ML20085N220

Proposed Tech Spec Sections 1.31 Re Primary Containment integrity,3/4.6.1 Re Primary Containment & 3/4.6.3 Re Primary Containment Isolation Valves

ML20085N220
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/06/1991
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20085N217	List: ML20085N215 ML20085N219 ML20085N220
References
NUDOCS 9111140195
Download: ML20085N220 (25)

Text

_-_______- _ _

ATTA N A NIMIARA NORAWK POUBR CORN *ATION LICWitt NO. NPF-49 0073T NO. 50-410 ff.9JRDatd. Ch40&tR._19 th.t_Itshniea1 SDicifIcation3

- Replace existing pages x1, x11, xiii, 1-6, 3/4 3-15, 3/4 6-1, 3/4 6-2, 3/4 B G, 3/4 6-4, 3/4 6-21, 3/4 6-22, 3/4 6-23, 3/4 7-7, 3/4 7-9, 3/4 8-24, 3/4 6-25 3/4 8-30, 3/4 8-31, B3/4 6-5, B3/4 6-6, B3/4 7-1 and B3/4 8-3 vith the a nsched revised pages. These pages have been retyped in their entirety with marginal markings to indicate changes to the text.

Pages 3/4 6-24 through 3/4 6-35, 3/4 7-10, 3/4 8-26 and 3/4 8-27 have been removed and notation added indicating that these pages are "Not tised".

4

((*II140195pi1201 p

ADOCK or.coogig PDR I

ATTACm ett B NIAGARA NORAWK POWER CORPORATION LICtNSE NO. NPF-49 DOCRET No. 50-410 Eupy9tting Inftr.Laa11en i

Niagara Mohawk proposes to change Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technien1 Specifications to remove Tables 3.6.3-1, 3.7.2-1, 3.8.4.1-1, and ).8.4.3-1 and any references citing those tables in the associated Index, Definitions, Limiting Conditions For Operation, Surveillance Requirements and Bases. These tables constitute component lists which vill be relocated to engineering controlled documents under the change control provisions for plant procedures in the Administrative Controle section of the Technical-Specifications (Section 6.5.2 Technical Review and Control Activities). The Technical Specifications are being proposed for revision such that an appropriate description of the scope of the components to which the Technical Specification requirements apply will be incorporated in lieu of the tables or

-referente to the tables. Reference to the engineering documents containing the component lists is being added to the associated Technical Specification i

Bases.

The removal of these component lists from the Technical Specifications vill permit administrative control of any future changes to the lists without processing a license amendment while maintaining an appropriate regulatory process for change control. These Technical Specification improvements are proposed in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-08

" Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications".

Additionally, a typographical error on page xii of the Index has been corrected. The " Plant Service Vater System - Operating" page designation has been corrected from 3/5 7-1 to 3/4 7-1.

1 No Significant Harada_Analysig l

10 CFR 50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it

_must provide to.the Commission its analysis, using tne standards in Section 50.92, about the issue of no significant hazards consideration.

Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 50.92, the following analysis has been performed:

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2. in accordance with the D12DR.Eid 3.m_g.dment. Vill not involve a significant_ increase in the orobability or San 112RCAces of an accident oreviousiv evaluated.

I Removal'of the component lists and correction of the typographical error does

-not alter existing Technical Specification Operability or Surveillante Requirements or those components to which they apply. Therefore, the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

L lC, u.

s.

- ~.

h i

e The_gneration of liing Hile PoinL.llniLL _ in accordgnge with the_pigD9at.d amendment. vi11 not cItAlt_1ht_n2111hilily_q[ a nev oI_d.ijftienLkind_pl aggident f rom any accidgn.t previogg.ly.,tyahtattii.

An appropriate description of the removed components has been incorporated in the associated Technical Specification requirements in lieu of the component lists or references thereto.

The lists of components to which the Technical Specification requirements apply vill be incorporated in engineering controlled documents under the change control provisions for plant procedures 1

in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The operatign of Nine Mile Point Unit 2. iR 01C91.dAllig._vith the proogigd amendment. vill not involve a significcat reduction in a margin of safgly2 The Technical Specification Limiting Conditions For Operation or Surveillance Requirements for the removed components are not being altered. The component lists vill be incorporated into engineering controlled documents which are controlled by administrative procedures which require that all changes be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

The engineering controlled documents vill be under the change control provisions for plant procedures in the Administrative Controls Sect on of the Technical Specifications.

^

Therefore, the proposed changes do not adversely affect a limiting Safety System Setting or involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

i I

t

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIPEMENTS PAEL WhTAllRifELS1$11h5 (Continued)

Table 3.6.1.2-1 A11ovable Leak Itates Through Valves in Potential Dypass Leakage Paths.

. 3/4 6-6 Primary Containment Air 'ocks.

. 3/4 6-0 Primary Containment Sttuctural Integrity.

. 3/4 6-10 Dryvell and Suppression Chamber Internal Pressure.

. 3/4 6-11 Dryvell Average Air Temperature.

. 3/4 6-12 Primary Containment Purge System.

. 3/4 6-13 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSUlt1ZATION SYSTEMS Suppression Pool...................

3/4 6-15 Suppression Pool and Dryvell Spray.

. 3/4 6-19 Suppression Pool Cooling.

. 3/4 6-20 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINHENT ISOLATION VALVES.

. 3/4 6-21 I

3/4.6.4 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER /DRYVELL VACUUH BREAKERS.

. 3/4 6-36 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINHENT Secondary Containment Integrity...

. 3/4 6-38 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers.

. 3/4 6-40 Table 3.6.5.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers.

. 3/4 6-42 Standby Gas Treatment System.

. 3/4 6-43 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINHENT ATHOSPilERE CONTROL Dryvell and Suppression Chamber liydrogen Recombiner

. 3/4 6-46 Systems.

Dryvell and Suppression Chamber oxygen Concentration.. 3/4 6-47 NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 xi

e i

A

[

i IEEX i

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS rar J/4.7 PLANT _EXAILM l

3/4.7.1 PLANT SERV 1CE WATER SYSTEh8 Plant Service Water System - Operating.

3/4 7-1 l

. 3/4 7-4 l

Plant Service Water System - Shutdown.

3/4.7.2 Revetment-Ditch Structure

. 3/4 7-7 j

-l 3/4.7.3 CONTROL ROOM OUTDOOR AIR SPECIAL FILTER TRAth SYSTEM.

3/4 7-21 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORD ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.

. 3/4 7-14 k

3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS.

3/4 7-16 l

Table 4.*. 5-1 Snubber Visual Inspection Interval.

. 3/4 7-20a Figure 4.7.5-1 Sample Plan for Snubber Functional Test.

. 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.

. 3/4 7-22 t

3/4.7.7 MAIN TU'dBINE BYPASS SYSTEM.

. 3/4 7-24

. jf,b 8 ELECTRICAL POWER _R11TI14 i

3/4.8.1 AC SOURCES AC Sources - Operating.

. 3/4 8-1 Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 Diesel Generator Test Schedule.

. 3/4 8-12 Ac Sources - Shutdown..

3/4 8-13 3/4.8.2 DC SOURCES DC Sources - Operating.

. 3/4 8-14 Table 4.8.2.1-l' Battery Surveillance Requiremente.

. 3/4 8-17 DC Sources - Shutdown.

. 3/4 8-19 NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 xii Amendment No. 29

.._ _ _.. _ _.. _ _,. _.c.....

i j

INDEX i

L!HITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l'A91

[

3/4.8.3 CNSITE PotfER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

^

Distribution - Operating.

3/4 8-20 Distribution - Shutdown.

3/4 6-22 t

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES AC Circuits Inside Primary Containment.

3/4 8-24 i

Primary containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices.

. 3/4 6-28 Emergency Lighting System - Overcurrent Protective Devices.

3/4 8-30 l

Reactor Psotection System Electric Power Monitoring (RPS Logic).'.

. 3/4 8-32 Reactor Protection System Electric Power Monitoring (Scram Solenoids).

. 3/4 8-33 3/4.9 BEIUELINO-OPIBATIONS r

3/4.9.1 REACTOR HODE SWITCH.

. 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.

. 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION.

. 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME.

3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

. 3/4 9-7 i

3/4.9.6- _ REFUELING PLATTORM.

. 3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL,

. 3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL.

. 3/4 9-10

-3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL.

3/4 9-11 i

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 xiii 1

DEFINITIONS

-PRIMARY COftTA1NMENT INTEORITY 1.31 (Continued) 1.

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or 2.

Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except as provided in specification 3.6.3.

I b.

All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

c.

Each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of specification 3.6.1.3.

d.

The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.

e.

The suppression pool is in compliance with the requirements of specification 3.6.2.1.

f.

.The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration (e.g., welds, bellown, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

UfLC$ M NTROL ROOM 1 32 The PROCESS CONTROL ROOM (PCP) shall contain the current formula sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that the proceaning and packaging of radioactive wastes, based on demonstrated prccessing of; actual or_ simulated __ wet or liquid wastes, will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20, 10 CPR 61, 10 CFR 71, and Federal and State regulations and other requirements governing the transport and disposal of radioactive waste.

PURGE - PUROING 1.33 PURCE and PURGING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a_ confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacament air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

RATED THERMAL POWER-1.34 RATED THERKAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3323 MWt.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.35 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from L

when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor i

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 1-6

_.----.____,,,__--._,_.,-..,._.~,c,__-_,,,__

..,.. ~.

IABLE 3.3.R-1 (Cor.tinued)

)

ISDLATIDN ACTUATION 1NSIEWiLMIAIIDE IABLLERIAIIDES

• During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the i

reactor vessel., This applies to functions described in notes (c) and (d) that isolate secondary centainment and automatically start the SGTS.

• • Vheh any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or when the keylocked condenser lov vacuum bypass switch is open (in Normal position).

t Valves 2VCS*H0V102 and 2VCS*HOV112 are also required to be OPERABLE or closed in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 vith any control rod withdrawn but not with control rods removed per Specifications 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.10.2.

tt Vhen handling irradiated fuel in the reactor building and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(a) Refer to Table 3.3.2-4 for valve groups, associated isolation signals and i

key to isolation signals.

(b) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for requited surveillance without placing the Trip-System in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same Trip System is monitoring that parameter.

(c) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.

(d) Also actuates reactor building ventilation isolation danpers per Table 3.6.5.2-1.

(e) Also trips and isolates air removal pumps.

(f) Initiation of SLCS pump 2SLS*PIB closes 2VCS*H0V102 and manual initiation of SLCS pump 2SLS* PIA closes 2VCS*HOV112.

(g) For this signal one Trip System has 2 channels whic;. close valves 2ICS*HOV 120 and 21CS*HOV 170, while the other Trip System has 2 channels which close 2ICS*HOV 121.

(h) Hanual initiation only isolates 2ICS*HOV121 and only following manual or automatic initiation of the RCIC system.

(1) Only used in conjunction viti, lov RCIC steam supply pressure and high drywell pressure to isolate 21Cd?40V148 and 2ICS*H0V164.

(j) Signal from LPCS/RHR initiation circuitry.

NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-15

3/4.6 CONTAINMENLjljIIH) i i

2/4.6.1 PRLMARY CONTAINMENT l

l RBIMARY. CONTAINMENT _ INTEGRITY

[

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION w

1 3.6.1.1 PRIKARY CONTAINHENT INTEORITV shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITX OPEkATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2*, and 3.

hC11QH Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIKARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

-within I hour or be-in at least HOT SHUTCOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in i

COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

After each closing of each penetration subject to Type a testing, except the primary containment air locks, if opened following Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seals with gas-at Pa, 39.75 peig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for thews seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Surywillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type a and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetratione** not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic-isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except as provided in Specification 3.6.3.

l c.

By. verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

'd.

By verifying the suppression chamber is in compliance with the requiremerts of Specification 3.6.2.1.

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

• • Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside tha containment, and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed during ea:h COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed when the primary containment has not been de-inerted since the last verification or more often than once every 92 days.

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 i

_,.. ~ _.....,. _,, _ _ - _... _ _ _. _,, _. _ _ _.... _ _ _

gpif7AINMENT SYSTEMS RAIMARY CONTAINMEh?

PRIMARY CONTA1FMENT LEAKA01 LIMITING CCNDITIONS FOR OPERATION

=

= - - = -

m 3.6.1.2 Primary containment leakage raten shall be limited tot a.

An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal tot 1.

La, 1.1% by weight of the containment air every 24 haurs at Pa, 39.75 peig, or 2.

Lt, 0.72% by. weight of the containment air every 24 houra at a reduced pressure of Pt, 20.0 peig.

b.

A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 La for all penetrations and all Primary Containment Isolation Valvss, except for main _steamLline isolation valves * (and Primary Containment Isolation Valves which are hydrostatically leak tested per Specification 3.6.3) subject to_ Type D and C tests when pressurized to Pa, 39.75 psig.

c.

A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 1 gpm times the total number of containment isolation valvos in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment, when tested at 1.10 Pa, 43.73 peig.

d.-

Less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1 through values in lines that are potential bypass leakage pathways when tested at 40.0 psig.

APPLICABILITY: When PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required per Specification 3.6.1.1.

ACTION:

Withs a.

The measured overall integrated primary containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, or

• Exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-2 I

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CONTAINMENT SYSTfdit PRIHARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKhqE L1HITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 (Continued)

ACTION:

I b.

The measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and all Primary Containment 1 solation Valves except for main steam line isolation valves

• and valves which are hydrostatically leak tested per Specification 3.6.3 subject to Type B and C teste exceeding 0.60 La, or c.

The measured combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment i

exceeding 2 gpm times the total number of such valves, or d.

The measured leakage rate through any valve that is part of a potential bypass leakage pathway exceeding the limit specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1.

Reatores a.

The overall integrated leakage rate (s) to less than or equal to 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, and b.

The combined leakage rate for all. penetrations and all Primary Containment toolation Valves except for main steamline isolation valves

• and valves which are hydrostatically leak-tested per Specification 3.6.3 subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to 0.60 La, and i

c.

The combined leakage rate for all containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the primary containment to less than or equal to 1 gpm times the total number of such valves, and d.

The leakage rate to less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.6.1.2-1 for any valve that is part of a potential bypass leakage path.

prior to increasing reactor coolant system temperature above 200*P.

5

• Exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-3

_-...__m-i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS t

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRIRARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE SUR'+'EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

r 4.6.1.2 The primary containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 crR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI H45.4-1972:

a.

Three Type A overall integrated containment leakage rate tests shall be conducted at 40 1 10-month intervals during shutdown at Pa, 39.75 pelg or_at Pt, 20.0 psig, during each 10-year service teriod. The third ti.,t i

of each net _shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection.

b.

If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the concission.

If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A testa meet 0.75 La or 0.75 Lt, as applicable, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.

c.

The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test whicht l

1. Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the difference between the supplemental data and the Type A test data is within 0.25 La or 0.25 Lt, as applicable.

2. Has duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test.

3. Requires the quantity of gas injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test to be equivalent to t'

at least 25% of the total measured leakage at Pa, 39.75 psig, or Pt, 20.0 poig, as applicable.

d.

Type B and C testa shall be conducted with gas at Pa, 39.75 peig,* at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:

1. Air locks,

2. Main steam list isolation valves and the remainder of the valves and the remainder of the valves specified in table 3.6.1.2-1.

3. containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines which penetrate the priinary containment, and

4. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient scala.

• Unless a hydrostatic test is required per specification 3.6.3, i

NINE_HILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-4

-. ~.. _ _ _ _. _ _. _

'c 4

C2HIAINHERI_1111XM2 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINME47,1RQLATION VALVEj I

I LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

~

3.6.3 Each primary containment isolation valve and reactor instrumentation l

line excess flow check valve shall be OPERABLE.

I hEELighBILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 l

hCTION a.

With one or more of the primary containment isolation valves inoperable, j

maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected I

penetration that is open and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either 3.

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or 2.

Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position,* or 3.

Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed f

manual valve or blind flange.*

4.

The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided

{

that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> thu affected penetration is isolated in l

accordance with ACTION a.2 or a.3 above, and provided that the associated system is declared inoperable, if applicable, and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are performed.

f f

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one or more of the reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves inoperable, operation may continue and the provisions of I

specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either; 1.

The inoperable valve is returned to OPERADLE status, or 2.

The instrument line is isolated and the associated instrument'is declared inoperable.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

• Isolation valves closed to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

t I

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-21 l

CONTAINMENT _SYSIEUA ItlBAHY CONTAlHMUI 1$MARQL_YALYKE SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

f 4.6.3.1 Each primary containment isolation valve shall os demonstrated i

OPERADLE before returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or i

replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation timo.

4.6.3.2-Each primary containment automatic isolation valve shr.11 be demonstrated OPERABLE during COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELTHQ at 1rast once per 18 months by verifying that on a ;ontainment isolation test slynal each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 --The isolation time of each primary containment power operated or-automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested l

pursuant to specification 4.0.5, 4.6.3.4 Each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve shall be

- demonstrated OPERABLE at least once por 18 months by verifying that the valve l

checks flow.

[

4.6.3.5 'Each traversing in-core probe system explosive isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABL1 a.

At least once per 31 dsys by verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.

b.

At least.once per 18 months by removing at least one explosive squib from at least one explosive valve, such that each explosive squib in-each. explosive valve will be tested at least once per 36 months,_and initiating the explosive squib. The replacement charge for the exploded i

squib shall ba f rom the same manuf actured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having at least one of that

- batch successfully fired.

No sqyib shall remain in use beyond the expiration of its shelf-life and operating life, as applicable.

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NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-22 l

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NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-23

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- PLANT SYSTEME h7.2 REVETMENT-QRCJLpYRUCTUR$

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 The revetment-ditch structure shall be structurally sound and capable of limiting wave action as intended.

The revetment-ditch structure shall be maintained so that the elevation of each survey point is not more than 1.0 g

foot below the October 1985 Control Elevation.

I hEI'LigAl[ILITY:

At all times.

I ACTION:

With the elevation of one or more survey points more than 1 foot below the

- October 1985 Control Elevation, prepare and submit to the Commission within 90 l

days, pursuant to specification 6.9.2, a special Report which includes the I

. tollowing informations

]

a.

Explanation of how the elevation change occurred and if the revetment-

- ditch structure is continuing to change; I

b.

A planned course.of repair (if required) and a schedule for accomplishing the repair; c.

Evaluation of and justification for continued plant operation; and d.

The current elevation of each survey point.

j e.

The provisions of specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

i e

c NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 7-7 P

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ELEC1RL461._t9ERELMEDiA Jfl&LELEGIBICAL..EOUIPMENT PROTLgILVE DEVICfji AC CIRCUITS INSIDE PRIMARY CONTAli{}iD(I LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.1 The AC circuits inside primary containment that are not provided with j

primary and backup containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective i

devices shall be doenergized

• M I Lig M I LI.TX :

OPERATIONAL CONUITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With any of the above required circuits energized, trip the associated circuit breaker (s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.4.1 Each of the above required AC circuits shall be determined to be deenergized at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ** by verifying that the associated circuit breakrro ace in the tripped condition.

S Required before power ascension and following final drywell inspection.

Excluded from this specification are those penetration assemblies that are capable of withstanding the maximum current available because of an electrical fault inside containment.

• • Except at least once per 31 days if locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the tripped condition.

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ELKRTli1 CAL POWFR -SXJIffit ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTER,TIVE DEVICES EMERCENCY LICHTING $11IIM - OVERCURRFNT PROTECTIVE DLylg[1 LIMITING CONDITION pOR OPERA"!ON 3.8.4.3 The emergency lighting system overcurrent protection devices shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY:

At all times.

hEIlOBt With one or more of the overcurrent protective devices inoperable, within 72 1

hours remove the inoperable circuit breaker (s)-from service by opening the breaker. Return the breaker (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, otherwise be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.0.4.3 The.overcurrent protectis.e devaces shall be demonstrated 0.'ERABLE at least once per 18 months by selecting and testing one-half of each type of circuit breaker on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breaker 0 shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the pickup of the time delay element.- The measured response time shall be compared with the manufacturer's data to ensure that it is less than or equal to a value specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested by inject *.ng a curren, in excess of the nominal instantaneous-pickup setting and verif)ing that tircuit breaker trips instantaneously with no intentional time

' delay.

NINE HILE p0 INT - UNIT 2 3/4 8-30

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-NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 8-31

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CONTAINMENT SYSlfJiS BASES f]tIMARY CONTAINHENI PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 3/4.6.3 (Continued)

GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

Measurement of the closure time

-ti t.utomatic containment isolation valves is performed for the purpose of demonstrating PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY and system OPERADILITY (Specification 3/4.6.1).

The list of Primary Containment Isolation Valves is located in engineering l

specification no. SH2-0002.

.The maximum isolation times for primary containment automatic isolation valves are either the analytical times used in the accident analysis as described in the FSAR) or times derived by applying margins to the vendor. test data obtained in accordance with industry codes and standards.

For non-analytical automatic primary containment isolation valves, the maximum isolation time is derived as follovst 1)

Valves with full stroke times-less than or equal to 10 seconds,-maximum isolation time approximately equals the vendor tested closure time multiplied by 2.0.

2)

Valves with full stroke time greater than 10 seconds, maximum isolation time approximately_ equals the vendor tested closure time multiplied by 1.5.

Valve closing times do not include isolation instrumentation response times.

Valve closing times do not include isolation instrumentation response times.

The opening of locked or sealed c1csed contaihment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerationst (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions vill not preclude access to close the valves and that this action vill prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 SUPPRESSION Cll6]iDER - DRYVELL VACUUH BREAKERS Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and dryvell. This system vill meintain the structural integrity _of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.

The vacuum breakers petveen the suppression chamber and the dryvell must not be inoperable in the open position since this vould allov bypassing of the I

suppression pool in case of an accident. There are four pairs of valves to i

provide. redundancy so that operation may continue for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with no more than one pair of vacuum breakers inoperable in the closed position.-

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 B3/4 6-5 L

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3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT secondary containment is designed to minimise any ground level release of-radioactive material which may result from an accident.

The reactor building and associated structures provide secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service, At other times, the drywell may be open and, when required, secondary containment integrity is specified.

Establishing and maintaining a subatmospheric condition in the reactor building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.

The drawdown time limit has been established considering the same fan perform.nce and building inleakage assumptions as-in the post-LOCA analysis except that since the surveillance test is performed when the plant is shut down, (1) post-LOCA heat-loads are not'present; (2) the initial secondary containment pressure is atmospheric; and (3) loss of offsite power is not assumed. Neeting this drawdown time verified that secondary containment leakage and fan performance are consistent with the assumptions of the LOCA analysis.

The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient i

iodine removal capability will be available in the svent of a LOCA. The j

reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary

- radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used _in the LOCA analyses. ' Continuous operation of the system with the heaters operating for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during each 31-day period is sufficient ~to reduce'the buildup of moisture on the' absorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtete.

3/4.6.6 Ig] MARY CONTAINMENT JLT119APHERE COMIBQL The OPERABILITY of_the systems required for_the_ detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the primary containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

The drywell-and suppression chamber

- hydrogen recombiner system is_ capable of controlling.the expected hydrogen and oxygen generation associated with (1) airconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.7, " Control of Oombustible Gan Concentrations in.

Containment-Following a LOCA", March 1971.

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The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal or accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

Independence-in the plant service water system, as required by the specification, is achieved by OPERABILITY of the divisional separation logic and valves (2SVp*H0V50A, 2SVP*HOV50B).

During normal plant operating conditions, the two divisions of the service water system are interconnected.

The intake dolcing heater specification ensures that adequate vater is available to the service vater system.

In order to prove that the system is supplying adequate heat to the bar racks, a portable ammeter shall be used to check the full load current of the heaters. The current should be checked on a veekly basis. Current shall be measured for each phase at each of the four motor control center locations.

If a major deviation from rated current is detected, further investigt;.on is required to determine if an open circuit exists in the individual heater circuits.

The 18-month check of circuit readings vill check against long-term degradation of circuit insulations.

3/4.7.2 REVEINENT-DITCil STRUCTURE The purpose of the revetment-ditch structure is to protect the plant fill and foundation from vave erosion, expected during the probable maximum vindstorm for a maximum still vater elevation of 254 feet.

The revetment-ditch structure is Seismic Category I and is designed to withstand the impact of vaves.

So long as the fill is in place, vaves cannot impact Category I structures because of the lack of sufficient depth of water to sustain such vaves.

The revetment-ditch structure can sustain a high degree of damage and still perform its function, protecting the site illl from erosion._ Thus, the operability. condition for operation of the revetment-ditch structure has been

'vritten to ensure'that severe damage to the structure vill not go undetected

-for a substantial period of time and to provide for prompt corrective action-1 and NRC notificatfor.. The list of survey points for the revetment-ditch-structure surveillance is located in engineering drawing no. EY-10A.

l 3/4.7.3 CONTROL ROOH OUTDOOR _ AIR SPECIAL FILTER TRAIN SYSIEM The OPERABILITY of the control room outdoor air special Illter train system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed.the allovable temperature for. continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room vill remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design-basis-accident i

conditions.

Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 D3/4 7-1 m m-e oc n+ meww ww

ELECTRICAL POVEB__ SYSTEMS BASES

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3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQQIPMERf PROTECTIVE DEVICES Primary containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating-the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surve llance. The list of primary i

containment AC circuits required to be de-energized is located in engineering drawing no. AE-005.

The Surfeillance Requirements applicable to lover voltage circuit breakers provide; assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker.

Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested.

If a vide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for survalliance purposes.

The emergency lighting system overcurrent protective devices ensure thrt a failure of the non-Class 1E portion of the circuit vill not affect the operation of the remaining portions of the class 1E circuits that are necessary for safe shutdown. The list of these overcurrent protective devices is located in engineering drawing no. AE-006.

The EPSs provide Class 1E isolation capabilities for the RPS power supplies and the scram power supplies. This is required because the power supplies are not Class 1E pover supplies.

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