ML20069K270
| ML20069K270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1994 |
| From: | Konopka G, Mattei A, Sterdis A WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069K266 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-14075, WCAP-14075-R, WCAP-14075-R00, NUDOCS 9406150350 | |
| Download: ML20069K270 (58) | |
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L WCAP-14075 REV.O WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 AP600 Design DINerences Document For Development Of Emergency Operating Guidelines Report
+
WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 2 [ 1h document contans informaton propnetary to Westinghouse Electne Corporabon; it is submrtted in conhdonce and is to be used solely for he purpt 5 for which it is fumashed and retumed upon request. This ck>cument and such informabon is not to be reproduced, transmined, diadosed f or usi I otherwise in whole or in part without pnor wntlen authonzation of Wesbnghouse Electne Corporaton, Energy Systems Busswas Unit, subject e the legends contaned hereof. , O WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 (NON PROPRIETARY) O DOE DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAM ' GOVERNMENT UMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT [See reverse side of this form)
@ (C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 19 S4 A heense is reserved to the U.S. Govemment under contract DE-ACO3-90SF18495. ;
O DOE CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DELIVERED DATA) 7 Subpet to specified excephons, disclosure of the data is restncted until September 30,1995 or Desegn Certhcation under DOE contract DE..'OO3-90SF18495, whichever is later. EPRI CONFIDENTIAUOBLIGATION NOTICES: NOTICE: 1 2 3 4 5 CATEGORY: A B CO D E F t Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit Nuclear Technology Division P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 C 1994 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Reserved
1 AP600 DOCUMENT COVER SHEET Form Sa202F(943)lWP xxxx) APeoo CENTRAL FILE USE ONLY: RFSt RFS ITEM a: l 0058.FRM APeoo DOCUMENT NO. REVISION NO. PAGES ATTACHED ASSIGNED TO ; GW-GJR-001 0 N/A j ALTERNATE DOCUMENT NUMBER: WCAP-14075 ATTACHMENTS l DESIGN AGENT ORGANIZATION: Westinghouse l PROJECT: AP600 N/A WORK BREAKDOWN #: 2.3.1.3. 7 TITLE: AP600 Design Differences Document For Development Of Emergency Operating Guidelines Report i CALCULATION / ANALYSIS
REFERENCE:
DCP #/REV. INCORPORATED: N/A ELECTRONIC FILENAME: APPLICATION: O WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 2 This document contains informaton propnetary to Westinghouse Electne Corporanon; it is submitted m confidence and is to be used soloty for the purpose for wtuch it is fumished and retumed upon request. This document and such informaten is not to be reproduced, transmmed, decioned or used otherwise in whole or in part without pnor wntten authon2aten of Wesbnghouse Electric Corporanon, Energy Systems Busmess Urut, subject to the legends contained hereof. O WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3 (NON PROPRIETARY) O DOE DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAM GOVERNMENT LIMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT lSee reverse side of this form)
@ (C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 19 94 A Iconse is reserved to the U.S. Govemment under contract DE AC03-90SF18495, 1
0 DOE CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DELIVERED DATA) Subject to specified excepbons, disclosure of this data is restncted unt! September 30,1995 or Design Cerbficaten under DOE contract DE-ACo3-90SF18495, whichever is later. EPRI CONFIDENTIAUOBUGATION NOTICES: NOTICE: 1 2O aO 40 sO CATEGORY: AO BO CO D EO F 0 ARC FOAKE PROGRAM ARC UMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT ISee reverse side of this form) 0 (C) WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 19 _, A leense is reserved to the U.S. Govemment under contract DE FCo2-NE34267 and subcontract ARC-93-3 SC 001. O ARC CONTRACT DELIVERABLES (DEllVERED DATA) Subject to specified exceptons, disclosure of this data is restncted under ARC Subcontract ARC 93-3 SC ool. ORIGINATOR SIGNATURE /DATE A. L. SterdiS ()gw h j cp6MayPV AP600 RESPONSIBLE MANAGER SIGNpTURE* ,/ APPROVAL DATE B. A. McIntyre ;w , gy g 4 9y
- Approval of the responsible manager segnifes that document as complete, all reqbited reviews are complete, electrone fde as at: ached and document is released for use.
Form Sa202F(9/BS) LIMITED RIGHTS STATEMENTS DOE GOVERNMENT UMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT p) These data are submrtted wth hmited nghts under govemment mntract No. DE-ACo3 90SF18495. These data may be to cod and used by the govemment with the express kmrtabon that they will not, ethout wntion permiesson of the contractor, be u for purposes of manutacturer nor dsclosed outsade the govemment; exmpt that the gpvemment may dtscioso these data outade the govemment for the foBowmg purposes, if any, provided that the govemment makes such disdosure subject to prohibiton agamst further use and dociosure: (i) This 'Propnetary Data
- rnay be disc 60 sed for eveluation purposes under the restndsons above.
(ii) The 'Propnetary Data' rnay be disdosed to the Electne Power Research insatute (EPRI), electne utikty representstrves and their droct consuttants, exduding dract commermal compebtors, and the DOE Nabonal Laboratones under the prohituhons and ' restncbons above. (B) This notice shall be marked on any reproduchon of these data, in whole or in part. ARC UMITED RIGHTS STATEMENT: TNs propnetary data, fumashed under Subcontract Number ARC-93-3-SC 001 with ARC may be duplicated and used by the govemment and ARC, sub iect to the kmstations of Arbde H-17.F. of that subcontract, with the express hmitabons that the propnetary data may not be dadosed outzde the govemment or ARC, or ARC's Class 1 & 3 members or EPRI or be used for purposes of manufacture without pnor permismon of tne Subcontractor, except that further disclosure or use may be made solely for the following purposes-This propnetary data may be disclosed to other than commercial compettors of Subcontractor for evaluaton purposes of this subcontract under the restncton that the prop 9etary data be retasned in confidence and not be further disdosed, and subject to the terms of a non+hre agreement between the Subcontractor and that organization, exduding DOE and its contractors. DEFINITIONS DELIVERED DATA - Consists of documents (e.g. specifications, drawings, reports) which are generated under the DOE or ARC contracts. EPRI CONFIDENTIALITY / OBLIGATIONNOTICES NOTICE 1: The data in this document is sub ect t to no confidenbahty obhgabons. NOTICE 2: The data m this document is propnetary and con 6dential to Westnghouse Electne Corporabon and/orits Contractors. It is forwarded to tsopcent under en obhgabon of Confidence and Trust for hmited purposes only. Any use, dsclosure to unauthonzed persons. or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited except as agreed to m advance by the Electne Power Research insttute (EPRI) and Westin use Electne Corporaton. Roopeent of this data has a duty to inquire of EPRI and/or Westinghouse as to the uses of the informahon con hereen that tre permetted. NOTICE 3: The data in this documentis propnetary and confidential to Westinghouse Electne Co raton and/orits Contractors. It is forwarded to recipient under an obhgabon of Confidence and TrusMor use only n evaluabon tasks spectf ly authonzed b the Electne Power Research inabtute (EPRI) Any use, dsdosure to unauthc.ved persons, or copying this document or parts thereof is bited except as agreed to m advance by EPRI and Wesbnghouse Electne Corporanon. Reapient of thss data has a duty to inquire of E I and/or Westinghouse as to the uses of the informabon contasned herein that are permitted. This document and any copses or excerpts thereof that may have been generated are to be returned to Wesbnghouse, drecOy or through EPRI, when requested to do so. NOTICE 4: The data m this document is propnetary and confidential to Wesunghouse Electnc Corporabon and/or its Contractors. It is being revssied in confidence and trust only to Employee's of EPRI and to certam contractors of EPRI for kmrted evaluation tasks authonzod by EPRI. Any use, disclosure to unauthonzed persons, or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited. This Document and any copies or excarpts thereof that may have been generated are to be retumed to Wesbnghouse, direct!y of through EPRI, when requested to do so. NOTICE 5: The data in tnis document is propnetary and confidential to Westnghouse Electne Corporabon and/orits Contractors. Access to this data is given in Confidence and Trust only at Wesbnghouse facilities for hmited evaluabon tasks assmed by EPRI. Any use, disdosure to unauthonzed persons, or copying of this document or parts thereof is prohibited. Neither this document nor any excerpts therefrom are to be ramoved from Westmghouse facihties. EPRI CONFIDENTIALITY / OBLIGATION CATEGORIES CATEGORY *A* - (See Deltvered Data) Consists of CONTRACTOR Foreground Data that is contained in an issued reported. CATEGORY *B* - (See Delrvered Data) Consists of CONTRACTOR Foreground Data that is not contained in an issued report, except for computer programs. CATEGORY *C' - Consists of CONTRACTOR Background Data except for computer programs. CATECORY *D* - Consists of computer programs developed in the course of performing the Work. CATECORY *E' - Consists of comouter programs developed pnor to the Effeebve Date or after the Effochve Date but outside the scope of the Work. CATECORY *F* - Consists of administratvo plans and administradve reports.
1 i WCAP-14075 REV. O AP600 Design Differences Document For Development Of Emergency Operating Guidelines Report Prepared by: , George G. Konopka p Anita M. Mattei ' Andrea L Sterdis I May 1994 I l i 1
Desen DWforences Docurnent _ ______ b Development of AP600-Specific Emergency designed pressurized water reactors, they are used for and adapted to the AP600. Response Guidelines The objective of this section is to compare the ERG low-pressure reference plant system designs upon The first step in developing the AP600-specific which the ERGS are based, to the AP600 system designs emergency response guidelines (ERGS)is to compare the to determine design differences with respect to low-pressure (LP) reference plant design with the AP600 design. To identify the design differences with respect emergency operation high-level operator action strategies. The results of this comparison are used as the to emergency operations between the ERG low-pressure reference plant design and the AP600 design, a basis for determining the applicability of the transient and accident analyses basis of the ERGS to the AP600 comparison of the systems of the two plants is made. and preparation of high-level operator action strategies This comparison is performed in a systemati,: and for the AP600 based on the ERGS. complete manner. l The low-pressure reference plant is chosen as the initial starting point in the development of AP600- Background ! specific ERG's because the charging pumps (make-up The Westinghouse Owners Group ERGS are pumps for AP600) are not part of the emergency core cooling system, thus making the AP600 more similar to generic guidelines that have been developed in two i the ERG low-pressure reference plant. Because of the versions: a high-pressure (HP) version and a low- l major functional similarities between the AP600 design pressure 0 P) version. Each version is based on a reference plant design configuration. The high-pressure and the low-pressure ERG reference plant. the ERG version of the ERGS is based on a plant configuration process can easily be applied to the AP600 design. This document provides the AP600/ ERG low- that incorporates a safety injection system that includes safety injection pumps with a shutoff pressure greater pressure reference plant design differences. A high level than the reactor coolant system pressurizer power-comparison of the LP reference plant and the AP600 for use in adapting the ERG high level action strategies to operated relief valve pressure setpoint. The high-the AP600 is made. A summary of differences in pressure plants use the charging pumps as safety injection pumps. The low-pressure version of the ERGS system functions, major design features, components and instrumentation and controls available to the plant is based on a plant configuration that incorporates a safety injection system that includes safety injection operators is provided. From this differences document, the high-level operator action strategies for emergency pumps with a shutoff pressure less than the reactor coolant system pressurizer power-operated relief valve operations are developed. pressure setpoint. Low-pressure plants do not use the Differences Between the Two Loop Low. charging pumps as safety injection pumps. When comparing the AP600 to the ERG Pressure Reference Plant and the AP600 reference plant, it is important to note that the AP600 Plant has been designed as a simplified plant that minimizes the number and complexity of operator actions required This represents the first subtask in establishing to control the safety-related systems in response to an the high-level operator xtion strategies for emerFency accident. This has been done through the use of passive operations for the AP600 design. This section safety-related systems to mitigate accidents. These establishes the bases for the high-level operator action passive safety-related systems do not require support strategies for emergency operations for the AP600 systems such as emergency ac power sources, design. Since the Westinghouse Owners Group ERGS are the industry-approved reference for Westinghouse-3 Westinghouse weFiassoccusT):io/osi294
Design Differences Document E component cooling water, or service water for accident the ERG reference plant most similar to the AP600 is mitigation. the low-pressure reference plant. The low-pressure Also, operator actions for the AP600 have been version of the ERGS is the most applicable to the simplified by eliminating required operator actions rather AP600. This comparison document compares the AP600 than by automating operator actions. The design system designs with the system designs of the low-includes greater safety margins and passive safety-related pressure reference plant. systems that do not require operator action. The second step is to identify the functions of A design goal is to eliminate operator actions the low-pressure reference plant systems and the AP600 required to maintain core cooling following design basis systems. The principal source documents used for this accidents for an indefinite time. After three days,it may review are the Westinghouse Owners Group Low-he necessary for the operator to perform limited support Pressure Reference Plant Description (Reference 1), the actions in order to continue plant monitoring or to AP600 SS AR, and information collected from selected maintain low containment pressure to minimize doses. AP600 design documents. The ERGS do not restrict the operator to using The Low-Pressure Reference Plant Description only safety-related systems to mitigate accidents. Nor provides a description of the reference plant design do they restrict the time in which the operator is allowed configuration upon which the Westinghouse Owners to act. Alternatively, the ERGS are structured to use Group ERGS are based. available plant equipment to mitigate transients and Based on the review of plant systems, the accidents in an optimal manner while monitoring and AP600 systems that perform the same (or similar) maintaining the plant critical safety functions. functions as the low-pressure reference plant systems are identified. These systems are itemized in Table 1. His Comparison of System Functions table provides a system comparison and also identifies the AP600 system acronyms since they differ from the To identify the design differences with respect acronyms used for the low-pressure reference plant to emergency operations between the ERG reference systems. The AP600 systems that are classified as plant system designs and the AP600 system designs, a safety-related for accident mitigation purposes are comprehensive, systematic comparison of the systems for footnoted in the table. the AP600 and low-pressure reference plant is made. Table 2 provides a complete listing of AP600 The first step in comparing the AP600 systems systems and also identifies the system acronyms. The to the ERG reference plant systems was to select the AP600 systems that are included in the Table 1 ERG reference plant most similar to the AP600. De comparison are footnoted in Table 2. The comparison of system functions for each major design difference between the high-pressure and the low-pressure reference plants is the shutoff pressure low-pressure reference plant system is presented in the of the safety injection pumps with respect to the reactor following subsections. The high-level system function coolant system pressurizer power-operated relief valve of the low-pressure reference plant system is defined and pressure serpoint. the AP600 system that performs the function is The AP600 system that corresponds to the low- identified. System design differences that may affect pressure reference plant safety injection system is the emergency operations are identified. passive core cooling system (PXS). The passive core cooling system uses passive, high and low-pressure Reactor Trip Actuation System - Re low-pressure tanks to deliver makeup flow to the core subsequent to reference plant reactor trip actuation system monitors the initiation of engineered safeguards features. De specified process parameters and equipment status and passive core cooling system use pumps. Consequently, actuates a reactor trip if conditions exceed specified limits. 2 wmasecccust);io/ost294 3 Westirigtlollse i C-
Desian Differences Document g On the AP600, these f anctions are performed by AP600 systems are functionally similar to the low-the protection and safety maitoring system, which pressure reference plant system from the standpoint of includes the integmted pr& un system that performs emergency operating strategies. the reactor trip function. ' The protection and safety monitoring system Nuclear Instrumentation System - De low-pressure provides safety-related, automatically and manually reference plant nuclear instmmentauon system monitors actuated reactor trip capabilities. The protection and and displays the reactivity state of the reactor core, safety monitoring system also monitors plant parameters On the AP600, the instrumentation that required to ascertain the state of the plant and provide performs this function is included in the protection and guidance for manual operator actions. monitoring system. From the standpoint of emergency The AP600 has several design differences from operating strategies, the AP600 system is functionally the low-pressure reference plant with respect to the similar to the low-pressure reference plant system. process parameters and equipment status that are monitored (input signals) and initiate a reactor trip. The Control Rod Instrumentation System - The low-results (output signals) of the reactor trip are similar for pressure reference plant control rod instrumentation the two plants. From the standpoint of emergency system monitots and displays the position of the reactor operating strategies that are primarily associated with core control rods. operator actions after the reactor trip is initiated, the On the AP600, these functions are performed by function of the AP600 systems are similar to the low- the plant control system, which includes the rod position pressure reference plant system. indication function. From the standpoint of emergency operating strategies, the AP600 system is functionally Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - De similar to the low-pressure reference plant system. Iow-pressure reference plant engineered safeguards features actuation system monitors specified process Radiation Instrutnentation System - The low-pressure parameters and actuates and sequences the various reference plant radiation instrumentation system monitors emergency safeguards features if conditions exceed the radiation levels in specified process systems and specified limits. specified areas internal and external to the plant. On the AP600, these functions are performed by On the AP600, monitoring specified areas of the the protection and safety monitoring system. The plant is performed by the radiation monitoring system, protection and safety monitoring system includes the which is supported by radiation sensors located in integrated protection system that performs the functions specified AP600 process systems, such as the steam of the engineered safeguards features actuation generator system. From the standpoint of emergency i subsystem, and the diverse actuation system. operating strategies, the AP600 systems are functionally I The protection and monitoring system provides similar to the low-pressure reference plant system. the safety-related capability for automatic and manual actuation of engineered safeguards features. The Containment Instrumentation System - The low-protection and safety monitoring system also monitors pressure reference plant containment instrumentation plant parameters required to ascertain the state of the system monitors the environment conditions and plant and provide guidance for manual operator actions. isolation status of containment. , The AP600 has some design differences On the AP600,this function is performed by the j compared to the low-pressure reference plant with protection and safety monitoring system. The protection respect to the process parameters that are monitored and safety monitoring system uses input signals from (input signals) and the equipment that is automatically containment condition sensors in other AP600 systems. actuated (output signals). Ekspite these differences, the From the standpoint of emergency operating strategies, 3 [ Westinghouse weFiassoccusT):io/os1294 1 1 1 1
l 1 I l i i 1 Desian Differences Document i the AP600 system is functionally similar to the low- from the reactor coolant system during plant shutdowns pressure refeirnee plant system. at low reactor coolant system pressures. On the AP600, these functions are performed by Iteactor Coolant System - The low-pressure reference the safety-related passive residual heat removal heat plant reactor coolant system transfers heat from the exchangers and the nonsafety-related normal residual reactor core to the main steam system or residual heat heat removal system. The normal residual heat removal removal system to provide a barrier against the release system can be manually aligned to provide low pressure of reactor coolant or radioactive material to the injection from the in-containment refueling water storage containment environment. tank and can also be aligned to provide closed-loop On the AP600, this function is performed by the shutdown cooling. This system differs from the low-reactor coolant system. From the standpoint of pressure reference plant system in that it does not share emergency operating strategies, the AP600 system is components with engineered safeguards systems and its similar to the low-pressure reference plant system for components are not actuated by an engineered safety this function, although the operation of various feature actuation signal. components differ from that in the ERGS. The passive core cooling system is the safety. related system that provides low-pressure injection flow Safety injection System - The low-pressure reference from several injection sources. The passive core cooling plant safety injection system provides makeup to the system also provides residual heat removal at any reactor reactor coolant system and introduces negative reactivity coolant system pressure via the passive residual heat or restricts the addition of positive reactivity for events removal heat exchangers. He passive core cooling that require engineered safeguards features operation. system equipment is autTMcally actuated by the On the AP600.these functions are performed by protection and safety monis iring system using the passive core cooling system. De AP600 system is engineered safety feature admioon The protection and significantly different from the low-pressure reference safety monitoring system includes the capability to plant system since it delivers cooling flow to the core manually actuate the passive core cooling system. From via passive sources and does not include any safety the standpoint of emergency operating strategies, the injection pumps. The automatic depressurization system AP600 system is functionally similar to the low-pressure functions to reduce reactor coolant system pressure reference plant system, although the operation of the sufficiently to allow the intermediate and low pressurc various components differ from that t the ERGS. passive core cooling system tanks to provide injection flow. De capability for providing short-term and long- Chemical and Volume Control System - The low-tenn makeup flow to the core still exists and is pressure reference plant chemical and volume control performed by the passive core cooling system. From a system provides makeup to the reactor coolant system standpoint of emergency operating strategies, the AP600 and provides reactivity control for nonnal operations and system is functionally similar to the low-pressure for any event that does not require engineered safeguards reference plant system even through the system is features operation. significantly different and the operation of various On the AP600. these functions are performed by components differ significantly from that in the ERGS. the chernical and volume control system. The AP600 chemical and volume control system is different from Residual lleat Removal System - The low-pressure the low-pressure reference plant system. Its functions reference plant residual heat removal system provides are similar to those of the low-pressure reference plant. low pressure safety injection during events that require The operation of various components differ from that in safeguards features operation and removes residual heat the existing ERGS, but from the overall standpoint of WPF1858D(CUSD:1DA?51294 [ W85tingh0USB
Design Differences Docurnent E emergency operating strategies. the AP600 system is On the AP600, the pressure suppression similar. function is performed by the safety-related passive containment cooling system. The passive containment Component Cooling Water System ~ The low-pressure cooling system removes heat from containment and thus re ference plant component cooling water system provides suppresses containment pressure for events that release heat removal from components containing radioactive mass and energy to the containment. It is designed to , fluids via an intermediate closed-loop system. This deliver cooling flow to the outside of the steel i function is required for both nonnal operation and containment shell to remove energy from the reactor enginected safety features operation. containment to prevent the containment from exceeding On the AP600, this function is performed by the its design pressure and to reduce containment pressure component cooling water system for nonnal operation. following design basis events. However, it is not required for engineered safety features On the AP600, the airborne fission product operation and is, therefore, nonsafety-related. De removal function is performed by the combined AP600 component cooling water system is not an operation of the passive containment cooling system ar.d engineered safeguards features system and is not the containment sump pH control system, which is part automatically actuated by the protection and safety of the passive com cooling system. The steam released monitoring system. His functional difference does not in containment is condensed on the steel containment significantly impact the ERG emergency operating shell due to cooling from the passive containment strategies. However, operation of various components cooling system and this process removes airbome fission differ from that in the ERGS. products. The containment sump pH control system adds sodium hydroxide to the floodup inventory in Service Water System - De low-pressure reference containment to maintain the required recirculation sump plant service water system provides heat removal from pH to promote fission product retention. system processes and equipment to the ultimate heat sink From the standpoint of emergency opemting via an open. loop system. This function is required for strategies, these two AP600 systems are functionally both normal operation and engineered safety features similar to the low-pressure reference plant system, operation. although the systems are significantly different from the On the AP600, this function is performed by the low-pressure reference plant system and the operation of service water system for normal operation. However, it various components differ significantly from that in the is not required for engineered safety features operation ERGS. and is, therefore, nonsafety-related. De AP600 service water system is not an engineered safeguards features Containment Atmosphere Control System - The low-system and is not automatically actuated by the pressure reference plant containment atmosphere control protection and monitoring system. This functional system provides containment heat removal and difference does not significantly impact the ERG combustible gas mixture control. For this low-pressure emergency operating strategies. However, operatior. of reference plant system, the containment heat removal various components differ from that in the ERGS. function is provided by containment fan coolers. Containment combustible gas mixture control is provided Containment Spray System - The low-pressure by hydrogen recombiners and containment fan coolers, reference plant containment spray system provides which provide mixing of the containment atmosphere. containment pressure suppression and airbome fission The AP609 design includes containment fan product removal for events that trquire engineered coolers, that provide containment heat removal during safeguards features actuation. normal operations. However, the AP600 containment f an coolers are not engineered safety features equipment [ W85tiflgl10llSe WPFlassD(cusi):10/os1294
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Desion Differences Docurnent 7 g R'IM i and are, therefore, nonsafety-related. The AP600 system provides water to the secondary side of the steam containment fan coolers are not automatically actuated generators during plant power uormal) operations. by the protection and safety monitoring system on an On the AP600,this function is performed by the engineered safety features actuation signal, and are not steam generator system, the main feedwater system, and taken credit for in the mitigation of accidents. As the condensate system. The AP600 steam generator described above, the passive containment cooling system system corresponds to the safety-related ponions (that is, provides for containment heat removal, downstream of the main feedwater isolation valve) of the On the AP600, combustible gas mixture con:rol low-pressure reference plant system. The AP600 is performed by the containment hydrogen control feedwater system and condensate system correspond to system. The system includes hydrogen sensors and the nonsafety-related portions (that is, upstream of the hydrogen igniters,in addition to hydrogen recombiners. main feedwater isolation valve) of the low. pressure From the standpoint of emergency operating reference plant system. strategies for combustible gas control, the AP600 system From the standpoint of emergency operating is fonctionally similar to the low-pressure reference plant strategies, the AP600 systems are similar to tne low-system. The strategies are augmented to incorporate the pressure reference plant system and can be used in a hydrogen sensors and hydrogen igniters. These design similar manner for this function. Design differences do differences do not significantly affect the emergency not significantly affect the emergency operating operating strategies of the ERGS. However, operation of strategies, although operation of various components various components differ from that in the ERGS. differs from that assumed in the ERGS. Main Steam System - The low-pressure reference plant Auxiliary Feedwater System - The low-pressure main steam system provides conuolled heat removal reference plant auxiliary feedwater system provides from the reactor coolant system via the steam generators. coolant to the secondary side of the steam generators On the AP600, this function is performed by the during plant shutdown operations and for events that steam generator system and the main steam system. The require engineered safeguards features actuation. AP600 steam generator system corresponds to the safety- On the AP600, providing coolant to the related portions (that is, upstream of the main steam secondary side of the steam generators is a plant isolation valves) of the low-pressure reference plant shutdown operations (normal operations) function only main steam system. The AP600 main steam system and not an engineered safeguards features function. corresponds to the nonsafety-related portions (that is, For normal AP600 plant shutdown operations, downstream of the main steam isolation valve) of the the function is performed by the steam generator system low-pressure reference plant system. and the stanup feedwater system. The AP600 steam From the standpoint of emergency operating generator system corresponds to the secondary pressure strategies, the AP600 systems are similar to the low- boundary ponions (that is, downstream of the auxiliary pressure reference plant system and can be used in a feedwater flow control valve) of the low-pressure similar manner for this function. However, the AP600 reference plant system. The AP600 stanup feedwater steam generator system provides no nfety-related heat system corresponds to the ponions of the low-pressure sink function as used in the low pressure reference plant. reference plant system upstream of the auxiliary Design differences do not significantly affect the feedwater flow control valve. emergency operating strategies, although operation of For events requiring engineered safeguards various components differ from that in the ERGS. features actuation, delivery of water to the secondary side of the steam generators is not required since the Main Feedwater and Condensate System - The low- safety-related function of heat removal from the reactor pressure reference plant main feedwater and condensate coolant is provided by the passive residual heat removal 6 WPF1858D(CUST).lD/051294 W W85tingh0US0 1
Desian Differences Doctsrnent =
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system which is a subsystem of the passive core cooling On the AP600,this function is performed by the - system. De system is automatically actuated by the primary sampling system and the secondary sampling protection and safety monitoring system. De passive system. Any design differences do not significantly residual heat removal system circulates reactor coolant affect the emergency operating strategies, and the AP600 to a primary loop heat exchanger located in the in- systems can be used in a manner similar to the low-containment refueling water storage tank to remove heat pressure reference plant system for this function. directly from the reactor coolant. From the standpoint of emergency operating Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System - De low-l strategies, heat removal from the reactor coolant is pressure reference plant spent fuel storage and cooling provided for the AP600 by the passive residual heat system controls fuel storage positions to maintain a removal system. Providing water to the secondary side suberitical geometric configuration and to provide heat of the steam generators is not required subsequent to removal to maintain stored fuel within specified engineered safety features actuation. Consequently, the temperature limits. overall emergency operating strategies of the ERGS On the AP600, this function is performed by the continue to apply to the AP600 even though the systems spent fuel pit cooling system. Le AP600 spent fuel pit and components that provide heat removal from the cooling system is nonsafety-related. Following loss of reactor coolant differ significantly. onsite and offsite ac power, the spent fuel is cooled by the heat capacity of the water in the pit. Safety-related Steam Generator Illowdown System - De low- connections are provided in the spent fuel pit cooling pressure reference plant steam generator blowdown system so that makeup can be made to the pit if system provides letdown from the secondary side of the necessary. From the standpoint of emergency operating steam generators. strategies, the AP600 system is similar to the low-On the AP600, this function is performed by the pressure reference plant system and can be used in a , steam generator system and the steam generator similar manner for this function. Design differences do l blowdown system. The AP600 steam generator system not significantly affect the emergency operating corresponds to the safety-related portions (that is, strategies, although operation of various components upstream of the blowdown isolation valve) of the low- differ from that in the ERGS. pressure reference plant system. The AP600 steam generator blov:down system corresponds to the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling System - He nonsafety-related portions (that is, downstream of the low-pressure reference plant control rod drive blowdown isolation valve) of the low-pressure reference mechanism cooling system provides heat removal from plant system. Any design differences do not the control rod drive mechanisms. significantly affect the emergency operating strategies, On the AP600, this function is performed by the and the AP600 system can be used in a similar manner reactor system, which includes the integrated head as the low-pressure reference plant system for this package. From the standpoint of emergency operating function. strategies, the AP600 system is functionally similar to the low-pressure reference plant system for this function. Sampling System - The low-pressure reference plant sampling system provides a means of obtaining Control Rod Control System De low-pressure representative fluid samples for laboratory or on-line reference plant control rod control system controls the analysis, ne sampling system consists of equipment position of the control rods in the reactor core. that can be used to sample the reactor coolant system, On the AP600, this function is performed by the the steam generators, and the containment recirculation plant control system, which includes the rod control sump. subsystem. From the standpoint of emergency operating 7 3 Westinghouse , wprissaoccusT):io/os1294 ;
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Desian Differences Docurnent
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Bm] I strategies, the AP600 system is functionally similar to On the AP600,this function is performed by the the low-pressure reference plant system for this function. compressed and instrument air system for normal operation. However, it is not required for engineered Turbine Control System - The low-pressure reference safety features operation and is, therefore, nonsafety-plant turbine control system controls the turbine- related. De AP600 compressed and instrument air generator. system is not an engineered safeguards features system On the AP600, this function is performed by the and is not automatically actuated by the protection and main turbine control and diagnostic system. From the safety monitoring system. This function difference does standpoint of emergency opemting strategies, the AP600 not significantiy impact the ERG emergency operating system is functionally similar to the low-pressure- strategies. However, operation of various components reference plant system for this function. differ from that in the ERGS. From the standpoint of emergency operating Electrical Power System (ac and de) - The low- strategies, the AP600 system is functionally similar to pressure reference plant electrical power system provides the low-pressure reference plant system for this function. ac and de electrical power to equipment that requires electrical power to accomplish its functions. In addition ATWS Mitigation Sptem - De low-pressure reference to the offsite ac power supply, the system includes the plant ATWS mitigation system provides diverse onsite emergency ac and de power supplies, which are automatic actuation of turbine trip and auxiliary powered by separate safety-related emergency diesel- feedwater. generators and battery banks, respectively. The AP600 diverse actuation system provides On the AP600, providing ac power is a normal nonsafety-related diverse actuation of turbine trip and operations function and not an enginected safe-guards passive residual heat removal in the event of an features function. It is provided by a number of anticipated transient without scram. Diverse actuation of nonsafety-related electrical systems and includes two the passive residual heat removal system provides decay nonsafety-related diesel-generators. Only the supply of heat removal corresponding to the function of the de power for safety-related de loads, vital auxiliary feedwater system in the low-pressure reference instrumentation (including monitoring), and control room plant. emergency lighting is an engineered safeguards features From the standpoint of emergency operating function. De supply of safety-related de power is strategies for ATWS, the diverse actuation system is provided by the Class IE de at d UPS system. functionally similar to the low-pressure reference piant From the standpoint of emergency operating system for this function. strategies, the absence of a need for safety-related ac The AP600 diverse actuation system also power following engineered safety features actuation includes nonsafety-related diverse capability for manual does affect emergency operating strategies. Bis and automatic actuation of reactor trip and selected potentially eliminates the need for strategies to cope with engineered safety features. The diverse actuation system and recover from the loss of ac power. As a minimum, also monitors the plant parameters required to ascertain it changes the priority associated with the restoration of the state of the plant and pro.ide guidance for operator ac power (either from the nonsafety-related onsite diesel- actions utilizing the diverse manual controls. generator or the off.:ite power supply) for the AP600. From the standpoint of emergency operating ; strategies for events other than ATWS, the additional Pneumatic Power System - De low-pressure reference capabilities provided by the AP600 diverse actuation ! plant pneumatic power system provides a supply of system do affect emergency operating strategies. The pneumatic power (typicaliy instrument air) for emergency operating strategies will need to be expanded instruments and controls. WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 WBStingh0 Me l
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i E to include the diverse manual and automatic actuation capabilities. [ Comparison of System Design Features ; 5 i Following tne system function review, system design features that may affect emergency operations were compared. The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 3. Table 3 presents a summary of i the significant design feature differences between the low-pressure reference plant and the AP600. The tenn i, same is used in Table 3 to indicate that from the standpoint of emergency operations, the specific design for the AP600 system and the low-pressure refen:nce f plcnt system is basically the same. That is, when writing the AP600 high-level operator action strategies, , no change to the structure or operational strategy of the ERGS is anticipated. i I i i s k i l 5
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Desian Differences Document ! Table 1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Comparison of Low-Pressure Reference Plant Systems and AP600 Systems ; Low Pressure Refercnce Plant Systems AP600 Systems ACRONYM NAME NAME
- 1. Reactor Trip Actuation System 1. Protection and Safety Monitoring System PMS")
(Reactor Trip Subsystem) ,
- 2. ESF Actuation System 2. Protection and Safety Monitoring System PMS") !
(ESF Actuation Subsystem) ;
- 3. Nuclear Instrumentation System 3. Protection and Safety Monitoring System PMS"' [
4 Control Rod Instrumentation System 4. Plant Control System .PLS l (Rod Position Indication Subsyston)
- 5. Radiation Instrumentation System 5. Radiation Monitoring Syst%n RMS ,
i
- 6. Containment Instrumentation System 6. Protection and Safety Monitoring System PMS$
Passive Containment Cooling System PCS") ! Passive Core Cooling System PXS* +
- 7. Reactor Coolant System 7. Reactor Coolant System RCSS +
- 8. Safety injection System 8. Passive Core Cooling System PXS* ;
- 9. Residual Heat Removal System 9. Normal Residual Heat Removal System RNS* f Passive Core Cooling System PXS") -
- 10. Chemical and Volume Control System 10. Chemical and Volume Control System CVS* !
- 11. Component Cooling Water System 11. Component Cooling Water System CCS l
- 12. Service Water System 12. Service Water System SWS j
- 13. Containment Spray System 13. Passive Containment Cooling System PCS* -
Passive Core Cooling System PXSW , VLS*
- 14. Containment Atmosphere Control System 14. Containment Hydrogen Control System
- 15. Main Steam System 15. Steam Generator System
- SGS* l Main Steam System MSS ;
- 16. Main Feedwater and Conder> sate System 16. Steam Generator System
- SGS* j Main Feedwater System FWS +
Condensate System CDS t (" These AP600 systems are safety-related systems for accident mitigation. f
- These AP600 systems (or portions of these systems) are safety-related systems for pressure boundary ;
integrity. .
- The AP600 steam generator system contains the safety-related steam generator pressure boundary portions t of the corresponding low-pressure reference plant systems.
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Desian Differences Document l l l Table 1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Comparison of Low-Pressure Reference Plant Systems and AP600 Systems Low-Pressure Reference Plant Systems AP600 Systems ACRONYM NAME NAME
- 17. Auxiliary Feedwater System 17. Steam Generator System
- SGS*
Startup Feedwater System FWS Passive Core Cooling System PXS"'
- 18. Steam Generator Blowdown System 18. Steam Generator System
- SGS*
Steam Generator Blowdown System BDS
- 19. Sampiing System 19. Piimary Sampling System PSS Secondary Sampling System SSS
- 20. Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System 20. Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System SFS
- 21. Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling 21. Reactor System RXS System
- 22. Control Rod Control System 22. Plant Control System PLS (Rod Control Subsystem)
- 23. Turbine Control System 23. Main Turbine Control and Diagnostic TOS System
- 24. Electric Power System (ac and de) 24. Electrical Power Systems (ac and de)
- 25. Pneumatic Power System 25. Compressed and Instniment Air System CAS These AP600 systems are safety-related systems for accident mitigation.
- These AP600 systems are safety-related systems for pressure boundary integrity.
- The AP600 steam generator system corresponds to the steam generator pressure boundary portions of the corresponding low pressure reference plant systems.
"' The AP600 electrical power systems consist of a number of systems, including the Class IE de and UPS system (IDS). which provides safety-related de power and ac instrumentation power, and the onsite standby power system (ZOS), which is a nonsafety-related system and includes the nonsafety-related diesel generators. W8Stingh0USS WPF185BD(CUST):1D/051294
Desiois Differences Document Table 2 (Sheet 1 of 5) AP600 Systems and Acronyms NSSS/ Steam Generator Auxiliary Systems Steam Generator Blowdown System BDS"' Containment System CNS Chemical and Volume Control System CVS") Passive Containment Cooling System PCS") Passive Core Cooling System PXS") Reactor Coolant System RCS") Norma! Residual Heat Removal System RNS") Reactor System RXS") Steam Generator System SGS"' Main Power Cycle & Auxiliary Systems Condensate System CDS") Tmbine Island Chemical Feed System GFS Condensate Polishing System CPS Demineralized Water Treatment System DTS Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System DWS Main and Startup Feedwater System FWS") Heater Drain System HDS Main Steam System MSS") Main Turbine System MTS Raw Water System RWS Turbine Island Vents. Drains and Relief System TDS Gland Seal System GSS Non-Class IE Power Systems Main ac Power System ECS Non-Class lE de and UPS System EDS Onsite Standby Power System ZOS")
")
These AP600 systems are included in the Table 1 system comparison. F1858D(cusT):1D/051794 WBStingh00S8 l l 1 l l i
Design Differences Document l
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Table 2 (Sheet 2 of 5) AP600 Systems and Acronyms Non-Nuclear Controls and Monitoring Systems Data Display and Processing System DDS Fire-Smoke Detection and Alarm System FDS Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System MES Plant Control System PLS0) Plant Security System SES Secondary Sampling System SSS* Closed Citcuit TV Sys,em TVS Diverse Actuation System DAS Special Monitoring System SMS Nuclear Control and Monitoring Systems Incore Instrumentation System IIS Operations and Control Centers System OCS Protection and Safety Monitoring System PMS") Primary Sampling System PSS") Radiation Monitoring System RMS"' Seismic Instrumentation System SJS Material llandling Systems Fuel Handling and Refueling System FHS Mechanical Handling Systems MHS Class IE and Emergency Power System Class IE de and UPS System IDS")
") These AP600 systems are included in the Table I system comparison.
W Westinghouse weriassoccusT):io/osi29
f Desson DWerences Document ; a , Table 2 (Sheet 3 of 5) AP600 Systems and Acronyms Cooling and Circulating Water Systems Cooling Tower Makeup and Blowdown System CBS { Component Cooling Water System CCS") Condenser Tube Cleaning System CES ; Circulating and Service Water Chemical Injection System CLS Cooling Tower System CTS Circulating Water System CWS , Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System SFS") ; Service Water System SWS$ ! Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System TCS Piping Services Systems Compressed and Instrument Air Systems CAS* Fire Petection Systems FPS ; Plant Gas Systems PGS Potable Water System PWS Miscellaneous Electrical Systems Security Lighting System DCS f Communication Systems EFS Grounding and Lightning Protection System EGS l Special Process Heat Tracing System EHS ; Plant Lighting System ELS Cathodic Protection System EQS i
- These AP600 systems are included in the Table I system comparison. !
y [ wfriassoccust):iofosi294 T Weg@ouse ! P f
I l l l I Desian Differences Document i mer l Table 2 (Sheet 4 of 5) AP600 Systems and Acronyms Radwaste Systems Gaseous Radwaste System WGS Liquid Radwaste System WLS Radioactive Waste Drain System %RX Spent Resin Processing System WSS Turbine-Generator Controls and Auxiliary Systems Condenser Air Removal System CMS Generator Hydrogen and CO2 Systems HCS Hydrogen Seal Oil System HSS Main Turbine and Generator Lube Oil System LOS Stator Cooling System SCS Main Turbine Control and Diagnostics System TOS* IIVAC Systems Radiologically Controller Area Ventilation System VAS Nuclear Island Non-Radioactive Ventilation System VBS Containment Recirculation Cooling System VCS Main Control Room Habitability System VES Containment Air Filtration System VFS Health Physics / Control Access Area HVAC System VHS Containment Hydrogen Control System VLS* Pump House Building Ventilation System VPS Solid Radwaste Building Ventilation System VRS Turbine Building Ventilation Systern VTS Containment Leak Rate Test System VUS Central Chilled Water System VWS Annex / Aux Non-Radioactive Ventilation System VXS Hot Water Heating System VYS Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System VXS
- These AP600 systems are included in the Table I system comparison.
[ W8Stiflgt10US0 WPFisssD(cusT):10/os129
Desian DiNorences Document Table 2 (Sheet 5 of 5) I AP600 Systems and Acronyms Auxiliary Steam System Auxiliary Steam Supply System ASS Non-Radioactive Drain Systems l l Storm Drain System DRS i Gravity and Roof Drain Collection System RDS Sanitary Drainage System SDS Waste Water System WWS 1 Fuel Systems 1 Onsite Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System DOS I Generation and Transmission Systems Main Generation System ZAS Switchyard System ZBS > Startup Transformer System ZSS Excitation and Voltage Regulation System ZVS !
+
i h nassoccusn:io/os12u T Westinghouse !
Desian Differences Document t Table 3 (Sheet 1 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 1. Reactor Trip Actuation System [
Reactor trip signal, including generation of P-4 Similar, except that reactor trip is also generated by signal to: the diverse actuation signal.
- Turbine trip logic
- Feedwater isolation logic
- SI block logic.
- 2. Engineering Safeguards Features Acniation System [
Safety iniection (SI) signal SI actuation from: SI actuation from:
- Manual - Manual '
- High-1 containtnent pressure - High-1 containment pressure
- Low pressurizer pressure - Low pressurizer pressure
- Low steam line pressure. - Low steam pressure (in any SG)
- Low Tm (in any loop). j When pressurizer pressure exceeds the P-ll setpoint, the accumulators are automatically armed for use by opening of the isolation valves. ,
Actuated on SI signal: Actuated on SI signal:
- Reactor trip - Reactor trip
- Feedwater isolation - Feedwater isolation
- Auxiliary feedwater start - Passive core cooling system start core makeup tank
- Diesel-generator start (CMT) and in-containment refueling water storage ;
- Emergency fan cooler start tank (IRWST) actuation
- Safety injection system start - Containment isolation '
- Component cooling water system start - RCP trip (with time delay) - ,
- Service water system start - Turbine trip ,
- Containment isolation phase A i
- Containment ventilation isolation 9
W Westinghouse wmassoccusmofosE4 I J l 1 l 1
. -. - . -~ - _ . - .-
i Desian DINorences Document
' :r ; .
t Table 3 (Sheet 2 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Si reset / block features include: S1 reset / block features include:
- Manual reset / block of Si signal - Manual reset / block of SI signal
- Manual reset / block of low pressurizer - Manual low pressurizer pressure safeguards reset /
pressure signal (P-11) block (for low pressurizer pressure signal)
- Manual reset / block of low steam line - Manual steam /feedwater isolation and safeguards ;
pressure signal. reset / block (for low steam pressure signal and low T signal). Once SI signal is reset, SI signal cannot be Same. automatically actuated until reactor trip breakers are closed (P-4 removed). Reset / block of low pressurizer pressure signal and Similar, except block also applies to low T signal. Iow steam line pressure signal are interlocked , with pressurizer pressure (P-1!) permissive. Reset / block automatically cleared with pressurizer pressure exceeds permissive setpoint. Containment Sprav Signal Containment spray actuation signal actuated on: Containment cooling actuation signal on: i
- Manual - Manual
- High-3 containment pressure serpoint. - High-2 containment pressure setpoint.
Equipment actuated on containment spray signal: Equipment actuated on containment cooling actuation
- Containment spray system start signal:
- Containment isolation phase B. - Passive containment cooling system start.
A containment isolation phase B signal does not exist; there are no phase B isolation valves. Separate manual resets are provided for: Separate manual reset is provided for:
- Containment spray signal - Containment cooling actuation signal
- Containment isolation phase .B signal. >
Containment cooling is also actuated by the diverse actuation system on:
- Manual
- High containment temperature F1858D(CUST):1D/051294 W8StI1gt100S8 8
, _ , , - ~'
.- - - - ~ _ . .- -- - , . . . . . - . Desion Differences Document . . _ _ . . I Table 3 (Sheet 3 of 21) l Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design { Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Start Signal . t i Auxiliary feedwater start signal for the Not included in the AP600, which does not have a motor-driven AFW pumps is actuated on: safety-related auxiliary feedwater system. See Passive
- SI signal Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) actuation for
- Trip of all main feedwater pumps equipment system function. .
- Blxkout signal from associated ac emergency bus ,
- Low-low level in any SG.
Auxiliary feedwater stan signal for the turbine-driven AFW pump is actuated on: 4
- Low-low level in two SGs
- Loss of power signal.
Equipment actuated on auxiliary feedwater start signal includes closure of: I
- SG blowdown isolation valves
- SG sample valves. l Passive Residual Heat Removal Actuation (PRHR.)
Not included in LP reference plant. The PRHR is actuated on: -!
- Manual ;
- Low SG level (narrow range) in any SG (with signal delay) in combination with low startup l feedwater flow ;
- Low SG level (wide range) in any SG l
- Coincident with first stage ADS actuation signal ;
- Core makeup tank actuation . j t
The PRHR is also actuated by the diverse actuation j system on: j
- Manual l
- High hot leg temperature !
- Low SG level (wide range) ;
1 I l 19 l 3 Westinghouse wrriassoccusT):10/os12n I l
_m _ _ .- . _ . _ _ _ . - _ - . _ _ -_ _ . - _. .. _ . _ _ j Deston Differences Document y= Table 3 (Sheet 4 of 21) ' l 1 Comparison of System Design Features I i Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design - AP600 Design Equipment actuated on a PRHR actuation signal:
- PRHR discharge valves
- Close SG blowdown valves.
Manual reset is provided for:
- Manual PRHR actuation signal.
Containment Isolation Phase A Signal Containment isolation phase A signal is Containment isolation signal is actuated on: actuated on: - Manual
- Manual - SI actuation signal
- Si actuation signal. - Manual actuation of containment cooling signal. ;
Containment isolation is also actuated by the diverse actuation signal on:
- Manual
- High containment temperature ,
Manual reset is provided for containment Manual reset is provided for containment isolation isolation signal. signal. Containment isolation Phase B Sienal High-3 containment pressure Not included in the AP600 A containment isolation phase B signal does not exist, there are no phase B isolation valves. Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Main steam line isolation signal for SGs is Main steam line isolation signal for SGs is actuated actuated on: on:
- Manua! - Manual '
- High-2 containment pressure. - High-1 containment pressure ,
- Low steam pressure (in any SG) ,
- Low Tm (in any loop)
- High steam pressure negative rate (in any SG).*
- This signal only xtive when below P-Il and low steam pressure and low T auto signals are blocked.
- e
l Design Differences Document m mm i Table 3 (Sheet 5 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Main steam line isolation signal for only the Main steam line isolation for only the affected SG is affected SG is actuated on: actuated on:
- Low steam pressure - Manual - High steam pressure negative rate (below P-11)
Equipment isolated on main steam line isolation Same. signal:
- Main steam line isolation valves - Main steam line isolation bypass valves.
Reset / block features include: Reset / block features include:
- Manual reset for main steam isolation signal - Manual reset for main steam isolation signal - Manual reset / block for low steam pressure - Manual steam /feedwater isolation and safeguards signal. reset / block (for low steam pressure signal, high - Manual reset / block for high steam pressure steam pressure negative rate signal, and low negative rate signal. Tm signal).
Manual steam /feedwater isolation and safeguards reset / block is interlocked with presstuizer pressure (P-11) pennissive setpoint. Containment Ventilation isolation Sicnal Included in LP reference plant. Similar. The AP600 has a containment air filtration system isolation signal on High-1 containment radioactivity. Main Feedwater Isolation Sienal Main feedwater isolation signal for SGs is Main feedwater isolation signal (close main feedwater actuated on: isolation valves, control valves and trip main
- SI signal feedwater pump) is actuated on: - High-high level (P-14) in any SG - SI signal - Reactor trip (P-4) coincident with low RCS - Manual.
T ,. - High-2 SG level (in any SG) 21 3 Westinghouse wpriassoccusT):io/os1294
Desian Differences Document urn Table 3 (Sheet 6 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features i Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design In addition, closure of main feedwater control valves occurs on:
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) T,,, low-l sLtpoint coincident with reactor trip (P-4). ,
in addition, closure of main feedwater isolation valves and trip of main feedwater pumps is actuated on: !
- RCS T,,, low-2 setpoint.
Closure of startup feedwater convol valves and trip of [ stanup feedwater pump are actuated on:
- RCS Low Ta setpoint (in any loop) s
- High-2 SG level (in any SG)
Block of steam dump valves to condenser is actuated l on:
- RCS T.,, low-2 setpoint.
Equipment isolated on main feedwater isolation Equipment isolated on main feedwater isolation signal: l signal: - Main feedwater isolation valves
- Main feedwater isolation valves - Main feedwater flow control valves '
- Main feedwater flow control valves - MFW pumps tripped.
- Main feedwater bypass valves.
Reset / block features include: Reset / block features include:
- Manual reset / block for SI signal - Manual reset for manual feedwater isolation signal (same as for SI signal) - Manual steam /feedwater and safeguards reset / block
- Manual reset for reactor trip signal (P-4) (for RCS low-l T,,, signal and RCS low-2 T., l coincident with RCS low T,,,. signal). ;
Manual steam /feedwater and safeguards reset / block is interlocked with pressurizer pressure (P-11) permissive setpoint. Manual steam dump interlock selector switch provided for cooldown steam dump valves to condenser.~ t I 22 WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 We5filigh00Se ; r I
Desian Differences Document ._. Table 3 (Sheet 7 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Actuation Not included in LP reference plant. CMTs are actuated on:
- Manual
- SI signal
- Pressurizer level low-2 serpoint
- Low wide range SG level coincident with high hot j leg temperature CMTs are also actuated by the diverse actuation system on:
- Manual
- Low pressurizer water level Actuated on CMT signal:
- Actuate CVS
- Close demin water isolation valves to CVS makeup
- Arms first stage ADS
- Actuate passive residual heat removal heat exchanger
- Blocks pressurizer heaters Manual reset is provided for the manual CMT actuation signal.
Automatic RCS Depressurization Not included in LP reference plant. First stage of automatic RCS depressurization actuated on:
- Manual ADS actuation.
- Manual reset is provided for manual ADS actuation.
- CMT '.ow-1 setpoint coincident with CMT actuation signal.
- Sustained 4kV bus undervoltage (with time delay).
23 W Westinghouse WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294
Desian Differences Document mm Table 3 (Sheet 8 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design First stage of automatic RCS depressurization is also manually actuated by the diverse actuation system. Actuated on ADS first stage signal:
- Reactor trip
- RCP trip
- Actuate PRHR heat exchangers Second stage of automatic RCS depressurization actuated on:
- First-stage actuation with time delay.
Second stage of automatic RCS depressurization is also manually actuated by the diverse actuation system. Third stage of automatic RCS depressurization actuated on:
- First-stage actuation with time delay.
Third stage of automatic RCS depressurization is also manually actuated by the diverse actuation system. Fourth stage of automatic RCS depressurization actuated on:
- CMT low-4 setpoint coincident with third-stage actuation (with time delay).
Fourth stage of automatic RCS depressunzation is also manually actuated by the diverse actuation system. 1 t i 24 WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 WOStingh0USB 1 I
1 l o sian omerences ooeument . . _ _ . . k Table 3 (Sheet 9 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design RCP Trin , Not included in LP reference plant. Trip of RCPs is actuated on:
- Pressurizer levellow-2 setpoint .
- Manual CMT actuation
- First stage ADS actuation signal ;
- Low wide range SG level coincident with high hot ;
leg temperature
- SI signal.
I In addition, RCPs are tripped individually on Ngh bearing water temperature. Trip of the RCPs is also actuated by the diverse actuation system on: .i
- Manual
- Low pressurizer water level l
- 3. Nuclear Instmmentation System ,
Separate ranges provided for source, intermediate Same. . and power ranges with interlocks and permissives to change range. Source range detectors automatically energize with flux decreases below source range flux trip (P-6) setpoint. Startup rate provided for source and intermediate Same. ranges. Neutron flux recorder provided. Same. ;
- 4. Control Rod Instrumentation System [
Control rod position indication and control rod Similar except that a digital rod position indication ; bottom light indication provided (analog rod system is provided. position indication system). ! P i [ Westifigt100Se WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051 I y - m . . - . , - -
==
Desson DNforences Document n =_ L usu Table 3 (Sheet 10 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 5. Radiation Instrumentation System Radiation instrumentation provided for: Same.
- Inside the containment
- In the main steam system and steam generator blowdown system
- Inside the auxiliary building.-
- 6. Containment Instrumentation System Containment instrumentation provided for: Same.
- Containment pressure
- Containment temperature
- Containment recirculation sump level
- Containment isolation valves and dampers position indication.
- 7. Reactor Coolant System One steam generator, one reactor coolant pump One steam generator, one hot leg, two cold legs and (RCP), one hot leg and one cold leg per reactor two reactor coolant pumps per loop. SGs are vertical coolant loop. RCP connection to the steam U-tube, similar to reference plant. Two RCPs are generator is by a crossover line similar to a loop connected dimetly to the cold leg channel head for seal arrangement. each SG, eliminating the need for the crossover line connection.
RCPs are shaft-seal type, with continuous seal RCPs are canned-motor type with no shaft seal. The injection or thermal barrier cooling required. motor beanngs are lubricated by primary coolant. Purified CVS purge water is provided to the motor to minimize radioactive crud deposition. Cooling water is used to provide motor and beanng cooling. No automatic RCP trip. Automatic RCP trip on CMT actuation signals including safety injection, pressurizer low-2 level - setpoint, first stage automatic RCS depmssurization signal, high hot leg temperature coincident with low wide range steam generator level, and manual CMT actuation. NriassoccusT):io/os12,4 W Westirigtiouse
l Design Differences Document Table 3 (Sheet 11 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Individual RCPs tripped on high bearing water temperature. Hot leg and cold leg RTD bypass lines. No RTD bypass lines. RCS temperature measured i directly in the hot legs and cold legs of each reactor ( coolant loop. l Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) (and No pressurizer PORVs. The pressurizer is designed associated block valves) provide normal operation so that pressurizer spray flow contmls pressure overpressure protection and cold overpressure increases. The PORV overpressure control function protection. PORVs discharge to pressurizer relief during normal operation is not required. tank. However, six sets of RCS depressurization valves (two isolation valves per set) are provided from the pressurizer steam space to initiate automatic RCS depressurization in sequential stages. Th& alves discharge steam through spargers to the E i Two pressurizer safety valves provide Similar, except discharge to containm- mphere. overpressure protection. Valves discharge to the pressurizer relief tank. Reactor vessel head vent to PRT. No remote control reactor vessel head vent provided for emergency operations. A orie-inch head vent is provided (at the top of the head) for normal operations. Reactor vessel level instrumentation system No RVLIS. (RVLIS) capable for providing level trend indication over the following ranges: -- upper range -- vessel level above the hot leg pipe when no RCPs tunning -- Full range -- vessel level from the bottom of the core to the upper head when no RCPs running -- Dynamic head range -- vessel level from the bottom of the core to the upper head with any combination of RCPs running. [ WBStingl10llSe WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051 4
l Desion Differences Document Table 3 (Sheet 12 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features I i I Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design ' No automatic depressurization valves. AP600 employs automatic depressurization valves connected to the pressurizer and the RCS hot legs. The valves connected to the pressurizer (stages 1,2, and 3) consist of six parallel sets of two valves in series that discharge to the IRWST. l The valves connected to the hot legs (stage 4) consist of four parallel sets of two valves in series, with two set connected to each hot leg and discharge dimetly to containment.
- 8. Safety injection System injection Mode (hich-head and low-head Si No high-head Si pumps. Passive high-pressure SI subsystem: provided by gravity-flow from the core makeup tanks.
There are two basic operating processes for the CMTs. Two high-head SI pumps take suction from boric steam-compensated injection and water recirculation. acid tank (BAT) (12 wt %) or refueling water CMTs are pressurized by lines from the pressurizer storage tank (RWST) and delivers to RCS cold and the RCS cold legs and inject directly into the legs. Automatic transfer of high-head SI pump reactor vessel. Following a small LOCA, the CMTs suction from BAT to RWST on low BAT level provide borated makeup to the reactor vessel at a high (prior to Si reset). High-head SI pump design pressure and a relatively high flow rate for j flow mte is about 650 gpm. High-head SI pump approximately 20 minutes. Following a steam line shutoff head is less than the PORV set point. break, the CMTs provide borated makeup to mitigate the core reactivity transient and to shut down the com. Following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), the CMTs provide borated makeup to the reactor vessel to compensate for the SGTR leak. The PRHR functions l in combination with the CMTs to remove core decay heat, reduce RCS temperature and pressure, equalize RCS and ruptured SG pressure, and terminate the leak. This process terminates the event by stopping RCS leakage into the SG without operator action or ADS actuation. W F1858D(CUSTLID/051294 Westinghouse i
Desian Differences Document [ Table 3 (Sheet 13 of 21) l l Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Two low-head safety injection (LHSI) pumps No low-head Si pumps. Automatic RCS (which also serve as RHR pumps). Low-head SI depressurization occurs on low core makeup rank level pumps take suction from RWST and deliver to (concunent with CMT actuation signal), which RCS cold legs. pennits the in-containment refueling water stomge tank (IRWST) to gmvity feed to the RCS at low pressure. IRWST injection is possible only after the RCS has been depressurized by the ADS or by a LOCA. Iniection Mode (SI Accumulator Subsystem): One accumulator tank connected to each RCS Similar, except two accumulators pressurized to a cold leg. Safety injection accumulators are tanks nominal 700 psig inject directly into the reactor pressurized to a nominal 750 psig with nitrogen. vessel. As pressure in the RCS drops below the nitrogen pressure, the nitrogen forces the borated water into the RCS. Recirculation Mode: Switchover initiation - semiautomatic on sump No switchover to recirculation like the reference plant valve opening on low RWST level. Low-head since there are no Si pumps. Passive injection of safety injection (LHSI) pumps take suction from water from the low-pressure IRWST provides a lower containment recirculation sump and are manually flow rate, but for a longer time, ranging from a aligned to discharge to the suction of high-head minimum of six hours, for a break in the reactor SI pumps into either the RCS hot or cold legs. vessel direct injection line, to days for other line The LHSI pumps also directly inject into the breaks. Following the injection of water from the RCS cold legs. The RHR heat exchangers are IRWST, the water level in the containment building is used to cool the LHSI recirculation flow from the increased above the elevation of the RCS leap piping. recirculation sumps in containment. Long-term cooling is established by water draining back to the RCS from sumps located inside the containment as well as water that condenses on the inside of containment shell and retums to the IRWST via gutters above the operating deck that collect the condensate. 29 [ W8Stiligh0tlS8 WPF1858D(CUsi):1D/051294
i Desian DWierences Document va. . . . Table 3 (Sheet 14 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features l Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design ;
- 9. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Two RHR pumps (which also function as low- Two RHR pumps and RHR heat exchangers located head SI pumps) and two RHR heat exchangers outside containment.
located outside containment. The normal residual heat removal system (RNS) i removes heat from the core and RCS during normal I cooldown and refueling operations. It is designed to remove heat from the core and RCS following successful mitigation of an accident by the passive safety-related systems. The RNS is a nonsafety-related system, and the pumps and heat exchangers are not used as part of the passive safety-related systems. The RNS is capable of pmviding low pressure makeup from the IRWST to the RCS. The system is designed to be manually initiated by the operator following receipt of an ADS signal. If the system is available, it will provide RCS makeup once the pressure in the RCS falls below the shutoff head of the RHR pumps. The RNS also provides nonsafety-related low-pressure makeup to the RCS for recovery from inadvertent actuation of the automatic ! depressurization signal (ADS). The RNS also serves : as a low temperature overpressure function during refueling and shutdown operations, and cools the IRWST, , RHR pumps take suction from one hot leg and Similar, except return flow enters reactor downcomer return the flow to two cold legs. directly via the direct vessel injection lines. RHR initiated at nominal RCS operating Similar. conditions of 400 psig and 350*F. . ! 10. Chemical and Volume Control System , i Three positive displacement charging pumps Two centrifugal makeup pumps (located outside (located outside containment) deliver continuous - containment) with normal makeup flow rate (dilution { flow through the charging and RCP seal injection or boration) of 100 gpm and maximum makeup flow lines to the RCS. rate of 135 gpm. Makeup pumps are not normally < running unless needed for RCS boron changes, chemical addition, makeup for RCS leakage or for RCS shrinkage due to cooldown. : l l W F1858D(CUST):1D/OS1294 WBStiligh0USS s 1 5
Desian Differences Document Table 3 (Sheet 15 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design At least one charging pump is nonnally running. The makeup pumps automatically start on a low Charging pumps automatically stop on a S1 pressurizer level signal in order to provide maaop. signal. The makeup pump automatically stops when the pressurizer level increases to the correct pmgrammed value. The letdown control valve is automatically opened by the pressurizer level control system if the pressurizer level reaches its high (relative to programmed level) setpoint. This valve automatically closes when the pressurizer level returns to normal, and also closes on a high-3 degasifier level or on a containment isolation signal. l To protect against steam generator overfill, makeup is isolated by closing the makeup line containment isolation valves if a high steam generator level signal is generated. These valves will also close and isolate the system on a high pressurizer level signal. Continuous charging and letdown for RCS RCS purification is provided via a CVS purification purification and boron control. loop located inside containment, which uses the head of the RCPs to circulate reactor coolant through the purification loop. This eliminates the necessity for running CVS makeup pumps continuously. Flow is returned to the RCS via the charging line. The normal RHR system provides the motive force for CVS purification during plant shutdown when the RCPs are stopped. Charging and letdown outside containment are not normally in service unless additions or reductions in RCS inventory are necessary. Letdown, charging, and RCP seal return lines are The charging and letdown lines from the inside automatically isolated on a containment isolation containment purification loop to outside containment phase A signal. are normally closed. However, they also receive a containment isolation signal similar to the reference plant. Since the makeup pumps start on an SI signal, the makeup line will not be isolated on containment isolation signal unless a low charging header pressure permissive is present. 12 wt c/c boric acid system. 2.5 wt % boric acid system. WBStingh0USB WPFlesso(cusT):1D/ost 4
Desian DWierences Document a-
-mu -
Table 3 (Sheet 16 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design Boric acid is supplied to the suction of the The makeup pumps receive flow from the boric acid charging pumps from the boric acid tanks through tank by direct gravity-feed sia a makeup system _ either the normal reactor makeup water system or control valve that also controls the flow of a separate emergency boration line. Boric acid demineralized water. For boron dilution protection, transfer pumps provide the motive force. Borated this valve fails with the makeup pump suction aligned water can also be supplied to the suction of the to the boric acid tank and can be manually controlled charging pumps from the refueling water storage from main control room. There are no boric acid tank. transfer pumps, no separate emergency boration line from the boric acid tank and no suction line from the IRWST. I1. Component Cooling Water (CCW) System The CCW system is a safety-related system. It Similar but nonsafety-related and provides cooling provides heat removal from potentially water to different components. radioactive system equipment, including the following: RCP motor and thermal barrier / bearing cooling are
- RHR heat exchangers potential sources for leakage of high pressure reactor
- Seal water heat exchanger coolant into the CCS similar to the LP reference plant.
- Containment fan coolers The CCS is automatically isolated by nonsafety-related
- RCPs components if excessive leakage occurs, which is similar to the LP reference plant. However, reactor coolant leakage cannot be isolated and would discharge to the drain header via the RCP cooling water line relief valve (s), resulting in a small LOCA inside containment. Safety-related isolation is provided by the cooling water containment isolation valves which rnaintains the cooling water inventory inside containment.
- 12. Service Water System Service water pumps and service water valves. Similar but nonsafety-related.
W8Stingh00S8 WPF1858D(CusT):1D/051294
Design Differences Document
= min i
Table 3 (Sheet 17 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 13. Containment Spray System Two low-head containment spray pumps take No containment spray pumps.
suction from RWST. System can be manually realigned for recirculation by taking suction from Passive safety-related containment cooling is provided containment sump. One shared spray additive by a water tank that provides a gravity-fed flow onto tank. Two spray additive eductors, one for each the outside of the containment dome surface for three pump. Actuated on high containment pressure. days. After three days, heat can be removed by convective air flow to maintain containment pressure below design pressure. Heat removal by the passive containment cooling system is initiated automatically l in response to a high-2 containment pressure signal or manual actuation. Separate system provided for containment sump pH control This is a subsystem of the passive core l cooling system and activates on a high-2 containment radiation signal.
- 14. Containment Atmosphere Control System Four emergency fan coolers (two speeds) receive Two fan coolers provided for normal operation. The start signal in slow speed on SI signal. fan coolers are nonsafety-related and not actuated by an engineered safety feature signal.
Two hydrogen recombiners with manual Similar, acept the hydrogen recombiners are powered actuation. by nonsafety-related power supplies. The hydrogen recombiners can be manually actuated by the protection and safety monitoring system. Nonsafety-related hydrogen igniters are also provided. The igniters can be manually actuated by the plant control system and the diverse actuation system. WBStiflgt10LISO WPFla58D(CUST):1D/051294
( .. Design Differences Document
!f Table 3 (Sheet 18 of 21)
Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 15. Main Steam System
'~
Air-operated steam generator PORVs that fail Similar except that motor-operated steam generator closed. power opemted relief valve block valves are also provided with automatic closure on steam line low pressure. Main steam safety-related valves. Same. Steam dump valves to condenser. Same. The SGs can be isolated from the main steam Same. header by main steam line isolation and bypass valves located in the individual main steamlines. Steam supplied to turbine-driven auxiliary No steam supply line. since there are no AFW pumps. feedwater (AFW) pump from two SGs.
- 16. Main Feedwater and Condensate Systems The main feedwater and condensate system Similar except flow control bypass valves are not consists of separate main feedwater lines to each provided. The main feedwater system is designed to SG that originate from a common main feedwater take suction from the deaerator storage tank and header. The SGs can be isolated frorn the main supply the SGs with feedwater during power operation feedwater header by feedwater flow control and transient conditions. The startup feedwater valves, bypass valves, and isolation valves located system can take suction from the deaerator storage in the individual main feedwater lines. tank or condensate storage tank and supply the SGs with feedwater during shutdown conditions. The condensate system collects and condenses steam from the LP turbines and turbine steam bypass systems and transfers this condensate from the mam condenser to the deaerator storage tank.
Feedwater isolation valves. Same. Feedwater isolation signal. Same. 34 W WOStingh0USB WPF1858D(CUST):10/051294
Desian Differences Document _ h l Table 3 (Sheet 19 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features l Low. Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design l One motor-driven and two steam-driven Two motor-driven feedwat:r pumps. . feedwater pumps.
- 17. Auxiliary Feedwater System Two motor-driven pumps, one steam-driven A nonsafety-related startup feedwater system with two pump, condensate storage tank and attemate motor-driven pumps that take suction from the water supply. System perfonns both an deaerator tank and/or condensate storage tank is engineered safety features (ESP) accident provided to supply feedwater to the steam generators mitigation function and a normal startup and during normal startup and shutdown operations. The f shutdown function. System is safety-related stanup feedwater system function is similar to the because of its ESF accident mitigation function. reference plant auxiliary feedwater system role for normal operations. The startup feedwater pumps start automatically following loss of main feedwater flow in conjunction with an intennediate low SG level setpoint that is between the narrow range low setpoint and the programmed SG level setpoint or low narrow range SG level. In situations where startup feedwater l is actuated, the flow control valves automatically l control flow to each SG.
The startup feedwater system does not perform an ESF accident mitigation function and is therefore not safety-related. Instead, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger serves as the safety-related means of heat removal to mitigate loss of secondary heat sink accidents.
- 18. Steam Generator Blowdown System SG blowdown isolation valves close on an 51 Similar, but valves also close on PRHR actuation signal, an AFW initiation signal, or a high SG signal (instead of AFW actuation) and blowdown blowdown radiation signal. system high temperature, high pressure, or high radiation signals.
The blowdown system can be used to cool the SG (feed and bleed) when the pressure is less than 125 psig. l I W Westinghouse wpriassoccusT):io/os1294
Design Differences Docurnent
=
}
Table 3 (Sheet 20 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 19. Sampling System Sampling system for use in sampling RCS, steam Similar. Separate sampling systems are provided for generators and containment recirculation sump. the primary and the secondary systems.
The primary sampling system performs sampling for normal operations and post-accident operations. It consists of both on-line monitoring and grab sampling capabilities. The heat of the primary sampling system (PSS) is a shielded grab sampling unit, which is common for nonnal and post-accident activities. The valves (except for containment isolation) are manual and are located inside the grab sampling unit. The secondary sampling system (SSS) performs sampling of the secondary systems, including the steam generators.
- 20. Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System The system provides heat removal from the Similar, with the equipment arranged in two stored fuel and includes the spent fuel pit independent trains.
level instrumentation. Tt i tanctions of the AP600 spent fuel pit cooling system include spent fuel pit cooling, spent fuel pit purification. refueling cavity purification, water tra*.ufers (transfer water between IRWST and refueling cavity during refueling), and IRWST purification. Following a station blackout, make-up water must be provided to the spent fuel cooling pit after 72 hours. However,72 hoca is the minimum worst case scenario. Typically, it will be at least several days before makeup water must be provided to the spent l fuel cooling pit.
- 21. Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling System CRDM fans. Similar.
36 , WPFI858D(CUST):1D/051294 WBStiflgh011SO l l 1
Design Differences Docurnent 2===
- 1 :
Table 3 (Sheet 21 of 21) Comparison of System Design Features Low-Pressure Reference Plant Design AP600 Design
- 22. Control Rod Control System Control rods. Same.
- 23. Turbine Control System Turbine trip. Same.
Turbine load control. Same.
- 24. Electrical Power System (ac & dc)
Safety-related ac power system with two diesel- Nonsafety-related ac power system with two generators. Automatic diesel-generator start on nonsafety-related standby diesel-gererators pmvided to loss of offsite power or on SI signal. power selected shutdown loads continuously, based on one of two redundant components powered at a time. Automatic diesel generator stan on loss of offsite power. The ac power system and the diesel generetors are nonsafety-related since the AP600 safeguard systems are passive and do not include pumps or valves that require ac power to operate. Safety-related de battery banks. Same.
- 25. Instrument Air System Instrument air compressors. Same.
Instrument air to valves located inside Similar, but the use of ait-operated valves inside containment is isolated on containment isolation containment is minimized. (For example, accumulator signal (CIS). It is necessary to re-establish nitrogen vent valves have electric solenoid operators). instrument air following Si and CIS reset in order Therefore, the need to establish instrument air to to provide the necessary air supply to the air- containment to support emergency operations is operated valves. reduced. WOStingh0L!Se WPFissantcusT):10/os1294
_ , Desian Differences Document h Comparison of System Instrumentation and AP600 systems are identified by the system acronym Controls (see Table 2 for acronym to system reference). The term same is used in the table to indicate The low-pressure reference plant contains the that from the standpoint of emergency operations, the instrumentation and controls available to the operator to specific instrumentation or control requirements for the operate the reference plant systems in response to AP600 system and the low-pressure reference plant emergency transients. In this context, instrumentation system are basically the same. That is, when writing the includes component status indication. Instrumentation AP600 high-level operator action strategies, no change and controls are defined to the extent necessary to to the structure or operational strategy of the ERGS is maximize technical guidance in the ERCS with respect anticipated. to system operation while maximiz.ing the generic The comparison of the AP600 instrumentation applicability of the technical guidance. and controls and the reference plant instrumentation and Table 4 contains a comparison of the low- controls identified a number of instrumentation and pressure reference plant instrumentation and controls and control items that are on the AP600, but are not the AlWK) instrumentation and controls. The left-hand explicitly identified for the low-pressure reference plant. column of Table 4 identifies the low-pressure reference These items are included in the left-hand column of plant systems and associated instrumentation and control Table 4, but are preceded with a double asterisk (**) to items within the defined scope of the low-pressure distinguish them from the low-pressure reference plant reference plant and specifically used in the ERGS. items. Based on past practices and the similarities The instrumentation and controls comparison between the AP600 systems and the low pressure provides a high level comparison summary of the reference plant systems, the assumption has been made instrumentation (including component status indicators) that the AP600 will have instrumentation and control and controls available to the plant operators. This similar to that of the reference plant. This information summary is used in adapting the ERG high level will be used as input to the task analysis that will be strategies to the AP600. It does not include automatic performed as part of the man-machine interface design. controls. 38 WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 W85tiflgh0US0
Desson DNforences Document n-;;
- - - l Table 4 (Sheet 1 of 12)
Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and ControlItems Requirements Requirements System I* C* IW C'"
- 1. Reactor Trip Actuation System Reactor trip annunciator X -
Similar Similar(2) DDS i Reactor trip and bypass breakers X - Similar Similar PMS Reactor trip signal X X Similar Similar PMS l Turbine trip signal X X Similar Similar PMS
- 2. ESF Actuation System Si annunciator X -
Similar Similar(2) DDS , SI sigt il X X Similar - PMS SI signal reset / block X X Similar Similar(3) PMS Low steam line pressure Si actuation signal block X X Similar Similar(4) PMS Low PRZR pressure SI actuation signal block X X Similar Similar(5) PMS Containment isolation phase A signal X X Similar Similar(6) PMS Containment isolation phase A reset X X Similar Similar(6) PMS Containment isolation phase B reset X X - (6) - Feedwater isolation signal reset X X Similar Similar PMS Main steam line isolation signal X X Similar Similar PMS
** Containment cooling actuation signal - -
X X PMS <
** Containment cooling actuation signal reset - - X X PMS .
4 R l' [ W8Stingt10llSe WPF185aD(cusT):1D/ost
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Design Ddferences Document
-z=r re-Table 4 (Sheet 2 of 12)
Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements J Low Pressure Reference Plant AP600 t System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System ym C'" I* C*
** PRHR actuation signal - -
X X PMS , t ** PRHR actuation signal reset - - X X PMS
" Main steam line isolation signal reset - -
X X(4) PMS
** Feedwater isoiation signal - -
X X PMS f
** Automatic RCS depressurization signal - -
X X PMS
** RCP trip signal - -
-X X PMS f
** CMT actuation signal - -
X X PMS !
** CMT actuation signal reset signal - -
X X PMS
- 3. Nuclear Instrumentation l Power range neutron flux reset X X Similar Similar PMS !
Intennediate range neutron flux X - Similar - PMS Intermediate range startup rate X - Similar - RXS j Source Range Neutron flux X - Similar - RXS ! Source range startup rate X - Similar - RXS Neutron flux recorder X X Similar - DDS i t l Source range detectors (energize) X X Similar Similar PMS
- 4. Control Rod Instrumentation System Control rod position X -
Similar - PLS Control rod bottom lights X - - - -
" Control rod status messages - -
X - PLS : 4 i I nassoccusnao/osuu 3 Westinghouse I l l 4
l l Desian Differences Document k i Table 4 (Sheet 3 of 12) Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and Controlitems Requirements Requirements System I(" C" I(" C"
- 5. Radiation Instrumentation System Containment radiation X -
Similar - RMS SG blowdown radiation X - Similar - BDS Condenser air ejector radiation X - Similar - RMS (condenser exhaust radiation) Auxiliary building radiation X - Similar - RMS SG steam line radiation X - Similar - SGS
- 6. Containment Instrumentation System Containment pressure X -
Similar - PCS Containment temperature X - Similar - VCS Containment recirculation sump level X - Similar (7) PXS Containment hydrogen concentration X - Similar - VLS Phase A containment isolation valves X X Similar Similar (8) Phase B containment isolation valves X X - (6) - Containment ventilation isolation dampers X X Similar Similar (8)
** Passive containment cooling system storage tank to - -
X X PMS containment valve status
** Passive containment cooling system storage - -
X X PMS tank level
" Passive contaiament cooling system water Gow - -
X X PMS
" Gutter to containment sump valve status - -
X X PMS 41 W WestinghcuSe weriassoccusT):io/osi294
Design Differences Document E Table 4 (Sheet 4 of 12) Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements Low Pressure Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System f" CW I* C*
- 7. Reactor Coolant System RCS pressure X -
Similar - RCS PRZR pressure X - Similar - RCS RCS hot leg wide range temperature X - Similar - RCS RCS cold leg wide range temperature X - Similar - RCS RCS average temperature X - Similar - RCS Core exit TC temperature X -. Similar - RCS PRZR water temperature X - Similar - RCS PRZR steam temperature X - Similar - RCS PRZR level X - Similar - RCS Reactor vessel liquid inventory system (RVLIS) X - (9) - - Reactor coolant pumps X X Similar Similar RCS PRZR PORVs X X - - PRZR PORV block valves X X - - PRZR spray valves X X Similar Similar RCS Reactor vessel vent valves X X Similar Similar RCS PRZR heaters X X Similar Similar RCS
** Automatic depressurization valves - -
X X RCS
** RCP speed - -
X - RCS
** RCP bearing water temperature - -
X - RCS W F1858D(CUST):1D/051294 WeStingt10USS
. - - _ - _. . - . _ ~ ~ -
l i Desian DiNorences Document : : __ :: i i m __ i Table 4 (Sheet 5 of 12) , Comparison of instrumentation and Control Flequirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and Control items Requirements Requirements System im C* I* CW
- 8. Safety Injection System ;
Refueling water storage tank (RWST) level X - (10) - PXS High-head Si flow X - - - - High-head SI pumps X X - - - Accumulator isolation valves X X Similar Similar PXS , Accumulator vent valves X X Similar Similar PXS Low-head SI pump suction valves from containment X X - - - j recirculation sump Low-head SI pump suction valves from RWST X X - - - High-head SI pump suction valves from BAT X X - - - High-head SI pump suction valves from RWST X X - - - Low-head Si pump discharge valves to RCS cold legs X X - - - SI valves X X Similar Similar PXS
" Core makeup tank level - -
X - PXS
** Core makeup tank inlet temperatum - - X - PXS
** Core makeup tank outlet temperature - - X - PXS
" Core makeup tank inlet / outlet valves - - X X PXS -
" Accumulator level - -
X - PXS i
" Accumulator pressure - - X - PXS _
** IRWST temperature - - X -
PXS
** IRWST outlet valves - - X X PXS i
I
)
[ WeStingh00Se WPFlassoccust):10/os1294 l
[ Demon DINorences Document , _ _ _ _ _ _ _m ; Table 4 (Sheet 6 of 12) . Comparison of Instrumentation and Control Requirements - Low-Pressure l Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System p en p en
** Passive RHR inlet / outlet temperature - -
X - PXS i
** Passive RHR flow - -
X - PXS .
** Passive RHR valves - -
X X PXS
** Containment floodup water level - -
X - PXS
- 9. Residual Heat Removal System Low-head SI (RHR) flow X -
(11) - RNS i Low-head SI (RHR) pumps X X (11) (11) RNS Low-head SI (RHR) pump suction valves X X (11) (11) RNS from RCS j
- 10. Chemical and Volume Control System Boric acid tank temperature X - - - -
Boric tank level X - Similar - CVS Charging flow X - Similar (12) CVS RCP seal injection flow X - - - - Letdown flow X - Similar - CVS ; RCP number 1 seal leakoff flow X - - - - RCP number 1 seal differential pressure X - - - - Charging pumps X X Similar(12) Similar(12) CVS Charging pump suction valve from RWST X X - - - Charging pump suction valve from VCT X X - - - I WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 WeStiligh0USB
a l Desson DeNerences Document = 9 Table 4 (Sheet 7 of 12) Comparison of Instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System It" C" I"' C" RCP seal retum outside containment isolation valve X X - - - Letdown isolation valves X X Similar Similar CVS Letdown orifice isolation valves X X (13) (13) CVS Low-pressure letdown control valve X X - - - Excess letdown isolation valves X X - - - VCT makeup control system X X (14) (14) CVS VCT makeup control system (mode selector) X X (14) (14) CVS
- 11. Component Cooling Water System CCW pumps X X (11) (11) CCS RCP thermal barrier CCW return inside containment X X (11) (11) CCS isolation valve ,
RCP thermal barrier CCW return outside containment X X (11) (11) CCS isolation valve CCW valves X X (11) (11) CCS 12.' Service Water System Service water pumps X X (11) (11) SWS ; Service water valves X X (11) (11) SWS
- 13. Containment Spray System ;
Containment spray pumps X X - - - Containment spmy valves X X - - -
- 14. Containment Atmosphere Control System Containment ventilation isolation dampers X X- (15) (15) VCS -
5 [ WBStingh0USS WPriassoccust):10/os1294 l
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i 4 Desen Differences Document r a w-Table 4 (Sheet 8 of 12) Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 _ System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System 1(" C'" I(" C(" Containment fan coolers X X (15) (15) VCS Hydrogen recombiners X X (15) (15) VLS l Containment air circulation equipment X X (15) (15) VCS Containment filtration equipment X X (15) (15) VFS
** Hydrogen sensors - -
X - VLS 1
** Hydrogen igniters - -
X X VLS
- 15. Main Steam System SG pressure X -
Similar - SGS j SG narrow range level X - Similar - SGS SG wide range level X - Similar - SGS SG PORVs X X Similar - SGS Condenser steam dump valves X X Similar - MSS Main steam line isolation valves X X Similar - SGS Main steam line isolation bypass valves X X Similar - SGS Steam supply valves to turbine-driven AFW pump X X - - - Turbine stop valves X - Similar - MSS
** SG steam line radiation - -
X - SGS :
** SG PORV block valves - -
X X SGS
- 16. Main Feedwater and Condensate -
FW flow control valves X X Similar - SGS FW flow control bypass valves X X - - SGS F1858D(CUST):1D/051294 West nghouse
l l 1 Desian Differences Document ___= Table 4 (Sheet 9 of 12) Comparison of Instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 - System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System I* C* I* C* FW isolation valves X X Similar - SGS
** Feedwater pressure - - X -
SGS
** Feedwater temperature - -
X - SCS
** Feedwater flow - -
X - SGS
- 17. Auxiliary Feedwater System Auxiliary feedwater flow X -
Similar (16) SGS , i Condensate storage tank level X - Similar (16) FWS MD AFW pumps X X Similar (16) FWS Condensate storage tank to hotwell isolation valves X X Similar (16) FWS AFW valves X X Similar (16) SGS
** Startup feedwater flow control valves - -
X X(16) SGS
- 18. Steam Generator Blowdown System SG blowdown isolation valves X X Similar (8) SGS l
- 19. Sampling System SG blowdown sample isolation valves X X Similar BDS
- 20. Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System Spent fuel pit level X -
Similar SFS ' 21. Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling System Control rod drive mechanism fans X X Similar RXS 47 [ WeStingt100Se WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294
Desson DINorences Document
=
Table 4 (Sheet 10 of 12) l Comparison of instrumentation and Control Requirements Low-Pressure Reference Plant AP600 { System / Instrumentation and Control Items Requirements Requirements System gm en pn en j i
- 22. Control Rod Control System i Control rods X X Similar PLS
- 23. Turbine Control l t
Turbine runback X X Similar TOS i
- 24. Electric Power System Diesel-generators X X Similar (17) ZOS ,
i
- 25. Pneumatic Power System Instrument air compressor X X Similar CAS ,
Instmment air valves X X Similar CAS
- 26. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
** ADVS mitigation system X -
X X DAS i i l i 1 f WPF1858D(CUST):1D/051294 W8Stingt100S8 i i
Desian Differences Document M Table 4 (Sheet 11 of 12) Comparison of Instrumentation and Control Requirements NOTES: (1) 1 - Instrumentation requirements column C - Control requirements column An "X" entry indicates an instrumentation or control requirement within the scope of the reference plant or an instrumentation / control for the AP600. A " " entry indicates no requirement for the reference plant or no instrumentation / control for the AP600. The term similar indicates that from the standpoint of emergency operations, the specific instrumentation (including component status indication) or component control requirements for the AP600 system and the low-pressure reference plant system are the same on a functional level. When writing the AP600 high-level operator action strategies, no change to the structure or operation strategy of the ERGS is anticipated. (2) The AP600 data display and processing system (DDS) includes a plant alarm system, which is the functional equivalent of the low-pmssure reference plant annunciator, (3) Manual reset / block for SI signal concurrent with expiration of the SI signal reset time delay and P-4 reactor trip input signal. (4) The AP600 Manual Steam /Feedwater Isolation and Safeguards Reset / Block is for main steam line isolation (Iow steam pressure, high steam pressure negative rate and 1.ow Tasignals) main feedwater isolation (low-l T., and low-2 T., signals) and Si actuation signal (Iow steam pressure and Low Ta signals). (5) The AP600 Low Pressurizer Pressure Safeguards Reset / Block is for SI actuation signal (Iow pressurizer pressure). (6) The AP600 has a single containment isolation signal, not separate phase A isolation, phase B isolation, and containment ventilation isolation signals as does the low-pressure reference plant. (7) The AP600 containment sump does not have forced recirculation capabilities. 49 3 WeStingt10Use WPFIB58D(CUST):1D/051294 1
Desiyn Differences Document ? Table 4 (Sheet 12 of 12) Comparison of Instrumentation and Control Requirements NOTES: (8) The AP600 containment isolation valves and ventilation dampers are located in the systems that penetrate containment. (9) The AP600 hot leg level indication is used to monitor reactor coolant inventory. (10) The AP600 In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (located inside containment) corresponds to the low-pressure reference plant Refueling Water Storage Tank (located outside containment). (11) The AP600 normal residual heat removal system components, component cooling water components, and service water system components do not perform an engineered safety features function. (12) The AP600 makeup pumps correspond to the low-pressure reference plant charging pumps. The makeup pump injection flow passes through a discharge flow control valve. (13) Note that containment isolation valves also serve as letdown isolation valves and only one orifice exists. (14) The AP600 makeup system provides makeup directly to the suction of the makeup pumps. The CVS does not include a volume control tank (VCT). (15) The AP600 containment air recirculation cooling system (VCS), which includes the fan coolers, and the containment air filtration system (VFS) are for normal operation and are not actuated by an engineered safety features actuation signal. (16) The AP600 startup feedwater system corresponds to the low-pressure reference plant auxiliary feedwater system. However, the AP600 system is used for normal shutdown operations and is not actuated by an ESF actuation signal. (17) The AP600 diesel generators start on loss of offsite power only, and are not actuated by an engineered safety features actuation signal. The comparison of the AP600 instrumentation and controls and the reference plant instrumentation and controls identified a number of instrumentation and control items that are on the AP600 but are not explicitly identified for the low-pressure reference plant. These items are preceded with a double asterisk to distinguish them from the low-pressure reference plant items. W F1858D(CUST):lD/OS1294 WBStiflgl10USS
Design Differences Document _, _ Comparison of Containment Structures operations are the passive core cooling system (which also provides passive residual heat removal) and the The low-pressure reference plant consists of a passive containment cooling system. However, the containment structure that has the functions to prevent functions performed by each of these systems are similar the inadvertent release of radioactive fission products to to be functions performed by the low-pressure reference the atmosphere and to provide biological shielding. De plant systems. The major difference is related to how reference plant containment is a dry atmospheric the systems are controlled by the operator to accomplish containment and includes associated containment features the system function as part of an overall recovery l l that can vary widely from plant to plant. De low. strategy. For example, the safety injection termination pressure reference plant description also discusses other containment types and features, including the ice criteria in the ERGS do not directly apply to the AP600 condenser containment, the sub-atmospheric containment, since it does not have safety injection pumps. However, following initiation of the passive core cooling system, and the dual containment. The AP600 containment is similar to the dual there is a need to determine when passive safety containment as described in the low-pressure reference injection can be stopped. Thus criteria for termination plant description. De dual containment consists of a of passive safety injection is necessary. The criteria may steel containment structure surrounded by a controlled be different from the ERGS, but will serve the same volume annulus with upper annulus open to atmosphere, basic intent as the ERG criteria. Since the low-pressure reference plant and AP600 made possible by the use of a separate biological shield concrete structure. The AP600 containment is similar to have similar basic system functions, the basic framework the dual containment except that its associated and recovery strategies contained in the low-pressure containment systems differ from the low-pressure ERGS apply in general to the AP600 Selected changes to the basic framework and to reference plant because of the passive nature of the recovery stategies may be appropriate since the passive AP600 systems, safety-related systems do not require support systems such as emergency ac power sources, thus impacting the Conclusions ERG rules of usage with respect to loss of all ac power sources. However, the changes to the basic framework Based on the comparison of the low-pressure and recovery strategies should not be major. reference plant systems and the AP600 systems, the More significant changes will occur in the AP600 plants have similar system functions, in several cases decision criteria for operator actions and the detailed the functions are performed by different systems. l perator actions, since there are differences in which i The most predominant system design differences systems provide specific functions and since there are between the low-pressure reference plant and the AP600 differences in system design features and system systems are in the engineered safeguards features instrumentation and control requirements. systems. Specifically, the AP600 engineered safety features systems are passive, safety-related systems that rely on natural circulation and convection to remove and l transfer heat from the core and the containment. They do not contain pumps that deliver fluid to the core or to the containment atmosphere and they do not rely on support systems for ac power sources and cooling water. The AP600 passive systems that contain the majority of differences that will affect emergency 51 W W85tiligh0!!Se WPF1858D(cuST):1D/051294
1 Desian DINorences Document L---E , i Fleferefices AP600 Plant Condensate System, System Specification Document CDS413-001. Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines, Low-Pressure Reference Plant Description. AP600 Plant Functional Diagrams, Revision 0, Sheets 1-29 (SSAR Fig. 7.2-1). AP600 Plant Description Document, GW GO 001. AP600 Plant Reactor Coolant System Piping and AP600 Plant Passive Containment Cooling System, Instrumentation Diagram, RCS-M6-001/002/003, System Specification Document. PCS-M3-001. Drawing No.1874E74. AP600 Plant Reactor Coolant System, System AP600 Plant Normal Residual Heat Removal System , Specification Document, RCS-M34)01. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, RNS-M6-001. j AP600 Plant Passive Core Cooling System. System AP600 Plant Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System Piping and Specification Document, PXS413-001. Instrumentation Diagram, SFS-M6-001. , AP600 Plant Primary Sampling System, System AP600 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability Specification Document, PSS-M3-001. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, VES-M6-001. AP600 Plant Chemical and Volume Control System, AP600 Plant Primary Sampling System Piping and System Specification Document, CVS-M3-001. Instrumentation Diagram, PSS-M6-001. AP600 Plant Protection and Safety Monitoring System AP600 Plant Component Cooling Water System Piping : Specification Document, PMS J7 001. and Instrumentation Diagram, CCS-M6-001/002/003/(XM. AP600 Plant Main Steam System, System Specification AP600 Plant Chemical and Volume Control System i Document, MSS-M3-001. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, CVS-M6-001/002. AP600 Plant Component Cooling Water System, System AP600 Plant Passive Containment Cooling System ; Specification Document, CCS-M3-001. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, PCS-M6-001. AP600 Plant Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System, System AP600 Plant Passive Safety injection System Piping and Specification Document, SFS-M3-001. Instrumentation Diagram, PXS-M6-001/002/003/0M. AP600 Plant Normal Residual Heat Removal System, AP600 Plant Steam Generator System Piping and System Specification Document RNS-M3-001. Instrumentation Diagram, SGS-M6-001/ 002. ; AP600 Plant Steam Generator System. System Design Specification for AP600, Reactor Coolant Pump. Specification Document, SGC-M3-001. AP600 Reactor Coolant Pum, - Functional Specification, Revision B, March 18,1W1. AP600 Plant Containment System System Specification Document, CNS-M3-001. AP600 Main and Startup Feedwater System Specification ; Document FWS-M3-001. 52 WPF1858D(CUsT):1D/051294 W65tingh0USB 9 t
l l l I 1 Design Differences Document l AP600 Containment Hydrogen Control System Specification Document, VLS-M34X)1. AP600 Plant Control System Specification Document, PLS-17-001. 53 3 Westingflouse weriassoccusT):to/osi294}}