Text

Forwards Response to 840719 Request for Addl Info Re Tech Specs.Complete Package of Comments & Suggestions to Section 3/4.8 of Proof & Review Version of Unit 1 Tech Specs Also Encl
	ML20094A860
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/26/1984
From:	Swartz E; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	9023N, NUDOCS 8408060136
	Download: ML20094A860 (65)
	v • d • e

~

[

Commonwealth Edison

)

/

, One Fast NItionti Ptiza. CNcigo. Ilkno s k

O 7 Address Reply to Post Ofoce Box 767

\\

/ Chicago. lilinois 60690 l

l July 26, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Byron Station Units 1 and 2

{

Technical Specifications NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455 l

Reference (a):

B. J. Youngblood letter to D. L. Farrar dated July 19, 1984 D:ar Mr. Denton:

Reference (a) requested that the Commonwealth Edison Company provide additional information to allow completion of the NRC Staff's ovaluation of the Byron Technical Specifications.

The purpose of this lotter is to provide our response to this request.

Commonwealth Edison has had numerous meetings with the NRC to rOspond to technical reviewers' questions on the Byron Technical Specifications.

As a result of these interactions, many questions have been resolved by our formal submittal of page changes to the Byron T;chnical Specifications.

Reference (a) contains the residual concerns of the Reactor Systems Branch and requests our response to thirteen questions.

The Enclosure to this letter provides our response to each question.

Our review of these thirteen geestions indicates that eight are generic in nature and question the structure of Revision 4 to the Standardized Technical Specifications which our Byron Technical Specifications are patterned after.

Our responses address the Reference (a) concerns without imposing technical specifications in some cases, or by deferring our final response and possible technical specification changes until Westinghouse Owner's Group activities currently underway are completed.

Additionally, at the request of NRR, we are enclosing a complete package of our comments and suggestions to Section 3/4.8 of the Proof and Review version of the Byron Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

These comments and suggestions, with a few exceptions, have been previously transmitted to the NRC in several packages.

This complete scetion should aid NRR in their review.

Recent discussions with NRR have also necessitated some changes to the previously transmitted comments in the area of D.C. Sources and Diesel Oil Surveillances.

These changes have been discussed with your technical reviewers and have b;en included in this package.

8408060136 840726 PM ADOCK 0S000454 1

A PDR I

k

s-

. Your prompt review of the Enclosures to this letter is requested.

Please direct any questions that you may have regarding this catter to this' office.

~

One (1) signed original and fifteen copies of this letter and

._the. Enclosures are provided for NRC review.

Very truly your,

E ouglas Sw z

Nuclear Licensing Administrator cc:

Byron Resident Inspector Enclosures 9023N

. QUESTION 1:

Relief Valves (Section 3.4.4, page 3/4 4-10)

It is the staf f's understanding that your stcam generator tube rupture analysis presented in Chapter 15 of your FSAR relied on the availabilit and operability of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs)y and the steam generator atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) for d pressurization and cooldown in order to limit offsite doses to within 10 CFR 100 guideline values.

Similarly, your cooldown evaluation in FSAR Section 5.4.7 performed to show compliance with BTP RSB 5-1 relied on the availability and operability of the PORVs and ADVs to provide the n:cessary depressurization and cooldown functions.

Your proposed t"chnical specifications however appear to be inconsistent with your FSAR assumptions in that they alkow the PORV to be taken out of service for an indefinite period of time and, on the other hand, they do not contain an operability requirement for the steam generator ADVs.

Please d:monstrate how you comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 rCgarding how your technical specifications for the PORV were derived from the FSAR safety analyses.

Specifically, we believe it is necessary to show that the steam generator tube rupture criteria and the RSB 5-1 criteria can be met assuming inoperable PORVs and ADVs consistent with your proposed technical specifications.

Otherwise, you should d monstrate that your technical specification is consistent with the FSAR analyses.

RESPONSE

ThC action statements for Technical Specification 3.4.4 have been chrnged to the following:

2 ACTION:

a.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s);

otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , b.

With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With both PORV(s) inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months either restore each of the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s) and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

k_

. d.

With one or more block valve (s) inoperable, within 1 hour:

1) restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or close the block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s), or close the PORV and remove power from its associated solenoid valve; and 2) apply the ACTION of b or c above, as appropriate for the isolated PORV(s).

e.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable."

The Lbove revised Action statement ensures that the pressurizer power operated

'rolief valves are available.

This revision has been submitted to the NRC.

-Commonwealth Edison recognizes the need to address the steam generator power operated relief valves which are presently not addressed in either the Byron i'

Tcchnical Specifications or the Standard Technical Specifications.

The W:stinghouse Owners Group, of which Commonwealth Edison is a member, is currently reviewing the Steam Generator Tube Rupture analysis generically.

At the conclusion of this review, Commonwealth Edison will evaluate the results and recommendations of-the Owners Cr,oup, and will incorporate same where appropriate.

4 3-

~i QUESTION 2:

Table 3.3-5, Engineered Safety Features Response Time (page 3/4 3-30)

The high steam generator level trip delay of 2 seconds to close feedwater system valves and, trip the turbine in table 15.0-5 is not consistent with the values in T.Sw table 3.3-5.

s

RESPONSE

The high steam generator water level trip time delay of 2 seconds listed in Table 15.0-5 of the FSAR is the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until an actuation signal is provided to the equipment but does not include equipment operation time.

This is the sensor time delay between detection and actuation of the appropriate response.

'* -The steam generator water level-high-high turbine trip response time of 2.5 '

s:conds listed in Table 3.3-5 of the Technical Specifications is the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function.

The response time includes the sensor time delay of 2 s:conds (Table 15.0-5) and the 0.5 second time interval required for the equipment action to be completed.

i i

s b_

-4 I

QUESTION 3:

Table 3.3-3 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation (page 3/4_3-14)

The Technical. Specifications do not require automatic safety injection in the cvent of a main steam line break outside containment below P-ll (1930 psig RCS pressure).

Justify that a postulated steam line break at the end of core life, when the moderator density coefficient is highly negative, would be cithin the calculated FSAR results for operation below P-11.

RESPONSE

Byron General Procedure (BGP) 100-5 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown requires the RCS to be borated to the cold shutdown concentration prior to reducing

-pressure in the RCS. This means that when the safety injection automatic initiation logic for both low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure are blocked'at the P-ll setpoint, the RCS is already borated to the cold shutdown concentration.

This precludes criticality in the event of a complete cooldown while SI'is blocked.

.r.

i i

. QUESTION 4:

Plant Systems, Main Steam Isolation Valves 3.7.1.5 (page 3/4 7-9)

The Technical Specifications do not require manual isolation capability for the Main Steam Isolation valves in mode 4 (below a RCS temperature of 3500F).

Justify that in the event of a steam generator tube rupture in mode 4 that the offsite dose consequences calculated in the FSAR would not be exceeded.

RESPONSE

The Byron Technical Specifications are consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications which do not require manual isolation capability for the Main Steam Isolation valves in Mode 4.

Commonwealth Edison recognizes the need to address the steam generator tube rupture, mode 4 issue.

The Westinghouse Owners Group, of which Commonwealth Edison is a member, is currently reviewing the Steam Generator Tube Rupture cnalysis generically.

At the conclusion of this review, Commonwealth Edison till evaluate the results and recommendations of the Owners Group, and will incorporate same where appropriate.

.-m

(

. QUESTION 5:

R^ actor Coolant System, Pressurizer 3.4.3 (page 3/4 4-9)

ThJ Technical Specifications limit the pressurizer level to less than 92% for peration in modes 1, 2 and 3 and impose no limits for operation below mode 3.

Justify that the recommendations of Branch Technical Positions RSB 5-1 (cald shutdown) and RSB 5-2 (LTOP) can be met within the above limits in view of the following considerations.

a.

A 450 ft.3 bubble is required to provide a ten minute warning to the operator before the Appendix G limits are reached for low temperature in the reactor system.

(SER page 5-4, Q212.153) b.

A pressurizer vapor space corresponding to an indicated water level of 25% is required to permit boration to cold shutdown without letdown.

(Q212.154 P.7)

RESPONSE Sa):

The scenario discussed in Q211.153 involves the failure of a d-c vital bus which results in the isolation of normal letdown and loss of one Pressurizer PORV.

In addition, the failure of the second PORV is postulated to occur.

This scenario results in the loss of cold overpressure protection through the Pressurizer PORVs with continued charging (120 gpm maximum assumed) to a potential overpressurization event.

There are several Technical Specifications which place limitations on plant operation such that the probability of this event occuring are minimized.

For this discussion, only operation below Mode 3 (ie temperatures below 3500F) is considered.

1).

Tech Spec 3.4.1.3 states that at least two loops, Reactor Coolant or RHR, shall be operable and one in operation in Mode 4.

A RCP shall not be started with the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 3500F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 500F above the RCS cold leg temperature.

This protects the RCS from overpressure transients such that the limits of Appendix G,10 CFR Part 50 are not exceeded.

2).

In Mode 5 with the RCS loops filled, Tech Spec 3.4.1.4.1 requires one RHR loop to be operable and in operation and either an additional RHR loop to be operable or the narrow range level of 2 steam generators to be greater than 41%.

The restriction on not starting an RCP also applies.

Having an RHR loop in operation allows the RHR suction relief valves to provide a means to mitigate an overpressure event.

3).

In Mode 5 with the RCS loop not filled, two RHR loops shall be operable and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.

With the RCS loops not filled, the potential for an overpressure transient is greatly reduced and the RHR suction relief valves would provide an alternate means to mitigate an overpress,ure eve'nt.

. 4).

Tech Spec 3.4.2.2 requires one pressurizer code safety valve to be operable in Modes 4 and 5.

The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure conditions which could occur during shutdown.

5).

Tech Spec 3.4.9.3 requires the Overpressure Protection Systems to be operable in Modes 4, 5 and 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

At least one of the following s Two RHR suction relief valves or (2)ystems shall be operable (1)

Two PORVs or (3) the RCS depressurizer with an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2 square inches.

The operability of one of these systems, ensures the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the Appendix G limits when one or more RCS cold leg temperature is less than or equal to 3500F, 6).

There is also a Tech Spec restriction that a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of the RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 3300F.

This is further assurance that the potential for an overpressure condition will be minimized.

In addition to the Technical Specifications, the operating procedures have limitations which also support minimizing the potential for an overpressure event below 3500F.

One of the first steps in the Plant Shutdown and Cooldown procedure BGP 100-5 is to verify operability of the Low Temp Overpressurization system per Tech Spec 3.4.9.3 surveillance requirements prior to moving from Mode 2 to Mode 3.

Another step ensures the Pressurizer PORVs are placed in the Arm Low Temp mode before RCS temperatsre is decreased below 3800F thus the PORVs will De in operation.

Typically, the RHR system is~1n operation, or at a minimum, the RHR loop suction valves are open providing an open path from the RCS to the RHR suction relief valve, whenever RCS temperature is below 3500F and RCS pressure is below 350 psig.

For this reason, an overpressure event resulting from the prescribed scenario is very unlikely.

In addition,- postulating the failure of 2 independent, separate and redundant systems such as the Pressurizer PORVs and RHR suction relief valves is highly unlikely.

However the discussion will be extended to the infrequent case where the RHR system is isolated from the RCS and the cold overpressure protection system is required to be operable.

Before the cooldown is initiated, letdown flow is verified and then the Pressurizer level is raised to 60% to compensate for shrinkage during the cooldown.

At a 60% level, a 720 cubic foot steam bubble will exist.

Since the Pressurizer level will decrease with the cooldown, the bubble size will increase so the operator must manually makeup to maintain the pressurizer level.

At this level, the operator will have more than a 15 minute warning before the Appendix G limits are reached for low temperature in the reactor system.

A.

Since the pressurizer level is being maintaineo by manual operator action, when a loss of letdown is observed the charging will be reduced to the minimum which will provide the operator with more than a 15 minute response time and an effort will be made to

.re-establish either normal or excess letdown.

If the charging flow can't be reduced, any operating RCPs can be tripped and the charging pump stopped to prevent an overpressure event.

This will also provide the operator with more than a 15 minute response time since all makeup to the RCS will be stopped.

To summarize, in our judgement:

1).

The postulated event is unlikely to occur because the d-c buses have a battery as an emergency power supply and should the d-c bus fail, it must be coupled with the additional failure of the second PORV for overpressurization.

2).

In the unlikely event that the prescribed scenario did occur, RHR would normally be on line and capable of mitigating any potential overpressure resulting from one charging pump.

3).

In the highly unlikely event that the scenario should occur when RHR is isolated from the RCS, the operator would have sufficient time to mitigete the event.

4).

The Appendix G curves are excessively conservative for their intended purpose of. assuring vessel integrity during cold condition.

Commonwealth Edison maintains that no further action is necessary to address this postulated event, and that existing plant design and operational techniques will result in successful event mitigation.

RESPONSE Sb):

Concerning the issue of having a pressurizer vapor space corresponding to an indicated water level of 25% to permit boration to cold shutdown without letdown in Modes 4 and 5 is not a valid concern.

In the Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Procedure BGP 100-5, in the Precautions section it states that normally, the RCS will be borated to Cold Shutdown, xenon-free boron concentration before cooldown 1s initiated which is started in Mode 3 well before entering Mode 4.

The cooldown can be initiated while boration is in progress if adequate Shutdown Margin is available from xenon for the duration of the boration operation.

So if the unit is being placed in Medes 4, 5 or 6, the plant would be borated to Cold Shutdown or refueling conditions (Modes 5 and 6 respectively) while in Mode 3.

Also in the Limitations and Action section, there is a statement that the Shutdown Margin shall be verified upon reaching Hot Standby and once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months while in Modes 3, 4 or 5 per Tech Specs 3.1.1.1 ane 3.1.1.2.

. QUESTION 6:

R^ actor Coolant System, Overpressure Protection Systems 3.4.9.3 (page 3/4 4-35)

The Technical Specifications provide for lockout of ECCS pumps below a RCS tcmperature of 3800F but do not provide for measures to prevent operation of reactor coolant pumps or accumulators at low reactor system temperatures.

The staff's conclusion that Byron was adequately protected against low temperature L

ov0rpressure events was based on the commitment that inadvertent RCP operation or accumulator injection at low RCS temperature would be prevented (SER page 5-4).

Justify that the Appenoix G limits will not be exceeded from inadvertent RCP or accumulator operation at low temperature.

RESPONSE

Tha accumulator isolation valves are closed and power is removed in accordance

. cith Byron General Procedure (BGP) 100-5 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown.

The

,,' following step is in BGP 100-5.

"33.

' Accumulator lineup for RCS cooldown with RCS pressure between 800-1000 psig, s.

Return to service and energize accumulator to cold leg isolations, MOV-SI8808A, 8, C and D.

b.

Close accumulator to cold leg isolations, MOV-S18808A, B, C and D.

c.

Take accumulator to cold leg isolations, MOV-SI8808A, B, C and D out of service."

Concerning the Reactor Coolant Pump's, Technical Specifications 3.4.1.3

(##)pg. 3/4 4-3 and 3.4.1.4.1 (##)pg. 3/4 4-5, reads as follows.

"A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 3800 F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 500 F above each Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperature."

Byron Station recommends changing the "3800F" number to "3500F".

Th3 restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 3500 F are provided to prevent RCS pressure

-transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, thich could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10CFR50.

The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water terperature of each steam generator is less than 500F above each of the RCS I

cold leg temperatures.

ThO above recommended page changes were submitted to the NRC.

e 10 -

QUESTION 7:

Trchnical Specificatinns are not provided for surveillance of the RHR miniflow bypass valves which open at less than 500 gpm for RHR pump protection and close at greater than 1000 gpm to provide for maximum ECCS flow.

Justify that the consequences of LOCA will remain within those documented in the FSAR in the absence of operability surveillance for these valves.

RESPONSE

A Technical Specification Surveillance is not required for the RHR miniflow bypass. valves RH610 and RH611.

For maximum ECCS flow, the worst case situation would be for the miniflow bypass valves to remain open, thus reducing ECCS flow.

The FSAR analysis conservatively assumes a degraded RHR pump discharge curve with a shut off h ad of 120 psig (0 flow) and a maximum RHR flow of 3080 gpm at 20 psig.

Preoperational testing on the RHR pumps has shown that Pump A will deliver 4300 gpm at 150 psig head and Pump B will deliver 4200 gpm at 150 psig head.

These data were taken with miniflow bypass valves closed.

If the mini bypass volves were to remain open, the measured flow could be reduced by a maximum of 650 gpm.. Thus the minimum flow delivered by either RHR pump with the mini bypass valves stuck open is 3550 gpm, which is well above the values required by the FSAR analysis.

For RHR pump protection, the worst case situation would be for the valve to go from the normally open position to closed, thus creating a potential situation of pump degradation by deadheading.

This situation is prevented because the n:rmal valve position is "open".

m

. QUESTION 8:

Table 3.3-2, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times (page 3/4 3-7, 8)

Several of the response times listed in Table 3.3-5 are not verifiable by rcview of Chapter 15.

Please provide references for those times not listed in Chapter 15.

If specific actuated equipment is not taken credit for in any of th3 transient analyses, it is permissible to state that in lieu of a reference for the associated response time.

Spacifically provide verification for the response times for those operations, Other than reactor trip, for a) containment pressure - high, high-2, high-3 b) pressurizer pressure - low c) steam line pressure - low d)

RWST level - low 2, coincident with SI e) undervoltege RCP Bus f) division 1 ESF Bus undervoltage g) loss of power h) steam line pressure negative rate 1) phase "A"

isolation

RESPONSE

Tho following ESF response times were used 1,n the FSAR analysis:

SIGNAL TIME (SEC)

Containment Pressure - High - 1 Containment Cooling Fans 40' Pressurizer Pressure - Low Safety Injection (ECCS) 27*

Feedwater Isolation 7

Reactor Trip 2

i l

Steam Line Pressure - Low Safety Injection (ECCS) 22/12 Feedwater Isolation 7

Steam Line Isolation 7

Containment Pressure - High - 3 Containment Spray 45' i

Stram Generator Water Level - High - High Turbine Trip 2.0#

Feedwater Isolation 7

i 4

12 -

i P

I Steam Generator Water Level - Low - Low Motor-Driven Aux 111ery Feeonater Pump 60 Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 60 L

o Assumes loss of offsite power f

Does not include valve closure time of 0.5 seconds.

j These values'are either documented in the FSAR or in the supporting proprietary calculations maintained by Westinghouse.

Table 3.3-5 of the

' Technical Specifications has been revised to reflect the above and submitted i

to the NRC.

is

)

o t

I i

I 6

i I

s I

B t

{

r I

{

i r

i a

i

l l

I 13 -

QUESTION 9:

I Table 3.4-L. Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves l

(page.3.4-21)

The staff notes that the charging system check valves were recently removed 6

i from the list of valves for which leak surveillance will be performec, r

Justify that the low pressure portions of the char 0ing system are adequately i

protected against full reactor system pressure in the event that all charging flow were lost and that a LOCA outside containment will not occur.

RESPON5E i

l l

Previously, Commonwealth Edison submitted a page change request to the NRC thich deleted check valves ISI8900A, 0, C and D and 1518815 from TLble 3.4-1.

This' request for change is being withdrawn.

}

h I

l i

i f

t i

+

i 4

h

[

i i

I I

i

)

[

s

?

i i

. i QUESTION"10:

Table 3.3-1. Reactor Trip Instrumentation (page 3/4 3-2) l FCr rod withdrawal accident at suocritical conditions, staff is under the impression that reactor trip is initiated by the power range neutron flux trip.

However, the power range neutron flux trip needs only to be operable in modes 1 and 2 according to the Technical Specifications.

Please explain this l

apparent discrepancy.

If your explanation takes credit for either the intermediate range or source range trips, then the setpoint methodology will have to be amended to reflect this.

RE $PONSE The Byron Technical Specifications are consistent with the Stunderd Technical Sp;cifications which requires the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint to be op;rable in Modes 1 and 2.

Cormonwealth Edison recugnizes the n'eed to address the issue.

The testinghouse Owners Group, of which Commonwealth Edison is a member, is currently reviewing this issue generically.

At the conclusion of this review, Commonwealth Edison will evaluate the results and recommendations of the 0:ners Group, and will incorporate same where appropriate.

j f

I f

i l

l l

l r

t

p.

e v

15 -

QUESTION 11:

Raactor Coolant System Hot Shutdown 3.4.1.3 (page 3/4 4-3)

'Tcchnical Specification 3.4.1.3 permits operation in Mode 4 with one RHR loop

'in' operation.

Justify that the consequences of an inadvertent control rod eithdrawal event with one RHR loop in operation in iiode 4 would be bounded by

-the FSAR analysis which~ assumes two reactor coolant pumps in operation in Mode 2.

In your evaluation consider the effect of non uniform flow distribution through the core on minimum DNBR.

RESPONSE

The Byron Technical Specifications are consistent with the Standard Technical

. Specifications which permits operation in Mode 4 with one RHR loop in operation.

Commonwealth Edison recognizes the need to address the issue.

The W:stinghouse Owners Group, of which Commonwealth Edison is a member, is currently reviewing this issue generically.

At the conclusion of this review, Commonwealth Edison will evaluate the results and recommendations of the 0:ners Group, and will incorporate same where_ appropriate.

s

?

W 1 < ~,

4 97

\\,

k,

-1 4

,a

\\'

b' b

a e '

'N A

y s

N,

\\

s

+

m z

w *%

\\

~*y, x

s 3

N-4 w

i

'T e

'i ~.,

,f

i 1_

,.s QUESTION 12:

Tcble 3.3-1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Item 19, the minimum channels operable for interlock P-10 for Mode 1 conflicts

'cith FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.2.

That is, when coming down in power it takes a 3 out of 4 P-10 channels to reinstate the intermediate rLnge high neutron flux

-trip and the_ low power. range neutron flux trip.

Item 19 shows 2 out of 4.

Please resolve this inconsistency.

_ RESPONSE:

Commonwealth Edison does not recognize any inconsistency because the logic is different when going up in power versus coning down in power.

Two of the four po'ver range channels above the setpoint will actuate P-10 allowing the Intermediate Range and Low Power Range neutron flux trips to be blocked.

The Intermediate Range and Low Power Range reactor trips are reinstated when P-10 is de-actuated which requires 3 out of 4 nuclear power range channels to drop below the setpoint.

IE e

h

,. _ _. QUESTION 13:

Plant Systems, Turbine Cycle Valves, B 3/4.7.1.1 (page B3/4 7-1)

What is the. basis for the equation that derives the reduced reactor trip satpoints_whenever there are inoperable safety valves?

Is there an analysis

' to support this equation?

RESPONSE

The purpose of Specification 3/4.7.1.1 Turbine Cycle Safety Valves is to cssure the Power Range Neutron Flux high setpoint is reduced if any steam generator safety valve becomes inoperable.

The setpoints for 1, 2, and 3 inoperable safety valves are specified in Table 3.7-1.

The reduced setpoint values, for'4 loop operation, are computed by the first equation appearing in Tech Spec basis B 3/4.7.1.1.

The equations appearing in the basis provide a linear relation between the Power Range Neutron Flux high setpoint and the relieving capacity of the operable safety valves in_any one steam generator.

It is noted that if safety valves become inoperable in any one steam generator, symmetric flow dictates that the heat transfer to all four steam generators be reduced uniformly.

Each steam generator has 5 safety valves.

Therefore, for each inoperable velve'in a steam generator, the Power Range Neutron Flux high setpoint will be rcduced by less than or equal to 20% of its nominal value (109%).

There are no safety analyses that utilize the equations appearing in Basis 83/4.7.1.1.

9023N L_

, PEOF & REM COPY 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

m enthe/stemwity ffsitetr/nsmission \\

a.

Two o ically in pendent qfecuits bet ne ek and the nsite Cl Vs 1E Distr ution

['

Each s em auxilfa transformer energized fro Ininde ndent L4 iT H ioncycuit,and,/

,/

/

tran IN5E LT

/

. go

/

2)

O e of the)tw'o transforme.rs form' g a systapII auxil

/ trarys'-

Q ormer bapt.

/

b.

Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1)

A separate day tank containing a minimum volume of 450 gallons of fuel, 2)

A separate Fuel Oil Storage System containing a minimum volume of 42,000 gallons of fuel, and 3)

A separate fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

odg our With either err %ffsite circuit or{ diesel generator of the above a.

i required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERASILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.la or Specifications 4.8.1.1.2a.4) and 6) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERA 8ILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specifications 4.8.1.1.la and 4.8.1.1.2a.4) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least orce per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Restore at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-1

9, 4

A 'N ct. Ca.d eh ie du.o 'A h wa._ g g W W:

o W Ws s a n&,a

+ %% q-k~h. p. a

.o w h s g

L m a w

% 'T P k~k, M -

E,a A s p oj y T + h A g y u >@ W eku.at..

,&?

I

~

LP

& R fW hhhf ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

LIMITING CONDITIW FOR OPERATION

^

-ACTION (Continued) c.

With one diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION a. or b.

above, verify that:

1.

All required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices

,that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and

.24M 2.

When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the diesel-driven auxiliary,f pumos nd the ?.;.;

C m...:

inoperable diesel generator is the emergency power supply a

3.....-

a vn.anou, if the 4

j the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

p-ffe If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months be in at least M /%

HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With two of the abcve required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.2a'.4) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . With only one offsite source restored, restore at least y

two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within tne following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

e.

With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERA 8ILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by perform-ing Specification 4.8.1.1.la. within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERA 8LE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STAliO8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Restore at least two diesel generators to CPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or be in least HOT STAN08Y within tne next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDCWN

. within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Eacti of the above required indepi.ndent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System shall be:

a.

Determined OPERA 8LE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and l

b.'

Demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once per 18 months curing shutdown by l

transferring manually unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-2 i

.,,_\\'***

.~L*

i.

".. _,.. _., ~

\\

~.

i i

PR00F & EEW COPY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) a.

In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1)

Verifying the fuel level in the day tank, 2)

Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank, 3)

Veri 1/ ng the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from i

the storage system to the day tank, 4)

Verifying tne diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 600 rps in less than or equal to 10 seconds.

The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ignal.

420 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start s The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

a)

Manual, or b)

Simulated loss of ESF bus voltage by itself, or c)

Simulated loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, or d)

An ESF actuation test signal by itself.

5)

Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW in less than or equal to 60 seconds, operates with a load greater than or equal to 5500 kW for at least 60 minutes, and 6)

Verifying.the diesel generator is aligned to provide stancby power to the associated ESF busses.

b.

At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to I hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the day tanks; c.

At least once per 92 days by checking for and removing accumulated water from t,he fuel oil storage tanks;

'd.

At least ce per.2 days nd from41ew fuel il prior to its di-on to he.st age tan by rifying th a sample btain in accor nce wi ASTM-70-1975 ets the ol ing inim re ire-me in a rda with the test spe fied in 4

097 1977:

er an sed nt content o ass than re a to 0.

\\

p cent; 2)

A kin tic vis sity f C of gre e than r equ to 1.

\\

can sto t less t or equal to ntisto s,

3) ecific vity as eci 'ed the ma ctur at 6 0F of g at than r al to 0.

but le tha equa to j

0.89 o n API gr ty at 60 o g ea er than q

to 1

27 de se but less an equal y39 degrees; j

rM "omi.a s" BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-3

E

)

s

,a h A 6 k M (L in accordance with ASTM-D4057 4.8.1.1.2 fuel oil

' tanks and:

.By sampling newprior to addition to storage tests specified

d. -

By verifying in accordance with the to the storage in ASTM-D975-81 prior to addition 1) tanks that the sample has:

at 60/E0 F, An api Gravity cf within 0.3 cegreet 0.0016 at or a specific gravity of within a) when compared to the supolier sor an 60/60'F, to 0.83 60/60 F of greater than or equal certificate, or an ADI less than or equal to 0.89, l to 27 at gravity of grecter than or ocua to 29 degrees; but ler.s than or ecual degrees but prester than 40 F o#

A kinematic viscesity at Icss ther. cr to 1,9 centistokes,if the gravity was..%

but b) centistokes, the supplier's or ecual ecual to 4.1deterreined by comparision with not certification; 125 F; and to or greater than point equal appearance with proper color c)

A flash ith ASTM-D4176-82 and bright A clear when tested in accordance w d) ing the sample i

By verifying within 30 days of obta nin accordanc in Table 1 of other properties specified 2) met when testedthe analysis for sulfur may that the ASTM-D975-81 are ASTM-D975-81 except with ASTM-D1552-79 or that be performed in accordance

(

ASTM-D2622-82.

g a drain sample i

least once every 92 days by obtain nand verifying that th met with ASTM-D4057-811 of ASTM-D975-El are At j

e.

t in accordance with ASTM-D975-81 except tha properties specffied in Table ed in accordance L

when tested in accordancethe analysis for sulfur m f

j or ASTM-D2622-82.

with ASTM-D1552-79 i

5 3

k i')t h

a

~-

~

'&ewn

PR00F & REYlEVi C ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS L

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) g L)

A urit level of less than 2 mg of i soluble -per 100 ml

, n tes d in a rdarce wi STM-0 4-70, alysis shall I

e comp eted wi in cays fter t ning t.

ole b may be ormed er the cition of fuel oil; a j5)

T e other operties speci d n Table ASTM-75-1 nd Regu to Gui 1.137, ision, Octoe 79, Po t1

, when sted in a cor ce ith ASTM-5-197,

anal 1

shall ec let within 4 days af+ r o ing the sample may be formed a a the ad ition o new fuel oil f f.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1)

Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service, 2)

Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 1034 kW ( C " ; fwhile maintaining vo.it ge at 4160 + 420 volts and frequency at 60 + 4.5 Hz M );

bo ?1.L R %ng the diesel generator capability to reject a load of stat ).

~

3)

Veri fyi 5500 kW without tripping.

The generator voltage shall not exceed 4784 volts during and following the load rejection, 4)

Simulating a loss of ESF bus voltage by itself, and:

a)

Verifying de-energization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses, and b)

Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, j

energizes the ESF busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected safe shutdown loads through the load saquencing timer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its i

generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 420 volts and 60 + 95 Hz during this test.

. 17.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-4 0

4 w eimas e

+= ece

=-N nw

m m --

t

++

s_

_s Cs

, M

I J

h hh hy ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS u

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 5)

Verifying that on an ESF Actuation test signal without loss of ESF bus voltages, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for creater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 420 volts and 60 +

Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the gene tor steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be mai tained within these limits during this test; g,1 6)

Simulating a loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF Actuation test signal, and a)

Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding i' rom the ESF busses; b)

Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the ESF busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-cennected emergency (accident) loads through the LOCA sequencer ano operators for greater than or equal to 5 minutes whiles its generator is loaded with emergendy loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 + 420 volts and 60 + +:t Hz during this test; and l. 2.

c)

Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss-of-voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation signal.

7)

Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of this tast, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 6050 kW and during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW.

The generator 1."2.

voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 420 volts and 60 +

Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Specification 4.8.1.1.2.6)b);"

8)

Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5935 kW; f

If Specification 4.8.1.1.2p.6)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is no.

necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test.

Instead, the diesel generator may be operated at 5500 kW for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or until operating temperature nas stabilized.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-5 gum.

W'#_8 h9'"N@

,_%hh'r-_

==h

= ' " '

l

[ ---

1

\\

fnnne n7 b NE )hh

.~

j-ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 9)

Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

a)

Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, j

b)

Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and c)

Be restored to its standby status.

10)

Verifying that with the diesel generator operating fe a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated

Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation and (2) automatically energizing the emergency loads with'offsite power; 11)

Verifying that the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel via the installed cross-connection lines; 12)

Verifying that the autcoatic LOCA and Shutdown sequence timer is GPERA8LE with the interval between each load block within i

2 10% of its design interval; and 13)

Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting only when required:

a)

Turning gear engaged, and b)

Emergency stop, i

l f.

At least once per 10 years or after any mocifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both i

diesel generators accelerate to at least 600 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds; and l

g.

At least once per 10 years by-1)

Orsining each fuel oil storage tank, removing the accumulated sediment and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution, and SYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-6

^-

e.,

e6, MQm.eQe-H

-A

"I PR00f L REVH COPY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

_SURVEkLLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued)

Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel f FC oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the AS 2)

Code at a test pressure equal to 110 percent of the system design pressure, ll Reports - All diesel generator f ailures, valid or non-valid, sha Reports of be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7.1.

4. 8.1.1. 3

~

d d in Regulatory diesel generator failures snall include the information recommen e 7

If the Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 197.

l nit basis),

number of failures in the last 100 valid tests (en a include the f Regulatory additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b o Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

I l

)

3/4 8-7 BYRON - UNIT 1

~F**

pp,

.=4

~

l P!!00F T< REVIEW CDPY Table 4.8-1 OIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 100 VALID TESTS

TEST FREQUENCY

< 1 At least once per 31 days 2

At least once per 14 days 3

At least once per 7 days

> 4 At least once per 3 days k

t

" Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, where the last 100 tests are determined on a per nuclear unit basis.

For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted after the OL issuance data shall be included in the computation of the "last 100 valid tests." Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31-day test frequency.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-8 Q 4 FG>'.

. - -, - -,, -., ~ -

-e,

~

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS PR007 & REVIEW COPY A.C. SOURCES SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 8.1. 2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERA 8LE:

ne circuit netwee5 the p(fsite tradsmiss' n netwerk and the Cnsit a.

/

l

/

d,, f,,

ClasF1E Distrttiution,Sistem withi

/

k, II A syMen aux 11,fary transformer Anergized by onedircuik of the,-

ofHite transinission network, and, 2)/Oneofthetwot

's ormer formi g system auxili tran er bank. /

b.

One diesel generator with:

1)

A day tank containing a minimum volume of 450 gallons of fuel, 2)

'A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 42,000 gallons of fuel, and 3)

A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, insediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactiv-ity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool, and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through at least a (2) square inch vent.

In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, inmediately initiate corrective

. action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 8.1. 2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4. 8.1.1.2 (except for Speci fication 4.8.1.1.2a. 5)), and 4.8.1.1.3.

8YRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-9 e

,,.-_a_.,m. -. _ _ _ _. _ _. -, - -

i ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS -

PRDOF & EEW COPY 3/4.8.2 0.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.1 As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

125-Volt D.C. Sus 111 fed from Battery ill, and its associated full I

capacity charger, and 4

b.

125-Volt 0.C. Bus 112 fed from Battery 112, and its associated full capacity charger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one of the requir battery banksknoperable, restore the j

inoperable battery bank to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in i

at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

7 Wdh one cf the required full capacity cpargersNnocerabJe, d b./

f onstrata the OPERABILITY of its dssociat4d battacy bank by perfprming/ pecif

, cation 4.8.2.1.2a.1) within I hour, and at least once'per S' hours thereafter.

If any Category A limit'in Table 4.8-Z'is not met, 7

l

/

declare the battery inoperable.

t With one 125-Volt bus i# operable, restore the, inoperable bus to oc,s

! [' c., OPERA 8LE status withir/2 hours' or be/in at least H0 STANDBY

/

s and pn COLD STANOBY['withir. the fgliowipg en t 6 ho is se l

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1.1 Each D.C. bus shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from its battery at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment.

4.8.1.1.2 Each 125-volt battery bank and its associated charger snall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE:

I a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

1)

The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and 2)

The total battery terminal voltage is great'ar than or equal to l-125-volts on float charge.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-10

~~

88

-6 DM.Dv weg w*eN

$N.

We 8'@*w 66 6N A

9 e

e

a. On do-->ie m e A w u p w 4 h g p :

6W W % kin. M s.va%S&

O>s3Q r&M, ul

2) NW %.A & 4 Sp T e w h a., vata

% 5 g % T M.<vm h a. % g tk.

suas u 4 y-ga n a o.iwJk..

\\

O

,e w--

m y

.y._.

d W

b. Lo#JL tk. M p e,pq Ap

-%: o g m aa.m+a. % _al.

gn a r A*~u a m A a.ga. w;+g 4 x a.w n u. -

cdk. b d. 4.:t < Q u a+JL A ->t h. M % b + w k.

a.GAAS W M L.

so %,ud

2) A A M S at % % io M Atmu & M.lewu; cn..L_ A <d..bd (!.:t S-X.kh. & s LewuJ uL a CAeL W so M.

'N i

e l --

I ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS k

l i.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) r b.

At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 105 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 145 volts, by verifying that:

1) ' The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category B limits, 2)

There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, ortheconnectgnresistanceoftheseitemsislessthan 150 x 10 s ohn* and o19, c.aryvere_h M 3)

The average electrolyte temperature of >+ ' rt :;;, :':th "--

cellsis above 60*F.

c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1)

The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, l

2)

The call-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anticorrosion material, i

3)

The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to 150 x 10.s ohafand 4)

The battery charger will supply a load equal to the manufacturer's m.

rating for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

A d.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual emergency loads for 240 minutes when the battery is subject to a battery service test; lg e.

At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80%.of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test.

This performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1.2d.;

f.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by giving performance discharge tests of battery capacity to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application.

Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity 4

drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

QE h_a1 Ab M Aw2^

=t oh : 9 b M m f3 A M D oo oti"ohe,,M.-Ea 4 Ae<.A. M (So 7 6 L

) ; p t A s.

s

.- w a jut.. A -e. n

+ h e m.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-11

-_,.m.

3

,,..,_,.r..,-,.

..,.,,,,,_g,_,,ym

,,._,m,

.m

PRDOF & REV!EW COPY TABLE 4.8-2 BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

]

CATEGORY A(1)

CATEGORY B(2)

U) i PARAMETER LIMITS FOR EACH LIMITS FOR EACH ALLOWA8LE DESIGNATED PILOT CONNECTED CELL VALUE FOR EACH CELL CONNECTED CELL f

Above top of Electrolyte

> Minimum level

> Minimum level Level indication mark, indication mark,I

plates, and < %" above and < %d above l

and not overflowing maximum level maximum level indication mark indicatien mark l Float Voltage

> 2.13 volts

> 2.13 volts (6)

> 2.07 volts Not more than 0.020 below the average of all

> 1.195 connected cells Specific Gravity (4)

> 1.200(5)

Average of all Average of all connected cells connected cells

> 1.205

> 1.195(5)

TABLE NOTATIONS (1) For any Category A parameter (s) outside the limit (s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided '. hat within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months all the Category B measurements are taken and found to be within their allowanle values, and provided all Category A and 8 parameter (s) are restored to within limits within the next 6 days.

(2)' For any Category 8 parameter (s) outside the limit (s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERA 8LE provided that the Category B parameters are within their allowable values and provided the Category 8 parameter (s) are restored to within limits within 7 days.

(3) Any Category 8 parameter not within its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.

(4) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level.

(5) Or battery charging current is less than 2 amps when on charge.

(6) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-12 n-2

_m

[-

i hkh y g ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS O.C. SOURCES l

SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, one 125-volt D.C. bus fed from its battery and its associated full-capacity charger shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES S and 6.

ACTION:

With the required battery bank inoperable, immediately suspend all a.

operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to restore the required battery to OPERABLE status as soon as possible, and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through at least a 2 square inch vent, b.

With the required full-capacity charger inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery bank by performing Specification 4.8.2.1.2a.1) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

If any Category A limit in Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperacle.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The abcve required 125-volt 0.C. bus fed from i

battery and its ts associated charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Specifications 4.8.2.1.1 and 4.8.2.1.2.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-13 e

e -

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 3/4.8.3 OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ified The following electrical busses shall be energized in the spec

- i d,- :.".; = f te- -

Lmu manner with tie breakers open @ tM L L.....e m..t 3.8.3.1

-fen #Setween units at the same station @ "

Division n A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:

a.

1) 4160-Volt Bus 141, 480-Volt Bus 131X, and 2) 480-Volt Bus 131Z.

3)

Division 12 A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:

b.

1) 4160-Volt Bus 142 480-Volt Bus 132X,and 2) 3)

480-Volt B.

r cted 120-Volt A.C.fBus in energized from its associated inver to 0.C. Bus in,* ^-

ized from its associated inverter conne c.

120-Volt A.C/~

d.

to 0.C. Bus ul,* *"

us U2 energized from its associated inverter

120-Volt A.C.

connected to 0.C. Bus U2 (and e.

us H4 energized from its associated inverter 120-Volt A.C.

f.

connected to 0.C. Bus n2."- e MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

APPLICABILITY:

t fully With one of the required divisions of A.C. ESF busses no ACTION:

be in at least energized, reenergize the division within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or N within the a.

HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in C

g ftal buyhot endgized,deenergize thd' A.C. ' vital following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

V urs or'be in at least HOT STANOBY within th i

Wi1fh oria' A.C.

b.

6)xiurs and'in COLD'SHUTDONN within the followi

' bus within 2-L -

Mith one'A.C. ip(erter,inoperapfe or not connected to g

M V4 in 2 rs or e in least, HOT ANOBY thin t next

" B" c./ power supply,,reenergfze the ours.

nthe/ollowng30 inve er w 6

urs an in C0 SHUTD N wit

/

forupto24ho6rsss nyeptfors (ay gdisccyntfected froar their 0.C. Bus harge on their i

cess (ry, for the purpos's of performing an equaliz ng c(1) their vita h

k are energized associatea' battery bank provided:

(40m[hevital,bussesassociatedwiththeoth bus.

ci ateo,0. C.f

?J t f

3/4 8-14 BYROM - UNIT 1 v

w

TM ' B"

6. w. iia.

A.c. C h.dt h M 4 p 1% w_;4.A A,n. A th A & A

.A it w /J A T).c. h : 0 Q *A. A.c.

M M v i+ L a a % en.. k. w & 9 n k. H d.

5

& % & u w A L au SW vatLk&_ p gsoh,%1CO Q &

A.c.. M h p A w bha a M.h A wJ 41 T>.c. W A a+ M n.h. A d. b d.At % A th auf.G W L AA S h vatLA. h W g sc h -

% A. A

--c m

s

--e-., -i_,,.,. - -, - -., - -.

n-

--.,-.y77-

i hkh d

]g ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the ESF busses.

.1 t

l SYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-15

,,-----.-,.-,,,-,_-...,m,_

~

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ~

ONSITE POWER OISTRIBUTION SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be operable and energized in the specified manner:

'l l Vo63" g

d.

One SF Bus (141 or 142),

b.

One 480-Volt ESF Bus (131X or 132X),

c.

One 480-Volt ESF Bus (131Z or 1322), and d.

Two of the 120-Volt A.C. instrument busses powereo from their associated inverter with the inverter connected to its 0.C. power supply.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With any of the above required A.C. busses inoperable or not energized, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel-pool, and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2 square inch vent.

In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled or in MODE 6 with less than 23 feet of borated water covering the reacter vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required A.C. busses to OPERA 8LE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-16

I PiiD9F & h'Y!BY CDPy ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ~

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the above required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device (s) inoperable:

a.

Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize tne circuit (s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of.Soecification 3.0.4 are not aoolicable to overcurrent i

devices in civcuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, their inoperable circuit breakers racked out, or removed, or b.

Be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated CPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 18 months:

1)

By verifying that the kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:

a)

A CHANNEL CAIISRATION of the associated protective relays, b)

An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system : t... % in;

....- C

."ar.. 2 : ' r; --'_ _ -- - - ' _r : d ; i, ;....... ii n m~

2__4_

_2

__2 3c~

-a %

& [& '?0

~~

MMW 3/4'8-17 BYRON - UNIT 1

i i

I ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) c)

For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of.

at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperacle type shall also ce functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

2)

By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of 480-volt circuit breaker.

Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be T

QW -

selected on a rotating basis.

^ '" ' ' :.. : '

.: ' - ' '.*. t.. L,,

....z 1...t.,

....,4,,,,,

_-->n e.

_ - 55.k N'.:.......'.h 'k h ::P -- [-h : :-i ;;

k'--'E-4:n M

g

a. &

b:..

f..

... ; - ' u n.....

h olt' ^ ^ ' d b d.;.. -- --"-' ':

0.'.;

4;;i'i;;

.;i.e."- Circuit breakers found v

0' inoperable during functional testing sna11 be restored to W SQA od. OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation.

For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an NN P additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the h,

M circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be func-Qg tionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested; and jld, c,9 JLd,3:e kMa.

~

3)

By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis.

Each representative Md i.k,4 Mb sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of til fuses of that type.

The functional test shall consist of a nondestructive

,,,m g g g g resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse

7 l g Ma meets its manufacturer's design criteria.

Fuses found inoper-u Alla able during these functional tests shall be replaced with N

C '

OPERA 8LE fuses prior to resuming operation.

For each fuse W>-iA'-

found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally testee.

6.f b.

At least once per 60 months by subjecting each I kV circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with oracedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

8YRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-18

_ _ ~ - -.

l 5

IABLE 3.8-1 5

CONIAlletENT PfMETRATION CONouCION E

OVERCURRENT PADIECTIVE DEVICES 4

e i IP f

PROTECTIVE DEVICE 5 POINT RESPONSE TINE l

NUBSER Ass LOCATION DEVICE

(

res)

(Sec/ Cycle) f 1.

6.9 kV Switchgear i

I 1AC0!PA-8CPA Primary Long ti

- 1440x2.1 11.5 /

Bus 157 Cub 1 Inst. -

N.A.

Sus 157 Norm. Feed Backup Long time

.4800x2 0:9 ACS.EM i5 fi Gr. - 200

\\

0.3 f

1 Bus 157 Emerg. Feed Backup iong time - 48p0x2 0.9

=

AC8 1572 InsL. - 7680 s

N.A.

?

1RC0!P8-RCPS Primary tong time - 1400xt.1

!!.5 Bus 1% Cub 2 InsL. - 7680 N.A.

Bus IM Nora. Feed Backup tong time - 4800s2 \\

0.7 m

g AC8 M66 t%I Gr. - 200

\\

0.3

o

Bus 1% Emerg. Feed Backup tong time - 4000x2 0.7 O

g.

ACB 1%2 Gr. - 200 D.3

-ri Ro INC0lPC NCPC Primary Long time.- 1440x2.1 11.5 Bus 158 Cub 5 Inst.-J680 N.A.

(me-4800x2 Sus 158 Norm. Feed Backup long 0.

AC8 1582 Gr.

200 0.

Sus 158 Emerg. feed Backup los time - 4800x2 0.7 c2 ACB Met SSt Gr - 200

0. 3 C3

-)

N

}

TASIE 3.8-1 (Continued)

S E

CONTAlteqENT PEllETRAll0N CONDUCTOR OVERCUR8ENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES I

Eq gp - - -

PROIECTIVE DEVICE

\\SETP0lNT RESPONSE TIME IIHISER AND LOCAllott DEVICE (4mperes)

(Sec/ Cycle) /

\\

/

1.

6.9 k't Switchgear (Continued)

IRCOIPO - RCPD Primary Long time - 1440x2.1 11.5 Bus 159 Cuh 5 Inst. - 7680 N.A.

1 l

Bus 159 Nora. Feed Backup Loing time - 4800x2 0.7 i

AC8 1591 Gr. - 200 0.3 I

Bus 159 Emerg. Feed Backup Long time - 4800x2 0.7 j

w J

)

AC8 Hr97 15ct2.

Gr. - 200 0.3 i

ce

~s j

4 2.

480V Switchgear

(

o r

1RYO3EA - Pzr.

Primary MCCB - 100 N.A.

litr. Backup Group A Compt. Al-A6, B1 Backup MCC8 - 100 N.A.

~n 1RYO3EB - Pzr.

Primary MCC8 - 100 N.A.

g litr. Backup Group B o

Compt. 81-86, Al Backup MCC8 - 100 N.A.

-v1 28 IRYO3EC - Pzr.

Primary MCC8 - 100 N.A.

litr. Backup Group C j

Compt. Al-A6, B1 Backup MCC - 100 N.A.

1RYO3ED - Pzr.

Primary MpC8 - 100 N.A.

l titr. Backup Group D

/

c3 Compt. 81-86, Al Backup

/MCC8 - 100 N.A.

Q

)

)'

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

~

3

./

g CONIAINNENT PENETRATION C,0NGUCTOR

~*

z c

OVERCURRENT PEGTECTIVE DEVICES E

lG l........

j';

,( ' 1 TRIP g

SETP0 INT RESPONSE TINE PAGTECTIVE DEVICC NupeER AND 10CAllGt-

. DEVICE,

{f& genes)

-(Sec/ Cycle)

- f~!

~

[

3.

483V A.C. Ckt. 8brs.

c-

~*

~

i;

'.IVF0!CA ;RCFC Fin ~

IA low Speed feed l

i

,5 Bkr Swgr 131)

Primary Long time - 460 20-32, Ct.b 4C Inst.'

4.500 N. A.'

/.

l

\\

Hi Speed feed hkr Primary long time - 900 20-32..

/

s t'

Swgr 131X Cub SC Inst. -~),500 N.A.

s 131X Norm.

l

Long time - 960 3.4 p

feed 141 Swgr.,

Backup i

Cih 14,

', Inst. - 3,9E0 N.A.

i i

ACB 1415 h

IWOICC - RCFC f.sn IC Low Speed j

m Feed Skr Swgr I'r (mary

+ Long time - 450 20-32

2 131X Cub 4C l Inst.-4,500 N.A.

[.}.]

~r1 Hi Speed Feed Pkr ' Primary Long time - 900 20-32 gp Swgr 131X Catl* SC Inst. - 7,500 N.A.

_J f

G j

~

l o

C_3 "O

=- <

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

E l

CONTAIMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

I 4

e IRIP PROIEC11VE DEVICE SEIP01 RESPONSE TIME NtBSER AND LOCATION.

DEVICE (Amperes)

(Sec/ Cycle) f 3.

480V A.C. Ckt. Skrs. (Continued)

IVP01CB - RCFC Fan 18

\\.

s Low Speed Feed Bkr Primary Long time - 450 20-32 Swgr 132X Cub 4C Inst. - 4,500 N.A.

\\

I Hi Speed Feed Ekr Primary Long time - 900 y

20-32 Swgr 132X Cub SC Inst. - 7,500 g

N.A.

x s

bBus132XNorm. Feed Backup Long time - %D x

3.4 I

T l

142 Swgr., Cub 14 Inst. - 3,960 N.A.

O ACB 1423

\\

IVPolCD - RCFC Fan 10

/

\\

Low Speed Feed Bkr Primary Long time.450 20-q Swgr 132X Cub 2C Inst.

,4,:r?D N.A. s

/

lit Speed feed Bkr Primary Long' me - 900 20-32

3-Sw0r 132X Cub 3C In'st. - 7,500 N.A.

]

-x E

o C3 "t3

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued) g CONTAlletENT PENET.'lATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

4 e

1 RIP PROIECTIVE DEVICE IPOINT RESPONSE TIME NUMBER AND LOCATION DEVICE

(

eres)

(Sec/ Cycle) 4 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCC8)

..l*

MCC 133x4 1RC0lPA-A Primary 15 N.

Cub B1 Backup 15 N.A.

/

1RC0lPA-B Prinary 40

/N.A.

R Cub B2 Backup 40

/ N. A.

+

r

'?

IHC22G Primary 15

\\

N.A.

Cub B3 Backup 15

\\,

N.A.

d 4

IFH036 Primary 15 N.A.

Cub B4 Backup 15 N.A.

\\

IVPOSCA Primary 30

\\

N.A.

Cub Cl Backup 30

/

\\N.A.

]

C3 1RF03P Primary 30

/

A.

c;_ 3 Cub C2 Backup 30 N.

T l

Re IRC0lPD-A Primary 15

/

N.A.

m Cub 01 Backup 15 N.A.

g IRC0lP0-8 Primary 40 N.A.

Q Cub D2 Backup 40 N.A.

cs C3 1RF02PB Primary 3

N.A.

)

u Cub 04 Backup N.A.

lt

TABtE 3.8-1 (Continued) 5g CONTAINNENT PENETRATION CON 00CTOR i

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E4 TRI N g

j PROIECTIVE DEVICE SETPolNis RESPONSE flME I

NUNBER AND LOCATION DEVICE (Amperes)

(Sec/ Cycle) 4.

400V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued) i.

MCC 133x4 t

1RFolP Primary 15 N.A./

Cub 05 Backup 15 N.A./

/

1RE0lPA Primary 40 N.,A.

k 1

R.

Cub 06 Backup 40

$t. A.

4

/

?

IVP02CA Primary 40

,' N. A.

g Cub El Backup 40 N.A.

IVPO4CA Primary 125 j

N.A.

Cub E2 Backup 125 N.A.

/

IVPO4CC Primary 125

/

N.A.

Cub F1 Backup 125 N.A.

c.3 lEWilEA Primary L25 N.A.

M-Cub F3 Backup

,25

/

N.A.

/

C4 IEWilEB Primary

25 N.A.

OO]

Cub F3 Backup J25 N.A.

lEWilEC Primary 125 N..

h Cub F3 Backup 125 N..

g c3 IIC02EA Primary 2l)

H.A.

N Cub F5 Backup 2 t)

N.A.

j I '

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAlletENE PENEYRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E,

N r

. TRIP x

PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETPOINI N

RESPONSE TI NUpWER AND LOCATION DEVICE (Amperes)

(Sec/ Cycle) 4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)

MCC 133x4 IIC02EB Primary 20 N.A.

Cub G1 Backup 20 N.A.

IIC02EC Primary 20 N.A.

R Cub G2 Backup 20 N.A.

T IIC02EF Primary 30 N.A.

DI Cub Al Backup 30 N.A.

IIC02EE Primary 30 N.A.

Cub A2 Backup 30 N.A.

llc 02ED Primary 30 N.A.

p.

Cub A3 Backup 30 N. A.

I y

3G IFH02J Primary 15 N..

C3 Cub GI Backup 15 N..

IFH03J Primary 15 N. A.;

Cub G2 Backup 15 N.A.

Ou E3 1RColPB-B Primary 40 /'

N.A.

Cub B1 Backup 40<

N.A.

h

/

\\

c-s i

IRE 0lPB Primary

PD N.A.

\\

Cr.a Cub B3 Backup

?0 N.A.

\\.

Q J

I TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

O g

CONTAI MENT PENETRATION CON 00CIOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

Q TRIP

~/

Pil0TECTIVE DEVICE SETPOINI RESPONSE TIME J

NUNBER AND LOCATION DEVICE Amperes)

(Sec/ Cycle) 4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (NCCB) (Continued)

MCC 134x5 1RColPC-A Primary 15 N.A.

Cub C1 Backup 15 N.A./

1RCOIPC-8 Primary 40 4 h.

y Cub C2 Backup 40

.N.A.

j s

=

IVPOSCB Primary 30

./

N.A.

g Cub J1 Backup 30

/

N.A.

IRC0lPB-A Primary 15 N.A.

Cub C3 Backup 15 N.A.

f s

/

111C656-A Primary 40 N.A.

N Cub D3 Backup 40 N.A.

g3 m

IVP02Ch Primary 40 p.A.

p Cub F1 Backup 40

k. A.

m IRColR-A Primary 15

/

N -

Cub F2 Backup 15 N.A.

Q IRF02PA Primary 30 N.A.

C7 Cub G3 Backup 30 B.A.

Q

\\

-4:

IEW12EA Primary 12 N.A.

s Cuu F3 Backup' 1

N.A.

1

7.

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

E g

CONTAllGENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

~

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

4

\\

i r

IRI J

P90TECTIVE DEVICE SET NT RESPONSE TIME In#8ER AND LOCATION DEVICE (Ampe

)

(Sec/ Cycle) 4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. 8kts. (MCC8) (Continued)

MCC 134x5 IEW12E8 Primary 125 N.

I Cub F3 Backup 125 A.

l l

IEW12EC Primary 125 N.A.

t:'

Cub F3 Backup 125 N.A.

?

IVPO4C8 Primary 125

/

.A.

tj Cub F4 Backup 125

/

N A.

h IVPO4CD Primary 125 N. L 1

Cub F5 Backup 125 N.s

)

ISI8808C Prinary 70 N.A Cub A2 Backup 70 N.A c::3

/

C3 i

15I88088 Primary 70

/

N.A T

I Cub A3 Backup 70 N.A

ats IRH87028 Prinary 15 N.A.

Cub P1 Backup 15 N.A.

3 IRH87018 Primary 15 N.A.

Cub 83 Backup 15 N.A.

8

\\

o N'

i

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAlletENT PENEIRATION C00SuCTOR OVERCURRENT PROIECTIVE DEVICES E

TR PROIECTIVE DEVICE SEIPO RESPONSE TIME NLSSER Ape LOCATION DEVICE (Ampere ]

(Sec/ Cycle)

/

480V Molded Case Ckt. 8kts. (MCC8) (Continued)

MCC 132x2 ICV 8112 Primary N.A.

Cub 84 Backup 5

\\

N.A. '

i

\\

i 10G079 Primary 15 N.A.

Cub Cl Backup 15

)

N.A.

R IWOOS6A Primary 5

~ N.A.

{

Cub C2 8.ackup 5

l N.A.

f Ei?

10G080 Primary 15 I,

N.A.

Cub C3 Backup 15 N.A.

)

15

\\

8

}

IRY80008 Prleary N.A.

J-Cub C4 Backup r

15 N.A.

N 1RY8003C Primary 15 N.A.

O Cub C5 Backup 15 N.A.

/

s

?

IIP 06E Primary 20

/

N.A.

p Cub El Backup 20

/

N.A.

IRC80038 Primary 15 N.A.

Cub D4 Backup 15 j

.A.

g

\\

ILL43J Primary

}

70 N.A.

ca Cub E2 Backup g

N.A.

Q 70

\\

IRC8002A Primary

. 40 N.A.

Cub G1 Backup 4

N. A. - -

s s

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued) 8 CONTAlletENT PENETRATION CON 00CTOR

=

OVERCURRENI PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

.-i til

~ ~

l e

PfleIECTIVE DEVICE SEIP0lNT RESPONSE TlHE l

NupeER AND LOCATION DEVICE (Amperes}

(Sec/ Cycle)

/

4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. 8kts. (MCC8) (Continued

/

i MCC 132x2 1

1RC80028 Prleary 40 N.A.

Cub G2 Backup 40 N.A.

IRC8002C Primary 40 N.A.

R Cub G3 Backup 40 N.A.

j T

1RC80020 Primary 40 N.A.

,i Oi Cub G4 Backup 40 N.A.

1 I

MCC 131x2A

'I 15188080 Primary 70 H.A.

iss Cub A2 N

+

N

- d; 125 N.A.

c$-

,l

- r1 M

ISI8808A Primary 70 N.A.

m Cub A3 1AP2SE-A Backup 125 H.A.

N 1

MCC 131x2 Cub B2 Q

N-<

]

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

E g

CONIAlletENI PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES E

~

TRIP l

PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETPolNT RESPONSE TI NupeER AND LOCATION DEVICE (Amperes)

(Sac / Cycle 4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (NCC8) (Continued)

MCC 131x2 1RC8001A Primary 40 N.A.

Cub G I Backip 40 N.A.

\\

IRC80018 Primary 40 N.A.

l ta Cub Q 2.

Backup 40 N.A.

i i>

1RC8001C Primary 40

\\ N.A.

g Cub Q 5 Backup 40

\\N.A.

\\

1RC80010 Primary 40

s. A.

Cub G 4 Backup 40 N1A.

i g

\\

!i IRil8701A Primary 15 N.

N I'

Cub Bt Backup 15 N.

L '3 1RH8702A Primary 15 N.A M

l Cub B 4 Bsckup 15 N.A.

82 0 Ag fl ILL42J Primary 70 N.A.

Cub C l Backup 70 N.A.

i*

IVQ001A Primary 10 N.A.

Cub C$

Backup 10 N.A.

Q

\\

T IVQ002A Primary f 10 N.A.

W Ct.h Fi Backup 10/

N.A.' ~

n

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINNENT PENE1RAll_0N CONDUCTOR L

E 5

OVERCURRENT PROTECilV_E DEVICES

=

TRIP RESPONSE TINE 7

SETPOINT N.

(Sec/ Cycle)

PROJECTIVE DEVICE eres)

DEVICE NUN 8ER AND LOCATION

\\,

480V Molded Case Ckt. 8kts. (NCCB) (Continued)

I

't l

4.

[

MCC 131x2

\\

N.A.

15 Prinary N.A.

15 1RC80030 Backup Cub C'l N.A.

15 NA Primary 15 IRC8003A Backup Cub C6 H. it.

R 15 N.A.

Primary

}

15 l

T 10G057A Backup Cub '01 N.A.

3:

,I M

15 M.A.

Primary

~

C3 i

15 I

ICC9416 Backup Q

Cub D3 N.A.

g k15 N.A.

g I

Primary 1CC9438 Backup j 15 h

l Cub D4 N.A.

N l

Primary N.A.

15

{ 15 I

10G081 Backup Cub E 2.

l s

N MCC 133x6 c :3 R.A.

~

j j

125 N. AN

]

Primary 1HC016 - Cub 82 125 Backup Cub 81 N.A.

225 N.A.

Primary ILLO4E - Cub C3 225

/

Backup l

l Cub Cl

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

E g

CONTAIDMENT PENETRA110N CONDUCTOR DVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES i

E 3

M PROTECTIVE DEVICE SE(Polt i RESPOP.SE II NUDGER AND LOCATION DEVICE ere s)

(Sec/ Cycle),

480V Molded Case Ckt. 8kts. (MCCB) (Continued) i i

MCC 133x IVP03CA Prinary 125 N.A.

Cub A3 Backup 125 N.A.

IVP03CD Prinary 125 N,

N.A.

l R

Cub C4

. Backup 125

's N.A.

I l

?

MCC 132x5 g

\\

i ICC9414 Primary 5

\\ N. A.

j Cub B4 Backup N.A.

.A.

/_

\\

f MCC 134x7 I

\\

ILLOSE Primary 225 N. A' Cub BI, B2 Backup 225 N. A.\\

n

e i

O I

IVP03C8 Primary 125 N.A.

M Cub A3 Backup 125 tl. A.

g IVP03CC Primary J25 N.A.

Cub B't Backup

( /125

. N... A.. _

k_

, ' ' ~

CCM l

i 8 i

i o

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued) 5g CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCIOR x

OVERCURRENT PROIECTIVE DEVICES Ey w

y TRIP N

PR0iECTIVE DEVICE SEIPOINT N

RESPONSE TI ji NupeER AND LOCATION DEVICE resj

'N (Sec/ Cycle) 4.

480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (HCCB) (Cont:Inued)

MCC 131x28 i

i.

/

IW00568 Primary 5

.1 N. A'.

\\

p.A.

Cub Al Backup 5

IRY8000A Primary 10 N. A'.

R Cub A5 Backup 10 N.A.

]

?

""C "..:

0 '_.

w

&n8 h

&&&E34.

...-.j 70 N.A.

N 70 N.A.

N 5.

260 VAC RCD Power (53 rods, 5 panels) ta g

g C.3 Stationary Gripper Primary 10 - Fuse

/,

g N.A.

'v1 Coils (all panels)

Backup 10 - Fuse /

i N.A.

Do

-7 s

m I.ift Colls Primary 50 - Fuse M. A.

y (all panels)

Backup 50 - Fyfe N.S.

.a

/

D Movable Gripper Primary 10 / fuse N.A.

<I Coils (all panels)

Backup 10 Fuse N.A.

{*~J u

g I

f h k h' {fIf ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS-MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERL0A0 PROTECTION DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor starter of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2, shall be OPERABLE.

APPCICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required.o be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare the affected valve (s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION statement (s) for the affected valve (s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of a representative sample of at least 25%'of:

a.

All thermal overload devices, such that each device is calibrated at least once per 6 years, and b.

All thermal overload devices --- :, '

such that each thermal overload is calibrated and each valve is cycled through at least one complete cycle of full travel with the motor-operator when the thermal overload is OPERA 8LE, at least once per 6 years.

l l

l BYRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-34 l

l

. i!

f & REllE# CDPi TABLE 3.8-2 I

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES

/

VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION 1RC8001A RC Loop 1A Hot Leg Stop Valve 1RC80018 C Loop 18 Hot Leg Stop Valve IRC8001C R Loop 1C Hot Leg Stop Valve IRC8001D RC oop 10 Hot Leg Stop Valve 10G081 H2 Rec b Suction Cnet. Isol. Valve ICC9438 CC Wtr om RC Pumps Thermal Bar Isol. Valve c

1CC9416 CC Wtr fr RCPS Isol. Valve 10G057A H2 Recomb mt. Isol. Valve Disch. "H"

{

M'A.

IRC8003A RC Loop 1A B ass Leg Stop' Valve N

1RC80030 RC Loop 10 8 ss leg Stop Valve 1RH8701A RC Loop 1A to RH Pump Isol. Valve IRH8702A RC Loop 1C to RHR dmp Isol. Valve R

"n y

ISI8808A Accum. lA Disch. Is 1. Valve e

E 15I88080 Accum. 10 Disch Iso. Valve d

1RY8000A Pzr. Relief I

1. Val 1A 1W00568 Chilled Wat Cnet. Is

. Valve IRC8002A RC Loop old Leg.Stop Valve IRC80028 RC Loop Cold Leg Stop alve IRC8002C RC Loo 1C Cold Leg Stop V ive IRC80020 RC Lo 1D Cold Leg Stop Va ye IRC80038 RC op 18 Bypass Leg Stop V4 ve R

oop 1C Bypass Leg Stop Va e IRC8003C 1RY80008

r. Relief Valve 18 10G080 H2 Recomb Suct. Cnet. Isol. Valv 1 WOOS 6A Chilled Water Cnet. Isol. Valve 10G079 H2 Recomb. Disch. Cnet. Isol. Valv l

1CV8112 RC Pump Seal Water Return Isol. Val l

1RH87018' RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve IRH87028 RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve 15188088 Accum. 18 Disch. Isol. Valve 1518808 Accua. 1C Disch. Isol. Valve ICC94 CC Water from React. Chg. Pumps Isol. Val e 18 I

f l

8YRON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-35

~*

. - ~ ~

TABLE 3.8-2 MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD y

{"{

G45)

PROTECTION DEVICES FUNCTION VALVE NUMBER 00G059 Unit 1 Suct Isol Viv H2 Recomb 00G060 Unit 1 Discharge so1Viv H2 Recombiner 9

1 Recombinsr 000061 Unit Discharge Xtie for H2 Recombiner 00G062 Unit Xtie on Discharge of H2 Recombiner 00G063 Unit Suction Xtie for H2 Recombiners 00G064 Unit Suction Xtie for H2 00G065 OB H2 AnaljzerInletIsolViv Recomb Disch Isol Viv 000066 OB H2 H2 Recomb Cnet. Isol. Valve Disch. "H" 10G057A 10G079 H2 Recomb. Disch. Cnet. Isol. Valve 10G080 H2 Recomb Suct. Cnsit. Isol. Valve 10G081 H2 Recomb Suction Cnet. Isol. Valve Recomb Disch Cnet Isol Vlv 100082 OA H2 RgcombDischCnetIsolViv 100083 OA H2 Recomb Cnet Outlet Isol Viv 100084 OA H2 Recomb Cnet Outlet Isol Vlv 10G085 H2 1AF013A Al Mir Drv Pmp Disch Hdr Dwst 1tol Viv f

AF Mir Drv Pmp Dsch Ildr Dust it.nl Viv 1At011H 1Al013C Af Mu Drv Pp Disch Hdr Dust isol Viu 1(fol3D : lW rer* Drv Pp Disch Hdr Dust 1sul Viv 1 AF 013E AF Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Hdr Dwst isol Viv 1 AF013t Af Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Hdr Dwst isol Viv 1 AF013G Al Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Ildr Dwst Isol Viv g 3/4 8-35 1 AF 013tl Al Dsl Urv Pp ()sch tidr Dwst isol Vlv

TABLE 3.8-2 (Gcid d MOTOR-0PERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PR TECTION OCVICES b

VALVE NUM ER FUNCTION ICC685 ' RCP Thermal Barrier Outlet Hdr Cnet Isol Viv ICC9413A RCP CC Supply Dwst CNMT Isol 1CC9413B RCPs CC Supply Upst CNMT Isol ICC9414 CC Water from React. Chg. Pumps Isol. Valve 18 1CC9416 CC Wtr from RCPS Isol. Valve ICC9438 CC wtr from RC Pumps Thermal Bar Isol. Valve ICS001A 1A CS Pp Suct From RWSI 364' ICS00ln lH CS PP Suction from RWST 364' ICS00/A CC Pp in Disch Line Dwst Isol Vlv ICSOO70 CS Pp IB Disch Line Downstream Isol Viv i

1CS009A IA Pump Suction From 1A Recirc Sump,

ICS0090 18 CS Cont Recirc Sump B Suct Isol. Vlv to CS ICS019A CS Eductor 1A Suction Conn Isol Vlv ICS019B CS Eductor 18 Suction Conn Isol Vlv ICV 112D MOV RWST to Chg PP Suct Mr ICV 1125 MOV RWST to Chg PP Suct We ICVS100 MOV KCP Seal Leakoff Mr Isol icv 8105 MOV Chrg Pps Disch Mr Isol Viv icv 8106 MOV Chrg Pps Disch We Isol Viv ICV 8109 MOV PD Chrg. Pp. Miniflow Rectrc. V1v icv 8110 MOV A & B Chg. pp Recirc Down stream Isol ICVO111 MOV A & 8 Chg Pp Rectre Upstream Isol i

ICV 8112 RC P g Seal Water Return Isol. Valve

_~---..y-..._,,c,

.-,-e----,my

.[*

TABLE 3.8-2(Col..)

~

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES 3p VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION ICV 83554 MOV RCP 1A Seal Inj Inlet to containment Isol IC'18355B MOV RCP 1B Seal Inj Inlet Isol l

ICV 8355C MOV RCP IC Seal Inj Isol ICV 43550 NOV RCP 1D Seal Inj Isol ICV 8804A MOV RIE Sys X-Tie Viv to Chrgng Pump Suction Hdr A.B.

IRC8001A RC Loop 1A Hot Leg Stop Valve 1RC80018 RC Loop 18 Hot Leg Stop Valve IRC8001C RC Loop 1C Hot Leg Stop Valve IRC8001D RC Loop 10 Hot Leg Stop Valve IRC8002A RC Loop 1A Cold Leg Stop Valve IRC80028 RC Loop 18 Cold Leg Stop Valve IRC8002C RC Loop 1C Cold Leg Stop Valve IRC8002D RC Loop 1D Cold Leg Stop Vdive IRC8003A RC Loop 1A Sypass Leg Stop Valve IRC80038 RC Loop 18 Bypass Leg Stop Valve IRC8003C RC Loop 1C 8ypass Leg Stop Valve IRC80030 RC Loop 1D Bypass Leg Stop Valve IRH610 RH PP 1RH01PB Recire, Line Isol.

1RH611 RH PP 1RH01P8 Recirc Line Isol 1RH8701A RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve 1RH8702A RC 1.oop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve

'1RH870^18' RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve 1RH87028 RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve 1RH8/16A RH HX 1RH02AA Ownstra Isol Vlv 1RH87168 RH HX 1 RHO 2A8 Dunstra Isol Valve IRY8000A Pzr. Reifef Isol. Valve 1A 1RY80008 Pzr. Relief Valve 18

,._m._

[*

TABLE 3.8-2(CoI.)

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES

i M VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION ISI8801A SI Charging Pump Disch Isol Vlv ISI88018 SI Charging Pump Disch Isol Vlv ISI8802A SI PP 1A Disch Line Dwst Cont Isol Vlv 1SI88028 SI PP 18 Disch Line Owst Isol Vlv ISI68048 SI Pump 18 Suct X-tie from RHR HX 15I6806 SI Pumps Upstream Suction Isol 1SIO807A SI to Chg PP Suction Crosstie.Isol Vlv ISI880/8 SI to Chg PP Suct' ion Crosstie Isol Vlv 1SI8808A Accum. '1A Disch. Isol. Valve 15I88088 Accum. 18 Disch..Isol. Valve ISI8808C Accus. IC Disch. Isol. Valve 15I88080 Accus. 10 Disch. Isol. Valve ISI8809A SI RH HX 1A Disch Line 0WST Isol Vlv ISI68098 SI RX HX 18 Dsch Line Dwst Isol Vlv ISI8811A SI CNPIT Sump A Outlet Isol Vlv 1SI88118 SI Cnet Sump 8 Outlet Isol Vlv I

ISI8812A SI Rwst to RH Pp 18 Outlet Isol Vlv ISI88128 SI RWST to RH Pp 18 Outlet Isol Vlv ISI8813 SI Pumps 1A-18 Recirc Line Dwst Isol l-1SI8814 SI Pump 1A Recirc Line Isol Vlv 1SI8835 SI Pumps X-tie Disch Isol Vlv l

t 1SI8840 SI RHR HX Disch Line Upstra Cont Pen Isl Viv ISI8821A SI PP 1A Disch Line X-tie Isol Viv l

1SI88218 SI Pump 18 Disch Line X-tie Isol Vlv.

-... - ~ - - - - -. _ - -

--,,-..w n.

-n.-,-,w-,.

mh_. )

TABLE 3.8-2 MOTOR-0PERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD 5 45 PROTECTION DEVICES VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION ISIS 920 SI Pump 18 Recirc Line Isol V1v ISIB923A SI PP 1A Suction Isol Viv l

IS18923B SI Pump 18 Suct Isol Valve ISI8924 SI Pump 1A Suction X-tie Dwnstra 1801 Viv ISXOl68 RCFC B&D Sx Supply NOV ISXOl6A RCFC A&C SX Supply NOV g

ISXO27A RCFC A&U Return ISXO2/li RCIC H&D SX Return NOV IWOOO60 Chilled Wir Coils IA & IC Supply isol Viv IWD0060 Chilled Wtr Colls 10 & 10 Supply Isol Viv iMX)/OA Challed Wir Coilt, l A 6 1C Nuturn isol Viv IWX)/OU Chilled Wir Cutis ill & 10 Nulurn tsul Viv IMX)/'J A Chiiler IWOOICn Os ! Cooler Retur se Viv IWlX)/iti Chiller lWOOICU Oil Coolur Wulurn Viv IWOO56A Chilled Water Cnet. Isol. Valve IW00568 Chilled Water Cnst. Isol. Valve

j.

3.4.8 m_WICAL POWER SYSTDtS 3/4.8.1 A. C. SOURCES OPERATIW l

LIMITIM CO W ITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.3 The 2A Diesel Generator shall be capable of being manually started and crosstied to Bus 141.f APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:

With the 2A Diesel Generator incapable of being manually started arui crosstied to Bus 141, restore the diesel generator to capable i

status within 7 days or be in HDT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l

and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.4 The 2A diesel generator shall be demonstrated capable of providing power to '-

$c ' 'ws l'i i

~

y m.

a.

At least once per day by:

)

1.

Verifying the day tank level is greater than 450 gallons.

2.

Verifying DC control power is available to the 2A Diesel Generator local control panel (2PLO7J).

3.

Verifying that at least one starting air receiver is at greater than 175 psig.

4.

Verifying the Essential Service Water System is d to supply cooling requirements.

b.

At least once per 31 days by:

1.

Verifying the diesel generator starts manually and operates with a load of greater than or equal to 5500 KW for one half hour.

c.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying the diesel generator can be crosstied to Bus 141.

4g q 9u.na,&, of IOCFR.So.%b.ht)d-o Md (%

upp s.ph a &.h sM I

BYRON - UNIT 1 3/48-K

/

(0464M) 7

ML20094A860

Contents

Text

Subject:

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Navigation menu

ML20094A860

Text

Subject:

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Navigation menu

Search