ML20094A295
| ML20094A295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1984 |
| From: | Gamble D DEFENSE, DEPT. OF, THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094A275 | List: |
| References | |
| SP, NUDOCS 8411060359 | |
| Download: ML20094A295 (23) | |
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TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. GAMBLE Submitted by Three Mile Island Alert November 1, 1984 Joanne Doroshow The Christic Institu+e 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002 Louis Bradford g TMIA 1011 Green Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 Lynne Bernabei
.1; Government Accountability Project
' 1555 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Suite.202 Washington, D.C. 20036 8411060359 841101
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I am David H. Gamble, currently a Supervisory Criminal Investigator (Special Agent) with the Defense Criminal Investi-gative Service. Formerly I was a Criminal Investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor ("OIA") of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and participated in the investigation into whether licensee Metropolitan Edison failed to report information about the accident which occurred at Three Mile Island ("TMI"), Unit 2, on March 28, 1979. I am also an attorney licensed to practice J aw before various
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federal and state courts. My educational and professional background is described in my resume. (Exhibit 1) I am not testifying as an official representative of the Department of Defense; references to my current employment are included solely for the purpose of assessing the weight to be given any opinions I provide.
The purpose of my testimony is to describe the deficiencies I perceived in the NRC's investigation into communication of information about significant events and reactor conditions during the TMI accident. It is also intended to highlight my criticisms of the NRC report which was issued in January, 1981, as a result of that investigation, " Investigation into Information Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Island" (NUREG-0760).
On March 21, 1981, Acting Commission Chairman John Ahearne directed the Office of Inspection and Enforcement
("IE") to begin this investigation. Although Chairman Ahearne ordered an investigation rather than an inspection,
non-investigative IE personnel directed the effort. At that time Chairman Ahearne also instructed the' Director of OIA to assign a criminal investigator to the IE investigation "to protect the interests of the U.S. Department of Justice in any criminal matters that might arise during the investigation."
OIA Director James Cummings assigned me to the investigation full-time.
l I have participated in four other ir.vestigations of the ~)
TMI accident and related events including:
(1) the investigation of the accident which led to the l IE report entitled, " Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and Enforce-i ment," Report No. 50-320/79-10 (August 1979) , NUREG-0600; L (2) the investigation into the accident conducted by the Rogovin Special Inquiry Group; (3) the joint OIA-IE investigation into falsification of leak rate tests at TMI; (4) the OIA investigation which led to an OIA Report entitled, "IE Inspectors' Alleged Failure to Report Information re March 28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion at TMI-2' (January 7, 1981).
L After receiving this assignment, I spoke to Norman Moseley, then Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspections, IE, who in large part coordinated the investigation. Mr. Moseley told me I could not physically be located in IE offices as Mr. Cummings had directed but tha+ he would ensure I was notified as to the time and date of interviews and meetings.
During the investigation Mr. Moseley in fact did not notify me of some interviews and did not' inform me of all the countless
informal meetings and strategy sessions which occurred among IE-staff.
Two members of the investigative' team, Ronald C. Haynes and' William L. Fisher, both of IE, drafted the portions of the report for which they were responsible prior to conducting any interviews. It is my opinion that writing sections of the report before engaging in any significant investigation of the facts indicated that they may have predetermined the conclusions
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they would reach.
Near.the start of the investigation, I perceived that.Mr.
Haynes had a potential conflict of interest which may have affected his objectivity. He was assigned responsibility for an area of the IE investigation into information flow for which he had held . responsibility in the Rogovin Special Inquiry Group investigation into the accident. Shortly after I brought my concern about Mr. Hayne's potential conflict of interest to the attention of my OIA supervisors and Mr. Moseley, Mr. Haynes was relieved of his responsibilities in this investigation.
(I understand that the reason for his release was listed as his need "to resume other pressing duties.")
A similar area which I do not believe was ever addressed was the question of whether Mr. Moseley, who headed the investigation, potentially had a conflict of interest since I understand that in the position he occupied at the time of the accident he held certain duties to receive, analyze and report ,
'l information about the accident.
I recall that in early discussions on the scope of the investigation, IE (Mr. Moseley and possibly Victor Stello)
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!L determined that the focus of the investigation was to be the
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flow of information during the first'three days of the accident, March.28 to' March 30, 1979.
Criticisms'of Conduct of the Investigation 1
One major criticism.I have of'the-investigation is that the IE Headquarters personnel assigned to the investigation, Mr. Moseley, Terry L. Harpster and John W. Craig,. drafted 3=
d the questions to'be asked during-all interviews.and then tried to prohibit other interviewers from asking questions outside
- the pre-approved list, even those flowing logically from the .
witnesses' answers.
i For exampl', e I conducted a number of interviews of Babcock 3 & Wilcox employees in Detroit with Mr. Fisher. Mr. Fisher, af ter reviewing the list of questions IE Headquarters had provided him, told me he believed at lesst one follow-up question should be added to the list but that he felt he was
- not permitted to take this initiative.
i At the time of conducting an interview of George Smith, an IE Branch Chief, Mr. Moseley gave orders to the team to
- adhere to a protocol providing that only one person ask the pre-approved questions. Normally this person was either Mr.
Harpster or Mr. Craig. If other interviewers on the team j wished to ask additional questions,he was to wait until the l e
) end of the interview and then ask Mr. Moseley's permission to
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i j pursue.these additional inquiries.- Mr. Moseley at the end of I
the session would prescreen additional questions prepared by other interviewers and determine whether they could ask them "on the record." J refused to follow this procedure for two 1
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reasons. First, I believe it improperly limited the scope of the interviews and impaired our ability to draw useful informa- I tion from the witnesses. In the case when witnesses gave non-responsive answers to certain pre-approved questions, this protocol would forbid follow-up questions or inquiries more closely tailored to the knowledge or demeanor of particular
., witnesses.
Second, the Commission Chairman had assigned me, as the OIA representative, a specific mission in this investigation which could not be accomplished within the strictures Mr.
Moseley attempted to impose.
Another criticism I1have of the investigation was that I understood IE officials, presumably Mr. Moseley, had made an advance agreement with the attorneys from at least one company as to the areas in which that company's employees would be questioned. I learned that NRC officials had actually told the B&W attorneys that employees interviewed by the investiga-tive team would not have to answer questions which fell within certain areas even if the questions asked for such a response.
Mr. Moseley had not informed me of this agreement; instead I learned of it in a chance conversation with Peter Baci, an IE investigator who participated in interviews of B&W employees.
I disagreed with this approach insofar as it limited the potentially useful information which could be provided to the interviewers. However, my greatest concern was that NRC officials would enter into such an agreement without the knowledge of the interviewers. I, and Mr. Baci as well, questioned B&W employees about this restriction on their testimony.
After this set of interviews, Mr. Baci was not asked to participate in the investigation further and no other IE investigators were requested to participate in the investiga-tion. IE's investigation into information flow should have been headed by trained investigators using standard investiga-tive techniques instead of by IE inspectors and IE management.
Third, I believe that IE's policy of permitting legal counsel representing interviewees' employers to be present during interviews was counterproductive to the accomplishment of a successful investigation. I believe this policy may have had a chilling offect upon interviewees and provided oppor-tunities for improper coaching of later interviewees to provide consistent testimony.
Fourth, in concrast.to assertions in NUREG-0760, the investigative team did not document all interviews which were conducted. I understand that prior to an "on the record" interview of Eldon Brunner, an IE inspector conducted an informal interview of Mr. Brunner which was not transcribed and not documented other than perhaps by interviewers' notes.
Mr. Moseley also imposed an additional limitation on the investigation by prohibiting interviewers from inquiring into whether Metropolitan Edison or General Public Utilitias had failed to report information to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The stated basis for this direction was that he did not want to ask questions which might provide Pennsylvania authorities a forum in which to complain that they had not received suffi-cient information from the licensee during the accident.
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The definition of " material false statement" was discussed in early discussions on the scope of the investigation. This came up in a discussion attended by Mr. Moseley, Richard Hoefling, Office of Executive Legal Director, Marian Moe, Office of General Counsel, and myself. As I recall, Mssrs.
Moseley and Hoefling were questioning whether there would be any criminality if the investigation were to determine that the licensee failed to provide NRC with information but did not actually provide falsa information. I brought up-to the group the fact that the definition of material false statement for criminal purposes is broad and also encompasses a willful omission of material facts.
I did not have the opportunity to participate in most of the discussions conccrning the conclusions included in the report. My primary assignment was to work at that time on a related investigation requested by IE Director Victor Stello on IE inspectors' alleged failure to report information on the March 28, 1979 hydrogen explosion at TMI-2.
I remember, however, hearing of a number of discussions among IE officials which focused on which word would be most appropriate to describe the intent of the licensee's actions.
In general, IE appeared to want to avoid use of the word
" willful" even though words connoting similar intentional or deliberate action were considered. I believe part of the reason IE wished to avoid use of the word " willful" was because of a desire not to indicate the company's potential exposure to criminal liability for its actions.
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- 8-Criticisms of the Report Mr. Cummings directed.me to review the draft of NUREG-0760~
which IE sent to theLfull Commission on January 17, 1981.
After reviewing the draft, I noted several obvious deficiencies.
Af ter calling these 'to the attention of my OIA superiors, Mr.
Cummings directed me to apprise Mr. Moseley of my concerns.
I met with Mr. Moseley and began to list my criticisms of the draft report. Mr. Moseley appeared not to be receptive to my criticisms but rather became very angry that I had brought them to his attention.
Therefore, I did not detail ~each of my criticisms to him at that time. I consulted with Mr. Cummings who directed me to write a memorandum to Mr. Moseley detailing the problems with the draf t report. I prepared a memorandum and sent it to Mr. Moselay on January 26, 1981. (Exhibit 2)
Among the more significant criticisms I listed in my memorandum, which appear relevant to the issue of licensee site personnel's knowledge and understanding on March 28, 1979 of the pressure spike, generation and combustion of hydrogen, and potential core damage are the following:
(1) The report's conclusion that conflicts in testimony are not the result of lying is not adequately supported in the report. Both that conclusion, and the opposite one --
that conflicts are the result of lying -- are equally reasona-ble given the facts which appear in the report.
(2) The summary section of the draft report on the containment pressure spike listed one of three factors relevant to licensee's knowledge.of the containment pressure
' spike "the testimony of Chwastyk and Mehler." This introductory statement is inconsistent with the details which follow since it improperly narrows the focus.of the reader solely to the testimony of Mehler and Cheastyk. In fact, other licensee and NRC personnel testimony is relevant to the issue of licensee's knowledge and appreciation of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979.
(3) The draft report incorrectly stated that only Chwastyk and Mehler attributed the pressure spike to other than electrical faults or-instrument malfunctions..
(4) The draft report incorrectly stated that only i
Chwastyk and Mehler testified that an NRC inspector was present in the control room at the time of the spike. In fact, other Met Ed and NRC personnel agree that an NRC inspector was l
present at that time.
(5) The draft report's use of language to describe NRC inspector Karl Plumlee's testimony and its general treatment of Mr. Plumlee's testimony does not weigh or consider his testimony as it does other witnesses' .
Evaluation of the Investigation's Findings and Conclusions The NRC investigation failed to inquire adequately into possible failings by NRC management and employee. on March 28 to transmit and evaluate information about significant events and reactor parameters. In preparation for a January, 1981 Commission meeting to review the draft report, the NRC staff discussed the need to take care not to discuss in detail areas which might provoke a question from any of the Commissioners
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'regarding possible_ fault oflNRC. employees in~ reporting failures.
On-March 5, 1981,'OIA referred the matter-of possible licensee reporting failures to the Department of Justice for.
potential criminal prosecution. The Justice ~ Department asked OIA to do an analysis of the differences which existed.between-
.the NRC Report, NUREG-0760, and the report prepared by the Majority Staff of the. Committee on Interior and. Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, entitled
" Reporting of.Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island" (March, 1981). On December 1, 1981, OIA completed its analysis of the differences between the two reports and forwarded it to the Department of Justice. (Exhibit 3)
Overall, my evaluation of the NRC investigation into information flow, which led to the issuance of NUREG-0760, is
, that it was not searching enough in its areas of inquiry, was conducted in a manner to preclude a full development of the i
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facts, and reached conclusions-that were not supported by.
I the facts. .
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, Exhibit 1 d
DAVID H. GAMBLE P.O. Box 9290 Alexandria, Virginia 22304-9998 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 1982 to present
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Criminal Investigator (Special Agent)
-Contract Fraud Division
- Defense Criminal Investigative Service 1978 to 1982' Criminal Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975 to 1978 Personnel Security Specialist Division of Security U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EDUCATION Juris Doctor (with Honor) University of Maryland School of Law Bachelor of Arts Bucknell University HONORS 1982 Award for Superior Performance in directing the investigation into NRC's' Region IV's investigation of the Hayward-Tyler Pump Company.
1984 Award for Special Achievement in investigations leading to the prosecution of Defense procurement fraud cases.
' PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS Member, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association Member, American Bar Association Licensed to practice law before various state and federal courts.
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, . Exhibit 2 e
I of g U.";;7CD c7A7c0 l J t,c y NUOLUt,R RECULtJCRV CCZMICO:CN a-[ we.searc Ten.c.c.Icces f; yI.:,::. ,j)g t
Q%M e e ,,e January 26, 1981
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ICCRTL,wi FOR: 1:orcan C. Mscoloy. Director -
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.. Fcst: - David H. G::blo. Invecticator .I M i yQ ..
.0ffica of Incpcetor and Auditor
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"" IE If3fESTIGAT!03 IlJTO INF0;:mT!04 FLOU CC::CECII;"i TE SCJ2CT:
T.HI .. ACCID 34T
,._ n . 7 Att::h:d cro ty c:=:ents en the s5joct draft IE rc;crt which you tecn:cH*W
- to the Cc=1ccica un J r.cary 17, 1031. Coccs:o r/ participatien in the 1
invecticatica ecs licdtod to potcaticily cric;fnal aspects, this c:=rcri:n d:03 not c 33tituto, nor ca I prc;!cred to give, a thorcegh critiqua of tlK inv:: tic:tivo offcrt. Th:ce cc =:nts cro lircitad to thoco catters which c'; Vices to to frca a rc dina of this draft in tha short cc: nt of tica "
i li 3 k ;a cv 11cblo to DIA; I licvo not ctdrce:Od catters such cs tho cnicrc Ot c: tier.s boing ccac1 Cared or tha c r.33r in which tha investigoH*
c c cc de:ttd. I ca prcviding thoco c:..::r.ts to .yot n3 this fora baccuse 1
W:::a I lait:211thtcd scvcrol to ycu on Jcr.cary 21. you res;cadad that the (l- ,
c;=0;ts U re not stSt:ntici ccd thorofore you had rv' int:ntica o' in:Org: rating thca into ycur rc; ort.
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l9 Attc:I:::nt: As stated 4
t- ce t:[ctt: J. Ct ::tngs.' OIA .
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l t' - C010'EP!TS 0?f 1/17/81 CRAFT OF 1
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- k. Pp 2. '94. end 99 a'nd the cover sheet must be revised to accurately s
~ rof1cet the extent of CIA's part'icipation (i.e., as outlinod in the Cl; circon's ttarch 21,1930 n:norandun which directed the investiga!?or, 4
./ ~I understand feca you that those chargos will be nade.
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- 2. Threeshout the report are conclusions which I do not feel arv
. cds;uctoly supported by the report. While the opposite conclusion cold not bo justified eithor, the report confusos cpinions wit
- cc::1ccicas - ( plicit in the lottor is that they have a factual b: sis. For c:cnplo, at tho enaf of the first porcgraph on pago 15.-
you "cca:1cdo" that none of the ccaflicts c ::ainod wro tha resuS-of lying; h:mvor, it is just as reaccachle baccd c;;:n the foetc
- grcccctod yf ng. ' ' . in ysur recort to concicdo that they ware the mcult o'
- 3. P. Il ca. . ,ra.C 3. center.co 3. attc:sts to doffne the invostigation's -
sec;o. Lut has two pecb1cas:
- a. Tho stat =ont prot p cos' that infomatica did not cdor,uatel:
f1cu. This toy of phrasino it is not opprcpriato for en intrede:tica unlocs p u hcd reached this conclusion hafore the invostigatica cs initiated.
b Tho scat =:0 includos the flow of inforcatica to tho stato i C:vcrr ::nt tif thin the investigation's ccepe. Ny undarct:nding of tho I:cpo ts that it was tot to in:ledo THI's relaticashir i with the stato. kup the c:en:ncos that lod ria to this undortt= ding toro ysur dirc:ticas to thoto of us participiting in tho intervicus of stato officials to corofully rostrict out 4 c ticaing to prcycnt providing thoto stato officials with a ,
i fcrc i to cir thoir difficultics in cbtaining infomatics frcn
- Tii!. Fy endorst= ding of tha c
- t'.:a1 curpoco of thoco interviews t::s to det mino thother Ti4! provid:d the stato wf th infomatfor
, th:2 cc not previd:d to CC (which muld indicato that TP c:y h:/Jo uithhold tho inforcatica frca CC). H:c.vor, th-rc;;rt p:rtregis the Itaited in:uiry parfemad in this em toticfying a grector tec;o. Thore oro othat courcos dich did not ottapt to c:ploro (o.9.. c cband=od tha idos of intervicains tho Licuten:nt Covernor boc ::o his cchedulo culd not ellcu cn intervicu ch n a cat:d it; wa did not tr :k dera dother cny ntnutos cro tokoa of WI's triofino ai tho Licutanent Covarnor). It ccc:.s strenga to n:u take actiot boccd upon this restricted phaco'of the invostigation.
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't . P. 2. para. 3.. sentonce 2. refers to SIG depositions. Not all of SIG's intervicus ware depositions.'
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B. P. 3.e the contonce which began on the previous page refers to a Congressional subcasaittee, but it doos not indicate which comittee or thich house of rongress the subccrmittee is from.
. . . g G. P. 3.. para 1. sentonce 2. said "... all intarviews ware conducted under cath uith a ecurt Poporter providing a verbation transcript f.' hat chut the intervicus (infomal proscrooninn or whatever yoe call thca) of individuals such as Eldon Brunner which are not rof1ceted cayd:cre in the . report?
P.12 para. 3. - The Regional Diro: tor must havo told the IE Dirc:t:r r.sro th:n tha bare fcet that the I:ogicnal Fr.organcy C at:7 I d LO:n c:tivated. Con you cro reportino an investicat* - .
of infc:r. tica fleu, this scos to torrcnt a little more detai' h ro, ccc:: tally b:ccuse if the RcDicnal Director provided thit.
1 infc:r.:tica ta l'c:dcacrters at 8:00 a.n., IE usuld hard1v tw* * .
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- Oitica ta cito Tril for rot providing the infomation
- 8. C- ~nt G2 cbva is sonora11y cpplicable to the conclusions at op
(' 19-20. In cdditica
- e. Cca:1cate:S 60 cr.d $5 relate to the Stato/Tt!! relationshir -
Eco cu nt G3.b. chovo.
t- Cca:Iccica 07 specks of MC's having ca inaffective svntc t re in?o f1cu. It is interocting to ccncare this to tha~iEii1 Tar cca:1ccic s ro l'ot-Ed: cc :lesica #2 says Mat-Ed alco had at it:ffc:tivo tysta; he:cvor cen:1ucien 03 goas further by trying that Cat-Ed porc ::01 c:ntributed to tha infomation fica pr:51c=s. ficu 6:k to cc :1ccica 07: tha report ccaclude Cat I::'.*,'c cvtta toc a prchica, bt it is silent en t;hathar I:i.: r".-rds ccatrihted to tha info fica preb1cris. This site.a w :.:rcago in licht of pur c:proccod intenticas to ec .:::t a rcvica of cetions by t.DC parccanal as soon as thic i rc,. rt is tccted. l
' I Ca n:t rc::.11 Cat furchall tas intervictod, yat ha cppears to ;
ficura fa en U:a t=:aled;a of tha En37 being e,, n (cca p. 36, par.
2., taich stat:s Uct litCgins rceoived his info on this area from Itecb11). .,
! tr P. Cc p:ra 1. scaten:o 3. statas "This cenjo:ture wiQ cti r infe:r.atica, tugeactd that tha coro may.have tAonboonecshined en:c. red." 1 hic stat:::o is cat cic:r: Aro p u statina that the
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ec g:tiva did, in fcet, t::pgest to tc::::a (wica?) that tha core r.:y [:Vo L::a c::cvorcd? or cro y:u statinn
- hat in retrescect "
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( l II, e. 47. torn 1, lists "the testinony of Chusstyk and Ptohlor" as tM '
third cccoct partincnt to a discussion of the 28 psic contairmat spiko. As you subscauont analysis indicatos. there are othors 4
uhsco tecthany is cloorly portinent to this issue; thorofore, to j only cito Chastyk's cad Hahlor's testimony in this introductica may 1 unduly norrew the recdors' focus bafore they reach the subsequent l discussion. '
17 P. 48, para. 2 sentonce 1 states that the roactor building l proccuro roco to 28 ps1. 0 Isn't it nora correct to say that the !
prcccaro rc:crder indicotcd 28 psig? That is to say, isn't it :
pecciblo that tha c:plosien conoratod greator than 2e osfD for er j inst:nt (I unf.orst nd that. thoro is sc:a c=311 time lao bottaen ;
cet:31 proccuro cr.d the indication on tha recordar. ? cold guoss ,
that cvon a fec:tica of a so: cad's dolay would roan that tha cetua' proccaro during cn explosion may have been so; owhat Sigher than the indicated pcccuro). .
- 13. P. 40, pcro. 2, scaten:o 5. cold that only two Rat-Ed cmployces (th=ctyk cad H:hice) attritated the croscuro spiko, etc., to cnything cth r then electricci fcults or instrenant P.alfunctient This scatc::co fails to take Iljos' cc=:unts into ccccunt (coa po G1-G2).
la P. 49 p ra. 2, st.urtros knculodge of hydregon and paints cut Cht:styk's cad Ibblor's difforc;it rc:011c:ticas. This discussici 4
fclic ch:rt of taing ecaploto by failing to reatica othars who rc:011 hydec ;n dic:ccsien ca the day of the c:cidont (i.e., Iljas ccdPlealco);.
i M P. 51, para 1 sentesco 2. Ycuc:cainedenallocatidiscussionnot c estcibio dic:cssica (IF did not indepcadonilv explora tha cassibib ..
t!.a w:..u cecca caly b::::co ch:tastyk cnd Hohlor have allocad that ccch a dicet:cica to:k plcco). In cdditica, tha alleged disecesion t::s not just "in tha proccr.:o of cn (;2C inspactor" 't was eithar uith cr in the pocc::co of ca I:;;C incp0:tur."
- 16. P. 51, scra 1. tc::tento 5, states that cnly Chuastyk cr.d Rahlor ov a picccd cn I;;;C incp : tor in the ccatrol rc:m. I balieve otheri.
.cico caid this (o.g., Zcra, I;:cs. Higgins, cnd I;ooly).
P. 92, para 2, ccr.t: .co 2 states that Icoly's diccucsien uttn
- Fchlor was in T ril. i caid this dic:l!Ed~n es In cc:
t*.:a c Dcc:;;
Otka aftcr cat Iby intervicua 15, 1979 0!Aby(OIA, reportt'031y pa l 0 c:,d 17). This sce scatc :o dec:ribed Ithlor as "a Ibt Ed l cnpleyco," This is ritclocdtng. It is 6; art:nt that Rahlor's narc '
La t:cd li:ro L::: :o ha is cao of tha lbt-rd coployaos allooing I th;t cn fEC ic:;;;t:r as inferr:d of the cpiko - if l'ahlor had f felt I: coly t: Ora tha incp::ter, it t:culd havo boon highly unlikely
\._ tt.:.t Itlifor t::ald have ccaffded this infomation in Hooly (see O!n rc;;rt P. a, para l Instcentcaco).
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- 18. P. 52, paro. 2 sentonco 3 says that Nooly turned Mahler's attocatier
.. "over to the !E fivostination tecn, doso findines ara contained ir il 'O EG-0GPO." This sentonce is also nisleading. 0!A's investigatio- '
M fe::nd that, caparenti.v threugh a misunderstanding, !E cddressed the .
inferection ficoly crovidod by interviewino !1jes ant' nehody to date j i( has intervicmd Nohlor specifically regarding the Wormatfor he provided to !!Goly (0!A PGport pp. 20-21).
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'f 19. P. 53, para 1. custos Higgins' description of why he nsy have
' mistcd the " thud." Hs=3vor, the report statos that this is Higgint' cuplcnation of thy he tas not cuare of tha spiko on the pressure
, rc:crdor. Obvicusly the c;uotation is not oppropriate to anser the
, q:cstien posed in tha report. This nakos Higgins appoor to he non rc:p ncivoi he::3vor, if you furnishod the cenpleto c30tation, the rc:dar usuld sea that Riggins was responding to a cuestica obou' his taculed;3 of oither the spike or the thud - his cascar uas ct;;rcatly r.ot intor.dcd to cddress71s knculadga of the spiko. Yet
, sh:31d t:0 a C:otatica here in which Hig kr. ulodga of tha spiho ittol' (soo. e.g. gins diro:tly refdrosses hh i
.. the 0!A report of p.12, 4 . p;ra. 2 cnd p.13, scra.1).
20 P. 8;a, para 1, scatenco 3 c:nticas a Hillor/"arshal' discussier
. rcgording the thud - tas Harshall intarvicmd?
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P. GP, P0ra 1. descritos 0!A's intarvices of o1caloe and Soolingar This p rt:;rcph has thrca prc51cas:
e The first scntca:o scyd GIA interviced tororal inspectors who ucat to li4! on tha day of tha cecident. Tr.a rtet of the catter is that O!A interviced all of the inspectors who were 3
ct THI by 1:50 (the tir.a of tho hydrcgen explcsien).
, I T!:a sc: cad scatenco said plealco "o prossed sevaral cencarns" de:ina the intervicus. It is intorosting that P1calco is tha caly intervic=0 e.cco rescensos are characterized as 0:;rosske-.
cf cen:cens - rathar than reco11ceticas. Chilo I rc:cgnize that the rcpsrt ulticatoly disatssos Ple:nica's stat: . cats, I c:uld ::ggest that the narrative acccant of his statcr. ants be c:ro cMcetivo.
' , c. 11:0 cc;::rt caly attributos Pleafoo's statc= nts ta his O!A intervicaing ca 00:caScr 2 cnd 3, ICOD. H:nover, than IE intervica:d Picalca en Ity 30, 1978, for ClO53-t:SD, Picalco also st:ted that ha learned "that tha containa:nt tuildin,t har tha liydecg:n prosant in tho, ate:: phore in a significcat i
c:ntity"(Tr.5). Furtkarcsro, Plenloa rc;:03tod ccd 01charatec u;;;a his statc .:nts wson IE cutensively rointerviomd hfa in Jcn:Ory 1931. Consit.,tcat statonants at various caints of ti.w
.(c p:: icily thoso clocar to tha ovent.' cdd to the credibility jof cn intervice:ae.
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. 22. D. 62, paia,- 2. " concern" #1 cddresses knowledge of hydrogen by Fogien I norsennel. 1his fails to state the triportant fact that this knothooga was reportedly %1d by Pegion ! ruinaceaent. -
?3. P, 63, para. 2, lists tuo sourcos for Pluatoo's boliof that rootona!
perscanoi hcd hiowledge of hydrogen. The first is what ha bolioved his brcnch chief said regarding hydregon (this would c3vious indicatt knculedga by regional porsennol). The second is Plenica's c.m enalysis; hoeavor, it does not necessarily follow that Plunloe usuld have ccscluded that regional personnel knew of hydrogon basr .
'. Upon his era chility to enslyzo the situation. A third factor which is not doccribcd in the rcport is the corrchoratica Plumice rc;crtedly recofvod frca Scolingar regarding the hydregon scnplos ocely on the day of the cecident. Sco11ngor's ccnversatica undoub'eC reinforecd Plealco's boliof that his branch chie# hcd cctua113 ccntioncd liydregen durinD tho briefing.
'e P. 05, ccatence 3, states, "Pltnico was also cortain that, @.cn h6 *
> tc1d Callina of his ceavorsation with Scoliccar, Gallina told hir that thoro was alrecdy g ncral.spcenlation that the twd:=ccra brr hcd cccurred" (c:;hasis added). Paring OIA's intervic;s (OTA rc; crt, P. 27, para 3-4), Pitnler sair' the crocruro cnike (no th hydrcgon turn) was kncut.
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February 2.198;
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MS40RANDUM FOR: David H. Eamble, Investigator Of);ce of Inspectden and Auditor ~
FIpi: Norman C. Moseley, Director, Division of Program Developannt and Appraisal. Office of Insp:ction '
, and Enforcement -
SUB3ECT: IE INVESTIGATION INTO INFORMATION FLOW CONCDtNING THE TRI ACCIIENT
. . This fesponds to your gratuitous mts on the subject mport. these comunentsi Prf.~ .were asiled on January 26,1961 and received by me on January 27,1981, fwhen -
4
. the report was already finalized and in the-printing process. _
Your memorandom ingilies that the draft upon uhich you commented wa; the only opportunity you had to review the report. This, we both knisw is not true.
You e
haw been supplied copies of each of the tienerous drafts of the report, n each case with e unterstanding that your comments were solicited. In,most cr.ses no tsponse was received from you. Let the record be straight that the contamts sich you gave me on January 2: weit verbally given and :.: the best .
a recollection were related to Itaas l e 4,17,18. and 21C. My ea: tion t-211' of the cosaunts in your January 26 memorandum is that even tf :9ey had bee; Oc:cazadated there would have been no s3cnificant offect on the : nt:Usion (A ). . and recor:nendations unde in our. report. i
>4 Finally, it is incomprehensible,.% un that .Wu wetted'until now t: bring up the ntzerous issues you now ra1%. You not only received copies :? previous dent:s, at was stated above, yce. also sat ih on a ntaber of disc.:stions where
- Jn repor . ite conclusion: and recossendations were discussed: :n neither :ai did you avail yourself of tne opportunity to raise the issues yo :iow express.
I Norman C. Moseley ,
D1 st -ibution:
~
Director -
y..- Division of Program Development
,.e;ey
. and Appraisal Office of Inspection and inforecaent cc: V. Stello, Jr. , IE J. J. Cumings IA R. Fortuna, IA M. E Moe, GC '
..PDA:IE R. L. Hoef11ng, ELD NC Moseley at ;d B1 b '
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Exh'ibit 3 a.,
December 3, 1981 Julian Greenspun, Esq. -
Deputy Chief for Litigation
. General Litigation and Legal ABvice Section -
Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice
- Washington, D.C. 20530 '
Dear Julian:
i.
Enclosed is a self-explanatory' review of two investigative reports concerning the reporting of infomation to the State and Federal Governments on the day of the accident at Three Mile Island. You had requestec this Office to conduct this review to assist you in analyzing the differences between these reports. In addition to copies of these reports, we have also enclosed a related report' prepared by this Office.
Sincerely.
h James J. Cumings, Director
,0ffice of Inspector and Auditor
Enclosures:
- 1. Hemo Fortuna and Gamble to Cumings, dtd 12/1/81, " Question of Withholding Info During TMI Accident".
(NUREG-0760, dtd 1/81).
- 3. Report of Majority Staff of' Committee on Interior and Insular .
Affairs, U.S. House of Re'preseatatives, " Reporting of Info Re Accident at THI" (97th Co;ngress,1st Session, Comittee Print 3 "
dated March 1931).
- 4. OIA Report, "IE Inspectors Alleged Failure to Report Info re March 28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion at.TMI-2 " dated 1/7/81.
Distribution: '
OIA 81-10 OIA Reading '
DGamble bec: Comission W.Dircks,EDO R.DeYoung,IE L.Bickwit,0GC t D. Thompson,IE H.Shapar, ELD nV f OIA: OIA: _.G on.cr > .
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octy ....121.11.81..... .......t.?f.d. . .. ........... ........................ ....................... ...........
ar.mau so ,m.ani um. u mm OFFICloL RECORD COPY
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UNITED STATES -
2 n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ ..: I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20585 g,
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a e i December 1, 1981 : I MEMORANDUM FOR: James J. Cunnings, Director Office of Inspector and Audi r FROM: Roger A. Fortuna, Assistant Dir r foryInvas Office of Inspector and Auditor.
pyf. hbpions David H. Camble, Investigator yI.
/
Office of Inspector and Auditor #
% / '/-
SUBJECT:
QUESTION OF WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION DURING TMI ACCIDENT -
On March 5,1981, at the direction of the Commission, we met with representatives of the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), to present the results of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) report entitled " Investigation into Information Flow During the a
Accident at Three Mile Island" (NUREG-0760, dated January 1981, hereinafter referred to as the "IE Report"), for their consideration as to whether i the facts warranted prosecution for willful misrepresentations, omissions, or violation of NRC regulations.
4 l At that time we also provided DOJ with a draft of the report prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, entitled " Reporting of Infonnation Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island" (97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Committee Print No. 3, dated March 1981, hereinafter referred to as the "HRReport"). We then advised DOJ that we were providing theta.with both reports because of an apparent difference in the conclusions reached therein regarding whether Met-Ed employees withheld infonnation from the State and Federal Governments on the date of the accident at Three Mile Island. Not having read the HR Report, we were unable to describe for DOJ what discrepancies existed between the two reports. At that time DOJ requested that the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) identify the portions of each report relating to the specific topics so that they could more easily analyze the discrepancies between'them. Per your j
instructions we perfonned this task by reviewing the IE and HR re without consulting the results of similar reviews (e.g., by ACRS) ports or other investigations (e.g., by Rogovin's Special Inquiry Group). In
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James J. Cummings '
R :
this review we have avoided the temptation to' characterize the contents of various , sections of these reports in favor of referring to specific page numbers in order to insure that D0J reads the actual words of the reports within their own contexts. The following are the results of our ~
review:
I. Scope of the reports .
IE Report - pp.1-2, 33 par. 3, 35 par. 3, and 39 par. 5 HR Report - pp. 1-3 II.
Identification of the primarj individuals and org'anizations IE Report - p. 33 par 4 HR Report - pp. 4-5 III. Availability and comprehension of information A.
Open PORV/EMOV as cause of low pressure in the cooling system IE Report - pp.16-17 and 33 par. 5 HR Report - pp. 6-11 and 93 par. 2 B. Throttling of high pressure injection IE Report - pp.13-14 HR Report - pp. 11-14 and 93-94 C. Temperature Data IE Report - pp.14-16 and 18-20 HR Report - pp. 14-33 and 94-95 D. Uncovering the core " >-
IE Report - pp. 14-16,18-20, and 34 par.1 HR Ref art - pp. 35-45 and 95-96
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E. Uncertainty as to core cooling IE Report - pp. 14-16 and 18-20 -
HR Report - pp. 45-54 and 95-96 F.
Neutron detectors / count rate behavior IE Report - pp. 20-22 and 34 par.1 HR Report - pp. 33-35
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G. High radiation levels in containment /Goldsboro radiation dose rate projection IE' Report - pp. 31-33 .
HR Report .p. 35 .
H. Hydrogen combustion / containment pressure spike IE Report - pp. 22-31 and 35 par.1 (see also OIA Report.
"IE Inspectors' Alleged Failure to Report Information re March 28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion .
at TMI-2," dated January 7,1981}-
HR Report - pp. 54-92 and 96-97 IV. Information received by the NRC IE Report - pp. 35-39 HR Report - pp. 103-121 V. Information received by the State IE Report - pp. 39-45 HR Report - pp. 103-121 VI. NRC reporting requirements IE Report - pp. 45-52 HR Report - pp.98-102 and 121 i
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