ML20069F522
| ML20069F522 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1983 |
| From: | Reveley W HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8303230209 | |
| Download: ML20069F522 (291) | |
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l fyh550 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 50 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In-the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUFFOLK COUNTY'S MOTION TO TERMINATE THIS PROCEEDING AND FOR CERTIFICATION March 18, 1983 Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 d
volume One of Two 8303230209 830318 M g PDR ADOCK 05000 i - _ - - r1
LILCO, March 18, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUFFOLK COUNTY'S MOTIONS TO TERMINATE THIS PROCEEDING AND FOR CERTIFICATION I. INTRODUCTION This brief will respond to Suffolk County's February 23 motion 1/ to terminate this licensing proceeding and " cease further consideration of LILCO's OL application." The reason for the County's motion is that the County has resolved not to 1/ "Suffolk County's Motion to Terminate the Shoreham Operating License Proceeding," Feb. 23, 1983. The motion was accompanied by a " Motion for Certification," also dated February 23, asking the Board to certify the motion promptly to the Commission without further considering the issues or sub-mitting them to the Appeal Board. By direction of the Board, l the County filed a supplemental brief (SC Br.) in support of the motion. " Supplemental Brief of Suffolk County in Support of the County's Motion to Terminate the Shoreham Operating License Proceeding and the County's Motion for Certification,"
March 4, 1983.
l l
l prepare a radiological emergency plan and, in the County's view, the NRC regulations do not permit the agency to issue an operating license, under any circumstances whatsoever, unless the County is participating in the emergency planning process.
The NRC regulations cannot possibly mean what the County says they mean, because if they did, they would render the NRC regulatory scheme arbitrary. This very case illustrates just how arbitrary it would be, for the County's position on emer-gency planning, on which the County believes NRC operating licenses should depend, has shifted radically and unpredictably over time. c Had the Board been present at the time of the limited appearances in the Shoreham construction permit proceeding on September 21, 1970, it would have heard then-Suffolk County Executive Dennison say to the ASLB:
I urge you, as County Executive, to grant immediate licensing for construc-tion of this nuclear power facility as proposed at Shoreham.
CP Tr. 216 (Sept. 21, 1970). Emergency planning was addressed in the CP proceeding, and the ASLB's decision shows that " local authorities" were consulted:
1 The Applicant has outlined its plan for coping with emergencies and has I conferred with New York State and local !
authorities with respect to them. The Board finds the Applicant's emergency
l planning adequate for the construction f
permit stage.
Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station),
LBP-73-13, 6 AEC .c71, 285 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
As the " Background" section of this brief shows, there followed some 10 years of cooperation between LILCO and Suffolk County. A County " General Radiation Emergency Plan" was approved by County Executive John Klein in 1978 and, in re-sponse to the Three Mile Island accident, Suffolk County signed a contract in September 1981 promising to prepare "a County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, as required by Federal Regulations." The County Department of Planning represented in the contract that it was familiar with the applicable federal regulations and that it believed it could develop a plan that complied with them. Work on the new plan proceeded apace, with LILCO and the County having frequent meetings and phone conversations over the plan.
But suddenly the County officials' attitude changed. In February last year the County repudiated the contract with LILCO and the work of its Department of Planning. For several months thereafter it went through the process of producing a 8'
draft emergency plan all its own, refusing advice, help, or other participation by LILCO and declining to involve the State
l of New York in the process. During this period LILCO tried repeatedly to resume joint planning with the County, as when a I LILCO Vice President wrote the County on September 17, 1982, saying among other things:
Let me close by repeating that much of the work LILCO has done on the offsite plan, as well as the resources and expe-rience of LILCO employees and consul-tants, would be of uce to the County in developing its plan. LILCO takes no pleasure in working on emergency planning without the County. I urge you to resume joint planning with LILCO as soon as pos-sible.2/
To no avail. Just last month, following hearings by the Suffolk County Legislature, County Executive Peter Cohalan is-sued a statement that "the unique local conditions of Long Island make it impossible to protect the public safety if there were a serious accident at the Shoreham plant," that "Shoreham should never operate," and that he was " prepared to lead the fight in both Washington and Albany" against Shoreham. The following day the County legislature resolved:
that since no local radiological emer-gency response plan for a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham will protect the health, welfare, and safety of Suffolk County residents, and since the prepara-tion and implementation of any such plan 2/ Letter from Matthew C. Cordaro to Chief Deputy County Executive John C. Gallagher, Sept. 17, 1982.
would be misleading to the public by indicating to County residents that their health, welfare, and safety are being protected when, in fact, such is not the case, the County's radiological emergency planning process is hereby terminated, and no local radiological emergency plan for response to an accident at the Shoreham plant shall be adopted or imple-mented . . . .
Thus did a 12-year record of cooperation between LILCO and the County change virtually overnight. Soon thereafter the County presented the Board with its motion to terminate and the novel legal theory that this NRC licensing proceeding cannot go forward without the County's consent.
It is important that the Board understand just how ex-treme this legal theory really is. Although the County's argument sometimes mixes fact and law, suggesting that it is an
" undisputed fact" that "necessary emergency preparedness to respond to a nuclear accident at Shoreham does not and will not exist" (see SC Motion to Terminate 1, 4), the question whether health and safety are protected plays no part in the County's theory.
The fact is that Suffolk County -- at present -- refuses to engage in emergency planning. LILCO therefore requests an opportunity to prove to this Board that emergency planning can be done, and the public adequately protected, without the County's help. The County cannot claim, for the purposes of its motion, that the public cannot be protected without its co-operation, for that is a question of fact. Suffolk County is saying rather that LILCO unould not even be given the opportu-nity to present evidence that the public can be protected.
Suffolk County is saying that who prepares an emergency plan is more important than whether the plan will protect the public.
Suffolk County is saying that the NRC's regulations absolutely require this result.
Suffolk County is v.lso saying that whenever a local government decides that the radiological risk from a nuclear plant is unacceptable, or that the plant is unacceptable for any other reason, it can shut down the plant by simply refusing to participate in eme'rgency planning. And there is no basis for limiting this veto power to new plants waiting to come on line; the County's theory applies to already-operating plants as well. If the County's theory were to prevail, then the de-bate over nuclear safety would shift immediately from the NRC to local legislatures, city councils, and boards of supervisors across the country, where the fate of nuclear reactors would be
, decided under short-range political pressures, with the vote changing each time the political winds shifted. There should be no illusion that these decisions would be made on the 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . I
evidence; the Suffolk County legislators heard from-three different groups of experts but rejected LILCO's witnesses',
the Brookhaven Laboratory scientists' and the County's own con-sultants' work, even as they earlier rejected the work of their Department of Planning. The next county to decide the issue might not bother with hearings at all.
The foregoing is not fantasy; it represents the clear and unavoidable consequences of accepting the County's theory of what the NRC emergency planning regulations mean. Since these consequences are intolerable, they are good reason to believe the Commission did not intend the County's interpreta-tion when it promulgated the regulations.
In addition to this fundamental reason, there are five other reasons why the County is wrong as a matter of law.
First, neither the regulations nor the rulemaking record underlying them says what the County says the regulations mean; the regulation, 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(2), speaks of " local plans," not " local government plans." A local plan is a plan for a locality, and LILCO has one. If the Commission had meant 5 50.47(a)(2) to deal only with plans endorsed by local
- governments, it would have said " plans of local governmental entities" as it did in a different regulation, 5 50.33(g).
Indeed, the proposed versions of the regulations S 50.47 and
l 5 50.54 were changed when they became final to delete references to 6 50.33(g) and to plans of " governmental entities."
Also, nowhere in the rulemaking record have we found (nor has the County found, judging from its brief) anyone saying that a local government plan is a prerequisite for an NRC license or that a license may not be issued unless there is a plan approved by a local government. Nor has any court, NRC Commissioner, or Administrative Judge said such a thing. It is reasonable to conclude that if this were meant to be the 1,.w someoni would have said so.
Second, the purpose of the NRC regulations at issue is contrary to the County's theory, and regulations are supposed to be construed so as to effect their purpose. The purpose of the regulations is to produce sound emergency planning; the purpose of Suffolk County is to do no emergency planning at all. The purpose of the regulations is to acsure safely-operating nuclear plants; the purpose of Suffolk County is to shut down Shoreham.
Third, the regulations provide a number of very broad exceptions that allow a reactor to operate even if all the reg-ulatory standards are not met so long as the public can be shown to be adequately protected. The Commission has directed,
both in-the rulemaking record and in the Indian Point proceeding, that "all factors" are to be examined before deciding whether a plant may operate in the face of deficiencies. The County, on the other hand, wants the inquiry to stop and the facts never to be heard.
Fourth, as noted above, the County's theory would give local governments a veto power over nearby nuclear plants --
not the "de facto" veto mentioned in an NRC Staff document cited by the County, but a de jure veto. (It is not entirely clear which governments the County thinks have this veto; counties and states would certainly have it, and some of the County's argument implies that a plant could be vetoed by any city, town, or village within 10 or 20 miles of the plant.)
This veto, if granted by the NRC, would violate $ 271 and 5 274 of the Atomic Energy Act and contradict over 10 years of cases holding that states and localities may not regulate the radiological health and safety aspects of nuclear power power.
Fifth, there is no conceivable policy cognizable under the Atomic Energy Act to be served by having a regulation that means what the County says it means. Since the County's argument is that a local veto stops the reactor regardless of whether health and safety is protected, health and safety can-not be a reason for construing the regulation in the County's
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favor. The County suggests no reason why the NRC would want to to give local governments such a veto.
In short, all LILCO is asking at this point is a chance to present evidence that its own offsite plan will work. What Suffolk County is asking is that the Board deny LILCO that op-portunity and construe the NRC regulations so as to give local governments the ultimate authority to deny licenses for nuclear plants. The County asks the Board to stand down, after a decade of construction, almost seven years of this operating license proceeding, and almost a year of evidentiary hearings before this Board, and concede to the County the right to make the ultimate decision in this case. This result, LILCO sub-mits, is incompatible with the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's regulations. It is incompatible as well with public policy, good sense, and the integrity of the NRC licens-ing process.
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS The remainder of this brief is organized as follows:
Page III. BACKGROUND............................................. 14
l Page A. As Early as the Construction Permit Stage, Suffolk County Endorsed Shoreham and Cooperated in Emergency Planning.............. 18 B. The Continued Cooperaticn between LILCO and Suffolk County on Emergency Planning. . . . . . . . . . 21 {
I C. The Sea Change.................................... 30 l i
l D. The County's Behavior while Drafting Its Plan.............................................. 36
- 1. Suffolk County Participation in this l Proceeding.................................... 36 l
- 2. The Suffolk County Planning Process........... 37 E. The Legislative Hearings.......................... 40
- 1. The Legislators Are Not Knowledgeable about Nuclear Power and about the Contents of the Draft County Emergency Plan......... ...............................41
- 2. Suffolk County Is Attempting to Regu-late Nuclear Power through Its Review of the County Emergency Plan.................. 49
- 3. The County Determined Well before the
! Legislative Hearings Began that No I
Plan Would Be Accepted........................ 53 F. The Result o5 the Legislative Hearings............~58 i
G. LILCO's Continued Pursuit of Offsite Planning. . . . . 59
- IV. THE LEGAL ISSUES....................................... 63 A. Introduction...................................... 63 r B. Section 50.33(g) Does Not Require the Appli-cant to Produce a Local Government Plan If None Exists....................................... 66 C. Section 50.47(a)(2) Does Not Give Localities aVeto............................................68 l
I l
Page D. A Local Government Plan Is Not a Prerequisite for Using 5 50.47(c)(1)........................... 71
- 1. The Text of (c)(1) Does Not Support Suffolk County................................ 71
- 2. The Per Se Rule Urged by the County Goes Against the Rulemaking Record............ 74 E. The Regulations Must Be Interpreted so as to Effect Their Purpose and so as to Avoid Vio-lating the Federal Preemption Doctrine............ 80
- 1. Purpose....................................... 82
- 2. Preemption.................................... 83 F. LILCO Is Entitled to the Opportunity to Show an Exception to the Regulations under 10 C.F.R. $ 2.758(b) and S 50.12(a) and to Have a Low-power License under 5 50.57(c).............. 94 G. The Significance of Section 5 of the 1982-83 NRC Authorization Act.......................... 96 V. CERTIFICATION.......................................... 104 A. The ASLB Should Decide the Issue.................. 106 B. There Is No Need for Expedited Review............. 106 C. Who Should Perform Expedited Review, If It Is Performed...................................... 108 VI. THE LITIGATION SHOULD PROCEED ON THE FACTUAL ISSUES, NO MATTER WHAT................................. 109 VII. THE STATE'S POSITION ON EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR SHOREHAM............................................... 112 VIII. CONCLUSION............................................. 116
ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Letter.from Legislator Giese to constituent Schechner, dated January 19, 1983.
- 2. Memorandum of Understanding between LILCO and Suffolk County dated December 28, 1979, with transmittal letter-dated December 31, 1979.
- 3. Amended Emergency Planning Contract between
'LILCO and Suffolk County, dated September 1981.
- 4. Excerpts from Deposition of Robert C. Meunkle taken on August 6 and 16, 1982.
- 5. Excerpts from Deposition of Laura L. Palmer taken on August 16, 1982.
- 6. Letter from Dr. Cordaro to Dr. Lee Koppelman, dated March 17, 1982.
- 7. Letter from Chief Deputy County Executive Gallagher to Dr. Cordaro, dated May 17, 1982.
- 8. Report of the suffolk County Legislature (draft) dated February 17, 1983 from Special Counsel Michael Ward.
- 9. Report of Suffolk County Executive Peter F.
Cohalan Concerning Radiological Preparedness In Suffolk County, dated February 16, 1983.
- 10. February 17, 1983 statement by_Suffolk County Executive Peter F. Cohalan.
- 11. Letter from Dr. Cordaro to Commissioner William Hennessey dated May 10, 1982, trans-mitting the LILCO off-site plan.-
- 12. Letter to Suffolk County Attorney David J.
Gilmartin from the Chief of Suffolk County's District Attorney Special Investigatory Unit, dated November 17, 1982.
- 13. Letter from Dr. Cordaro to Chief Deputy County Executive Gallagher, dated September 17, 1982.
- 14. Letter from LILCO's counsel to County counsel, dated August 7, 1982.
- 15. Letter from Dr. Cordaro to Deputy County Executive Frank Jones, dated September 29, 1982.
- 16. Letter from Dr. Cordaro to Chief Deputy County Executive Gallagher, dated October 4, 1982.
- 17. Letter from W. G. Schiffmacher to Deputy County Executive Frank Jones, dated October 7, 1982.
III. BACKGROUND Set out below is the history of emergency planning for Shoreham leading up to the County's motion to terminate. This history is relevant for several reasons.
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First, the Background shows that Suffolk County supported the construction of Shoreham at the beginning and participated in emergency planning for the plant for some 12 years, changing its position to opposition only recently, and only after almost a year of hearings by the Board. This histo-ry suggests that it is not an " undisputed fact" that there will never be a County emergency plan, because the County may change its mind again. It also suggests that equitable principles favor LILCO's position over the County's.
Second, the Background shows that, contrary to the County's assertions, it is not the case that no offsite plan-ning exists. Much offsite planning for Shoreham has already been accomplished. Besides the 1978 pre-TMI plan mentioned above, the most recent draft plan developed by LILCO and the County was completed in 1982 by LILCO (the "LILCO offsite plan"), after County planners were ordered to discontinue work on it. This plan was submitted to the New York State Disaster Preparedner:s Commission (DPC) Staff for review against emergen-cy planning regulations. The DPC Staff requested certain changes, which LILCO made. On a second review, the plan passed muster.
Third, the Background shows that the Suffolk County government, which seeks for itself the power to veto nuclear power plants on grounds of radiation health and safety, is not sufficiently knowledgeable to do so. The County's conclusion that emergency planning is impossible is based upon the latest, unilateral planning effort by the County, consisting of nine months' work by outside consultants at a cost of $600,000 and resulting in a document that has no implementing procedures, no provisions integrating with the State and LILCO onsite plans, and no chance of being complete without a significant amount'of additional work. This document is touted by the County as "the
best possible plan that could be developed." It is not a plan at all. In addition, nowhere in the draft County plan did the County's consultants state that emergency planning was impossi-ble for Suffolk County.
It fell to the Suffolk County Legislature to examine the document and pronounce it good (or otherwise). The Legislature
~
finds itself " uniquely qualified" for the task. Draft " Report of the Suffolk County Legislature," dated February 17, 1983, at 1 (Attachment 8). In truth, the Legislature showed during its hearings on the plan that it was unprepared on the subject of nuclear power,- and that, due to political machinations,.it had no intention of approving any offsite plan for Shoreham, under the misguided notion that without a County-approved plan, the NRC would not allow Shoreham to operate. One legislator's question posed to LILCO during the Legislative hearings on emergency planning is indicative of the lack of knowledge of the group:
What type of fuel [is used at Shoreham]?
I have a car and I pull into the gas station, and there is a high octane, low octane, regular, unleaded. What type of fuel?
This question might be reasonable for a person beginning to educate himself about nuclear plants; most people do not have detailed knowledge about the technical aspects of nuclear
power. But unlike its more accustomed investigative and political role, the Legislature here set itself up as a fact-finding body on the draft County plan. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that the County legislators would have acquired more than a passing knowledge of emergency planning for nuclear power plants. The record shows they did not. (It is unclear whether their lack of knowledge resulted from their staff or the County Executive's office not providing the proper information, their counsel and consultants not calling atten-tion to it, their not reading it, or a combination of these factors.)
Not only was the Legislature unprepared to deal with the issue of emergency planning for a nuclear power plant, it was apparently not inclined to deal with it fairly. Another legislator stated in a letter, addressed to one of his constit-uents and entered in the public record, that "the reasoning behind the hearings for a so-called plan, at the present time, is to use the facts presented as the basis for a future law suit." See Attachment 1 The County relies upon the Legislature's fact-finding to 7 conclude that emergency planning is impossible for Shoreham.
That conclusion is not based on fact.
l l
A. As Early as the Construction Permit Stage, Suffolk County Endorsed Shoreham and Cooperated in Emergency Planning The construction permit for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station was granted on April 12, 1973, five years after the ap-plication was filed', and following contested hearings that in-cluded challenges to the choice of the site, the feasibility of emergency planning, and accident probabilities. See Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-73-13, 6 AEC 271, 275-76, 278, 285, 29i 99 (1972). At that time Suffolk County was not a party to the proceeding, but H.
Lee Dennison, County Executive, made a limited appearance before the Licensing Board in 1970 to urge that'the Board grant a construction permit for Shoreham:
I am here in representation of the 1,100,000 people of the County of Suffolk, and I speak as the administra-tive head of the county government, as the county budget officer; and I have a ,
certain basic responsibility for the , y health, safety and well-being of the peo- '
ple of the county, a concern with -
adequate and safe transportation, police, f finances, the general economy, human re- .
lationships, public health and welfare, '
adequate and clear fresh water, and sure-ly the assurance of the quality of l
service and consumer price for light and ,
power.
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- _ _ _ _ . i
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Now there isn't any other source for en-ergy in this area. We can't depend upon the metropolitan region or New York State or the St. Lawrence powerplants. We must begin to be self-sufficient on our own because we are an island.
I urge you, Mr. Chairman, as County Executive, to grant immediate licensing for construction of this nuclear power facility as proposed at Shoreham.
CP Tr. 209, 211-12, 216.
The provisions of the 1971 version of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.II, required that the PSAR contain sufficient infor-mation to assure compatibility of the facility design and site with emergency planning requirements.3/ The NRC Staff found 3/ The old Appendix E provided in pertinent part:
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to as-i sure the compatibility of proposed emergen-cy plans with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, and land use.
As a minimum, the following items shall be described:
1 1
B. Contacts and arrangements made or to
, be made with local, State and Federal gov-ernmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies . . . .
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' ll that Shoreham satiIfied the requirements eC Appe'ndix E. CP Try
- , .'y ,,1 5969-73. In~ addition, intervenor Lloyd Harbor Study Group -
(LHSG) cross-examined during the construction permit hearings /
p,
> regarding LILCO's development of an emergency plan. Testimony .
~
showed that LILCO had outlined generally its plans / for coping '/. " .
l with emergencies in the PSAR (PSAR at;XIII-4-1 to -3) and had ;*
i y',y _ ,
sQ, discussed emergency planning with the Ri.verrmad Police e r O ', e'=
.t Department, Suffolk County Police D,epartment, Suffolk.. County -, , .,',
Health Department, Suffolk County' Medical Society, and New York' ' "
State Authorities. CP Tr. 2299, 2511-12.. ,
In its initial decision, the Licensing Board rejected n
LHSG's assertion that LILCO was unable to achieve adequate ,
emergency planning for Shoreham, peinting out that "It]he ap ~ -
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- a. , f, plicant has outlined its plan for coping with emergencies an,d ,
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has conferred with New York State and._ local authorities with*' .
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respect to them. ','/ 6 EC at 285 (footnot'/oditted) i < ~
(emp.hk si. s'-
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added). The Appe.a1 Bo'ard concurred. '-Long Islanci Lightirid,, .
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Company (Shoreham' Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831, 851 (1973). 9 "
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Thus, the record shows that (1) the County supported the application for a construction permit for Shoreham; (2) emer-gency ple.nning for Shorehat was an issue from the beginning of this proceeding; (3) the County agreed that planning was -
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possible for Shoreham and engaged in discussions with LILCO regarding emergency planning before the construction permit for i -
! , g 5horeham was issued; and (4) intervenor LHSG's assertion in the
! r CP proceeding that adequate emergency planning was not possible i
! for Shoreham was rejected by the Board, based in part on the I-. i' g
i cooperation exhibited by LILCO and local authorities regarding or emergency planning. This cooperation between the County and HJ'.- _ 1 LCO was to continue for over a' decade.
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ITU B. The Continued Cooperation between LILCO "T/ and Suffolk County on Emergency Planning u..
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Following the issuance of the Shoreham construction l l C 1 permit the Suffolk County Department of Emergency Preparedness
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'7?;was directed by Executive-Order in February 1973 to develop a l '" Response Plan -- Specific Operating Procedures For Major
! Radiation Incidents." In early 1975 the State, the County, and i LILCO met to define the emergency planning roles,and responsibilities of each body. This was the first of many ses-l
> sions to support the development of the Suffolk County response plan.
In 1977 Mr. Norman Kelly, County Emergency Preparee.ena
. Director, was given overall responsibility for the offsite emergency plan, and the Suffolk County Department of r
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Transportation was directed to develop an evacuation plan.
After numerous working-level meetings and discussions between the County and LILCO, Suffolk County's " General Radiation Emergency Plan" was approved by County Executive John Klein on August 30, 1978. It was reviewed, and eventually accepted, by the New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness.
In late 1978 the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued NUREG-0396. It recom-mended that emergency planning be expanded to address Class 9 accidents that might result in the need to take emergency action out to 10 miles from the plant. In response to NUREG-0396, LILCO and certain State and County officials began updating Shoreham's evacuation plan to provide for an emergency response out to 10 miles.
Following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the NRC promulgated new emergency planning regulations, which are at issue now. As a result, LILCO and County Executive John Klein signed a " Memorandum of Understanding" on December 28, 1979, outlining the revised responsibilities of the Company and the County in emergency planning. Attachment 2. A cover letter to the Memorandum indicated that County Executive-elect Peter Cohalan had approved the terms of the agreement. Id.
i
To respond to the extensive post-TMI changes in the NRC's emergency planning requirements, LILCO began discussions with private consulting firms early in 1980 with an eye toward hiring outside consultants to assist the County and LILCO in updating the existing plan. Throughout 1980 planning discus-sions with suffolk County officials continued. County emergen-cy planning personnel inspected the Shoreham site on February 28, 1980. LILCO met with 60 representatives of Suffolk County departments in March and submitted nine volumes of material to the County Legislature's health Committee in conjunction with legislative hearings on nuclear power. The County continued discussions with private consulting firms. By fall, the County received a proposal to prepare a plan from EDS Nuclear Inc.
Chief Deputy County Executive John Gallagher met with LILCO representatives in September and December to discuss the pro-posal.
In February 1981 the County concluded that it could develop the revised emergency response plan on its own, since County personnel had already worked on the original plan and were familiar with local conditions. LILCO Vice President Dr.
Matthew C. Cordaro, Suffolk County Planning Department Director Dr. Lee Koppelman, and Mr. Gallagher signed a contract on March 15, 1981, calling for the County to produce a revised l l
radiological response plan within six months at a cost of
$245,000 to be paid by LILCo. The Suffolk County Legislature, however, rejected the initial contract because it had not been consulted on the terms. In September 1981 an amended contract with substantially the same terms was submitted to the County Legislature and accepted (Attachment 3), and LILCO paid the Suffolk County Planning Department $150,000 as the first in-stallment on the contract. The balance of the contract
($95',000) was due upon completion of the plan on March 18, 1982.
The contract is described as being between LILCO "and
.the County of Suffolk, acting through its Department of Planning." Contract at 1. It further states that "[t]he DEPARTMENT represents that it has read and is familiar with the applicable Federal Regulations, set forth in Exhibit B attached hereto and that the DEPARTMENT believes it can develop a County Radiclogical Emergency Response Plan which complies with such I
regulations." Contract at 1, 52. The scope of work includes preparing a draft and final County plan, integrating the plan with State and LILCO plans, developing implementing procedures, 7 preparing and distributing public education materials, l providing expert witness testimony concerning planning work, and training emergency planning personnel in coordination with the State and LILCO.
l-
Dr. Lee Koppelman, Director of the Suffolk County Planning Department, was to supervise the effort. The task of actually revising the plan fell to two Suffolk County Planners, Robert Meunkle and Laura Palmer.4/ In a deposition taken in conjunction with Phase I Emergency Planning issues (see Attachment 4), Mr. Meunkle described his involvement in Suffolk County's planning efforts, including his close working rela-tionship with LILCO, particularly with Mr. Charles A. Daverio, who, from early 1980 until spring 1982, was Chairman of LILCO's Emergency Planning Task Force:
Q. Who did you work with with LILCO on the siren system?
A. Mr. Daverio.
Q. Did Ms. Palmer have any involvement in that work?
4/ Mr. Meunkle took specialized courses in traffic engineer-ing and transportation at Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn in 1970, and was employed by the New York Highway Transportation Studies Group and the New York State Department of Public '.iorks i
before coming to work for Suffolk County in 1972. He is cur-
! rently Assistant Director of Traffic Safety in Suffolk County.
Meunkle Tr. 5-10.
Ms. Palmer received a B.S. in forestry and a B.S. in land-scape architecture and engineering from Syracuse University.
f She began work for Suffolk County in 1978 as an engineering l aide in the Suffolk County Department of Transportation, where
, she gained a background in Suffolk County transportation routes. After one year as an aide she was given the professional title of planner. Palmer Tr. 5-7 (Attachment 5).
A. Yes.
Meunkle Tr. 44.
Q. Who did you discuss (prompt notification] with?
A. Specifically, I can recall Mr. Daverio, Mr. Renz, and other technical people from the utility at a meeting where prompt notification was discussed.
Q. Tell me everything you can recall about those dis-cussions that you had with Mr. Daverio and Mr. Renz.
A. The thrust of the meeting was more oriented to the tone alerts and to the siren system with respect to their activation. As I recall, the bulk of the meeting was concentrated on that area, the tone coded signals.
We had brought a communications expert from the [Suffolk County] Police Department with us who was familiar with that aspect of the overall public -- prompt notification system concepts. Also at the meeting, we were briefed on the Wyle proposal, what they intended to do and how they intended to accomplish it.
Meunkle Tr. 57-58.
Q. Did you consult with anyone else other than the people at Brookhaven with respect to recommendations for a protective action?
A. The utility.
Q. Who did you contact at the utility?
A. Mr. Daverio.
Q. This is a general question. I am not just talking about protective action now. During the time you had Y
contact with Mr. Daverio, would there ever be an occasion for the County, or through you, to make any demands on Mr. Daverio for any type of services, logistical support, information, anything of that sort?
A. Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell me generally the demands that you made on Mr. Daverio?
A. I wouldn't categorize it as demands.
Q. How about requests? Do you like that better?
A. Let's say we had what I consider to be a professional working relationship with the people at the utility. We had a common goal of an emergency plan, and we did whatever was necessary to reach that goal. Yes, we made requests of the utility for services.
Q. All right, sir. Insofar as you were concerned then, did the utility respond in a professional manner?
[ Discussion by counsel omitted.)
A. Absolutely.
Meunkle Tr. 90-91.
This information is consistent with the affidavit filed with the Board on August 1, 1982, in support of LILCO's-appli-cation for issuance of a subpoena, in which Mr. Daverio indi-cated the extent of the cooperation between Suffolk County and LILCO:
I talked by telephone and met frequently with Robert C. Meunkle and Laura Palmer, of the Suffolk County Department of Transportation and then the Suffolk County Planning Department, to discuss both Suffolk County's and LILCO's emer-gency planning.
f In preparing its emergency plan, LILCO l_ relied directly on certain of the plan-ning efforts of Mr. Meunkle and Ms.
Palmer. For example, l
- 1) Communications: the system for communicating with Suffolk County, described in LILCO plan Section 7.2, was developed through discussions with Mr. Meunkle and Ms. Palmer.
l (2) Equipment: Suffolk County Health l Department officials provided LILCO a list of equipment, most of which LILCO was willing to provide the County (radiation monitoring equip-ment, for example). Mr. Meunkle and Ms. Palmer were present at the l meeting at which this list was presented to LILCO and may be able to provide information about the list and its genesis.
(3) Evacuation zones: the map of 2-mile, 5-mile and 10-mile radius evacuation zones (Figure 3 in Appendix A of the County plan),
developed by Mr. Meunkle and Ms.
Palmer, was used by LILCO in developing its protective action rec-ommendations.
(4) Prompt Notification System: the placement of sirens by LILCO was in-fluenced by the County evacuation zone map (Figure 3 mentioned above).
The tone alerts were discussed with the County planners Meunkle and Palmer.
In her deposition (see Attachment 5), Ms. Palmer explained why she and Mr. Meunkle were chosen to do the emer-gency planning work, and described the scope of that work:
Q. As I understand it, the reason that the planning department, you, and Mr. Meunkle were given the respon-sibility to develop the Suffolk County emergency plan instead of outside consultants was to take advantage of the recognized experience and familiarity that you all had with Suffolk County?
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A. That is correct.
Q. In doing all the work that you did do on the emer-gency plan that resulted in the final product in April of 1982, did you take into account as part of your work various local conditions that are unique to Suffolk County, such as its population and demography and its topography and its climate?
A. Yes.
Q. And its geography, all those local conditions?
A. Yes.
Q. I take it you were able to do so in part based on your own longstanding familiarity, experience with the area?
A. Yes, I was.
Palmer Tr. 26-27.
LILCO continued to cooperate with Suffolk County in exchanging and refining similar information from other nuclear plants en emergency planning, population figures, and meteoro-l 1
logical data. Most of the sections of the County plan were l
completed by February 1982. At that time County planners indi-cated they would need assistance on the Health Department section if they were to finish their work by March 18th. LILCO offered to obtain assistance from Stone & Webster Engineering y Corporation to complete that section of the plan. Meunkle Tr.
Ex. 15 at 2.
1 C. The Sea Change In mid-February 1982, a great change apparently occurred in the thinking of Suffolk County officials. On that date they
, announced the hiring of their present counsel in the licensing proceeding, and the very next day Dr. Koppelman sent a letter to Dr. Cordaro stating as follows:
We wish to inform you that based on cur-rent evaluation we believe an apparent conflict of interest exists in accepting
, your funds for the preparation of the County's Radiological Emergency Response
, Plan. Accordingly, we will return the funds you advanced and will not call for any further funds.
The' County will continue, as required by law, to develop a plan consistent with the requirements of law and its obliga-tion to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people.5/
i.
5/ Dr. Matthew C. Cordaro responded in a letter to the County dated March 17, 1982, stating the following:
LILCO, however, has requested neither the return of.the $150,000 paid to date nor the discharge of its obligation to make final payment. The Company is at a loss to understand why the County believes that acceptance of these pay-l 'ments constitutes a conflict of interest.
1
( LILCO is relying on the County to perform its obligations under this contract and will be damaged severely if the County fails to perform these obligations fully.
Attachment 6 at 1. The County subsequently sent LILCO a check in the amount of $150,000. LILCO has not cashed it and re'ards .
the contract as still in effect.
- l
Press accounts quoted the County's new lead attorney as stating that emergency planning would be a " centerpiece" of the County's participation in the hearings.
Shortly thereafter, the Suffolk County Legislature adopted Resolution No. 262-1982, authorizing the County to hire certain consultants to prepare yet another emergency plan. Ms.
Palmer explained in her deposition that she and Mr. Meunkle were abruptly relieved of their emergency planning duties:
Q. Without going into additional massive amounts of documents before me that chronicle the work that you and Mr. Meunkle engaged in as part of the emergency plan, is it fair to say that the extent of your work was very substantial to prepare the Suffolk County emergency plan?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. There came a time when you stopped working on the Suffolk County Emergency Plan; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. That was sometime in March of 1982?
A. I would say closer to April.
Q. But for the change in circumstances, do you think 9 that a final plan would have been reached by May of 1982?
[ Objection of counsel omitted.]
A. Definitely.
Q. Let me hand you a handwritten document -- it appears to be captioned " Meeting and Conference Logs,"
-- and ask if you recognize that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is it?
l A. Basically, this is a piece of my own recordkeeping which catalogued the dates of particular meetings relat-ed to emergency planning since, I believe it was, 1980 to present.
[The document is Exhibit 2 to the Palmer deposition.]
Q. Palmer Exhibit 2 essentially was a work diary that you kept while you were working on emergency planning?
A. That's correct.
Q. Exhibit 2 ends with May 18th, I assume, 1982 entry.
Why did it stop then?
A. Basically, that was the last contact we had with anyone in regard to the emergency planning project. We were no longer actively working on it.
Q. My question, to clarify something I have never un-
- derstood, is what happened to the Suffolk County emer-
! gency plan and why did it happen?
[ Objection of counsel omitted. Counsel for Suffolk i County directed the. witness not to answer this question.]
Q. What did you do when you stopped working on emer-j gency planning, Suffolk County?
l i
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A. Basically, it was to reread some of the work that we had previously done and make corrections, such as ty-pographical errors, etc., that we never had time to re-ally look at before; make sure that all our files and correspondence were organized in case such material was required by our lawyers. In general, it was just to clean up the project in the best way possible, tie up loose ends.
Q. Then what did you do?
l A. Subsequently, I was transferred to the Department of Public Works out in Yaphank.
Q. Was that transfer at your request?
A. No , it was not.
Q. Who had requested it?
A. .The transfer was done through resolutions through the Suffolk County Legislature.
Q. My earlier question was at whose instance was the transfer initiated?
[ Counsel for Suffolk County objected and instructed the witness not to answer.)
Palmer Tr. 43-50.
Similarly, Mr. Meunkle testified during his deposition
. that he was abruptly discharged from his emergency planning duties:
t Q. When did you last have any duties and responsibilities with respect to the emergency plan?
A. April 15th of this year.
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{
Q. When your duties and responsibilities in respect of the emergency plan ended on April 15th of this year, were you given a new job title?
A. No.
Q. You were just relieved of those duties and responsibilities?
A. That's correct.
Q. Mr. Meunkle, what is your understanding of why ycu were relieved of your duties on April 15, 1982?
[ Counsel for Suffolk County objected and instructed the witness not to answer.]
Meunkle Tr. 22-24.
After he was directed to abandon his emergency planning efforts, Mr. Meunkle wrote a memorandum to Frank Jones, Deputy County Executive, emphasizing the cooperation that had existed between Suffolk County and LILCO, and describing the nature of the emergency planning effort at the time it was abruptly broken off by the County:
The purpose of this memo is to clarify some aspects of what has been done with respect to the SCRERP [Suffolk Courty Radiological Emergency Response Plan].
Initially, let me indicate that every-thing you have to date was written and prepared by the County.
I must also state that, until the very recent intervention by the County at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings, l
we were working in a cooperative vein with LILCO, therefore, their preparation and printing of the exibits that were designed by the County were to save the County time and money. Subsequent to the lawsuit [Suffolk County's intervention in the operating license proceeding), I received instructions from Dr. Koppelman to end our formal relationship with LILCO and to get from the utility whatever was then in the pipeline. This has been done.
Meunkle Tr. Ex. 15 at 1.
John Gallagher, Chief Deputy County Executive, explained in a May 17th letter to Dr. Cordaro (Attachment 7) that "given that the County is in an adversarial relationship to LILCO in the pending licensing hearings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the County believes there would be the appearance of a conflict of interest by receiving any funds from LILCO."
The let?.er closed with the fallowing admonition:
It is the County's hope that LILCO will promptly terminate its resistence to the County's good faith emergency planning efforts. An increasing amount of the County's time is being consumed by the need to respond to seemingly belligerent actions of LILCO that challenge the County's current effort. I ask that you convey to your colleagues these serious sentiments, and that LILCO refrain from escalating further with rhetoric or deed any difference which exists between LILCO and the County with respect to the criti-cal goal of effective radiological emer-gency preparedness.
D. The County's Behavior While Drafting its Plan
- 1. Suffolk County Participation in This Proceeding After abandoning in February the almost-completed plan prepared by Meunkle and Palmer, the County delayed considera-tion of offsite planning in this proceeding for almost a year, slipping the completion dates of its planning efforts from October 1, 1982 to October 18 to "the latter half of November."
The plan ultimately emerged during the first week in December, and the County announced that hearings were to be held the fol-lowing January.
In response to the Board's inquiry with respect to inte-grated planning, the County suggested that " harmonious integra-tion can be attempted if consideration of all emergency plan-ning issues were deferred until after the County's plan is developed" and that " integration is impossible, as a practical matter, in the atmosphere of contentiousness in which the parties must square off to contest ' Phase I' issues." Suffolk County's Response to the Board's Inquiry with Respect to Integrated Planning, dated August 20, 1982. That atmosphere, of course, stemmed from the County's oon actions regarding emergency planning. This behavior culminated in the County
defaulting on Phase I emergency planning issues, after focusing the parties' and the Board's attention on emergency planning for months by conducting discovery,-drafting contentions, fil-ing written testimony, and preparing for cross-examination.
- 2. The Suffolk County Planning Process The County asserts in its motion to terminate that "Suffolk County in early 1982 instituted a comprehensive plan-ning process to develop the best possible radiological emergen-cy response plan." SC Motion to Terminate at 1. It supports this assertion by saying that Suffolk County assembled "a team of nationally recognized experts to perform various analyses, studies and surveys necessary to effective planning on Long Island," expended $600,000, and stated in Suffolk County
, Resolution 262-1982 that the " plan shall not be operable and shall not be deemed adequate and capable of being implemented until such time as it is approved by the Suffolk County legis-lature." SC Motion to Terminate at 1-2.6/ Although the
"/
6 A subsequent resolution adopted in May stated that Suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test or implement any radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Plant" until a plan is approved by the Legislature. See Resolution 456-1982. The County's many reso-lutions on emergency planning echo a single theme: there is preparedness when the County proclaims it, and conversely there is no preparedness when the County refuses to declare it.
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County emphasizes that it is "the local conditions" on Long Island that prevent it ficom going forward with emergency plan-ning, none of its consulta nts had previously been involved in emergency planning for Long Island.
At the end of eight months' work, the County produced the draft Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated November 1982 (draft County plan). It has two distin- -
guishing features: (1) it provides for a 20-mile emergency planning zone for protective action taken on behalf of the pop-ulation (including evacuation), and (2) it requires additional
" development." Draft County plan at 3, 18. As LILCO noted in its written statement to the Legislature-of January 14, 1983,7/
and as noted by the County in its draft jlan, the further "de-velopment" includes such items as (a) implementing procedures; (b) written agreements with hospitals, relocation facilities, governmental agencies and the like; (c) training, exercises, and drills for emergency workers; (d) resolution of the question whether bus drivers, firemen, and other emergency workers will report for work during an emergency; (e) public education; and (f) integration with the State and LILCO plans.
7/ This statement was served on the Board and emergency plan-ning parties on February 1, 1983.
l I
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In short, the draft County plan is not a " plan" at all within a reasonable meaning of that word, and it contains very little if any information that is site-specific to Shoreham or Long Island. It is a generic blueprint, organized along the lines of NUREG-0654 and identifying the sorts of items one must l develop to plan for an emergency at a nuclear power plant.
The County states in its supplemental brief at 10 that the draft County plan focuses particularly on the planning and preparedness problems caused by the special circumstances and conditions present on Long Island, such as the Island's elongated narrow shape, its severely limited roadway system, its quickly changing wind patterns, and its local demographic features.
These items relating to siting of Shoreham were considered 11 years ago in the Environmental Statement for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, dated September 1972, which was prepared by the AEC in conjunction with Shoreham's construction permit application.
After participating as a party in these hearings since 1977, and engaging LILCO and the Board in litigation for a year over myriad issues, the County now asks the Board to terminate this proceeding because the County has rejected a draft plan produced unilaterally within the last year. The County's actions since February 18, 1982, abrogate 12 years of cooperation between Suffolk County and LILCO; that is clear.
But to conclude that Suffolk County will never be involved with emergency planning for Shoreham, as the County has in its pleadings, one must ignore those many years of cooperation and County effort, and focus only upon the curious behavior re-cently exhibited by County representatives.
E. The Legislative Hearings The County states in its supplemental brief at 8 that, pursuant to its responsibility "for the protection of the health, welfare and safety of its citizens," the Suffolk County Legislature adopted Resolution Number 262-1982 outlining "the County's comprehensive program" to develop a plan. Part of that program includes approval by the Suffolk County Legislature of any plan before it can be submitted to State and Federal authorities for review. The County describes its review process in its supplemental brief at 11, citing the many witnesses appearing during public hearings, the days of testi-mony, and the pages of transcript. These statistics present the impression of a thorough, systematic, substantive review of the draft County plan. An examination of the legislative hear-
)
ings, however, shows that the legislators lacked knowledge about emergency planning and nuclear power and did not focus upon the-emergency plan before them.
I i
- 1. The Legislators Are Not Knowledgeable About Nuclear Power and About the Con-tents of the Draft County Emergency Plan In the draft Report of the Suffolk County Legislature, the County's special counsel states that offsite planning "is a matter which a county is primarily and uniquely qualified to' address." Attachment 8 at 1. An examination of the legisla-tive record, however, shows that for whatever reason, be it lack of information presented to them or lack of attention to the information before them, the legislators did not know the terms of the draft County plan they were considering. In most instances, the draft County plan addressed the questions posed by the legislators during the hearings. On evacuation, for ex-ample, one legislator stated:
Legislator: I think routes have to be planned. I.think there has to be -- just getting in your car and leaving, is may be simple to say but it is not going to be simple when it happens.
i Herrg/: There will still need to be planning. They will still need to be informed in advance as to what the best route for them is going to be under the several contingencies.
Believe me, I do not think it is simple at all.
I Legislator: I mean, we have two-way streets; we are going to have convert them to one-way streets.
g/ Mr. Phillip Herr is one of the County's consultants who worked on the draft County plan.
l l l
Herr: No, sir. At the moment we are not proposing that. At the moment we are not proposing that any streets that are two-way be converted to one-way.
Legislative Hearings Transcript 52 (hereinafter Leg. Tr. ).
The draft County plan indicates on pages 8, 17, and 98-100 that streets will remain two-way.
A second legislator stated incorrectly that the draft County plan does not provide for sheltering, relocation centers, or medical services:
Sheltering has been one of my problems for a year now, ever since we have been addressing this issue. Nowhere in our evacuation plan or our emergency plan is there shelter mentioned. You want to take people out of their homes.
You want to put them in their cars and take them out of the area. Where are they going to go? Are you going to provide shelter? Are you going to provide for their food, their medical at-tention?
Leg. Tr. 210-11. The draft County plan describes sheltering at pages 5-6 of its introduction and at pages 4 and 9 of the text; medical services at pages 17 of the introduction and 116 of the text; and relocation centers at pages 17 of the introduction and 94 of the text.
This legislator also indicated an unfamiliarity with the emergency planning criteria against which the draft County plan would be measured:
Mr. Cordaro9/, let's go over your state-ment. On page two, you refer to the Federal Regulations of the EPZ. I don't know what the Federal regulations are, or how they were designed, but I am just questioning whether in their regulations there was an area of Long Island taken into consideration or are we talking about flat lands such as we have out west, or up north.
And, this legislator expressed a lack of knowledge regarding nuclear power plants in general and Shoreham in particular:
Legislator: What size is the reactor at Shoreham?
Cordaro: It is 820 megawatts.
Legislator: Are there any other reactors of that size in the United States?
Cordaro: Yes, a number.
Legislator: The design of the reactor at the Shoreham plant, is it the same design as other plants in the United States?
Cordaro: Yes, there are a number of similar reac-tors, the same model of reactor and the same containment.
Legislator: This is all steam?
Cordaro: A boiling water reactor, yes.
Legislator: What type of fuel? I have a car and I pull into the gas station, and there is a high octane, low octane, regular, unleaded.
What type of fuel? . . . .
4 9/ Dr. Matthew C. Cordaro, LILCO Vice President of Engineering, testified before the Legislature on January 18, 1983. See Leg. Tr. 167.
1 How long does it take to cool down and what is the radioactivity that would be released ,
when you removed the head of the reactor? .
Will he [an employee working at the plant) take home any radioactivity to his family?
Leg. Tr. 209-210.
. A third legislator was confused about the size of the emergency planning zone:
Let me ask another one. You have
.) presently set up sirens all over the 12-mile zone. Whose idea was the sirens?
Leg. Tr. at 298. A 10-mile emergency planning zone, as provid-ed in NRC regulations, is used by LILCO in conjunction with i
sirens. In fact, the County's departure from the 10-mile zone provided in regulations is a major distinguishing feature of f the draft County plan.
- A fourth legislator indicated he was unfamiliar with the l
procedure for notifying County officials regarding an accident-at Shoreham:
Legislator: Dr. Cordaro, in the event of an accident the plant will depend on a LILCO employee to initiate the procedures. Who at the Shoreham plant is the person who will be i
responsible for seeing that officials of Suffolk County should be notified?
l Cordaro: It will always be the person who assumes the role of Emergency Director . . . .
l l Legislator: Does he have any other authority besides l that?
l i
Cordaro: Normally he is the shift supervisor who is responsible for what goes on in the control room and what goes on on the site during the shift.
Legislator: Is he in a position to establish in his own mind the problems as far as economics with the calling of an emergency versus the safety question?
Cordaro: There are no economics involved at all.
The procedures are set forth in detail. He is required to act when certain emergency action levels are reached regardless of the economic consequences.
Legislator: This has not come up at all today, but I have to ask that question. Is LILCO prepared to allow a Suffolk team to come in for a full safety inspection?10/
Leg. Tr. 321-22. Notification of Suffolk County officials is described in detail in the draft County plan at pages 44-58.
A fifth legislator criticized the witnesses for not hav-ing studied events that have never occurred:
Legislator.: Have you personally wicnessed and done interviews with large movements of people
[as in an evacuation]? Have you witnessed such events?
Miletill/: I have done. In fact my doctoral 10/ The discussion of a full safety inspection continues through page 330.
11/ Dr. Dennis Mileti, Associate Professor of Sociology at Colorado State University, testified before the Legislature on January 18, 1983, in conjunction with LILCO's presentation.
See Leg. Tr. 182.
l
dissertation ten years ago was on warning ;
on evacuation at the Rapid City flood.
Legislator: The question was, where in the United States have there been evacuations as a result of a nuclear accident?
Mileti: I am happy to say in very few places. I have not done any interviews with human beings in response to their movement be-cause of risk associated with a nuclear power plant.
Legislator: So you have done no work in that area?
Mileti: I have done extensive work in how human beings respond to warnings of emergencies.
'l Legislator: I am saying have you personally observed and done interviews after evacuation be-cause of an accident at a nuclear power plant?
Mileti: But conceptually -- ,
Legislator: That is what our consultants were doing also, conceptual. So your opinions can also be characterized as random specula . e tions as well. Let me finish my comment please. Since you have no prior experience with the movements of people after a nucle-ar accident, you are just speculating what people's perception might be. You are speculating what their conduct might be, because you have no prior experience to '
, il gauge, do you?
Dynes 12/: I don't know whether you heard me in the l beginning. I said I was head of the task force for the Kemeny Commission as such. .
I 12/ Dr. Russell Dynes, Professor of Sociology at the ' '
University of Delaware, testified before the Legislature on 4 January 18, 1983, in conjunction with LILCO's presentation. ,
See Leg. Tr. 182.
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Legislator: So?
Dynes: So that is Three Mile Island. The President's Commission as such to look at that particular situation. It involved looking at evacuation.
Legislator: The other gentleman did answer the question. You clouded it. I did not mean to imply that you haven't looked at various i
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scenarios. I am saying the Three Mile Island accident did not result in large evacuations of people from one region to another.
Dynes: I think he was answering you from another viewpoint. You asked specifically in terms of a nuclear thing. The only parallel is Three Mile Island. I commented that I have studied that.
Legislator: Yes, you have studied it, but it was a sit-uation, and thankfully so, that did not result in the evacuation of large numbers of people from communities. Correct?
Dynes: That is'the only example. If you are asking specifically, we argue essentially, if you look at a wide variety of behaviors and a wide variety of situations, to look at the commonalities among that, in other words, the similarities in nuclear power involves threats in the same way that hur-ricanes, tornados, and other types of things.
Legislator: That is your assumption.
Dynes: That is the assumption. That is the as-i sumption of most people in the field.
Legislator: You are making assumptions, but you have never experienced, you have never done work h based on events after an evacuation because of a nuclear accident.
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The excerpts quoted above indicate that the legislators lacked the knowledge about nuclear power and their draft County hlantomakeadeterminationregardingtheadequacyoftheplan k before them.
, 2. Suffolk County Is Attempting to l Regulate Nuclear Power through Its Review of the County Emergency Plan
- $1
/ 1
/;/ On the first day of the legislative hearings (January y j.
m 17, 1983), the presiding officer opened the proceeding by
~
.saying:
y
!/
y ,C- I would emphasize to those of you who e c;: would be acting as committee chairman or y
p' ' -
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chairpersons [at each day's hearings) 7 -
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that-the subjects are and should be
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,7 '; confined only to the [ draft County) plan that we are discussing, and it would be inappropriate to discuss any other issues
[V ;' such as the relative merits of nuclear
, power.
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' Leg. Tr. 3. The epterpts below illustrate that this statement
./ was ignored, and that the Legislature in its review did consider the relative merits of nuclear power, and not just the
. ~ draft County plan.
(j First, a legislator questioned County consultant Philip
Herr regarding the siting of the plant:
1
< Legislator: Let me ask one final question. I can't resist asking. As a physicist, and if you
< -c7 b __ _ . _ . . _ _ .. _ - .
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were on the siting committee, would you place Shoreham where it is today?
Herr: If I were a physicist?
Legislator: You said you were a physicist.
Herr: No , I didn't. No. No. No, I, am a planner.
Legislator: That is even better. As a planner, would you place Shoreham where it is today?
Herr: I haven't really thought about that. I think that it takes a lot of considerations that I have not really looked at . . . .
Leg. Tr. at 62.
Another legislator stated the purpose of the hearings:
We are in a new industry, looking for the kind of regulations and the kind of reactability of the public so that there will be some maximum protection for the public, and that is precisely what the heart of this particular hearing and this particular process is about, and that is why we have to make a judgment call on what we believe to be the best in the in-terest af the County of Suffolk.
Leg. Tr. 228.
A third legislator discussed at length the risks of nu-clear power, and the insurance available to industry:
Legislator: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Cordaro, your
! comments with respect to probabilistic risk assessment indicate a faith in the safety of nuclear power which I find inspiring. I was wondering, given your faith in limited i risk, if LILCO wishes at some point to insure homeowners with respect to possible property loss. Would you consider that a profitable enterprise?
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ b
. -- _ . - - _ _ . - ~
Cordaro: Homeowners are insured by the Price Anderson Act approach to insdrance, which is now being assumed totally by the nuclear power industry. In effect, we do insure
. homeowners right now by contributing to the pool that would be available in the event of an accident, which would cover 4
liabilities as a result of that accident.
Legislator: The fact remains that there is still limit-ed liability with respect to private utilities and nuclear power, and that is why homeowners cannot take out insurance policies, just like they take policies.for auto and homeowners' insurance, fire insur-ance, auto insurance. They cannot take out an insurance policy to protect their homes
. in case of a nuclear accident. They just l cannot get a policy like that, which leads me to believe that perhaps the insurance industry knows something that you don't j
know. Perhaps the insurance industry --
they don't place much faith in the probabilistic risk assessments that you place in them. I think they see something that perhaps you don't see. And I th.'nk I would like to add at this point that the mathematical modeling that the probabilistic risk assessment involves ba-sically goes back to Mr. Rasmussen in the 1960's and mid 70's, and the so called Rasmussen Report, and that mathematical 1 modeling, which is still being used, and I also believe our County consultants employed it to a certain extent, and is still being used throughout the country, has come under some criticism by various professional organizations like the Union of' Concerned Scientists and the American Physical Society. So, this mathematical modeling that is going on is something i
about which there is not a uniform consensus as to its accuracy. . . . We can play a lot of games with numbers and I l
would not like to use the mathematical modeling that you employ to make any judg-ment about emergency planning in Suffolk County.
Leg. Tr. 228-230.
The legislators also considered (1) the transportation of nuclear waste, Leg. Tr. 287-90, (2) whether it would be more expensive for the ratepayers to operate Shoreham or abandon it, and (3) the ability of LILCO to convert other oil-fired units to coal. Leg. Tr. 308-19.
Suffolk County's interest in the merits of nuclear power in general, rather than in the details of the County plan, is also reflected in the draft Legislative Report written by the County's special counsel:
Because of the questions raised concern-ing the use of [probabilistic risk as-sessment] the legislature believes that it cannot rely on the work of both LILCO's and the County's experts in regard to the probability of an accident and especially core melt accident and its consequences, and views such data with skepticism.
[A]ny discuseion of the low probability of an accident which would require an evacuation is irrelevant.
l
I Any considerations of developing radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham nuclear power reactor must begin by confronting the one single most overriding feature of the area, and that is that the reactor is built on an is-land.
Given their responsibilities in proxim-ity, the legislature believes that both the State and Federal government should defer to the County's judgment as to what is in the best interests of its citizens and their public health and safety.
Legislative Report 1, 7-8, 12, 21-22 (Attachment 8).
- 3. The County Determined Well before the Legislative Hearings Began that No Plan Would Be Accepted Suffolk County decided to reject the notion of any emer-gency planning before it began its hearing process. On the first day of the hearings, one legislator stated his opposition to the plan (based upon the site of Shoreham):
I don't know that the people that I represent could accept any plan that leaves them stranded at a geographical dead-end of an island in the event of some kind of mishap which we all say is
, infinitesimally remote [ sic] possible, and yet it could or may occur. It depends upon the persons that you speak to that give you these statistical levels of probability that they may or may not occur at all. The point is that we have .
a nuclear [ plant) that has been
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constructed, and the risk assessment that has been made by various experts, but no matter where you look the substantial communities of eastern Long Island, espe-cially substantial in terms of population during certain times of the year as I said, are virtually excluded. . . Based upon the risk that I see and the exclu-sion of a substantial part of Long l Island, I dont't see how we can adopt a l plan like this.
Leg. Tr. 192-3.
In response to a scientist who emphasized the low proba-bility of an accident in urging that emergency planning contin-ue for Shoreham, another legislator rejected statistical probabilities in connection with emergency planning:
Doctor, I really recognize and appreciate your talent in the field of nuclear sci-ence, as well as the gentlemen who have spoken before you, and as well as all the statistics that we have received in the past and will receive many, many more, I am sure, before this is resolved, but I am sorry, there is just one thing that keeps going through my head.
You say one in one thousand, one in ten thousand, one in a million, one in a trillion. That only brings back to my thoughts a vessel that left England many years ago that was supposed to be sink-proof and it sunk on its maiden voyage.
I mean, things like this happen. Don't
- tell me--I mean, don't insult me by saying one in ten billion years, because it could happen the day Shoreham happens.
We do not know. We are not God, and nei-ther are you. Therefore, it is our job to protect everyone on this island.
l
Leg. Tr. 443-444.
On the fourth day of legislative hearings, members of the public were invited to make three-minute statements to the Legislature, reflecting their views on Shoreham. The first speaker began by saying "I am here to implore everyone in this l'
room who has the power to do so to prevent permanently the opening of the Shoreham plant." Leg. Tr. 468. The statement was long (see Leg. Tr. 468-472) and detailed many grievances regarding Shoreham and emergency planning. A legislator's remarks in response illustrate the Legislature's predisposition regarding Shoreham:
Legislator: Excuse me. I have extended your speech a few minutes.
Levy: I am sorry. Thank you.
Legislator: May I just make one point? I know that you are here to express your views, and I believe that we all have the same feelings on this particular issue, and to give everyone a fair chance, please keep it at three minutes. So if you can just summa-rize, and leave the statement with the Clerk, every legislator will read it.
Leg. Tr. 471 (emphasis added).
In response to a statement by the Executive Director for the New York State Committee for Jobs and Energy Independence, who represented the New York Building and Construction Trades Council at the AFL-CIO, and spoke in support of Shoreham, an emergency plan and the operation of Shoreham, another legislator stated the following:
Sir, you just spoke of cooperation.
There can only be cooperation when people and institutions agree on goals. The goals of Long Island Lighting Company and the goals of this county government are diametrically opposed, and under those circumstances, there can only be confron-tation, and we do not shrink from that responsibility Leg. Tr. 526.
At the public hearings, several school children spoke against Shoreham:
Schoolchild: I don't know much about nuclear power, but I do know that I am against anything that endangers my life and even if we do make it without getting any harm to us, what about if we do grow up and have children. What is going to happen to them?
Are they going to be deformed? Is there going to be something physically wrong with them? I think all the kids here would like to grow up without any harm to them or, if something should happen, that they might have something wrong with their kids if they do have kids. Thank you.
Legislator: Thank you. Out of the mouths of babes.
Leg. Tr. 537.
. At the close of the day, the legislato;s were invited to comment. One legislator closed his remarks with the following statement:
[S]tay with the fight to the end, [and] I think wisdom might eventually prevail and maybe we will show that there can be no evacuation planning and emergency plan-ning for Long Island, and maybe we will prove that there is no justification for Shoreham to open.
Thanks very much and stay with it.
I
- Leg. Tr. 574-575.
A letter dated January 19th -- three days into the two weeks of hearings and one month before the Legislature voted on the draft County plan -- from a legislator to the President of the People's Action Coalition of Suffolk County states pre-cisely the reason why, in the legislator's view, the County was holding legislative hearings:
As you will remember, I openly expressed my displeasure of . . . legis-lation relative to the Shoreham Plant. I maintained at the time that the most simple and direct answer to the problem would be institution of legal action by the County of Suffolk at the time the NRC decides to issue the license and
( demanding that LILCO prove the effec-l tiveness of a viable Evacuation Plan. It l stands to reason they could not do so in a million years and then, in my way of thinking, they could not activate the plant.
The purpose of [the] resolution
[ establishing a new planning effort for
! the County], as I see it, was to spend four million dollars of taxpayers' money, 7
not counting the untold millions that will be paid in the event any so-called Evacuation Plan is implemented.
I understand your pocition that the plan should not be adopted; however, the reasoning behind the hearings for a so-called plan, at the present time, is to use the facts presented as a basis for a future lawsuit. In this case, [the legislator promoting the planning resolu-tion] has saddled the people with an ex-pense that is atrocious, unreasonable and, in my humble opinion, with no affir-mative result in the future . . . .
(Emphasis added.) A copy of the letter is Attachment 1 to this brief.
F. The Result of the Legislative Hearings The Legislature's flurry of activity in January and February culminated in Resolution 1196-83, which provides that "no local radiological emergency plan for a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham will protect the health, safety, and wel-fare of Suffolk County residents." The resolution passed the Legislature 15 to 1, following brief consideration of reports from the special counsel to the Legislaturc (see Attachment 8),
and Peter Cohalan, the Suffolk County Executive (see Attachment 9). Mr. Cohalan, abrogating the years of Suffolk County support for and acquiescence in constructing Shoreham (and his own approval of previous emergency planning efforts), stated t
publicly the day before the vote was taken that "there never can be emergency preparedness" for Shoreham and that "Shoreham should never operate." See Attachment 10 at 3.
l f
l In light of the long history of County-LILCO cooperation l
on emergency planning, it is quite possible that Mr. Cohalan's i
statement is not the final word on County participation in emergency planning for Shoreham. Even taking his statement at face value, it comes at least 10 years too late.
! G. LILCO's Continued Pursuit of Offsite Planning While the preparation and later the Legislature's hear-ings on the draft County plan went forward, LILCO continued to develop the offsite plan begun by Mr. Meunkle and Ms. Palmer.
Shortly after the County had abandoned that plan LILCO had explored with the County the possibility of refining the plan and using it as an interim plan while the draft County plan was being developed. The County refused. Therefore, on April 29, 1982, LILCO met with New York State Commissioner of Health David Axelrod, and Disaster Preparedness Commission Chairman William Hennesey, and it was agreed that the offsite plan prepared by Meunkle and Palmer would be submitted to the State for review against emergency planning criteria.
LILCO submitted the plan on May 10 with a letter of transmittal specifically noting that Suffolk County did not endorse it. Attachment 11.14/ It was reviewed by the State 14/ LILCO has never asserted that this offsite plan is endorsed by the County. Still, the County states without ex-(footnote continued) i I
and returned to L'LCO with comments. LILCO responded to the comments, amended the plan, and resubmitted the plan to the DPC in the fall of 1982.15/
The DPC Staff subsequently determined that the plan satisfied State and Federal requirements. A hearing was sched-(' uled for December 8th for the entire DPC to consider the LILCO-submitted offsite emergency plan; the County was invited.
Rather than participate in the administrative process before the DPC, the County sought and obtained a temporary restraining order from New York State Supreme Court Justice Edward F.
Conway on December 7th, precluding the DPC meeting until a pre-liminary injunction hearing could be held. On December 15 attorneys for Suffolk County, New York State, and LILCO met (footnote continued) planation in its Supplemental Brief that "[o]n May 10, 1982, LILCO submitted to the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission ('DPC') a document contained in two loose-leaf bind-ers entitled 'Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan'." Supplemental Brief at 13. But as indicated, (1) the plan was accompanied by a letter from Dr. Cordaro to the DPC
' expressly stating that the County had disavowed the plan, and (2) the Chief of the Suffolk County District Attorney's Special
-Investigation Unit, following an investigation urged upon him by the Suffolk County Executive and Legislature, found on l
November 17, 1982 that LILCO broke no State or local laws by submitting the plan to the DPC (Attachment 12).
L 15/ An updated copy of this plan was provided the Board and parties on February 1, 1983.
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before New York State Supreme Court Justice Robert C. Williams and agreed upon a stipulation that provided that the DPC would refrain from further action on the LILCO-submitted plan until February 23, 1983.1p/ To date, the State has not acted upon 7
the plan.
From the time that Mr. Meunkle and Ms. Palmer were in-structed to cease work on the offsite plan, LILCO has continued its efforts to obtain the County's cooperation in emergency planning. For example, on June 17, 1982, LILCO Vice President Ira Freilicher met with Frank Jones, Deputy County Executive, in an attempt to explore ways for the County to proceed with emergency planning. On September 17, 1982, Dr. Cordaro wrote Mr. Gallagher that "we are willing to meet at any time and place you suggest with the County's consultants or emergency planning steering committee . . . . Attachment 13. Likewise, on August 7, 1982, LILCO's counsel wrote to counsel for the County suggesting that one or two LILCO representatives be made a part of the County's steering committee and stating that l
LILCO was ready to resume meetings with the County to coordi-nate the County's planning with LILCO. Attachment 14. On 1s/ This stipulation was served upon the Board and the emergency-planning parties on February 1, 1983.
l September 29, 1982, Dr. Cordaro invited Mr. Jones to an informational meeting to discuss the distribution of tone alerts to special facilities in the vicinity of the plant.
Attachment 15. On October 4, 1982, Dr. Cordaro wrote Mr.
, Gallagher and said that "we are willing and anxious to cooper-l ate with the County in this [ emergency planning] endeavor."
Attachment 16.
On October 7, 1982, W. G. Schiffmacher, Manager of LILCO's Electrical Engineering Department, wrote to Mr. Jones describing the Shoreham Prompt Notification Siren System (as Mr. Jones had requested) and asking permission to proceed with 1
the installation of communications equipment at County facilities. Attachment 17. On October 11, 1982, Dr. Cordaro wrote to Mr. Jones, asking permission and cooperation regarding some six items involving communications among emergency person-nel and the public. And, in its statement filed with the Legislature on January 18, 1983, LILCO expressed hope that "there will be a renewed relationship of cooperation with the l County on emergency planning as a result of LILCO's participa-
) tion [in the Suffolk County Legislature's hearings]." Long Island Lighting Company's Presentation of the Legislature of Suffolk County on the November 1982 Draft Suffolk County r
Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated January 14, 1983, at 27.
Unfortunately, current political wisdom in the Suffolk County Executive's office and the County Legislature seems to require County officials to ignore LILCO's proffer of coopera-tion. But it is clear, as discussed below, that Federal' law and regulations do not permit a local government to come at the i eleventh hour and demand that because it is then unwilling to participate in emergency planning, a nearly complete nuclear power plant cannot operate as a matter of law.
IV. THE LEGAL ISSUES A. Introduction On pages 2-3 of its brief the County states the two a
" purely legal issues" of which the County seeks certification:
Issue 1.
~
Do Sections 50.33(g) and 50.47 of the NRC's regulations require, as a precondition as to issuance of an operating license for Shoreham, the RERP
[ Radiological Emergency Response Plan) of the local government, Suffolk County?
Issue 2. If the answer to Issue 1 is affirmative -- i.e., the local government RERP of Suffolk County is required by the NRC's regulations -- does Section 5 of the NRC Authorization Act for FY 1982-83 f permit the NRC to disregard Section 50.47 and Section 50.33(g) of the NRC's regula-I tions?
t SC Br. 2-3. The County must prevail on both issues in order to succeed in having this proceeding terminated.
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~ , - - , - - - , , . , . . , - , , - , . --.-e ,- e , , - - - , -- -.
Since the County insists that purely legal issues are involved, the Board should presume that any facts are in LILCO's favor. Specifically, the Board should assume that LILCO is prepared to present evidence on an emergency plan that can adequately protect the health and safety of the public and can be implemented without Suffolk County's approval or cooper-ation. Indeed, LILCO here asserts that this is the case.12/
In this way, by assuming that the plant can operate safely without the County's help, it becomes clear that what the County is asserting is simply a veto power.
There are essentially four reasons why the veto power claimed by the County does not exist. First, 10 C.F.R.
$ 50.33(g), sensibly read, requires the applicant to submit local plans only if they exist. Second, 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(a)(2) _ simply does not by its plain meaning support the County; indeed, the County has to add the word " government" to
$ 50.47(a)(2) to get it to read the way it wants. Third, even 12/ LILCO acknowledges that Suffolk County has made the task of emergency planning much more difficult by its refusal to co-operate; indeed, it may turn out that emergency planning done
, without the County, though meeting NRC standards, protects the l public less than if the County had helped. But LILCO denies that the task is impossible and in fact is developing alterna-tive means for implementing the LILC0 offsite plan without the County's help. LILCd will be ready to go forward with evidence of these alternate means presently.
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if the applicant cannot get a license under S 50.47(a)(2), he is entitled to show exceptional circumstances. Under 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(c)(7), for example, he may show the insignificance of any deficiencies, the existence of " interim compensating actions," or "other compelling reasons." The rulemaking record shows that the Commission intended to look at "all the factors" and make a " balancing judgment" to decide whether a plant could l
! operate in the face of deficiencies; it did not intend to enact a per se rule that automatically ended the proceeding if a 4
local government said "stop." Fourth, construing the Commission's regulations to give local governments a veto would permit those governments to exercise ultimate authority in an area that has been preempted by the federal government; this construction would violate S 271 and 5 274 of the Atomic Energy Act and thus the principle that regulations should not be con-
, strued in such a way as to call into question their validity.
Suffolk County asserts that two of the NRC's regulations are involved in this issue, 10 C.F.R. S 50.33(g) and S 50.47.
Although, as we shall see, 10 C.F.R. S 2.758(b) and S 50.12(a) y also shed light on the issue, we will address the two regula-tions that the County thinks relevant first.
B. Section 50.33(g) Doe's Not Require the Applicant to Produce a Local Government Plan If None Exists The County relies first on 10 C.F.R. 9 50.33(g), which specifies what information the utility must include in its ap-plication for a license:
l Each application shall state:
(g) If the application is for an operating license for a nuclear power re-actor, the applicant shall submit radiological emergency response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or' par-tially within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within the ingestion pathway EPZ.
10 C.F.R. 6 50.33(g) (1982) (footnotes omitted). The County says that this regulation means that the applicant must submit a plan "of"18/ the County government or it can never get an 18/ The meaning of the phrase " plans of . . . local governmen-tal~ entities" is itself not free from doubt. Suffolk County thinks it means plans endorsed by the highest level of government in a county. LILCO submits that a plan, such as the
)
LILCO offsite plan, that was originally prepared in large part by the Suffolk County Planning Department under a contract approved by the County Legislature and Executive, is a plan "of" the County government for the purposes of 10 C.F.R.
$ 50.33, at least when there is no other county plan. This might not be the case under New York State law or Suffolk County law, but it is the case, LILCO submits, under the (footnote continued)
I
I operating license.
A fairer reading of 5 50.33(g), however, is that the ap-plicant must submit a plan of a local government entity if it exists. If an Internal Revenue regulation were to say that "the taxpayer shall report income from rental property," it would not mean that every taxpayer had to buy property and rent it out in order to get rental income to report; it would mean that every taxpayer would have to report rental income if he had it. Similarly every NRC applicant must submit the local county plan if there is one (and local town plans if they exist as well).
The trouble with Suffolk County's 5 50.33(g) argument is that it proves too much. Since " local governmental entities" in 5 50.33(g) can mean any town, village, or other municipali-ty, as well as a county, Suffolk County's argument implies that a plan from every village.in the EPZ must be in the license ap-plication.19/ But in fact the requirement that an applicant (footnote continued) federal regulation. The now-outdated 1978 County plan, mentioned above, might also serve.
19/ LILCO suspects that few nuclear plants in this country can show a separate emergency plan for each and every " local gov-ernmental entity." And the Rockland County situation shows that an absence of an approved plan from one local entity does not necessarily prevent a reactor from operating. Consolidated (footnote continued)
submit the plans of local governmental entities obviously does not mean that the applicant must ensure that a plan exists for every local government for ten miles around.20/
C. Section 50.47(a)(2) Does Not Give Localities a Veto The County's central argument is that "the NRC's find-ings on offsite preparedness must be based upon a review of State and local government plans." SC Br. 16 (emphasis supplied by SC). The County bases this conclusion on 5 50.47(a)(2), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
l l
(footnote continued)
Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-38 (Dec. 22, 1982). It therefore becomes hard to see why the County thinks that S 50.33(g) requires a Suffolk County-approved plan.
If the County believed that the absence of an emergency p.'an for'every " local governmental entity" in the lO-mile EPZ constituted a fatal flaw in LILCO's license application, it should have advised the Board before allowing the Board and ,
parties to_ spend almost a year litigating other issues.
20/ The County's argument also has the unwelcome implication that the NRC regulations make it impossible for a State and a q utility alone to effect emergency planning without the help of localities. We are not talking about a state implementing a '
local government's plan; we are talking about the theoretical possibility that a state plan, using state resources, might be the only plan other than the utility and the federal plans. It is simply not credible that the Commission intended to preclude this possibility even if it could be shown to adequately protect the public.
(2) The NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and de-terminations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the appli-cant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and capable of being imple-mented.
10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(a)(2) (1982). Obviously what the County has done here is to add the word " government" to 9_50.47(a)(2),
making " local emergency plans" into " local government emergency plans."
A comparison of 50.47(a)(2) to S 50.33(g), which speaks of plans of " local governmental entities," shows that the Commission knew how to specify government plans when it wanted to.21/ A local government plan is one prepared or endorsed by 21/ Under S 50.33(g) the applicant is obliged to submit any local governmental plans that exist. But under S 50.47(a)(2) the applicant may base its case on " local plans," no matter who prepared or endorsed them. The important thing, as always, is that the public be adequately protected.
That the difference in wording between 5 50.33(g) and
$ 50.47 is meaningful is suggested by the change that occurred in S 50.47(a) between the proposed and the final versions.
Both of the two alternatives for the proposed S 50.47(a) pro-f vided that no operating license would be issued unless the emergency response plans " submitted by the applicant in accor-dance with 5 50.33(g)" had been reviewed and concurred in by the NRC. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,170 col. 3 (Dec. 19, 1979). Section 50.47(a) as finally adopted lacked the reference to 9 50.33(g) and provided simply that no OL will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that "the state of onsite and offsite emergency (footnote continued) e
a local government; a local plan is a plan for a locality.22/
There is no local government plan for Shoreham, but there is a
" local plan, the one begun by the Suffolk County Planning Department and completed by LILCO.
l (footnote continued) preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken."
A similar change, leaving intact the provision that plans of State and local " governmental entities" be submitted to the NRC but making the required finding, not that " local government
. emergency plans" have been concurred in, but that the " state of emergency preparedness" provides reasonable assurance, was made
, between the proposed S 50.54(s) and the final 5 50.54(s). Cf.
44 Fed. Reg. 75,171 col. 1-3 (Dec. 19, 1979) with 45 Fed. Reg.
55,410 col. 1-3 (Aug. 19, 1980).
This view finds some support also in the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA, which provides that the NRC may request FEMA to review a plan, quite apart from the or-dinary FEMA review procedure that starts with the State government. 45 Fed. Reg. 82,713, 82,714 col. 1 (Dec. 16, 1980).
22/ The word "onsite" in the phrase " applicant's onsite emer-gency plans" in 5 50.47(a)(2) suggests that the Commission con-templated that applicants might have offsite plans as well as 7
onsite plans. Had the Commission intended, to the contrary,
, that only local governments might have offsite plans, presuma-l bly the Commission would have written 5 50.47(a)(2) not in terms of the " applicant's onsite emergency plans" but merely of the " applicant's emergency plans," because onsite plans would have been the only kind of applicant plans possible.
A plan prepared by a private volunteer for a locality is just as much a " local plan" as any other; indeed, many local plans in this country are prepared by consultants, often con-sultants paid by the utility. Nothing in the NRC regulations l suggests that such plans are not local plans until the local
! legislature elects them to that position. A private local plan may be harder to implement than a governmental plan; but that is an issue of fact, not law.
D. A Local Government Plan Is Not a Prerequisite for Using 5 50.47(c)(1)
- 1. The Text of (c)(1) Does Not Support Suffolk County Even-if the County were correct that only an official government-sponsored local plan could satisfy 5 50.47(a)(2),
50.47(c)(1) would still permit-the applicant to show for a va-riety of reasons that deficiencies in plans are not sufficient to block the operating license:23/
23/ The ASLB in the San Onofre case cited by the County g recognized that S (c)(1) was intended to solve the problem of governments that fail to meet NRC/ FEMA standards:
Finally, in apparent recognition of complexities in emergency planning requirements, and of a license applicant's limited control over offsite planning, the rule contains a special provision for exception relief, 10 (footnote continued)
Failure to meet the standards set forth in paragraph [50.47](b) of this section
- may result in the Commission declining to
, . issue an Operating License; however, the applicant will have sut opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.
I 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(1) (1982).
Thus, LILCO is entitled to show that " adequate interim compensating actions" can be taken. An-example of such actions is the LILCO offsite plan. LILCO would also be entitled to show that the County's nonparticipation is not "significant" or that there are "other compelling reasons" to permit plant operation. Under the first of these standards, LILCO might try to show that Shoreham-specific design features coupled with new information about radioactive source terms make the County's cooperation unnecessary. Under the second standard, the need i
for electric power might be a compelling enough reason given the right circumstances.24/ Of course, LILCO might or might
)
(footnote continued)
C.F.R. 50.47(c)(1).
, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1174 (1982)
(emphasis added).
24/ The impact of shutting down a reactor may constitute "other compelling reasons " . See 45' Fed. Reg. 55417 col. 2 l- (footnote continued) not be able to carry its burden of proof on these matters; the point is that it is entitled to an opportunity to try. ,
The County's argument is that 5 50.47(c)(1) is
" immaterial" (SC Br. 25-30) because it cannot be triggered unless there is first a local government plan. The County puts it this way:
The essential predicate for Section 50.47(c)(1), however, is that all three of the required emergency plans be in existence and be operational. . . . Section 50.47(c)(1),
however, is immaterial, to the present pro-ceeding, because here there is no local government plan in existence and none will be forthcoming and operational. Therefore, there is no predicate for the application of Section 50.47(c)(1).
SC Br. 26 (emphasis in original).
The problem with this argument is, first, that the
" essential predicate" idea is plucked out of thin air, and it violates the " plain meaning" rule on which the County relies so heavily elsewhere (see SC Br. 15, 22, 25).
LILCO submits that the regulation means what it sayc.
Section (c)(1) can be resorted to if there is a "[f]ailure to meet the applicable standards set forth in [S 50.47(b)]." If (footnote continued)
(Aug. 19, 1980) (discussing shutdowns of multiple units on a single site because of an unsatisfactory local plan).
/
the County's nonparticipation causes the plan to fail to meet one or more of those standards, then LILCO "will have the op-portunity" to show that it meets the standards of (c)(1).
In effect, the County is arguing that 5 50.47(c)(1) s allows minor deficiencies to be cured but not major ones like a county's refusal to participate. This view of the regulation '
simply cannot be squared with common sense or the purpose of-the regulations. ,
s
- 2. The Per Se Rule Urged By the County Goes Against the Rule-making Record The County's position that the failure of the local government to participate in emergency planning per se is fatal to an NRC licensing proceeding, no matter whether the public l
can be protected or not, goes against the grain of the rulemaking record. For the record shows that the Commission intended that "all factors" should be considered before a reac-t s tor would be shut down for deficienciescin emergency planning: )
The Commission recognizes there is a pos-sibility that the operation of some reac-tors may be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments L or an inability to comply with these rules. . . . Relative to applying this rule in actual practice, however, the Commission need not shut down a facility - , ,
until all factors have been thoroughly )
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4 45 Fed. Reg. 55,404 col. 1 (Aug. 19, l9'80).
7 The NRC considered, and rejdcted, the alternative of a per se rule that yould have required immediate shutdown of a reactor if the local emergency plan;had not received "NRC con-currence": ) .
I Under alternative B, shutdown of the re-actor would be required automatically if; '
the appropriate State and local emergency response plans had not received NRC con- '
currence within the prescribed time periods unless an exemption is granted.
(, ' y
.After consideration of the public
- ord and on the recommendation of its Staff, the Commission has chosen a text
!' for Sections 50.47 and 50.54(s) and (t) that is similar to, but less restrictive '
than, Alte'rnative A in the proposed rule.
Rather than providing for shutdown of>.the reactor as the only enforcement action "l
6
.and prescribing specific preconditions for the shutdown remedy, the final rule .
makes clear that for emergency planning ,
i rule's , like all other rules, reactor shutdown as o^utlined in the rule 18 but one of a' number of possible' enforcement \ ~
> actions and many factors should be con-sidered in' determining whether it is an 3 appropriate' action in a given cane.~
~
The
, -Commission choice is consittent with most o'f the comments received from State and local governments and is consist.ent with local governments an'd is consistent with
- the provisions of Section'109 of the NRC fiscal year 1980 Authorization Act.
e Alternative B was seen by'some of the 3
1commenters as potentially causing unnec-
@ g. essary harsh economic and social consequences to State and local If governments, utilities, and the public.
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., 45 sed. 339 55,406-07 (Aug. kr1980). (Note,that even<lthe rw .
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,:/ more restrictive alternative A would have; allowed exemptions.) ,...
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The County's in,terpretation i .,
of.3.50.47 is even more extreme 4
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- than_the proposal that.the Commission rejected in the :s r',
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That l 50.47(c)(1) 'was. intended to give the NRC consid-x>>
s -
erable ideway is shown by The transcript of the , July'23, 1980,
- . y .
Commissi'on meeting. 'There the Commissioners are,found debating 7, ~,,~
whetherthepreambic/tothe,ruleshouldread d ~
- alternative equally effective compensatory action" instead of " alternative compensatory actions":2 , ,
COMMISS. TONER HENDRIE: Well, we have ~
got a syctem in which w'e ,are trying' through a nominally voluntary but coer-cive in the senseithat we work against their electrical supply s'ystem a system ,
to try to bring a,long state and local entities, government entiti.eo in the preparation of plans, ,emorgency plans, the provision of equipment and of staff when they may very well preclude they l would prefer to spend their money some l place else.
[ The thing you are coercing them with we are going to shut down your reactor.
l I think to expect that in all of the states that may be concerned and all of the localities that may be concerned that you are going to get a wholesome, forthright and aggressive adherence to l-25/ See NRC July 23, 1980, Tr. 12.
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. - - . = -. - _ _ , _ _ , - . - _ -- . _ . .- -
these guidelines as you might hope, it ain't going to work that way.
I think that in some places there are going to be plant [planl deficiencies which are going to have to be endured for some time while one works out with those officials means to finance and continue to argue and eventually hopefully to
[ persuade, or if not to persuade, to move up a couple of levels in the government and try to get some pressure.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: It is a balancing judgment for the Commission.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: What worries me is that the equally effective says that there is an acceptable level of emergency planning and you either hit or you shut down, and that is the level which is represented by the full rule and the guidelines enunciated in the staff guidance, and you are not going to allow anything which is in any sense less ef-fective. All it allows is some way of-meeting' guideline 15 which the staff hasn't thought of and which after'a lot of argument maybe FEMA and the staff could agree was equally effective.
What I am saying is you are going to have to contemplate some. cases where in-deed the alternative compensatory actions are going to result in an emergency plan probably less satisfactory in the sense of probable effectiveness in the case in need. Then you will eventually I trust ~
get at that facility.after a while when you are able to work out some of what I see is the inevitable difficulties.
I am willing to buy that and to say, yes, indeed, one:looks at the plant, at what they have tried to do and what the measures are and how close it comes and 4 !
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how badly you need things and the costs and everything else, and I am willing to buy off on a couple of years of a plant that isn't absolutely up, you know, that still misses by some little bit the full rigor of the rule and its implementing guidelines.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Will you be saying when you do that, though, you will have to be saying that the deficiencies are more than insignificant because oth-erwise you get out under the first one, that the deficiencies are insignificant.
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE: Well, I will tell you, when people argue what is sig-nificant and insignificant in our pro-ceedings, what I find is that no gnat is so small as not to be significant in somebody's eye. I have never met a board yet that was willing to say, no, that is insignificant. So I think any issue peo-ple want to raise in differences here are going to be matters that they should raise.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you have got something on the end that says whether other compelling reasons exist for reactor operation.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The fact is that that would let you ignore even significant deficiencies with no alternative compensatory action. The trouble is we are not stuck with the damn phrase " alternative compensatory action" because it has become essential to define it in such a way as to satisfy the Congressional concerns. It may well be that the last phrase sweeps it up.
NRC July 23, 1980, Tr. 85-89 (emphasis added).
Likewise the Indian Point decision cited by the County (SC Br. 28-29) shows the Commission's continuing intent to look at the facts in deciding whether deficiencies in emergency planning are sufficient to shut down a reactor. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-38 (Dec. 23, 1982). The Commission declined to shut down Indian Point in that decision, but the County finds comfort in it be-cause the Commission's decision " relied upon the existence of the compensatory State plans and Rockland County's imminent de-velopment of its own plan" (SC Br. 29). The County suggests that the decision was a close one and distinguishes Shoreham based on the fact (1) that Suffolk County's nonparticipation is a greater burden to LILCO than Rockland County's is to Consolidated Edison and PASNY and (2) that the Governor of New York has said that the state "will not be a party to any effort to impose an independently developed State plan upon Suffolk County" (SC Br. 29 and Exhibit 5). But this simply shows how much a question of fact, not law, is the issue of compensating for emergency planning deficiencies. If there is one thing clear from all this it is that an applicant is entitled to try to prove that its own emergency planning efforts can protect the public.2p/
2p/ LILCO believes this result is required by the Due Process Clause. We acknowledge that the construction of a nuclear (footnote continued)
E. The Regulations Must Be Interpreted so as to Effect Their Purpose and so as to Avoid Violating the Federal Preemption Doctrine Section IV.A.2 and IV.A.3 of the County's brief (SC Br.
17-25) are meant to show that the administrative record underlying the post-TMI emergency planning regulations reveals an agency intent that a local government-approved plan be an absolute requirement for an operating license. In fact the rulemaking record shows nothing of the kind.
The various passages cited by the County are, by and large, irrelevant to the issue now before this Board. These passages tend to show that offsite emergency planning is impor-tant and that it is important that local governments be in-volved. There is no argument about this; and there is no question that much of the rulemaking record addresses planning by local governments, because the Commission believed that local governments would cooperate. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,414 col. 2, 55,417 cols. 2, 3 (Aug. 19, 1980). Therefore most of (footnote continued) plant is done at the licensee's own risk, with no guarantee t':st an operating license will be issued.
_ But we believe there is a due process guarantee that the utility will be allowed to presant evidence to show that the public will be adequately protected.
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the passages cited by the County simply do not address the problem in the Shoreham proceeding of a county that will not cooperate.27/
There are some passages in the rulemaking record that do deal with the effect on operating licenses of States' or local governments' failing to meet NRC emergency planning standards.
But even in these the Commission did not address in detail the complete, willful refusal of a local government to cooperate; it was addressing rather their inability to do so for lack of time or resources.2g/
27/ Thus, for example, the Three Mile Island reports cited at SC Br. 18-20 address local government action because TMI was the problem they were dealing with and TMI involved local governments that wanted to implement an emergency plan but were unable to do so effectively.
2p/ This is apparent from three things. First, the Commission said in so many words that it believed states and localities would cooperate. 45 Fed. Reg. 55,404 col. 1, 55,417 col. 1, 2-3 (Aug. 19, 1980). Second, the Commission suggested that the solution to such problems was for utilities to finance the gov-ernments' efforts. Id. 55,417 col. 1. Third, the Commission stated its belief that plant shutdowns would be infrequent and of short duration, id. 55,417 col. 2, which would not be the case if local governments began refusing to cooperate, as Suffolk County has, out of a belief that the risk of reactor operation is too great.
1 i
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- 1. Purpose But the fact that the NRC did not anticipate precisely the Suffolk County situation when it promulgated the rule does not mean the rule cunnot be applied here. Rather, the rule must be interpreted broadly and liberally to effect its purpose, Baldridge v. Hadley, 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974), reh. denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974), and the intent of the agency, U.S. v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), and of Congress.29/ The purpose of the NRC is to have effective emer-gency planning; the purpose of SC is to ensure that emergency planning will not be done at all. The purpose of the NRC is to consider "all factors" before shutting down a reactor; the purpose of Suffolk County is to prevent the Commission from considering the facts at all. The purpose of the NRC is not to shut down a reactor if 1-t meets the federal standard of reason-able assurance that the public is safe; the purpose of Suffolk County is to shut Shoreham down based on quite different criteria. In short, to accept Suffolk County's legal theory is to do violence to the purpose of the regulations.
k 29/ The intent of Congress is shown by the two NRC authoriza-tion bills, that for 1980 and that for 1982-83, discussed below.
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- 2. Preemption In section IV.A.3 of its supplemental' brief the county says that the NRC has recognized that a local government may
" affect" the operation of a nuclear plant. For example:
j The staff recognizes this potential for a third party defacto (sic] veto power.
The Commission is also aware of this.30/
SC Br. 24, citing SECY-80-275, June 3, 1980, Enclosure L, Analysis of ACRS Comments, at 9.
The words "de facto" are crucial, and they cut directly against the County's argument that what is involved here is a purely legal barrier to emergency planning. It is certainly true that a locality's refusal to participate might prevent-an adequate emergency plan from being implemented; but that is a question of fact.
The Commission, in the passage cited by SC at SC Br.
24-25, addressed this issue:
The Commission recognizes there is a pos-sibility that the operation of some reac-tors may be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments or an inability to comply with these i 30/ The industry witness, Mr. Owen, also referred to a "de facto veto." Statement of Warren H. Owen, June 25, 1980, at 8, bound into transcript of NRC June 25, 1980, ff. Tr. 131.
Elsewhere he called it simply a " veto," but he appears to have meant the same thing.
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rules. The Commission believes that the potential restriction of plant operation by State and local officials is not sig-nificantly different in kind or effect from the means already available under existing law to prohibit reactor operation, such as zoning and land-use laws, certification of public convenience and necessity, State financial and rate i considerations (10 C.F.R. 50.33(f)) and Federal environmental laws.
45 Fed. Reg. 55,404, cited at SC. Br. 24-25.
The reference to zoning laws and the like is a sure sign that the Commission did not intend to give localities a de jure veto with its emergency planning regulations, because a long line of cases has established that States and localities may regulate nuclear plants through devices such as zoning laws, but not for the purpose of regulating radiological health and safety and not to the point of permanently shutting down an ex-isting reactor. States and localities may regulate only on the
" fringe"31/ of the area regulated by the Federal government.32/
31/ Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, enacted in 1959, permitted States to regulate small quantities of nuclear materials by agreement with the NRC. Section 274(k), 42 U.S.C.
5 2021(k), provides that 5 274 is not intended to cut back on preexisting state authority outside the jurisdiction of the NRC. But the function of 5 274(k) was "to leave room for
[ state laws] . . . dealing with matters on the frince of the preempted area in light of all the provisions and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act . . . ." Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field: Hearings Before The Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306, 500 (1959). Commentators have placed in the " fringe" of the preempted area such matters (footnote continued) t l
i The doctrine of Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. VI, i 2.
This doctrine forbids State regulation of an area if there is an express or implied exclusion by Congress of State ju- ,
risdiction.33/
l The Atomic Energy Act'of 195434/ granted the NRC exclusive-authority to regulate the radioactive health and (footnote continued) as nuclear plant site selection, zoning, local pollution, building and equipment codes on nonradiation machinery, and working conditions of plant employees. . See Lemov, State and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under the i Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1008 (1964); Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1762 (1974); Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental' Relations Problem, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 41 (1961).
32/ See 10 C.F.R. $ 8.4 (1982).
33/ Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly de-clares that its authority is exclusive. See, e.g., Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In the absence of a federal statute explicitly prohibiting state regulation, an intent to preempt can be inferred from pervasive federal
. ' regulation or from a dominant federal interest. Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Even if no congressional
- -intent is found, state laws conflicting with federal law must be held invalid. A conflict exists where a state law " stands
- as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34/ Pub. L. No.83-703, 68 Stat. 919.
t
safety aspects of nuclear power plants. The seminal decision analyzing the Atomic Energy Act, Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972), holds that by enacting the Atomic Energy Act the Federal government unmistakably preempted State regulation of I
the radiological safety aspects of nuclear power plants and that State regulation of nuclear discharges was preempted by Federal law.35/
Other cases are consistent with Northern States. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Buchanan, No. 10811-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 14, 1975),.6/
} the New York court held that the Village of Buchanan 35/ The courts have consistently adhered to the analysis in Northern States. See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976); Simmons v. Arkansas Power and Light Co., 555 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1981); Liesen v.
Louisiana Power and Light Co., 636 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1981);
Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S.
1096 (1981); County of Suffolk.v. Long Island Lighting Co., No.
82-2045 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 14, 1983); Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. NRC, 481 F. Supp. 443 (D.N.J. 1979); United States v.
City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 64 Ohio St.2d 209, 414 N.E.2d 718 (1980); New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection
- v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App.3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342 (1972).
36/ As cited in Consolidated Edison Co. v. New York, Inc.,
(Indian Point Station, Unit 2), 5 NRC 1156, 1160-61 (1977).
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could not deny a zoning variance for a cooling tower system which the operator of a nuclear power plant had been directed to seek by the Commission. The court found that the local reg-ulation was preempted because the denial of a variance might lead to closing of the nuclear facility. The Appellate Division affirmed and directed the issuance of the variance.
It held permissible only limited regulation [by the Village] of local and incidental conditions with respect to the proposed facilities, in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance, so long as such regulation is reasonable and is not inconsistent with the construction of the proposed facility.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 54 App. Div. 2d 761, 387 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1976), aff'd on state law grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 598, 374 N.E.2d 105 Trustees of Indiana v. U.S., 618 F.2d 736, f
739 (Ct. C1. 1980). (1978).
Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266, 276-77 (1975), is likewise consistent. The court said in Marshall that a state that required a power company to halt the construction of a power plant temporarily to abate a i nonradiological nuisance would not be frustrating a federal mandate. But the court added an important proviso that if measures required by the ste.te to abate the nuisance l
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made the construction of a nuclear power plant impossible, they could not be required. In such a case, the Federal interest would prevent state action from absolutely prohibiting the construction of nuclear power plants within its boundaries.
237 N.W.2d at 282.
Other cases affirm the position taken in Marshall that
. states cannot regulate the radiological aspects of nuclear power plant operation in a manner that would effectively prohibit an essential aspect of the construction or operation of the facility. In State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,
l 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 3?7 (1976), the State Department of Environmental Protection initiated an action against a utility because of fish kills caused by a sudden water temperature change. The operator was charged with violation of a State statute prohibiting the discharge of a harmful substance into fresh waters. After noting that the NRC had authorized con-struction of the plant with its cooling water method, that the power company had received a Federal license to so operate, and that the license required the continued discharge of water even 1 after it had turned cold, the court held that the state could not issue an injunction. Such interference by the State with 1
" facets of nuclear power generation, regulation of which has been vested exclusively with the AEC," was not permissible.
= - - .
351 A.2d at 344. See also Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power &
Light Co., 152 N.J. Super. 391, 377 A.2d 1244 (1977).37/
Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.
1981), cert, granted sub nom. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
1 State Energy Resources Censervation & Development Comm'n, i
37/ One of the primary objectives of the Atomic Energy Act is to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maxi-mum extent consistent with national security and public health.
42 U.S.C. $ 2013(d); see Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1153. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the congressional aim to encourage the commercial development of nuclear energy. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1978); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 557-58 (1978).
The County's interpretation of the regulations would be an obstacle to the' fulfillment of these objectives. Not only would the County's legal theory, if upheld, prevent Shoreham from operating, but if other localities used the same tactic Suffolk County has used, the result could be the virtual elimi-nation of nuclear power as an energy source -- a result in direct conflict with the stated purpose of Congress in enacting the Atomic Energy Act. See Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1153-54. While Congress has not shown
'an intent to promote nuclear power at all costs," Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Corporation &
, Development Comm'n, 659 F.2d at 926, one may not fairly J conclude from this premise that the congressional purpose to encourage development of nuclear power is defeasible by a coun-l ty. The development of nuclear power is a matter of national concern that may not be foreclosed or restricted by local oeci-sions. See State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council v. Public Service Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698-99 (Mo. App.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
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U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982), has been touted by some ae narrowing the field of federal preemption in the nuclear area.38/ However, that decision simply held that Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. In so holding, the court I
recognized the congressional intent to preempt state regulation of the radiation hazards of nuclear material. 659 F.2d at 922.
It is clear that in this case radiation hazards are ex-actly what Suffolk County is attempting to regulate. The County's Resolution No. 111-1983 makes this clear:
WHEREAS, evacuation times in excess of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> -- and certainly evacuation times in the range of 14-30 hours -- will result in virtual immobilization of evac-uation and high exposure of evacuees to radiation such that evacuees' health, safety, and welfare would not Ime protected; and RESOLVED, that the document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without the County approval or authorization, if imple-mented, would not protect the health, welfare, and safety of Suffolk County re-sidents and _hus will not be approved and will not be implemented . . . .
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L 38/ The Ninth Circuit's decision in Pacific Legal Foundation is now before the_ Supreme Court and may not survive the year.
But if it is reversed it will only strengthen LILCO's case.
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These findings are based on nothing more than the calculated radiological consequences of certain postulated worst-case accidents at Shoreham, as a glance at either the County Executive's February 16 report or the Legislature's_special counsel's draft report of February 17.
Indeed, the County has been quite blunt in stating that its purpose is to regulate radiological health and safety and 3
to preinpt Federal regulation. The draft report of the Suffolk County Legislature's special counsel makes this clear:
[I]n the absence of . . . a plan having full support of the County and its government, the public health and safety cannot be adequataly protected. In keep-ing with this belief and in view of the unprecedented nature of the issues raised in determining the adequacy of a radiological emergency response plan, the Suffolk County Legislature has vested in itself the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving such a plan.
Draft Report 1-2 (emphasis added). County Resoltation No.
111-1983 also makes apparent that Suffolk County is attempting to preempt the Federal government:
RESOLVED, that since no radiological emergency plan can protect the health, welfare, safety of Suffolk County re-sidents and, since no radiological emer-gency plan shall be adopted or imple-mented by Suffolk County, the County Executive is hereby directed to take all actions necessary to assure that actions taken by any other governmental agency, be it State or Federal, are consistent l
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with the decisions mandated by this Resolution.
(Emphasis added). This attempt to apply the law of praemption in reverse should not be permitted by this Board.39/
We would expect the County to argue that Federal pre-emption depends on the Federal agency's pervasive regulation of the preempted field, and that in this particular area the NRC has ceded part of its authority to localities by means of the 39/ It is plain that what the County has done is to set itself up as an alternate NRC to make alternate findings of fact. The County Legislature held hearings in which it considered calcu-lated doses to the public from various core-melt accidents greater than the design basis events for Shoreham. On the basis of these calculated radiological consequences, and taking i into account (says the County) the population, geography, and meteorology of the Shoreham site, the County concluded as a matter of fact that the public'cannot be adequately protected from a radiological accident at Shoreham. What the County has done, in short, is to make the Shoreham siting decision over again, using criteria altogether different from 10 CFR Part 100, and to change the licensing design basis of the plant.
The County's analysis is based in part on a 20-mile EPZ instead of the 10-mile EPZ in the NRC regulations. (This makes evacuation slower and contributes to the finding that the public cannot be adequately protected.) Thus, the County chal-lenges both 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR $ 50.47 at once. But it does so not by challenging the regulations before the ASLB but rather by holding its own hearings and, in effect, arguing that J
its findings of fact are binding on the NRC because of the
- emergency planning regulations.
In short, what the County has done is simply set itself up as the fact-finder and licensing authority instead of the NRC.
A bolder intrusion into the federally regulated area can hardly be imagined.
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I emergency planning regulations. But the NRC could not legally do so, because it is prohibited by SS 271 and 274(c)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Section 274(c)(1) states that the NRC must retain authority to regulate "the construction and operation" of nu-t clear reactors:
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) shall provide for discontinuance of any author-ity and the Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of --
(1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility . . . .
42 U.S.C. $ 2021(c)(1) (emphasis added). Section 271 of the Act also addresses State versus Federal authority:
Sec. 271. AGENCY JURISDICTION. --
Nothing in this chapter shall be con-strued to affect the authority or regula-tions of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission:
Provided, that this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission.
7 42 U.S.C. $ 2018 (emphasis added).
LILCO does not suggest that this Board can overrule an NRC regulation because it fails to comply with $$ 271 and 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, but this Board may, and is called
upon here to, interpret the NRC regulations. And regulations should be interpreted so as to avoid raising doubt as to their validity. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d.128 (8th Cir. 1960). As shown above, a construction of NRC rules that gave local governments a veto over power plant operation would certainly throw the validity of those rules into question.
F. LILCO Is Entitled to the Opportunity to Show an Exception to the Regula-tions Under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(b) and 5 50.12(a) and to Have a Low-power License Under 6 50.57(c)
Even if the County were correct in its reading of 5 50.33(g) and 5 50.47, it ignores the fact that LILCO is enti-tied to show that it qualifies for an exemption from a particular regulation. The Commission's regulations provide this opportunity in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(b), which reads as follows:
(b) A party to an adjudicatory pro-ceeding involving initial licensing subject to this subpart may petition that the application of a specified Commission rule or regulation or any provision thereof, of the type described in para-graph (a) of this section, be waived or an exception made for the particular pro-ceeding. The sole ground for petition for waiver or exception shall be that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopt-ed. . . .
10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(b) (1982). Similarly, 10 C.F.R. 5 50.12(a) provides:
(a) The Commission may, upon appli-cation by any interested person . . .,
grant such exemptions from the require-ments of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are oth-erwise in the public interest.
If it were the case that LILCO were prohibited from mak-ing its factual case under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47, the emergency planning regulation, the Board may be assured that LILCO would ask for an opportunity to petition that the regulation be waived or an exception be made under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(b) or S 50.12.
In the event the County's refusal to cooperate did make it impossible to meet S 50.47, the exception provisions of f 2.758(b) and 6 50.12(a) would be tailor-made for the problem, because the Commission's assumption underlying the emergency planning regulation has now been shown to be inappropriate here. As the Commission said in its preamble to the final rule:
l l
The Commission believes, based on the record created by the public workshops, that State and local officials as part-nors in this undertaking will endeavor to provide fully for public protection.
45 Fed. Reg. 55,404 col. 1 (Aug. 19, 1980).
Finally, LILCO believes it could-qualify for a low-power l'
license under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.57(c) notwithstanding the County's 4
refusal to have an emergency plan. Indeed, under 10 C.F.R.
) 5 50.47(d) "no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy'of and capability to implement State and. local offsite emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power 3
operations (up to 5% of the rated power)." 47 Fed. Reg. 30,236 col. 1 (July 13,'1982).
G. The Significance of Section 5 of the 1982-83 NRC Authorization Act i In section IV.C of its brief Suffolk County argues that 5 5 of the 1982-83 NRC Authorization Act, Pub.L. No.97-415, 96 Stat. 2067, does not authorize the NRC to " disregard the re-W quirements of 10 C.F.R. 55 50.33(g) and 50.47" (SC Br. 30-31).
Section 5 reads as follows:
[T]he Nuclear Regulatory Commission may use such sums as may be necessary, in the absence of a State or local emergency preparedness plan-which has been approved by.the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to issue an operating li-conce . . . for a nuclear power reactor, if it determines that there exists a i State, local, or. utility plan which
! provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned.
Pub. L. No.97-415 6 5. The County's argument is that 6 50.47 was enacted with the knowledge of statutory language identical to 6 5 and that the Commission chose not to exercise the full scope of the authority Congress had conferred.
The County's statement of the second legal issue as whether the Authorization Act would allow a Licensing Board to
" disregard" NRC regulations is really beside the point, because
$ 5 and 6 50.47 are consistent. The Commission said as much in the F_ederal Register notice of the final rule:
i In deciding whether to permit reactor operation in the face of some deficiencies,.the Commission will examine among other factors whether the deficiencies, are significant for the re-actor in question, whether adequate in-terim compensatory actions have been or will be taken'promptly, or whether other compelling reasons exist for reactor operation. In determining the sufficien-
- cy of " adequate. interim compensatory actions" under this rule, the Commission will examine State plans, local plans and licensee plans to determine whether features of one plan can compensate for
1 1
l deficiencies in another plan so that the level of protection for the public health and safety is adequate. This interpretation is consistent with the provisions of the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub L.96-295.
45 Fed. Reg. 55,403 col. 1 (Aug. 19, 1980) (emphasis added).
! As the County points out, the words of l.109 of the 1980 Authorization Act were the same as 5 5 of the 1982-83 Act.
What exactly does " consistent" mean here? The County apparently' thinks it means that 6 50.47(c)(1) stays well within the bounds of the authority granted by 5 5. This interpreta-tion is based on the expressed fears of industry representa-tives and Senate staff members that the proposed regulations did not go as far as 5 109 of the 1980 Authorization Bill would have allowed.
The County's theory is based also on the legal advice to the Commission by its General Counsel, Mr. Bickwit, who repeat-edly opined 40/ that the Commission need not go as far as 6 109 would allow. For example, the exchange went like this in the passage cited by the County:
40/ Besides the passage quoted below, see NRC June 25, 1980,.
Tr. 49; NRC July 3, 1980, Tr. 41-42; SECY-80-220, Apr. 29, ,
1980.
l l
l l
MR. BICKWIT: . . . .
Their [that is, members of the major-ity staff of the Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee] concern was that under the rule as drafted it was not clear to them that the Commission contem-plated that in the absence of a plan, of a state or local plan which fully com-plied with the requirements of the rule that the Commission intended to look at the utility's plan to see whether that plan could compensate for the deficiencies of the state and local plans.
They said it was a central feature of the agreement reached in conference that that would be the case.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Their concern was that our rule was too harsh?
MR. BICKWIT: That is true.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: Their interpreta-tion of the Congressional action was that a more flexible rule was intended by the Congress?
MR. BICKWIT: That is correct. I told them, as I have told the Commission, that the way our office has read the leg-islation that the legislation provides for minimum requirements for a rule and therefore the Commission is free from a legal standpoint to be as stringent as it
, chooses to be under the law. They disagreed with that assessment.
Others I have spoken to on the Hill have expressed agreement with that.
NRC July 23, 1980 Tr. 5, cited at SC Br. 33. But the County
l does not take into account the later pages of the same transcript that show that the Commission intended 5 50.47(c)(1) to effect the intent of Congress all along and added words to the Federal Register notice to make that clear:
MR. BICKWIT: . . . .
I told them [the Senate Nuclear Regulatory Subcommittee Staff] that I believed it was the Commission's view that one of the alternative compensatory actions that might be looked at would be the actions taken by a utility in any kind of utility plan that might compen-sate for the deficiencies. I asked them if the Commission were to include lan-guage that specifically stated that intent it would make the rule consistent in their view with the intent of the Congress as they saw it, and they said yes.
Now, I want to reiterate my view that whether or not the Commission chooses to do that is not a legal matter. As I read the legislation and the supporting legis-4 lative history, the Commission is free to go beyond the minimum requirements set by the Congress.
However, if it is the Commission's view that alternative compensatory actions would include a look at the util-ity's plan to see whether that plan was in fact compensatory, then I would suggest stating that in the supplementary information associated with the rule. I have proposed some language which you have before you as Enclosure 1.
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m _ __
NRC July 23, 1980, Tr. 6-8.
" Enclosure 1" is included in the transcript of the July 23 meeting. As modified by the Commissioners, it reads as follows:
In determining the sufficiency of
" adequate interim compensatory actions" under this rule, the Commission will examine State plans, local plans or li-censee plans to determine whether features of one plan can compensate for deficiencies in another plan so that the level of protection for the public health and safety is adequate. This interpreta-tion is consistent with the provisions of the NRC Authorization Act for FY 1980, Pub.L.96-295.
] NRC July 13, 1980, Enclosure 1, ff. Tr. 135. The discussion went on:
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE: So what you are o saying is that you are confident that the majority staff of the Senate subcommittee would agree that the language that you have is consistent with the intent of the Congress?
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are now referring to Enclosure 1?
MR. BICKWIT: I am referring to Enclosure 1.
Enclosure 1 was included in the Federal Register notice when the emergency planning rules were promulgated.41/ 45 Fed. Reg.
41/ A comma was added and the "or" was changed to "and."
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55,404 col. 1 (Aug. 19, 1980).
Elsewhere the transcript of the July 23 meeting, in passages set out in section IV.D of this brief above, shows that the Commissioners addressed the possibility that local-ities might not provide " wholesome, forthright, "and aggressive adherence" to the emergency planning guidelines and said that even significant deficiencies might be tolerated for compelling reasons. Clearly 5 50.47(c)(1) is intended to be a broad provision allowing the Commission to look at all the circumstances.
One further piece of information is pertinent to the Board's consideration of this issue. The County says that "Section 5 and 109 are identical in purpose and intent" (SC.Br.
32). Since, as shown above, 5 50.47(c)(1) was promulgated to be consistent with the intent of Congress in S 109, evidence of the intent behind S 5 ought to be relevant to the intent of 5 109 and thus to the intent of the regulation. Some weight should be given, then, to part of the legislative history of
$ 5, namely certain remarks that Representative Lujan had s
inserted in the Congressional Record while the 1982-83 '
Authorization Bill was being considered:
Frankly, these pro'risions -- allowing a utility to file an onsite plan for a temporary operating license, and allowing the NRC to determine that an adequate
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offsite plan of a utility exists in the
~ absence of a FEMA-approved State or local h,,
.h '
. . plan for a final, full power license -- .. -
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were included to insure that Federal '
preemption in the area of nuclear power ,.
would not be f:nistrated in the emergency planning ares. by foot dragging on the '
part of a reluctant. State or locality. .
The wisdom of in61uding such Federal i,
^; provisions is understood by the situation ,
which we understand exists in one 4
~
t-district where a county has sued to try g, to enjoin its State from approving an Tw - .
emergency plan. The clear language of P the statute and our intent throughout the legislative process was to insure that a *[ ' ^
plant could operate if there existed some -
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plan -- State, local or utility "
f sponsored -- providing reasonable assur- -",'
.; ance of the public health and safety. 7
{ '
Cong. Rec. E5060-61 (Dec. 10, 1982) (emphasis added). _.
.t All this goes to show that 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1) does 4
just what it says -- gives the utility the opportunity to dem-onstrate ' lor a variety of reasons that it should have an g f.-- .
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operating license despite failures to meet the S 50.47(b)
A standards. - * '
1 Indeed, the County's contrary interpretation of the reg-
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ulation makes no sense when viewed against the Commission's ,-
I statutory mandate. Singularly absent from the County's brief t
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is any policy raason. supporting its legal theory -- any reason, .M N
,that is, why the.HRO would have wanted to give a veto to local .- I s, ,
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,. governments. The reason cannot be that only local governments . .-
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can adequately protect the public, for all LILCO asks is a chance to prove that that is not so. In fact, no policy that the NRC is to serve under the Atomic Energy Act suggests itself as a reason for doing what the County claims the Commission did.
i The County ignores the fact that the purpose of this proceeding, and of the NRC,.is to protect the public health and safety and attempts to avoid ever reaching that issue. To that end it has moved the Board to stop the NRC hearings on the subject, even as it moved to enjoin the New York DPC from fin-
- ishing its review of LILCO's offsite plan and from passing it on for FEMA review. What we have shown in this brief is that
, there is no support in the NRC regulations for this latest County effort to thwart the NRC licensing process.
V. CERTIFICATION The law of certification was summarized recently by the ASLB in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum (Nov. 17, 1982), slip op. 2-3:
The Commission's Rules of Practice contain a general prohibition against in-terlocutory appeal. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.730(f). Nevertheless, there is an exception. The regulations permit dis-cretionary interlocutory review, either by Licensing Board certification or Appeal Board directed certification, 4
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where it is demonstrated that failure to resolve the issue immediately will cause
" detriment to the public interest or un-usual delay or expense." The Appeal Board, however, has left little doubt that such review is truly exceptional.
The Appeal Board has stated that it will rarely take interlocutory review and only then where a Licensing Board's ruling "either (1) threatened the party ad-versely affected by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, could not be alleviated by a later appeal, or (2) affected'the basic structure of the proceedings in a pervasive or unusual manner" Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Ctation, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1170, 1191 (1977).
LILCO sees three separate questions involved in the County's motion for certification. First, should the Licensing Board make a decision on the legal issues? Second, if so, should there then be expedited review of the Board's decision by the Appeal Board or the Commission? Third, if so, should the first review be by the Appeal Board, or should the Appeal Board be skipped and the question sent directly to the Commission?
LILCO's view on these issues is that the Board should decide the issue; that interlocutory review is not necessary or
~
desirable; and that if nonetheless expedited review is sought, the Commission rather than the Appeal Board should do it.
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A. The ASLB Should Decide the Issue LILCO believes that there is a real and substantial benefi: to be gained by having the Board give its opinion on the legal issue presented here. When certification is directed
! by the Appeal Board, the certification is not granted unless the Licensing Board has first had a reasonable opportunity to decide the question as ta which certification is sought first.
Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station),
ALAB-297, 2 NRC 727, ~29 (1975); see also Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactot- Plant), ALAB-330, 3 NRC 613, 618-19 (1976), reviewed and reversed in part on other grounds sub nom. U.S.E.R.D.A. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-76-13, 4 NRC 67 (1976). This Board has presided over these proceedings for almost a year now and knows the parties and the issues well. It is familiar with the history of emergency planning in this case. It is hard to imagine that the Appeal Board or Commission would not welcome the views of this Board.
B. There Is No Need for Expedited Review The County's reason for wanting immediate commission review is apparently that the legal issues here are important
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I 1
ones of first impression and that they could, if decided in the County's favor, end the proceeding. As to the first point, Licensing Boards are perfectly qualified to decide important issues and, in this instance, LILCO believes the Commission's intent has been made quite clear, particularly as to the point tnat'10 C.F.R. s 50.47(c)(1) is to give the applicant an oppor-tunity to present his evidence, so that the Board can be confident it is construing the regulation correctly.
In any event, the Commission is aware of the events in this docket and has said it will act if action is appropriate.
In a letter of March 10, 1983, to the Suffolk County Executive, the General Counsel of the NRC said:
.[T]he Licensing Board has taken steps to further focus the positions of the various parties by requiring further fil-ings concerning the development of an offsite emergency plan. The Commission will be studying those submissions care-fully in an effort to determine whether Commission action may be appropriate.
As for the second point, the only reason for deciding now whether or not the County wins the case on a legal point is to save the County the trouble of litigating the factual issues in the -event that the Board rules for LILCO and is eventually overruled by a higher body. But the trouble and expense of litigating a case is not such harm as will justify departure
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from the usual rules and procedure. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2),
ALAB-706 (Dec. 15, 1982), slip op. 8 n.7 (time and expense of litigating contentions do not alone warrant Appeal Board's in-terlocutory involvement). In any event, after putting everyone through almost a year of hearings on other issues, the County is ill-placed to claim that the litigation of emergency plan-ning is-too troublesome.
C. Who Should Perform Expedited Review, If It Is Performed Assuming that the Board decides, contrary to our argument above, that its decision on the legal issue should be reviewed by a higher body immediately, that higher body should be the Commission itself. True,. it is the Appeal Board that exercises the Commission's authority in the first instance in certifications under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.718(i). Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
ALAB-56, 4 AEC 930 (1972). But in this case LILCO believes it would be appropriate to short-circuit the appeal process some-what. Once the Licensing Board has rendered a decision, there is little need for a second opinion to help the Commissioners focus the issues. The uniqueness of the ASLB is that it is
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l l
closest to the case and best informed about it. This cannot be i said of the Appeal Board. Indeed, the Commission itself, which has indicated it is following the Shoreham case closely, is probably better informed at present than the Appeal Board. If there is to be an interlocutory appeal, then, in the interest of speeding up a process that will almost surely end up in the Federal courts, the Commission should take the case directly from the Licensing Board.
VI. THE LITIGATIO1: SHOULD PROCEED ON THE FACTUAL ISSUES, NO MATTER WHAT Whether or not the Board decides the legal issues first or certifies them without decision to the Appeal Board or Com-mission, LILCO believes that, immediately upon the Board's de-cision on the merits or decision to certify the drafting of contentions and the continuation of discovery on emergency planning should go forward.
Any further delay in this proceeding is likely to result in detriment to LILCO. The history of this proceeding shows that, the more important the issue to the County, the longer it takes to litigate it. Issue 7B took from May 4 through July 22 and is still not finished; Quality Assurance took from September 14 through February 23. Emergency planning, which by
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F all accounts is the County's most important issue, could take even longer. No matter what the ultimate fuel load date of the plant, the litigation of the factual issues is unlikely to be finished by then, and certainly not if litigation halts while the County pursues its legal theories.
LILCO therefore suggests that two weeks from the date the Board decides the County's motion to terminate, the County and other parties should have their draft contentions on the LILCO offsite plan in the hands of the other parties for dis-cussion. One week later final contentions and objections to them should be filed with the Board. The rest of the litiga-tion should proceed briskly from that point on.
When the . time for filing testimony arrives, LILCO believes the parties who have raised contentions should file first, and the parties defending against those contentions should file sometime later. This nonsimultaneous filing of testimony would help to focus and streamline the proceeding.
Time and time again in this proceeding the Board and parties have been faced with contentions the meaning and scope of which were unclear. Only the filing of testimon2 (and sometimes not even that, es witness the QA issuec) seems to elicit from the County what its concerns really are. With offsite planning, as with other issues, we are in a situation in which the essence
-110-
of LILCO's case is well documented -- the LILCO-offsite plan has been in the other parties' hands for months, and much of it was written by the County's own employees -- while we have lit-tle indication what the County's. case' will be other than its belief that emergency planning for Shoreham is impossible. The County and other intervenors should therefore file their testi-mony first and LILCO be allowed to reply with testimony of its own.
LILCO suggests that it may be desirable to hold the offsite emergency planning litigation in several phases. The first phase would decide whether the LILCO offsite plan is adequate, focusing on the functions described in the plan and the means to accomplish them. The second phase would decide any contention about implementation (who will perform the functions), which we would expect to arise because Suffolk County officials will refuse to prepare for emergency planning in advance.42/ (Apart from " role conflict" questions, we do 42/ In some cases the adequacy of the plan and the feasibility of implementation may be inextricably intertwined. For exam-7 ple, the plan contains a certain evacuation plan that depends on Suffolk County police to direct traffic. If Suffolk County were able to prove the plan unacceptable because the police would not report (the implementation. issue), then the plan might have to be changed. These sorts of situations can be dealt with as they arise, much as the Board dealt with the need to distinguish Phase I contentions from Phase II earlier in-this proceeding.
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l l
not expect the County to allege that its officials and employ-ees would stand idly by in an actual emergency merely because the County has decreed that emergency planning is impossible.)-
We would expect Phase 2 to cover " interim compensating actions" under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(1).
The third phase of the litigation would occur only if LILCO were unable to meet its burden of proof in Phases 1 and 2; in that event LILCO would ask for an exemption from the reg-ulations and expect to present either legal arguments or evi-dence, or both, justifying such an exemption. Probably Phase '
.3, if it occurred, would involve 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(b), 10 C.F.R. 5 50.12(a), or a showing that deficiencies are not sig-nificant or that there are "other compelling reasons" under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(1).
LILCO would anticipate that written testimony would be filed on a rolling schedule depending on how long the hearings on each phase were taking. In every case the intervenors should file their testimony first, and LILCO subsequently.
VII. THE STATE'S POSITION ON f EMERGENCY' PLANNING FOR SHOREHAM l
[ In its " Confirmatory Memorandum and Order Directing the Submission of Briefs Addressing Suffolk County's Motion to
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Terminate This Proceeding," dated February 28, 1983, the Board directed the parties to include in their briefs "each party's understanding of the position which the State of New York has taken or will take with respect to the review, litigation
, and/or implementation of LILCO's proposed offsite emergency i
plan." Board Order at 4. The Board issued a second order on February 28, 1983, entitled " Memorandum Requesting Submission of Views of New York State on Emergency Planning."
LILCO counsel inquired of the State and learned that as of the date of that inquiry the State had not yet taken a posi-tion. LILCO cannot predict what the final position of the State on emergency planning for Shoreham will be. Several points, however, are worth noting.
Prior to December 8, 1982, the LILCO offsite plan was submitted to the Disaster Preparedness Commission staff for review. It is LILCO's understanding that the plan passed mus-ter when compared by the reviewers to applicable regulations, and that the DPC was prepared to recommend that the plan be forwarded to FEMA. The County persuaded a court to enjoin the b
meeting at which that recommendation would have been made.
Subsequent to the initial injunction, LILCO, the County, and the State entered into a stipulation by which the DPC refrained from taking further action before February 23, by which time it
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was assumed the County Legislature would have come to some decision regarding its own offsite plan. As noted above, the County Legislature declined to approve any offsite plan for Shoreham on February 17, 1983.
l That same day the Governor of New York issued a state-ment announcing that he had directed that the DPC not forward to FEMA the LILCO offsite emergency plan. Governor Cuomo's statement also said that he would not-be a party to any effort to impose an independently developed State plan upon Suffolk County, but concluded that the State " stands ready and willing to cooperate in any way possible" with Suffolk County and LILCO "to develop an adequate and implementable evacuation plan for Shoreham."
LILCO also notes that New York State laws impose a duty upon the State both to prepare emergency plans and to act in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham. First, the Governor has the power to declare a disaster emergency by exec-utive order, directing chief executives in emergency services organizations to respond. N.Y. Exec. Law $ 28 (McKinney Supp.
f 1980) (hereinafter Executive Law $ __). Second, Executive Law l
t
$$ 21.3.C and 22.1 make it clear that the State Disaster Preparedness Commission is required by law to create a state emergency plan:
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Section 21.3. The Commission shall have the following powers and responsibilities:
- c. prepare state disaster preparedness plans, to be approved by the gover-nor, and review such plans and report thereon by March thirty-first of each year to the governor and the legisla-ture. In preparing such plans, the i
commission shall consult with federal and local officials, emergency service organizations, and the public as it deems appropriate; Section 22. State disaster preparedness plans
- 1. The commission shall prepare a state dis-aster preparedness plan and submit such plan to the governor for approval no later than one year following the effec-tive date of this act. The governor shall act upon such plan by July first of that year. The commission shall review such plans annually.
Pursuant to these sections, there is in fact a State Disaster Preparedness Plan. On page I-ll of that Plan, under
" State Government," the Plan states that "the State also shall take the necessary actions to respond in those instances where a county does not have the capability to implement all or part of its Radiological Emergency Response Plan, or the Chief Exec 1tive of a county does not elect to put such a plan into effect." This language appears throughout the State Plan, in
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i conjunction with provisions for the State to implement action 2
required for emergency preparedness. Thus, under the State Disaster Preparedness Plan,-the State has a duty to "take the necessary actions to respond."
j' Finally, the State Plan also provides on page A-2, Part III, $ 1 at 3.4 that "[t]he Director of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group, in instances where a county does not review and update its Radiological Emergency Response Plan at appropriate intervals, will perform such reviews and incor-porate necessary revisions after consultation with the county's Chief Executive, other local officials designated by him, and affected State agencies." The State presently has in its files the now-outdated 1978 County emergency. response plan, which the
-State has a duty to revise.
Thus, it appears that the State will be-required to act regarding emergency planning at Shorehem. It is difficult to predict at this juncture, however, exactly what that action
, will be.
VIII. CONCLUSION The short of the matter is that the NRC regulations, the rulemaking record underlying them, and the 1982-83 Authorization Act all combine to show that LILCO is entitled to
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present evidence-to show that offsite emergency planning, no matter who does it, is adequate to protect the public. LILCO is ready to go forward with the litigation of that issue.
Suffolk County seeks to prevent the issue from ever being l
heard. The Board should rule for LILCO and allow the parties to get on with the litigation of the factual issues.
There is no need to certify anything to the Commission at this point. The law is sufficiently clear on the point that LILCO's hearing rights are not to be automatically cut off merely because a local government says they must be. The Commission has said it is keeping informed about the events in this docket, and it will doubtless say something quickly if it disagrees with the Board's handling of the legal issue. Unless it does, the proceeding should go on according to the usual procedures.
f
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, __.__.-m,-- _ __, _ , _ _ _ _ . , , _ _ _ . _ _
l Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
. Taylor Reveley, III James N. Christman Kathy E. B. McCleskey Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 DATED: March 18, 1983 h
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atoinic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
) Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUFFOLK COUNTY'S MOTION TO TERMINATE THIS PROCEEDING AND FOR CERTIFICATION March 18, 1983 Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Volume Two of Two:
Attachments x
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. . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ i
- "" l COUNTY OF CUFFOLK j
COUNTY LEGISLATURE LHulN AND J GlESE t a9 semise statt? 9 es vas t v LE Gasta ?O4 F.rTM O 5?msct tas? SETausLCT.New Tomst t t 733-2099 838444498300 e..hwsh
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- un L uenmen t t i t
..L a t t M a r= D C 6 L e a %(.s e a s s i e gevamp January 19, 1983 Mrs. Deborah Schechner, President Peoples Action Coalition of Suffolk County P. O. box 27 Shirley New York 11967 Re: Shoreham Evacuation
Dear Mrs. Schechner:
1 as in receipt of your letter dated January 6th in relation to the above-referenced topic. .
As you will remember I openly expressed my displeasure of Legislator Prospect introducing legislation relative to the Shoreham Plant. I main-l tained at the time that the most simple and direct answer to the problem would be institution of legal action by the County of Suffolk at the. time the N.R.C. decides to issue the 11 cense and demanding that LILCO prove the_ ef fectiv'eness of a viable Evacumeinn Plan. It stands to reason they could not do so in a million years and then Tii'my way of thinki1g, they could not activate the plant.
The purpose of Mr. Prospect's resolution, as I see it, was_ to spend four million dollars of taxpayers' money, not counting the untold millions that
! will be paid in the event any so-called Evacuation Plan is implemented.
1 understand your position that the plan should not be adopted; however, the reasoning behind the hearinas for a so-called plan, at the creaany I
time, is to use the facta nresented as a basis for a future lawsuit.
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In tTs case. Legislator Prospect has saddled the people with an axpense that is atrocious, unreasonable and, in my husble opinion, with no affirmative result in the future. On the other hand. wara the Yeef =1=enr= to sares that, es elected officiala- we ahan1A reject the plan, we are in effect 1Dicating that we do not chrish human life and have no desire en protect our con-otituents. On the basis of this assumption. Imgislators hayvo other
Mrs. Deborah Schechner, President January 19, 1983 olternative but to vote in the affirm'eiue.
There is no longer a sinple solution to this p roblem because of the politi-cal maneuverings of one individual. I regret the situation that we are confronted with but we have no other alternative. I have been criticized for voting for the oriCinal resolution; however, how was it possible to v.,te "no" and y,1ve t he ir.prer,sion t hat I was in f avor c,f the LILCO opera-tinn.
I thank you for the comments in your letter and I assure you of my con-tinued interest in the safety of all constituents throughout Suf folk County.
Sincerely yours, ,
.e3
~FERDINAND J. GIESE County Legislator 5th District FJG: gfk cc to: All Suffolk County Legislators e
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COUNTY OF SUFFOLK -
ATTACHfENT 2 John V. N. Klein CouMTV EMECUTIVE December 31, 1979 Ira L. Freilicher, Vice President Long Island Lighting Company 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 Re: Memorandum of Understanding - Shoreham
Dear Ira:
Enclosed herewith is a photocopy of the original Memorandum of Understanding between the Long Island Lighting Company and the County with respect to emergency planning at Shoreham.
With the addition of paragraph 1, providing for mutual termina-tion on ten days notice, I have signed the agreement and made the County Executive-elect Peter Cohalan aware of such action, with which he is in agreement.
If you wish a copy executed in original, I would be glad to do so.
cere y yours, l
knV.N.Klein Suffolk County Executive JVNK:ds Enclosure cc: Honorable Peter F. Cohalan Suffolk County Executive-Elect
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'My 1 MEMORANDUM iF UNDEft3TANDING PETWEEN
, .f g O SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK AND LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON EMERGENCY PLANNING In order to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix E IV(D) and to provide for efficient and timely implementation of protective actions abauld they ever be required as a result of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), Suffolk County (County) and the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) have reached the following agreeacnts and understandings:
A. The (LILCO) Emergency Plan define; accident conditions and delineates responsibilities and duties of the SNPS staff in the event of a potential radiological incident. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be implemented whenever conditions exist which have a significant probability of leading to elevated levels of radiation which might result in an onsite or offsite personnel hazard, and/or environmental concern. Certain nonradiological events at the plant may also result in activating portions of the emergency organization. Emergencies have been separated into five^ classifications which are explained in detail in Section 13 3 SNPS FSAR.
B. LILCO is responsible for the protect'ive action of notifying the following persons onsite and in the immediate vicinity of the site in the event of an emergency:
- 1. All persons whether LILCO employees or visitors within the " owner controlled area" of the site,
! 2. All persons on the jetties or on the shore-front that is part of the Shoreham site, 3 All persons within the LILCO owned portion of the Wading River marsh on the northeast por-
' tion of the site, and
- 4. All persons associated with the St. Joseph's Villa located on the Shoreham West site.
C. The County is responsible, in support of New York State, for the notification and protective action of all. members of the public not specifically included in B, above, l
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D. LILCO agrees to notify the Emergency Ooerations Center (EOC) or Warning Point, using the National Alert Warning System (NAWAS) undur the following circumstances:
- 1. Upon declaration by the LILCO Emergency Director of a Plant Emergency as defined in Section 13 3 3 1,3 of the SNPS FSAR where significant potential
' exists for the emergency to become a Site or General Emergency, as defined in Sections 13 3 3.1.4-5,
- 2. Upon declaration by the LILCO Emergency Director (within 15 minutes) of a Site Emergency or a
! General Emergency, 3 LILCO agrees to notify the County in a timely fashion (within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) upon a serious incident, regardless of whether such incident involves releases of radioactivity and LILCO also undertakes to notify the County of events which could, mistakenly or otherwise, be con-strued as a radiological incident, and
- 4. Upon dispatch from the site of injured or sick per-sonnel who are contaminated with radioactivity and who are being transported to a local hospital (within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />). -
E. LILCO will install and maintain at its expense a dedi-cated telephone line connected to the NAWAS. Three telephones will be installed onsite, in the (1) Control Room, (2) Onsite Emergency Control Center, and (3) Al-ternate Onsite Emergency Control Center. The County will provide a terminal for this line in its NAWAS system located in its Emergency Operations Center in Yaphank, New York.
F. In the event of a Site or General Emerr.cncy, LILCO agrees to notify the County Warning Point and to provide the following information:
- 1. Location and type of emergency,
- 2. Caller's name and means of communications contact if different than the predesignated telephone number, 3 Date/ Time of incident,
- 4. Wind speed and direction, and
7" 5.
status of engineered safeguards (working /not working County EOCabove.
information, or. Warning Point will call LILCO to confirm the following additional information as possible:LILCO will then p 1 1
1.
Type of accident (transportation accident, reactor discharge, cality, other),
fuel handling accident, accidental criti-acc 2.
Primary effect to offsite areas (release to the at- !
mosphere, release to water, direct radiation), i 3.
Estimate of the quantity and type of radioactive material released or that may be released, 4.
Estimates of offsite two-hour whole body (immersion) and thyroid (inhalation) dose,
- 5. Perimeter survey results, 6.
Pasqu.ill wind stability category,
- 7. Status of safeguards (status of core coolant systems, containment integrity, etc.),
8.
Additional offsite agencies notified and nature of request and response, and
- 9. Other pertinent information.
G.
The County and LILCO agree to coordinate their efforts in the release of information to the public to provide the public with accurate and timely information.
H.
LILCO agrees to conduct at least one drill annually to test invitedcommunication to participate. channels in which the County will be I.
written notice to the other party.This agreement may be term l
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Il FOR SUFFOLK CQU TY
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Signature ~f -
Date_/ h - N ' 7 7 Title FOR LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Signature _.
U A _--a M h Date December 26, 1979 V
Title Vice President O
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ATTACHMENT 3 TMIS ACAEEMENT, as entered into as of thia 15% day ofi yt. b e, 1931
- by and between the Long Island Lighting Company (hcrainafter referred to as "LILCC") and the County of Suffolk, acting through its Departsent of Flanning *
(hereinaf ter referred to as the " DEPARTMENT").
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VITNE55ET11 THAT:
WHEREAS. LILCD desires to enter into a contract with the DEPART;E:iT to render certain technical and professional services hereinaf ter described.
3dW THEAEIDRE, the parties hereto do sutus11y agree as follows:
- 1. Errotonent of contractor. LILCO hereby agrees to engage the DEPARttC:T and the DEFAATMENT hereby agrees to perform the services herein-after set forth. The relationship of the parties hereto shall be that of client and independent contractor; neither the DEFART.".ENT nor any person hired by the DEPARTMENT shall be considered esployees of LILCD for any purTose.
- 2. Scoee of Servtees. The DEPART:!C."* shall prepare a County liadio-logical berg ncy Response Plan, as required by,Tddaral Regulations in effect on the date of this Agreement for the LII.C0 Shorehas helcar P.'ver Station.
I Said Plan chall be prepared in accordance with the descriptica contained in clause 3 "kork Statement". The DEPAtt1ENT represents that it has read and is familiar with the applicable Federal Regulations set forth in hhibit 3 attached hereto and that the DETAlttENT believes it can Javelop a Ceu,nty Radiological bergency Respoitse Flan which crrsplies with such regulattens.
If reviatons to the aforcraid Federal kculations slull be =aJa 'uring the period of this Agreement, calling for chan as in the scopc of .mrk, ch n the l '
pruvintens of clause 10 " Changes in $ cope" of this Agreement SM11 apply.
- 3. L*.wk S t.s r men t .
- a. The DEPARTMENT shall perform the activieles Jeestibed in the SCOPE OF WCRit appended herato as Exhibit A. .
- b. The DLrAantENT . hall conform to the TeJeral Agulaticas ind
- uidelinets limted in Eshibit 3, appended hureto, in the far=ation of uutputs ,
of .mtivities Jescrit.ed in Exhibit A.
3ev. 1 1/11/82 l .
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h c. Wherever specialtacd technical and scientific inputs are
- secessary, the DEPAlt?. EXT will retain, af ter consultation with LILCD, the, _ ,
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services of appropriate esperts, at the DEyAJtt'ENT's expense. . .'
6 Time of Performance. , ,
- a. The DDAAS2NT will aske every effort to complete .the taska
' listed la Exhibit A within 6 acaths from the date of executies of this Agreement, subject to the timely response by yederal and State agencies to requests- for Laformation, and the timely receipt of Tederal and State , ;
concurrences with the draf t and final Emergency Radielegical Response Plans. .
la the event the DDA10:ENT fails to receive timely response from Federal and State agencies to requests for information, the DDAltD2XT shall proeptly notify L:LCD is writing of such failure. .
- b. The DDARTENT will 1.ssue moschly progress reports, and distribute them to LILCC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Tederal .
Emergency ".anagement Agency, the New York State Department of Health, the Suffelk County Legislature, and other involved and'istarosted agencies as specified by LIL:3 and agreed to by the DEFARD.ENT. The DDARTMENT agrees
) to provide LIL:3 with reasonable actase to all memoranda. correspondence, professional qualification records of employees performing under the contract, papers, reports. studies and similar documents preptred by or obtained by the DDAAD:ENT in connection with the performance of its obligations under this contract. L LCD 'shall give the DEFAE:2 TENT 7 days' antice of its inten=
ties to amersi.se its rights under this paragraph.
- 1. Suoervision and personnel.
- a. All work performed bythe DEPART: TENT shall be under the direct supervisian of Lee E. Koppelana. . .
- b. The DDARDENT. represents that it has, or will secure at its swa empense, all personnel required to perform the services covered by this
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Agreessat. Such peraennel shall set be employees of, or have soy centractual ,
relatiosahip with, LIL::D. * * * ~
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- 6. Comoensatten* LIL 0 agrees to rainbusse the DEFAR3EYT on a fixed price basis; total es=pensation shall be TW utlX:: RED mfd TCETT-TIVE TECU$AND ($243.0C0.00) 00LI.UL3 for the services described is clause 3
" Work Statement" of this Agressent unless this Agressent is amended as provided herein. De DEFA17::Df! shall be ce=pensated according to the following payneet schedules .
3130.000.00 on esecution of this Agreement; l .
Balance os Caspletion.
- 7. Mondisert inarfoe. De DEFARTME:f! shall not di?criminate, directly or indirectly, on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, age, sational origin, or physical handicap in.its e=ploysant practices related to this Agressant. The DDA1:MD:T shall take af firmative steps to ensure that applicants are employed and acployees are treated during employment without regard to race, color, religios, sez, age, or sational origia.
- 8. Interest of Centracter. De EFAt:ME:f! represents that it O
presently has ne interest and will not acquire any interest, direct or
,k. indirect, which would conflict in any =anner or degree with the performance of services required to be perfor=ed under this Agreement. The OEFA17:tE.7 fureer represents that, is the perfor=ance of this Agreement, no person having any such interest shall be employed.
- 9. Title of presertv. Title to property acquired under this Agreement vests with the DEFARTMENT.
- 10. Channes in scese. II during the period of this Agressant, any change in the relevant Tederal regulations causes as increase or decrease La the DDAATMENT's cost of or the time required for, the performance of shall any part of the work under this Agreeenst, as equitable adjustment No charge I' he ande and this Agreement modified in writing accordingly.
, .~ shall be ande to LIICD for any change or increase is the obligations of
- the DEFALT!iDf! requiring extra work under this Agreement, unless the parties eascute such as Agressent specifying the work to be done thereunder and the cost thereof. Disputes peer such as adjustzest sha'11 be resolved as provided la clause 11 "3emedies" of this Agreement.
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- 11. Reeedles. This Agree =ent shall be interpreted according to to the lave of the State of New York. All claims, cou ster-claims, disputes ,
and other =atters to ques: ton between 11100 and the :CPA17XENT arising out .
of or relating to this Agree =ent or the breach thereof shall be decided by arnitratica in accordance with the rules for commercial disputes of the e
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American Arbitration Associat102 in the City of New York. The parties hereto agree that the determinatten of said arbitration shall be fi=al and binding upon the parties hereto and that a judg=ent on said award say be entered as a judg3ent of record in the Suprese Court of the State of New York. The fees and expenses of t.'r. arbiters shall be borne equally by the parties. Clat=s and disputes shall be defined as any for=a.1 vritten complaint which remains unresolved between the parties after reasonable efforts to resolve such atters have failed.
IN VI~NT.33 VdIRT. T, L1L 3 and the C00:*TT have executed this Agressent as of the date first above written.
- A. P '8 R C V E..D.
. LC3: 131 x c L1:d!!s: C::eAhT
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GEN *L COUNSEL j 3, S W Da'. M 'n , '#, ,
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r.attnew C. Carcaro, Vice-Prestment 5;TTCLK C ::.T :EFAA* MINT CT PLAN::IN
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% e E. Koppel=an. Dirtdtor
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. COU::TT CT SL77C11 AFFRCVED AS TO TCRM.
NOT IIV1riED AS TO EXICUTICN Sy: % .
[
. [#hn C. Callagher g Chief Deputy County Eastutive Alf red .IAesagn, Jr. 7/ M //f Deputy County Attorney
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STAit CF '.r4 YCkK) ee..
COUNTY QT .uSSAU )
Co this /D day cf
- If 31931, before se personally came I
ttATThrJ C. CORCARC, to me known, and known to se to be the person described is and uho executed the foregoing instrument as Vice-President of,the LCNC 15' J N3 L1:"clT13C COMPANY, and he duly acknowledged to me that he suscuted the same.
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AWVk Notary Pualic
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~ .. .. .I:.5/2 CO*JNTY OF SUTy0LK)
- Os -
On this S [ day of '
1981, before me personally came LIE E. KOFFC.?.tN to me known, who being by se duly sworn did depose cod sty: Bat he resides at Suffolk County, New York; that he is the Dirceter of the SUf TCLK CO'.NTT ;,EFARCE.'r! CT F'.n~N15C, described herein, and uhich executed the above instrument, and that it was executed by ordst of thes, and that he signed his nama thereto by like order.
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So t a ry Pu warf P:st: *as se:se pig ea MerW4*J h a 3.n r a %
STATE CT .NT4 YCRK) w a=== usa % sam uf7 ss..
4CUNTY CT !UTTCLK)
Cothia$[Jyo jb
- 1981, before se p rsonally come JCHN C. CALI.'CMER, to me known, who being by se duly sworn did depose
.ind say: Dst he reetdes at Suffolk CountT, Xev York; that he is the Chief De uty County Es.cutive of Suffolk County, sad that he executed thm within ins trument, and that he signed his name thereto by order of ths County Esecutive of Suffolk Ccinty.
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IW!*!? A S'COPt CF '.'OpI
- The preparation of the County Radiological hergency Response Flan consists of nine phases. In carrying out the nine phases, the Suf folk County :eparttent of Flanning (the OEFAA02::T) will provide overall canage=ent and technical direc-tien. and will be resycasible for preparing document draft input (or =stifica- ;
tions to existing' docu=ents), typi=g Printing, and distribution. In the de-velo; cent and of f actuatico of the hargency Radiological Respcase Plan, the ,
OEFAAT:Cf!
e:ents may utilize to the =axi=us and e=
degree ploy the responsible County agencies and 'e; art-possible. The work already perfor=ed by L1LC3 Suf folk County er.ergency plannist organizations, the State of New York, and other New York counties surrou: ding operating nuclear plants in New York State will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable.
k Each phase and its associated tasks is discussed below:
I Ba se ! - Assess suf felk Counrv !._ereenew ?!annine Weds .
I l The purpose of this phase is to review and assess the present status of the County t energency preparedness program and to take reco=mendations for a de-TResponse ailed program concerning schedu.las for both the County Radiological hargency Flan a=d its 1=ple=enting Procedures. Based upon the results of this analysis. Suffolk County would have clear understanding of how best to accon-
,{ plish furtheritsphases energency planning a=d task.s responsibilities described below. The and could add to or modify the Ifollow. specific tasks to be perfar:ad I
Task No. t
- r Rsview the level andofevaluate effort exist 1=g suffolk Couary plans and procedures and deter ise tions. needed to bring then into c =pliance with existing regula-Develop a schedule and an action plan that would accomplisa this.
Task No. 2 Review existing evacuation plans, evacuation time estimates and public notifica-gtion/cct=unicatien systa=s with those parties involved. Oevelcp a detailed i cxisting pectras for upgrading or developing these plans and systems in order to meet requirenants.
- ask No. 1
[ Evaluate suffolk Count 7's independene environ:antal radiological monitoring
[ czpabilities and deter =ine steps necessary to bring this capability up to the
[ 1evel required by Suffolk County to = net applicable federal and State require-
! eents. This task shall be coordinated with other work in this area done by f.IU:0 and New York State. Methods and equip =ent requir;d to perform radio-l l lagtcal assessments to a degree desired by County officials in order to meet applicable laws and regulations vill be determined.
Task so. 4 Fispare a needs analysis report which would address each aspect of Tasks 1-1; davelop a detailed recc== ended approach to meet these needs; and provide a re-fined schedule for both the plan and its respective inplementing procedures.
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- . i Phase II - Seveloeeent of Orafe Suffolk Countv tadialeetcal E.ereenev Reseense Plans The purpose of this phase vould be to develop a County RI2P that incorporates ell necessary infor=.ation and which is suitable for review by all ap;ropriate agencies. The specific tasks to be performed follev.
Task No. 1 Farform an in-depth review of participating County government organizations tad their axisting radiological e:ergency response plans.
, Task No. 2 .
Identify County agencies involved in emerge.ncy planning, define the au tho riza-tion and responsibilities of these agencies, and identify the cognizant in-dividuals within each agency.
Es tablish techr.ical and man a gerial liaison with the responsible individuals
, in the County preparedness agency. 'O.03. New York State, the Nuclear Reguia-t.wy Co :tission , and the Tederal Imargency Y.anagement Agency.
Task No. 3 The DEFAA*Y. INT will c:cduct fa=111arization nastings with the cognitant indi-vidual.s is t.he County e=argency preparedness agencies. The :EFAA*iE:C will provide guidance and background concerning the role and contribution of each agency in the c=ergency plar.=ing process, and rec == end measures which will
- result in the mos t ef ficient planning activity.
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a No. 4 C I
Identify a list of available County resources so that the overall energe.ncy plan vill take caz1=um use of these resources. The :EFAA : E:t! vill develop caec.klists and prepare discussion agenda to ensure that the initial survey
. infor=ation is obta1=ed in an orderly f ashion, is properly documented, and is
}cocplete. These discussions vil.1 help determine assign =ent of various respons:
i bilities to applicable energency preparedness agencies and vill also provide as lcffectivefor:at for identifying special emergency plannits situatier.s and/or
- pecolems.
Task No. 5
!iaca ge the R.nF development e f f o rt. The CEPA1:2iI C will identify individual agency task.s. responsibilities and interfaces to ensure maximum coordination sad to f acilitate the preparation of the draf t plan.
The esecution of Task No. 3 vill require the completion of the following Sub-tas ks . .
Sub t s sk No . 5.1 Buildies on the work done in Phase 1, Task 3. those agencies or organizations having some radiological assessmant role during the ecergency will be identifia j and their responsibilitias v11.1 be delineated. Discussions will be held with the Depart =ent of Energy Regional Coordinating Of fice to determine their assia.
tance role. The specifications, procurement and installation of thi.s equipcent is not included as part of this. program.
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e Su b e n sir we. 5.2 ,
Raview the existing or proposed ec==unications 'astverk butvean the responsible Tederal agencies. State and local officials 1:100 and field survey tea s to ensure that the systen is effective and reliable.
Su'bessk No. 3.3 -
R4 view and outline existug development of an early varning system for the general public. Individuals responsible for maintaining and actuating this systen vill be identified and their specific roles vill be deter =ined. Twen ty-four (24) hour per day operational capability of de systen shall be a prograa .-
requirement. .
Subtask No. 3.4 Incorporate into the Ocunty pIV the e.nergency action levels developed for the Shoreham Nuclear Fever Station in accordance with WRIO-C610.
Subtask No. 3.3 Ixcorporate the prepared evacuation plans and a.ssociated time estinates into
. the ca ery Plan.
i Wsk Ito. 6 is task vill be perfor=ed in parallel with Task No. 5, and vill comprise de j fellowing suhtasks:
3 l5ubtask No. 6.1 g o 3De RI1F vill also include the use of protective naasures other than general
% ,ecuation. The folleving protective action response options vill be developed
- Initial Frecautionary Cperatione (i.e., institution of road blocks. etc.)
- Selactive Evacnation
- Selective Sheltering
- - Oaseral Sheltering l - Radieprotective h s Ad=inistration
- - I. solation of Ingestion Pathways and Sources h54easkVa.6.2 De emergency olanning needs for special facilities and/or problems will be addressed in this subcask along with the development of prelininary approaches f far deall=g with them. Facilities having special energency planning needs and/
or proble::s include, but are not linited to, the following:
- Bospitals
! - Tursing/Racirament Rooms
- Jails l - Iacreational Areas j - Airports Trsk No. 7
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Frepare and issw the draf t RIRP for Licensee. State and local agency review and consent. This RIM shall emphasize prever and effective coordination be-i tween the responsible emergency preparedness agencies. All authorities and i responsiblities, as deter =ined in Task No. 2, will be clearly delineated in the plans.
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- have tit - Presaratten of Tiral herrenew tessense Plan The objective of this phase.vould be to finalize the energency plan for sub-mission to the Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission and to the Federal Energency Manas sent Agency. The following taks will be completed during this phase.
Task va. 1 ~ .
Conduct meetinie with the responsible County emergency planning officials, the Licensee, and New York State offic.ials to discuss their cos:=ents en the draf t plan and to secure action. Were necessary, to resolve outstanding concer=s. .
Task No. 2 .
Cather inputs and other infer =4 tion free County and State planning representa-tives and the 1,1censee as necessary to resolve outstanding dif ferences.
Task No. 3 Finalise the County and State enargency plans by incorperst.ing the inf ormation
. developed in Task No. 2. The :DAAS'T vi.11 print and dis tribute the fir.al-ised plans to all parties. .
l*ask 10. L
! Coincident with Task No.1 above the :DAATFIf! and the cognizant energency I planning agencias util finalize the development of plans for the previously
- 1dentified special energency planning situaticos and/or soluticus to pro'clens.
1 Task Mo. S
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- Coordinate final plan sis'n-off casti=gs. stint and distribute final plans to the 1.icensee. State and local agencies and other organizations as designated by the County.
F5a s e IV - As sist in Cbtainine yederal Aeenew Traf f Ceneur ence *= Tith !_ettenew Flans
,The objective of this phase is to confer vich the reviewing Tederal agency
. staff s to discuss their cor. ants and to develop a program for obtaining agency
[ concurrence with the plans developed in Phases I through IIT.
Task Mo. 1 Participate in meetings with the h"RC. TU.A, DCT and other responsible agency staffs to discuss the plans and, to the extent possible, resolve chasion and agency concerns.
i Task Mo. 2 01scuss agency com=ents with the Count 7 and State emergency planning representa-tives and the Licensee to develop a program to resolve outstanding diff erences.
L F5ase Y - Freearse' ion of RI?F Teslesecting Procedures The objective of this phase is to develop detailed implementing procedures for the County Radiological Energency Response Flaa.
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-[ Task No. 1 .
h :evelop a listing of all ne.cessary i=plementing procedures for the County fenergencyresponseplan. Any available local specific coerating procedures
! vill be utilised to the nazimum extent feasible.
8 Task Yo. 2 ,
. Nold discussions with the Cstaty emergency planning organizations to ensure b
that they are fully aware of the latest Tederal require ents for preparing f satisfactory i=plementing procedures. Develop detailed outlines for each ta-I plamenting procedure in cooperation with County emergency planning coordinators h
. m
,o. 3 F
i The :tra 2:NT will prepare draf ts of the i plementing procedures and distrib-
?. ute ces to the respective agencies for review and approval, e
Task Mo. 4 Coordinate ce=ments frem the agencies and prepara final draf ts of the proca-p dures. -
t
- Task Wo. 5
- The ODAJt m*:" will assist the County agencies in meetings held with the nc, TD'.h. New York State, or other reviewing agencies sa necessary to obtais final approval of the procedures.
Phase 7T - Netifientie-a Svstem !nterraties In cooperatien with 1,M and work which 1:LC3 centracted to an indepen'aent
. consultant er;erienced in site evaluation, systes design and systes specifica-tion, the OE?M MCfT shall deter =ine the resources, both ad=inistrative and I physical, that are required to ce= ply with the N2.013-cimute I?: notification b regulatica and assi.st in review of the preoaration of specification and pro-
, curement of the necessary harchtare. Issta11ation and test procedures vould f also be developed upon selection of a vesdor. Actual installation vould be a accomplished by others. * '
Task ,o. 1 Raview survey of the 10-e11e I?*,; includ1=g demographic, topographic and geo-graphic considerations that deter =ine the characteristics of the required
- . varning/notificacica system. Also, review the evaluation of existing notifica-
[ ticut capabilities , such am covu and village fire deoart=ent sirens.
. Task Mo. 2 t
l The :IFAK:22NT will verk jointly with LIL 3 to:
I
- 1. select the nofification system (s) that will be ucilised;
- 11. review list of con =arcially available equipment and vender selection /
qualification; and l ,
111. develop system installation and test procedures.
I j .
l - lo - .
4 I -
- ., s '.
l - . . . . . - . .. , . _
.m- - . .. --
-_ % -_.m- ;
I Phase VII - Publie Iducat tun Freeran Task No. 1 - Tefine Freeran Secoe ,
turing this task, the detailed scope and content of the public education infor-nation program vill be identified af ter consultation with and concurrence by L 'Oc. Verk c==p1sted or in progress by I.1'00 shall also be reviewed and eval-u s t ed . T.xamples of ite=s whic.h vill be addressed includes I
- brief factual information on radiation 1 - sources for additional infor=4 tion during energency (i.e.. Emergency' 3roadcasting System) *
- guidance on respiratory protection
- protective action response optiens such as sheltering and avecuation l
- emergency response pla:si=g areas (map)
- evacuation routes (zap)
- reception center assignment and location
- provisions for identifying transit captives and those individuals requirisg special handli=g who live in private residences
- ingestion exposure safeguards
- what plans and preparations can be made now
- things to take during evacuation (checklist)
- notification or alertiss systes details (sirene. etc.)
- method for notifying authorities that residents have lef t their hc=es (verification / con firmation)
Task Me. 2 We thed o f tis s e-N s .-,
l Duries this task. the means of disse:i=ating the infor=ation to the public vill
- be developed and supported by detailed procedures for=ulated jointly by the OUA1
- "KE.NT and I.I' CD. These set. hods could include .,)
- = regional infor:dation centers
. - periodic i=for acion la utility bills
- public service assouncements (radio and TT)
- ads in periodicals (local navs7 apers and magazines)
- pesting in public areas
- pamphlets distributed on a periodic basis
- infor=ation in the telephone book
- di.stributien to school childres/FTA meetings
= local goverr.=ent/cor=mity testisss
- telephone infor=ation service
- ask No. 3 - Proeras !=slerentaties During this task, the program vill be implemented via procedures incorporating datails developed in Tasks No.1 and 2.
Ph ase vi!! - Testinental Services At the request of Suf f olk County or appropriate Tederal or State agencies havtr.g jurisdiction or supervision over E=argency Response Plans, the :DAAN vill provide expert witnese testimony before local. State and/or Federal regula tory stancy boards concernirs all energency planning work performed by the DUA1*. .DfT.
. 11 =
~ .
- s.
~ . . . - . . . . . .
=
,- _ __ - - - w - ~ - -. - _ y .,_ - -~ - a- .ma,,m l, . ... .
prse II - 7_adiolerical !.-ertence Pesse-se Trainin In cooperation with 11,00 and New York state, where practical. and in support of the overall Radiological
- E=argency Kasoonse Program, the llIFancNT vill provide personnel trainir4 services for all program participants. E=phasis will be placed on the folleving disciplisest
- emergency plan and procedure f aciliarization *
- use of radiolegical survey instruments
- radioactive vaste disposal :sthods a=d techniques
- radia:1cn protection =4asures
- deconta=ination procedures
- radiological erposure control record keepiss '
- desi=atry
- notification procedures
- evacuation me thodology
- radialegical accident pro gnosis
- protective action response option evaluation, process I
i
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I
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, t e
I n ,
b- ,
~--- -
._ _ ~ _- __ _ ._
'. *i ES TstT 4 Cuideline Soeveents All finalized plans and procedures vill be developed to meet hac. .T.A. EFA and any other applicable regulatory requitecants in ef f ect at the date of the execu tion of this Agree.nent. It is the intention of the OEFACZNT therefore, to l
utilize the f ollowing criteria as the basic guideline documents for the develop l aent of the appropriate plans and implasentins procedures.
- a. NURIO-0396 .
l "Flanning 3 asis for the Development of State and Local Covernment Radio-logical Emergency lesponse Plans in Support of Light L'ater Nuclear Fever Funen" '
December,1978
- b. 3 :RIC-C610 "Draf t Emersency Action Level Guidelines for Nucinar Powe.r Flants" Septembe r.1979
- c. EFA-320/1-75-001 "Mamel of Protective Action Guidas and Protective Actione for Nuclear Incidents" September.1975
- d. 10 C7150, Appendiz E
. C "Emergasey Plans for Production and Utilization Tacilities"
- e. sCKEG-0654. TD'.A-IIF-1 Eav.1
" Criteria for Fraparation and Ivalu.ation of ladiological Emergency Kasponse Flans and Frtpacedness in Support of Nuc. lear Fever Plants" Novemb er. 19 80.
1,3 I
i l
l
. . u,
'~- -. ~ .. .
I ATTACHMENT 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINC EOARD i )
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGEING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-332 OL
)
l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station )
Unit 1) )
)
)
Discovery Deposition of ROBERT C. MEUNKLE, called as a witness pursuant to 10 CFR Section 2.740 and 2.740(a),
taken before Carl W. Girard, C.M., a Notary Public at the offices of Hunton & Williams, 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. on Friday, the 6th day of August, 1982, commencing at 2:00 p.m., pursuant to agreement of counsel.
1 APPEARANCES:
4
- HUNTON & WILLIAMS, by Joseph M. Spivey, III, Esq.
D. Alan Rudlin, Esq.
James N. Christman, Esq.
, Kathy E. B. McCleskey, Esq.,
on behalf of LILCO:
KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS l 1900 M. Street, N.W.
1 Washington, D.C. 20036, by Cherif Sedky, Esq., and Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.,
! on behalf of Suffolk County, j
New York Intervenor.
ALSO PRESENT:
l l V-Charles A. Daverio l Mr. H. Mark Blauer .
~
W. 9 f. % d, W . u ft.
ages afaa#a. .
UNITED STATES OF A' ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO:CISSIO::
BEFORE THE ATO:11C SAFETY AND LICENSI:!G BOARD 1
l
)
In Matter of )
)
LO::G ISLAND LIGHTI::G COMPA::Y )
) Dochet ?!o . 50-332 OL (Shoreham Nuclear Pcwer Station )
Unit 1) )
)
)
Continuation of discovery deposition of ROBERT C.
ME L";KLE , called as a witness pursuant to 10CFR 2.740 and
- 2. 740 (a) , taken before Carl W. Girard, C.:I., a Notary Public at the offices of Light Island Lighting Company, Hicksville, New York, on Monday, the 16th day of August 1982, cc=mencing at 9:40 a.m., pursuant to agreement of counsel.
APPEARA:!CES :
HUNTON & WILLIA'-IS, by Joseph M. Spivey, III, Esq. and D. Alan Rudlin, Esq.,
on behalf of LILC0; KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOP0HER & PHILLIPS Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.,
on behalf of Suffolk Count.
- ew York, Intervenor.
ALSO PRESE::T-Mr. William Rent, LILCO W. 9f. %ard, W.ufl.
l l $Ar&ones/ oSem/>whtnal $r0ct{rt
l' il 176
?
O L
p 1HDEX ii 1j NO. -
DESCRIPTION PAGE ii 3
2
' 2 Letter to Mr. Meunkle from Mr. Herskowit 190 j dated October 4, 1979. '
3 1 3 Letter to Mr. Merskowit from Mr. Strang 192 l j dated December 3, 1979; letter to 4 ! l Mr. Meunkle from Mr. Herskowitz dated it October 4, 1979, and attached documents.
5d ,
4 Letter to Mr. Strang from Dr. Koppelman 194
] i i dated April 28, 1981.
6 l 5
7 Letter to Mr. Soleo from Dr. Koppe l:"a n 201 L dated June 15, 1982. !
,1 8- '
6 Letter to Mr. Prospect from Dr. Koppelman 202 l
l dated February 11, 1982.
9 -
i 7 Letter to Dr. Koppelman from Mr. Prospect 202 10 dated February 5, 1982. !
i E Letter to Dr. Koppelman from Mr. Mounkle 210 II dated January 11, 1982.
12 9 Memorandum to Mr. Meunkle from Dr. Koppelman 211 dated December 16, 1981. ,
10 Memorandum to Dr. Koppelman from Mr. Meunkle 213
), , dated March 2, 1982.
11 Memorandum to Mr. Meunkle and others from cl6 l 15 p Mr. Gilmartin dated March 18, 1982.
d h
16 [' 12 Memorandum to all department heads from 217 Mr. Jones dated April 16, 1982.
17 i j 13 Memorandum to all department heads from 218 l
' Mr. Jones dated April 29, 1982.
18 14 Memorandum to all department heads from 219 19 i Mr. Jones dated July 23, 1982.
I 20 15 Memorandum to Mr. Jones from Mr. Mounkle 220 !
1 dated May 12, 1982. I i
21 l l l
22 l t I
23 l
1 il i
i i P
L - ._. ._. - _ _ - .
f
22 1
Q I'm sorry, Mr. Meunkle, you told me but, when did !
2 you start these general duties?
I 3 MR. SEDKY: He testified about three years ago.
t i 4 A It was over three years ago.
5 BY MR. SPIVEY:
6 Q When did you last have any duties and responsi-7 bilities with respect to the emergency plan?
8 A April 15th of this year.
9 Q Am I correct then, Mr. Meunkle, that as the 10 Assistant Director of Traffic Safety you did have some ij responsibilities in respect to the emergency plan?
A Yes.
i 12 That was my title witn the Department of 33 Transportation before I--no, I shouldn't say that.
I t
14 That was my title in the Department of Transporta-15 tion when I was transferred to the Department of Planning 16 to work for Dr. Koppelman. I retained the title and I still 17 retain the title in the Department of Public Works.
)
18 Q Were you sort of attached TDY to Dr. Koppelman?
19 A At the time I went to Dr. Koppelman it was
\ permanent.
20 31 Q When your duties and responsibilities in respect 22 of the emergency plan ended on April 15 of this year, were 23 you given a new job title?
23 1 A No, i
2 I Q You just were relieved of those duties and 3 responsibilities?
4 A That's correct.
5 Q And is it fair to say that you went back to doing l 6 what you had been doing before you had any responcibilities
! l
! 7 l with respect to the emergency plan?
lL l
8 MR. SEDKY: Excuse me, the emergency plan 7 9
you've been referring to is the Suffolk County plan?
l 10 MR. SPIVEY: Yes.
11 Q You understand what I mean by emergency plan, i
j 12 don't you, Mr. Meunkle?
l 13 A Yes.
l l u Q All right, sir.
! l l 15 A Ultimately, yes, I returned to doing the duties I i
! 16 l that I was--let me retrace it.
17 Initially, it was just doing the evacuation 18 portion of the plan and just before we started I had certain I
19 duties that I retained.
20 In addition to that, now I'm back to pre-evacuation al Pl anning, the same duties I had at that time.
22 Q All right, sir.
23 , (Recess taken at 2: 47 p.m. and reconvened J
1 -
1 i
4 l
24 l
1 at 3:00 p.m.)
l i
2 j
MR. SPIVEY: Back on the record, please.
l 3 Q Mr. Meunkle, what is your understanding of why l
4 you were -relieved of your duties on April 15, 1982?
5 MR. SEDKY: I obj ect to the question and 6 instruct the witness not to answer.
j 7 MR. SPIVEY: All right, sir. We'll take that i
I a up with the judge, too.
- 9 MR. SEDKY
- Sure.
4 10 BY MR. SPIVEY:
- 11 Q Mr. Meunkle, I'm getting a copy of a document made ,
i 12 but I'm sure you are familiar with it, which is the contract 1
i i3 between LILCO and the County dated September 18, 1981. I ja will hand it to you j us t as soon as we get a copy of it and i
15 ask you if you are familiar with it?
16 A Yes.
1 17 Q Will you tell me, please, what role you played I
is in the formation of that contract?
l 19 l MR. SEDKY: ,Before I object, Mr. Spivey, L ,-
20 rgould you just proffer for me what the issue as i
21 to which that question is related to is?
22 MR. SPIVEY: No, sir.
I 23 , MR. SEDKY: Well, in that case I instruct the I
e 1.
44 1 deposition in accordance with Mr. Brown's request.
3 MR. SPIVEY: We'll j us t have to take that up, 3
Mr. Sedky, when you file your brief, or whatever you 4
choose to file.
5 MR. SEDKY: Very well.
i 6 BY MR. SPIVEY:
j 7 Q Are you going to follow his instructions ,
j 8 Mr. Meunkle?
i l 9 l A Yes.
4 10 Q You know you're coming back again?
l 11 A You're pleasant folks.
12 , Q All right, sir. What are the consultants you worked i
13 with on the siren coverage?
14 A I wouldn't characterize it as working with them:
l l 15 they were retained by th'e utility but it was Wiley Associates 1
. 16 who was working on the siren system for the utility.
l 17 Q Who did you work with with LILCO on the siren 18 system?
l 19 A Mr. Daverio.,
20 Q Did Ms. Palmer have any involvement in that work?
l 21 A Yes.
22 Q Who did you work with at LILCO on the tone alert?
i l 23 A Mr. Daverio.
l l
l l
l l
l 57 1
Q Did you ever make any inquiry to determine if it 2 would work under all types of weather?
3 A Not that I.can recall.
4 Q Do you ever recall having any discussions with 5
any of the County officials with respect to the efficacy of I
6I the system to operate under inclement weather con'd'itions?
i 7 A No.
I s Q Did you ever have any discussions that you can 4
9 recall with any representatives of LILCO along the same line?
10 A No.
4 d
11 Q In your consideration of the prompt notification 12 system, did you ever have any occasion to consider backup
, 13 p wer sources for this system?
ja A Backup power was discussed. I don't know if there 15 was any ultimate resolution on the issue.
16 l Q Who did you discuss it with?
i 17 A
, Specifically I can recall Mr. Daverio, Mr. Wrens, 1 18 and other technical people from the utility at a meeting where
)
19 I prompt notification was, discussed. -
I 4
20 Q Tell me everything you can recall about those l
21 discussions that you had with Mr. Daverio and Mr. Wrens.
22 A The thrust of the meeting was more oriented to 23 l the tone alerts and to the siren system with respect to their I
l , . - . - _ . . - . . - - . - - - - - ' - - - ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
- _ . _ _ - . = -. .. -
58 1 activation. as I recall, the bulk of the meeting was 1
2 concentrated on that area, the tone coded signals. We had 3 brought a communications expert from the police department 4 with us who was familiar with that aspect of the overall 5 public--prompt notification system concepts.
6
,, Also at the meeting we were briefed on the Wiley 7
proposal, what they intended to do and how they intended to 8 accomplish it.
9 Q As a consequence of those meetings, did you ever 10 conclude that the system you had proposed was inadequate?
11
, MR. SEDKY: I'm sorry, that who had proposed?
i 12 MR. SPIVEY: That he had proposed.
13 l MR. SEDKY: The tone alerts?
i 14 F3. SPIVEY: The prompt notification. system.
{
15 A I don't know that we proposed it per se. As I 16 said, federal guidelines indicate that the prompt notification 17 system is utility responsibility.
18 Q Well, with respect to those discussions, irrespec-l l
19 tive of who proposed th,em, did you ever conclude that the l
20 system that was being considered was inadequate?
21 A No.
l i
22 Q Mr. Meunkle, in considering the siren coverage, 23 ,
i tell me what you did to assure yourself that everyone within I
90 1
were close by? l 2 l A Absolutely.
3 Q Did you consult with anyone else other than the 4 I people at Brookhaven with respect to recommendations for l
5l protective action?
( 6 4, A The utility.
t 7 i i
O Who did you contact at the utility?
I 8 A Mr. Daverio.
9 O During what period of time were you having this l
10 ccntact with Mr. Daverio?
11 A I would say from the middle of 1981 until April 12 1982. That contact is with respect to protective action.
t 13 Q Protective action, yes. I understand that, but I
i i
ja I understand that you've had a continuing course of contact 1
15 i with Mr. Daverio over the time that you were responsible for
. 16 the formulation of this emergency plan?
37 A That's correct.
jg O This is a general question. I'm not just talking
[
39 about protective action now. During the time you had contact 30 with Mr. Daverio, would there ever be an occasion for the al County, or through you, to make any demands on Mr. Daverio 22 f r any type of services, logistical support, informa tion, I
i 23 , anything of that sort?
l ll l' ,
ll .
ll
1 l
l 91 I A Yes, sir.
l 2
O Could you tell me generally the demands that you !
3 made on Mr. Daverio?
4 A I wouldn't categorize it as demands.
5 Q How about requests? Do you like that better?
l 6 A Let's say we had what I consider to be a l
7 i professional working relationship with the people at the 8 utility. We had a common goal of an emergency plan, and we 9
did whatever was necessary to reach that goal.
10 Yes, we made requests of the utility for servicest 11 Q All right, sir. Insofar as you were concerned 12 j then, did the utility respond in a professional manner?
13 ; MR. SEDKY: Are we still involved in protective 14 i
action or did we move to some other topic?
15 53 . SPIVEY: No, we are on general issues right e
i' 16 now.
17 MR. SEDKY: Go ahead.
18 A The question was -- please repeat it?
19 j BY MR. SPIVEY:
20 Q - Did Mr. Daverio, insofar as you were concerned, 21 respond in a professional manner?
22 A Absolutely.
l
! 23 j Q Mr. Meunkle, with respect to this one meeting 1 !
a l
l Dl ,
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- s. ...=..m
- - . , q7 _onc 8ew A xa d i n e .:.i v e r , :: . y . o ,=2 AUC, 6 Fs'7-( 516) c?9-30c8 - '
%4 Ex. t Id v -EV
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A RCL. . . , .h. G , a ,s. . _D a ......
~; y ...
.. .. .- -~ .n. .;. .' v. . :: '; (": _;T_ ;'. . _ .n,
?? 5 to fresent lk County Departnent of Trrn.eportation ic Safety .~:.ivision T-o'ri n '.r.-i r a e r 1 I pernililitien cover staff adninistratien and coardirat:": Of the Jep?-t-
$'r: "i c f Crty Jivisio: C perr.t i on s r.nd Cu rve i ll:
- c- D. t whiri e s .-
pt tra'fi .- ancinecring and inprover.an t s*niies, reserrei. u-> spec'e'.
g ;..
.. y T.-,,s.
-J. .2 .
eerched and wrote several reports on F:azardous I:e.terial Transportation the Leciclative Subconnittec; resulti.c in acraenants and 1ccel lec-ation instrunantal in irproving the surety wit'- whic? theta noterials t r-ns p ort e-' withi: Suffoli County.
a=rchei, developed ~nnd wrrio t5 a Transport = tion Elenent o f tl.a ev.c.ttier n f n r t i. r- .:i cro6m :'u cla=r Pcwer Cts tin: currently under constructior..
ceptually, this plan is concistent with recomnendations expressed in i c n e r.; J:nnission .r-pc-t.
?ified on behalf of Suffc1'.s Courty Before the I.ew York Jtrie c i t i n;-
M f o r '.1<-ci ri en 1 G e n e r: t i on , ni the ';u rlear lieculr t ory 0,n i sni nn.
.: , . c. r-, 9. ., .c ..c.2c r 5 c .. . ....
. _< u, e a- .- $ .
c ....
,< .t.~..-,c...,
s:a n p: ..t ,c..<. . . . . 1
. n. . . ... - .
ve ce ;fvisier supervisor in the .'tsenes of the Director; c o': rd i n =.t c ivitie- with ccvernnental and civia leaders.
it'i to i c. 7 4 2.k Ocurty Depe rtnent of Trni c C= fety b.c c :. . cent uocation r,,rocran Trnffi c Encinaer III marily rasponsible for the coordination r.nd supcrvi icr of t'/- Incincer- -
Unit where function war the identification and surveillance of higF
- ident locatiens.
'se investications produced a series of technics.1 reports e.nd recommend-ons to reduce accidents. The subsequent implementation of t'.inse re-aendations resulted in a 25C reduction in accidents and a benefit cost 6: 1, or six dollars saved for every dollar spent.
1969 to 1971 c ri Ctste Department of Transportntion nel Trnffic Encineerinc and 3afety Unit A s r i s t ar.t Ci vi l En,-i n aer
'ef r~ tec'rnical advisor to .", tate construction encinaers, respenribl,e
\
ru-contra. cts recardinc traffi c control d evi ces Fr.d i n.stallati en. Thces tractr represented 6.5 nillion dollarr. in capi:51 constrneticr f u r. i i r c ,
srunantal in developinC a traffic actuatud naster cenputer enp ble cf vidinc .uix cycles, five offretr, and *wn spli+r frr slevo i nt e rr act inns P a ma.icr nrtarin1 hic.hwa.y.
R ed $ r. cooparatien wi th pri vat a citizens, church and con'nrity cr c .-
tions, and publi c officialr in racr-rd t o tre.ffi c proble'ns .
1' C 5 te 19A' ark State Depp-tv. ant of T a>rportatien hal Trar#i c ::ncineerint "i S: Crt: "ri t I ri nci ma i f i .c c ri r Tc k. . i ci nn tial]y r Seni or ~-:r.ci n o cri n; TecFnicier,
. w. 9 p cr.ctai wit" m.1 ted
. c ...c '. F.4. '. .i. t. .i a. .c .' r. + 'q e 6. . .e i u~. . o .' '. . a ". i. c .c .ie r r.7 1 c o . *a .e .e + u. .r .
L pe e.jL.r.. 1 .e-e..e y c4 c<,+u.< or...- :4 a j . , e +. c .a t. w. . n. , - . ,y- -p s 4 e . o .r .re. - c. c. - .a .m . ....
a
- r. . e . . . rs t. r. +. i s tac .. ,. n , a .. : .i .c ,- o c i f. .i c. r.s. + < r.... , e e .- t . e. . n .c. > ~, - - .- p.:. .:. . o .r. _
eers retained by the 6tnte.
i O. A O
+nr 1 C. 4.s C 3rk Sta te 7,eportment c ' l' a b l i c . c ri s n . .. .... e,a..y.io. a...a. e.s w-on-
.. . c. .
e
'7- e i n c - f r.r T e c'r r. i c i n n ty ch'er of survey crew conductinE topecraphical surveyn cf v:-rinut
- n. e < r. y. r ... ~ n. . .- r. .n z + - - ..+. .r= c . 3 i +u z. +. e ~. u. e.e v.e c a.-;.*'on
. .. nf c.o.<. :c. , ' r. . .c .
isted in the preparatien of the finF1 contract by wri tinc speci fier ti cLF con; :+ i:.c cost sni qiantit3 ' r t i n:- t e r .
'ici~y. . r.* ". .i .n. * ~ f .' i c. .e. ". . r ". g" c " . , o. a.(-i r n.' 3 4..e.e. *
. i .n =. *. i. r,, . . .e .+ .i " '. r e , -> e ;' ' '
1
, . < . p. s entori es , =nd t.avel tinF FtudiaF.
l l
c....en u . . -. - =. . n. u. .1. . e. u. m
. 1_ q p . .=. m.... ..
. . , .- :w----
. . . . .v. .=. C = . - . .C C'. ~' '.m. -
D i v ." ." i c .n o f c. ~< r. .e. r- m r *. .=. *. i e .- . 1 = ~ . i .r. u.
lYcrk (1970). Ocmpleted procran of Case Studies in Traffic Control:
e n .e Analysis 'pproach; a comprehansive course dealinc wi th trnffi c rol problems.
TIC".:IC I::SIIT"TE C? EhC Li LY:: - Division of Transportation 11anninc, York (1969). Completed an accelerated procran in traffic encineerinc,
.r. porta ti on planning, and an=1ytical technicues in traffic and trans-tion civen in Albany under the purpices of the New York State Sciar.ce
- Technolecy Foundation. -
Y O.o.1 C '1 ". ". C C '"<.".
.a ."a' T. v. C .' ' '. ' t. . ~ .2 , ' . a. w V. o . 'r.
. . ( *. C. A. 3 - 1 C. A. ' T. . "u .n-'.e r a.d 'a c
'its, at nicht, in .
T INSTITUTI, Eev York (1957 - 1960). Cenpleted 77 credits in i r c'. i -
ure and incineerinC 3 fore enterint nilitary service.
i LY:' TEI.::I Cr.L MI'.'i CC!!C UL, New "o rk . Craduated 1957 i
6 e
p =...g :...T- T. '. :'. C ' " *.". r. r.
et iran, l'nited States Arny,101'~ Airborna Di vision , her.or:-ble di n ch;-rge .
I led from March 1960 to June '967.
r len , Islip Tovn Traffic :4Prety 30Eri for twn yeerr.
ted te addrers the Covern'r's Or ffic Fnfety Co'.nittee in .: rth (lint.. Ihat presentation w"s 1$tcr pub 21shed.
- e an article published in the internat!o-al Municipal Sicn.1 .sro
- - :4-tie-lzine which w's awe-ded " 3.-rt '2reffic .rticle " honors by the .
i n t i r.
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[ SUFFOLK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING EVACUATION PLNiNING GROUP H. Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway h Hauppauge, N.Y. 11788
~
MEMORANDUM May 12,1982 .
iTO: Frank Jones Deputy County Executive FRCM: Robert Meunkle Planning Depart =ent RE: Suffolk County Radiological Ecergency Response Plan (SCRERP)
The purpose of this memo is to clarify some aspects of whac has been done with respect to the SCRERP. Initially, let me indicate that everything you have to date was written and prepared by the County.
I must also state that, until the very recent intervention by thef County at the Nuclear Regula*]ry Ccmission hearings, we were working in a cooperative vain with LILCO, therefore, their preparation and printing of the exhibits that were designed by the County were to save the County time and money. Subsequent to the law suit, I received instructions frc:i
.Dr. Koppelman to end our formal relationship with LILCO and to get from tha utility whatever was then in the pipelinei'.sThis has been done.
There also appears to be some confusion as to consultants, again I must stress, that the discussions relative to consultants was prior to the County's legal actions. .- n There were two distinct areas where we have asked the utilitsy for hassistance. One was when we suggested they retain KLD Associates to do
, the dynamic analysis of the evacuation routing assignments. We requested -
'this because the County did not have the in-house computer or traffic
'model capability needed, and predicated on inquiries we had made, it was apparent that KLD had the state-of-the-art model which was proprietary.
.In addition, we wanted someone.(as did the utility) to independent 1y' .
, verify our time estimates for the various evacuation senarios as postulated in NUREG 0654, Appendix IV. The initial meeting with KLD occurred on December 30, 1981. ,
9 a
ll L 492g439
. . - . y
c ....
,.,' s May 12, 1982 A . Frank Jones
/
M The second major area we asked the utility for assistance with were
, items within the Health Services portion of the SCRERP. The firm of Stone ard Webster, already acting as consultants to LILCD on their emergency plan, were asked by the utility to work with us on the County Health Services portion of the local plan. This occurred in early March. Subsequent to your directive to me on April 15, 1982, and further reinforced by a discussion with Dr. Koppelman and myself, I contacted LILCO to request that any materials belonging to us be returned and to indicate we would not be making further requests.
During the long process that this planning effort has been 1
follcwing, many meetings were held with representatives of the Department of Health Services, some of which were attended by the utility.
Predicated on those meetings, the utility asked Stone and Webster to write the Health Services portion of the County plan at.our direction.
At the initial meeting with the principals, I presented an outline of what I wanted in this portion of the plan. There were two subsequent meetings, prior to being directed by yourself to terminate any working relationships with the utility. At each of these meetings we cemented on the draft document and requested changes and modifications. hthe termination of the working relationship with the utility we did not have the current Health Services section of tha plan. I specifically explained this to Chris MacPurray, stating that we were working on health with the utility and the utility was currently in possession of the Health Service's portion of the plan. Mr. MacMurray indicated that if we did not receive the document to inform him and he would see that it was provided through -
the attorneys.
It was over three years ago that we initiated work on the Evacuation Plan (Appendix A) for the ten mile EPI. At that time, it was our stated objective-to prepare the best possible document to protect the health and safety of the people of Suffolk County.
When the County entered into an agreement with the utility to prepare the SCRERP, our role greatly expanded but the stated objective has always ~
remained the same.
I believe we were successful in realizing our stated objective, which is probably unfortunate in view of the current County po ition with respect to emergency planning. I state this, having read many other plans, all of which have been prepared by consultants. Invariably, consultants cannot devote the time necessary to guarantee that their methodology is functional . In essence a consultant ultimately gets to move on to their next project, while a local agency which develops a plan, must make sure that their plan is, in fact, operable.
~
4020438
_ _ . - . . _ _ _ ..-m..-. . - . - - - . - - - - - , - - - - -
,r ,,,-- , . , , , - -
ATTACIIMENT 5 C11TED STATES OF A' ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO:0!ISSIO::
BEPORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY A::D LICE:: SING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
)
LO::G ISLAND LIGHTI::G COMPANY )
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ,
)
Unit 1) ) Docket No. 50-332 OL
)
)
Discovery Deposition of LAURA LYNN PALMER, called as a witness pursuant to 10CFR 2. 740 and 2. 740 (a) , taken before Carl W. Girard, C.M., a Motary Public at the offices of Long Island Lighting Company, Hicksville, New York, on
!!onday, the 16th day of August 1982 commencing at 11:35 a.m., pursuant to agreement o f counsel.
APPEARANCES:
HUNTO:I & WILLIAMS, by Joseph M. Spivey, III, Esq., and D. Alan Rudlin, Esq.
on behalf of LILCO:
KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS, by Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.,
J on behalf of Suffolk County New York, Intervenor.
ALSO PRESENT-i Mr. 'dilliam Renz , LILCO.
W.9f. % ard, W.uft.
3 l
1! I : DEX l
2 !!O . DESCRIPTIOII PAGE k
3 l 1 Contract between Long Island Lighting 19 l Company and County of Suffolk dated l 4 j September 18, 1981 l l
5 2 Document entitled Meeting and Conference 45 '
p Logs 6 ll i l! l 7 !! !
l l 0 l 8! i i
e 9h l d ;
i i 10 ;!
c t 11 i ;
!l l
12 ll i 13 4[4 p
14 l.
J ,
1: I 15 6 l d' i
16 l d
17 !!
I li j 18 ,
i !
19 l i
l 20 i !
l i i 21 22 l
i 23 i i
i l i
6 l
l 1
26 I
t i
p, i'
I i BY MR. RUDLIN:
I '
l 2 ,li O This is the shortest way to go at it. Will 3 l you tell me what the modifications are? l I
4 MR. McMURRAY: Obj ection.
5 A Basically, this document refers to reviewing l l
6 ( evacuation plans that were already prepared, and tPat I
i 7 ll! wording is because, again, it was a paraphrase of the 1 j i -
8 EDS contract. They were going to look at the overall 9 i emergency response plan and LILCO was going to use our l 10 evacuation portion as a supplement to their overall i j
11 response plan since they respected the work we had done l
12 to date. '
13 l
In that vein, where it says review, prepare 14 d ocuments, we were actually in the process of also f .
l 15 preparing those documents jointly within the same time 16 frame.
17 Certain scopes related to public education
) 18 and training, those were areas that we never got a chance I
l k
19 l i
to get into as far as actively participating. although '
20 we did have some writeup within the context of the report.
I 21 l as far as the need for those services. ' '
22 BY MR. RUDLIN:
i i 3
i 23 O As I understand it, the reason that the l
, I
~ - __ _
27 i
1 .
t Planning Department, you and Mr. Meunkle, were given the 2 l.I responsibility to develop the Suffolk County emergency i
l 3 plan instead of outside consultants was to take advantage ;
4 of the ceazpized experience and f amiliarity that you all I, 5l ,
had with Suffolk County? l I
i' 6 !. A That is correc*
il n I' 7 i 0 In doing all the work that you did do on !
ll '
8{ '
the emergency plan that resulted in the final product in .
9 !
i April of 1982, did you take into account as part of your 10 , work various local conditions that are unique to Suffolk i
4 11 !; County, such as its population and demography and its ri 12 e t
topograpny and its climate?
i 13 l A Yes. '
i 14 ll 0 And its geography, all those local 1 :
15 conditions?
16 A Yes.
17 ;( O I take it you were able to ao so in part i
18 based on your own longstanding f amiliarity and experience 19 with the area?
s 20 i A Yes, I was.
I 21 O You mentioned earlier in your deposition !
22 today one of the things that was taken into account in
{
t 23 developing the Suffolk County emergency plan were some of f I
' l l
' I l !
\
l i I l
43 I l
I 1
I I
I
'i '
1F A No. Again, there may have beer. stipulatior.o, I i '
l 2
9l such as training or protective equipment.
3 O Where you all recognized there might be ,
4 some potential for people who have some kind of a conflict, i
5 i you intended to provide for public education and trainlag i
6 l to remedy that problem?
F .
L 7 A That's correct. ;
8l Q Without going into additional massive l l
l 9
amounts of documents before me that chronical the work l' Ii 10 that you and Mr. Mounkle engaged in as part of the .
1 i
11 emergency plan, is it fair to say that the extent of your
'i 12 h work was very substantial to prepare the Suffolk Cour.ty o
13 emergency plan?
i ja ( A Yes, it was.
14 r 15
,1 (Pause) ;
16 i BY MR. RUDLIN:
I I
h' O There came a time when you stopped working 17 j, l 18 on the Suffolk County emergency plan: is that right?
I ! !
19 A That's correct.
I i i
20 i 6 o That was sometime in March of 1982? ,
21 A I would say closer to April.
l 22 O I take it that up until that time it was l
i 23 ~ anticipated that the emergency plan that you were producinq i
i i
l
44 1 , would result in a final executed emergency plan by suffolk l I 2 County' i
t 3 MR. McMURRAY: Objection, relevance. l 4 A Yes. We were working on a final draft.
i 5 :' The actual final plan would be subject to federal and I 1 i
6 state reviewing and comments.
h l 7 , BY MR. RUDLIN: I c
8 Q From the perspective of Suffolk County, and 9 , that of you and Mr. Meunkle who were doing the work on the 10 cmergency plan, when did you anticipate that the plan I,
11 ; would have been final in order to submit to the .;RC and 4
12 hl New York State?
13 ! MR. McMURRAY: Obj ection , relevance.
I 14 A The original contract obligation was for i
15 six months, which meant approximately March 18th; however, 16 we had verbally asked for an extension and we figured I 17 j sometime either the end of March of '82 or in April of '82.
l l k 18 l BY MR. RUDLIN:
I l
l 19 l 0 But for the change in circumstances, do l
l 20 , you think that a final plan would have been reached by l
21 May of 1982?
I !
22 0 MR. McMURRAY: Same objection. ;
I 23 l A Definitely. !
I d
I I
l
45 li ll e
I; I g BY MR. RUDLIN:
2f' Q Let me hand you a handwritten document.
I '
3 l' It appears to be captioned meeting and conference lags, '
I 1 i
4 l and ask if you recognize that. !
5; (Document proffered) f l
6 A (Witness perusing document) !
\['\ s 7 il Yes, I do. i 0
'l 8 i, O What is it? '
9 (l A Basically, this is a piece of my own
'l I 10 l recordkeeping which cataloged the dates of particular '
a l;l meetings related to emergency planning, since I believe 11 i o
12 ll it was 1980 to present.
f l
MR. RUDLIN: Let me have that marked as 13 fi "
p 14 ll Palmer Exhibit 2, please.
il l 15 (Whereupon, the aforementioned document 16j was marked as Palmer Deposition Exhibit No. 2.
l' I
17 for identification. )
I l 18 ! BY MR. RUDLIN:
i 19 O Palmer Exhibit 2 essentially was a work I
i I 20 diary that you kept while you were working on emergency ,
planning? l' 21 i l
22 A That's correct. ,f i
23 Q Exhibit 2 ends with May 13, I assume, 1982, I l
r I
I a
l :
I 46 I l
i l u
4 -
1 entry. Why did it stop then? -
2, MR. McMURRAY: Objection, relevance.
3 , A May I see the document?
4 Q Sure.
l 1
5 (Document proffered) 0 A l 6 (Witness perusing document) !
l "
N 7 Basically, that was the last contact we l'
i I 8 l, had with anyone in regard to the emergency planning '
I 9 l, project.
He were no longer actively working on it. :
, +
10 ] O As of April of 1982, you and Mr. Meunkle 9
11 [ had done an immense amount of work to prepare an emergercy o
J 12 d
I plan for Suffolk County; is that right?
13 0 A Tht.t's correct.
- i h
la ' O You and Mr. Meunkle produced an emergenc'. i I
i i 15j plan that appears to me, and I take it to others as well, i
16 to have been an excellent plan, and I take it you would 17 agree that it was an excellent plan?
18L A Yes, I would. !
l l
I' 19 O My question,to clarify something I'have 20 never understood,is what happened to the Suffolk County '
l 21 emergency plan and why did it happen?
22 MR. McMURRAY: Objection. That does not j 23 deal at all with Phase 1 issues, and I'll t i
.i t i
a I
I
- ! i
- _l _ __ _
47 1
I i
1 instruct the witness not to answer that question.
2 BY MR. RUDLIN:
i 3 Q Miss Palmer, are you going to follow the 4 instruction of Mr. McMurray?
l l
. 5 A Yes,- I am. !
l 6 ! Q Do you deem Mr. McMurray to be your lawyer? i 7 i A Yes, I do. l 8 Q When in your mind did Mr. McMurray beccme l 9 your la.;yer? l 1
10 [ MR. McMURRAY: Mr. Rudlin, as you well il !
11 l' know, we represent Suffolk County, and in that l l
12 l respect we also represent Suffolk County's 13 employees.
14 A In terms of this deposition, I would say l i si I
15 he became my counsel as of August 6th. !
16 i BY MR. RUDLIN:
I
- 17) Q Of this year?
l 18 A Yes.
19I O Did you consider Mr. McMurray to b6 your l !
( 20 I lawyor pri or en 'ngust 6th?
l l .
l 1 1
! 21 MR. McMURRAY: Objection. -
l I
22 A No.
I i
I j 48 l 1
il
.e.
'l j BY MR. RUDLIN:
l 2[l Q Are you paying Mr. McMurray to act as your ;
I 3 lawyer? ,
I '
4 MR. McMURRAY: Mr. Rudlin, I find this i
5 ,
fishing expedition through the attorney-client 6 j relationship highly inappropriate.
l t
7 MR. RUDLIN:
] Mr. McMurray, I'm trying to ,
t i
8 .j establish if there is such a relationship.
ti 9 '; MR. McMURRAY: Miss Palmer has already '
1 10 f stated there is such a relationship.
i 11 f
BY MR. RUDLIN:
12 ll 0 Can you read back my last question?
'l 13 (Question read by the Reporter) h, 14 A No, I am not.
15 I l[I I o on August 6, did you ask Mr. McMurray to l
I i 16 l serve as your counsel?
l 17 MR. McMURRAY: Objection. Mr. Rudlin, v' '
18 i this is entirely inappropriate. j 19 A No, I did not specifically ask. ,
20 BY ':R. RUDLIN: l 21 Q What is your understanding of how he came 22 to be your attorney on August 6th?
l 23 1 Mit . McMURi( AY : 7.e t me advise Miss Palmer I i
i i
i 49
}
u:
i l;:
1 L
she is not required to answer these questions ,
j 2!1 that seek information on the attorney-client i
3 relationship. I will advise her she does not 4 have to answer these questions. I will instruct 5 her not to answer these questions. '
l 6h BY MR. RUDLIN: .
A li 7 j Q What did you do when you stopped working i
8 , on emergency planning,Suffolk County? l 9 A g Basically, it was to re-read some of the ;
I 10 i work that we had previously done and make corrections, such as typographical errors, et cetera, that we never 11 l
12 had time to really look at before; make sure all our 13 l files and correspondence were organized in case such 14 material was required by our lawyers. In general, it was l .
15 j Just to clean up the project in the best way possible, f l
16 j tie up loose ends.
17 O Then what did you do?
i
' i 18 A Subsequently, I was transferred to the '
19 Department of Public Works out in Yaphank.
I 20 0 Was that transfer at your request? '
l 1
21 A No, it was not. I I
l 22 O Who had requested it?
l i
1 23 .' MR. McMURRAY. Obj ecti on .
l
, i i
l 1
50 l i i :
1
!' I 1 A The transfer was done through resolution i l t 2 through the Suffolk County Legislature. i 3 BY MR. RUDLIN:
4 O I'm not familiar with how local governr.ent 5l .
works, but is it standard for the local Legislature to I
i 6 4 become involved in personnel transfers?
i 7 ji MR. McMURRAY: Objection, relevance.
n 8; A Our transfer is deemed a budget transfer, l
9l i where not only the title but the particular salary of tnat !
l i 10
- l title is transferred from one department to another, and I
i f
11 j since the Legislature has control over all budget matters, 12 the L,gislature has to approve the change in financing. i
- 13 BY MR. RUDLIN
I l 14 Q My earlier question was at whose instance I 15 ! was the transfer initiated?
I i .
l MR. McMURRAY: Objection, relevance, a n c'.
16 [
t 17 I will instruct the witness not to answer the k 18 question.
1 f l
l 19 BY MR. RUDLIN:
20 Q Where did fou get transferred to?
1 l
l l 21 A I was transferred to the Department of i 1
I 22 Public Works. I<
! i 23 l 0 What have you been doing at the Department !
i
ATTACHMENT 6 1
1
/Eg*O ' LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY te V G MJFAIW t M i 17 5 EAST OLD COUNTRY ROAD H IC KSVI LLE, NEW YORK 11801
~~[,c,* *f20, " March 17, 1982 1 Dr. Le e E . Koppelman i Director of Planning County of Suf folk H. Lee Dennison Bldg.
Voterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, NY 11787 Re: Contract Between Suffolk County and LILCO Regarding Emergency Planning Dea r Dr . Koppelman: ,
Your letter of February 19, 1982, indicates that Suffolk County intends to return $150,000 that LILCO has paid to the County pursuant to a contract under which the County is to receive financial assistance from LILCO to help defray the County's expense in preparing its Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Pur suant I to the contract, the County is to complete its plan by March 18,
, 1982.
Your letter of February 19th also states that LILCO should not make the final payment that will become due upon completion of the County plan.
LILCO, however, has requested neither the return of the
$150,000 paid to date nor the discharge of its obligation to make final payment. The Company is at a loss to understanc why the County believes that acceptance of these payments consti-
, tutes a conflict of interest.
LILCO is relying on the County to perform its obligations under this contract and will be damaged severely if the County fails to perform these obligations fully. LILCO will not accept the return of any money paid under this contract unless the County first assures the Company in writing (1) that acceptance of this money by LILCO will not be construed to release or discharge the County from its obligations under the contract, (2) that the County intends to perform its obligations under the contract, an' (3) that the return of this money will not impair the County's ability to perform its contractual obligations fully. The Company intends to make final payment in accordance with the terms of the contract.
o a
SG ISLAND UGHnNG COMI%NY l
Dr. Lee E. Koppelman Director of Planning County of Suffolk March 17, 1982 Page 2 [ ,
If you would like to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours, lk 3 L4 w .
cc: Hon. Peter F. Cohalan David J. Gilmartin, Esq.
W. T. Reveley, III, Esq.
I. L. Freilicher , Esq.
1 4
COUNT OFCUFFOLK' td I,$
p ATTACHMEI;T 7 b'
M. !
i*
.:t j; OFFM*4 OF THE COUNTYEXECUTIVE I' Psm F. Costal.Aa na- **** e - h es d, .2
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May 17, 1982 E ' G .ii .
. 3, .. :
364 Mr. Matthew c. Cordaro, Ph.D.
Vice President
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Long Island Lighting Company i M* " ~ 's l '
175 East Old Count Road 1 Or
- .l.7+d Nicksville, New Yo 11801 $
Dear Mr. Cordaro:
- . y:,J;. .-
This is in reply to your letter of March 17, 1982, -
concerning the September 18, 1981 agreements between 2 iip SuffolkCountyandLIICOregardingesorgency' planning.,j y
- ,~. W ?'
Given that the County is in an adver'arial
- 1: :.
s .
- 1. s .
irf.J rolationship to LILCO in the pending licensing hearings'i . . ,i t ,
before the Nuclear Regulatory Cossaission, the county
. T +$ '
believes there would be the apgearance of a Denflict 'MT + ' O' -
-of-interest by receiving any runds fma LILco. . 4,. 1 E* 4 .. .
.- y: T. > .y
- 2. The county is preparing a radiological emergehoy.lU.3!. Ef.
responseplanwhichwillsatisfyalflocal,stateand*..ln.ffy'Y}.-'
fcderal criteria and regulations, as contemplated by a .a f., p > i.
l ,
the September 18, 1881 agreement between the County n
and LILCO. Pursuant to Legislative Resolution 262 and ' ' 26 i 9[ 4 E,,2 Executive Order, such plan will be transmitted to the county Legislature by October 1, $982. . .Ekut
~
$'. f:ff. ;.f ,j ,
- a ...
- 3. The county's emergency planning effort is being &N performed by a team of nationally recognised experts. i ? . ~ ..
A list of these experts is enclosed, herewith for your 1;;; d.]
information. The County Executive lias informed these
( experts that suffolk County wishes to develop the best ,, M(q Q ;d ':j: *,'.
possible emergency plan to protect the health and safety v:,
cf the residents of Suffolk County. Needless to say, ' ! Ai'y.%'p[;.
1
, ,y o meaningful, wogkable radiological emergency plan .iM :b i it would'also be in LILCO's best interests. '
.... h. +
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(. '.
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- e :, ., t owe - - v e eu wsunem me.inses e L , ,, ,r .
. . a.1
asay 17, 1982 ,,
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'. .'. ., 1
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- 4. Should LIIc0 be dissatisfied with the foregoing, ~ ..' ,k please refer to Clause II of the September 18, 1982 agr hif Therein,itisstatedthatallmatters_in..farbitration estion riela }
to the agreement be decided by a stipulate j;d- $
procedure.
{;, r.j.y
. h. --
It is the County's hope that LIIco will promptly e,
terminate its resistance to the County'.s good faith -
j '. y emergency planning efforts. An increasing amount of ',.1.
County's time is being consumed by the need to respond iL v.
l to seemingly belligerant actions of 1,ILCO that challenge,- g j.P.'
the County's current effort. I ask that you' convey - i. .s.-
to your colleagues these serious sentiments, and that ,Q,, .' ~ %yh ;p '
l'! s;b -
LILc0 refrain from escalating fruther with rhetorio ," w.T
' l cr deed any difference which exists between LIIco - '
.f. bE$J and the count:r with respect to the critical goal,'of ' @$j.1 offective rad;,ological emergency p,reparedness. ..-y,j. , j,3-Q .H -
, , ;l
.'. Sincarely yours,
, di .[hI((d,,( .'
f.,v f - ..
S . , . . .. -;
John C. Gallagherf __ WO ',
Chisf Deputy County' Executivt
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suffcik CoLmty has retained the fa11ass permes to anwicy the Ommty's l l radiological mergecy respones plan.
- h, i;- !
. . s .. ..
- 1. 75C - hMs of M2 man Virginia,, s' fina isith entensive ageriance,inficcel:1, ". - '
radio 11gical emergenqy a1=4g and preparetimes will have the overall zessss>. ,
l e
, .. 1 ,
sibility for hwi.ica of the plan.. pac-Utzshees has weeked a wadia1p.M
.y -
amargency resemas plans scr Iczzl gewr=mts at tue15. nuclear sitesW '
~
the most recent being at san Luis Odspo canty regarding the Diablo %. Plant,
.s and near cleveland, oue, for the Puery plant. .
t -
- 2. Philip 3. Beer, Prefeesce af 72anning at MIT, is a asnbar af the County Descutive's
-a .
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, ATTACH!iEIIT 8 This report is a draft and, as such, it has no status until it has been sunsicer e.
and acted upon by the Suffolk County Legislature.
. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN l For The SHOREHA'4 NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR l
REPORT OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY LEGISLATURE a
i i
February 17, 1983 l
INTRODUCTION The Suffolk County Legislature is an elected, 18 member legislative body f o r Suf f olk County, New Yo rk. The siting of a nuclear power reactor by the Long Island Lighting Company within the boarders of Suffolk County raises issues of a type and magnitude which had not previously been considered by the Legislature. While many of the issues related to the construction and operation of a nuclear power reactor are beyond the jurisdiction of a county, the question of an ef f ective and timely of f site radiological emergency response plan is a matter which a county is primarily and uniquely qualified to address.
In a March 30, 1979 report entitled " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Shculd Be Better Pr epa red For Radiological Eme rgencie s", The General Accounting Of fice, the investiga' 2 en arm of the Congress, stated:
Nuclear facilities rely on State and local governments for responding to offsite emergencies and initiating protective measures... In the past, NRC has primarily directed its efforts at the State level. However, the Sta te s' emergency response activities are p r.im a r il y related to the restoration or recovery phase of an emergency, and only secondarily address initial-response or public protective actions. For the most part, immediate of f site emergency response actions must be taken by local goverment authorities. (p. 14)
The members of the Suffolk County Legislature concur with the preceeding extract from the General Accounting Of fice's report, and believe that, in the absence of a radiological emergency response plan which has been f o rm ula ted at the county level and which provides for all the unique characteristics of the county and its resources, there can be no timely, effective and i r. p l e r e n t a b l e plan. In the absence of such a clan havine the
Introduction, Fage 2 full support of the county and its government, the public health and safety cannot be adequately protected. In keeping with this belief and in view of the unprecedented nature of the issues raised in determining the adequacy of a radiological emergency response plan, the Suffolk County Leg i sla ture has vested in 1
l itself the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving such a plan.
In tne course of its consideration of this matter, the Suffolk County Legislature has committed a substantial amount of resources and a significant amount of time. The Legislature directed the County Executive office to retain nationally recognized authorities to assist in the formulation of the criteria for developing the best' plan possible, taking into account the unique characteristics'of the county. Studies were undertaken of the probability of a serious accident, its potential consequences, and the possible behavior of emergency workers in the event of'a serious accident which threatened their f amilies as well as the population in general. In all, almost i
one-half of a million dollars was expended in completing these studies. The Legislature held 9 days of public hearings on this issue. Additionally, most of the members of the legislature toured the Shoreham nuclear power reactor and traveled to Harrisburg, Penns ylvania to meet with government officials who were responsible for responding to the accident at the Three Mile Island reactor and to hear f rom the residents of the area their reaction to the accident and its aftereffects. Eriefings on some
\
Introduction, Page 3 of the technical issues were conducted for the members, and many spent some of their own time in independently learning about Uthese issues. In order to assist the members in arranging and conducting the hearings, the legislature retained the services of a special counsel who, for the last seven years, had served as the sole sta f f members responsible for nuclear matters to the U.S. House. of Re pr e se n ta tives' Co m m i t t e e on . Interstate and Foreign Commerce which has jurisdiction over all matters related to the commercial operation of nuclear reactors and who had been involved in all legislative issues concerning nuclear issues which had been involved in all legislative issues concerning nuclear issues which had been considered by the House in the last few years. As a r e s ul t of these actions, the legislature's consideration of this matter was both serious and informed.
The following sections of this report will contain, (i) an explanation of the history of the Suffolk County Government's efforts to formulate an emergency response plan; (ii) a 'summar y
, of the testimony presented as the legislature's hearings; (iii) an explanation of the Legislature's conclusions of the major issues raised in f o r m ula ti ng a radiological emergency response plan, and (iv) the findings of the Legislature.
I %
l BACXGROUND SECTION FOR LEGISLATIVE REPORT The County's Planning Efforts Under Section 10 of the New York State Municipal Home Rule f La w , Suffolk County is charged by law to protect the health, 1
wel f a re and sa f ety of its residents. Among the disasters that could strike the County is a radiological accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Shoreham) which is situate.d near the village of Shoreham, a Suf folk County community located on the North Shore. Shoreham is owned and operated by the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) .
A severe accident at Shoreham could send radioactive fission products into the environment far beyond the plant site, thus posing a grave health and pro pe'r ty ha za r d to the citizens of Suf f olk County. Recognizing the' potential danger posed by the Shoreham nuclear plant, particularly in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, Suf f olk County ente r ed into an agreement with LILCO on September 18, 1981 to develop a radiological emergency response plan (RERP) . The task of developing the plan was assigned to two members of the Suffolk County Planning Department. However, by the end of 1981 and in early 1982 higher level officials in both the County Executive's Office and the County Legislature became concerned with inadecuacies they perceived in wor k being per fo rmed on the plan. In particular, those officials found that the planning to date was unsa.:sizetery because :: fa:1ed te acccunt for the prc ble- s
- -! t' ic .; : sl a n d's elongated shape, its Iimited roadway
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emergency learned from TMI, and it relied without question on the appearance of all required emergency personnel. In addition, the
- dimensions of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the plan in I, general were not based upon an analysis of the specific types of r
accidents and consequent fission product releases that could result f rom an accident a t Shoreham, nor did it investigate the health consequences to the public of such releases. In short, the plan ignored local conditions and site specific circumstances l and thus was deficient for the purpose of protecting the public from an accident at Shoreham.
Ba sed upon these perceived deficiences and mind f ul of its
! mandate to protect the health and safety of its citizens, the Legislature on March 23, 1982 passed Resolution No. 262-1952 which ceased the planning effort then underway, returned to LILCO all money paid under the September 1981 agreement, and undertook l
to develop a plan which would be sensitive to the local conditions l and circumstances which the previous planning efforts had overlooked. Resolution No. 262-1982 stated further that no plan would be operable or deemed adequate and capable of being i
) implemented until approved by the Legislature. By the same l token, no RERP f o r Suf f olk County could be submitted to f ede ral 1
! authorities for review absent such approval. The resolution made l an initial appropriation of S375,000 for preparation of the RERP.
l County Executive Peter F. Cohalan signed Resolution No. 262-19E2 on March 25, 1922 and four days later established a Steering Cc- :ttee consisting cf both County personnel and outside experts
- < r+- :-( -:: 'r frvelt .e... The Cc..mi t tee pr o ceed e d to
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gather a team of experts in such areas as planning, traffic analysis, nuclear accident risk a s s e s_sm e n t , nuclear accident consequence analysis, human behavior, and the medical effects of radiation. Work commenced on the plan in mid-April 1982 and continued diligently thereafter.
LILCO'S Unauthorized RERP Despite the formation of the Steering Committee and the Co un t y's commitment to develop the best RERP possible, LILCO gathered the working papers that had been prepared by the Co un t y's planning Department -- and which the County had pr evio usly rej ec ted -- and on Ma y 10, 198 2 submitted them for review to the Ne w Yo r k State Disaster Preparedness Commissicn
- (DFC) . Th o ug h LILCO submitted the documents without any authorization from the County, it nevertheless bound them in binders identifying them as the "Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan."
! The County Executive informed Governor Carey and the DPC on Ma y 14, 19 8 2 tha t the LILCO plan which purported to be that of Suffolk County was, in fact, not the County's plan and recuested i that the DPC not review it. In addition, on May 18, 1982, the County Legislatur e passed Resolution Nos. 465-1982 and 457-1952.
The former reaf firmed the County's commitment "to assure that the best possible plan and preparedness are developed to protect the citizens of Suffc'k . Co un t y." Tne latter noted the Co un t y's firm opposition to any action by the State of New York which recc7n :ed L:LCO's at ility to prepare a plan f or Suf felk Ccunty
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t.. : ti r.g :n e pr ev i c u sly r e j e c t e d wr r k cf
. 7 the Planning Department under the guise of Suffolk County's RERP
,_ and reiterated that only a RERP approved by the Legislature
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$'Cwould be Gnplemented in Suf folk Co un ty .
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Despite the County's protests, the DPC staf f proceeded to review the LILCO RERP. That review resulted on June 9,1982 in the determination that the plan was deficient in a number of areas and thus " unsatisfactory for submission to the full Ce m m i s s i o n." However, on October 6, 1983, LILCO resubmitted an amended version of its unauthorized RERP to the DPC. In its acccmpanying lette r, LILCO conceded tha t "neithe r cur criginal plan which we submitted on May 10, 1982 or th
- s revised plan, has been approved by Suffolk Co un t y." William Hennessey, Chairman of
, the DPC, advised the County by letter of November 12,19E 2 that he was recuesting the Commission to review the LILCO RERP.
Ignoring the Co un t y's subsequent protests, Mr. Hennessey then informed the County by letter of November 29, 1982 that the Commission intended to hold a meeting on December S', 1982 to review the unauthorized LILCO RERP.
After the DPC rebuffed further protests, the County, on December 6, 1982, sought and received an order by the Supreme Court o f Ne w Yo r k, sitting in Suf f olk County, ordering that the DPC show cause why it was not exceeding its authority in I rev: ewing a local RERP developed by cther than a 1ccal government. The nex t da y, the Supr eme Cour t in Albany issued a t e r. r e r a r y restraining crder which enjoined the DPC frem
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agreement under which the DPC ag reed not to revie w LILCO's RERP until February 23, 1982, by which time the County legislature diA culd have held hearings and made a decision regarding its RERP.
e County's RERP' N' During the time that LILCO was se' eking to promote its own unauthorized local radiological emergency response pl a n , the Steering Committee and its team of experts continued their work on a plan that was sensitive to the proble.ns and conditions on Long Island that might hamper an effective emergency response. Their ef f e r ts culmina ted in the developm en t of a plan consisting of three large volumes which County Executive Cohalan submitted for the Legislature's review on December 2, 1982.
The Legislature held eight days of hearings on emergency planning commencing on January 17, 1983 and ending on January 27, 19 8 3, d ur ing whi ch i t heard testimony f rom a number of Suf folk l County agencies and experts put forth by both the County and LILCO. In addition, three days of the hearings were devoted to receiving testimony f rom concerned organizations (botih pro and enti-Shoreham) and citizens. The hearings compiled a record of 1,590 pages of testimony and many supplemental documents.
BACKGROUND Under the provisions of Resolution 262 82, The Suffolk County
,,, Legislature is vested with the responsibility with determining if any radiological emergency response plan, either as submitted to or as modified by the Legislature, provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety of those living and working in the vicinity of the Shoreham nuclear power plant would be adequately protected in the event of an accident which involved or threatened to involve the release of radiation beyond the boundary of the reactor site, thereby requiring the need to initiate protective actions on the part of a significant portion of the county's population.
During the course of the Legislature's hearings on the issue of radiological emergency response plans, there were three (3) proposals which were submitted as a part of the hearing record.
The first proposal is identified in the record as "The Draft Suffolk County Emergency Response Plan," which was prepared l
l pursuant to Resolution 262-82 by consultants to the County who had been retained by and worked under the direction of the l Emergency Response Plan Steering Committee, chaired by Deputy County Executive Frank R. Jones. The second proposal before the Legislature was submitted by the Long Island Lighting Company and I
was commonly referred to as "the LILCO proposal" and which cc.sisted of the relised L! LOC subtissior to the New York State Discster Preparedness Commission. The third proposal before the
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was commonly referred to as "the State generic plan" and consisted of the generic State plan which was originally developed in 1981 by the State Disaster Preparedness commission k.,.
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In response to 10 CFR 50 to define the role of the State o f New 0 York and its agencies and to insure adequate comprehensive emergency management in the event of a radiological emergency.
l In making its decision, the Legislature was not bound to confine its inquiry to any particular plan, for the scope of the Leg i sl a t u r e's inquiry cannot be limited by the scope of a submission. Thus, the Legislature was free to consider all three plans as well as the component parts of each plan. Moreover, the Legislature was free to consider health and safety issues which were not specifically raised as a part of any of the three plans.
The Legislature also had the option of making additions,
, deletions, and modifications to'any or all of the plans before l
i t. Additionally, the Legislature could have drafted an entirely new plan or approved a plan conditionally, by requiring that the County Executive make specified changes to a plan before forwarding any such plan to the State Disaster Preparedness t
Commission or by requiring that the Long Island Lighting Company meet certain demands of the Legislature before the plan could be l
considered approved. Finally, the Legislature could have deferred a decision pending further study. Thus, all the parlimentary options normally available te the Legislature r e r:. a i n ed available in this case. Practically, however, some of trir; :;;; r v.: ( mrt realistic because of a stipulation in a
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Long Island Lighting Company. Under the terms of this court order, the Commission was prohibited from considering the proposal until February 23, 1983, which was a negotiated date selected to provide the Legislature with time to review the draft county plan. While the terms of this agreement did provide time for consideration of the draft county plan, the time limitation effectively precluded the Legislature from drafting a new plan or referring the plan back to the County Executive's o f fice for further study. However, for the reasons discussed below' , these options were unnecessary.
In making its decision on the issue of a radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham nuclear power plant, the Legislature applied the criteria contained in Public La w 96-295 (94 Stat. 780), the Nuclear Reg ula tor y Commission Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, which is the statute which mandated that the issuance of operating licenses for nuclear po we r reactors be conditioned on the existence of an emergency preparedness plan. In addition to requiring- that the Commission promulgate standards for radiological emergency response plans, Section 109(b) of Public Law 96-295 requires that l the issuance of an operating license be conditioned upon a 4
determination that there exists a Sta te or local radiological emergency response plan which provides for responding to any l
radiological energency at the facility concerned and which complies with the Co m m i s s i o n's standards for such plans p r : r. _ ; : s t e : ;_:r.rn: : E. paragraph (b) (1) ( A) of Section 109.
Tt r, .: n d e : ine : s t r. s Of Sectic. 109 (b', (1) (B) (;) (i) , there are 9" - - - -
.m two requirements which-must be met in order for a State or local plan to comply with the provisions of ' Public Law 96-295. First, ,
the plan must provide for r e b po nd}i ng to any radiological ,
emergency at the facility; and second, the plan must comply with i s the Commission's standards for such plans. '.,Co m pl i a n c e with the Commission's standards is, -the, not in and of itself, adequate to meet the requirements of Section 109 (b) (1) (B) (i) (1) .
Section 109 (b) (1) ( B) (1) (II) provides that, in the absence of a plan which meets the requirements o f, Subclause (I), the issuance of an operating license must be dependent upon a determination that the re exists a State, local or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that public health 'snd sa f ety 1
is not endangered by the operation of the facility cencerned.
Thus, Subclause (II) retains the requirement contained in Subclause (1) that there must be a plan fo r responding to a radiological emergency before a license to operate a reactor can be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The distinction contained in Subclause (II) is the criteria to ba used .in determining the adequacy of the plan. Rather than re-lying on compliance with the NRC's regulations, which is one of the two criteria mandated in Subclause (1) , Subclause (II) required that
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- there be a finding tha t the plan provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not endangered by the operation of the facility concerned.
In summa r y, the requirements of roblic La w 96-295 are: A) trere .. : If.: .:-;ra. -
erergency respense plan for l
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f acility which is the subject of the plan, which is interpreted by the legislature to mean that the plan must be (i) implementable up to and including the capability to evacuate the threatened area; and (ii) capable of responding to a complete range of accident scenarios, including the most severe class of accidents; c) the plan must, at a minimum, comply with the Nuclear Regulatory Co m m i s s i o n's promulgated rules for radiological emergency response plans; and D) the plan must provide, at the m inimum, reasonable assurance that the public health and sa f ety would not be endangered by the operation of the nuclear facility which is the subject of the plan The legislative history of the Nuclear Regulatory Co m m i s s i e n's Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, (Public La w 96-295) demonstrated the Co ng r e s s' interest in recuiring effective and implementable em ergency preparedness plans. Senator Gary Hart, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Reg ula tio n , which is the Senate subcommittee of jurisdiction over the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its authorization, stated during the course of the Senate debate on the bill:
?
One of the many things that we learned in the Three Mile Island accident was that a great number of States have no plan at all, and, certainly, no plan approved, as required by law, by the NRC for evacuating people in case of an em e rg ency, or reactor meltdown, or l any se ricus nuclear incident.
Tht . seemed to ::.e and cther memoers of the committee to be a deplorable situation. It is e n t h i r. k e b l e that we could have had in this
- --- ::: tw: er : ree decades a full-blowr d: ci .: .;: lear er.ergy industry, and yet n:
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emergency situa tions, for protecting public health and safety.
Traditionally, this .has been a responsibility of the S t a t e s .- Some States have acted and some have not. Unfortunately, those who have not far outnumber those who have.
Mr. President, it seems to me, intolerable that we should have reactors opera ting in this country, three (3) months after the Three Mlle Island accident, where there is no preparation wha tsoever fo r moving people or handling the emergency that may be occasioned by an accident at that reactor. (Congressional Reco rd , J uly 16, 1979, P.S. 9 4 7 2)
The Senate bill would have required that any reactor which did not have a radiological emergency response plan in place within six (6) months from the date of enactment of the authorization cease operation. This was a matter which was debated at leng th during the cour se of the Sena te flood deba te.
In discussing this issue, Senator Hart stated:
The re a re two f undamental issues involved here, Mr. President. One is whether we learned anything from the Three Mile Island accident. For myself, I have learned that we should not have reactors operating in this country certainly no longer than nine (9) months after the enactment of this bill, that do not have fundamental plans mafe to accomodate an accident and to protect the lives, the safety, and the health of the people in the area. That is a fundamental issue.
...Fe r m ys el f , and I think other members of our committee, we came down in terms of protecting the system as it presently exists; namely, planning done by the States, approved by the appropriate Federal agency, in this case the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with an acti:n enfercing mechar. ism; namely, :f States nave not done that planning, if the NRC has not approved it, then the reactor that has not been planned for, where plans have not ree.- nade to pr:tect c.dlic ~.ealth and safety, w:uld be tr.- - - ;: :enal Reco:f, J.. . . :, 7
Another issue debated on the Senate floor during the consideration of the NRC authoriza tion was who should have the ultimate responsibility for formulating emergency response plans.
l While the debates concerned providing the NRC or the Federal l
Emergency Management Agency with the authority to develop a plan l if a State failed to do so in order to avoid shutting down any reactor, the Senate decided to preserve the traditional perogatives of the State and its subdivision. While the specific issue concerned having the Fed e r al government preempt the States in this matter, it is clear that the Senate viewed the preparations of radiological emergency response plans to be a governmental function which should be performed at the State and local level. In speaking against an amendment which would have allowed the NRC to establish interim plans where the State had failed to act, Senator Simpson, the ranking Republican member on the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, stated:
Mr. President, I will come back to the theme I previously stressed, that is that I think generally I certainly concur with what Senator Johnson is doing with relation to assuring that there will be continuous opera tion of nuclear power plants. But the issue here to me is much more fundamental.
) That is by doing what his amendment would do, we are intruding upon an inherently State
, function.
The House bill also contained a provision requiring that ene rgency response plans be a part of any license to operate a nuclea r reacto r. Cong ressman John C. Dingnell, the Chairman of the Eubccrrittee on Energy & Power, which shares jurisdiction in
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of the House during the course of the debate on the NRC Authorization b*ll:
There are, however, certain reforms which would be implemented immediately. Of paramount concern among these is the issue of the sa f ety of those who live nea r opera ting nuclear power plants. The Com m erce Comm i t te e adopted an amendment which would provide an additional S1.4 million to the authorization for the Of fice of State Programs to enable the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expedite the review of State radiological emergency response plans and to assist States in formulating these plans and to train their personnel to implement them. It also directs the Commission to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to establish the criteria for such plans, and to review all existing plans or other preparations made by the States to respond to such emergencies, and to notify the Governors of each State and the Congress of any deficiencies in these individual plans and preparations, and to assess each Sta te's capability to implement such plans or preparations. .
At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, only 10 States had plans concurred in by the Nuclear Reg ulatory Commission, and 16 States did not have such plans. Since the accident, many States have focused on the need for such plans and most have or will soon submit emergency response plans. However, the' existence of a plan is not, in itself, adequate assurance. That is why the Com m e r c e Committee believes it is essential that the criteria for radiological emergency response g plans be reviewed in an open forum and be subject to debate. (Congressional Record, November 19,19 7 9, P. H.113 31) 5 The inadequacies of the existing criteria was discussed by Congressman Teby Mcffett, who, as Chairman of the House G vernment Ope ra tiens Succommittee on Environment, Energy and Katera: Resources, conducted hearings on existing emergency
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l What did we find? We found that even in those few States where we do have emergency preparedness plans that have been concurred in by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, even in those States, Sta tes such as South Ca rolina ,
Ne w Yo r k , a Sta te sucts as Maine, my own State of Connecticut, which is regarded as having a good plan for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--even in those States which do have emergency plans, there is a real question about whether the folks at the local level in responsible positions really know what those State plans mean and whether the existence of i a State plan insures that they do have a local plan on paper. (Congressional Record, November 29, 1979, P.H. 11331)
Thus, in enacting the Nuclear Regulatory Co m m i s s i o n's Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, the House of Representatives also imposed the requirement that the existence of a radiological em e rg ency response plan be a prerequisite to the issuance o f an opera ting license. But the i
j House position went farther than the Senate by requiring that the existing standards for emergency response plans be reviewed to I
insure their adequacy and especially their implementability and that local officials be full participants in the process.
The Conference Report on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 included a provision prohibiting the issuance of a new opera ting license unless there is an acceptable emergency response plan. In speaking in support of the Conference Report, Senator Hart stated:
First, the ag r e e r.e n t contains a provision, substantially similar to the one passed by the Senate last July, that requires the NRC to conditien the granting of a new operating
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7t* . 7 L .i ~ - *. s e *r
The provision acknowledges the harsh lesson taught by the Three Mile accident. That operation of a nuclear plant cannot be l considered entirely safe if an adequate plan i does not exist for responding to nuclear accidents, including evacuation of area residents, if necessary.
The conference report modifies the position in the Senate-passed bill that explicitly directed the NRC to condition continued operation of an existing plant upon NRC l
approval of the applicable State emergency l response plan. The conference agreement remains silent on that issu e, but by directing the NRC to " encourage and assist" States to comply with the Ag ency's upg raded standa rds, it permits the NRC to fully exercise its existing statutory authority to protect public health and safety by assuring that existing plants will have applicable to them adequate State emergency response plans.
The conferees intend that every nuclear plant ultimately should have applicable to it a State emergency response plan that protects the public from a nuclear accident.
(Congressional Record, June 16, 1980, P.S.
7083)
The legislative history of Public La w 96-295 clearly indicates the Congressional intent that there be emergency response plans, that such plans, must be im plem en table , that such plans must include the ability to evacuate the endangered population, that such plans must have the support of both the State and local government, that emergency response planning is a 0 government function, that such plans must, at a minimum, ccmply with NRC standards, and that such plans must be capable of
)
providing reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be adequa tely protected in the event of an accident which in;;;ves the r elease c f radiation beycnd the boundaries c f che rear:or site, t
av Conclusions The question be fore the Legisla ture is: Can a radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham nuclear power reactor be developed which provides reasonable assurance that, in the event of an accident at the reacto r, timely and ef f ective protective actions corresponding to the nature of the danger can and will be taken in order to avoid or suf ficiently mitigate any threat to the public health and safety of the citizens of Suffolk County?
Because the Legislature has the authority to amend any plan be f ore it, and thus is able to correct any perceived de f ects in any radiological emergency response plan before it, the question must be f ramed in general terms rather than in ref erence to any specific plan. As a result the Leg i sl a t u r e's answer to the question before it is not limited in scope to the terms of the individual plans which were submitted as a part of the record but is instead directed towards the ability to formulate a radiological emergency response plan which realistically and effectively responds to not only the general issues which must be addressed, but also the unique problem s which exist in Suf f olk County.
]
De t e rm in i ng what constitutes an acceptable radiological emergency response plan is a complicated matter, because such a i
F an cor.sists o f a number of complex components, each of which l
. _' r : te addressef ir.d i ei d ut:1y and ther considered in context of their rela tionship to each othe r. The problem the Legislature ft tr :- thir rr::er .r further corp: ended cy the fact that some
- ,_ _ ,s- - .
- .e - r. :_3s- -- - : : r : - . : r. ;
- 8"' S.
l Conclusions, Page 2 and estimates. In exercising its responsibility in regard to this matter, the legislature invited a number of nationally l l
r ecog ni::ed experts in various technical fields to testify during its hear ing. These invited individuals were in addition to the technical experts who accompanied the representatives of the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) during their appearance on January 15, 1953.
One of the fundamental questions which must be addressed by the Legislature in the course of its consideration of a radiolegical emergency response plan is the probability of an accident actually occuring at the Shoreham nuclear power plant.
The difficulty in answering this question is that there is a wide range of accidents which could occur, with each having different consequences, both in nature and degree. As a result, it is, for planning purposes, somewhat meaningless to consider the issue of probability in isolation. As the ultimate objective of a radiological emergency response plan is to avoid and mitigate the harmful effects which result from a nuclear accident, the relevant consideration is the probability of an accident in relationship to its consequences. Generally, there is an inverse relationship between the probability of an accident and the 4
severity of its consequences, with the severity increasing as the prcbability decreases. Essed upon this relationship, it is argued that there is a point at which the probability of a given r e c i d e r.t teroner er small tnst it is not werth planning for, even
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. A; .. ::.ve; , , it s
i Conclusions, Page 3 also a rg ued tha t there is a point where the consequences become so small that the probability of the accident is irrelevent.
The experts retained by the Co un ty ag r ee in theory with those retained by the Long Island Lighting Company that there are some accidents whose probability is so remote that their occurance should not be a factor in the planning process. Thus, when discussing the " worst accident" both groups are actually discussing the worst " credible" accident which means that there are accidents which could have more serious consequences, but the odds of these occuring are so small that, in the view of the expert, they are not worth discussing. These two groups of experts do not agree on the probability of certain accidents and on the point at which the consequences do not need to be included in the planning process. It is im po r ta nt at this point to draw a distinction between accident consequences and health ef f ects.
For planning purposes, accident consequences should be considered in the context of a set percentage of the population being exposed to a specified level of radiation while the health effects should be considered in the context of the effects resulting from exposure to the specified level of radiation in l
terms cf the incidents of cancer and other illnesses.
The principle dispute between the probabilistic risk 2rststrent experts retainend by the C unty and these relied up:n the LILCO relate to the size of the area for which planning rhcu f cecur i- the event of an accident. The emergency planning
- tre area witr.-
Conclusi$cns, Page 4 approximately a 10 mile radius of the Shoreham plant, which equals the area recommended by the Nuclear Regultory Commission and which is used for planning purposes at most nuclear plants.
The NCR's recommendation of a 10 mile radius Emergency Planning Zone is based upon data from the Reactor Safety Study - WASH 1400 also kncwn as the Rasmussen Report. Using information from this Report concerning a po ss ibl e core-melt accident, a joint NCR/ EPA Task Force plotted the probabilities of exceeding certain
- critical doses, given a severe (Class 9) accident, and found that "the probability of large doses (that is 200 r e m s) drops off substantially at about 10 miles from the r e a c to r ." On the basis of this work, the Task Fo r c e concluded that a 10 mile radius emergency planning zone would be adequate. It should be noted that at 200 rems, evidence of severe radiation sickness develops, characterized by nausea, vomiting, infections, loss of hair and for some sensitive persons, death.
Using the same methodology but applying a different risk criteria, the county consultants established an Emergency i
Planning Zone consisting of two rings, with the inner ring occupying a radius of approximately 7 miles and an outer ring of approximately 20 miles. The inner ring was established by the County consultants en the basis of a It conditional probability 11 receiving a dose cf 200 rems in the event of a core-melt accident, meaning that the odds were 1 in 100 of receiving such a
.. 5 i :i cenditionti probabi'ity .
- i. ! -r .&-bcd d:!i cf
Conclusions, Page 5 ,
30 rems represents the lower levels where there are temporary but detectable changes in the bloed.
In calculating the probability of a severe accident and its
- consequences, both the Long Island Lighting Company and the l
County consultants relied upon a methodology known as "probabilistic risk a s s e s sm en t". In the course of his testimony before the. Legislature, Dr. Ma the w Co rda ro , Vice President for Engineering for LILCO, stated that the utility relied exclusively on this methodology in predicting the probability of an accident and its consequences at the Shoreham Facility. As used in the nuclear ind ustry, probabilistic risk assessment is an analytic system which involves identifying all sequences of events that might occur if any given piece of equipment should fail and continuing this analysis through to describe sequences in which a major accident would occur. Then, the probability of failure of any given piece of equipment involved in such a sequence was estimated, after which the probability of a chain of failures leading to a major accident was computed.
Probabilistic Risk As se ssm ent (PRA) is a highly controversial methodology whose creditability is f ar from universally being accepted. Even the Adviso ry Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), which is a division of tne Nuclear Regulatcry Commission,
'sr raised caertiens as
- tne pr:priety cf its use. As recer.tly as S e p t e r. b e r 15, 1992 the ACRS, in a letter to NRC Chairman F r. 1 1 2. 1 . : r- the rrc:: red r:f e t y goals for nuclear po we r l
I Conclusions, Page 6 The Draft action Plan notes the problems which arise in our use of PRA from the existence of large uncertainties and gaps in our knowledge but does not identify the specific processes by which PRA methodology and data would be judged and by which decisions would be made in the presence of uncertainties. We believe that this represents a major gap in the implementation plan. Either a generally accepted approach should be established (with provision to update it es n e c e s s a r y) for only partly developed and more controversial methodology and data, or a means should be established for independent review and judgement in the face of continuing large uncertainties....
The Draft Action Plan suggests greater application of the safety goals during the trial period than the maturity of PRA warrants....
In addition to these official reservations towards the use of the probabilistic risk assessment methodology, two members of the ACRS expressed the following personal reservations in the Committee's September 15 letter.
There is no way in which the currently proposed sa f ety goal policy will serve any useful purpose as long as its main assessment basis is PRA...
The use of PRA for regulatory purposes is defensible if event sequences and related probabilities are well understood and the consequences to the public welf are can be clearly defined. The PRA methodology now in use does not meet these conditions.
...The foregoing is sufficient to who why PRA studies as currently preformed will remain inscrutable and will, at least for the next decade, be little more than a display of logical thought based on esser tially arbitrary reliability assumptions. They may permit event probabilities to be assigned very conservative boundary values, but if the mathematical interpretations are rigorous, the value will be only a measure of the data based and ~ not a mea sure of public safety adequacy.
~~
Without question, the most ser iou's . disto rtion 'of ' fact being introduced by the use of PRA is the claim that it can estimate the probability of a core melt. As previously noted, the NCR has not even attempted to define what it means by a " core melt."
Conclusions, Page 7
. . . .Th e claims for PRA concerning its ability to assess public saf ety risks are little more than a sham that will hide the f act that the basis for safety will always depend on the judgement of a few individuals.
There are numerous additional exerpts which could be sited from a wide range authorities raising questions as to the acceptability of probabilistic risk assessment as a methodologoy, l
but it would serve no purpose at this point, other than duplicate the point.which is clearly made by the preceeding statements.
Because of the questions raised concerning the use of' this methodology, the Legislature believes that it cannot rely on the work of both LILCO's and the county's experts in regard to the
[
probability of an accident and especially a core melt accident I
and its consequences, and views such data with skepticism.
In the course of their testimony to the Legislature, 1
( representatives of the Long Island Lighting Company themselves i
i raised questions about some of the conclusions in their own probabilistic risk assessment, which was submitted in support of their application for an operating license. Based upon what was f
1 said to be "new evidence", LILCO's spokesman said that the previous estimates of the release of certain " source te r m s" ,
j which are radioactive materials released during an accident, had been overestimated and actually smaller quantities would be released, thereby reducing the extent of the danger. Using this
! i n f o r r. a t i o n , LILCO's ex pe r ts a rg ue tha t the consequences of an cecident would be substantially less than previously predicted by
- - : c : .- a..: :u c:u-*t'r exg rt: t r.d ': :- the basis ef this
- a : r. : . . - .; :...:, :: e>...- .= .:r+ cf 10 r e- r a t
v.
Conclusions Page 8 10 miles was only 1%. Given that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not reviewed and confirmed this information, it would be premature for the Legislature to preempt the Commission on such a technical matter.
During the cource of their testimony, LILCO representatives also objected to the 20 mile radius emergency planning zone on the grounds that, by substantially increasing the size of the zone, the county consultanats significantly increased the pcpulation, thereby making planning more difficult. The Legislature finds this argument to be unpersuasive. The responsibility of a government is to provide protection to all its citizens whose health and safety is threatened, and it cannot abandon a portion of its population on the grounds that p ro te c t i ng them is difficult. Such a suggestion places the
- Legislature is the position of having to choose between allowing a risk to the public health continue at the expense of the safety of a portion of its citizens. When confronted with such a choice, it would be preferable to eliminate the risk than jeopardize the health and safety of the county residents.
l
! In regard to the issue of the size of the emergency planning zone, the Leg i sl a t u r e finds that the operation of a nuclear power plant within the borders of the County creates a risk to the health and safety of the citizens of Suffolk County which recuires that the Legislature take every action te mitigate and, where ever posssible, eliminate. Although the Legislature cc- -(: ; t'-- -: - tra:_ lit, cf In preffent having serious
i, i
l Conclusions Page 9 consequences is sm all, and in some cases perhaps even smaller than certain nonnuclear accidents, the fact remains that an accident could happen. Although the odds are small, even the controversial Ra sm ussen Study concluded that a serious accident could happen. Even though the odds may be as high as 1 in 20,000 per year, or 1 in 200,000 per year, that 1 could happen on any day at any reactor, including the Shoreham reactor should it ever become operational. Given the potential adverse health consequences of a serious accident, emergency response planning must be based upon the worst possible assumptions. The Legislature believes that by so doing, planning efforts are enhanced and the options available are increased.
The Legislature believes that emergency response planning must protect the citizens of Suffolk County from both early l An emergency planning zone t fatalities and latent illnesses.
i based upon a dose of 200 rems, which is the level at which early fatalities are produced, fails to provide adequate protection of
! the public health and safety. The Legislature finds of particular interest the f act that during the Three Mile Island l occioent, the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatcry considered l
evacuating an area within 20 miles of the plant, even though the Commission's guidelines recommend as area of 10 miles. While the l Legislature enderses the concept of an emergency planning zone which would reduce the probability of an exposure of 30 rems to l - W - .- 2 ._:e is c r.cerned at: : the danger to the citizens
- e-- -
, -.i t .us believes that future
Conclusions Page 10 consideration should be directed to wa rd s lowering the exposure level to 5 rems, which is the level at which the Environmental Protection Agency recommends taking protective action.
In addition to the health concerns, the Legislature believes that an emergency planning zone of at least 20 mile radius is a practical necessity because of the likelihood of the " shadow ph e n o m e n o n ," which refers to the tendency of people during a
~
radiological emergency to evacuate voluntarily and spontaneously.
The Legislature believes that people have a unique perception of nuclear risks, and that perception will cause them to behave dif f erently f rom the manner in which they would in the event of a nonnuclear accident or threat. As a result, the Legislature finds that nonnuclear incidents, and especially those involving evacuations, do not provide reliable estimates of people's behavior during a nuclear incident and that emergency planning must anticipate this shadow phenomenon, which was evidenced during the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, during their
, appearance before the Legislature on Thursday, January 27, 1983, the representatives of LILCO denied that any evacuation occured
\'
during the course of the Three Mile Island accident. In a subsequent letter dated January 31, 1983 to the Presiding Office
' c:ncerning enether issue related to the he a r i ng s , Mr. Ira Freilicher, Vice President of the Long Island Lighting Com pa n y ,
- -' - . : .f_r1 wh. cenied th: :ny evacuation occured at T r. r s . . .rette: : a p pr x !- 2 e l y 14 0,0 0 0 pe :Fl e
Conclusions Page 11 did evacuate the area despite the fact no evacuation was ordered.
.q
,,phe only official announcement was an advisory that pregnant g~ -
women and small children leave, which groups combined totaled less than 2,500.
The centerpiece of any radiological emergency response plan rests in its ability to evacuate in a timely manner that endangered population in the event of a serious accident. In establishing the requirement that the existence of a radiological emergency response plan be precondition to the issuance of an operating license, the Congress clearly intended that, no matter how small the odds, the essential feature of any such plan must be the ability to conduct an evacuation of the threatened population. As stated in the Report of the Co m m i t t e e on Environment and Public Works, which had jurisdiction over the legislation which imposed the requirement that such a plan be a condition of an operating license:
In the wake of the accident at Three Mile Island, the logic of low probability can no longer be allowed to justify less than priority treatment of emergency preparedness.
(S. Report. No.96-176, p. 27)
During the course of the floor debate in both the House and
{ Senate, emergency preparedness is synonymous with evacuation, with the members using both interchangeably. The legislative history of the I;.:cl e a r Regulatory Co:rnissien's Authorization cf Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, which establishes the
- _ri--- 1.:- c...
e e :. h - : r.r t r a t e r t%: e r. evacuttien p;ar
- - =: - - . r e s t.i r.; tr. this
o Conclusions Page 12 legislation. As stated during the Senate floor consideration of this bill by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, Senator Hart, who was the floor manager for this legislation and was subsequently chairman of the Conference Committee:
It is important that we have electricity and that we have energy in this country.
There is no question about it. It is also important that we do not kill people or radiate them in the process.
That is the real issue here--whether we should permit a nuclear reactor to ope ra te in this country if, af ter 6 or 9 months (which was all the time the pending bill would have given existing plants to develop a plan before it would lose its operating license) there is no plan whatsoever to evacuate the people in the case of an accident. That is the issue.
Given the legislative history of the radiological emergency response plan requirement, any discussion of the low probability of an accident which would require an evacuation is irrelevant, for it was Cong ress' clear intent that an ability to evacuate an crea be an essential part of any emergency plan.
Any considerations of developing a radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham nuclear po we r reactor must begin by conf ronting the one, single, most overriding feature of the area, and that is that the reactor is build on an island. Long Island is surrounded on all 4 sides by wa te r , and the only land route off the ;sland which is the er.ly means most cf the pcpd atior wculd use, is by a limited number of bridges and
- ere.t.:.
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Conclusions Page 13 two-thirds of the island, is bounded entirely on its western side by Nassau County, which itself is bounded on its western side by ktueens County on its northwest border and by Kings County on its southwest border. Traffic exiting Suffolk County must pass through these heavily populated areas to get off the island.
Traffic leaving the island mus: then pass through New York City.
Thus, even if an evacuation were to occur during a non-rush period, exiting traf fic would have to pass through some o.f the most densely populated and congested areas of the country.
The Shoreham nuclear power reactor is located on the northern shore to wa rd s the eastern end of the island at a distance of approximately two-thirds of the length of the island. An emergency planning zone with a 10 mile radius would occupy approximately two-thirds of the width of the island and a 20 mile radius EPZ would extend about 5 miles into the ocean on its southern side. Most of the area of an EPZ on the northern side of the plan would be part of Long Island Sound, with a small part of a 20 mile radius EPZ extending into Connecticut. Within the 20 mile Em e rg enc y Planning Zone, there is a total resident i
population of about 635,000 people, which, because of the tourist j industry in the area, is increased by approximately 100,000 during the s u m r. e r months. There are approximately 100,000 permanent residents living west of the plan just within the 20
..le EF2, and, d.::ing the sum .er men .hs the population within the
- le EFZ 1; v : .- wert of the plant increased to a total of
- c '- - .'; 'e noted that there are
Conclusions Page 14 land areas west of the plant which are beyond the twenty mile EP2 whose populatien has not been included in the previous calculations.
The fact that the Shoreham nuclear power plant is located on an island which is less than 20 miles wide creates some unprecendented probl em s for planners, because for the vast majority of the residents of Suffolk County, evacuation can occur in only one direction, which is to the west. It is believed' tha t most of the people living east of the plan will also evacuate in a western direction, in order to avoid the fear of being trapped at the eastern end of the island with no means of escape, should the winds move the radioactive plume in that direction. Thus, unlike previous situations where evacuation of an area was, even for plants located on an ocean shore, always away f rom the plant in a circular or semicircular direction, a significant portion of the population wishing to evacuate Suffolk County in the event of an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant will have~to pass by the plant, and perhaps into the direction of the plume. As l indicated by hearings for the public conducted in the to wn o f
?
l Riverhe,ad, which is located east of the plant, a majority of the residents of that area who testified stated that they would evacuate to the west and were deeply concerned and resentful that l they were being cenfronted with this possibility. Moreover, people living beyond the 20 mile zone to the west of the plant isst:fied trat, :- the:r epinirn, all Fl ans were inadequate
. . :... . : ir .he
Conclusions Page 15
! event of an accident, even though wind changes may leave them exposed with no escape routes other than in the direction of the plume.
The ability of those living east of the plant to evacuate in a westward direction may be further complicated by traffic congestion caused by those living west of the plant also trying to evacuate in a westward direction. There are a limited number of major thoroughfares on Long Island all of which co uld b.ecome easily congested in the event of a mass evacuation. These roadways are already experiencing (Continued on next page) l 1
9 2
l l
\ l
\
l i
6,
Pag .i Lcnc;us'ons problems handling the daily traffic, especially during the summer months.
Experts retained by the County made a number of estimates of the time which would be required to evacuate certain areas. For planning purposes, the outer ring of the emergency planning zone was divided into 6 sections, with the inner ring being considered a seperate section. In the event of an accident, the path of the plume would be plotted, and only those sections in the direction of the path would be directed to evacuate, thereby theoretically reducing the number of evacuees. Using this division, a number of estimates were made of the time which would be requried to evacuate the inner ring and selected outer sections. Estimates were first made of the time required for workers to receive notification of an accident and an order to evacuate, IJnder these figures, 50% of the population was assumed to receive notification within 25 minutes of the first announcement, with that figure rising to 80% within 30 minutes. It was further estimated that 50% of the workers would leave their job within 10 minutes' of-learning of the nctice, with an additional 40% leaving within 20 minutes of recieving such notification. An estimated 70% of the workers were assumed to arrive at their heme within 20 minutes of leaving work, with an additional 18% requiring 40 minutes or more. After arriving bome, it was estimated that 30% of the workers would be prepared to leave within 30 rainutes of their arrival and that 60% would be prepared to leave within 45 minutes of arriving home,' Tfius, for the vast majority of residents, at least one hour must 5e allotted to learn of the evacuation order, leave work, travel fiame and then prepare to evacuate, It was estimated that it sculd take I hour and 40 minutes for 50% of the auto owr.ir; population i to actually leave their hcne, County planners then developed eight scenarios, varying in time of year, wel.M ::."icticns, possible tra'fic cc.strictions, pcpu'.ation gro ch, and
" shadow effect" sensitivity. Using these variables, the county consultants s
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Page 17 - Conclusions a low of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 45 minutes (during the winter with no adverse weather conditions) to a high of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> W 15 minutes (during the winter with adverse weather conditions),
the time required for clearing the inner zone plus one or two of the outer zones increased dramatically. For example, when the inner zone and the western zone are to be evacuated, the estimated evacuation times range from a low of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and 45 minutes (during winter with no adverse weather conditions) to a high of 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> and 15 minutes (during adverse winter weather conditions), When the west-south western zone is added to the preceeding two zones, the time estimates range from a low of 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes (during the winter with no adverse weather conditions) to a high 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> and 30 minutes (during adverse winter weather conditions), The lowest combined time estimates occur when just the inner zone and the. eastern zone are combined, with a low estimate of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 45 minutes (during restricted north and south fork traffic in non-adverse winter weather conditions) to a high of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 45 minute (during adverse winter weather conditions),
However, when the adjacent zone to the sourth is added) the highest time estimate rises to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes (during sumer tourist conditions), In making these estimates, the county consultants retained normal traffic flows',' in the sense that east bound lanes remained east Sound',' rather than Seing converted to west bound to accomadate additional volumes of traffic, This was thought to be necessary to accomodate those who were returntng home to pick up their family.
The evacuation time estimates of the county consultants are based upon a number of assumptions, including assumptions that certain common, ordinary everyday expe-iences will not happen, No provision is made for cars runnino out c' gas, mechanical breakdowns or accidents. the occorance of any one of which sti.d "es.'t in c b'::1.ed traffic lane ar.d exter.d tha time re:;uired to evacuate an orez. As t*is re-~t is being written, a heavy snowstorm has hit this area, u a-- ~.- - r e #--t cf r e v. THr has re aly:ed traffit, but, no e importantly,
. - ;"ic lanes, inciading tScie
ifage 18 - Conclusiorise-- I evacuation time estimates, it is not improbable that some people may become I
frustrated or apprehensive about the slow rate of progress and abandon their cars in traffic, as they did during this winter storm, especially if they feel their or their family's health and safety is being threatened by remaining in place.
As noted by Suffolk County Police Co :missioner Donald J. Dilworth in his testimonyt It must be remembered that we are not dealing with people just in a traffic jam, but people who are experiencing an e otional and potentially dangerous situation.
We note that the evacuation time estimates in the plan do not take into account many practical problems such as people running out of fuel, cars breaking down, and accidents, Such problems are found to hamper any evacuation, In addition, the performance of traffic control will most definitely be hampered by a lack cf obedience to the rules of the road and a person's desire to get out of the area as quickly as possible.
All of the plans assume that the police will be available to assist the flow of traffic, and the LILC0 plan is particularily vulnerable on this point, because it is dependent upon police directing traffic at certain locations and erecting barricades at other locations to prevent the flow of traffic in certain directions. However, Cor:missioner Dilworth explained that it would take 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to contact the required number of off-duty police officers needed to impliment an emergency plan, and it would require an additional 4 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for then to respond to designated locations, Even this time estimate could be optimist for it assumes the police officers do not encounter traffic prehlems in reporting for duty.
Another problem identified by Conmissioner Dilworth concerned the hurden the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people would place on those sectors of the County which are not within the evacuation area. Specifically, the Cornissioner stated:
The reprcussions of the evacuation will be felt throughcut this County and into Nassau County and New York City, The potential for certain segments of the population to use this to their best advantaae cannot be overlooked, Daring this emergency, the potential of civil distrder, looting and an increase in other types of crimes exists and must be planned for.
Page 19 - Conclusiore The most critical problem identified by Commission Dilwo-th concerned the potentiai Icss of the police co7munications systen, which is located just within the 10 m.iie radius o' the plan: If the Communications Center had to be evacuated, police woJId lose the ability to Communicate by
- radio with the officers in the field, 7-d thus vould be unable to rove then i
to trouble areas, even if traffic conditions made such neves cossible. This is also the center for receiving ere ger.cy calls se pecole seeking emergency assistance throughout the cour.:y would be unable to contact the police by l
dialing 911. In the words c' the Commissioner:
If you lose your communicatier., you lose contrcl, ycur command a bi li ty. You could't dispatch a oersen out, you could give him no guidance. Each police officer would be acting as an individual unit, using his owr, best judgement. Usually their judgement is excellent ard I hope ir. that case they would do the best they could. But you would lote the ability to have a unified force. (p.1279)
On the issue of whether cerria :uld
- r' cv ? Lferently au-ir.; a naclear accident, Co7missicner Dih. --- .: te-Caite, qu7te di'fere t. '. r : .e r-Sc:im ' :'co-le, thc e's
~
a ce-tair ' ear trat s rel;te: t, t hi s t h . J oe: * ' ' core with a sterr or even fire, 'c- !*at r..arte , ihr 's -e-* cted to a certsin area. Eut just ' cur pelicemer - '..c .ar deal vith that which we b now we car rc rectair a t*.ri t c *.os . Pen you're dea'ing with raciatier. all the horrars :qnceiatr{ witt it, that's a diffe ent thir.* ( .irely.(p, I?/.'
On the crc:ial cuestien e' .
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evacua tec ,
there was the fcilor. ire. excnanr.e:
"r. Allgrove: , , . T r am tnr . v.o out st i:* - tra ; : reve asked you ciready, it would seem to et : tat y ir.te-tretatier. would be that this tyr.e of planning ir vcu ';9 -- arc corre:t me if
- am wrong -- is useless, Commi ssicne 'si h.o-th: h t l '. , it': e. . a r.2 civer, the conditicns tha t we weal anticipate at tne t're. would te -- tc have a *inely evacua tion wt aid be mest dif f' a.'.* ?27'
' 'page 20 - Conclusions Mr. Allgrove: Time.
Conmissioner D11 worth: Timely.
l Mr. Allgrove: Timely. And your answer is based upon a parameter of what distance?
Comissioner Dilworth: The numbers of people involved who live in that area; the experience that there has been reported in other sections those who would evacuate before the word is given to evacuate; the masses attempting to put the greatest distance betw?en the i
SNP and themselves, at one time would certainly over-load our i network of highways; we discussed the configuration of the Island and this difficulty, and we feel that it is a most difficult task.
Mr. Allgrove: We have sat here for almost -- going on the second week now and we have listened to expe-ts in all of the fields from one corner of the globe to the other; specifics upon specifics, interpretations, just about everything has flowed into these hearings, and it seem to me that every night I go home andl try to evaluate what has been done that particular day, I come to the realization that an evacuation plan for this area is just not feasi ble, Do you feel the same way?
Comissioner Dilworth: Well, the key word was " utilization",
We deal in reality and our feelings are about the samer, its most difficult to evacuate an area of that size in any given time frame, Given Cornissioner Dilworth's position within the County government, his familiaritywith the county, its citizens and its roads, and his understanding of human behavior, the Legislature must give great weight to his ooinions.
Against this testimony are a series of paper studies and computer calculations by experts retained by both the county and the Long Island Lighting Company, and while the studies done by the county's consultants are not necessarily in conflict with Commissioner Dilworth's testimony, the Conr;issioner's conclusion's are clear.
One of the important questions in estimating the ability to evacuate an area is time, in the sense of how much time will be available to warn and prepare the citizens, Given enough time, any evacuation can work regardless of the number of people or the size of the area. The Legislators believe that, for planning purposes, it must be assumed that tire available will be limited,
Page 21 - Concinicris amounting to less than a few hours. The Reactor Safety Study indicates that major releases may begin in the range of one-half hour to as much as 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> af ter the initiating event, and that the duration of the release may last from one-half hour to several days with the ma,ior portion cf the release occuring well within the first day. The time available for responding is, to a great l extent dependent upon how quickly the reactor operator notifies county officials that an accident has occured. Although most plans call for pro: ot notification, the Legislature is aware that, in the past, utilities have not promptly notified local and State officials and even Federal efficials.
In the Three Mile Island case, utility officials did not notify State or county of ficials until 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> af ter the initiating event occured.
Finally, the Legislators beleive that energency planning is fundamentally a government function that can best be performed by the county, and therefore the Legislature condemn efforts by the Long Island Lighting Company to usure this function. And the Legislature will cppose with equal vigor any attempt of the State to impose a plan upon the county. The essential role of local government in implimenting an emergency response plan was identified by the General Accounting Office in a report entitled " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should Be Better Prepared For Radiological Emergencies". Specifically, the report statede Nuclear facilities rely on State and local governments for responding to offsite emergencies and initiating protective measures.....In the past, the NRC has primarily directed its efforts at the State level. However, the States' s ergency response activities are primarily related to the restoration or recovery phase of an emergency, and only secondarily address initial -response or public protective action. For the most part,
- immediate offsite emergency response actions must be taken by local government authorities. (p.14)
....The role of State agencies is limited during the initial emergency phase because, generally, their energency resources and personnel are located too far from fixed nuclear facilities to initiate immediate protective measures for safeguarding the public, Thus, responsibility for initial response rests with local authorities, They are responsible for protecting health and safety within their jttrisdiction, are closest to the accident site, and would be expected to initiate protective measures. During the initial emergency phase, the State's role is usually limited to providing support and assistance to local
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- Page 22 - Conclusions ef forts for safeguarding the public. (p.19)
Since communities in the vicinity of nuclear powerplants and installations would be the first to receive any offsite radiological release, they are basically responsible for implimenting the first line of defense. They may include monitoring and assessing the radiological release and implimenting necessary protective measures. Thus, local authorities have a vital role in preforming emergency reasures for safeguarding the public. (p. 20) ~
Given their responsibilities and proximity, the Legislature believes that both the State and Federal governments should defer to the County's judgement as to what is in the best interests of its citizent and their public health and safety, h.. . _ . _ _ _ __
I FINDINGS Based upon the evidence, testimony, hearing record and conclusions, the suffolk County Legislature finds' that:
- 1. although the probability is small, a serious accident at t
the Shoreham nuclear power reactor could occur at any time during the plant's useful life;
- 2. .given the geographic configuration of Long Island and the location of the Shoreham nuclear power plant in relation to that configuration, the maginituce of the population which would be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of 5 rems, and the limited number of land routes available to evacuate the area, a timely evacuation of those Suffolk County citizens in the path of the pltrie coola not occur in the event of a fast developing release at the reactor;
- 3. none of the plans submitted to date and no proposed change to
! such plan offers or could offer adeqaate protection of the l
i public health and safety of those living east of the Shorehan 1
nuclear power reactor; I
l 4. in the event of a serious accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant, there should be a range of protective actions available to the citizens of Suffolk County which could be taken in a tinely manner which would prevent any exposure to higher level than that level at which the Environmental Protection Agency recommends that protective actions be taken, which is 5 rems;
.o Page 2 - Findings
- 5. as no plan can be devised or preparation made which would provide I reasonable assurance that the citizens of Suffolk County would not be exposed to a level of radiation in excess of 5 rems, or even 30 rems, the operation of the Shoreham nuclear power l
reactor poses an unreasonable threat to the public health and safety
- 6. as planning for a radiological emergency must place the responsibility for the initiation of a response at the county level of government, no plan can be devised without the full cooperation of the county government,
- 7. Without the support of the Suffolk County government; no radiological emergency response plan can be implimented, and thus such a plan would, by definition, fail to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.
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ATTACIIMI:NT 9 REPORT OF SUFFOLK CotnITY EXECUTIVE PETER F. COHAIA'i CONCERNING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN SUFFOLK COUNTY February 16, 1983 f
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REPORT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE PETER F. COIIAL1di ColiCERNING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN SUFFOLK COUNTY _
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Table of Contents Page I. Introduction........................................... 1 II. Summary of Conclusions................................. 4 III. Background............................................. 7 IV. LILCO's Unauthorized RERP.............................. 12 V. The Suffolk County Radiological -
Emergency Response Plan................................ 20 A. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)................. 21 B. The Inadequacy of a 10-Mile EPZ................... 24 C. Sociological and Psychological Issues in Emergency Planning...................... 28
- 1. Overreaction and the Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon............................. 28
- 2. Mississagua.................................... 32 I
'I 3. Role Conflict................................. 34
- 4. Other Social and Psychological Issues........................................ 37
- 5. The Value of Surveys.......................... 38 I
D. Evacuation Routes and Time Estimates.............. 40 E. Health Effects.................................... 43
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- 1. Short Term Health Effectr..................... 43 i
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- 2. Long Term Effects............................ 44 (a) Cancer.................................. 44 Genetic Effects......................... 45 (b)
- 3. Psychological Effects......................... 46 F. The Health Effects of Sheltering................. 46 VI. Conclusion............................................. 48 B
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REPORT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE PETER F. CCHALAN CONCERNING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN SUFFOLK COUNTY I. INTRODUCTION The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, an 820 MWe boiling water reactor (BWR), is being constructed within Suffolk County on a 500 acre site on the north shore of Long Island near the village of Wading River. Construction of the plant, now nearing completion, has been ongoing for over a decade at a cost estimated to be $3.2 billion. The Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), which owns Shoreham, predicts that the plant will be ready to load fuel in June of this year, with
' commercial operation to follow early in 1984.
'A serious nuclear accident at Shoreham would release sig-nificant radioactive fission products into the environment.
The impact of such an accident on the health, welfare, and safety of the people of Suffolk County and the value of its ,
property would be severe.
_ By law, Suffolk County has an obligation to protect the health, welfare and safety of its citizens. See for example Section 10, New York State Municipal Home Rule Law. Thus, it is the duty of the County to prepare for emergencies in an l
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Never before, effort to avoid injury to life and property.
however,.has the County been faced with the task of planning "
for an emergency with the potential magnitude and complexity of o nuclear accident at Shoreham.
Many circumstances existing on Long Island make emergency
- a particularly planning and preparing for a Shoreham accident difficult task.
SuffolkCountyhas1.fmillionresidents,and that population swells in summer when visitors are attracted to the County's many recreational facilities. Under the best of circumstances, protective actions for the portion of this popu-lation affected by a Shoreham emergency would be difficult.
However, circumstances existing on Long Island coupled with the
. unique nature of a radiological emergency make preparedness for Shoreham even more difficult. For exampre, the unicue configuration of Long Island, an elongated, narrow island, as well as;its limited road network, present probisms for any attempted evacuation. A 360 degree dispersal of evacuating traffic is impossible. Furthermore, the unique nature of radi-I ation -- being an invisible hazard undetectable by human senses .
-- is likely to cause behavior that will hamper the to retreat offectiveness of any evacuation as people attempt Finally,
' from a danger they cannot see, hear, touch or smell.
a radiological emergency of the magnitude that could occur at ,
Shoreham would place overwhelming demands upon County re-sources, but significant numbers of emergency personnel are f of their xpected to concern themselves first with the sa ety
'amilies.
To be workable, any plan developed to meet the threat of a t and
'adiological emergency at Shoreham must take into accoun Furthermore, such a plan must "
.varcome these uni que problems.
uences of an
.c developed with knowledge of the specific conseq at Shoreham, both in terms of fission products re-ccident the resulting doses of radiation to the reased from the plant, and the health uman body at specific distances from the plant, radiation.
affects of such doses on the people exposed to the Earlier this year, the Suffolk County Government, safety, and exercizing its duty to protect public health, welfare, undertook to develop a plan for a radiological emergency at Shoreham that was sensitive to the local In so doing, it
' conditions existing on Long Island.
h commissioned the talents of nationally-known experts in t e i l scientific and technical disciplines related to radiolog ca After months of effort, this team cmargency response planning.
has developed the best possible plan for Suffolk County -- one '
that is sensitive to the unique problems of Long Island and to This Draft County Plan is now before the l
human behavior.
' County Legislature for its review.
The purpose of this Report is to review the data which are t
before us concerning the provisions of the Draft County Plan.
the Draft Plan should be These data compel the conclusion that rejected and that, in fact, no emergency response plan would
- protect the health, welfare and safety of Suffolk County's res-idents from an accident at Shoreham.
II.
SUMMARY
OF CONCLUSIONS A nuclear accident at Shoreham that caused the release of significant radiation-into the environment of Suffolk County would have a serious impact on the health, safety and welfare of Suffolk County's residents. Computer analyses reveal that even if'the public were to take protective actions, there could be a mean of 15 and up to 577 deaths, along with a mean of 18 and up to 1270 illnesses within 60 to 90 days of radiation exposure. Thousands of cancer incidences and fatalities could result. In addition, a nuclear accident at Shoreham could
- cause genetic diseases in future generations and serious psy-chological distress.
Analysis of the amounts of radiation which would be re-1 cased during an accident and studies of human evacuation be-havior lead to the conclusion that an Emergency Planning Zone
("EPZ") smaller than 20 miles is inadequate for the protection of the residents of Suffolk County. The traffic analyses and l
t evacuation time estimates performed by the County's experts demonstrate that it would take as much as 14 to 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to evacuate most sectors of the EPZ, particularly the more Populous western sectors. Such slow evacuation times are a
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result of the elongated, narrow shape of the island, a very limited number of appropriate evacuation routes, and the large B numberc of voluntary evacuees who, according to studies conducted by the County and data gathered from Three Mile Island, would attempt to evacuate though not advised to do so (the so-called evacuation shadow phenomenon).
Any attempt to evacuate the western sectors of the EPZ would result in automobiles being stranded for hours in traffic queues, leaving the occupants exposed to the hazards of the ra-diological plume. In addition, automobiles cannot be expected to operate for such long periods without many running out of gas. Therefore, evacuation is not an acceptable protective action for most sectors of the EPZ. On the other hand, sheltering (staying indoors), the only other available
- protective action, would expose .the residents of Suffolk County within the EP: to unacceptable doses of radiation, resulting in thousands of increased incidences of cancer and cancer fatalities.
Any radiological emergency response plan depends upon the .
availability of large numbers of emergency personnel to perform a number of essential tasks. However, studies conducted for Suffolk County, and the testimony of several heads of County .
agencies, reveal that in the event of a radiological emergency, a significant number of emergency personnel may not report promptly, or even at all, for duty in a radiological emergency.
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- __ i e' l The reason is that they will experience a role conflict between their responsibility to the job and their responsibility to their own spouses and children. In such cases, of course, the feasibility of an effective emergency response would be undermined.
While the problems of emergency workers' role conflict are erguably capable of being dealt with, there are obstacles to omergency preparedness in Suffolk County that are in fact insurmountable. These result from the actual local conditions of Long ' Island and studied human behavior -- circumstances today beyond everyone's control. Because of these insurmountable obstacles, the County Executive concludes that no emergency plan can provide adequately for the protection of the public safety in the event of a nuclear accident at Shoreham. Thus, the Draft County Plan should be rejected.
Furthermore, LILCO's own version of a County emergency plan, unauthorized by the County, is grossly deficient. That document entirely ignores local needs and conditions and should be categorically dismissed. The fundamental finding must be l
that, because of the inherent conditions on Long Island, there l
l can be no preparedness adequate to protect the public safety in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham.
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III. BACKGROUND In September of 1981, Suffolk County agreed to LILCO's re-quest that the County develop a radio 1'ogical emergency response plan (RERP) in anticipation of an accident at Shoreham. Such a plan - properly implemented by local governmental authorities
-- is required before a utility can obtain an operating license from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The County assigned the task of developing the RERP to its Planning Department, which designated two of its staff persons for that purpose.
By the end of 1981, it became apparent to officials in both the Legislative and Executive branches of the Suffolk County Government that the plan was not being developed in a realistic manner. Further inquiry proved the planning effort
-to be deficient in many respects. In particular, the work up to that time: (1) ignored the unique configuration of Long Island and the problems it posed for an orderly evacuation; (2) largely overlooked the problems resulting from the limited roadway network available to Suffolk County residents for ,
evacuation; (3) failed to analyse the health consequences to Suffolk County residents if evacuation and/or protective shel,tering were instituted as protective actions to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham; (4) failed to account for the lessons learned during the accident at Three Mile Island
(especially the human behavior exhibited during tha't' emergency); (5) relied unrealistically on the willingness of all necessary emergency response personnel to report promptly for emergency response duties; and (6) ignored the dilemma faced by those residing on the eastern end of Long Island who could be trapped by a radioactive plume traversing the Island.
Moreover, the dimensions of the emergency planning zone were not based on an analysis of the specific fission products that could be released from Shoreham and the consequent health effects to the public of such releases. In short, the plan being prepared in late 1981 and early 1982 was largely a paper exercise that ignored human behavior and the conditions existing on Long Island and thus was inadequate for the purpose of protecting the public from an,accidedt at Shoreham.
Recognizing its duty to correct the deficiencies in the County!s planning efforts, the Suffolk County Legislature on i
March 23, 1982 adopted Resolution No. 262-1982 which ceased the planning effort then underway, returned to LILCO all money paid under the September 1981 agreement, and undertook to develop at j
- the County's own expense a RERP that would be sensitive to the local conditions on Long Island. Recognizing also the County's 1
duty as the protector of the public health, welfare and safety in Suffolk County, Resolution No. 262-1982 further required logislative approval prior to implementation of the RERP or its i
submittal to federal authorities for review:
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RESOLVED, that said plan shall not be be deemed adequate operable and capableandofshall beingnotimplemented until such time as it is approved by the Suffolk ,
County Legislature; and RESOLVED, that only after said plan is approved by the Suffolk County Legislature, shall it be submitted to the Federal Emergency Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory ,
Commission for purposes of any findings, determinations, rulings, reviews, or hearings by such Federal agencies.
A sum of $375,000 was initially appropriated for plan develop-ment, which was subsequently augmented by further cpptcpriations now totaling well over $500,000.
County Executive Peter F. Cohalan signed Resolution No.
262-1982 on March 25, 1982 and four days later, by Executive Order, established a Steering Committee consisting of both County personnel and outside experts to eversee the plan's de-
,velopment. The Committee, chaired by Deputy County Executive Frank R. Jones, proceeded to gather a team of nationally-recognized experts including:
Fred Finlayson, Ph.D., of Finlayson and Associates, an expert in the consequences of radiological accidents; M.D., Professor of Edward P. Radford, Environmental Epidemiology, University of Pittsburgh and former Chairman of the Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences; Philip B. Herr, Professor of Planning at MIT;
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i Kai T. Erikson, Ph.D., Professor of ,
Sociology, Yale University; James H. Johnson, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Geography, UCLA; Donald J. Zeigler, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Geography, Old Dominion University; PRC Voorhees of McLean, Virginia, a firm specializing in traffic planning; Robert J. Budnitz, Ph.D., of Future Resources Associates, Inc., an expert on the assessment of risks and accident probabilities at nuclear power plants; Stephen Cole, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, Stony Brook.
The Steering Committee and its experts began work on the RERP in mid-April under a demanding schedule and a mandate to be sensitive to human behavior and to confront the specific problems of developing a plan for suffolk County. County Executive Cohalan explained the County's commitment in testimo-ny before the suffolk County Legislature on May 18, 1982:
The County is engaged in a good faith effort to produce the best possible emergency plan and preparedness for the people of Suffolk County. This effort begins with the fundamental premise that
- the purpose of the emergency plan is to J
protect the people who would be affected by an accident at the Shoreham plant. To do l this, there must be a meaningful, workable f plan that addresses the realities of the i particular conditions on the island. The analysis and planning must consider the particular types of accidents that could occur at Shoreham; the potential consequences of those accidents; the dispersion of radioactive releases on Long Island; the population -- that is, the l
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concentrations of people -- affected by such dispersion of radioactivity; the po-tential health effects to those people; the social and psychological profile of Long Island; and finally, the types of actions necessary to protect the people who would be affected by the radioactive releases.
In carrying out these analyses and related planning, the County's consultants have been instructed to emphasize practical considerations. Accordingly, they will apply the lessons of Three Mile Island and the studies which followed that accident.
They will also pay particular attention to any problems associated with the east end of Long Island, including possible difficulties in evacuating persons living in east end communities.
The work of the experts, described more fully below, resulted in a plan comprised of three large volumes. County Executive Cohalan submitted the plan to the Legislature for re-view on December 2, 1982. For eight days, beginning on January
.17, 1983 and ending on January 27, 1983, the Legislature held hearings on the plan, as required by Resolution No. 456-1982 (May 19, 1982). During that time, it heard testimony from County agencies and from witnesses put forth by both the County and LILCO. In addition, three days of the testimony were devoted to hearing from the public, both in Riverhead and Hauppauge, and from concerned citizens groups, both pro- and anti-Shoreham. The sentiment of the public was overwhelmingly l against the operation of the Shoreham plant and was highly 1
skeptical of the feasibility of any effective evacuation from the island. At the conclusion of the hearings, the record
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1 consisted of 1,590 pages of transcript and hundreds of pages of l suPP emental documents.
l l IV. LILCO'S UNAUTHORIZED RERP The Draft County plan submitted by County Executive 1982, is not the only Cohalan to the Legislature on December 2, document which has been proferred as the County's RERP.
l Rather, despite the format, ion of the Steering Committee and the efforts of County experts to develop a RERP, LILCO -- without j County approval or authorization -- packaged and submitted to on ,
the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC),
May 10, 1982, a document purporting to be the local RERP for Suffolk County. The document was contained in two blue loose-leaf binders entitled "Suffolk County Radiological
' Emergency Response Plan." It consisted mostly of materials developed earlier by the County's two. Planning Department staf f members whose work had been discarded by Resolution No.
262-1982, supported by other materials which LILCO and its own contractors had prepared. Not only was the LILCO-submitted document sent to the DPC without any authorization from the 9
County but, being based largely on the County's previously s
- discarded work, it also failed to address the essential issues presented by local conditions on Long Island.
In a mailgram dated May 14, 1982, County Executive Cohalan informed Governor Carey and William Hennessey, Chairman of the
DPC, that LILCO had no right or power to speak for the citizens og Suffolk County, that the County had not authorized LILCO to submit any document on the County's behalf, and asked the Commission not to review the unauthorized LILCO document. The ,
mailgram concluded by reiterating the County's commitment to providing'the greatest protection of the public:
[The] Suffolk County Government is engaged in a serious good faith effort to prepare the best possible emergency plan to protect the public's safety. We trust that State officials will not permit themselves to be used by LILCO as pawns in LILCO's arrogant end run to the State around the critical interests of the people of Suffolk County.
We therefore ask that the State prcmptly reject LILCO's inappropriate request.
In testimony before the Suffolk County Legislature on May 18, 1982, County Executive Cohalan expressed the concern of the Suffolk County government that LILCO was attempting to usurp 2he County's responsibilities as the protector of the public welfare:
The power to act for the people of Suffolk County is by law vested only in the County i
government. LILCO, by its presumptuous re-cent actions, has arrogated to itself that governmental power. This fact was ,
confirmed in last Friday's newspaper, where a high-level LILCO official justified his company's action with the following quoted words: "When government refuses to act l responsibly, as a government, then we must l . do so for the government." LILCO's i far-fetched words, which would justify the usurpation of governmental authority by a l private corporation, are nothing less than preposterous. These words -- which with little imagination smack of a vigilante spirit -- evidence a corporate belligerancy in LILCO which demeans the public purpose for which this County government exists.
Promptly, LILCO should retract its unfitting words. They are not only in bad taste; they are nonsensical.
Attempting to convince LILCO of the County's good faith efforts in emergency planning, Chief' Deputy County Executive John C. Gallagher wrote the following in a letter dated May 17, 1982 to Dr. Matthew Cordaro, a vice president of LILCO:
The County's emergency planning effort is being performed by a team of nationally recognized experts. A list of these experts is enclosed herewith for your information. The County Executive has informed these experts that Suffolk County wishes to develop the best possible emergency plan to protect the health and safety of the residents of Suffolk County.
Needless to say, a meaningful, workable ra-diological emergency plan would also be in LILCO's best interests. .
It is the County's hope that LILCO will promptly terminate its resistance to the County's good faith emergency planning efforts. An increasing amount of the County's time is being consumed by the need to respond to seemingly belligerant actions of LILCO that challenge the County's current effort. I ask that you convey to your colleagues these serious sentiments, and that LILCO refrain from escalating
- further with rhetoric or deed any differ-ence which exists between LILCO and the County with respect to the critical goal of effective radiological emergency preparedness.
The County Legislature also protested against LILCO's attempted usurpation of the County's duty to provide for the I health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. By Resolution No.
456-1982 (May 18, 1982), the County Legislature reaffirmed its
. primary responsibility for the protection of its residents in the event of a radiological emergency at [Shoreham]" and its
, serious intention "through good faith and sound planning efforts, to assure that the best possible emergency plan and preparedness are developed to protect the citizens of Suffolk Similarly, Resolution 457-1982, passed the same day, l
County."
also recognized the Co'unty's " sworn duty to protect the health and safety of the people of Suffolk County," for which it "has commissioned studies to determine all planning facets that are assential in developing a viable [RERP]." Both resolutions condemned LILCO for submitting to the DPC an unauthorized RERP purporting to be for Suffolk County and reiterated that the only RERP that would be implemented in Su'ffolk County would be 4ne adopted by the Legislature. Resolution 457-1982 further served to inform the Governor, the State Legislature, and the DPC that the County vehemently opposed any action by the State which gave credibility or dignity to LILCO's unauthorized i
l document.
I Notwithstanding the County's attempts to explain its posi-ftionanditsprotestsagainstanyusurpationofitsauthority, LILCO continued to press for review of its unauthorized RERP by tho DPC staff. The DPC staff complied with LILCO's wishes but l
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its review resulted on June'9, 1982 in the determination that LILCO's plan was deficient in numerous areas and thus was
" unsatisfactory for submission to the full Commission."
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,I I Meanwhile, the County's Steering Committee and its experts However, on October 6, continued to develop a County RERP.
39g2, LILCO submitted an amended version of its unauthorized gggP to the DPC, claiming to have corrected the deficiencies found earlier by the Commission's staff. The letter accompanying LILCO's submittal conceded that:
" ...neither our original plan which we submitted on May 10, 1982, or this revised
{ plan, has been approved by Suffolk County.
We note that no direct contact was made with Suffolk County personnel regarding any j of the changes contained in the enclo-sures."
Again, the unauthorized RERP failed to address the crucial problems being faced by the County's planners.
Mr. Hennessey advised the County by letter of Nove=ber 12, 1982 that he would request the DPC to review the LILCO RERP.
'In reply, Deputy Suf folk County Executive Frank R. Jones informed Mr. Hennessey by letter of November 22, 1982 that LILCO's RERP for Suffolk County was without County approval, that "LILCO's document is not and never will be the local
[RERP] for Shoreham," and urged the DPC not to review the document, particularly in light of the fact that release of the l Draft County plan was imminent. Again ignoring the County's protests, Mr. Hennessey replied by letter on November 29, 1982 that the DPC intended to hold a meeting on December 8, 1982, to consider the LILCO document and invited the County to attend.
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P The County Executive submitted the County's RERP to the Sof folk County Legislature for its review on December 2, 1982.
A copy of the County RERP was sent the same day to Mr.
gennessey and the DPC for informational purposes. In spite of the existence of the County's draft RERP, Mr. Hennessey
' informed Deputy County Executive Frank R. Jones the next day in a telephone conversation that the DPC still intended to review and to approve LILCO's document at the December 8 DPC meeting.
The County Executive protested the CPC's proposed actions in callgrams sent to Mr. Hennessey and Governor Carey on December 4, 1982, informing them that the DPC had no authority to review the LILCO document and demanding that the DPC neither review nor approve that document at its December 8 meeting.
In the absence of a satisfactory response from the DPC, the County commenced legal action. On December 6, 1982, the County sought and obtained an Order to Show Cause demanding that the DPC appear to show cause why an order should not be entered pursuant to Article 78, or in the alternative by de-claratory judgment and appropriate injunctive relief, on the g grounds that the State had no authority to review the LILCO dccument. On December 7, 1982, the Supreme Court sitting in Albany County issued a Temporary Restraining Order, prohibiting any review of LILCO's plan pending a hearing on the County's request for a preliminary injunction. Finally, on December 15, 1982, the County, the DPC and LILCO entered into an agreement 3 .- - ,v-- -
O........- . . . . . . ...--- _...- -.. .
by which the DPC agreed to ref rain from reviewing LILCO's RERP and until the County Legislature had an opportunity to review but in no case decide upon the adegricy of the County's RERP, later than February 22, 1983.
The foregoing recital of LILCO's unauthorized and unprece-dented attempts to usurp the County's authority to protect the health, welfare and safety of Suffolk County's citizens must not cloud an underlying fact. Even if the LILCO-submitted Not document were implemented, it would be grossly inadequate.
only does it fail to deal with the realities of health .
consequences which would be suffered if an evacuation and/or protective sheltering were ordered, the LILCO document totally fails to deal with the actual local condi,tions which exist on Long Island. Thus, this document fails to address (a.) the portions of the population which must be planned for so as to prepare them for response to a radiological accident at Shoreham; (b) The geographical areas of Suffolk County affected directly by radiation released by a serious accident at Shoreham; (c) the effects of meteorlogical conditions and
- I frequently changing wind direction on actions required by local government and r
the public to protect the affected popula-tion from adverse health consequences of radiation released by a serious accident at Shoreham; (d) the large number of persons who would be I required to evacuate in the event of a l
serious accident at Shoreham; 4
- g. .
(e) the large number of persons who would i
voluntarily evacuate in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham; I'l (f) the dif ficulty of mobilizing police and other emergency workers on a timely basis; (g) the number of school bus drivers and other emergency workers who have stated their intentions to unite and take protective ,
actions with their own families rather than reporting for work in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham; l
('h )
the amount of time it would realistically take to evacuate the population affected by a serious accident at Shoreham; (i) the effects of inevitable breakdowns and accidents of automobiles during evacuation and the effects of automobiles running out of gasoline and immobilizing evacuation routes; (j) the impacts of likely human behavior on the ef fectiveness of evacuation and protective sheltering, particularly given the actual and perceived constraints caused by the limited road network in Suffolk County;
'(k) the particular problems of persons residing in the east end of Long Island, from which evacuation would recuire travelling toward Shoreham and into areas of traffic congestion and highest potential radiation concentration; (1) other local conditions and effects ad-
- 4 dressed by the analyses, studies, and surveys performed by the County's expert consultants and others who presented statements and testimony at the Legislature's public hearings.
In short, LILCO's unauthorized " plan" is merely paper ehich even if implemented could never provide any preparedness to protect the health, welfare and safety of Suffolk County's ritizens.
I f ..
THE DRAFT SUFFOLK COUNTY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPCNSE I
ILh3 The Draft RERP submitted by the County Executive to the
, tegislature on December 2, 1982 represents approximately seven conths of work by the County's team of experts. It consists of three large volumes totaling approximately 777 pages. The i Oraf t RERP is the best plan that could be developed for Long Island, but the key question is whether, given the unique circumstances on Long Island, the best is good enough. As Mr.
l:
Philip Herr, a member of the Steering Committee and Professor of Planning at MIT told the Legislature:
I am satisfied that the County in fact l
engaged impeccably qualified advisors, that i those advisors were given free rein to reach their own conclusions and that a sound and thorough job has been done in bringing the plan to this point. I am sat-
/ isfied that the response plan is just about
. as good as could be devised for this circumstance, and that the consequence estimates are fully supportable by scien-tific analysis.
Even though the plan is about as good as can be achieved, the outcomes may be unsatisfactory to some of you. The risk is not and could not be reduced to zero. In the event of a severe plant accident, there -
4 are likely to be substantial public health consequences, not because of any emergency plan failure, but because that plant at that location makes those consequences essentially unavoidable.
Deciding whether or not those consequences are acceptably remote and small in relation to other considerations is not our charge.
Rather, we want only to make clear what the consequences resulting from an accident might be given implementation of the best plan we can devise.
T r . 11- 12 .
i t ..
I The following is a review of the plan's major features.
f
..is review demonstrates that the Draft County RERP, while
.onscientiously prepared, cannot protect the public health, l
l gagety and welfare in the event of a severe accident at Sr.o r eham .
A. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) l The EPZ developed by the County's experts relies largely l
- ron the consecuence analysis performed by Dr. Finlayson, the f
- *calth ef fects expertise of Dr. Radford, and the need to accom-codate the evacuation shadow phencmenon studied by Drs. Johnson,
- eigler and Cole (see below). The EPZ consists of an area ap-proximately 20 miles in radius from the Shoreham plant, d ivid ed
- nto 7 sectors. See Herr, Discussion Overview (RERP, Vol. I) at
~
f, 4. The first sector is the so-called " inner sector" which is an area approximately five to seven' miles in radius from the Shoreham plant. The remaining six sectors are approximately 30 degree segments that radiate from the outer boundary of the i inner sector to the outer boundary of the EPZ.
With respect to radiation doses and the health effects of -
(
such doses, the characteristics of the EPZ were developed according to the following criteria. It was the overall objictive of the planning ef fort to limit doses to the popula-l tien as much as possible. For very serious accidents, the first l
Prictity was to prevent the public f rom receiving
] .
l
I .
In the case of less severe accidents, l . ,e-threatening doses.
g., goal was to limit doses below those that would cause early l .=,uries
- * (vomiting, fatigue, etc.). RERP, Vol. II, Document 2 i
! rinlayson and Radford, Basis For Selection of Emergency rianning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant)[ hereinafter rinlayson and Radford] at 47; Tr. 1131, 1185.
The 20-mile outer limit of the EPZ seeks to meet both of tr.ece criteria. Two hundred rems to the whole body is the level at which early deaths (those occurring within several weeks of exposure) occur. As the EPZ is presently structured, during se-vero accidents the chance of receiving such a potentially fatal dose of radiation outside of the EPZ (i.e. beyond 20 miles) is very small. Id. at 48; Tr. 1132. Thirty rems to the whole body represents the point at which detectable' physical damage can
. occur. Tr., Jan. 27, 1983, Attachment A at 4.1/ In the case of a less severe core melt accident, there is no more than a 1 percent chance of receiving more than 30 rems outside of the EPZ. Finlayson and Radford at 48; Tr. 1131. Thus, the 20 mile EFZ is required to provide protective actions for those actually in danger of suffering early injuries or fatalities in the event of an accident at Shoreham.
t 1/ In addition to oral testimony, the Legislature received written statements from most of the witnesses who appeared before it. In most cases, those statements were included in the transcripts of the hearing as attachments.
Statements bound into the transcripts will be cited by transcript date and alphabetical designation (Attachment A, Attachment B, etc.).
The existence of the inner zone reflects the fact'that gese closest to the plant are in the greatest danger. The time 331 owed for people to take protective action within this zone gill be relatively brief because the wind (which would carry ra-tioactive particles during a severe accident) often blows at a speed of ten miles per hour or more in the Shoreham vicinity and shif ts direction frequently. Thus, if evacuation was deemed necessary, the entire inner zone would always be evacuated to ensure that wind shif ts would not catch part of the population within the inner zone unprecared. Id. at 50.
The six sectors between the inner sector and the outer boundary of the EPZ provide flexibility in the emergency re-sponse. Since a plume of fission products released from the Shoreham plant would follow the direction of the wind,
,rotective p actions would be recommended for the sector along which the wind was traveling, as well as both adjacent sectors.
Id. at 50. The other sectors, whose population would be in no immediate danger, would not be ordered to take protective actions such as evacuation or sheltering (but note the problems of the evacuation shadow phenomenon described below) . ,
It is important to note, however, that the development of the EPZ and protective actions within the EPZ do not guarantee i
freedom from risk. Tr. 1135. Dr. Finlayson's consequence .
analysis determined that even where protective actions are taken, the more probable of the severe core melt accidents could l
ciuse a maximum of 577 early fatalities within the EPZ with a mecn number of 15.2. The same accident could cause a maximum of 1,270 early injuries within the EPZ with a mean of 18. Failure i
l to take protective actions would increase those numbers substantially. Finlayson and Radford at 35.2/
Cancer fatalities would also occur within the EPZ, ranging from a few to over 1,700, depending upon delay time (time be-tween public notice of accident and taking of protective action) and evacuation speed. Id. ht Table 8. It is also interesting to note,that most fatal cancers, up to 7,000, will occur outside the EPZ, whether protective actions are taken or not. Id.
B. The Inadecuaev of a 10-Mile EPZ.
LILCO, in its testimony before the Legislature on January 18, 1983, was critical of the dimensions of the County's EPZ, u,rging that the County adopt an EPZ of only 10 miles in radius,
, such as presented in LILCO's unauthorized submittals to the DPC.
i LILCO prepared statement at 33-41; 3/ Tr. 175-177. However, 2/ In contrast, compare the results of a study conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (Technical Guidance for -
Siting Criteria Development, NUREG/CR-2239, SAND 81-1549) which concluded that a " worst case" accident at Shoreham would result in 40,000 early. deaths, 75,000 early injuries and 35,000 cancer fatalities.
l 3/ As part of its presentation to the Legislature, LILCO submitted an 85-page document explaining That its positionthough document, on emergency planning into the record.
not included in a transcript, became part of the hearing record. It will be cited as "LILCO's prepared statement."
LILCO's criticism appears to be based in large part o'n a lack of understanding of the risk criteria by which the County derived the EPZ.
In criticizing the 20-mile zone, LILCO stated that:
The County consultants used 200 rems as the dose above which early deaths from radia-tion can occur. They then chose a 1%
conditional probability as their criterion and found that, according to the plot, the chance of receiving 200 rems would be only 1 in 100, even assuming a core-=elt acci-dent occurs. This analysis produced the 5-7 mile " inner ring."
This " inner ring," it is imcortant to recognize, corresponds in concent to the Federal government's 10-mile EPZ. The rea-son the former is 5-7 miles in radius while the latter is 10 miles is that the calculated results of accidents at the Shoreham plant are less severe than the re-sults calculated in NUREG-0396. In other words, had the County planners dsed the same risk criterion that tne Federal
. government used, but with the Shoreham-specific draft PRA, they would have come up
- with an emergency planning zone of substantially less than the 10-=ile EP2 re-quired by the Federal government.
[ Emphasis added.]
LILCO prepared statement at 39. As is clear from this explanation of the County's EPZ criteria, LILCO has misunder- .
1 stood the use of the 200 rem dose level. Contrary to LILCO's i.
I characterization, the inner sector was not based on any dose level at all, but rather was an attempt to identify an area .
where rapid protective responses were most essential, due to its proximity to the plant. Actually, the 200 rem dose level
- , _~
jor the most severe core melt accidents was one of the criteria for establishing the outer edce of the EPZ, not the 5-7 mile LILCO's misunderstanding of these essential inner sector.
factors led it to conclude erroneously that the 5-7 mile zone
" corresponds in concept" to a 10-mile EPZ, which it clearly does not.
More importantly, however, LILCO's above testimony asserts i
that if the County's planners had used federal risk criteria, the EPZ they would have calculated would be less than 10 miles.
Again, LILCO's assertion is inaccurate. Federal risk criteria as set forth in NUREG 0654 provide that projected doses beyond the EPZ should be below the EPA's Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels. See NUREG 0654 at 12. The upper bound of the PAG 1evels is 5 rems to the whole body. If 'the County planners had rigidly adhered to those guidelines and set the EPZ at a point where. there was less than a 1 percent chance of exceeding 5 rems, the EPZ would have been approximately 60 miles in radius, not less than 10 miles. See Finlayson and Radford, Figure 12. 4/
! 4/ LILCO also testified that the County's experts failed to account for the lower potential dose levels caused by the
" scrubbing action" of Shoreham's suppression pool (a feature of boiling water reactors) and by the interaction of fission products with other elements. LILCO prepared testimony at 42-52, Tr. 253. However, as Dr. Finlayson testified, both factors were accounted for in the County's analyses. Tr. 1144. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that the fission product release values used by the County's experts are precisely those that were derived by LILCO's own consultant, Science Applications, Inc.
It is evident from the County's analyses that nothine less than a 20 mile EPZ will offer adecuate protection to the public. The consequences of an EPZ less than 20 miles are too severe to justify a smaller EPZ such as LILCO suggests. As Dr.
Finlayson testified, if the County were to adopt a 10 mile EPZ, in e severe accident there would be a 35 percent chance of re-l ceiving 200 rems (enough to cause early fatalities) and a 60 parcent chance of receiving 30 rems outside the EPZ. Tr. 1142; see also Finlayson and Radford, Figure 11. Even in a less se-vero core melt accident, a 10 mile EPZ would provide a 50 parcent chance of receiving 10 rems and a 20 percent chance of receiving 30 rems. See Finlayson and Radford, Figure 12.
Clearly, those risks are unacceptable. Therefore, a 10-mile EPZ, and indeed anything less than a 20-mile EPZ, would be ill-advised.
If any adjustments should be made to the EPZ, they should t
be directed outward. Tr. 15; see also Tr. 1459. Such an outward adjustment, however, would significantly increase the complexity and costs of planning for a radiological emergency.
As Mr. Herr testified: ,
Stated another way, the EPZ is sized so that in the event of a core-relt accident, early fatalities will not occur outside of it, exposure high enough to make detectable blood changes has only a one percent chance of happening inside of it, and the EPA protective action threshold has a 50-50 chance of being exceeded.
No smaller EPZ would allow that level of A 10-mile EP2, safety outside of the zone.
for exarple, would place a large number of persons at substantial risk outside of the EP2.
A larger EPZ would be feasible but at the price of added complexity and cost to a va-riety of local agencies such as the schools. [ Emphasis added]
Tr. 15.
C. Sociological and Psycholocica.1 Issues In Emergency Planning
- 1. Overreaction and the Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon One of the key issues confronting the County's planners, which generated a significant amount of discussion during the Legislative hearings, was the question of how people will be-have during a radiological emergency. It.was an issue which placed the witnesses proffered by LILCO in clear disagreement with the County's experts.
LILCO asserted in both its' written submission to the Lcgislature and during the actual testimony of its experts that human behavior does not vary between different types of disasters. Based on research of disasters such as floods, hurricanes and chemical spills, LILCO's experts testified that p20ple experiencing a radiological emergency will tend to react calmly and follow authoritative orders. LILCO prepared statement at 63-65, 84; Tr. 345-366. Therefore, they conclude, a radiological emergency response plan need not take into
e account any potential overreaction or disobedience to instructions. Tr. 346-347.
The County's experts, however, take a different approach, supported by their studies of TMI, the disaster related literature, and the actual studies which have been performed on Long Island. The testimony of Dr. Susan Saegert, Professor of Environmental Psychology at City University of New York, was typical of the County experts' unanimous position on the issue:
Well, I think that the message that I think would be clearest in psychological litera-
. ture is that there are aspects of nuclear hazards which make them different in peo-ple's perceptions than other kinds of hazards and these include the more involuntary, more dreaded, . . . more feared, perceived as being out of control, perceived as being unknown both by lay peo-ple and by scientists, and perceived as being hard to locate both (onsite and offsite).
, These characteristics make it more likely that people will overreact to a threat.
Tr. 1121-1122. As Dr. Johnson of UCLA and Dr. Zeigler of Old Dominion University testified, radiation is undetectable by human senses. As such, it causes a greater fear in people, born out of uncertainty, causing them to overestimate the danger of a nuclear accident and thus to overreact. Tr. 1035, 1117, Attachment B at 1; see also, testimony of Dr. Erikson, Tr. 1047.
The conclusions drawn by Drs. Johnson and Zeigler are not based on speculation, but on their. detailed studies of human l
l l
a b;havior both at Three Mile Island on Long Island. A t' T'h r e e Mile Island, the Governor of Pennsylvania issued an advisory that pregnant women and pre-school aged children within 5 miles of the plant should evacuate. An estimated 2,500 persons with-in the five mile area around TMI fit that category; however, the studies of Drs. Johnson and Zeigler, as well as two other studies (Tr. 1100), revealed that over 144,000 persons living as far as 15 miles from the plant in fact evacauted. Tr. 1037, 1099; see also testimony of Dr. Stanislav Kasl, Tr. 1399.
This tendency for persons in a radiological emergency to evacuate in great numbers, though not advised to do so, has been labeled the " evacuation shadow phenomenon."
Mindful of this occurrence at TMI, the Steering Cormittee
! commissioned a study to investigate whether* such behavior might oc, cur on Long Island in the event of,an accident at Shoreham.
!The study, conducted primarily by Drs. Johnson, Erikson,
!Zeigler, and Cole, consisted of a random sample telephone survey of more than 2,500 Long Island residents. Dr. Cole's research firm, Social Data Analysts, administered the survey, the results of which are contained in Documents 4 and 5 of Volume III of the County's RERP. The focus of the study was l
- upon three nuclear accident scenarios posed to each linterviewee. In Scenario One, each interviewee was asked what lha or she would do if there was an official advisory that P2rsons within a 5 mile radius of the plant should stay
No one was advised to evacuate. The responses of the Indoors.
215,000 families, or about one gneerviewees indicated that to quarter of the population of Long Island, would attempt Tr. 1040.
evacuate.
Scenario Two was patterned after the TMI accident where a partial evacuation out to 5' miles from the plant was advised.
While such an advisory would cover only 2,700 families in Suffolk County, responses indicated that 289,000 families would attempt to evacuate. Tr. 1041.
In Scenario Three, an evacuation was ordered out to 10 miles from Shoreham. Thirty-one thousand families live within that area, but the survey discovered that 430,000 families --
about half the population of Long Island -- intended to leave their homes in such a case. Tr. 1041. .
A tendency to evacuate voluntarily in such large numbers has obvious and severe implications for emergency planning which, contrary to the conclusory approach of LILCO's experts and its unauthorized RERP, cannot be ignored. Dr. Jchnson sum-marized those implications and their consideration by the County's experts in contributing to the definition of defining ,
the County's 20 mile EPZ as follows:
I think generally any definition of a ten-mile EPZ ignores what we have defined as the evacuation shadow phenomenon, that is, the tendency for people beyond a l
designated danger zone to overreact and spontaneously evacuate.
l l
Now the significance of this evacuation shadow phenomenon is that you're l going to have all of these people on the evacuation routes as well as the people t
from within the designated danger zone, and
! the traffic beyond the ten-mile EPZ . . .
could slow or hinder the evacuation from the designated danger zone.
Our purpose in redefining the EPZ for twenty miles is to accommodate the evacuation shadow phenomenon because we ac-I knowledge or realize that that traffic is going to have some effect on evacuating the designated zone, however it's defined.
Tr. 1071-1072.
In short, if people beyond 10 miles from the plant are going to evacuate in great numbers, there must be an EP:
proportionately much larger than that in order to provide po-lice traf fic control and other pre-planned measures designed to l
expedite the anticipated traffic flow as'much as possible. The 20 mile EP: thus is based not only on the anticipated doses of l
radiation that can be expected in a radiological eme'rgency, but also recognizes the need to plan for the evacuation shadow Phenomenon.
- 2. Mississacua In order to buttress its argument that people will behave .
calmly and rationally during a radiological emergency, LILCO I
l Offered the example of a train accident in Mississagua, Ontario, which caused chlorine gas to escape into the atmosphere. As a result, there was a successful evacuation of over 200,000 peo-
! ple from a 116 square kilometer area over the course of 24
LILCO prepared statement at 65-70. Relying on-the w0rs.
operience at Mississagua, LILCO urges that an evacuation in the event'of a radiological emergency would be no more difficult. Id.
The County's experts concluded, that Mississagua is not an appropriate example from which to draw lessons relevant to a i
radiological emergency. Dr. Erikson explained that position in his testimony at Tr. 1048-1050:
Now, there are those who cite the evacuation of a place called Mississagua in Ontario, Canada, as an indication that a large scale evacuation can be carried out in a successful manner, but I think it's very important that one understands what happened there, because I am not at all sure it makes sense to take much comfort from it.
In the first place, the emergency of Mississagua was created by chlorine gas, which has an exceptionally sharp smell, rather than radiation which has no smell at I all. And being aware of that difference,
. both the Mayor of Mississagua and the Emergency Planning Coordinator of the Province of Ontario, have public1v and specifically warned that it would be very foolish to ceneralize from that experience to one in which radiation was a potential problem.
Second, the emergency at Mississagua began with an explosion in the middle of a Saturday night, and the evacuation began at
(
4 o' clock on a Sunday morning when all of the schools, and I presume most of the stores, and most of the places of business were closed. So that virtually everybody in Mississagua was home; virtually every family in Mississagua had been -- already had been assembled, and the Mayor of Mississagua, again, would share with most
-2 ~ " - - - _ - = . .. _ __ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _
people who had thought seriously about i this, it's foolish to assume that the I outcome of an emergency that operated on
)
such favorable conditions can be generalized to someplace like Suffolk l
. County, where conditions are worse.
Third, the Mississagua evacuation was phased over a relatively relaxed period of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> or even more, and that's a luxury l
that one dare not assume that one would have in the event of a potential -- future accident involving radiation. The people of Mississagua, during the whole of that evacuation, had no reason to suppose that they were in grave danger at the moment.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, he concluded, Suffolk County would be better served by heeding the studies done in Suffolk County pertaining to a ra-diological emergency, rather than the experience of Mississagua, the relevance of which is dubious to radiological Tr. 1050; see also emergency response planning on Long Island.
Tr. 1064-1066.
I 3. Role Conflict As discussed earlier, Suffolk County also was concerned with the issue of whether emergency personnel with families would be available for duty during a radiological emergency in which such personnel would have two conflicting duties, one to ,
The
! their job and the other to their families. Tr. 1067.
problem is known in sociological terms as " role conflict."
Each duty is ecually noble, but many workers would be expected to resolve the conflict in favor of their families, particular-l ly in a radiological emergency where the danger is not easily detectable and therefore more feared. Tr. 1048.
Drs. Erikson and Cole performed two surveys to' determine to what extent, if any, the problem of role conflict might hamper the County's response to a radiological emergency. The i
first survey studied the attitudes of school bus drivers in Suffolk Councy, who would have a major role in evacuating school children and others from the EPZ. The second survey l
' studied role conflict among volunteer firemen serving fire districts close to the Shoreha= plant. During a radiological emergency, volunteer firemen would also be expected to perform various evacuation duties.
.The details of the role conflict studies are contained in Volume III, Document 6 (" Responses of Emergency Personnel To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Plant"). They reveal that 68 percent of the firemen surveyed indicated they would first care
. for the safety of their families and therefore would not be available for immediate emergency duty. About 36 percent indi-cated they would not be available at all. Tr., Jan. 24, 1983, Attachment C at 6. With respect to school bus drivers, 69 Percent indicated that they would not report to duty until they were certain that their families were safe. Tr., Jan. 24, 1983, Attachment C at 7.
l l Highlighting the implications of these results for radio-logical emergency planning, Dr. Erikson concluded:
These are striking and important findings. They indicate in the sharpest way that it is reckless to assume that emergency personnel can be counted on to 1
e report to duty in a Shoreham emergency withoutNor assurances that their families are
~
safe. should we be surprised,.for, if social and behaviorial scientists know any-thing, it is that people instinctively turn first to the needs of their own offspring.
Tr., Jan. 24, 1983, Attachment C at 7.
LILCO, preferring to refer to the problem as " role strain," testified that in all other emergencies, personnel performed adecuately and that therefore they could be expected to do so in a radiological , emergency. LILCO prepared statement at 70-79; Tr . 179-180. That position, however, ignores the findings of the County's experts that a radiological emergency is not like other emergencies due to its undetectable nature.
See, e.c., Tr. 1048. Moreover, the presence of a potential role conflict problem among Suffolk County emergency personnel was confirmed by the testimony of the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department, and the Commissioners of Health, Social Services and Public Wor.ks, all of whom expressed misgivings about the availability of their personnel during a radiological emergency. Tr. 1210, 1285, 1290, 1292; Suffolk l
County Police Department prepared statement (hereinafter SCPD statement] at 11-12. As Commissioner Dilworth of the Suffolk i
r County Police Department testified:
Look, those who are at home or off duty, and the great proportion of our personnel within the EPZ, we would certainly see some role conflict. It is our opinion that their conflict would be a moral responsi-bility to their public duties and their family duties, and they would first provide for their families.
Tr. 1220.
~ - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ ___._
Quite obviously, role conflict is a problem which exists and must be resolved in order to have an effective emergency response. Until the problem is resolved, any attempt to implement a plan without an assurance of adequate emergency personnel would threaten the safety of Suffolk County's resi-dents.
- 4. Other Social and Psychological Issues In addition to the problems of the evacuation shadow phe-nomenon and role conflict noted above, Professor Saegert of the City University of New York noted other important problems in planning for a radiological emergency. For instance, stressful situations might arise during an evacuation in Suffolk County which could lead to aberrant, violent or irrational behavior that could hamper an effective response:
f
'l The other problem that I think should l
be emphasized is the difficulty that this
! particular site presents for coordinating an evacuation to the person who's faced with trying to decide what to do. The
[ lack) of alternative routes, possible perceived time pressure, the possibility of choosing a route and finding it to be
- unsuccessful, choosing another route and l
finding it to be unsuccessful, are the kinds of things that can change the intent to evacuate in an orderly fashion into an l irrational kind of behavior.
l Tr. 1122-1123. Concerns about disorderly behavior were also i
raised by the Suffolk County Police Department. Tr. 1212; i 1220-1229; 1248; see also SCPD statement at 32.
l In addition, while it has been suggested that public education about radiation and radiological emergencie's might reduce disobedience to orders from public officials or police, studies indicate that public education may, in fact, heighten confusion and fear about radiological accidents and cause an increase in undesirable behavior. Tr.'1091. Accordingly, it is not clear that the difficult issues surrounding preparedness for Shoreham -- evacuation shadow, role conflict, and the others -- are amenable to resolution by education even with a total commitment of County resources.
Finally, Professor Saegert urged that the County should be aware of and concerned with the problems of long term stress which is still being exhibited by inhabitants around Three Mile Island. Tr. 1069-1070.
- 5. The value of Surveys As discussed above, some of the conclusions drawn by the County's' experts about human behavior derive from scientific
- otudies of Suffolk County's residents and emergency personnel.
LILCO has attacked the County's studies as irrelevant, taking
' the position that surveys cannot adequately predict future ,
human behavior. LILCO prepared statement at 80-81; Tr. 179.
t In essence, LILCO urges that the County should focus upon human 1
l bahavior in other, non-nuclear, disasters and ignore the l information offered by its own residents. ,
~
However, as Dr. Cole testified, surveys which are properly conducted 5/ can be highly accurate indicators of future human behavior and, in fact, are used constantly by corporations and governments in decisionmaking. Tr. 1058-1060. In fact, Dr.
Cole has conducted two telephone surveys for LILCO. Tr.
( 1114-1115.
Speaking on the issue of the accuracy of surveys, Dr.
Erikson reminded the Legislators that the surveys conducted on Long Island represent "the only relevant information available to us ...
and to say those findings are unreliable is to say that the people who live in this community cannot be trusted to know their own minds." Tr . 10 52. Further evidence of the accuracy of the surveys is shown by the fact that the results of the social survey conducted by the Codnty's experts closely 5/ As;Dr. Cole testified, the results of the surveys he conducted for Suffolk County are highly reliable:
Of all of'the surveys I have done; all 150 l
or so that I have done, not one was done to more reigorous or higher professional standards than the surveys which I conducted for Suffolk County.
Tr. 1054.
The unusually large sample (2595 persons) interviewed for the social survey gave it a sampling error of only three per-contage points. Tr. 1055. The emergency personnel survey interviewed almost all of two specific sets of emergency work-ers and'thus did not have a sampling error. Tr. 1059-1058. In
! cddition, the surveys were extensively pre-tested and administered by trained interviewers. Tr. 1056-1057.
matched the actual behavior recorded at TMI. Tr. 11,16. In light of this evidence, the County is satisfied that the surveys it commissioned were useful tools in the development of its RERP.
D. Evacuation Routes And Time Estimates Perhaps the most perplexing issue in developing the County's RERP was the problem of how to move large numbers of people out of the EPZ and beyond on a limited number of roads running through a narrow island. In his testimony, Police Commissioner Dilworth posed the problem starkly:
Our job will be made difficult by the elongated, narrow shape of the island and its large population which is spread amongst a limited network of roadways. The location of the Shoreham plant, immediately adjacent to the Long Island Sound, prevents 360' dispersal of evacuating traffic. In short, the Police Department and emergency planners are confronted with having to move a large population through a small corridor.
Tr. 1207-1208.
The County hired the firm of PRC Voorhees to analyze Suffolk County's road system and to estimate the time required to evacuate the various segments of the EPZ. The results, ,
t compiled in the County's RERP at Volume II, Document 1 l (Preliminary Evacuation Time Estimates For The Shoreham l
l EPZ1[ hereinafter Time Estimates) provide a dim view of the I
prospects for rapid evacuation of County residents.
The EPZ is served by only four major evacuation routes running in an east-west direction (the Long Island Expressway, Sunrise Highway, Jericho Turnpike and Northern State Parkway), and a few additional minor routes. Time Estimates at 25. Only three routes have limited access. Id. at 6.
Given this limited network and the elongated shape of Long l
l Island, the time estimates developed by Voorhees' computerized traffic model are in most cases extremely high. They are sum-marized in Table 10 of the Time Estimates, which is reproduced on the following page. As the table indicates, the evacuation time estimates for evacuation of the inner and eastern sectors of the EPZ are relatively low. However, an evacuation of the inner sector plus any other sectors produces evacuation times ranging from well over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, depending upon the specific sector and postulated road conditions. The most distressingly high time estimates, in the range of 14-30 hours, occur in the western sectors -- the most highly populated sectors.
While the PRC Voorhees traffic model took into account the 3
numbers of cars expected to be on the road due to the .
evacuation shadow phenomenon (see above), it did not consider l
such obstacles to an evacuation as automobiles running out of gas, 1/ accidents, breakdowns and disobedience of the rules of i
f/ Table 3 on page 31 of the SCPD statement depicts the amount of fuel consumed by automobiles with idling (Footnote cont'd next page) l
- e e
i
. 1 EVAChATIOet ECf3thisto 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 100% of Shadow Test mentrleted Sectore 20s ropstation Stiadow Test 1004 Inner Sectore 1985 Winter Wortti s South pece==cwlest increase 100s Innar only pit oaumended Popul a t lors roth Traffic 0% of Otteere Winter o *.Iadow On Ot lies e for 19e5 suesmer 1905 Winter (Adverse 19n5 Winter 1905 Winter Hon-Adverse Sim=e r Smwar e Evacuatton Popeletinn Popsl e t lon Conditlonel Poggel at inn _ _
_PopistatInn Conditlong (Winter), ,{WI,ns nl_
Inner only 4:30 3:45 5:15 3:45 4:15 4:30 5:15 500 (to30) (4:151 saner + Western 14:30 13:45 22:15 13:45 14:15 16:15 ,
taxer. Western
& Wsw 99s15 17:30 28:30 17:30 20s30 20:45 Inner. Western Wr.W & SW 21:15 19:45 30:00 ,, 19:45 24 45* 23:30 SKnor. WSW.
sw & 5 21:15 19:45 30 00 19:45 24:45 23:30 i
i Inner. SW. ,
5L SE 17s30 10:45 17:15 9:45 12:15 12:45 Ins.nr. 5 sE 6 seat 15:00 10:45 17:15 9:45 12:15 12:45 faner. Et s last 12:30 4:30 6:45 3s45 5:00 5:00 faner &
rest 6:30 4:30 6:45 3:45 5:00 5 00 Tans.E 10 sinetany or EvntttATItse vsese:s
~
\
l the road. These are problems that could severely hamper an evacuation and thus raise evacuation times considerably or, in the case of many cars running out of gas, even immobilize an evacuation effort.1/ While the rapid deployment of tow trucks might be useful to clear non-functioning cars from the roads,
~
few such trucks are at the County's disposal. The Department of Public Works has only one tow truck (Tr. 1293), while the police have four. Tr. 1226. Private tow truck operators might provide some assistance in removing non-functioning cars, but they would experience the same role conflicts as other emergency personnel and thus would not be reliable. See Tr.
1293.
(Footnote cont'd from previous page)
~
engines. Assuming that the, average automobile has a half tank of gas, and assuming further that a small 4-cylinder
-automobile has a 10 gallon tank while a large 8-cylinder automobile has a 20-gallon gas tank, the information in Table 3 indicates that the average automobile would run out of gas in about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Since the evacuation time estimates for so many of the sectors in the EPZ are above 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, it can be assumed that many cars will run out of gas before the completion of an evacuation. Obviously, such an occurrence would impede or even immobilize the .
)
progress of traffic, as would accidents and breakdowns.
, 7/ Note also other problems raised by the police department that could have an adverse impact upon evacuation times including: (1) a potential loss cf communications if po-lice headcuarters must be evacuated; (2) the possibility of civil disobedience; (3) uncertainty that police mobili-zation could be achieved before an evacuation starts; (4) traffic moving into the EPZ as families attempt to unite; and (5) potentially inadequate police resources. See generally SCPD statement.
In short, the PRC Voorhees evacuation time est,im,ates are actually too low. Nevertheless, they make it clear that while it may be feasible to evacuate the inner sector alone or the eastern sector, it is unworkable to attempt evacuations of the other sectors, which could take as much as 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> or more.
Tr. 1128, 1167. Thus, the only available protective action for I
persons in the western sectors is to take shelter in their homes. However, as will be discussed in later portions of this report, the sheltering option poses a significant danger to the public health of Suffolk County's residents.
E. Health Effects An accident at Shoreham would have adverse effects upon the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of Suffolk County (and in some circumstances, beyond the County's borders), including short term deaths and illnesses, long term
' deaths and illnesses, and various psychological illnesses.
I t 1. Short Term Health Effects Short term (or "early") deaths and illnesses are those that would occur within 60 to 90 days after exposure. With re-i spect to early injuries, detectable changes in the blood ,
i I platelets will occur at 30 rems, while more acute effects such l es nausea and fatigue could begin at approximately 50 rems of I exposure. Finlayson and Radford at 17. Two hundred rems rep-resents the lower level of exposure at which early fatalities may occur.
l l-
As discussed above, Dr. Finlayson, in his cons'equence analysis, calculated that in the event of one of the more prob- i able types of core melt accidents, there could be as many as 577 early fatalities with a mean of about 15 early fatalities.
The same accident could cause up to 1,270 early injuries, with an average of about 18 such injuries. Failure to take adequate protective actions could increase those numbers substantially.
Finlayson and Radford at 35.
- 2. Lone Term Effects (a) Cancer The most prevalent long range physiological effect of ra-diation released during at accident at Shoreham will be in-creased incidences of cancer. Dr. Finlayson has calculated, using the CRAC-2 code and the latest Japanese , atomic bomb data provided by Dr. Radford, that there could be between about 1000 and 1,700 cancer fatalities within the EPZ'and between 7,000
\ .:
and 8,700 fatal cancers outside of the EPZ, depending on evacuation speed and evacuation delay time (the time between l
public notification and the commencement of evaluation) .
j Finlayson and Radford at Table 8(a). -
1 In addition, Dr. Radford urged that any consideration of radiation-induced cancers should not be restricted to those re-Bulting in death since the occurrence of cancer, even non-fatal, imposes significant suffering and economic loss upon its victims. Dr. Finlay, son's CRAC-2 calculaions, again using
I the new Japanese atomic bomb data, show that within,the EP2, there could be between 1,810 and 3,500 incidences of cancer, both fatal and non-fatal, depending upon evacuation speed and delay time. Outside of the EPZ, between 15,700 and 17,400 cancer incidences could occur. Finlayson and Radford at Table 8(b).
(b) Genetic Effects Dr. Seymour Abrahamson, Professor of Zoology and Genetics,*
University of Wisconsin, addressed the Legislature on the effects that radiation exposure may have upon future genera-tions in the form of genetic diseases. The evidence at this time indicates that if one million parents are each ' exposed to one rem of radiation, there will be 100 additional occurrences of' genetic disease among their offspring and 70 additional genetic diseases in the second generation. Tr. 1411. The
' genetic effects of radiation increase linearly according to dose'; i.e,., a 10 rem exposure to one million parents would re-sult in 1000 additional genetic diseases in the first genera-tion of offspring and 700 additional genetic diseases in the second generation. Tr., Jan, 27, 1983; Attachment D at 2. ,
3 An accident at Shoreham could subject a large segment of l
the population both inside and outside the EPZ to radiation.
Ther.efore, on the basis of Dr. Abrahamson's testimony, it can
, be expected that some genetic diseases would occur in the
. offspring of Suffolk County residents as a result of such l
exposure during a radiological emergency.
- 3. Psychological Effects ..
Stanislav Kasl, Ph.D., a professor at the Yale University School of Medicine, addressed the Legislature'on the psycholog-ical impacts on the population in the wake of a radiological emergency. Dr. Kasl noted that about 10 percent of the popula-tion surrounding TMI suffered severe psychological distress treflecting " anxiety, depression, anger, irritation, demoraliza-lion, hopelessness, helplessness and psycho-physiological symp-lons." Tr. 1396-1397. Some groups, such as women and parents sith young children, were more vulnerable to symptoms of psy-shological distress than others. Tr. 1398.
Thus, as Dr. Saegert also emphasized, the psychological
)ffects following a radiological emergency reflect further osts that must be of concern to Suffolk County lecision-ma k e r s . Tr. 1123.
F. The Health Effects of Sheltering In the above section describing the evacuation time
'stimates, it became evident that evacuation from the western
,cetors of the EPZ during a radiological emergency would be l
ppractical because of the extreme amounts of time -- 14 to 30 .
yurs--thatwouldbe required to evacuate those sectors.
i Aven the unavailability of evacuation as a protective action, he only other practical option is sheltering -- i.e., staying l
Kdoors until the radioactive plume passes, after which some
$mited evacuation of persons in contaminated areas might be
feasible. At issue, however, is whether sheltering ~would
~
provide adequate protection ~to Suffolk County residents during a radiological emergency. Dr. Radford and Dr. Karl Morgan, former Director of Health Physics at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and professor of health physics at Georgia Tech, ad-dressed this issue before the Legislature.
As Dr. Morgan noted, Suffolk County has a prevalence of frame houses which do not provide as much protection from radi-ation as do brick or stone, buildings. Thus, the typical house in Suffolk County would reduce a dose of radiation only by ap-proximately one half. Tr. 1391. ~Dr. Radford estimated that if, during the more probable core melt accidents, the western sectors did not evacuate, Suffolk County citizens residing in those sectors would experience 4,500 occurrences of cancer above normal levels. Tr. 1419-1421. About half of those cancers,-would be fatal. See Finlayson and Radford at 20.
Therefore, sheltering under those circumstances would result in about $250 cancer deaths.
In a very severe accident, the consequences of sheltering as the only practical protective action would be much worse. .
f Figure 11 of the Finlayson and Radford report shows that in
, such an accident, the outer sectors of the EPZ, including the wastern sectors, could receive significant doses of radiation.
At the mid-point of one of the outer sectors (about 15 miles from the plant), there would be a 20 percent chance of i
1 4
receiving a 200 rem dose. Finlayson and Radford, FigGr'e 11.
While sheltering would reduce exposure to 100 rems, that is still a very high dose which would be likely to cause acute illness. See Finlayson and Radford at 17. In addition, at 15 miles from the Shoreham plant, Figure 11 shows a 70 percent chance of receiving 30 rems and a 90 percent chance of a 10 rem dose. Again, sheltering would reduce those doses by half, but they would still lead to significant increases in the numbers of cancers occurring in the population. See Tr. 1419-1421.
VI. CONCLUSICN The unique local conditions on Long Island create problems and obstacles which make it impossible to develop a. radiological emergency response plan that protects the health, welfare and safety of the County's residents. In fact, there can be no
~ . - - _ ___,
om,ergency preparedness to protect the public safety in the event of a serious nuclear accident at the Shoreham plant.
~ ~
Therefore, the County Executive concludes that the Draft County RERP should be rejected. This is not a reflection upon the County experts, whose efforts were diligent and whose work
! product was consistently excellent, but upon the insurmountable f
l problems intrinsic in planning for a radiological accident on this island.
l
- l l
I In addition, any RERP that has neven~attemnted.to - -. .
/ot '
1 confront and deal with the problems of local conditions and the obstacles they pose for emergency preparedness on Long Island and the likely human behavior in a radiological emergency in Suffolk County is obviously grossly deficient. Therefore, LILCO's RERP, submitted to the DPC without the authority of the County, should also be rejected by the Legislature as a paper oxorcise whch would, at best, give only the vaguest illusion of preparedness.
Finally, the data which have been compiled in the County's emergency planning ef forts document that no RERF' can be prepared and implemented that protects the health, welfare and safety of Suffolk County's citizens. Accordingly, the County Executive recommends that this fact be recognized and that the
. County terminate efforts to create emergency planning for a Shor.eh'am accident. Such planning would be disingenuous --
creating the spectre that public health, safety and welfare can be protected when, in fact, the opposite is true.
- ~ - - . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ __ _ _ _
- ' - ~ - - --- - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . __ _ _ . _ _ _ _
ATTACUME:iT 10 r
pe.mS) ordham Plant Should Be Stopped'Noic tasymyws het see is $e pne of pretading pubid ,
The fo%==ag es a statement made yeerertfew asiety e Subik Caunty, but u e a prus Out mA be egwtably silscated ay, on the $umin shor 4sa,Co,unty nurirerlaervere, power pesarPover and F. CoAs.en To assum that the erareme susta of Sher,hani ,
genpegerig.y prpperydriens we $ue/& an dealt eth ogwtanly. I propane to ese sente e I am naday amasuntmg my pesan se es mese af mage snasuve in Albany - es teth the ge=eresta e
redm6 ercal emergeery pnpamenom a W Caum efeas and the Pubin Ssewue Comanianen i eilt nah
- t. es mass to deter'same ht d 5hereham dare not op ty ht? euerlume - obch e esamersind in esiaal ts e 7* erese me emein of the plant ml! em fall unreason P*'% - 8 easy egen the innerves reiepsyre eks bag suffend M9*F Fire". Se maague leral medatame yd aes WW
,*f Th make it ampons.Dena pnaen me t* - ,' UK0 e annunang mis.snanapmentment or its ese d uMO me. ta e v.operabia, ,e manage
- - blundert and te in Subik County an est geseg to
- ehen, thr 9 nMnna be empury pgandass M 9"'****'***'**
& he UK0a Wout
- Daally. eleeut*n taantated w my dwinnen m "hu T _
emeyery papandnees n e impenant for ne puWe T* est e n er is knee that during the pam peer. ULCO has ben a in:nad Isg%sg C,s) enivatanly - er the NRC ltheg,g,rgj peca,,, g gg; story r-%) erungh ughly 4W'" its *O*ns a new esunts e data mandate - should unned.stely klag a halt es me 4
- th8" te sa mare a case Shoreham plant Resentedly.the ler* .
latum and I bag mquntad. demanded. almet brgeod
$hwou'=i priiect The mevitable econseur esaaequeerse of hag
(' I .
UKO is podere an gea and independent des en re-demi Shmham num to aselt with pasuy and eqwtm .# we and pe,mcal mentaen of Law Shsmaam pian tdy smees oil the afm.eq a partwo - UK0 s shar* ,. no han me dmd is pay fw d bessers ed rotepe,re end the tarpeye a UKO mus * .- At every espe r tunity.however.UK0 has etsemed est is any ese te enriched for ria dand* hat a6amaa> 'N- the door a the munt y e (s e h has ignored the purpoor apawnt of the Shereham prepet *' of esunty lag matmo resolutsee and done htte more i em prope'*d is lead tne fght is bah #aaha,nt- $
than play games wie us ene arid A> bene to pt these things dame and d the Neverthetees. in UKO e usual eelf eersmg me trye.ature gamer se takes actase genament eith my ,' UKO has enes its ese wreen e( a pneticef in-ye,iien I out prempuy get sweiag ena the enes* spectaen. and has had the serve la cell it *andepe'i-M sary mat.aines ,
dent
- As far as I am eencened. ULCOs mpert en l am sches tofore the ($ubih Countylletalatm e esthing mere than a endiaspeeuen of UK0 be smeets temorms !%edayl because boah the her.a.e- UKO for Ulf0 ture sad the pubig have the nght te knee where the k esa ULCO hat snaramd the meet program (
soun ty escutoe mands brousneut the past year.the .Isr the inspecten and escretjy made all the arrange-W s.aiur, and I haie owned mopeesuwly and is a menta Imr tse n teend tw performed UK0 e 4 in.e a ensred marre a matiere d Shoreham a enlety I eevid totund sheed desre and eithout Se county a kneel-eetcome the lef a:stm agens piaang me and meNag ;\
/ . ; # _.
so e, e e e . edp la fart, et me very sement that LtKO ese to put ULCOs edundee et Shorunas beNnd us amor megetasung with the eeunt, - esppmedly is pod end for sti g p g,, ga,tn - UIIO esa actually brNnd our back maair4 Rad emg.cel emegncy preparedaees abr Shor+ a deal eith La een cheere inesense la do an inspw-ham .s the meet eigh.ficant issue of pubbe safety that tua of Shorehara se es, Ulf0 kned n done q this reun ti pinnwnt hee fed it aNecta the twalth. eN is iyytEOHible 20 eMl5s,g Ulf0 e insporten eheund be lented at noe as htele I
es'eti se narees and ofeelfa,re mesas W Sufoih aannuauy of entm.he 13 mabee un est. emergeneyarea and preparedness sn e su a anuaat.e of se nbsa niens n ga,nas campa.g'i met Ulf0 hee b*ed by dur+g the mar rerweiers! f.aribswo and eher fine,.The,ve is ase -. - Sii/Tolk County that can protect , ,es,
.e,ese e it , i.t . e-
-. tara e. mas .e r~< se wwe =rny any e a
the public health, safety and K unf.noaw'y u,er.o aur, .,ntede d-.it -= **n we me*, .f +e is w,ser*
is n,,e won m~e ,a e ,,,eto be .. en te i
-ty=^* o e se*a ne*y.u.
arybo.as.d-um,e.v>
e., welfare in the event ofa serious mem has heid = *e e-pwy sanamg warm f='* e*a
- iarn Sr= had * 'e'-a d mai a estabushed by Reelution262 1962 He have set only nuclear accident at Shoreham' cdent. Utf 0 e perumnel owkmg trbind the areen ,
succeeded in prepantig our est Drt$ Radaciarcal marked Ihr deck of titernere e94 Gen told the oit- d as natue eh eiessee ace a menuen dat ery ha teen actriiH Ereerge*cs Responer Plan. but we have fought off ma sewer ears as Su&lk County by Lilf0 UK0 e fregunt dairschens and even the State Di. prepares er implements the plaa But nane af this can egual the reen smeew af smotee Preparedness Co-- e threat to amurp the 3%s is e harsh reehty But a seuld be much Ulf0 last May in ed.ng to the Stav of % e i munty e naht te protect its eos ciharna harsher if Shoreham em is operale and a aurint er. lert fee eporewal a derweest *Nea ULCO !sMs Last Marth, the county commiamened as rates. odat impnied me emfety af humands af aur enuras smutled *hffolk County lladmeersal Emerpery He 6 nive red.eiorcal emerpary vengonse pianaang ebe eeund p'*est prestt Semarlem E e sua um put tag epenar Plan
- g-tm Me assembled a team a(maunas[fy recogmaed p a *ppr pwi*.a ngued petap d psau. #h le any neeanable publ+stibty mansemeat asper's and gew them frw rein to Pvpare the "best Wes out wm UKOs alf interem NL woubt eheuid'have reehed that such actwa ens e betresal piaiba p-u by == marurwd te forus se the ,,,iy han se puuie mu bet.e mg hl *ey are P, mag. g gh, trust that thy puhig genveyed a giveg the o paMKular legal eend2 beta of LArig faland, en the eb gg power ULf0 eevee get the mee tabbahed bery of srpen kneelerige, and on the le> Te t%ces ehs ergsse mat o wneus sar et stehty up lastesd. monepelhlf0 eisatinued to fqM a. Albany
. sena of Three We la.an.d h= ,We ,manted met uw obwan- eGectue at sh=ha= = a n== m*ihip 8 == aiy ati,, su ra , sn. aa u, aie day se ha.e e .e.sen WWM they eeuW how un es be *W d h to behave that at lits chariged sta unfittivig eurte I, Det s uS*in en hile . .ne emerynryau essa epaper pianevers
- ebach looks goed on the shelf, hist and look me wher o sy Cmwentnent e6 nela obe to preset me pubbe esfety de not have the f aae. ggg ,g ,, g ,,,,, , , , ,
The draR county plan and the analynn. madet ry of trushag werywy pmpmdneen and the pubia a nees, and even eynziam, that these arbens d.apier and eurse,e obch eaernpany st were stempteted et a we.rd the pbtu e efety essi of nuri3 woc ouu I transmtted then emmema enfeir as a caans Therefore, ga"e that Su%Ik County should I beisee Pwhape seeing einee heply puvirtumes Ul, to the leg's atm en Dec 2. and during January. the reselw that et esll neihr adept mer impiement say CO's cavaler ,,g,,g gg gegyalbu.de yise. teeord ,the public e ea'en g les a.stm he64 e ght days of branegs to taae espert letal rtdaS8erCSI eTergpry Reponse plan The rt gggg ggg gng,,,9p,g y,ggg, ggg and pubht test Lmeny B e see have the eMdence moret skit of Ih3a arbet will necreaartly be la nd the Wisn* srful tore af ewma et the NRC The SRC e een es ear % te siane se tafermeql theate af hee best to pretett ty a neutrthly Wetri the sitsmate aperthee ef y . $e q p @e h4C psomreed Sa 4
the rphlet or mea asfety them is only case theece Sufelk County $bereham sad to piace es equartty agnias aprethem its uchad spetseman a tune evitatal asfety swues
. ye,yyyf big agiquyr gygarteny that supported should ref the draft EDusty pian and afty ether d the haplast poembie ht seth a mune i emien seuld ulu- Ulf0 The NRC expert - m en affidavit undef
' psee 6) beunfly satang thia sneerapable senclus en it gee asyg [thaQ "Ul[Q tryly doce not vn-le 8 ll*D4r to establish emergeftry prepsNdness gasely bygng tem late tenOift still thr Iedeft! ge'e'B- gs@
an Su.46 Cever that ces pretecs the pubbe health, ment ehe's the peley hasn p,wro y been to preeneta decutand what a required masoneJIy for esfets bs NRC under the regulations" eMety and welfare in the event af a eenous authear the deve4apment of setiear posee planta ll medi e se*
adEident et Shoreham put ivistead of finally enhenne up and feeine tNo Diet anut I as prepared a leed the battle We easiet isteersealpe endertment, UlfO cnnevoir shruga nn the I
The feuMy a ena yees d the past tetr and the a$ erd te be umed obes e priatsp6e of publet enIety and ceae it "seIng dem:* heh <*
lera:au.e banagi am enir 4.=ws d#cuit r dieia- es,h ef such eampeu.ag imiportasse to the peepee of edifference Nac esademast by Ulf0 Le publa safety is oores than e I
a, resi emerse'try piaanas ereb ems ta Subib Cous tbs suusty a et saka ty. but they demedietrahe eftturmour9 fab 6p sbelacles pgggggg ggfety (gg gg gggg gagg, gg g, ggg, og)) qd bise beise the belk jt roere basse deshts ehether ,
le pNietting the publet e safety Three erotaClee afe suures ba9e ermame seeseque'tret For sf $heRlham l,RfQ ghsuld swet bene the rig *tt is preende > electret todag bevond euryeee a tetrel They em the predeCS daeg get egne. It ogG represent LMf0"a 33 2 ballane eyrwate la late eeunty "
p43 5 Iaft is that througitout the years The reahty a that Ulf0 esil ouvet, ressend to eI Amoene aande e senade age te per1 Bat Shereham mistana le be budt ht G Die samutabee for e6erbes eterpo. g( 6horeham a senKruttaen. Ulf0 has suamanaged a eeunty emerpery piafuting dreinsen theth 11 dort the Sterehade pr*JerL je my etee, of must maaisse gag bhe e1G even suo*e pubett re!steena prvipee18Ma U 9"9aWRr'.s**ph put it is the esture of the Shoreha), gat UlfQ M. in es esy peCia trema its suemanage. aa more dodgmg and weevmg artnind aliLPe U110 fade tot O
- d S he'e It st wouid pr?'eSt t %>^ /
em r43 .e a use ment Gad N,.enho,e.t impriearmte,eaa, ae . hi m .o.8 d sher. a,m
,,,i,,t ready ae g, eget, for the ghabsfWe i me,w u. siur el tahm3 ienE,.r t e i.
& *ae n=em s. le lertted O.r.ech.e -,e .b ~ . . _
a nnous sh ham e=>d-L uecu.e v.- ebam em ha e i. b. bor.e - her b, . commm ,, ens is ata . vee ud. . pas,. [ as e.
'#I ethe'paCy p19aredaeas for enas,b an ectament name d UlfG8 thareholders, renepayere and the mal et ed prT*td f N
7 l
ATTACIlflENT 11 ggE,g"0 ,
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY 175 EAST OLO COUNTRY ROAD
- HICKSVILLE, NEW YORM 19001 te&TTMEvs C. ConDamo, m CL vvCE mate Otes?
May 10, 1982 e
Commissioner William Hennessey Chairman Disaster Preparedness Commission c/o Dr. David Axelrod N.Y.S. Dep t . of Health Empire State Plaza Tower Building Albany, N. Y. 12237 Daar Commissioner Hennessey:
On August 11, 1981, the Suffolk County Legislature pessed Resolution No. 694, approving a contract for the devel-opment of a local off-site emergency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Stations the contract had previously been signed on behalf of the Suf fo'k County Executive and LILCO. A copy of the contract is attached to this letter.
Under the September 18th contract, County emergency planners, funded by $245,000 from LILCO, were to prepare the local of f-s tte emergency plan for Shoreham, to be completed within six months of the contract's effective date. County cmergency planners, assisted in various ways by LILCO, have in feet produced a local off-site emergency plan for Shoreham.
It is bound in two binders, which were produced at the request of the County Planning Department, entitled "Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan" and "Suffolk County Radio-logical Emergency Response Plan - Appendix A."
LILCO hereby submits the' local off-site emergency plan for Shoreham to the Disaster Preparedness Commission for its review. Also included is a separate volume containing the miss-ing Suffolk County Health Department Section which was prepared by Stone & Webster at the request of the Suffolk County Planning Depar tment . This section has not yet received final County review.
Commissioner William Hennessey Chairman Disaster Preparedness Commission May 10, 1982 Page 2 l -
f As you know, the County has recently refused to endorse the local off-site emergency plan prepared by its own planners, and has attempted to return the funds provided to it by LILCO under the contract of September 18. However, political endorse-ment of the plan is not required for its submission to and review by New York State and FEMA; the contracted work, essentially com-pleted, is ready for review. The County can certainly fine-tune this local off-site plan if its further emergency planning efforts so require.
Very truly yours, ftl.E.E 1--
Matthew C. Cordaro, Ph. D.
Vice President MCC:tz Attach.
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OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY PATRICK HENRY AcomEss mEPLT Yt> DeSTmiCT ATTomNET i CTECI AL INVEST 6G ATiON UNIT November 16, 1982 D vid J. Gilmartin, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney H. Lee Dennison Building Hauppauge, NY 11788
Dear Mr. Gilmartin:
Pursuant to your request, this of fice has reviewed the report to the Subcommittee of the Suf folk County Legislature concerning the actions of LILCO in filing an Emergency Radiological Evacuation Plan.
It would appear by a review of the correspondence dated May 10, 1982 of Dr. Matthew C. Cordaro to Commissioner William Hennessey that LILCO advised the state of the county's position with respect to the Radiological Emergency Evacuation Plan. This letter clearly indicates that LILCO fully acknowledged the county's disavowal of the off-site emergency plan submitted on May 10, 1982. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in April of 1982 a meeting was held with the county, state cnd LILCO officials present in which LILCO suggested its alternativeastois.
approval by the county of the evacuation plan was to submit a draf t LILCO has plainly maintained since April that the County's final approval is not required. Regardless of the substantive merit of that position, no mens rea on the part of LILCO can be found.
Though it cannot be denied that the binder and title of the Radiological Evacuation Response Plan suggested it was Suffolk County's plan, this was not an attempt to mislead any public agency. This certainly does not rise to the level of criminal conduct and while perhaps ill-advised is not a matter for action by this office.
Very truly yours,7
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s ,- -swA L g p JAM S J. O'ROURKE Bureau' Chief JJO:bam cc: Peter F. Cohalan Suffolk County Executive John Wehrenberg, Presiding Officer Suffolk County Legislature Rosalind Gordon, Esq., LILCO !
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.c a . .. . September 17, 1982 Mr. John C. Gallagher Chief Deputy County Executive Office of the County Executive of Suffolk County Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
Dear Mr. Gallagher:
I am in receipt of your letter of September 8,1982, in which you esk that LILCO reconsider its plan to resubmit to the State Disaster Preparedness Commission the offsite emergency preparedness plan on which the Company has been working. I deeply regret that you view LILCO's actions as an insult to the County's authority; I assure you they were never intended as such.
Indeed, LILCO is in agreement with you on the fundamental point that the LILCO onsite plan should be integrated with the County's offsite planning efforts. But we do not see any reason to wait until the County has produced a plan, largely without LILCO's input, to begin the integration process. We believe now, and have always believed, that it would be more productive for the County and LILCO to work together to develop both plans. We are willing to meet at any time and place you suggest with the County's consultants or emergency planning steering committee for this purpose. Indeed, at the County's request some of LILCO's probabilistic risk essessment consultants have already met with the County's emergency planning con-sultants, and we understand that the meetings were productive. Also, on more than one occasion we have asked the County, through its lawyers, to resume joint planning
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meetings with us on a general basis, but the only response was that the County is un-willing to pursue joint planning in the present " litigation environment." We would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our offer to you with the hope that you can
{ facilitate a favorable response.
Let me make absolutely clear to you that LILCO does not presume to take upon itself the legal responsibilities or authority of the County government.
Our only purpose in preparing an offsite plan (and in doing so we have relied as much es possible on the past work of County employees) has been to expedite the long and detailed process of achieving tnie emergency preparedness.
MNG IDI AND UGHnNG COM AANY Mr. John C. Gallagher September 17, 1982 At present the County has chosen not to avail itself of LILCO's help, but that was not always the case, and we hope it will not be the case in the future. If the County eventually decides to reject LILCO's work, or to modify it substantially, so be it. But we have thought it prudent to go ahead and do the work, recognizing that some of it may prove to have been in vain, in the hope that we may thereby avoid delaying the operation of thp Shoreham plant. As for submitting the LILCO offsite plan to the State, we have done so merely because we believed that an early indication of what parts of the plan the State finds adequate and what parts need improvement would save time and be helpful to everyone.
I do not believe that LILCO's work, or the submittal of that work to the State, is " contrary to the interests of Suffolk County's efforts to pursue effective local emergency planning." It might be so if LILCO had refused the County infor-mation it needs or refused to work with the County. But we have not. To the contrary, until the day after the prehearing conference before the NRC Licensing Board on April 14 of this year, we were having at least weekly meetings with the Suffolk County Planning Department personnel then responsible for developing the County's emergency plan. And we were in telephone communication with the County planners on a daily basis. During these discussions, we addressed problems brought up by the Suffolk County Planning Dep1rtment people and made commitments for the Company. These commitments included arrangements for communications systems, radiological assessment equipment, dose projection assistance, graphic art assistance, and printing services. The day after the NRC prehearing conference, however, we received a phone call from the Suffolk County Planning Department stating that any further discussions concerning Suffolk County's emergency plan for Shoreham would have to be referred to Frank Jones. This message was subsequently repeated by other Suffolk County personnel. Also, I am told we were refused per-mission by the County to install emergency communications equipment on the existing radio tower at the Suffolk County Police Headquarters in Yaphank.
LILCO has no quarrel at allwith the County's legitimate attempts to produce an excellent offsite plan. But we do have concerns that the County's plan will not be finished, without help from us, in time to support the licensing of our Shoreham Plant. It would be a great disservice to allthe public to let that happen.
f Let me close by repeating that much of the work LILCO has done on the offsite plan, as well as the resources and experience of LILCO employees and con-
{' sultants, would be of use to the County in developing its plan. LILCO takes no pleasure in working on emergency planning without the County. I urge you to resume joint planning with LILCO as soon as possible.
Very truly yours, 0 tu .
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Matthew C. Cordaro, Ph.D.
Vice President cc: Nassau/Suffolk Senate Delegation Nassau/Suffolk Assembly Delegation Suffolk County Legislators Honorable Stanley Fink -NYS Assemblyman
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Herbert Brown, Esq.
Cherif Sedky, Esq.
Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Bill, Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Gentlemen:
At our meeting Tuesday, August 3, you suggested that emergency planning ought really to be the product of coopera-tion between the County and LILCO. We agree. You suggested that one way to effect this cooperation would be to try to per-suade the Board to postpone the litigation of the Phase I issues. We of course can't agree to that unless cooperation is first resumed and shows signs of producing emergency arrange-ments acceptable to both the County and Company. We do think cooperation rather than antagonism is the right way to go about emergency planning. LILCO is willing and able to cooperate ,
l with the County at any time.
Coincidentally, on Wednesday, August 4, Judge Carpenter expressed an interest in knowing what arrangements are being made to include LILCO, and others, in the County's planning
llUNTON & WILLI AMS efforts. We suggest that one or two LILCO people be made a part of the Steering Committee that is overseeing the County's present emergency planning work.
Also, LILCO's emergency planning people are ready to resume meeting with your emergency planning people, whether they be the County's outside consultants or County employees, to coordinate the County's planning with LILCO's.
We look forward to hearing from you about the optimum means for the County and LILCO to get together anew on emer-gency planning. The Company remains very interested in doing so.
Yours very truly, W. Taylor Reveley, III James N. Christman Kathy E. B. McCleskey
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY 175 EAST OLD COU NT RY ROAD H IC M SVI L LE, NEW YORM 11801 e.eATTo.it
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September 29, 1962 Mr. Frank Jones Deputy County Executive H. Lee Dennison Building, 9th Floor Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
Dear Mr. Jones:
On October 12,13, and 14 at 10:30 AM there will be meetings held at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, second floor, Security Building to discuss the distribution of Tone Alerts to special facilities in the vicinity of the plant.
This is strictly an informational meeting with the representatives of those facilities to inform them of the purpose of the Emergency Broadcast System and where Tone Alerts fit in.
LILCO would Uke to invite you or your representative to attend any or all of these meetings.
In the near future, we plan to distribute Tone Alert Receivers to these facilities and would like your participation in this effort as well.
To assure proper security clearance for you or your representative, please fill out the enclosed postcard and return it by October 8. When you arrive at Shoreham, we will have Visitors' Passes available for you at the East Gate and we urge you to arrive at the Gate by 10:15 AM.
If you have any questions, please call either Mr. Darrell M. Lankford, Associate Director of Nuclear Information (929-8300, ext. 286) or Mr. William F.
Renz, Associate Scientist, Nuclear Engineering (733-4676).
Very truly yours, (Y ,
MCC:pmm l Enclosure bec: Mr. W. O. Uhl Ms. C. A. Clawson Mr. C. J. Davis Mr. D. M. Lankford Mr. E. M. Barrett Mr. W. F. Renz Mr. I . L. Freilicher Ms. K. McCleskey Mr. M. S. Pollock
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY
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October 4,1982 The Honorable John C. Gallagher Chief Deputy County Executive County of Suffolk H. Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
Dear Mr. Gallagher:
I am in receipt of your letter of September 16, 1982, raising certain concerns about an emergency preparedness brochure to be produced by this Company.
As you probably know, federal regulations require that a public education program be undertaken as part of the overall implementation of emergency preparedness. One of the means by which public education will be furthered is the preparation and distribu-tion of a brochure relating to emergency preparedness plans.
Drafts of such a brochure were prepared a long time ago, and were in fact reviewed in the development stage by the County personnel responsible for emergency planning at that time.
Since these early drafts were prepared, however, Suffolk County has drastically changed its plan regarding emergency planning implementation. It is now our understanding that the County has a task force which we have been told is working on emergency planning. As I have stated in past correspondence with you, we still hope that the County produces an implementable plan in the near future, and we are willing and anxious to cooperate with the County in this endeavor.
Nevertheless, LILCO is obligated to distribute an emergency planning brochure prior to the loading of fuel at Shoreham. That brochure will accurately reflect the state of affairs regarding the County's emergency planning efforts to the extent we are made privy to such efforts by that time. .
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3NG ISLAND UGHr1NG COMPANY l
l The Honorable John C. Gallagher October 4,1982 The draft of a brochure described in your September 16, 1982 letter was obtained, as we understand it, through discovery in the ASLB proceeding. It reflectdd -
an earlier and more halcyon view of the County's emergency planning efforts. Because of uncertainty as to when and if the County will engage in emergency planning, the brochure was left in draft form and not distributed.
Very truly yours, Q (- L LW Matthew C. Cordaro, Ph.D.
Vice President e
ATTACliMEUT 17
/Ed'O LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY 175 EAST oLD COUNTRY ROAo H t C M S VI L L E, NEW voRK 118 o1 Direct Dial Number 516 420-6300 October 7, 1982 Mr. Frank R. Jones Deputy County Executive H. Lee Dennison Executive Office Building Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
Dear Mr. Jones:
The following is a brief description of the Shoreham Prompt Notification siren system as requested in your telephone conversation with me on Friday, October 1, 1982.
The Prompt Notification System for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station is required by NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
The Shoreham system consists of 89 sirens distributed throughout the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The sirens will be activated by means of a coded radio signal transmitted from two control stations, one designated as the primary and the other as the back-up control station. Each control station will have similar type control equipment; i.e., encoder, transmitter and antenna. The Suffolk County Police Headquarters and the Of fice of Emergency Preparedness, both located in Yaphank, have been selected as the primary and back-up control stations for the Shoreham siren system.
Details of work to be done in the Suffolk County Police Headquarters and Office of Emergency Preparedness, Yaphank, are outlined on Attachments A and B. A purchase order to do this work was issued to Ed's Communication Service Inc. on June 21, 1982. In addition, we anticipate that the County would plan to coordi-nate any secondary notification methods that they feel are appropriate from these same locations. Therefore, we would be pleased to discuss any additional coordi-nation efforts you feel are required in this area.
Af ter your review please notify and confirm in writing permission to proceed with these two installations.
Very truly yours ,
kb W.G.Sch{ffmacher Manager, Electrical Engineering Department Attachments
6 ATECg g A_
Specific Work Requirements Department of Emergency Preparedness - Yaphank The following work will be done at the above location as outlined in attached Sketch JM-1, 1A
- 1. Install Motorola Radio base station in communications closet of communications room located in basement of Suffolk County Office of Emergency Preparedness.
- 2. Install one 3/4" EMT Conduit in hung ceiling from radio base station (Item 1) to desk top Fisher Pierce encoder located in operations room. This will require penetrating one cinder block wall.
3 Install half-inch Heliax cable (Andrew type FHJ4503) from base station (Item 1) through 18 inch sleeve to antenna tower, and terminate on antenna at elevation 160 ft., also to be installed by contractor. Drag line is available in duct for pulling purposes. Upon completion of pull, contractor shall make available a drag line for future cable installations. Cable shall be strapped to tower at intervals short enough to prevent movement of cable during periods of hurricane force winds.
4 Install one twisted shielded pair of #16 wire in 3/4" conduit, Item 2 above. This cable will be terminated on encoder in operations room and radio base station in communications room.
5 T1600 remote control console and encoder will be located on desk top in operations room. Interconnection of encoder, T1600 and radio base station will be in accordance with Sketch JM-1A The following is a list of equipment to be supplied by:
LILCO Radio base station Antenna and antenna .nounting kits Heliax antenna cable Fisher Pierce encoder ~
T1600 remote control console
Attachm.ent A Contractor 3/4 inch EMTMiscellaneous conduit and fittinEs. #16 AWG twisted shielded pair cable. connectors for antenna, base station, encoder and T1600 console. Antenna cable tower straps.
The contractor shall give a minimum of two days advance notice to the LILCO Engineer, J. Minto (516-733-4S99) to arrange for LILCO supplied equipment te be picked up by the contractor at the LILCO Storeroom, Hicksville Operations Center.
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1 ATTACHMENT B Specific Work Requirements Suffolk County Police Department - Yaphank The following work will be done at the above location as outlined in attached Sketch JM-2, 2A
- 1. Install Motorola Radio base station in communications Tbom 123 located in first floor of building. Location of base station is as shown on Sketch JM-2.
- 2. Install half-inch Heliax cable (Andrew type FHJ4503) from base station (Iter 1) through 18 inch sleeve to antenna tower and terminate cable on antenna on S.E.
corner of tower at elev ation 200 ft. also to be installed by contractor. Drag line is available in duct for pulling purposes. Upon completion of pull, contractor shall make available a drag line for cable installation.
Cable shall be strapped to tower at intervals short enough to prevent movement during periods of hurricane force winds.
3 Install one twisted shielded pair cable from Demark Point in Room 123 to radio base station.
- 4. T1600 remote control console and encoder shall be located on table in duty officer's room, second floor.
Inter-connection of these devices shall be in accordance with Sketch JM-2A The T1600 console shall be connected to the radio base station, first floor, via
- 16 AWG twisted shielded pair to S.C.P.D. terminal block in duty officer's room installed by others.
Cable from S.C.P.D. terminal block to Demark Point in Room 123 first floor has been installed by others.
4 The following is a list of equipment to be supplied by:
LILCO:
Radio base station ,
Antenna and antenna mounting kits Heliax antenna cable Fisher Pierce Encoder T1600 Remote Control Console
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i Contractor No. 16 AWG twisted shielded pair cable Miscellaneous connectors for antenna, Base station, encoder and T1600 console Antenna cable tower straps The contractor shall give a minimum of two days advance notice to the LILCO engineer, (J. Minto, (516) 733-4899) to arrange for LILCO supplied equipment to be picked up by the contractor at the LILCO Storeroom, Hicksville Operations Center.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 'a3 MR 22 M1 In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
I hereby certify that copies of LILCO's Brief in Opposition to Suffolk County's Motions to Terminate This Proceeding and for Certification were served this date upon the following by first-class mail, postage prepaid, by hand (as in-dicated by an asterisk), or by Federal Express (as indicated by two asterisks):
Lawrence Brenner, Esq.* Secretary of the Commission Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board Panel Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Peter A. Morris
- Commission Administrative Judge Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. James H. Carpenter
- Administrative Judge Daniel F. Brown, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel '
Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
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v Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.* David J. Gilmartin, Esq.
David A. Repka, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Attn: Patricia A. Dempsey, Esq.
County Attorney
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Commission Suffolk County Department of Law Washington, D.C. 20555 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11787 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.* Stephen B. Latham, Esq.**
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. Twomey, Latham & Shea Karla J. Letsche, Esq. 33 West Second Street Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, P. O. Box 398 Christopher & Phillips Riverhead, New York 11901 8th Floor 1900 M Street, N.W. Ralph Shapiro, Esq.**
Washington, D.C. 20036 Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.
9 East 40th Street Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith New York, New York 10016 Energy Research Group 4001 Totten Pond Road James Dougherty, Esq.**
Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 3045 Porter Street Washington, D.C. 20008 MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Howard L. Blau Suite K 217 Newbridge Road San Jose, California 95125 Hicksville, New York 11801 g Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.
New York State Energy Office State of New York Agency Building 2 Department of Public Service Empire State Plaza Three Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Albany, New York 12223 ames N. Christman Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: March 18, 1983 i
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