ML20083A269

Rev 2 to Procedure 1040-001-016, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return Valves

ML20083A269
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/20/1983
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17150A231	List: ML20083A206 ML20083A216 ML20083A222 ML20083A234 ML20083A237 ML20083A244 ML20083A252 ML20083A264 ML20083A269 ML20083A278 ML20083A283 ML20083A294 ML20083A298 ML20083A315 ML20083A322 ML20083A336 ML20083A365 ML20083A376 ML20083A396 ML20083A415 ML20083A422 ML20083A439 ML20083A454 ML20083A473 ML20083A486 ML20083A500
References
1040-001-016, 1040-1-16, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8312200235
Download: ML20083A269 (16)

Text

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CALCULATION / PROBLEM COVER SHEET Q Calculation / Problem No: 1040-001-016

Title:

Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return Valves 2.13 Client: Toledo Edison Company Project: Davis-Besse Unit I l 1040-001-67, I & E Bulletin 79-ole JobNo: Equipment Qualification Design input /

References:

Design Inputs are outlined in the Cover Report.

Assumptions:

Assumptions areoutlined in the Cover Report.

Method:

1 .

1 .

Methocs are outlined in the Cover Report.

Remarks:

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Faciliait Davis-Banza Unit 1 MAb>EB LIST It'dEx No: 213M-001 Docket: 50-346 HARSH ENVIRCHMENT Rev.: 2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL RETURN VALVES Prepared by:

Checked by: hh_ Date: Ni Date: N/J//)

i l l l l IOCATION l l l l l l l Inside i Outside 1 I l Worksheet l l Plant I- l Primary l Primaty l I I Index No. l Rev. lID Number l Generic Name l Containment I Containment i REMARKS l 1 1 I i l i I I I 213H-004 1 2 IMVMU59A 1 Valve Motor Operator i Rm. 214 I l l l 213H-005 1 2 lMVMU59B l Valve Motor Operator i Rm. 214 I I l i 213H-006 l 2 lMVMU59C l Valve Motor Operator i Rm. 214 1  ! l l 213H-007 1 2 IMVMU59D I Valve Motor Operator i Rm. 214 l l 1 1 I 2 lBEllB l Motor Control Center l l Rm. 304 l See 2.21 1

( l i 2 ICDEllB-1 1 Disconnect Switch Cabinet 1 I Rm. 304 l See 2.21 l l l 2 I CDEllB-2 1 Disconnect Switch cabinet l I Rs. 304 l See 2.21 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l i I I I I I I I I I I l l I l l I I I I I I I I I I l l I I I l l I I I I l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I l I l i I I I I I I I I I I I I f 1 I I I I I I l i I I I I I I I l l I

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' Facil't.cf D2vis-Basse Unit 1 Docket: 50-346 MASTER LIST NON-HARSH ENVIRONMENT Index No: 213M-002 Rev.: 2 ftEACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL RETURN VALVES Prepared by:

• Checked by: , Ahe f 2 8

_ Date: IIi!k)

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• O Facilith Docket:

Davis -Bassa Unit 1 50-346 n

MAhui LIST Rev.:

n Ind2x N5e d 3M-003 2

1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL RETURN VALVES Prepared by: e . Date: // 83 Checked by: ,h { A u- Date: // #//3 I l l l l LOCATION l 1 j l i I l l Inside i Outside l l l Worksheet I l Plant l l Primary l Primary l l

! I Index No. I Rev. IID Number l Generic Name l Containment I Containment i REMARKS I I l i I I I I l l l l- I l l' I I I i l l I i i 1 ,

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D nts-Besse Unit 1 SYSTEM COMPONX.esVALUATION WORKSHEET Index L --- 213H-004 kx:kst : 50-346 nev. : 2  ;

4

'repared by : N 'l Dater th]

, :hecksd by: A/<wh Date ///Y43 i '

! ll l l l l

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION ll ENVIRONMENT I DOCUMENTATION REF. l Qualification l Outstanding l l l Pa ramete r l Specif ication Qualification Specification Qualification Method l Items l

< ll l l l l l i System: Reactor Coolant l l Operating l 45 Seconds l 7 Days l K l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l Pump Seal Return ll Time l l l l V-24A l Test l l-ll l Note 1 _l l

Plant ID No, MVMU59A ll j j ,

l l l Temperature l 283.0 l 329.0 l H, X l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l 1 Componant : Valve Motor ll (*F) l l l l V-24A l Test l l Operator ll l l l l l l l '

l ll 1 l l l l l l Manuf acturers Limitorque l l Pressure l 52.0 l 104.7 l G, X l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l j ll(PSIA) l l l l V-24A l Test l l I

l Model Number: SMB-000-2 ll l l l l

O/N: 364187C ll l l l '

S/N

158237 ll Relative l 100.0 l 100.0 l A l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l

{ Function: Operates Valve ll Humidity l l l l V-24A l Test l l l MU59A ll (%) l l i l l l

f Accuracy: Spec: N/A ll l {

M-24 l l 1 Demon: N/A ll l Boric Acid l Boric Acid l A

l V-24A l

l Sir:ltaneous l None l ll Chemical l 1800 ppm l 1800 ppm l l l CAL-40 l Test, I l

! Service: Reactor Coolant l l Spray l pH 5.0 l pH 5.0 l l l l l Note 2 l Analysis l l Punp 2-1 Seal ll l l l 1 Return Line Valvell l l l

_I l ll l l i , l ll Radiation ll.7 x 10 RADS 7 l2.0 x 10 RADS l 8 CAL-44 l M-25 l Sequential Test l None l j Location: Containment l v-24A l l ll l l l l l i l l l i Flood Level Elev: 572'-2"ll l l l l CAL-93 l Sequential l None l j Above Flood Level: No ll Aging l 40 Years l 40 Years l I l l l l l Test l l ll l l l l Analysis l l ,

Naaded for: ll l l l l l l l '

Hot Shutdown l X l ll l 4 l l Subme rgence l 572'-2" l 567'-6" l B l M-16 l N/A l None l Note 3 l l l l I Cold Shutdown l l ll l l l l I J

l l l l l ll ,

[D )

l Fccility: Davic-Bessa Unit 1 50-346 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Dockst

Index No.: 213H-004A i

Re v. : 2 mates Prepared by: N Date ]

Chacksd by:

hJd Date af.*//3 1.

The test subjected the valve motor operator to I hour at 329'F and 104.7 psia, then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 312*F and 84.7 psia, then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 287*F and 54.7 psia, then 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> at 256*F and 34.7 psia, and 250*F and 29.7 psia for 6 days. The tenperature and pressure inside containment peak at 283*F and 52.0 psia in 17 and 50 seconds, respectively. At I hour the conditions are 214.7'F and 32.32 psia; at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 204*F and 29.46 psia; at 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 193.2*F and 27.08 psia; and at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 143*F and 18.03 psia. The containment returns to ambient conditions in 7 days.

Based on this information, i it can be concluded that the laboratory test subjected the valve motor operator to an overall Eore severe environment than that which would result f rom a postulated LOCA. Since the valve motor operator remained operable throughout the test and functional af ter the test, it can be concluded that the valve motor operator will remain f unctional H, and X) during and af ter exposure to the accident environment which would result f rom the postulated LOCA. (Reference G, 2.

CAL-40 qualifles couponents tested in a high pH boric acid spray to a pH value of 5.

!3 This valve motor gerator will become submerged during a postulated LOCA in 9 minutes and 38 seconds. This is a worst-case value based on a postulated DBA LOCA.

occurs at all. For smaller LOCAs, component submergence will occur further into the accident, if it system (SFAS incident level II).

The valve motor gerator will close in 45 seconds af ter receipt of a signal by the safety features actuation submerged geration.'

The valve is qualified f or exposure to a steam / chemical spray environment but not f or The valve will close prior to becoming submerged as it is qualified for the harsh eavironment and the SFAS signal which closes the valve also actuates the HPI, Containment Spray, and LPI/DH punps which f urnish the water which lords to containment flooding. If the valve would not close due to receiving an SFAS signal, then the pumps to flood containment would not be energized. Based on the components qualification for the harsh environment, valve closure time, and the time required for the valve motor gerator to become submerged, it is felt that adequate justification is provided for exenpting this conponent f rom the required one-hour operating time margin.

This valve motor operator is the reactor coolant pump 2-1 seal return line valve. Once this valve is closed, any further operation would not be required to mitigate a LOCA. Once closed, the valve motor is deenergized by opening its main line contactors at a 480 volt motor control center located outside containment. The only parts of the electrical power and "

control circuits f or this valve motor operator, which are exposed to the LOCA containment atmosphere are the motor leads, internal geared limit and torque switches, and the cabling inside containment. The cabling is addressed elsewhere in the submittal.

j Once the valve motor operator is deenergized af ter stroking its respective valve to the closed position, there '

is no way that environment. The it can be opened due to any poteritial f allure of any of its circuit conponents which are exposed to the LOCA motor is controlled f rom outside containment and to energize it af ter is bas been closed by SFAS it is nacassary to reset the SFAS output relays. If submerged, the motor leads could short circuit and the torque and limit

p s 70.

Fccility: D3vic-Be32e Unit 1 SYSTEM COMFONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET Indev No.: 213H-004B i i Dockit: 50-346 Re v. : 2 Prepared by: Date 3 Checksd by: Apw h Date "Y/ 8//3 1

cwitches could possibly short circuit. Since the power circuit is deenergized, any short circuit here due to submerge we would have no affect on the circuit. Parts of the centrol circuit containing the limit and torque switches are within the valve motor operator and are energized when the valve is closed. Any short circuits in this circuit due to sutmergence would not cause the valve to l'ecome energized. The control circuit is protected by 2.5 amp fuses which would blow on a control circuit short and would deenergize the control circuit and prevent energizing the motor operator and preclude valve op3 ration. Af ter f ailure of the control circuit resulting in a blower fuse would not affect any other circuits on the same cotor control center as this valve motor operator.

Since this valve is a containment isolation valve, the operator would be required to verify the position of this valve as one of his ime.ediate actions f ollowing a SFAS signal to af fect containment isolation. The 9 minute and 38 second

, submergence time, compared to the 45 second valve closing time, would give the operator suf ficient time to verify valve 1 closure p rior to the potential loss of indication due to shorting of the control circuit, which could occur af ter valve rmtor operator submergence. In addition, the f our seal return lines come together into one line inside contanment, and there is a containment isolation valve located outside of containment on this same line to ensure that this containment penetration is isolated. This outside containment isolation valve (HVMU38) is also closed by a SFAS incident level II signal and it would not be exposed to a harsh environment due to a LOCA. The operator would be able to verify that the seal return penetration was isolated by verifying the position of this valve (HVMU38). (Reference CAL-49 and Elem. Wiring Diag.

7749-E52B-SH30) l 4

l

Fceility: Davis-Bessa Unit 1 Dockst: 50-346 SYSTEM COMPWENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET Index No.: _213H-065 Re v. 2 Prepared by: Dates N Checksd by: ,4hrufDd 83

~ Date //////r I

il l EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION l ll ENVIRONMENT l l l I l l l Parameter Specification Qualification DOCUMENTATION REF.

l Qualification j Outstanding l l ll Specification Qualification l

i Method l Items l l Systs:a Reactor Coolant ll Operating l 45 Seconds l 7 Days i

l t l Pump Seal Return ll Time l K l M-24 l

', l l l l Simultaneous l None l ll l l l l V-24A l r Test l l

! l Plant ID No. WMU59B ll l l l Note 1 l l

il l l Temperature l 283.0 l l l l l

l l Conponent : Valve Motor l 329.0 l H, X l M-24 l ll ("F) l l l l Simultaneous l None l l Operator ll l l l V-24A l Test l l l

ll l l l l ) l l

lManuf acturer: Limitorque ll Pressure 1 52.0 l I i I

$l l 104.7 l G, X l

' ll(PSIA) l l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l l l lModel Number: SMB-000-2 ll '

l V-24A l Test l

,lO/N l ) l 364187C ll l l l l lS/N: 158238 l l l l l Relative l 100.0 l 100.0 l l l l Il Function: Operates Valve l l Humidity l A l M-24 l l l l Simultaneous l None l l MU59B ll (%) l l V-24A l Test l l l

} l Accurtcy : Spec : 7 N/A ll l l l l '

l

}l l l Demon: N/A ll l Boric Acid l l l l il ll Chemical l 1800 ppm l Boric Acid l l M-24 l l l 1800 ppm l A V-24A l

{lSarvice: Reactor Coolant l l Spray l pH 5.0 pH 5.0 l l Simultaneous l None l il 2-2 Seal Return ll l l l l CAL-40 l Test, l Il l l Line Valve ll l l l Note 2 l Analysis l l l l l l l ll l 1 l l l

l Location: Containment ll Radiation l1.7 x 107 RADS l2.0 x 108 l l l l l RADS l CAL-44 l M-25 l Sequential Testl ll l l l None l DFlood Level Elev: 572'-2"ll l V-24A l l l

l l l D Abova Flood Level: No ll Aging l 40 Years l 40 Years l l l .l

] l I l CAL-93 l Sequential ll l l l None l

)Needed for: ll l l l l Test l l Hot Shutdown lX l ll 1 l l Analysis l l 1

l l Subme rgence l l l 572'-2" l 566'-0" l l Cold Shutdown l l B M-16 l ll l l Note 3 l l l N/A l None l l l ll 1 l l l l l l l l

w m i

i Facility: Davio-Besse Unit 1 SYSTEM CCMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET Index No. : 213H-005A

Dockat

50-346 Re v. : 2 NOTES N b e m *gA [ )

I Prepared by: Date 'I Checksd bya gfisc h D _ M Date ///.V/3

1. Tha test subjected the valve motor operator to I hour at 129'F and 104.7 psia, then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 312*F and 84.7 psia, then 2 ,

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at 287'r and 54.7 psia, then 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> 'at 256'F and 34.7 psia, and 250*F and 29.7 psia for 6 days. The temperature and j pressure inside containment peak at 283*F and 52.0 psia in 17 and 50 seconds, re spectively. At I hour the conditions are l

214.7'F and 32.32 psias at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 204*F and 29.46 psias at 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 193.2*F and 27.08

psias and at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 143*F and 18.03 psia. The containment returns to ambient conditions in 7 days.

Caced on this inf ormation, it can be concluded that the laboratory test subjected the valve motor gerator to an overall l tEoro severe environment than that which would result f rom a postulated LOCA. Since the valve motor operator retsained l operable throughout the test and f unctional af ter the test, it can be concluded that the valve motor operator will remain j f unctional during and af ter exposure to the accident environment which would result f rom the postulated LOCA. ( Ref e rence G, l

j H, and X) i

2. CAL-40 qualifies conponents tested in a high pH boric acid spray to a pH value of 5.

3. This valve motor operator will become submerged during a postulated LOCA in 17 minutes and 15 seconds. This is a worst-case

}- value based on a postulated DBA LOCA. For smaller LOCAs, component submergence will occur f urther into the accident, if it occurs at all. The valve motor operator will close in 45 seconds af ter receipt of a signal by the safety features actuation system (SFAS incident level II). The valve is qualified f or exposure to a steam / chemical spray environment but not f or i submerged cperation. The valve will close prior to becoming submerged as it is qualified for the harsh environment and the

! SFAS signal which closes the valve also actuates the HPI, Containment Spray, and LPI/DH pumps which f urnish the water which ,

t i leads to containment flooding. If the valve would not close due to receiving an SFAS signal, then the pumps to flood I containment would not be energized. Based on the components qualification f or the harsh environment, valve closure time, End the time required for the valve motor operator to become submerged, it is felt that adequate justification is provided l for exenpting this component f rom the required one-hour operating time margin, i

This valve motor cperator is the reactor coolant pump 2-2 seal return line valve. Once this valve is closed, any further operation would not be required to mitigate a LOCA. Once closed, the valve motor is deenergized by opening its main line contactors at a 480 volt motor control center located outside containment. The only parts of the electrical power and I control circuits f or this valve motor operator, which are exposed to the LOCA containment atmosphere are the motor leads, I internal geared limit and torque switches, and the cabling inside containment. The cabling is addressed elsewhere in the j submittal. Once the valve motor operator is deenergized af ter stroking its respective valve to the closed position, there is no way that it can be opened due to any potential f ailure of any of its circuit conponents which are exposed to the LOCA envi roniaent. The motor is controlled f rom outside containment and to energize it af ter is has been closed by SFAS it is

) necessary to reset the SFAS output relay s. If subme rged, the motor leads could short circuit and the torque and limit i

b 1

~

b Facility: Dsvic-Besse Unit 1 V

SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET U

Index No.: 213H-0053 50-346 Dockst Rev.: 2 j NorES Prepared by k Date /

Checkzd bys JeG4%d)J Date rf /J/J3 l

j j switches could possibly short circuit. Since the power circuit is 'deenergized, any short circuit here due to submergence i

would have no affect on the circuit. Parts of the control circuit containing the limit and torque switches are within the valve motor operator and are energized when the valve is closed. Any short circuits in this circuit due to submergence j would not cause the valve to become energized. The control circuit is protected by 2.5 asp fuses which would blow on a  !

a control circuit short and would deenergize the control circuit and prevent energizing the motor operator and preclude valve

) ope ration. Af ter f ailure of the control circuit resulting in a blower fuse would not affect any other circuits on the same i motor control center as this valve motor operator.

! Since this valve is a containment isolation valve, the operator would be required to verify the position of this valve as

one of his immediate actions following a SFAS signal to affect containment isolation. The 17 minute and 15 second j submergence time, coupared to the 45 second valve closing time, would give the operator suf ficient time to verify valve

] closure p rior to the potential loss of indication due to shorting of the control circuit, which could occur af ter valve 4

motor operator submergence. In addition, the f our seal return lines come together into one line inside contanment, and

there is a containment isolation valve located outside of containment on this same line to ensure that this containment

! penet ration is isolated. This outside containnent isolation valve (HVMU38) is also closed by a SFAS incident level II l signo. and it would not be exposed to a h:-sh environment due to a LOCA. The operator would be able to verify that the seal

return penetration was isolated by verifying the position of this valve (HVMU38). (Reference CAL-49 and Elem. Wiring Diag.

i 7749-E52B-SH30.)

i i

1 i .

i i

i F

i 2

i d

t h

\ j Facility: D' isis-Besse Unit 1 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET '

Dockst 50-346 Index No.: 213H-006 Re v. : __

2

$ Prapsred by:

h,U Dates N /![]

Checksd by: Dates ///.4/#3 1

il li I i I l lBQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION ll ENVIRONMENT l DOCUMENTATION REF. l Qualification l Outstanding l l l Pa rameter i

l Specification Qualification @ecification Qualification Method l Items l

l ll l l 1 lSyctsm: Reactor Coolant l l Ope rating l 45 Seconds l 7 Days l K l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l ll Pump Seal Return ll Time l l l l V-24A l Test l l l ll l l l l Note 1 l l -l l l Plant ID No. MVMU59C ll l l l l l l l 1l l l Temperature l 283.0 l 329.0

) lConponent: Valve Motor l H, X l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l ll (*F) l l l l V-24A l Test l

l Operator ll l l l l l l

l il ll l I i l 1 i l

' lManuf acture r: Limitorque l l Pressure 52.0 l 104.7 l G, X M-24 l Simultaneous None l lj(PSIA) l l V-24A l Test j l Modal Nttmbar SMB-000-2 ll l l l l l l l

' l O/N: 364187C ll l l l l l l 1lS/N: 158239 ll Relative l 100.0 l 100.0 l A l M-24 l Simultaneous l None l ll Function Operates Valve ll Humidity l l l l V-24A l Test l l

• l MU59C ll (%) l l l l l

l Accu racy

Spect N/A ll l l l l l (

l l

il Demon: N/A ll l Boric Acid l Boric Acid l l M-24 l l l '

l l l Chemical l 1800 ppm l 1800 ppm l A l V-24A l Simultaneous l None l

l Se rvica

Reactor Coolant l l Sp ray l pH 5.0 l pH 5.0 l l CAL-40 l Test, l l lll ! 1-1 Seal Return ll Line Valve ll l

l l l l Note 2 l Analysis l l l l l l l l

}l ll l l l l l l l

}l Location: Containment ll Radiation l1.7 x 10 7RADS l2.0 x 108 RADS l CAL-44 l M-25 l Sequential Test l None l

!l ll l l l l v-24A l l l

- l Flood Level Elev: 572'-2"ll l l l l l l l l Above Flood Level: No ll Aging l 40 Years l 40 Years l I l CAL-93 l Sequential l None l 1l ll l l l l l Test l -

l l lNeedad for: ll l l l l Analysis l l ll Hot Shutdown lX l ll l l l l l l Il l l Subme rgence l 572'-2" l 570'-6" l B l M-17 l N/A l Nolo l

l

!l Cold Shutdown l l ll l l Note 3 l l l l l ll 4

ll l l l l l l l i

I Facility: Davis-Beasa Unit 1 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET IndIx No.: 213H-000A' -

3 Dockst: 50-346 Re v. : 2 Prepared by: b Date N# )

1 Checksd by: M&M Date s /1//7 .

4 i

~

1. Tha test subjected the valve motor operator to I hour at 329'F and 104.7 psia, then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 312*F and 84.7 psia, then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 287'F and 54.7 psia, then 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> at 256*F and 34.7 psia, and 250*F and 29.7 psia for 6 days. The temperature and

, pressure inside containment peak at 283*F and 52.0 psia in 17 and 50 seconds, respectively. At I hour the conditions are l l 214.7'F and 32.32 psia; at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 204*F and 29.46 psia; at 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 193.2*F and 27.08 j psia; and at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 143*F and 18.03 psia. The containment returns to ambient conditions in 7 days.

J  !

4 Based on this information, it can be concluded that the laboratory test subjected the valve motor operator to an overall j more severe environment than that which would result f rom a postulated LOCA. Since the valve motor operater remained 4

operable throughout the test and f unctional af ter the test, it can be concluded that the valve motor operator will remain j

functional during and af ter exposure to the accident environment which would result f rom the postulated LOCA. (Reference G, ,

l H, and X) '

l 2 CAL-40 qualifies conponents tested in a high pH boric acid spray to a pH value of 5.

4

3. This valve motor cperator will become submerged during a postulated LOCA in 33 minutes and 31 seconds. This is a worst-case

] value based on a postulated DBA LOCA. For smaller LOCAs, component submergence will occur f urther into the accident, if it j occurs at all. The valve motor operator will close in 45 seconds af ter receipt of a signal by the safety features actuation j system (SFAS incident level II). The valve is qtaalified f or exposure to a steam / chemical spray environment but not f or

, submerged cperation. The valve will close prior to becoming submerged ao it is qualified for the harsh environment and the SFAS signal which closes the valve also actuates the HPI, Containment Spray, and LPI/DH pumps which f urnish the water which

leads to containment flooding. If the valve would not close due to receiving an SFAS signal, then the ptmps to ilood

containment would not be energized. Based on the components qualification for the harsh environment, valve closure time, i and the time required for the valve motor operator to become submerged, it is felt that adequate justification is provided f or exenpting this component f rom the required one-hour operating time margin.

1 This valve motor cperator is the reactor coolant pump 1-1 seal return line valve. Once this valve is closed, any further j operacion would not be required to mitigate a LOCA. Once closed, the valve motor is deenergized by opening its main line

contactors at a 480 volt motor control center located outside containment. The only parts of the electrical power and ,

controi circuits f or this valve motor operator, which are exposed to the LOCA containment atmosphere are the motor leads,

internal geared limit and torque switches, and the cabling inside containment. The cabliniJ is addressed elsewhere in the l submittal. Once the valve motor operator is deenergized af ter strokinJ its respective valve to the closed position, the re

is no way that it can be cpened due to any potential f ailure of any of its circuit conponents which are exposed to the LOCA l envi ronment. The motor is controlled f rom outside containment and to energize it af ter is has been closed by SFAS it is j necessary to reset the SFAS output relays. If subme rged, the motor leads could short cittuit and the torque and limit l

( SYSTEM COMPONENT EV,m_-. ION WORKSHEET Indsx n 213H-0067 1 FEcility: L__s2-Bessa Unit 1 Dockst: 50-346 Rav.: 2

. NOTES l Ptsparsd by: N " " ^ ^

Date /// !73 Checksd by: M JE M Date U/.V/3

. switches could possibly short circuit. Since the power circuit is deenergized, any short circuit here due to submergence

! would have no affect on the circuit. Parts of the control circuit containing the limit and torque switches are within the valve motor operator and are energized when the valve is closed. Any short circuits in this circuit due to submergence would not cause the valve to become energized. The control circuit is protected by 2.5 amp fuses which would blow on a control circuit short and would deenergize the control circuit and prevent energizing the motor operator and preclude valve l operation. After failure of the control circuit resulting in a blower fuse would not affect any other circuits on the same motor control center as this valve motor operator.

Since this valve is a containment isolation valve, the operator would be required to verify the position of this valve as one of his immediate actions following a SFAS signal to affect containment isolation. The 33 minute and 31 second submergence time, cor.. pared to the 45 second valve closing time, would give the operator sufficient time to verify valve closure prior to the potential loss of indication due to shorting of the control circuit, which could occur af ter valve motor operator submergence. In addition, the four seal return lines come together into one line inside contanment, and there is a containment isolation valve located outside of containment on this same line to ensure that this containment penetration is isolated. This outside containment isolation valve (HVMU38) is also closed by a SFAS incident level II signal and it would not be exposed to a harsh environment due to a LOCA. The operator would be able to verify that the seal return penetration was isolated by verifying the position of this valve (HVHU38). (Reference CAL-49 and Elem. Wiring Diag.

7749-ES2B-SH30) 4 I

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F cility: '._ , ac-D;;;2 Unit 1

' xs; ,

\

Dockst: 50-346 SYSTEM COMPONEnr EVALUATION WORKSHEET Prepared by: Index no.: 213H-C07 Rev.:

Check;d by:

$1Wk ME Date: __

Date: ///=V/) _

[.2 2 l-- ,

ll l EQUIPMENT DESCRIFTION ll I l ENVIRONMENT 1 ,__ll_ Parameter l I I i

Il Specification i Qualification DOCUMENTATION REF. l ISy:tcm; Reactor Coolant lloperating i I ISpecificationlQualification!l Qualification l Outstanding l I l I Method Items l

Pump Seal Return llTime 45 seconds l 7 Days l K I

I l

l l I ll l 1 M-24 l IPitnt ID No. MVM959D l

l l

l V-24A l i Simultaneous l None l l ll l l l Test l IITemperaturel 1 l

Note 1 l l IC mponent: Valve Motor 283.0 1 329.0 l l

l

_f l Operator ll ( *F ) l i H, X 1 ll_ i l M-24 l i l I i l Simultaneous l None ll I

I V-24A l Test l IM:nufacturer: LimitorqJe llPressure l 1 I l l

l l 1 52.0 I i I

ll(PSIA) 1 104.7 l l i l G, X l l l Modal Number: SMB-000-2 11_

I M-24 l lO/N: 364187C l l I

l V-24A l Simultaneous l None lS/N: 158240 ll l l l

I Test l 1

llRelative l 1 I l Function: i 100.0 l l l l Operates Valve llHumidity 1 l 100.0 l A l l

l MU59D i i M-24 l lAccurtcy: Spec: ll (t) i l i i Simultaneous i None l N/A ll I I

V-24A l Test l l I 1 Demon: N/A ll l I l 1

1 Boric Acid i Boric Acid 1

l I l

llChemical i 1800 ppm l l l

l lServica: Reactor Coolant ilSpray i pH 5.0 l 1800 ppm i A 1 M-24 l l l V-24A l l 1-2 Seal Return ll l I pH 5.0 l l Simultaneous l l

Line Valve 11_ l l

l CAL-40 l Test, None l I l ll l I

! Note 2 i Analysis 1

I l I l l Location: Containment llRadiation l l l l

] 11.7 x 107 RADS l2.0 x 108 l I

l

__I Il l RADS l CAL-44 l

) Flood Lovel Elev: 572'-2*ll I l M-25 l l l l Sequential Testl None IAbova I

Flood Level: No llAging l l

l V-24A i i I 40 Years 1 ll i 40 Years l l

l Netdtd for: ____ ll_

l l

l I l CAL-93  ! Sequential l

l Hot Shutdown l l l None 1,j(_l l l i ll l l 1

} Test l llSubmergencel l l Analysis l Cold Shutdown 572'-2" l l l l_ l ll l

l 569'-0* I B l l

l l M-18

_ll_ l l Note 3 l l N/A l l l l None i I l I l I l I

I

f Fccility: L is-Dasse Unit 1 '

Dockst 50-346 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVAulATION WORKSHEET Index ho.: 213N-007A Prepsred by: Rev.: 2 Date ,

Chtcksd by: MeeaD&' Date _ N/WR3 l

! 1.

The test subjected the valve motor operator to I hour at 329'F and 104 7 psia .

pressure inside containment peak at 283*F and 52.0 psia in 17 and 50The seconds, hours a i

a for 6 days. temperature and respectively.

psia; at 5At I hourthetheconditi conditions are i

[ 214.7*F paia and 32.32 psias at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 204*F and 29.46 hours

}

and at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the conditions are 143*F and .18.03 psia. ons are 193.2*F and 27.08

}

The containment returns to ambient conditions in 7 days.

Based on this information, it can be concluded that the laboratory test subjected the valve

more severe environment than that which would result from a postulated LOCA. motor operator to an overall j operable throughout the test and functional after the test, Since the valve motor operator remained

functional H, and X) during and after exposure to the accident environment which would rosult from thit can be concluded tha e postulated LOCA.

I (Reference G, l2.

4 CAL-40 qualifies components tested in a high pH boric acid spray to a pH value of 5 .

3.

This value valve based motor operatorDBA on a postulated will LOCA.

become submerged during a postulated LOCA in 25 ainutes and 24 occurs at all. seconds. This is a worst-case ,

system (SPAS incident The valve level II).motor operator will close in 45 seconds after receipt of a signal by

, if it eatures actuation the t submerged operation. -

! SFAS sign-1 The valve will close prior to becoming submerged as it is qualified for the nment and the '

1 leads to containment wnich closes the valve also actuates the HPI, Containment Spray, and LPI/DH pumps flooding.

j containment would not be energized.If the valve would not close due to receiving an SFAS signal, then the pamps to floodwhich furn -

and the time required for the valve motor operator to become submerged, it is feltprovided for exempting this component from the required one-hour operating time margin.

that adeq 4

This valve motor operator is the reactor coolant pump 1-2 seal return line valve .

operation would not be required to mitigate a LOCA. Once this valve is closed, any further contactors at a 480 volt motor control center located outside containment.Once closed, the valva motor is deenergized by openi j control circuits for this valve motor operator, which are exposed to the LOCA containment atmosphere e the motorarThe leads,only part i internal geared subaittal. limit and torque switches, and the cabling inside containment ..

{ is no way that it can be opened due to any potential failure of anyc are environment. of its closed circuitthere position, compone exposed to the LOCA j necessary to reset the SFAS output relays.The motor is controlled from outside containment andytoSFAS energize it is it af ter 1

i If submerged, the motor leads could short circuit and the torque and limit '

k FEcility: \s_ s-Basse Unit 1 ) U Dockst: 50-346 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALJATION WORKSHEET

{ Index 1.o.: 213H-0078 Re v. : 2 Ptsputed by: Date / .}

Chscksd by: h-A d Date #/t/M i

switches could possibly short circuit.

l would have no affect on the circuit. Since the power circuit is deenergized, any short circuit here due to submergence l' valve motcr operator and are energized when the valve is closed. Parts of the control circuit containing the limit and torque switche would not cause the valve to become energized. Any short circuits in this circuit due to submergence i The control circuit is protected by 2.5 amp fuses which would blow on a I

control circuit short and would deenergize the control circuit and prevent energizing the motor operator and preclude valve operation.

motor control center as this valve motor operator.After failure of the control circuit resulting in a blower fuse would me no i

) since this valve is a containment isolation valve, the operator would be required to verify the position of this valve as j one of his immediate actions following a GFAS signal to affect containment isolation.

The 25 minute and 24 second

subnergence time, compared to the 45 second valve closing time, would give the operator sufficient time to verify valv

closure Eotor prior submergence.

operator to the potential loss of indication due to shorting of the control circuit, which could occur af ter valve i

there is a containment isolation valve located outside of containment on this same line penetration is isolated. nment to ensu

) This outside containment isolation valve (HVMU38) is also closed by a SFAS incident level II

}

signal and it would not be exposed to a harsh environment due to a LOCA.

return penetration was isolated by verifying the position of this valve (HVMU38).The operator would be able to verify that the seal

! 7749-E52B-SH30) (Reference CAL-49 and Elem. Wiring Diag.

1 .

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