Report (WASH-1400) DES 5-45-66.
However, a new NRC report reveals that the Rasmussen methodology, at least as' it 7
^
pertains to.rore severe accidents (total meltdoui), significantly understates the risk of such accidents by a factor of 20. Precursors to Potential Severe Core Danage Accidents: 1969-1979, a Status Report, NUREG/CR-2497 (June 1982). This report snows that probabilities of a
severe accioents should ce derivec on the basis of actual accident a
sequences and significant events, rather than the Rasmussen methodology. 'The failure of the DES to incorporate this anaysis cripples the entire Class 9 analysis of the DES.
+
bf kh Sinclair Eontention 14 (formerly revised new contention 5)
$ gh/L.
The Staff DEIS is deficient in that it continues to base its W analysis of the cooling pond's effectiveness in controlling thermal
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discharges (DEIS at 4-6) and ice and fog generation (DEIS at-5-7) on a j'
study based on cooling pond performance in a substantially different
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- climatic region. Instead, the DEIS should analyze information from the f
(
Dresden, Illinois nuclear facility (or other data from a comparably
~
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sized and situated facility) for both purposes, and present the baseline data from that facility to allow the agency and the puolic to l
reach an informed decision on the adverse effects of the cooling pond.
- .)
c.
[
Sinclair Contention 15 (formerly revised new contention 6, as l
rewritten, and Stamiris revised contention 2) l NRC regulations at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B require that applicants for operating' licenses develop and implement a quality f"'
~
assurance program for the protection of the public from. improper i
materials or unworkmanlike practices. This QA program includes such i
elenents as p ocurement dccument control, control of purchased material, equisnent, and services, proper inspections at.d bandling of '
nonconforming materials, corrective actions, sno audits by trained personnel. However, the affidavit attached to this centention and sunniarized below shows. clearly that the QA program for the Midland I,
plant was not in compliance with these requirements,.and that therefore, quality assurance and control cannot be &stablished at the Midland nuclear plant.
As basis for this contention, intervenor Mary $1nclair references i..
the affidavit of Mr. Albert T. Howard, a former t)uality Assurance
/
O Documentation Supervisor for Zack. Company, (from October 19, 1981 4
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through April 30,1982) which 'was under contract to supply equipment f
4 for the heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVA;) sys' tem of the 4
Midland plant.
[
His affidavit documents the complete breakdown of the QA progrha for the Midland plant, leading to his dismissal for refusing to conform 7
- to Zack's improper QA practices. Those improper practices, with regard j
to the Midland plant specifically, or all of Zack's nuclear clients c
T generally, are detailed as follows:
1.
Howard states that his supervisor, Mr. Calkins, had investigated and reported the QA problems Zack was having with the Midland plant to the Midland Site Manager as early as August 28, 1981.
f#
(at 4).'
^'
2.
As a result of this report, " major QA reorganizations" w#e i
undertaken at Midland, to correct improper QA documentatton.
Id.
3.
Soon after Howard's promotion to Supervisor of t6e Documents Assurance Department, Howard became aware of " serious deficier.cies" in OA documentation.
( at 5).
j 4.
On November 18, 1981,- a Mid and QQ (sic) contract employee
- ].
directed Howard to. sign a form attesting to having completed the 1
}
requisite training for his position, in spite of tiie fact that Howard i
j, did not receive such training.
I_d.
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- 5.. On November 30,1981, Howard reviewed reports which 1
p sisumarized various QA deficiencies at Midland, including such terms
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N "certs altered"; " white out used and retyped"; and
" heat nunber altered to agree with certification";
"j missing signatures; certifications missing; lack of i
test data for purchases; correspondence that steel had been purchased without verification and
~i traceability; and stickers indicating compliance with professional standards. As the suussary noted on the latter item,(" Authenticity of the signatures is questionable."
at6).
6.
On November 30, 1981, doward also received a report from Calkins describing the " breakdown of the quality assurance program",
I,d,.
d resulting in, inter alia, improper modifications to documents.
,i 7.
The report described in 16 concluded tnat the corrective action recommended was to " promise--with a plan--not to repeat the misconduct." No " offenders" were to be dismissed.
(at 7).
+
8.
Sechtel communicated to Zack in a December 21, 1982 letter
.f.
that the reported deficiencies (see 11 1, 5) were a " paperwork probler.', and that it was their opinion that "It is highly probable that Zack ordered correct materials for the Midland project from their subtier vendocs and that the vendnrs' intent was to comply with Zack's purchase order raquirements."
(enchatis aMed). Howard disagreed i
strongly with Bechtel's attempt to minimize the seriousness of the Q4 document breakdown at Zack. (at 9).
e 9.
Howard states that the Zack " internal report / audit" of j
ull Bechtel's QA documentation (in 18) was seriously deficient in that it knowingly understated the number of purchase orders to be evaluated, '
I and therefore that Zack's assurance to Bechtel t' hat a " total document audit" was completed was " simply not true." ('at 10).
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- 10. Howard reports that "several times" he discussed with Zack ic,j management that " delivered materials did'not conform to site..
- r speciffr=tions, and that many of' Zack's vendors were unapproved as suppliers of materi,a1 to nuclear sites." (at 11).
- 11. Howard's affidavit then states that a Mr. Perry contacted h
Commonwealth Edi, son QA manager about the deficiency in delivered 4 :}
materials, who then contacted Consumers Power at the Midlanc site.
~
o Consumers apparently then contacted the president of Zack, who informed Howard that she "did not appreciate our calls outside the company."
?i j
(at 11,12).
- 12. On November 5,' 1980, the Bechtel Power Corporation sent a
..,r-letter to the Zack. Company. Howard reports that the letter "makes it cIsar that Bechtel Power Corporation had sufficient kno~ ledge of w
2 material being shipped to the site in nonconforming condition."
+
7 (at 14).
+4
- 13. Howard states that a September,1981 letter to the Zack
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Conpany from U.S. Steel describes a " serious misunderstancino"
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regarding purchases of steel for Zh purchase orcers at all three ' sites (including Midland). Hovard states that the letter point's out.that the j
Za'ck
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" confirming orders" all read " Safety-Related". The'U.S.
- L Steel letter points out that first, the orders had not 1
been purchased as " Safety-Related"; and second, that A
since the purchase orders were not called in as safety-related, they were not handled through the "V&T" (Verification and Testing) program.". (at 16).
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Howard points out that the use of the term " Safety-Related" impli5a
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I that the items received the quality verification required by regulation, which was inaccurate.
Id.
- 14. Mr. Howard's affidavit states further that Zack did not confine its purchases to those from " approved" vendors.
"Anoth'er vendor, the Delta Screw Company, also failed a fall audit. A fall 1981 Zack letter from Mr. Calkins b
allegedly removed Delta Screw Co. from the approved vendors. list for f ailure to comply with the requirements of a Quality Assurance program as required by the NRC.
However, I knew that Zack Company did not follow its own
" approved vendors list." A list of the P.O.s from
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December 21, 1981 to February 1982 reveals that
.in-fact, Delta Screw received approximately 38 purchase orders from the Zack Company before being put back on the approved vendors list in February 1982." (at 18).
15'.
Howard also describes that Zack personnel were not adequately trained to perfonn their duties. This lack of training included the president of Zack, who " assured the utility management that all.
problems relating to the Zack QA/QC breakdown were under control and her personal supervision".
(at 18,19).
,j
- 16. Howard's affidavit describes the notes of' a, meeting on n.:
JJ November 3,1981, at the Midland site, with all relevant QA personnel Hi li in attendance. The notes showed that the principal purpose of the e'
i.J g.
meeting was to decide "whether or not to report the QA breakdown under e
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10 CFR 50.55(e) to the NRC".
(at 19). The notes further state that l
Zack was-to "try to get material certif ttd to federal specification",
and to " revise or clarify existing requirements so that thit purchases P
would be acceptable." Id.
I
~
.17.
Howard describes a steadily increasing level of " intimidation 4
and verbal abuse" from management, apparently designed to induce g
Howard's resignation.
(at 22).
4
- 18. Howard tnen states that he confided in Mr. Leonard of WyAD (at Midland) of the " awkward difficulties" with QA at Zack. ~ (at 22).
+
He advised Howard that he recognized Zack's "large number of problems over the years," ano that he should report any specific allegations
.-r under a confidentiality agreement. g.
- 19. On April 13, 1982, Howard called Leonard and repor'ted QA problems at Zack. Howard reported these allegations officially through the IfQAD allegation system on April 15.
(at 23).
20.
Despite Leonard's promise of confidentiality, Howard reports
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s that "on April 16, 1982, Mr. Calkins [his supervisor at Zack] called me n]
into his office and told me I had betrayed him and that he was not
- . i going to speak to me anynore".
I_d,.
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- 21. Soon after his visit with Calkins, Howard received a copy of a memorandun from the president of Zack to all employees. "Without f
mentionirfg me by name, this memo referred to and then denied the allegations I had made to Mr. Leonard.
It also denied us access to th'e
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files without upper management permission". 3
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- 22. After a short review of the Zack files, Mr. Leonard informea 1
A Howard that he failed to find ~ anything wrong "of substance" with the v
Zack-QA documents.
,Mr. Leonard stated to Howard that "I was fired once, too, you know." '(at 24).
f
- 23. On April' 30, 1982, Howard was fired by the president of Zack for " incompetence." hevertheless, she acknowledged that Zack's QA performance was " appalling.'" (at 24, 25).
- 24. On May 3,1982, Howard reported the QA deficiencies at Zack to NRC investigators. (at 25).. Wh'ile he left with them documents Q }l relating " alterations," "possible forgeries," and a that its' failure to qualify vendors was a " serious program deficiency,"
the.NRC has not contacted Howard further until July 21,' 1982 (the date y of the affidavit). Although he called, and vis.ited the. office several' -
i I
times, no interest was shown by the NRC in his revelations.
(at 26).
- 25. CPC/NRC internal reporting systems intended to al' low plant j workers to raise concerns or criticisms about inadequate workmanship or practices are ineffective because they have resulted in,jon losses due to QA/QC reporting.
(Midland Daily Aws article dated 7/20/82, l
8/82, and Howard affidavit, 7/30/82).
s Sinclair Contention 16 (formerly revised new contention 8, as
[M rewritten)
The Zack Company of Chicago which has been the contractor 3,
responsible for the heating, cooling and ventilating system of the ji
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Midland nuclear plant has filed a non-compliance report with the NRC on ji or about August 4,1982, indicating that, two sets of records--a shop record and a QA record--which are required to be kept to guarantee the
' integrity of the welds md therefore, must be signed by the same welder, were, in fact, signed by,two different persons. This violates.
the Feoeral standards for documentation for safety-related systems in a j
nuclearpowerpiant. This breakdown in quality control means. the
.:V M.
principal method that the NRC has for guaranteeing the integrity of the L t.[
welds in the HVAC system (which is already built into a large part of a
[.
the plant) has failed and that therefore the protection of the public health and safety cannot be guaranteed as requireo by 10 CFR
?
lb 50.57(1), 50.57(2),~50.57(3) and Part 50, Appendix '8.
~
Sinclair Contention 17 (formerly revised new contention 16, as Q
rewritten)
In the Part 21 report that Zack Co. filed which was signed by Dave Calkins of Zack and preparea by Howard McGrance of Consumers-Power Co.,
{
it was disclosed that 140 Travelers showed unverified welder qualifications for fabrication welds. Without qualified welders for k
this large' number of welds, the necessary guarantee for the protection t
of the public health and safety cannot be met as iequired by 10 CFR 7
50.57(1), 50.57(2) and 50.57(3).
In addition, this report indicates t h
that the quality-assurance in construction of these plants has not been i-met as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.'
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Sinclair Contention 18 (formerly' revised new contention 7 The issue of synergism between chemicals and radiation must be r* opened baseo on a new study. Scientists at Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico, have conducted tests sponsored by the NRC on polymer cable insulation and, jacketing used in nuclear power containment buildings.
(Industrial Research and Development, June, 1982) They hare found thet long-term low doses of ganma raciation degrades many polymers more than do equal cases administered at higher rates in shorter testing times. Besides the dose rate effect, the
~
researchers have also found that synergistic effects can occur when polymers are exposed to radietion and mildly elevated temperatures.
Dr'. Roger Clough, of Sandia National Laboratory, has stated that the
'~
present testing method underestimates the long-term effects and 4
synergisms that display themselves only in longer tests.
This study indicates that the useful life of the plant will be shortened considerably because of this problem.
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2 3-Stamiris C'ontention 1 (formerly new FES contention plus contentions 1
j 1b and Ic)
The 'new production-costs and cost-savings analyses of the FES, F
represented by revised table 2.1 (p. A-32) and the revised cost / benefit j
If analysis (p. 6-4) and revised economic statements derived therefrom do f
[
not accurately and fully represent the cost / benefit balance-of the b.
Midland plant to the public, and should therefore not be accepted as tv
.L presentec, for the following reasons:
h a.
The cost-benefit analysis employs unrepresentative and
(
Q inconsistent methodologies in deriving production cost estimates and benefits.
f'.
%p benefit of operations.
The cost-benefit analysis improperly relies on cost savings x-b.
.. i' as a i,.
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c.
Even if the cost-benefit analysis may utiliza cost savings as
.S a~ benefit, the cost savings set f' orth in the FES are unjustified, in that they are basec to too great an extent on purchased power.
d.
The cost-benefit analysis improperly f acters in increasec
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construction costs in computing the benefits of the facility, and 1
N improperly relies on local taxes as a benefit.
i
- d g h e.
The cost-benefit analysis improperly omits dewatering il r
operating expenses as a cost of operation.
4
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- f.. The co/t of decomissioning in the cost benefit analysis is
'h understated, ir, that it estimates ony $235 million for decommissioning
'?
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while CPC estimated about $500 million for Big Rock and Palisades in I
f 1980.
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The cost-benefit analysis estimates 'about a 36-year lifespan.'
for the facility despite the shorter life expectancy and/or'derates 1
capacity of Unit I due to its defective wela (SER,, P. C-10). _
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Stamiris Contention 2 (fnrmerly revised contention 6) 4 The NRC risk assessment in the DES and FES does not consider ial effects of permanent dewatering on groundwater relationships.
t' Stamiris Contention 3 (formerly revised contention 8)
The ACRS has recommended an asrsessment of Midland's design adequacy and construction quality in its 6/18/82 report (SER Supplement 1, Appendix G).
In order.to assure that this audit be thorough and Y
?
objective, it must be performeo by an independent third party of a competing contracting firm. Such a requirement was accepted by the Applicants in the Houston Power and Light (South Texas) OL proceeding.
And, due to the pattern of design de'ficiencies (4/2u/82 SALP, p.16) such an independent audit is necessary to assure the design integrity of this plant. however, the NRC has not required (sex Supplement 1
- p.19-2(1)), and CPC has not connitted (7/9/82 Tedesco to Cook. letter).
lt 1-to such an independent audit.
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APPENDIX 2 3
TRANSCRIPT CORRECTIONS OF BOARD
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RULINGS ON REWRITTEN CONTENTIONS (TR. 9854-72) ~
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Pg Line Change
.{
9654 7
"that" to "than"
-i 9855
'S
" anticipated transients without scram ATWS" a
to " Anticipated Transients Without Scram 21 (ATWS),"
" i,l 9856 17 "of" to "and" 9856 22
'"Demetrius Basdekas" to "Demetrios Basdekas" 1
9857 13 first " safety" to "non-safety"
.i 9857 18 "was" to "were"
,j j.
't 9857 23
" record produced" to " record can be produced" 9857 23-24 "can be used to" to " appropriate witnesses are present" 9859 2
add coma after "information"
.t l-9859 9
omit "an" s
9859 18 "on" to "in" 9864 2
" sentence" to " group" M;
9865 7
" soil specialist" to " Soil Specialist,"
5.
9865 10
" Boards order" to "BoaFd's Order" n
'A 9665 11
" activity" to " activities"
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j 9865.
12 first "to" to "of" i
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9865 17
" support" to " supports" 9865
'17
" restraint" to " restraints" 9865 21
" basic supply" to " basis supplied" i/
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Page Line Change 9866 3
" construed, the" to'" considered that" 9868 5
"off-site" to "on-site" 9866 11 "threee" to "three" 3
9866 12 delete " Board's" I
9666 13 delete "the Staff in" 9866 15
" bases" to " basis" 9866 16
" bases" to " basis" 9866 21
" bases" to " basis" 9866 23
," conditions" to " condition" A
9868 10
" produce" to " consider" 9869 2
"the same" to "some"
.fM 9869 3
"but the" to "but as the".
9869.
3
" worded. We" to " worded, we" 9869 5
second "is" to "are" 9669 21
" based" to " bases for the contention" 9869 23 "affects" to " effects" 9870 17-18
" aspect of contention shoula include as part of Basis A" to " aspect of the contention should be included as part of basis 8" 9870 22
" limit" to " limiting" 9870 25
" accidents" to " accident" 9871 2
"will" to "can" 9871 3
"in" to "at" 9872 21
" ruling these" to '" rulings on these" s.-
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i 4
Midland OL Contentions from i
Appendix 1 of 12/30/82 Memorandum and Order
~
Contention NRC
(
No.
Keyword Sponsor Sinclair 1 QA Mon-Confonsance W. Shafer (RIII)
Sinclair 2 Evacuation Plan D. Rohrer Sinclair 3 Waterhammer W. LeFave & A. Serk12 0
Sinclair 4 SG Tube degradation / Pend chemistry C. McCracken Sinclair 5 ATWS W. Jensen s
Sinclair 6 Reactor Vessel. Weld B. Elliott Sinclair 7 Snubbers and Supports J. Rajan & W. Shafer Sinclair 8 Systems Interactions F. Coffman & W. Shafer Sinclair 9 Equipment Qualification H. Walker Sinclair 10 Zack and Dartey W. Shafer
.j Sinclair 11 Station Blackout W. LaFave, O. Chopra, and W. Shafer Sinclair 12 Cable QA and Fires W. Shafer & R. Eberly Sinclair 13 Class 9/ Accident Precuson Report J. Mitchell i*
Sinclair 14 Cooling Pond Performance / Fog and Ice E. Pentecost (forANL-Carson)
Sinclair 15 Howard Affidavit W. Shafer Sinclair 16 Zack Wald Records W. Shafer Sinclair 17 Zack Welder Certifications W. Shafen Sinclair 18 Cable Synergism H. Walker Stamiris la-e Cost-Benefit Analysis N. Fields Stamiris if Cost-Benefit Analysis F. Cardile Stamiris 1g Cost-Benefit Analysis B. Elliott Stamiris 2 Dewatering J. Kane & R. Gonzales Stamiris 3 Audit D. Hood & R. Hernan
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