ML20091P597

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Proposed TS Section 1.31 Re Primary Containment Integrity, 3/4.6.1 Re Primary Containment,Bases 3/4.8.4 Re Electrical Equipment Protection Devices & Tables 3.6.3-1,3.8.4.1-1 & 3.8.4.3-1
ML20091P597
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/29/1992
From:
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20091P592 List:
References
NUDOCS 9202030193
Download: ML20091P597 (23)


Text

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ATTAcamHT A NIAGARA MORAVK POVMt CORPORATION LICENSE NO. HPF-69 D07Jtt HQ. 50-410 FJLQpgagd Channes to the Technical Specificatip_qa Peplace existing pages xi', xii, xiii, 1-6, 3/4 3-15, 3/4 6-1, 3/4 6-2, 3/4 6-3,-3/4-6-4, 3/4 6-21, 3/4 6-22, 3/4 6-23, 3/4 8-24, 3/4 8-25, 3/4 8-30, 3/4 8-31,__B3/4_6-5, B3/4 6-6, and B3/4 8-3 vith the attached revised pages.

These pages have been retyped in their entirety with marginal markings to -

indicate changes to the text. Pages 3/4 6 7 through 3/4 6-35, 3/4 8-26 and 3/4 8-27-have been removed and notation added indicating that these pages are "Not Used".

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-9202030193 920129-PDR ADOCK 05000410 P PDR ,

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILIANCE REQUIRENENTS Eh9%

CG!IMlutiXI.JJfilfdiS (Cont inued)

Table 1.6.1.2-1 el?ivable Leak Rates Through Valv6s

!- in Potential Bypass Leakage Paths. . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-4 Primary Containmer *, Air Locks. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-8 Primary Containment Structural Integrity . . . . . . . 3/4 6-10 Dryvell and Suppression Chamber Internal Pressure. . . 3/4 6-11 Dryvell Average Air Temperature. . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-12 Primary Containment Purge System . . ........ . 3/4 6-13 3/4,6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS Suppression Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-15 Suppression Pool and Dryveil Spray . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-19 ~

Suppression Pool Cooling . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-20 3/4,b.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMEAT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-21 5' l 3/4.6.4 SUPPRESSION CilAMBER/DRYVELL VACUUM BREA!'ERS. . . . . . 3/4 6-36

* 6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

_ Secondary Containment Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-38 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers. . . 3/4 6-40 Table 3.6.5.2-1 Secondary Contcinment Ventilation S Automatic Isolation Dampers. . . . . . . .ystem . . . . . . 3/4 6-42 Standby Gas Treatment System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-43 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATHOSPilERE CONTROL 4

Dryvell and Euppression Chamber Ilydrogen Recombiner Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-46 4

Dryvell and Suppression Chamber oxygen Concentration . 3/4 6-47 4

NINE MILE POINT - LNIT 2 xi t

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L1HITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION AND SV4VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  ;

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l'AGI 3/_4.7.. PLANT SYSTEH ,

3/4.7.1 ft. ANT SERVICE VATER SYSTEH5 l, Plant Service Water Dystem - Operating . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 l t i

Plant Service Vater System - Shutdovn. . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-4 l 3/4.7.2 Revet:nent-Ditch Structure . .. ..... . . . . . . . 3/4 7 Table 3.7.2-1 Survey Points for Revetment-Ditch Structure . . . . 3/4 7-9 3/4.7.3 CONTROL ROOH OUTDOOR AIR SPECIAL FILTER TRAIN SYSTEM . 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM , . . . . . . . 3/4 7-14  !

3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS . . .... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-16 I Table 4.7.5-1 -Snubber Visuel Inspection Interve,1. . . . . . . . 3/4 7-20a Figure-4.7.5-1 Sample Plan for Snubber r unctional Test.-. . . . 3/4 7 21 I

3/4.7.56 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION. ... . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-22 3/4.7.7 MAIN TURDINE BYPASS SYSTEM .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-24 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL'POVER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 AC SOURCES AC Sources - Operating . . . - . ... . . . . . , . . . . . 3/4 8-1 Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 Dieme] Generetor Test Schedule . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-12

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AC Sources - Shutdovn. . . . . . - . . - . = . . . . . . . 3/4 8  !

3/4.8.2L DC SOURCES DC Sources - Operating . . . . .. ,... . .. . . . - . . 3/4 8-14 Table 4.8.2.1-1 Battery Surveillance Requirements.. . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-17 DC Sources - Shutdown. . . . . . .... . . . . . . .

. 3/4 8-19 NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 xii Amendment No. 29 4

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Ingx LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS EbGE 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POVER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS Distribution - Operating . .... ...... . . .. . 3/4 8-20 Distribution - Shutdown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-22 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES AC Circuits Inside Primary containment . ... . . . . 3/4 8-24 Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurren Protective Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .t . . 3/4 6-28 ,

Emergency Lighting System - Overcurrent Protective Devices. . .... . . . ... . . .... .. . . . . 3/4 8-30 Reactor Protection Syster Electric Pover Monitoring (RPS Logic). ..... . . ..... ...... . . . 3/4 8-32 Reactor Protection System Electric Power Monitoring (Scram Solenoids). . . . . ... . ...... . . . . 3/4 8-33 3/4.9 REFUEllHG OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1- REACTOR MODE SVITCH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2, INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 COR!LOL ROD POSITION , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME . 4 .. ....... . ....... . . . 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 REPUELING PLATFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 VATER L8 VEL - REACTOR VESSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 VATER LEVEL - SPENT Ft1EL STORAGE POOL. . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-11 NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 xiii

DEFINITIONS

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PRIMARY CONTgtuifNT INTEGJ1111 1.31 (Continued)

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated autonatic valve secured in its closed position, except as provided in Speelfication 3.6.3.

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b. All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
c. Each prima y containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
d. The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.
e. The suppression pool is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration (e.g. welds, bellovs, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

PROCESS COEIROL ROOM 1.32 The PROCESS CONTROL ROOM (PCP) shall contain the current formula sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that the processing and packaging of radioactive vastes, based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated vet or liquid vastes, vill be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 71, and Federal and State regulations and other requirements governing the transport and disposal of radioactive vaste.

P_ URGE - PURGING 1.33 PURGE and PURGING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

RATED THERMAL POVER 1.34 RATED THERMAL ?0VER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3323 HVt.

BEACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMS 1.35 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 1-6

I&RLE 3.3.2 1 (Continu d) l}0LATION ACTUAIlqtL1RETMERBUQH IARLE NOTAI19HS During CORE ALTERATIONS and operation = with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. This applies to functions described in notet (c) and (d) that isolate secondary containment and automatically start the SCTS.

Vhen any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or when the keylocked condenser lov vacuum bypass switch is open (in Normal position).

t Valves 2VCS*H0V102 and 2VCS*H0V112 are also required to be OPERABLE or closed in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 vith any control rod withdrawn but not with control rods removed per Specifications 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.10.2.

tt Vhen handling irradiated fuel in the reactor building and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(a) Refer to Table 3.3.2-4 for valve groups, associated isolation signals and key to isolation signals.

-(b) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same Trip System is monitoring that parameter.

(c) Also actuates the standoy gas treatment system.

(d) Also actuates reactor building ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.5.2-1.

(e) Also trips and isolates air removal pumps.

(f) Initlation of SLCS pump 2SLS*PIB closes 2VCS*HOV102 and manual initiation '

of SLCS pump 2SLS* PIA closes 2VCS*HOV112.

(g) For this signal one Trip System has 2 channels which close valves 21CS*HOV 128 and 2ICS*HOV 170, while the other Trip System has 2 channels which close 2ICS*HOV 121.

(h) Hanual initiation only isolates 21CS*H0V121 and only following manual or automatic initiation of the RCIC system.

(1) Only used in conjunction with lov RCIC steam supply pressure and high dryvell pressure to isolate 2ICS*H0V148 and 2ICS*MOV164.

(j) Signal from LPCS/RRR initiation circuitry.

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-15 l

1

4 3L4ai_.CONIA11ENLSYSIMS 3/4.6.1 PR111ARLC0141AHMNI n1BhB1 GNIAUMRL1 NIT &R1T1 Q!QUNG CONDITIONS _ FOR OP(ljfyTyl{ ,,, .

3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

Al'111CADik1TJ OPERCIO!4AL CONDITIONS 1, 2*, and 3.

hCIIDB Vithout PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, testone PRIMAkY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY vithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least !!OT S!!UTD3VN vithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SilUTDOVN vithin the f olloving 2/ m.. v.

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4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMEl(T INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the primary containment air locks, if opened following Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seals with gas at Pa, 39.73 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the i leakage rates determined pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B and C penetrations, the cornbined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La. .,
b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations ** not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic ,

valves secuted in position, except as ptovided in Specification 3.6.3.

c. By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance sith the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
d. By verifying the suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
  • See special Test Exception 3.10.1
    • Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment, and are locked, sealed, or othervise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTD0VN except such verification need not be performed when the primary containment has not been de-inerted since the last verification or more often than once every 92 days.

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1

CG!IAIMihliLSISIItis l'R1 MARY CONfA1MiEl!I  !

i l'HitiABLCGiIAltilirEI_LEAIMGE kitt! TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Primary containment leakage rates shall be limited toi  !,

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal tot '

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1. La, 1.1% Icy veight of the containment ait every 24 houts at Pa, 39.75 psig, or- .
2. _Lt. 0.72% by weight of the containment air every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at a reduced pressure of Pt. 20.0 psig.

- b .' - A combined leakage _ tate of less than or equal to 0.60 La for all  !

penetrctitra'und all Primary Containment Isolation Valves, except for  !

main steam line isolation valves * (and Primary Containment Isolation  ;

Valves which are hydrostatically leak tested), subject to Type B and C ]

tests when pressurized to Pa, 39.75 psig.  !

c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 1 gpm times i k total  !

number of containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tes*- lines which penetrate the primary containment, when tested at 1.10 . i3.73 t psig. j

d. Less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1 thtough valves  :

in lines that are potential bypass leakage pathways when tested at 40.0 i psig.

AffLICABI1J,IIt ' Vhen PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY is requited per ~

Specification 3.6.1.1.

ACIl0 tit Vithi- I

a. The measured overall integrated primary containment leakage rate
  • exceeding 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, or  :

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NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-2

CONIAllMHLSHILMS fAlBARLIDEIMIMEI fAIHAM.12HIAINtiE14IlLAYMC 11HITitJG COWITIpNS FOR '11'f261]ON 3.6.1.2 (Continued)

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b. The measured combined 3eakage rate for all penotiations and all Primary Containment 1 solation Valves, except for tain steam line isolation valves
  • and valves which are hydrostatically leak tested, subject to Type B and C test.: exce.?dligt 0.60 La, or
c. The measuied combined leakage sate for all coritainmelit isolatf ori valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment exceeding 1 gpm times the total number of such valves, or
d. The measured leakage rate through any valve that is part of a potential bypass leakage pathway exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1.

Restores

n. The ovenail integrated leakage rate (s) to less than or equal to 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, and
b. The combined leakage rate for all penettations and all primary containment Isolation Valves except for main steamline isolation valves
  • and valves which are hydrostatically leak tested, subject to Type Il and C tests to less than or equal to 0.60 La, and
c. The combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment to less than or equal to 1 gpm times the total number of such valves, and
d. The leakage rate to less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1 for any valve that is part of a potential bypass leakage path, prior to increasing reactor coolant system temperatute above 200'F.

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-3

. Q IIAlHtiENT_.!iffiTM TRltiARLGNTAlHtiM PRIMARY C0]iTAINHENT LWAGI SURVEILLANCE REQUIRFMENTS 4.6.1.2 The primary containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972t

a. Three Type A overall integrated containment leakage rate tests shall be conducted at 40 1 10-month intervals during shutdown at Pa, 39.75 psig or t Pt 20.0 psig, during rach 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection.
b. If any periodic Type A test falls to meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission, if two consecutive Type A tests fall to meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, a Type A test shall be performed at least every-18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.

c.- The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

1. Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the difference between the supplemental data and the Type A test data is within 0.25 La or 0.25 Lt, as applicable.
2. Ilas duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate _between the Type A test and the supplemental test.

3..Raquires the quantity of gas injected into the containment or bled ,

from the containment during the supplemental test to be equivalent to at least 25% of the total measured leakage at Pa, 39.75 psig, or Pt,

~20.0 psig, as applicable. ,

r d._ Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at Pa, 39.75 psig,* at ~

intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving

1. Air locks,
2. Main steam line isolation valves and the remainder of the valves specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1.

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L .3. Containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment, and 1

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4. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient seals.

NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-4

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3.6.3 Each Primary containment isolation valve and tenctot instrumentation line excess ilov check value shall be OpERADI.E**.

AITIEAltll.lTY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 MDQN

e. Vith one or more of the primaty containment isolation valves inopeinble, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERA!)lE in each affected penetration that is open and vithin 4 houts eitheri
1. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OpERAllLE status, on
2. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position,* or
3. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least ott closed manual valve or blind flange.*
4. The pt ovisions of Specification 3.0.4 ar e not applicable pr ovided that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the affected penetintion is isolated in accoroance with ACTION n.2 01 a.3 above, and ptovided that the associated system is declared inoperable, if applicable, and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are perfotmed.

Othetvise, be in at least il0T Sil0TDOVN vithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SilVTDOVN vithin the f ollodng 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,

b. Vith one or more of the teactor ins'rumentation line excess flow check valves inoperable, operation may continue and the provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that within 4 houts either;
1. The inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status, or
2. The instrument line is isolated and the associated insttument is declared inoperable.

Otherwise, be in at loinst 110T SilVTDOVN vithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in c

COLD SilVTDOVN vithin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

    • Locked or scaled closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis undet administrative control.
  • Isolation valves closed to satisfy these requirements nay be reopened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

NINE Mite POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-21

.-__ - -. .-..--.--- - _- -.-- -- = - - -- . - .

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ColffAILEtiL1YEIElis IElji&RY CONTAINtiENT IS01Al101ULGy15 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS __

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4.6.3.1 Each primary containment fralation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE before returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement vork is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, j control, or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete ,

cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time. '

i 4.6.3.2 Each primary containment automatic isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during COLD SHUTDOVN or REPUELING at least once per 18 months by verifying that on a contair. ment isolation test signal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each primary containment power operated or '

automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested  :

pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.  !

t 4.6.3.4 Each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve.shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that the valve checks flow.

4.6.3.5 Each traversing in-core probe system explosive isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERALLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the continuity of the explosive charge,
b. At least once per 18 months by removing at least one explosive squib from at least one explosive valve, such that each explosive squib in each explosive valve vill be-tested at least-once per-36 months, and initiating the explosive squib. The replacement charge for the exploded squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the t.se fired or from e another batch which has been certified by having at least one of that batch successfully fired. No squib shall remain in use beyond the expiration of its shelf-life and operating life, as applicable.

NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-22 3

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NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-23

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ELECIALCAL POVER STEIERS ,

3/4.8.4 ELEEIRLCAbl0MIfED!L11QIECILYEJEY1CES l Ac c1RcHI1JESIDE_fR111ARL@lilAIFHuiI  ;

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.1 The AC circuits inside primary containment that ate not provided with primary and backup containmeat penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be deenergizedt*

AEfklCARILIII: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.  !

ACI198: ,

Vith any of the above required circuits energized, trip the associated circuit ,

breaker (s) within I hour, t SURVElblANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.1 Rach of the above required AC circuits shall be determined to be i deenergiued at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ** by vetifying that the associated circuit breakers.are in the tripped condition.

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  • Required before power ascension and following final dryvell inspection.

Excluded from this specification are thore penetration assemblies that are capable of withstanding the taaximum current available because of an electrical fault inside containment.

    • Except at least once per 31 days if locked, sealed, or othervier secured in the tripped condition.

FINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 8-24 I

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NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 8-25 1

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5 ELICIAICAkfRVlB_SI11ERS ELEGIR1CALIDVittiE14T PROTffDVE DEVICIS DiEllGINGl_LI.GilU11G_ SYSTEM - OVERCVly!LHI._EEg[LCIlyJJIJJGIS L1H1 TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.3 The emergency lighting system overcutrent protection devices shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICAQ1L1TJs At all times.

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-Vith one or more of the overcurrent protee'ive devices inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> remove the inoperable circuit breaker (s) from service by opening the breaker. Return the breaker (s) to OPERABLE stattle within 7 days, otherwise be in at lesst. HOT SilUTDOVN vithin the next 12 houra and in COLD Sil0TDOVN vithin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCI' REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.3 The overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by selecting and testing one-half of each type of circuit breaker on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit brenkers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the pickup of the time delay element. The measured response time shall be compared with the manufacturer's data to ensure that it is less than or equal to a value /

specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested by injecting a current in excess of the nominal instantaneous pickup setting and verifying that circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no intentional time delay.

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[EUfARY CONTAUMENT ISQLATION .VAldC.$ l 3/4.6.3 (Continued)  !

GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. Measurement of the closure tire of automatic containment isolation valves is performed for the purpose of demonstrating PRIMARY CONTAIMMENT INTEGRITY and system OPERADILITY i (Specification 3/4.6.1).

The list of primary containment isolation valves is contained in procedure AP-8.8 and revisions vill be processed in accordance with Section 6.0, Administrative Controls.

The maximum isolation times for primary containment automatic isolation valves are either the analytical times used in the accident analysis as described in the FSARI or' times derived by applying margins to the vendor test data obtained in accordance with industry codes and standards. For non-analytical automatic primary containment isolation valves, the maximum isolation time is derived as follows:

1) Valves with full stroke times less than or equal to 10 seconds, maximum isolation time approximately equals the vendor tested closure time ,

, multiplied by 2.0. ,

2) Valves with full stroke time greater than 10 seconds, maximum isolation time approximately (quals the vendor tested closure time multiplied by 1.5. Valve closing times do not include isolation instrumentation response times.

Valve closing times do not include isolation instrumentation response times.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an  ;

intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) ?tationing an operator, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these_ valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action vill prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 S1TMEASLQN CHAMBER - DRYVELL VAG11ti., JEERS Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalire the pressure between the suppression chamber and dryvell. This system vill maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures. ,

The vacuum breakers between the suppression chamber and the dryvell must not be inoperable in the open position since this vould allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are four pairs of valves to provide redundancy so that operation may continue for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with no more than one pair of vacuum breakers inopernble in the closed position.

NINE MILE-p0 INT - UNIT 2' B3/4 6-5

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ERlliARLMEIAUitlElH 3/4.6_d._SEGRDARY CONTA1R KliT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The teactor building and associated structures provide secondary containment during normal operation when the dryvell is sealed and in service. At other times, the dtyvell may be open and, when required, secondary containment integrity is specified.

Establishing and main',aining a subatmospheric condition in the reactos building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.

, The dravdovn time limit has been established considering the same fan performance and building inleakage assumptions as in the post-LOCA analysis l r except that, since the surveillance test is performed when the plant is shut down, (1) post-LOCA heat-loads are not presents (2) the initial secondary

, containment pressure is atmospheric: and (3) loss of offsite power is not assumed. Meet 3ng this dravdown time verified that secondary containment leakage and fan performance are consistent with the assumptions of the LOCA analys _is.

The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available'in the event of a LOCA. The reduction *.. containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site 'oundary radiation ooses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this -

system and resultant lodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Continuous operation of the system vith the heaters operating for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during each 31-day petiod is aufficient to uduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.

3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONT _AINJiENT ATHOSfRE R_Ml{IX %

The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems vill be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the primary containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The dryvell and suppression chamber hydrogen recombiner system is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen and oxygen generation associated with (1) rirconium-veter reactions, (2) radiolytic decompusition of water, and (3) corrosion _of metals within containment. The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

NINE MILE PolNT --UNIT 2 B3/4 6-6 i

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h ELECIltlCAL.10KlLUEIUiS BASES ,, j 344.8.' ELEGIR1CAkl0VIPMWLl'h91ECI1YWEY1CES Primary containnent electrical penetrations and penetration conductors ate  ;

protected by either de-energiring circuits not required during teacto operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcutient protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. The list of primary  ;

containment AC circuits reqaired to be deenergized is contained in '

administrative procedure AP-8.8 and revisions vill be processed in accordance with Section 6.0, Administrative Controls.

The Surveillance Re;uirements applicable to lover voltage circuit breakers provides assurance at breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manuf acturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into  ;

representative samplen which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensute .

that all= breakers are tested. If a vide variety exists within any  !

manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes. ,

t The emergency lighting system overcurrent protective devices ensure that a failure of the non-Class 1E portion of the circuit vill not affect the operation of the remaining portions of the Class 1E circuits that are necessary for safe shutdovn.- The list of these overcurrent-protective devices is contained in administrative procedure AP-8.8 and revisions vill be processed in accordance with Section 6.0, Administrative Controls. I

-The EPAs provide Class _1E isolation _ capabilities for the RPS power supplien and the scram power supplies. This is required because the power supplies are _

not Class 1E power supplien.

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ATTACRKENT B HIAGABA MORAVK POVER C0kPORATION LICENSE liO, HPF-69 DOCr2T HO. 50-410 SMPP9111DLln19tMllDn Niagara Hobavk proposes to change Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications to remove Tables 3.6.3-1, 3.7.2-1, 3.0.4.1 1, and 3.0.4.3-1 and any references citing those tables in the associated Index, Definitions, Limiting Conditions For Operation, Surveillance Requirements and Bases. These tables constitute component lists which vill be relocated to a plant procedute under the change control provisions in the Administrative Controls section of tho Technical Specifications. The Technical Specifications are being proposed for revision such that an appropriate description of the scope of the components to which the Technical Specification requirements apply vill be incorporated in lieu of the tables or reference to the tables. Reference to the plant procedure containing the component lists is being added to the associated Technical Specification Baser. The removal of these component lists from the Technical Specifications vill permit administrative control of any future changes to the lists without processing a license amendment while maintaining an appropriate regulatory process inr thnnge control. These Technical Specification improvemer.ts are proposed in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-08 " Removal of Component Lists f rom Technical Specifications".

Additionally, typographical errors have been corrected. The " Plant Service Vater System - Operating" page designation has been corrected from 3/5 7-1 to 3/4 7-1 on page xii. Page B3/4 6-6 has the spelling for building corrected.

M2JJKolf1MuLllMALdL 6RBlYEla 10 CFR 50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis, using the standards in Section 50.92, about the iss.ue of no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 50.92, the following analysis has been performed:

Iht ungration of Nine Hjle_ Point Unit 1. in asspidante vith th2JI2pJ2ftd Mf!DiGLS.J.llLn?L1RY.RlBJ lilfulilERELAILtLMALAR lhft.AL9babillhJI IL9DAt.quing.ti_9Lan,_,,grLisignLrle.yinup1y esp.lwit!h hemoval of the component lists and correction of the typographical errors does not alter existing Technical Specification Operability or Surveillance Requirements or those components to which they apply. Theretore, the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

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o Th L9 Pito11.91LnLH i t1LtillLl' ult 11_Un LL2 ul>Latt u td an ttu ttitthu t 91r en d M1tudt0 t1Lb _.Y1LL.n0LII R BILittues si bilily_0 La_u cLR Ld i lit ten LhiltL91 Attiden Lile!n_anLatti d e ttLutt v 10M lLeYalM e ith An appropriate description of the removed components has been incorporated in the associated Technical Specification requirements in lieu of the component lists ot- references thereto. The lists of components to which the Technical Specification requitements apply vill be incorporated in plant procedures under the change control previsions in the Administrative Contrnis Section of the Technical Specifications,. Therefoie, the prorased changes do not eteate the possibility of a new a illtr.ent kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Ihurttolisu_sLHlDL!111tjN; E91111tLatCOIMlltu11[L1ht_2LMpMCd gymendm.Loni. v1U not intygl.et,L egnilitattLtedyt.Lin.ttl1Li mngittglanf ety, _

The Technical Specification .iutting Conditions for operation or Suiveillance Requirements for the temtrt ra camponents are not being alter ed. The component lists vill be incorporsit<hl hith plant procedures which are conttolled by administrative proceduttet eM eh inquit e that all changes be evaluated in accordance vitt3 10 CFR W ,'H. The plant procedures vill be under the change control provisions in tre Adnfr.fstrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications. Thereflone, ao proposed changes do not adversely af f ect a limiting Safety System Settleg cr involve a reduction in a matgin of safety.

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PLANT #: ]J me 2 __

APPLIES to OTHER UNIT? _ YES d, 40

SUBJECT:

Wh %ct A c. u d m e 0 4 DUE L .. [I b h P PREPARED BY: BAv toi rv m Au APPLICABLE NCTS 'c.;

REFERENCE:

G r u t o c- Lt wtla 9mR

[NGINEERING AND LICENSING REVitt Slonature Design Engineer NRC Project Manager ~

v' Sveervisor Licensing Support Ouw iwA6tw/

Manager Technology Services <-

/ Manager Nuclear Engineering LA EWar x r Other (Specify)

SITE REVIEW l Plant Manager Manager Maintenance Manager Technical Support Manager Operations

/ _SORC Review __f3 -//- C/^/t 8/Eb v' Tech Review / Ow c rs b '2cu tu ^ 't

/ SRAB Review .b+ t% w L / P,,11 t h t/1 >

Other (Specify) '

FINAL REVIEW Slanature g cu,[se, u

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/ System Attorney Me e w ren [,u$ rcc O,ur e

/. Manager Licensing 7 > k utu k(3 f ,

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/ Proofreader i . /i c. ,, o - / v, - >s, Comments W .in nocu0milbtk 4An.h nowoves s,+-.lc ff-be ch socon..  %. oe,.  % mm,m a s atc,v, h o We e4 X;L 9 t- o A 4 Civ DISPOSITION _ NCTS Forms Attached GE vf 4 AMb (R u f b mbC IJ M h ptov

,,,,,,, N/A No new connitments made or followup actions required.

FSAR Change Required. LDCN #'

Mod Work Request Generated.

t KEYWORDS (for Recor1s Mgat.) Trea spe c. 'TA A,s.e T&meoA L G L 9 i- oB jJ_

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