ML20065K780
| ML20065K780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Browns Ferry |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1980 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082180535 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-82-261 NUDOCS 8210080118 | |
| Download: ML20065K780 (6) | |
Text
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BROWNS FERRY 1, 2, & 3 Evaluation Period: 4/1/79 - 3/31/80 I.
I.
General Steps have been taken to correct specific weaknesses in the areas of
.1 radiation protection, reporting and management control as identified in non-compliances and escal. lei enforcement actions referrenced below.
Licensee corrective action. have been reviewed and onsite inspection performed where necessary.
Enforcement conferences were held with senior licensee management to discuss specific problems and corrective actions.
Additionally, the Regional Director has discussed, in depth, the licensee's weaknesses from the senior management level during meetings with and speeches to, licensee management.
nn II.
Specific A.
Contention
.ca-
"The Brcuns Ferry facility disp'tyed evidence of weaknesses in the areas
.c of radiation protection, reporting, and management control."
..g The basis, NRC actions, and licensee corrective actions for this contention i
N are discussed in contentions 8-E below.
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B.
Contention
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" Radiation protection weaknesses were characterized by numerous noncom-4 pliance, weaknesses in exposure controlv and instances where licensee h
ws.1 personnel failed to follow procedures."-
1.
Basis Reference Examples of radiation protection noncom-IE Rpt. 50-259/80-21 pliances and weaknesses in exposure control include violations concerning a s.hipment of radioactive waste on April 21', 1980.~ Radiation levels on the external surface of the transport vehicle exceeded Department of Transportation levels.
In addition, an adequate survey was not performed prior to the shipment.
Inspection findings (including a Health IE Rpt. 50-259/79-41, Physics appraisal conducted in October, 80-36 1980) identified several items of noncom-IE Rpt. 50-260/79-41 pliance related to failures to follow 80-30 10CFR20 (Standards for Protection Against IE Rpt. 50-295/79-41, Radiation), Technical Specifications, and 80-30 radiation protection procedures.
These findings, though not significant when
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taken individually, were indicative of
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weaknesses in management attention to adherence to radiation protection
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requirements.
1 l
2 2.
NRC Action These and related topics were discussed IE Rpt. 50-259/80-21 at meetings with senior licensee manage-NRC letter of 6/18/80 ment on October 23, 1980, and December 4, 1980.
A special inspection was conducted on May 1, 1980 regarding the radioactive waste shipment.
On May 21, 1980 an c.
enforcement conference was held to fgi discuss NRC concerns over the shipment.
M On June 16, 1980 the licensee was issued j).2 a civil penalty relating to the waste g;d shipment.
d Qt Notices of Violation were issued for the IE Rpt. 259/79-41, 80-36 remaining items of noncompliance.
IE Apt. 260/79-41, 80-30
.x gj IE Rpt. 296/79-41, 80-30 L:
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3.
Licensee Corrective Action
$.b5 Ffr The licensee has taken specific correc-259/81-17 M
tive action in ' response to the identified 3
items of noncompliance.
f C.
Contention
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" Reporting weaknesses were characterized by instances of licensee event
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reports that were incomplete and failed to consider generic implications."
31 1.
Basis Reference Reviews of licensee event reports (LERs)
IE Rpt. 50-259/79-27, 4
.have.ident,1fied many instances where the 80-13, 80-20, 80-43 reports have been incomplete or in error.
IE Rpt. 50-260/79-27, The majo~rity of incomplete reports were 80-11, 80-15, 80-40 due to a failure to adequately discuss IE Rpt. 50-296/79-27, recurrence control.
Errors appeared to 80-12, 80-16,.80-39 be due to a lack of attention in completing forms and an inadequate review prior to issuance of the reports.
Other errors included a stated corrective action that did not addresses the failure in ques?, ion, improper coding, a lack of other required information or a slowness to take correc-tive action.
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3 2.
NRC Action Deficiencies in LERs were identified to IE Rpt. 50-259/79-27, TVA and revised LERs, where appropriate, 80-13, 80-20, 80-43 were requested. Revised LERs received IE Rpt. 50-260/79-27, were subsequently reviewed.
These and 80-11, 80-15, 80-40 related topics were discussed in a IE Rpt. 50-296/79-27, 4
meeting with senior licensee management 80-12, 80-16, 80-39 on October 23, 1980.
D 3.
License Corrective Action
- TVA submitted revised LERs as requested.
D.
Contention
" Management control weaknesses contributed to a loss of Unit 3 primary si containment integrity on December 6-9, 1979, while the reactor was at power.
This violation of technical specifications resulted in escalated enforcement action."
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,j 1.
Basis Reference l
Hy,A The loss of primary containment integrity IE Rpt. 50-259/79-45, q
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was noted during startup and return of 260/79-45, and 296/79-45 Unit 3 to power operation and was due-to LER 296/79-21, 79-22, and excessive leakage of a drywell equipment 79-2.4 hatch that had not been properly secured prior to startup. The licensee had not provi. fed written approved procedures for the t emoval and installation of primary containment hatches.
Dependence on state-of-the-art knowledge and verbal i
li instructions resulted in an inadequate
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sealing of the hatch.
Essential work steps such as inspection of sealing surfaces, sequence and fit-up of bolts and torque limits were not clearly understood by workers involved nor were independent verifications made of work activities.
2.
NRC Actions A prompt inspection was initiated on IE Rpt. 50-259/79-45, December 10, 1979.
Several commitments 80-04, 80-06 to initiate corrective action were IE Rpt. 50-260/79-45, obtained from plant management to 80-04, 80-06 4
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assure proper containment closure IE Rpt. 50-296/79-45, including issuance of specific proce-80-04, 80-06 l
dures pertaining to hatches.
An Immediate NRC letter of 12/12/79 l.
Action Letter was issued to the licensee NRC letter of 1/4/80 by Region II on December 12, 1979 to licensee letter of 1/10/80 l
confirm certain action items taken or to L
be taken by the licensee.. A letter was sent from the Director, IE to the licensee on January 4, 1980, including L
a Notice of Violation, Notice of Proposed
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Imposition of Civil Penalties and
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Order Modifying Licensee Effective t
Immediately.
In addition an enforcement i
meeting was held with the licensee in January 1980.
These and related topics l
were discussed with senior licensee management in meetings on October 23',
1980 and December 4, 1980.
3.
Licensee Corrective Action The licensee mads payment for the civil
'$ry.tg
. penalties and made a verbal report of c
133f corrective action to the NRC in the January 21, 1980 enforcement meeting.:
E.
Contention l
" Management control weaknesses also included instances of missed surveil-lance, procedure adherence errors, and misorientated fuel assemblies that l
were not discovered during post-refueling core load verifications."
1.
. Basis.
Reference Procedural adherence errors included a LER 259/79-26 I
May 29, 1979 Unit 2 startup in which a LER 260/79-11 recently revised control rod withdrawal IE Rpt. 50-259/79-13, procedure was not followed; improper 79-16, 79-27, 79-30, movement of the steam separator during 79-34, 79-48, 80-19 an August, 1979 Unit 3 refueling which IE Rpt. 50-260/79-13, resulted in workers receiving high dose 79-16, 79-27, 79-30, rates; and the improper completion of 79-34, 79-47, 80-14 several maintenance reports.
In addition, IE Rpt. 50-296/79-13, in September 1979 two main steam line 79-16, 79-27, 79-30, temperature monitoring channels were 79-34: 79-47, 80-15 "jumpered" without the required proce-I
5 dural authorization; in December 1979 a leak test of a Unit 2 equipment hatch was performed using a superceded procedure; and in March, 1980, qualified procedures were not used in the heat treatment of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection system piping.
Examples of missed surveillances include IE Rpt. 50-259/80-13, a Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection 80-34 system operability test in December, 1979 IE Rpt. 50-260/80-11, and scram discharge header ultrasonic 80-27
- level recordings in August,1980.
IE Rpt. 50-296/80-12, 80-28 The misorientated fuel assemblies were IE'Rpt. 50-259/80-35, discovered by the licensee in September, 260/80-29 and 296/80-29 1980, during a Unit 2 refueling outage.
The two fuel bundles were rotated 90*
and had been in this condition since-the i
previous refueling.
A review of Unit 1
~1 (55 and 3 fuel bundles revealed one Unit 1 y
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bundle also misorientated by 90'.
2.
NRC Action i
In all cases, notices of violation or IE Rpt. 50-259/79-13, deviation were issued and appropriate 79-16, 79-26, 79-27, corrective action, as applicable, was 79-30, 79-34, 79-48, verified by site inspection.
These and 80-13, 80-19, 80-28, related topics were discussed at meetings 80-34, 80-35, 80-43
, ith. senior licensee management on July 10, IE Rpt. 50-260/79-13, w
1980, Sept ~ ember 25, 1980, October 23, 1980, 79-16, 79-26, 79-27, January 7, 1981, and February 2, 1981.
79-30, 79-34, 79-47, In addition, the Regional Director 80-11, 80-14, 80-21, discussed these general subjects in 80-27, 80-29, 80-40 speeches to the licensee's senior manage-IE Rpt. 50-296/79-13, ment of the Office of Power and Office of 79-16, 79-26, 79-27, Engineering Design and Construction.
79-30, 79-34, 79-47, 80-12, 80-15, 80-22, 80-28, 30-29, 80-39 1
T.
6 3.
Licensee Corrective Action The licensee has taken specific correc-IE Rpt. 50-259/79-34, tive actions in response to identified 79-48, 80-34 items of noncompliance or deivation IE Rpt. 50-260/79-34, including retraining, procedural revi-79-47, 80-27 sion, additional auditing, and IE Rpt. 50-296/79-34, retesting.
79-47, 60-28 Licensee letters of 7/30/79, 12/5/79, 12/17/79, 12/19/79, 4/15/80, 5/20/80, and 12/8/80.
F.
Contention "However, the licensee's below-average performance in areas where the facility received many items of noncompliance was considered to be an important contributor to the overall below-average performance rating".
Many noncompliances were received by the licensee in the areas of radiation protection,' reporting, and management controls.
These
., 4; noncompliances resulted in a below-average performance in these areas
~7) and were the major contributor to the overall below-average rating.
The basis, NRC actions, and licensee correntive actions for these items are discussed in contentions B-E above.
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