ML20063H789

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Public Version of Revision 3 to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure A.2-101, Classification of Emergencies. Revised List of Current Pages Encl
ML20063H789
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/01/1982
From:
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML113190810 List:
References
A.2-101-01, A.2-101-1, AAA056, AAA56, NUDOCS 8209020127
Download: ML20063H789 (48)
v • d • e


Text

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06/30/82 A.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ,

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LIST OF CURRENT PAGES PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION NUMBER

./ 000 Series Organization A.2-001 Emergency Organization 2 100 Series Activation A.2-101 Classification of Emergencies 3  !

A.2-102 Notification of an Unusual Event 3 A.2-103 Alert 4 A.2-104 Site Area Emergency 3 4

A.2-105 General Emergency 3 A.2-106 Activation of Technical Support Center 3 A.2-107 Activation of Operations Support Center 3 200 Series Assessment A.2-201 On-Site Monitoring anc Protective Action Criteria 2 A.2-202 Off-Site Monitoring Durng an Emergency 1 A.2-203 Deleted 3-1-82 A.2-204 Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations 1

.; A.2-205 Personnel Accountability-Control Room /TSC 1 A.2-206 Deleted 3-1-82 A.2-207 Sampling Priorities During an Emergency 0 j A.2-208 Core Damage Assessment 0 300 Series Protective Actions A.2-301 Emergency Evacuation 1 A.2-302 Assembly Point Activation 1

A.2-303 Search and Rescue 1 A.2-304 Thyroid Prophylaxis 2 400 Series Radiological Surveillance and Control A.2-401 Emergency Exposure Control 1

, A.2-402 Contamination Control 0

] A.2-403 Emergency Surveys 2

! A.2-404 Emergency Sampling and Analysis 2 A.2-405 Release Rate Determination 1 1 A.2-406 Off-Site Dose Projection 4 i A.2-407 Personnel and Vehicle Monitoring 1 A.2-408 Sample Coordination During an Emergency 1 l A.2-409 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Use '

During An Emergency 0

.l A.2-410 Out-of-Plant Surveys 1

A.2-411 Establishment of Secondary Access Control 0 A.2-412 Mobile Lab Counting Procedure 0

.i l 500 Series Communications and Documentation -

A.2-501 Communication During an Emergency 0 A.2-502 Recordkeeping'During an Emergency 0 A.2-503 Emergency Reports and Documentation 0 4

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AAA056 4

8209020127 820813 PDR ADOCK 05000263 i PDR h i

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, 06/30/82 A.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES LIST OF CURRENT PAGES PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION NUMBER

-s 600 Series Re-Entry and Recovery A.2-601 Re-Entry 0 A.2-602 Deleted 11-19-81 A.2-603 Repair and Corrective Action 1 700 Series A.2-702 Response to an Emergency at Prairie Island 1 A.2-703 Response to Off-Site Situation Involving Radioactive Materials 0 1

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AAA056

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 1 of 46 Op. Com. Rev. Req'd. Yes X No Q.A. Review Reg'd. Yes No X ALARA Review Req'd. Yes No X CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES A.2-101 Prepared by: / ,ct ( f .,., ALARA Review: Revision 0 Date 03/31/81 Reviewed by: I M/ /'h Q.A. Review: Revisien 0 Date 03/31/81 Operations Committee FJral R[vi ^w: Mee ing Number /t'MY Date d // o/SZ 3

Approved by: 'I , {\

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Op. Com. Results Review: Not Requiced Mtg. # 946 Date 03/20/81 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify conditions or groups of conditions that indicate an emergency exists and the actions to be taken by the Shift Supervisor or Control Room Operators to verify and classify the type of eoergency condition.

CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES An of f-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in the appendices of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.

PRECAUTIONS A. There are many indications of an emergency condition that may occur either individually, in group events or sequentially. The operator or Shift Supervisor must be careful not to rely on any one indication as being absolutely indicative of an emergency condition. Although the operator should believe indications and take action based on those indications, he shall attempt to verify indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators. Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions is necessary to ensure that the emergency classi-fication is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

B. None of the actions specified in the EPIP's shall take precedence over the actions that are necessary to comply with Technical Specifications.

ORGANIZATION A. Overall Responsibility - Emergency Director B. In Charge Control Room - Shift Supervisor WP/dw

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Procedure A.'-101 2

Revision 3 .

Page 2 of 46 C. Assistance '

Reactor Operator Shift Technical Advisor when assigned Shift Emergency Communicator DISCUSSION A. Definitions

1. Emeroency Condition - An occurrence, or combination of events and indica-i tions that fall into one of the following classifications:
a. Notification of Unusual Event Unusual events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs,
b. ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY
Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective

! Action Guideline exposure levels except near site boundary.

d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or

, imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential l for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably I

expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

2. Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - Numerical or qualitative values for the operational or radiological parameters, (radiological dose rates; water borne or surface deposited concentrations of radioactivity; o specific instrument indications or changes in indications) that may l be used as threshholds for initiating procedures or actions to assess and verify plant conditions and may require initiating specific emergency procedures as designated by a particular class of emergency.

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Pre edure A.2-101 Ravision 3 Page 3 of 46

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} B. Recognition Attached to this procedure is Attachment 2, Event Recognition Guidelines (1-28).

These guidelines identify the four emergency classifications, the possible initiating event (s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency. The identified instruments and alarms are a representative listing of various instruments that may be used to verify an emergency condition. There are many process variables referred to in the guidelines.

The instruments, indications, or alarms listed for any particular event are not necessarily a complete list of all those that will show abnormal indications or be useful in classifying the event. There is typically more than one instru-ment or instrument channel that monitors a specific parameter. The redundant channels and coincident indicators should all be used to verify the emergency condition.

The emergency action levels specified in the guidelines do not necessitate initiation of any particular phase of the emergency plan but rather signify a need for assessment and classification of conditions. In many cases, the proper clatsification will be immediately apparent from in plant instrumentation.

In others, further assessment is necessary to determine the applicable emergency classification.

The plant operating staff should consider the effect that combinations of initiating events have, that if taken individually would constitute a lower emergency classification but collectively may exceed the criteria for a higher

%- classification.

In the Unusual Event classification, numerous EALs are related to limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) as specified in Technical Specifications.

In these cases, the EAL is not considered exceeded and an emergency condition does not exist if the appropriate corrective action for exceeding the LCO is taken. The EAL is exceeded and an Unusual Event has occurred if the event results in a forced shutdown by the LCO.

C. Computer Aid For Classification Part of the TSC equipment is an APPLE Computer. The computer is programmed to parallel this procedure and may be used for event classification. Use of the computer, however, does not remove the requirement for complying with the steps of this procedure. The result of the APPLE software should be verified by locating the appropriate Guideline (s) in this procedure.

NOTE: In situations where timeliness is critical, the computer should not be used because of the time it adds to the classification process.

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Procedura A.2-101 Revision 3 , ,,

Page 4 of *46 i

RESPONSIBILITIES A. Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor)

1. Prior to EOF activation, the Emergency Director shall declare the appropriate emergency condition as soon as the event has been indicated and verified.

After EOF activation, the Emergency Director shall notify the Emergency y Manager when change in classification is indicated and verified.

2. After the emergency condition has been declared, the Emergency Director is responsible for implementing the actions as specified in the follow-ing procedures:
a. Notification of an Unusual Event, A.2-102
b. Alert, A.2-103
c. Site Area Emergency, A.2-104
d. General Emergency, A.2-105 B. Control Room Operator
1. The control room operator shall immediately notify the Shift Supervisor of anv events that may be classified as emergency conditions.
2. The operator shall attempt to verify any indications.
3. The operator shall assist the Shift Supervisor in assessing the indicatio and determining the classification of emergency.
4. The operator shall take immediate actions as dictated by plant procedures and his general knowledge to control the event and place the plant in a safe condition.

C. Shift Technical Advisor The Shift Technical Advisor shall advise the Shift Supervisor in identifying the event.

D. Shift Emergency Communicator The Shif t Emergency Communicator shall assist the Shif t Supervisor in event classification.

PROCEDURE .

STEP 1: Verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to related parameters, physical observations, and field reports, as applicable. If not already present, notify the STA and/or SEC as appropriate. Initiate Form 5790-101-1, EMERGENCY CLASSIFI-CATION CHECKLIST (Attachment 3).

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  • Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 5 of 46 SEC: Deleted s

STEP 2: Use Attachment I to identify any Guidelines applicable to the initiating condition.

STEP 3: Locate the applicable guideline sheets in Attachment 2.

STEP 4: Determine the appropriate emergency classification by comparing the verified plant parameters to the EALs for each emergency condition.

If more than one guideline is applicable to the initiating condition,  ;

use the guideline which indicates the most severe classification. ~

STEP 5 If the EOF is not activated, declare the appropriate emergency and implement the corresponding response procedure. If the EOF is activated, contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. If a change is to be made, implement the corresponding procedure.

(The Emergency Manager will declare the new classification.)

a. Notification of Unusual Event, A.2-102
b. Alert, A.2-103
c. Site Area Emergency, A.2-104
d. General Emergency, A.2-105

. STEP 6: Continue to assess the events and, if necessary, the emergency classifi-cation, as more definitive information becomes available or if plant conditions change significantly.

REFERENCES

1. NSP Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Plant Emergency Plan
2. NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-logical Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"
3. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation Part 50, Appendix E ATTACitMENTS
1. Attachment 1, List of Initating Condition Categories l
2. Attachment 2, Guidelines for Classification of Emergency Conditions
3. Example of Emergency Classification Checklist t

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O Procedura A.2-101 Revision 3 . .-

Page 6 of 46 1

Attachment 1 q List of Initiating Condition Categories ~'

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! Initiating Condition Guideline Radioactive effluents-high release rate or unmonitored --- 1
Increase in plant radiation levels ----------------------- 2 Release or loss of control of radioactive material within plant ---------------------------------------------------- 2 s

Fuel handling accident ----------------------------------- 2 Reactor pressure high ------------------------------------ 3 Reactor coolant leak ------------------------------------- 4 Main steam line break ------------------------------------ 5 2

Fuel cladding degradation -------------------------------- 6 High coolant or off gas activity ------------------------- 6 FSAR trans ient (Control Rod Drop) ------------------------ 6 l S a f e ty re l i e f va l ve f a i l u re ------------------------------ 7 ECCS initiation ------------------------------------------ 8 i

Loss of primary containment ------------------------------ 10 Loss of engineered safety or fire protection features ----

11 Failure of RPS to initiate or complete scram ------------- 12 Loss of plant shutdown or shutdown cooling capability ---- 13 Loss of indicators or alarms (annunciators) -------------- 14 Control room evacuation ---------------------------------- 15 Toxic or flammable gas ----------------------------------- 16 Security compromise -------------------------------------- 17 Loss of AC power ----------------------------------------- 18 Loss of DC power ----------------------------------------- 19 Tornado or sustained winds ------------------------------- 20 Flood or low water --------------------------------------- 21 Earthquake ----------------------------------------------- 22 Fire ----------------------------------------------------- 23 Explosion ------------------------------------------------ 24 Aircraft or missiles ------------------------------------- 25 Train accident ----- '------------------------------------- 26

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Procedure A.2-101

  • Revision 3 Page 7 of 46

', Attachment 1 (Cont' d. )

List of Initiating Condition Categories Initiating Condition Guideline Contaminated injury -------------------------------------- 26 Turbine failure ------------------------------------------ 26 i

General emergency ---------------------------------------- 28 Other plant conditions ----------------------------------- 29 Spent fuel, major damage to ------------------------------ 30 1

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Procedure A.2-101' Revision 3 ,

Page 8 of 46 I

] ATTACHMENT 2

, - i l Guideline 1 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT i  !

{ UNUSUAL EVENT Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded.

EAL's

1. Discharge Canal Monitor exceeds 20 cps.

(High alarm annunciated on C04-A-22, DISCHARGE CANAL RADIATION, and recorded by CO2-17.358) f i

2. Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10CFR20 App. B limits.

2I

3. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 90,000 pCi/sec.

(Hi-hi alarm annunciated on C259-A-1, STACK EFFLUENT HI-HI RADIATION; recorded on C257 and C258 (RR 7858A and RR 78588), STACK N0BLE GAS RELEASE RATE; and alarmed by computer point D-061.) 7 or  !

4. Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 1100 cps or 28,000 pCi/sec.

(Reccrded on C2-NR-7391) >

SI j 5. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or .

suspected to exceed Appendix B Tech. Spec. limits.  ;

I ALERT

  • l Radiological effluents greater than 10 times technical specification instan-taneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, would ,

result in about 1 mR at the site boundary under average meteorological condi-tions).

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EAL's  !

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1. Discharge Canal Monitor exceeds 200 cps. L L

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- Procedure A.2-101

, Revision 3 Page 9 of 46 it ,

3 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 1 (Cont'd.) RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT 5

2. Unmonitored liquid release to river which is 10 times the limits in 10CFR20

. Appendix B.

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3. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+5 pCi/sec.

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4. Reactor Building Vent Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 10,000 cps or 2.8E+5 pCi/sec.

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5. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or expected to exceed 10 times Appendix B Tech Spec limits.

SITE AREA

a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mR/hr for hour or greater than 500 mR/hr Whole Body for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology,,
b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,

radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs; or

c. EPA Protective Action Guidelines are projected to be exceeded outside the Site Beundary.

i EAL's

1. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+5 pCi/sec for 30 minutes l E 4 2. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.0E+6 pCi/sec for 2 minutes 4

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3. Stack release rate of radiciodines exceeds 1.7E+4 pCi/sec for 30 minutes or
4. Stack release rate of radiciodines exceeds 1.7E+5 pCi/sec for 2 minutes EI
5. RBV Noble Gas Monitor exceeds 840 cps or 2.1E+4 pCi/sec for'30 minutes WP/dw 1

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- Procedure A.2-101' Revision 3 ,

Page 10 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

h J Guideline 1 (Cont'd.) RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT U

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6. RBV Noble _ Gas Monitor exceeds 8400 cps or 2.1E+5 pCi/sec for 2 minutes.

2.

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! 7. RBV release rate of radiciodines exceeds 2100 pCi/sec for 30 minutes d

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8. RBV release rate of radiciodines exceeds 2.1E+4 pCi/sec for 2 minutes 2E
9. Whole body doses greater than 1 Rem or thyroid doses of greater than 5 Rem are projected beyond the site boundary.

EE

10. Containment Radiation Monitor reading indicates above the .01% curve when plotted versus time after shutdown on the graph shown in Figure 1.

EE

11. Measured W.B. dose rates at site boundary or beyond exceed 50 mR/hr for 30 minutes or 500 mR/hr for 2 minutes 2E
12. Radioiodine concentrations measured at site boundary or beyond exceed 7.0E-8 pCi/cc for 30 minutes or 7.0E-7 pCi/cc for 2 minutes.

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 11 of 46 FIGURE 1 i

Perce. c'f Fuel Inventory Airborne in the containment 10 ,

100% Fuel Inventory = 100% Noble Cases g- + 25% Iodine 2 + 1% particulates

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'10" i 3 4 h 658VI(f2 ~ . 3 i h 8)bV10' 2 3 i h b)ii'10' I 3 A h b)hi10' - f Time atfler Shtstdaten (Hrs)

% Fuel Inventory Approximate Source and Damage Estimate Released

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100, 100% TID-14844, 100% fuel damage,' potential core celt.

50. 50% TID noble gases, TMI source.
10. 10% TID, 100% NRC gap activity, total clad failure, partial core uncovered.
3. 3% TID, 100% WASH-1400 gap activity, major clad f ailure.
1. It TID, 10% NRC gap, Max. 0% clad failure.

.1 .1% TID, 1% NRC gap, 1% clad failure, local heatir.g of 5-10 fuel assenblies.

.01 .01% TID, .1%'NRC gap, clad failure of 3/4 l fuel element (36 rods).

10-3 .01% NRC gap, clad failure of a few rods. i 10-4 100% coolant release with spiking.

f 5x10-6 100% coolant inventory release.

10-6 Upper range of normal airborne noble gas N/dW activity in containment.

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't Page 12 of 46

  • ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) f"3 Guideline 2 IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS UNUSUAL EVENT 3

, Not Applicable ALERT Severe degradation in control of radioactive materials.

EAL

l. Increase by factor of 1000 in plant radiation levels as indicated by Area 4

Radiation Monitoring System:

Panel Description Normal EAL C-11 A-1 Refuel Floor Low Range 2 Full scale C-11 A-2 Refuel Floor High Range 5 5000 C-11 A-3 Refuel Floor S.W. Stairway 1 1000 C-11 A-4 New Fuel Storage 20 Full scale C-ll A-5 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tk Area 20 Full scale -,

C-ll A-6 1001' Rx South 3 Full scale C-11 A-7 985' Sample Hood 5 Full scale C-11 A-8 Rx Cleanup System Access 0.25 250 I

C-ll A-9 962' Rx Tool Storage Area 0.8 800 C-11 A-10 East CRD Module Area 7 Full scale l C-11 A-11 West CR0 Module Area 3 Full scale C-11 A-12 TIP Drive Area Full scale 2

C-11 A-13 TIP Cubicle 30 Full scale C-11 A-14 HPCI Turbine Area 2 Full scale C-11 A-15 Rx. Bldg Drain Tk Area 3 Full scale C-ll A-16 RCIC Pump Area 1 1000 C-11 A-17 East C.S. and RHR Area 10 Full scale C-11 A-18 West C.S. and RHR Area -

5 Full scale C-ll A-19 Hot Lab 0.25 250 C-ll A-20 Control Room Low Range 0.02 20 "7) ul WP/dw

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Procedure A.2-101

- Revision 3 Page 13 of 46

, r '" ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

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! Guideline 2 (Cont'd.) IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVEL f Panel Description Normal EAL 1 C-11 A-21 Control Room High Range 3 3000 C-11 8-1 Turbine Operating Floor 20 -Full scale C-11 B-2 Turbine Front Standard 10 Full scale C-11 B-3 Cond Demin Operating Area 1 1000 C-11 B-4 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Rm 9 Full scale C-11 B-5 Feedwater Pump Area 1 1000 i

C-11 C-1 Radwaste Control Room 0.2 200 C-11 C-2 Sample Tank Area 2 Full scale C-11 C-3 Conveyor Operating Area 0.2 200 C-ll D-1 Hot Machine Shop 0.2 200 C-252 E-1 Recombiner Instrument Room 2 Full scale C-252 E-2 Recombiner Pump Room 2 Full scale C-252 F-1 Offgas Storage Foyer 0.1 100 C-ll F-2 Offgas Storage Foyer High Range (100 100 C-257 & C-258 Containment Radation Monitor 50 R/hr NOTE: EAL's shown as FULLSCALE indicate that an increase by a factor of 1000 is beyond the range of the particular monitor. In these cases, a fullscale reading combined with the Shift Supervisor's concurrence, shall meet the criteria for the ALERT classification.

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2. Direct measurement of radiation levels correspora'ng to an increase by a factor of 1000.

SITE AREA Not applicable GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101^

Revision 3 l Page 14 of 46 '

.c ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) '[3 Guideline 3 REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH UNUSUAL EVENT I:

1. Reactor Pressure exceeds safety limit (1335 psig).

Instrument Description EAL C05-FPR 6/97 Reactor Wide Range Pressure Recorder 1200 C05-6.90 A/B Reactor Pressure Indicators 1200 Verify 1335 psig exceeded by checking pressure indicator PI 2-3-608 on C56.

ALERT

-Not Applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY s

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As specified in Guideline 28. "'

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 15 of 46

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 4 REACTOR COOLANT LEAK NOTE: There are no instruments that directly measure reactor coolant leakage. However, there are many instruments that provide indications that leakage exists. Based on coincident indicators the operators must determine what, if any, would be absolute indication of leakage. The following indications and alarms may be used by operators to assess the possibility of coolant leakage.

Indicator / Alarm Description C03-LR7409 Drywell Floor Drain Tank Recorder (Red Pen)

C03-LR7409 Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Recorder (Green Pen)

C04-FR2544 Drywell Floor Drain Pump Flow Recorder (Black Pen)

C04-FR2544 Drywell Equipment Drain Pump Flow Recorder (Red Pen)

C04-FQ2543 Drywell Floor Drain Sump Totalizer C04-FQ2544 Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Totalizer C21-TR2166 Safety Relief Valve Temperature Recorder C04-B-13 Drywell Equipment Drain Leak Rate High Alarm C04-B-18 Drywell Equipment Drain Leak Rate Change High Alarm C04-B-02 Drywell Equipment Drain Sump High Level Alarm C04-B-17 Drywell Floor Drain Sump High Level Alarm C04-8-23 Drywell Floor Drain Leak Rate High Alarm C04-B-28 Drywell Floor Drain Leak Rate Change High Alarm C03-A-09 Auto Blowdown Relief Leaking Alarm WP/dw

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. ) (2 (7_

!; Guideline 4 (Cont'd.) REACTOR COOLANT LEAK UNUSUAL EVENT

I Primary system leak rate exceeds technical specification.

EAL's l

1. Unidentified leakage calculated from C4-FQ2543 or by computer point 0-122, Floor Drain Sump Rate of Change, exceeds 5 gpm OR  !

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2. Total leakage calculated from C4-FQ2543 and FQ-2544 or from computer points 0-120, Equipment Drain Sump Rate of Change, and 0-122, Floor Drain Sump Rate of Change, exceeds 25 gpm.

ALERT Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm.

EAL i

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1. Total leakage calculated from C4-FQ2543 and FQ-2544 or from computer poi f D-120, Equipment Drain Sump Rate of Change, 0-122, Floor Drain Sump Rate of r l Change, exceeds 50 gpm.

l SITE AREA t

! Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity.

, EAL's I 1 I

1. Reactor water level (C05-2.3.85 A/B) decreasing below 1 foot above  !

active fuel (-114 inches) '

GENERAL ,-

As specified in Guideline 28. j L -

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Procedure A.2-101

, Reufsion 3 Page 17 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 5 MAIN STEAMLINE BREAK

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UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable ALERT Steamline break with MSIV malfunction causing leakage to secondary containment.

EAL's

1. Shif t Supervisor's opinion that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam flow with evidence that steam line break is outside of primary containment (e.g. visual observation, radiation or temperature),

l and 2a. Annunciator alarms on MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW A/B (C05-A-25/26) and RX WATER LEVEL HI/LO (C05-B-24),

I or 2b. Annunciator alarm MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE A/B (C05-A17/18) or 2c. Annunciator alarm MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE (C05-B-32).

SITE AREA 1

Main steam line break with failure of MSIV's to isolate leak and causing leakage outside of secondary containment.

4 EAL's 4

{ 1. Shift Supervisor's opinion that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam i

flow with evidence that steam line break is outside of primary containment I

i and 2a. Annunciator alarms on MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW A/B (C05-A-25/26) and RX

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Revision 3 , .

Page 18 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

.' 7)

Guideline 5 (Cont'd.) MAIN STEAMLINE BREAK

. 2b. Annunciator alarm on MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE (C-5-A-17/18) or 2c. Aanunciator alarm on MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE (C05-B-32) and 3a. Annunciator alarm on TURBINE BUILDING HIGH RADIATION ALARM (C04-A-21) or 3b. High airborne radioactive material levels in Turbine Bldg. indicated by air monitors or direct measurement or 3c. Visual observation that blow-out panels between steam chase and turbine

, building have been ruptured.

GENERAL -

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As specified in Guideline 28. '~'

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i Procedure A.2-101

, . Revision 3 Page 19 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. )

Guideline 6 FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION i UNUSUAL EVENT l Fuel damage indication EAL's

) 1. Offgas Radiation Monitor exceeds 20,000 mR/hr or-1

2. Offgas Radiation Monitor increases by 4000 mR/hr within 30 minutes at steady power

-or l 3. React r coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 5 pCi/ gram as determined

by sample and analysis. .

$ ALERT 3

! Severe loss of fuel cladding.

a. High offgas at air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/sec; corresponding

} to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes) or

b. Very high coolant activity sample (e.g. , 300 pCi/cc equivalent of I-131)

EAL's i

1. Offgas Radiation Monitor exceeds 200,000 mR/hr 1 or j 2. Reactor coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 300 pCi/gm as determined by j sample and analysis.

or

3. Main Steam Line monitor initiates trip due to high radiation.

j NOTE: Resin intrusion may cause high radiation without fuel cladding damage.

SITE AREA

! Degraded Core with possible loss of coolable geometry I EAL's

?

! 1. More than 1/3 of core uncovered as indicated by reactor water level below

-174 inches and -
2. a. Reactor coolant I-131 dose equivalent exceeds 3000 pCi/gm as l determined by sample and analysis.

or i

b. InabiIity to insert control rods fully or i c. Inability to position SRM's or IRM's within core.

GENERAL l As specified in Guideline 28.

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1 Procedura A.'2-101' Revision 3 .

, Page 20 o'f 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

)

i Guideline 7 SAFETY RELIEF VALVE FAILURE i.

UNUSUAL EVENT Failure of a safety relief valve to close following reduction of applicable pressure.

EAL's Auto Blowdown Relief Valve Leakage Alarm, C03-A-09 or SRV Open Alarm, C05-A-54 ALERT Not applicable

.~

SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 21 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 8 ECCS INITIATION UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated and discharge to vessel.

EAL's la. RHR flow to reactor as indicated by RHR FLOW A/B Indicator, C03-10.139A/B or lb. Core spray flow to reactor as indicated by CORE SPRAY FLOW A/B Indicator, C03-14.50A/B l

or Ic. HPCI flow to reactor as indicated by HPCI FLOW Indicator, C03-FIC 23-108 or ld. APRS actuation as indicated by annunciator AUTO BLOWDOWN TIMERS ACTIVATED (3-A-25) and subsequent S/RV OPEN (5-A-54) annunciator and

2. Shift Supervisor's opinion that an emergency should be declared.

ALERT Not Applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY See Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101' Revision 3 ,

1 Page 22 o'f 46 of 4:

j' ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) '~T J

Guideline 10 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY I,

j UNUSUAL EVENT

, Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications.

2 4

EAL's f Plant shutdown is required by any one of_the following limiting conditions

'.' for operation:

a. TS 3.7.A - Primary Containment; or
b. TS 3.7.8 - Standby Gas Treatment System; or
c. TS 3.7.C - Secondary Containment; or
d. TS 3.7.0 - Primary Containment Isolation Valves ALERT

! Not Applicable 4

l SITE AREA EMERGENCY l'

Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY li As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101

' Revision 3 Page 23 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 11 LOSS OF ESF OR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Loss of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) or fire protection system requiring shutdown by Technical Specifications. The following is a list of operable ESF and fire protection subsystems necessary to meet LCO:

Core Spray System Low Pressure Coolant Injection Subsystem Containment Cooling Capability (RHR Service Water System)

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Automatic Pressure Relief Diesel Generator System Fire Protection System Standby Liquid Control System ALERT Not Applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28. -

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 .

4 ,' Page 24 of 46 ,

l i

, ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

us

)

{l Guideline 12 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE D

i UNUSUAL EVENT I' Not Applicable ALERT 4

Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical.

EAL's 1

Valid Scram Signal 1

and  ;;

Neutron count rate indicates reactor critical.

i SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram i

(continued power operation but no core damage immediately evident.) ~

! EAL's Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods

, and Failure of the standby liquid control system and i

Shift Supervisor's opinion that a transient is in progress and

[ No indication of core damage (if core damage indicated, call a general

[

emergency)

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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' Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 25 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

j Guideline 13 LOSS OF PLANT SHUT 00WN OR  !

SHUTOOWN COOLING CAPA8ILITY UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable ALERT Complete loss of ability to achieve or maintain cold' shutdown.

I EAL's

1. Loss of both RHR SW Loops or

! Loss 07 both RHR Systems Shutdown cooling mode of operation or

Loss of both RHR LPCI modes of operation and loss of both cort spray systems.

e AND/0R j 2. Shift Supervisor's opinion that plant cannot reach or maintain cold shutdown.

i SITE AREA I Complete loss of ability to achieve or maintain hot shutdown i EAL's

1. Inability to SCRAM and inoperable Standby Liquid Control System and
2. Loss of all safety relief valve capability i or j Inoperable RHR System or

-Inoperable RHR heat sink-and l

. 3. Loss of main condenser cooling or j- No makeup capability from either HPCI or RCIC systems.

I AND/OR

4. Shift Supervisor's opinion that plant cannot reach or maintain hot shutdown.

) GENERAL EMERGENCY i

i , As specified in Guideline 28.

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, Procedure A.2-101

' Ravision 3 ,

Page 26 of 46 '

'}

ATTACHMENT 2 '(Cont' d. )

Guideline 14 LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION NOTE
Indication of alarm or' instrumentation failure may be difficult to
determine. A failure of normally lighted indicators or the failure 4 of certain alarms to annunciate during a surveillance procedure may provide an initial warning. A cause of annunciator failure, and thus an indication of failure, could be a loss of the uninterruptable i MG set and no transfer to CKT Y10.

I UNUSUAL EVENT i

Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in the Control Room to an extent requiring plant shutdown. ,

i ALERT

! Loss of most or all annunciators (on panels C03, C04, C05, C08) sustained for l > 15 minutes with the plant not in cold shutdown.

1 1 -,

SITE AREA EMERGENCY l

1. Loss of most or all annunciators (on panels C03, C04, COS, C08) > 15 minutes and plant transient initiated or in progress.

GENERAL EMERGENCY f

As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101

  • Revision 3 Page 27 of 46 ATTACHMFNT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 15 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION UNUSUAL FVENT Not Applicable ALERT Evacuation of the Control Room is requii ad or anticipated and control of shutdown systems has been established at local stations. (If local control has not been established in 15 minutes, go to SITE AREA.)

- EAL As determined by on-duty Shift Supervisor.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY'

- Evacuation of Control Room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes.

EAL As determined by on-duty Shift Supervisor.

GENERkLEMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 '

Page 28 of 46

  • ATTACHMENT 2 '(Cent'd. )

')

Guideline 16 T0XIC/ FLAMMABLE GASES UNUSUAL EVENT Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release.

EAL Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected onsite (out-of plant) as indicated by visual observation, physical measurement or notification.

. ALERT Entry into facility environs of uncontrolled toxic or flammable gases.

EAL's Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within the plant as indicated

by measured concentrations equal to or greater than

(a) 3 ppm chlorine; or

(b) explosive levels (as detected by explosive meter).

SITE AREA i

Entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas or entry of uncontrolled j toxic gases into vital areas where lack of access to the area constitutes a safety problem and plant is not in cold shutdown.

EAL's

1. Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within vital areas of the plant as indicated by measured concentration equal to or greater than:

'- a) 3 ppm chlorine; or b) explosive levels (as detected by explosive meter)

I; and .

2. Plant not in cold shutdown.

I GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 29 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 17 SECURITY COMPROMISE UNUSUAL EVENT Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.

EAL Shift supervisor's opinion.

ALERT Ongoing security compromise.

EAL Security safeguards contingency event that results in adversaries commandeering an area of the plant, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas.

SITE AREA Imminent loss of physical control of the plant.

EAL Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the control room, auxiliary shutdown panels, and any other vital areas.

GENERAL Loss of physical control of the facility.

t

{ EAL Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the control room or any other vital areas.

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Procsdure A.2-101 '

Revision 3 '

Page 30 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.) 'N

.Y Guideline 18 LOSS OF AC POWER 4

UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability.

EAL's

1. Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators:

C08-B-7 No. IR Res Trans to No. 13 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-08 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 15 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-11 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip; and i

C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage indicated on Bus 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14, and 1AR Transformer voltage meters on panel C8.

2E

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications, s ALERT Loss of offsite power and loss ofall onsite AC power. (see Site Area Emergency for extended loss) -

EAL's

(

1. Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators:

C08-B-7 No. 1R Res Trans to No. 13 Bus Bkr Trip; and

l. C08-C-08 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 15 Bus Bkr Trip; and l C08-C-11 No. lAR Res Tras to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage iadicated on Buss 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14 and 1AR Transformer voltage meters on panel C8.

L and

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 31 of 46 ATTACHMEN'T 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 18 (Cont'd.) LOSS OF AC POWER SITE AREA Loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes.

EAL's

1. Loss of all offsite power as indicated by annunciators:

C08-B-7 No. IR Res Trans to No. 13 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-08 No. lAR Res Trans to No. 15 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-11 No. 1AR Res Tras to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip; and C08-C-19 No. 14 4160V Bus to No. 16 Bus Bkr Trip and verified by zero voltage indicated on Buss 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14 and 1AR Transformer voltage meters on panel C8.

and

2. Loss of both Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications.

and

3. 15 minute time lapse.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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t Procedure A.2-101 -

Revision 3 Page 32 of 46 ' '

t i

ATTACHMENT 2(Cont'd.1

',;'}

i Guideline 19 LOSS OF DC POWER 1

[ UNUSUAL EVENT 1

i Not applicable.

ALERT Loss of all vital DC power. (See Site Area Emergency for extended loss.)

EAL's Loss of both 125V DC power sources and loss of 250V DC power source as indicated

. by:

1. Annunciators C08-A-20 250V Bus Low Voltage; and C08-B-13 No. 12 125V DC Bus Low Voltage; and C08-C-13 No. 11 125V DC Bus Low Voltage AND
2. Shift Supervisors opinion that all vital DC power is lost or degraded voltages are measured at battery terminals. .~

SITE AREA Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes.

EAL's

, Loss of both 125V DC power sources and loss of 250V DC power source as indicated by:

1. Annunciators C08-A-20 250V Bus Low Voltage; and i

C08-B-13 No. 12 125V DC Bus Low Voltage; and C08-C-13 No. 11 125V DC Bus Low Voltage AND r

2. Shift Supervisors opinion that all vital DC power is lost or degraded voltages are measured at battery terminals.

i AND

3. Lapse of 15 minutes.

i GENERAL EMERGENCY ' 'S, j

As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 33 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 20 TORNADO OR SUSTAINED WINDS UNUSUAL EVENT Any tornado on-sitt.

EAL's A tornado is observed to touch down within site boundary SE Sustained winds above 75 mph for greater than 10 minutes at the site.

ALERT Tornado striking facility.

EAL's A tornado strikes a vital plant structure EE Sustained winds above 90 mph for greater than 10 minutes at the site.

SITE AREA Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess of design levels.

EAL's Tornado causes damage to vital plant equipment or structures SE Sustained winds above 100 mph for greater than 10 minutes at the site.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 *

. Page 34 of 46

  • 1 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)
Guideline 21 RIVER WATER HI/ LOW l

UNUSUAL EVENT l

1. River water level in excess of 918 Feet
2. River flow below 240 CFS (about 902.4 FT river level) 1
ALERT

, 1. River water level between 921 and 930 FT.

2. River flow below 220 CFS (about 902.3 FT).

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. River water level exceeds 930 FT.
2. River water level below 899 FT. -
3. Flood or low water causes damage to vital equipment.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28. -

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 35 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 22 -

EARTHOUAKE UNUSUAL EVENT Any earthquake felt in plant or detected on station seismic instrumentation, and subsequently confirmed by one or more off-site sources.

EAL's

1. Alarm C06-C-8, EARTHQUAKE 9E
2. Shif t Supervisor's opinion ALERT Confirmed earthquake greater than OBE levels.

EAL Alarm C06-C-13, OPERATIONAL BASIS EARTHQUAKE SITE AREA Confirmed earthquake greater than DBE levels and plant not in cold shutdown.

EAL's Alarm C06-C-18, DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE and Plant not in cold shutdown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Gudeline 28.

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Procedure A.s-101 Revision 3 '

Page 36 of 46 '

1 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 23 FIRE UNUSUAL EVENT Fire within plant lasting more than 10 minutes after initiation of fire fighting.

EAL Fire Brigade Leader's determination.

ALERT Cire potentially affecting safety systems.

t EAL's Observation that fire could affect safety system; and Shif t Supervisor's opinion.

SITE AREA Fire compromising the functions of safety systems.

EAL's Observation of fire that affects safety systems or functions; and Shift Supervisor's opinion.

GENEAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101

  • Revision 3 Page 37 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 24 EXPLOSION UNUSUAL EVENT Near or On-site explosion.

EAL Visual observation or notification received; and Shift Supervisor's opinion.

l ALERT ,

i Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation. -

1 I

EAL i Shift Supervisor's opinion, I j

SITE AREA Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from explosion or missiles.

EAL's Plant not in cold shutdown and Shift Supervisor's opinion j GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Pr'ocedureA.2-lb1 Ravision 3 Page 38 of 46 '

ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

b Guideline 25 AIRCRAFT & MISSILES F'

UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Aircraft crash onsite or suspicious aircraft activity over facility.

EAL Visual observation or notification is received.

ALERT Aircraft crash on the facility or missile impact; on facility.

EAL Visual observation -

SITE AREA

a. Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire.
b. Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion.

EAL As determined by Shift Supervisor with plant not in cold shutdown.

GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 39 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

Guideline 26 MISCELLANE0US UNUSUAL EVENT

a. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital.
b. Train derailment on site.
c. Turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown.

EAL's

1. Visual observation Ef
2. Shif t Supervisor's opinion ALERT Turbine failure causing casing penetration.

EAL's

1. Visual observation and
2. Shift Supervisor's opinion SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in Guideline 28.

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s e e Procedure A.f-101 -

Revision 3 '

Page 40 of 46

  • i ATTACMENT 2'(Cont'd.) "A RJ Guideline 28 ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
a. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponoing to 1 rem /hr W.B. or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions.
b. These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are measured in the environs.

EAL's

1. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch. A or 8) exceeds:

1.3E+8 pCi/sec in stability class A 1.9E+8 pCi/sec in stability class B 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class C 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class 0 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class E 1.0E+9 pCi/sec in stability class F 2E )

2. RBV High Range Monitor exceeds:

25 R/hr in stability class A (9.6E+7 pCi/sec) 8 R/hr in stability class B (3.1E-7 pCi/sec) 4 R/hr in stability class C (1.5E+7 pCi/sec) 2 R/hr in stability class D (7.1E+6 pCi/sec) 1 R/hr in stability class E (4.4E+6 pCi/sec)

{ .75 R/hr in stability class F (2.8E+6 pCi/sec) l 91

3. Stack radioiodine release rate exceeds:

2.3E+6 pCi/sec in stability class A 2.6E+6 pCi/sec in stability class B i 3.4E+6 pCi/sec in stability class C l~

4.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class 0 4.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class E j 5.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class F l or I

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 41 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. )

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY

4. RBV radioiodine release rate exceeds:

1.9E+6 pCi/sec in stability class A 6.0E+5 pCi/sec in stability class B 3.0E+5 pCi/sec in stability class C 1.4E+5 pCi/sec in stability class D 8.6E+4 pCi/sec in stability class E 5.6E+4 pCi/sec in stability class F or

5. Release rate projection based on Containment Radiation Monitor exceeds any of the values in 1 or 2 above or
6. Dose rates of 1 rem /hr W.B. are measured at the site boundary or beyond or
7. Radiciodine concentrations measured at the site boundary or beyond exceed 7E-6 pCi/cc.

NOTE: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> or EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels are predicted to be exceeded at larger distances.

c. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g. , loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure and high potential for loss of containment).

EAL's

1. Failure of fuel cladding (per guideline 6) and Failure of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by high drywell pressure or high drywell temperature or failure of MSIV's to isolate or safety relief valve stuck open and Potential loss of containment as evidenced by:

containment pressure near design limits and pressure increasing; or loss of containment cooling and Shift Supervisor's opinion that loss of containment is likely; or failure of MSIV's to isolate.

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ProcedureA.E-lb1 Revision 3 '

Page 42 of ',6

  • L; .

l]: ATTACHMENT'2 (Cont'd.) .~_ss I'}

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. Failure of fuel cladding _(per guideline 6) and Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment penetrations required for isolation not valved off or closed; or Shift Supervisors opinion that containment has failed and Potential loss of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by reactor pressure near design limits and increasing or loss of ECCS.

.i

3. Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment penetrations required for isolation not valved off or closed or Shift Supervisor's opinion l l

and I Failure of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by high drywell pressure or temperature or failure of MSIV's to isolate or stuck open safety relief valve .

and -'

Potential for loss of cladding as evidenced by ECCS failure or reactor water level low and decreasing.

NOTE: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. If more than fuel gap activity released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.

d. Loss of physical control of the plant.

NOTE: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.

e. Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation. See the example BWR sequences.

NOTE: a. For core melt sequences where significant releases from containment are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (45 to 90 sector) if large amounts of fission products (greater than gap activity) are in the containment atmosphere. Recommend sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning ;

Zone under this circumstance (radius 10 miles).  ;./

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 43 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd.)

~

Guideline 28 (Cont'd.) ALL GUIDELINES - GENERAL EMERGENCY

b. For core melt sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not imminent and large amounts of fission products in addition to noble gases are in the containment atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (45* to 90 sector).
c. For core melt sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere and containment failure is judged imminent, recommend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot be completed before transport of activity to that location.
d. As release information becomes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time available to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current conditions.

Examole BWR Sequences

1. Transient (e.g. , loss of off-site power) plus failure of requisite core shutdown systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. Mcre severe consequences if pumo trip does not function.
2. Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform, leading to core degradation or melt in minutes to hours. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent.
3. Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.
4. Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
5. Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, substantially beyond design basis) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.

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Procedure A.2-101' Revision 3 ' '

Page 44 of 46 ',

ATTACHMENT'2 (Cont'd. )

, (f5) n Guideline 29 OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of plant operating staff or State and/or local offsite authorities.
2. Plant conditions exist that require shutdown under technical specifi-cation requirements.
3. Plant conditiens exist that involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g. cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits or pipe cracking found during operation).

ALERT Plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary' activation of TSC and place-ment of EOF and other key emergency personnel on standby.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams or precautionary nctification to nearsite public.

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Procedure A.2-101 Revision 3 Page 45 of 46 ATTACHMENT 2 (Cont'd. )

Guideline 30 MAJOR DAMAGE TO SPENT FUEL UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT Not applicable SITE AREA Major damage to spent fuel in containment (e.g., large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level).

EAL's

1. a. Decrease in fuel pool level below 36'9" confirmed by LT-2787, Spent Fuel Pool Level Hi/Lo alarm or
b. Dropping of heavy object onto spent fuel confirmed by direct observation and
2. Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Ch A or B >50 mR/hr (Confirmed by annunciator 5-A-1 or 5-A-2)

GENERAL As specified in Guideline 28.

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'.' n Procedure A.f-101-Revision 3 '

Page 46 of 46 1

  • ATTACHMENT 3 -

Form 5790-101-1 Rev. 1, 10/20/81 Page 1 of 1 i Example of EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHECKLIST (For Use With Procedure A.2-101) l 1. Initiating Condition:

ED Initials Time Date

2. Attachment 1 directs use of Guideline Number (s): -

ED Initials Time Date

3. Attachment 2 classification:

i

Declared

ED Initials Time Date b

, 4. Implemented P,rocedure A.2- .

ED Initials Time Date i

{ NOTE: If reclassification becomes necessary, start a new Emergency Classification Checklist.

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l NOTE: After this checklist is completed and is not required for immediate l use, it shall be placed in the appropriate container provided for l Emergency Records.

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