ML20065K804
| ML20065K804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Indian Point |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1980 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082180535 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-82-261 NUDOCS 8210080137 | |
| Download: ML20065K804 (7) | |
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INDIAN POINT 2 Evaluation Period: 1/1/80-12/31/80
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Genera 1 V,M The intensive NRC investigation performed subsequent to the flooding
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.: M cussed in the SALP evaluation.
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-t i Subsequent to the flooding event, the licensee reorganized the onsite Jj; Ti management and completed equipment modifications in the systems designed Nyj to detect and prevent a recurrence of a similar event. A Vice President JCM ~
was stationed onsite and a new staff position, designed to improve the
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interface between the licensee and the NRC, was established. The licensee C.0;g;3 4r.aalled new containment fan cooler units, improved containment water (fg,, 3:
and nonradioactive water leakage and upgraded the containment pumping level indicating systems, improved the systems designed to detect steam H.;;.oj systems.
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A special NRC review of Management Structure was performed after the evaluation period to assess the capabilities of the new organization.
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The results of this review indicate that the licensee's onsite management organization structure provides a higher management level onsite and that Phr.
management structural weaknesses identified as a result of the flooding hy A
event have been corrected.
The NRC also reviewed the designs used in the d
Q modifications made subsequent to the event and verified, through inspection, g
the acceptibility of the plant change k _
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WW In addition to the reorganization discussed above, the licensee took fy.9 other actions designed to improve performance in each of the functional l: ' ~
areas in which weaknesses were identified.
These actions include an
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active recruitment effort to expand'the plant staff by approximately 40 l
positions, revision of administrative, operational and emergency planning procedures and directives, increased emphasis placed on the role of the Station Nuclear Safety Committee (SNSC) in plant operations and the additio'n of tystematic maintenance review programs to be conducted by both the SNSC and the Quality Assurance and Reliability Department.
II.
Specific Coritention "The Indian Poirit 2 facility displayed evidence of weaknesses in five functional areas.
These areas were plant operations, maintenance, reporting, committee activities, and management controls."
These contentions are addressed as follows:
Plant Operation (See Contention A)
Maintenance (See Contention B)
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-Reporting (See Contention C)
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Committee Activities (See Contention D)
Management Controis-(See Contentiorys A-E) 1 8210000137 820712 i PDR FDIA
_UDELL82-261 PDR
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2 Contention A "The plant operations area was characterized by instances where the licensee made improper assignments of supervisory personnel and failed to follow procedures."
1.
Basis i
?l:x; Reference The NRC investigation conoucted subsequent IE Report
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to the October, 1980 containment flooding 50-247/80-19; W ->
event, identified the fact that for eight 12/11/80 NRC
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hours on October 17, 1980, the Chief letter, EA 81-11 Operating Engineer, who is the immediate supervisor to the licensee's equivalent of the Shift Supervisor, was assigned the
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duties of the Shift Technical Advisor.
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This action is contrary to the requirements l'
of the TMI Lessons Learned Action Plan.
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Also, during the flooding event, the IE Report failure of the licensee's operators to 50-247/80-19; s @d follow the precedure covering malfunction 12/11/80 NRC W_
of a nuclear.in-trument resulted in a letter, EA 81-11 MD turbine runback and a plant trip on October Ibb5 kcNi 17, 1980l QZG
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2.
NRC Actions
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s,y Following the October, 1980 f.looding 12/11/80 NRC event, NRC Region I issued IAL 80-41 letter, EA 81-11; to confirm the commitments made by the licensee with respect to determining the 10/22/80 NRC causes and results of the flooding.
Region I letter Additionally, the NRC imposed a
(-IAL 80-41)
$215,000 civil penalty for the event, I ?. e -
$10,000 of which was assessed because j.
of the assignment of the Chief Operating l
Engineer as STA.
This civil penalty is t.'
baing contested by the licensee.
l The NRC continues to monitor plant operations with emphasis placed ca procedural adherence by the licensee's staff.
3.
Licensee Corrective Action The licensee discontinued the 1/5/81 Licensee practice of assigning the Chief letter; Operating Engineer as the STA.
The IE Report
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licensee also established a new 50-247/81-05
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Administrative Directive to define
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the duties of the STA and revised the management structure so that the STA W.cn reports to the Technical Engineering
(.D-Director vice the Chief Operating Engineer.
...; : n To prevent recurrence of the failure IE Report GlW a.M:j tu follow procedures, the operators 50-247/81-05 were retrained in the station's procedural Q$d adherence policies. Also, the nuclear i
.g instrument malfunction procedure has been j?"; Wj revised to better clarify the requirements 3..g in this case.
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$[iTj Contention 8 J,k.e$$.s$
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" Review of the maintenance area revealed instances where the licensee fjQ failed to. determine the causes of repeated equipment malfunctions and M4jj,
instances of incomplete maintenance actions."
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1.
Basis Reference
$N Subsequent to the flooding event, NRC IE Report
}{ 'A determined that the causes of malfunctions 50-247/80-19; T$,
in the fan cooler units were not 12/11/80 NRC
~-M identified, evaluated and recor.dgd _
letter, EA 81-11; l pg]
despite repeated leaks in this system LER 80-16 f
between 1973 and October 1980.
l Also, a'rcutine NRC inspection
'IE Report i
in' December, 1980 identified 50-247/80-22 l
that three different work requests written to replace missing handwheels on the,RHR pump suction and discharge valves were not processed as required.
Consequently, the necessary work on these valves was not accomplished.
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2.
NRC Actions The NRC took escalated enforcement 12/11/80 NRC
, action in the form of a civil penalty letter, EA 81-11 for the licensee's failure to determine l
the causes of failures in the fan cooler l
unit system.
NRC continues to monitor the licensee's performance in regard to these issues.
l 3.
Licensee Corrective Actions
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With respect to the failure to determine 1/5/81 Licensee the causes of fan' cooler; unit malfunctions, letter;
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the licensee revised and upgraded the IE Report quality assurance activities in this 50-247/81-11 regard.
Further, the licensee established a system of periodic reviews of equipment malfunctions to be conducted by the Station Nuclear Safety Committee and the Quality Assurance and Reliability Department.
To' assure that maintenance actions are 2/23/81 Licensee followed to their completion, the licensee letter committed to make appropriate changes in'the station's maintenance' work request process.
In addition, the licensee committed to retrain personnel in the administrative requirements associated with work requests 4
and to emphasize the necessity to adhere to these requirements.
Contention C "The licensee failed to submit several required reports to the NRC."
1.
. Basis Reference g
During the investigation subsequent to IE Report the October,1980 containment flooding 7 50-247/80-19; event, the NRC determined that the 12/11/80 NRC licensee failed to comply with the letter, EA 81-11; reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 LER 80-16 and those of Technical Specifications.
Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly notify the NRC Operations Center concerning the excessive amount of river water discovered in containment.
The licensee further failed to report the abnormal degradation of primary containment resulting frors the presence of this water.
2.
NRC Actions The NRC took escalated enforcement action 12/11/80 NRC in the form of civil penalties for each letter, EA 81-11; of the specific failures regarding event IE Report reporting.
The NRC also reviewed 50-247/81-05 l
the corrective actions taken by the licensee to prevent the recurrence of similar violations.
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3.
Licensee Corrective Actions
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The licensee revised the station 1/5/81 Licensee administrative directives regarding letter; the reporting of events to the NRC.
IE Report m
In addition, the licensee established 50-247/81-05
,N a new staff position onsite titled fp'
" Director of Regulatory Affairs,"
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the main function of which is timely dMii correspondence with the NRC.
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b Contention D
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[ 20 "The licensee's Station Nuclear Safety Committee failed to make reviews
@p;g of several safety-related events and activities that involved the potential g
existence of an unreviewed' safety question, as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(e)."
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1.
Basis Reference i.Mhh'
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The NRC determined that, subsequent IE Report Md to the discovery of the excessive amount L0-247/80-19; l l'pM of river water within containment by the 12/11/80 NRC 9 **
licensee, the Station Nuclear Safety letter, EA 81-11; MY$
Committee (SNSC) failed to review the LER 80-16 e.w 4533d
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potential impact of wetting'the reactor M
vessel and various stainless steel
.I?O components with cold, brackish r Yer~
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MM water.
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In addition, during the NRC investigation, IE Report l
it was determined that past repairs were 50-247/80-19; made to correct leaks in fan cooler units 12/11/80 NRC using an epoxy repair technique. The SNSC letter, EA 81-11 failed to review the use of epoxy in these repairs' to ensure that an unreviewed safety question was not involved.
2.
NRC Actions The NRC took escalated enforcement action 12/11/80 NRC in the form of civil penalties 'for each letter, EA 81-11 of the failures discussed above.
The NRC continues to monitor the performance of the SNSC activities.
3.
Licensee Corrective Actions The licensee revised adainistrative 1/5/81 Licensee procedures to emphasize the role of the letter; SNSC'in the review of facility operations IE Report
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and to establish a systematic revi of maintenance activities involving potential 50-247/81-05 safety consequences.
In addition, the role of the SNSC is addressed in the licensee's training and retraining programs.
Contention E "Further indications of weaknesses in the management controls area were identified as a result cf the health physics appraisal and the licensee's
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approval of a procedure which disabled the automatic start feature of the containment spray system."
1.
~ Basis Reference During March, 1980, the NRC performed a Health Physics Appraisal at the IE Report licensee's facility.
The Appraisal 50-247/80-02; identified eleven specific weaknesses 8/7/80 NRC associated with management controls in letter the Emergency Planning Area.
The weaknesses relate to training and training records, functional descriptions and responsibilities
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of the radiation protection elements of the emergency organization and various proce, dural inadequacies.
Additionally, during a routine inspection IE Report conducted on September 24-25, 1980, the 50-247/80-16; NRC determined that on May 10, 1977, 12/19/80 NRC licensee management had approved a procedure revision which disabled the letter, EA 81-04; automatic start feature of both containment LER 80-11 spray' pumps and thus involved an unreviewed safety question.
2.
NRC Actions With regard to the containment spray pumps issue, the NRC conducted an enforcement IE Report conference on October 15, 1980 and 50-247/80-20; assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure 12/19/80 NRC to comply.with the requirements of 10 CFR letter, EA 81-04; 4/29/81 NRC 50.59.
letter NRC will review the licensee's corrective actions regarding both the containment spray pumps issue and the weaknesses identified during the Health Pnysics Appraisal.
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7 3.
Licensee Corrective Actions The licensee revised the station IE Report procedure which resulted in the 50-247/80-16 problem associated with the containment spray pumps.
The licensee also committed to take 9/4/80 Licensee specific corrective action addressing each letter of the eleven weaknesses identified by the
. Health Physics Appraisal.
For example, additional administrative controls will be placed on the training program; the areas
,of responsibility of the radiation protection element in an emergency condition will be defined and reporting chains formalized; and procedure revisions will be made to address the inadequacies identified in the plan.
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