ML20083P977

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Revised Proposed Tech Spec Re Transversing in-core Probe Sys,Hydrogen & Oxygen post-accident Monitoring & HPCI & RCIC
ML20083P977
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/16/1984
From:
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20083P972 List:
References
TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.F.3, TASK-TM TAC-48294, TAC-53454, TAC-53455, TAC-54461, TAC-54462, TAC-54495, TAC-98294, NUDOCS 8404200286
Download: ML20083P977 (5)


Text

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ATTACINENT 3 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 EIMIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 TRAVIRSING INCORE PROBE SYSFIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHMGb PROPOSAL 1

i a 1. Gange "three" to "four" in both Section 3.3.6.6.a and 3.3.6.6.b:

BASIS:

4 This change constitutes a more restrictive operational limitation.

Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Exampics of Amendments that are. Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Register.

I

2. Add ". .. preventing nomalization of the TIP detectors. .." and ".. .. for -

more than 31 EFPD following the last nomalization."

BASIS:

This change would slightly relax the present Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation for the TIP system.

However, this change does allow the usage of still functioning portions of the TIP system for the monitoring of . in-core conditions, thus providing a more reliable indication of operating conditions. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment would not be increased above

those analyzed in the FSAR because this change would not involve . a -

1 system important to safety. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a : different type than analyzed in the FSAR would not

j. result from ' this change, because the extended use of the TIP system due to this charge would allow for more conservative monitoring of core themal limits.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical

Specifications would not be reduced by this change because this change would allow for an increase in input data for monitoring of core thermal limits while still maintaining an acceptable accuracy of the system
j output data.

J 8404200286 840416 PDR ADOCK 05000321 l P PDR __

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ATTACINENT 4 NRC DOCKET 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEA'1 PLANT UNIT 1 REQUEST 'IO CHANGE HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN POST-ACCIDENT MONI'IDRING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS I

1. Gange Rarge from "O to 52" to "O to 5%":

BASIS:

f This change is purely administrative in that it corrects a

, typographical error inserted. Into the Technical Specifications by Amendment No. 79. Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (i) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Register.

2. Gange Action from "(c)" to "(g)", and add. to the Technical Specifications:

"g. Instrumentation shall be operable with continous sampling capability within 30 minutes of an BCCS actuation during a IDCA. See Section 3.7. A.6.c for - the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION.":

BASIS:

This change is to make the license conform to changes in the regulations, specifically the requimments of NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1.

Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (vii) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazartis Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Ruister.

3. Change Instrument Check Minimum Frequency from "Each Shift" to " Monthly":

BASIS:

This change would decrease the frequency of instrument checks.

However, operating experience has shown that frequent operation of the H2 and 02 analyzers, especially . during these required checks, 'tends to lower the reliability of that equipment. Furthermore, the vendor for these analyzers has recommended the monthly instrument check as. being optimal for maintaining maxistui equipment operability. . The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident' or malfunction of safety-related equipment would not be increased above those analyzed in

. the FSAR, because the safety function ~ of .the drywell H2 and 02 _

analyzers as described in the FSAR would be maintained by' this change.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction ,of a different type than.

i analyzed in the FSAR would not result from this . change because the allowed. operational modes .for these analyzers _would be . essentially -

unaltered and no new failure modes would be ' introduced. . . The margin of l t

safety as defined in Technical Specifications would. not be reduced by -

this change because . the current Limiting . Conditions for Operation of.- i these analyzers remain -intact.

APR i 6 $84

ATTACINENT 3 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 EIMIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SUBMITTAL OF HPCI AND RCIC CHANGE PROPOSAL

1. . Change "113 psig" to "150 psig" in Sections 3. 5.D.1. a. ( 2) , 3.5.D.3, 3.5.E.1.a.(2), and 3.5.E.3:

BASIS:

hse changes would make the Technical Specification requirements consistent with the modes of HPCI and RCIC operation described in the FSAR, and would remove the present Technical Specification inconsistency between Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 with regard to the HPCI/RCIC minimum reactor pressure operability limit. Reviews performed in accordance with NRC approved methodology show that these charges would have no effect on the FSAR analyses of peak fuel cladding temperature changes during analyzed accidents and transients. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment would not be increased above those analyzed in the FSAR, because the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR accident / transient analyses and perfomance specifications for HPCI and RCIC do not take credit for operation of HPCI or RCIC below a reactor pressure of 150 psig. W possibility of an accident or malfunction different from those analyzed in the FSAR would not result from these changes, since these systems would not be operated in a manner new or different from that -described -

in the FSAR. h margin of safety as analyzed in Technical Specifications would not be reduced because the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications do not require surveillance testing of HPCI or RCIC below a reactor pressure of 150 psig. Furthermore, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System, Automatic Depressurization System, and Core Spray System, are all still required to be operational in the range of reactor pressure _ between 113 and 150 psig, as is consistent with the FSAR analyses.

2. Change the Bases to reflect the above changes:

BASIS:

hse changes _ are to achieve consistency between the proposed new Technical Specification restrictions, and the bases sections associated with these requirements. hse changes do not involve ' any safety issue -

outside of those discussed in- the Basis for item 1 above. Therefore, these changes are purely administrative in nature,- and the results of these changes are consistent with Item- (i) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards.

Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the

-Federal Register.

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ATTAONENT 4 (Continued)

4. Change Instnsnent Calibration Minimum Frequency from "Every 6 Months" to "Every 3 Months":

BASIS:

This change constitutes a more restrictive operational limitation.

The new calibration interval is consistent with the vendor's mcomendations for these analyzers. Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (ii) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

5. Otange the Bases to reflect the above mentioned changes:

BASIS:

These changes are to achieve consistency between the proposed Technical Specification restrictions, and the bases sections associated with these mquirements. These changes do not involve any safety issue outside of those discussed in the Basis for items 1 thru 4 above.

Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (i) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Register.

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ATTACINENT 5 NRC DOCKET 50-366 EDWIN I. HATOi NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 REQUEST 1D CHANGE IIYDROGEN AND OXYGEN POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING TEGINICAL SPECIFICATIONS

1. Add to the Technical Specifications:

"**The Drywell H2 /02 Analyzers shall be operable with continuous sampling capability within 30 minutes of an ECCS actuation during a LOCA":

BASIS:

This change constitutes a more restrictive operational limitation.

1herefore, this change is consistent with Item (ii) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Register.

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