ML20058F144
| ML20058F144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1990 |
| From: | Taylor D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9011080114 | |
| Download: ML20058F144 (44) | |
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November 2, 1990 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director l-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hashington, DC 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Rule
!!RClodtttloL30-454/4Sfi_and 50-456/451
Reference:
(a) 10 CFR Part 50.63, Loss of
(
all Alternating Current Power (b) April 17, 1989 letter from M. Richter to Dr. T.E. Murley conveying the SB0 Rule response for all six Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) plants (c) January 4, 1990 letter from B. Lee (NUMARC) to NUMARC Board of Directors (d) February 26, 1990 teleconference between the NRC staff and CECO representatives regarding the April 17, 1989 submittal for Byron and Braid ood Stations (e) March 30, 1990 letter from M. Richter to i
Dr. T.E. Murley (f) August 6, 1990 letter from S.P. Sands to T.J. Kovach (g) October 10, 1990 letter from S.P. Sands to T.J. Kovach
Dear Dr. Hurley:
Reference (a) requires that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be able to withstand and recover from a station blackout (SBO) of a specified duration. A response to the SB0 rule was required from each licensee by April 17, 1989.
Reference (b) provided Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECO) initial response to the 580 rule for Dresden, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle County, Byron and Braidwood Stations.
For these responses, the stations were evaluated against the requirements cf the SB0 rule using guidance from NUMARC 87-00 and Regulatory _ Guide 1.155.
Based on NRC concerns after reviewing several utilities' SB0 responses and support documentation, Reference (c) was issued to provide clarifications to portions of the NUMARC 87-00 guidelines.
Reference (c) requested that each licensee provide a supplemental response indicating that (1) the initial SB0 response was based on the use of the NUMARC 87-00 guidance including the clarifications in Reference (c), and/or (2) any deviations from the NUMARC 87-00 guidance had been or would be clearly indicated.
Additionally, it was requested that the supplemental response should confirm that the diesel generator target reliability chosen for each plant was to be maintained.
The letter of Reference (e) Indicated a revised response for Byron and Braidwood Stations, containing this information, was forthcoming, pending resolution of open issues identified during the teleconference of Reference (d).
This information is included in the enclosures of this ietter.
9011080114 901102 f
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s Dr. Thomas E. Murley 2 -
November 2, 1990 I
In March of 1990 CECO had requested clarification from NUMARC of a central issue to the Byron /Braidwood SBO submittal regarding the shedding of unnecessary loads en the NBo unit to establish additional excess capacity of the NB0 units EDG.
This issue was resolved through a series of meetings and correspondence between NUMARC and the NRC-staff.
Subsequent to this resolution, CECO received the letter of reference (f) containing a Safety Evaluation Report for both Byron and f.raidwood stations.
The report requested a re-response to the SB0 rule because CECO had not proven adequate excess capacity of the remaining EDG was available for utilization as an AAC source in light of the recent clarifications resulting from the NUMARC/NRC staff dialogue.
Prior to issuance of the Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of Reference (f),-CECO formed a multi-department / discipline group which re-evaluated the original Byron /Braidwood SB0 response. After issuance of the SER's,-the group proposed to the NRC staff that a presentation be made addressing the revised CECO approach to the SB0 rule.
The NRC staff accepted and on October 4, 1990 a presentation was made to the NRC staff-in Hashington, DC.
Subsequent to this presentation, the letter of Reference (g) was issued requesting additional time for preparation of the written revised response.
The date of November 2, 1990 was chosen to assure that the level of detall requested by the NRC staff could be supplied in the supplemental submittal.
This supplemented response to the SB0 rule for Byron /Braidwood stations contains two enclosures. provides a summary response to the SB0 rule in a. format recommended by NUMARC.
Evaluation results apply to-both Byron and Braidwood stations except where specifically noted.
This six page summary is written as-if it were the original submittal. addresses all concerns identified in the SERs issued in Reference (f) and identifies in detail the worst case.NB0/B0 unit electrical loading scenario with the analysis. also identifies a pending UFSAR revision and summarizes necessary emergency procedures.
Additionally, Enclosure 2 addresses NRC staff _ questions posed at the October 4th presentation.
Respectfully, Darrel' Taylor Generic Isst'es Administrator i
Enclosures cc:
A. Bert Davis-RIII Resident Inspector-Byron
-Resident Inspector-Braldwood Tom Boyce-NRR-Stephan Sands-NRR
/sc1:ID596:2
s ENCIDSURE 1 REVISED RESPONSE 'IT) STATION BIACKOUT RULE FOR BRAIDWOOD AND BYR(BI STATIONS USING ALTERNATE AC POWER On July 21, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) avsnded its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50.
A new section, 50.63, was added which requires that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant be able to withstand and
-recover from a station blackout (SBO) of a specified duration.
Utilities are expected to have the base line assumptions, analyses, and related information j
used in their coping evaluation available for NRC review.
The new section also identifies the factors that must be considered in specifying the station blackout duration. Section 50.63 requires that, for the station blackout duration, the plant be capable of maintaining core cooling and appropriate containment integrity. Section 50.63 further requires that each licensee submit the following information:
1.
A proposed station blackout duration including a justification for the selection based on the redundancy and reliability of the on-site emergency AC power sources, the expected frequency of loss of off-site power, and the probable time needed to restore off-site power; 2.
A description of the procedures that will be implemented for station blackout events for the duration (as determined in 1 above) and for recovery therefrom; and 3.
A list and proposed schedule for any needed modifications to equipment and associated procedures necessary for the specified SB0 duration.
The NRC has issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, " Station Blackout," which describes a means acceptable to the NRC Staff for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63.
Regulatory Guide 1.155 states that the NRC Staff has determined that NUMARC 87-00 " Guidelines and' Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," also provides guidance that is in large part identical to.the RG 1.155 guidance and is acceptable to
.the NRC Staff for meeting these requirements.
l Table 1 to RG 1.155 provides a cross-reference between RG 1.155 and i
NUMARC 87-00 and notes where the RG takes precedence.
Commonwealth Edison has evaluated Braidwood and Byron Stations against the requirements of the SB0 rule using guidance from NUMARC 87-00 and RG 1.155.
The results of this evaluation are detailed below.
(Applicable RG
'1.155. table numbers and.NUMARC 87-00 sections are shown in parentheses.)
Evaluation results apply to both Byron and Braidwood stations except where noted.- i i
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4 A.
- Proposed Station Blackout' Duration RG 1.155 Table 2 was use3Lio_sielermine_a_proposeLSB0_clutation_nf 0
[nur__ hours.
The following station factors were identified in determining the proposed station blackout duration:
1 The Off-site Power Design Characteristic Group is P1 (RG 1.155 Table 4), based on:
Expected frequency of grid-related loss of off-site a.
p power does not exceed once per 20 years (NUREG-1032);
b.
Estimated frequency of loss of off-site power (LOOP) due to extremely severe weather places the stations in ESW Group 1 (RG 1.155 Table 8);
I c.
The Severe Weather Recovery (SWR)-Group is 2 (RG 1.155 L
Table 7);
d.
Estimated frequency of LOOP due to severe weather places i
the stations in SW Group 2 (RG 1.155 Table 6);
1 The Independence of Off-Site Power Group is I2 (RG 1.155 e.
l' Table 5).
2.
The Emergency AC Power Configuration Group is C (RG 1.155 Table L
3), based on:
a.
There are two dedicated Emergency AC (EAC) power supplies for each unit. These two dedicated EAC power supplies are not credited as Alternate AC (AAC) power L
sources for that unit. However, these sources are credited as AAC power supplies for the opposite unit.
For AAC configuration of Braidwood and Byron Stations, refer to Item A.(4) below.
b.
One Emergency AC power supply is necessary to operate p
safe shutdown equipment following a loss of off-site power for each unit.
3 The-target EDG reliability is 0.95.
A target EDG reliability of 0.95 was~ selected consistent with RG 1.155, Section 1.1 and NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.4, based on:
a.
Having a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for the last 20 demands greater than 0.90 for both units at Braidwood and Byron.
b.
Having a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for the last 50 demands greater than 0.94 for both units at Braidwood and Byron Stations. L
l 0
c.
Having a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for the p
last 100 demands greater than 0.95 for both Byron Units and Braidwood Unit 1.
Data not available for 100 load demands on Unit 2 EDGs at Braidwood due to limited operating history.
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4.
An Alternate AC (AAC) power source will be utilized at Braidwood I
and Byron Stations which meets the criteria specified in Appendix B to NUMARC 87-00.
The AAC source is an EAC power source which meets the assumption in Section 2.3.1 of NUMARC 87-00.
i(
The AAC power source is available within ten minutes of the onset of the station blackout event and has sufficient capacity and capability to operate systems necessary for coping with a station blackout for the required SB0 duration of four hours to bring and maintain the station in a safe shutdown condition.
l The' Alternate AC configuration of Braidwood and Byron Stations l'
is similar to configuration 2B (dedicated diesels with crosstie l,
at multi-unit site) of NUMARC 87-00 Appendix 0.
Each unit of l
Braidwood and Byron Stations has two emergency diesel generators L
that provide power to emergency 4.16kV buses (Divisions 11 and 12 for Unit 1. Divisions 21 and 22 for Unit 2).
There is a L
manual crosstie capability that exists between Division 11 of Unit 1.and Division 21 of Unit 2 (similarly, between Division 12 of Unit 1 and Division 22 of Unit 2).
Upon loss of off-site power and failure of both diesels to start on one unit, either one of the other unit's diesels is capable of providing power for safe shutdown'of both units for a four-hour duration.
L-The capability for providing power to the blacked-out unit is l
possible with manual operation of crosstie switchgear breakers h
from the Main Control Room.
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D.
Procedure Description The System Power Supply procedure on AC power restoration has been reviewed and modified to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 1
4.2.2.
Station severe weather (tornado) procedure has been reviewed and determined to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.3.
1 fitAlipn Procedursa_ hare _hten reviere.d and changes nectasAty_.tD_meRL Hilt %RC 87-00 will be implemeni.ed in the folloy_ing_arna:
1.
Station blackout response per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.1 for operator actions tot a.
Manually toekout equipment on the blacked out unit not required for safe shutdown to limit the load on the EDG prior to closing the electrical crosstle; b.
Connect the Alternate AC source (the non-blacked-out unit EDG) to the blacked-out unit. AAC source is the excess capacity of the NB0 unit EDG after powering all
= normal safe shutdown loads on the NB0 unit, no load shedding is performed on NB0_ unit; c.
. Ensure operation of the diesel driven AFW' pump on the blacked out (BO) unit; 1
d.
Mechanically crosstic essential service water between non-blacked,out- (NBO) and B0 units; e.
Start a component cooling wa'a r pump for component and containment penetration cooling; f.
Start a charging pump for reactor inventory control; g.
Ensure the appropriate provisions of containment integrity; and h.
Restore off-site and EAC power when it becomes available.
1 l
C.
Alternate AC (Ten-Minute) Coping Assessment The AAC source has the capacity and capability to power the equipment necessary to cope with an SB0 in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Section 7 for the required coping duration determined in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.5.
The condensate inventory for decay heat removal, effects of loss of ventilation, reactor coolant inventory and containment isolation assessment is presented below.
It is noted that, for the ten-minute Alternate AC method, Class 1E battery capacity and compressed air need not be addressed.
1.
Condensate Inventory for Decay Heat Removal (Section 7.2.1)
It has been determined in accordance with Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC 87-00 that 78,858 gallons of water per unit are required f or decay heat removal without cool-down f or f our hours. The minimum permissible Condensate Storage Tank level per Technical Specifications provides 200,000 gallons of water per unit, which exceeds the required quantity for coping with a four-hour station blackout. The 200,000 gallons of water is sufficient to allow cooldown of the unit at 50' F/hr. to a reactor coolant temperature of 350' F.
2.
Ef fects of Loss of Ventilation (Section 7.2.4)
The AAC power source provides power to HVAC systems serving dominant areas of concern.
3.
Reactor Coolant Inventory (Section 2.5)
The.AAC power source powers the necessary make-up systems to maintain adequate reactor coolant system inventory to ensure that the core is covered for the required coping duration.
However, through analysis it has been shown the core will remain covered for the entire four hour coping duration without the use of a centrifugal charging pump for inventory control.
4.
Containment Isolation (Section 7.2.5)
A list of containment isolation valves- (CIVs)- of concern has been generated. Where two redundant CIVs exist in series, the AAC source will be used to close'one of the two CIVs and provide position indication in the main control room. The remaining CIVs are 125VDC or can be-locally operated / closed with local indication of position. Operator actions required to ensure proper containment isolation will be included in the operating procedures. -
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D.
Proposed Schedule The System Power Supply AC power restoration procedure and the station tornado procedure have already been reviewed and modified.
The other PInc.edure. changes for SB0_discustad_in_Part B will be implemented within oD2_y. ear af ter the_LinaLHafety_Ivaluation_Repntt addresting this_aupplemental respsnae_la_provided by the Directort Qflism_of NucienLEcantor_Engulation_in_acrordance_with_10__CER 50.63(cM3).
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9 INCLOSURE 2 RESOLUTION OF BYRGt/BRAIDWOOD SBO SERS ITEMS OF CGOCERN 1.
Eroposed_AAClover._ Source Recommendation: The licensee should undertake further measures such as providing a separate AAC source or a coping analysis which shows that the plant can cope with, and recover from, an SB0 for_the required duration independent of AC power.
Response
1.1.
. Evaluation of worst case Byron /Braidwood SB0 loading scenario.
Commonwealth _ Edison has re-evaluated EDG loading (Figure 1) in response to SBO. A revised loading scenario has been developed which now qualifies the NB0 EDG excess capacity as an AAC source.
The NB0 unit EDG loading as revised includes all normal LOOP safe shutdown loads. The excess capacity of the remaining EDG can be crosstied to the,B0 unit from the control room within 10 minutes. Table 1 indicates the loads that are to be powered on each unit. Total EDG loading for SB0 is within the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of the EDG.
Worst case loading scenarios are used throughout this analysis. Equipment necessary to satisfy the.SB0 coping duration is available and adequate no matter which EDG remains. All equipment shown to be required for SB0 is capable of being powered from a single remaining emergency diesel generator.
The tabulated loads-(Table 1) represent the most severe EDG loading scenario that can occur at. Byron or Braidwood Stations. The heaviest EDG loading occurs for a blackout on Byron Unit 2.. Byron EDG loading is higher than Braidwood's due to the presence of mechanical draft cooling towers for the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) including the various supporting equipment in the SX cooling towers for the tower operation.
The UHS at Braidwood is supplied by a passive cooling lake.
Byron 2 blackout is the highest EDG loading scenario, because Byron 1 has the highest EDG loading for normal LOOP safe shutdown. Because discretionaryEload shedding is not permitted on the NB0 unit by the SB0 Rule, Byron 1 as the NB0 unit represents _the worst case scenario for EDG loading.
Division ~11 EDG represents the worst case loading because the
=
motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is powered from Div.
11.
The Div. 12 auxiliary feedwater pump is a 100% capacity diesel driven-pump.
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The' turbine bearing oil pump does not appear in the attached Table 1, this is a Div. 12 load only and thus does not enter into unest case EDG loading scenario.
1.2.
UFSAR LOCA/ LOOP Electrical Loading Table.
The tabulated loads in Table 1 utilize a pending revision to UFSAR Table 8.3-5 which incorporates driven equipment design requirements for selected loads as opposed to overly L
conservative motor ratings and uses actual motor ef ficiencies for the larger motor loads. The pending revision also corrects errors in the table which were identified during the SB0 review.
Table 2 is a comparison of existing and pending revision UFSAR Table 8.3-5 motor loads.
Table 2 also indicates corrections to UFSAR Table 8.3-5.
Ceco has initiated the pending UFSAR Table 8.3-5 revisions as part of our annual update to the UFSAR.
100FR50.59 safety evaluations have also been initiated for the revisions.
1 1.3.
Conservatism present in the EDG loading assumptions.
Conservatism is maintained in the EDG loading tabulation by:
Driven equipment design requirements are used to arrive L
L at power requirements.- Actual flows that.will occur during SB0 will, in many cases, be less than the values
.used to determine horsepower requirements in the analysis. Table 3'sunmarizes the flow rates.
The. inclusion'of a motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
on the NB0 unit. The auxiliary feedwater: function can be supplied by the 100% capacity AC independent diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump which is available.
A value of 1190. BHP-was assumed in'the'SB0 EDG loading.
i Table 1 which istequivalent to a 990 gpm design flow E
value for the AF motor driven pump. The. maximum value of flow required by the'AF pump to: remove decay heat and renieve mini-flow' conditions is 600 gpm for which the y ip requires 990 BHP. The differential power equivalent to this flow is 200 BHP below the value used p
in the analysis.
The inclusion of the Residual Heat Removal Pump..During.
the' required SB0 coping duration of four hours the-reactor coolant system temperature will not reach the 350'F temperature required before start up of'RHR lla a normal 50*F/ hour cooldown. Component cooling-operation and. support of the RHR system is bounded by current FSAR analyses. Essential service water system operation and support of the RHR system is bounded by the analysis presented in Section 1.5 of this enclosure and previous-FSAR analyses.
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-t In addition, if it were necessary to place an RHR pump in service the motor driven auxiliary f eedwater pump would no longer need to be run since they perform a redundant heat removal f unction.
Utilizing the maximum motor capability for the SX pump 1437 BHP 3. the analysis, actual SX flows for SB0 would not exceed 27.300 gps. The differential power equivalent to this flow is 97 BHP below the value used in the analysis, 1.4 Analysis for non-powered equipment of blacked out unit.
Reactor Containment Fan Coolers are not pevered on the B0 unit. CECO has analysis in place that demonstrates that containment temperature will remain at or below 200'F for the four hour duration, assuming 25 gallons per minute leakage from each reactor coolant pump and increasing this leakage by another 11 GPM for the maximum allowable RCS leakage permitted by Technical Specifications.
The Essential Service Water Pump is not powered on the B0 unit. The setTice water function is supplied by a mechanical crosstie to the NB0 unit. CECO has performed flow analysis which demonstrates the feasibility of this action. Manual operator actions are required to complete the crosatie.
Station walkdowns have verified that the necessary valve operations can be completed within one-half hour. See Section 1.5.
Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not powered on the B0 unit. A 100% capacity diesel driven puup will provide auxiliary feedwater on the blacked out unit with manual local actions to regulate flow.
Diesel Generator Room Ventilation fan is not powered on the B0 unit.
It is not required to e.tn when the EDO is not operating.
1.5.
Analysis of Essential Service Water (SX) Crosatie between units.
Following is a description of various pump flow rates used in the essential service water system mechanical crosstle analysis during a station black-out event.
Based on the SX system design, the normal system design
)*A requirements for a SX pump is 24,000 gpm.
Pump specification capacity as shown in the pump manual data sheet _is 26,000 gpm (1290 BHP).
Based on the plant configuration with SX system mechanical crosstie, the calculated flow rate is no greater than approximately 27,300 gpm (1340 BHP).
The runcut flow rate of the SX pump is approximately 35,000 gpm (1437 BHP) (sax. motor capability).
SX flow rate for delivery of 15.000 gge to NB0 unit CC beat exchanger is less than 34,100 gpm.
The SX pump characteristic curve is enclosed for information (Figure 3).
t A calculation was performed to verify an operating condition for the Essential Service Water (SX) Systems during a station blackout (SBO) where one pump of the non-blacked-out unit will be shared to provide cooling water for both units.
In the L
calculation. Unit 1 is the non-blacked-out unit and Unit 2 is the blacked-out unit. This represents the worst case scenario. Unit 1 blackout is enveloped by the analysis.
l The calculation was performed by using the FLO-SERIES SX System models based on the plant configuration. Th systems were properly aligned to simulate the blackout condition, SX
)
ptsap 1A supplying all four trains in Units 1 and 2.
Actual flow values which exceeded the minimum flow requirements and l
an average of the component cooling heat exchanger flow rate were used in the computer model. The systems are analyzed by the computer which determines flow distribution to the-
)
1 l
components and the pressure drops through the components and l
lines.
Analyses were performed with all of the operating components running at their normal positions with the following l
additional loads isolatedt i
Both trains Reactor Cont et.ents Fan Coolers (RCFC) of l
l the blacked-out ur.it.
i One train of RCFC of the non-blacked out unit.
The results of this calculation, the pump operating conditions and the flows through the various components, are shown in the l'
attached Table 4.
The results of the calculations showed that the SX System can be aligned to allow unit crosstic with non-essential loads isolated. The use of a single SX pump to l
supply both units' loads during a station blackout was shown to be acceptable.
The SB0 scenario described has a single diesel generator inservice on the non-blacked-out unit.
Electrical crossties enable energizing limited loads on the opposite unit. The loss of energized equipment at the station allows considerable flexibility in aligning the SX System. Components de-energized by the SB0 cannot serve as a heat load for the SX System nor can they serve the unit in transferring heat to the ultimate heat sink. The equipment is grouped by safety trains l
corresponding to the divisions of electrical busses.
Procedural guidance has been drafted into an attachment for
. l p
the emergency procedures addressing loss of all AC power.
The procedure development will emphasize simplicity and SX System reliability. The attached one line diagram (Figure 2) illustrates the proposed final configuration for the SX System after crosstie. The procedure steps are outlined belows e
Initial Conditions. Prior to SB0 Event
- 1 SX pump inservice on each unit
- All " Train A/B Loads" inservice (ECCS Pumps' Coolers) on each unit
- All "RCFC" (Reactor Containment Fan Coolers) inservice
- Each unit specific Component Cooling Heat Exchanger inservice with 8,000 gpm SX ficw
=I
- Train A/B crosstie isolation valves open on each unit J
- Each unit SX supply crosstle/ Common Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation valves closed e
SB0 Event
- Unit 1 is the non-blacked-out unit with Train A energized b.
- Unit 2 is the blacked-out unit with selected Train A loads energized via electrical crossties SX System Mechanical Crosstles e
- Close the Unit 1. B train RCFC isolation valve (ISX016B)
- Close the Unit 2. Component Cooling RX outlet flow control valve (2SX007)
- Close the Unit 2. A train RCFC isointion valve (2SX016A)
- Close the Unit 2, B train RCFC isolation valve (2SX016B)
- Open the Unit 1 SX supply crosstie isolation valve (ISX005)
- Open the Unit 2 SX supply crosstie isolation valve (2SX005)
Once the blacked-out unit (Unit 2) has been crosstied to receive SX cooling from the Unit 1 SX pump, the procedure wili direct the operators to establish a minimum flow rate (1,000 gpm) through the Unit 2 CC heat exchanger, to accept the heat input from the Unit 2 CV and CC pumps and penetration cooling.
Computer modeling has determined that with the above-described loads isolated and with essential service water automatically aligned to cool the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the emergency diesel generator, the total flow demand on the operating Unit 1 SX pump is no greater than 27,300 gpm.
Continuous action statements in the emergency procedures will direct the operators to monitor the SX systems' pressures, temperatures and the inservice SX pump's motor current to ensure SX syetem performance.
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I V:lidation cnd varification of th) emerg:ncy prec:dur:s will be used to demonstrate that the intended sequence described can be performed expeditiously without burdening the operators in the main control room. The valving on the SX system isolates flow paths with components that are not energized during the SB0 event.
From an operator's perspective, the crosstie of the units' SX systems is a simple procedure.
It is noted that the SX pump runout flow rate is approximately 35,000 gpe. An additional calculation was performed allowing 15,000 gpm for the non-blacked-out unit's component cooling heat exchanger. The results show that required flow will still be provided to the required components with the SX pump running below the runout condition at less than 34,100 gpm.
1.6.
Pressurizer Heater Operation During Station Blackout Conditions for Byron /Braidwood Statient In the blacked out unit, the charging pump will be brought on line near the end of the first hour. At this time, the inventory will be restored such that at least 4% pressurizer level is maintained.
During this time, the operators will be removing decay heat through the secondary PORVs, as well as assuring that adequate subcooling margin is maintained.
FSAR Section 5.4.2.5.2 discusses natural circulation cooldown both with and without the heaters in operation.
It is clearly stated that cooldown can be performed at a rate sufficient to preclude saturation conditions in the primary.
In addition, Section 15.2.6 demonstrates that adequate natural circulation flow will be achievable to remove decay heat.
These analyses (Loss of Non-Essential AC, Loss of Normal Feedwater) do not credit the pressurizer heaters, and demonstrate acceptable behavior out to approximately three hours (10000 seconds).
Another example of plant behavior under depressurizing conditions without heaters is the S0 tube rupture analysis with loss of AC, in which the operator is required to rapidly j
cooldown using the SG PORVs in order to support depressurization below secondary side pressures within a 30 i
minute time frame.
1 Emergency operating procedures currently address the performance of natural circulati>n cooldown with pressurizer heaters.
It should be noted that should primary inventory problems occur, the operator is directed to depressurize the 1
prinary to allow accumulator injection, stabilizing the steam-generators at approximately 276 psig to preclude the potential for nitrogen injection to the primary system from the accumulators. Therefore, alternativen exist for controlled
)
plant operation in blackout conditions without heaters in operation.
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In conclusion, the pressurizer heaters, while desirable, are not needed to safely control the plant during an SB0 event for I
either the B0 unit or the NB0 unit.
The current diesel generator loading table shows that sufficient margin exists to allow heaters (150 KW) to be used at the operators discretion, but does not require these loads..
2.
Station _BlackouLDuration_(Braidwood_Only)
Recammendatlant The licensee should verify that grid related events that have occurred at Braidwood Station since its commercial operation date are not symptomatic of underlying or growing grid instability, and are not indicative of a loss-of-off-site power frequency greater than once in 20 years.
Responses Commonwealth Edison Company has evaluated the two events cited in the SAIC TER. The event which occurred on 3-2-89 resulted from the failure of a 345 KV lightning arrester on a system auxiliary transformer at LaSalle County Station.
The resulting singic phase transmission fault was cleared by circuit breaker operation at the LaSalle County Station switchyard.
The event which occurred on 3-28-90 war the result of an insulator failure on the 345KV transmission system near the LaSalle County Station. The resulting single phase fault on the 345KV system was cleared by circuit breaker operation at the LaSalle County Station switchyard.
Neither of the events caused a LOOP at Bra #,dwood station. The single phase transmission f ault on a line connected to LaSalle County Station switchyard resulted is a momentary voltage dip on all lines which connect to the LaSalle County switchyard buses. This included the lines connecting Braidwood and LaSalle County. As a result, Braidwood experienced a momentary (less than 0.1 sec) voltage dip, as expected. This dip in voltage initiated a low power interlock on radiation monitors and caused isolation of some ventilation systems, but off-site power remained available.
Ceco has evaluated these two grid events and other events that have occurred at Braidwood since commercial operation.
The events are the result of transmission system component failures and are not associated with widespread transmission l
system unreliability. Grid stability was not a major factor in any events that have occurred at Braidwood.
In each case protective equipment cleared the faulted portion of the transmission system. Our conclusion is that the grid events that occurred which affected Braidwood are not indicative of a loss of off-site power frequency greater than once in 20 years and are not indicative of underlying or growing grid instability. Based on this, Braidwood is properly classified i
as off-site power design group P1 with a four hour required coping duration.
4 3.
Etalien Rieckout_ Coping _ Capability A.
Class 1E Battery capacity Recommmendation The licensee is required to conduct an assessment to verify that the battery has sufficient capacity to power all normal battery-backed monitoring and electrical systems and controls for the required SB0 duration, and recovery theref rom, or provide battery charging f rom an independent AAC power source.
Responset The revised EDG loading now qualifies the remaining EDG as an AAC source which will provide normal charging to one train of ESF batteries per unit upon crossticing the NB0 unit AAC EDG to the B0 units respective 4KV bus (approx. 10 minutes after initiation of the event).
Jgu i
B.
Compressed Air Recommendation: The licensee should provide an acceptable AAC source that meets the SB0 rule and provides means for powering the ADV's f rom the control room, or provide alternate means for achieving decay heat removal during an SB0 event. Whatever method is chosen, the licensee should simulate the proposed procedure and provide the appropriate operator training to ensure the decay heat removal can be adequately maintains.
Responset Revised EDG loading now qualifies the remaining EDG as an AAC source. There are no air operated valves relied upon to cope with an SB0 event. Two of four atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) will be powered by the AAC source.
Decay heat is released to k
the atmosphere through modulation of the ADVs and main steam safety valves. CECO currently simulates this decay heat removal operating scenario and trains the operators appropriately.
9-
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... =.
es... ~ ~ 4 TABLE 1 STATION - BLACKOUT - DIESEL-GENERATT)H ' LOADING October 26, 1990 UNIT'1 - NON-BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 11 Page 1 of 6 UNIT 2 - BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 21 Loads.
Non-Blacked-Out Unit Blacked-Out Unit HP / EFF / kW HP / EFF / kW 4 KV LOADS (Mechanical Crosstie Essential Service 1437 HP 95 1129 kW to NBO Unit)
Water Pump Centrifugal Charging 480 HP 94 381 kW 480 HP 94 381 kW Pump Component Cooling 450 HP 93 361 kW 450 HP 93 361 kW Pump Aux. Feedwater Pump 1190 HP 94 944 kW (Diesel-Driven)
Control Room Refrigerator Unit 340 HP 93 273 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
+385 HP 94 306 kW RHR Pump Connection /Sub-9 kW 1 kW station Transformer Losses
+ Load not required, but added as a margin of safety COppe0NNEALTH EDISON CONPANY BYRON /BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 s 2
s:
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-TABLE 1 STATION BLACKOOT - DIESEL-GENERA 10R LOADING October 26, 1990 UNIT 1 - NON-BLACKED-OUT'- DIV. 11 Page 2 of 6 UNIT 2 - BLACKE N. - DIV. 21 Loads Non-Blacked-Out Unit Blacked-Out Unit HP / EFF / kW-HP / EFF / kW 480 V SNGR LOADS RCFC (2 6 115 HP each) 230 HP 92 187 kW Main Control Room Vent Supply Fan 105 HP 93 84 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Auxiliary Building Charcoal Booster Fan 80.HP 93 64 kW 80 HP 93 64 kW Diesel Generator Room Vent Fan 106 HP 95 83 kW 125 Vdc Battery Charger (100% P.F.)
50 kVA 64 78 kW 50 kVA 64 78 kW Essential Service Water Cooling Tower Fans (2 9 150 HP each) 300 HP 90 249 kW COfGIONNEALTH EDISON COMPANY BYRON /BRAIDNOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
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~.w TABLE 1-STATION BLACKOUT - DIESEL-GENERATOR LOADING October 26,'1990 UNIT 1 - NON-BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 11 Page 3 of 6 UNIT 2 - BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 21 Loads Non-Blacked-Out Unit-Blacked-Out Unit HP / EFF / kW HP / EFF / kW 480 V MCC LOADS Cubicle Coolers 6 3 HP each 24 HP 80 22 kW 6 HP 80 6 kW
~ Diesel Generator-Starting.
Air Compressors e 15 HP 30 HP 85 26 kW 30 HP 85 26 kW Lube Oil Pumps 6 2 HP each 6 HP 75 6 kW 2 HP 75 2 kW 120/208 AC Distribution Panels (3 9 22.5 kVA, 90% P.
F. each) 68 kVA 100 61 kW 68 kVA 100 61 kW 120/208 AC Distribution Panels (2 6 22.5 kVA, 90% P.F. each)
- 45 kVA 100 40 kW ESF Lighting Cabinets 35 kW
- 20 kW Inst. Bi.s Inverters (2 6 7.5 kVA, 100% P.F. each) 15 kVA 55 27 kW 15 kVA 55 27 kW Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Fans 3 HP 76 3 kW
- Load not required, but may operate COf500NNEALTH EDISON CONPANY BYRON /BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
A f Wf'?R.*
' & _ sM f b r$ 7'
, f'
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TABLE I STATION BLACKOUT - DIESEL-GENERATOR LOADING October 26, 1990 UNIT 1 - NON-BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 11 Page 4 of 6 UNIT 2 - BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 21 Loads
'Non-Diacked-Out Unit Blacked-Out Unit HP / EFF_/ kW-HP / EFF / kW 480 V MCC LOADS (Continued)
Diesel Oil-Storage Room Exhaust Fans' 3 HP 76 3 kW 3 HP 76 3 kW Diesel Generator Jacket Water Circulating Pump 5 HP 80 5 kW Diesel Generator Lube Oil Heater 12 kW Diesel Generator Space Heaters 4.5 kW Electrical Equipment Room Exhaust Fans 5 HP 82 5 kW 5 HP 82 5 kW Diesel Generator Jacket Water Beater 18 kW Diesel Genrator Pre-Lube Oil Pump 15 HP 85 13 kW Battery Room Exhaust Fan 3 HP 80 3 kW 3 HP 80 3 kW ESF Switchgear Room 50 HP 90 41 kW 50 HP 90 41 kW Vent Fan CONRONNEALTH EDISON COMPANY BYRON /BRAIDNOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
~.
- w. $
~
TABLE 1 STATION BLACKOUT - DIESEL-GENERATOR LOADING October 26, 1990 UNIT 1 - NON-BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 11 Page 5 of 6 UNIT 2 - BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 21 Loads Non-Blacked-Out Unit Blacked-Out Unit HP / EFF / kW HP / EFF / kW 480 V NCC LOADS'(Continued)
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 6 2 HP each 4 HP 80 4 kW Control Room Refrigeration Unit Purge Compressor 2 HP 80 2 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Control Room Refrigeration Unit Oil Pump 1.5 HP 75 1 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Control Room Chilled Water Pump 40 HP 85 35 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Control Room HVAC System Return Fan 40 HP 89 34 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Control Room HVAC System Air Filter Fan 25 HP 85 22 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Switchgear Room Fan 5 HP 83 4 kW Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Booster Fan 25 HP 90 21 kW (Unit 1 Load Only) 27.2 kW (Unit 1 Load Only)
Make-up Filter Beater COMMONNEALTH EDISON COMPANY BYRON /BRAIDNOOD - UNITS 1 f,
2
TABLE 1:
STATION BLACKOUT - DIESEL-GENERATOR LOADING October 26, 1990 UNIT-l'- NON-BLACKED-OUT - DIV. 11 Page 6 of 6
~
UNIT 2 - BLACKED-OUT - DIV.-'21 Loads Non-Blacked-Out Unit Blacked-Out Unit 4
'IDTALS Total 4 kV 3403 kW 743 kW Total 480 V Switchgear 745 kW 142 kW Total 480 V NCC 419 kW 250 kW TOTALS 4567 kW 1135 kW GRAND TOTAL = 4567 KW + 1135 KW
= 5702 KW DIESEL-GENERATOR 2000 HOUR RATING
= 5934 KW 232 KW NARGIN
=
4 6
4 COpWOONNEALTH EDISON COMFANY BYRON /BRAIDNOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
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..s TABLE 2 BORSEPOWER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CURRENF & PENDING October 26, 1990
. REVISION OF UFSAR TABLE 8.3-5 THAT AFFECT THE SBO ANALYSIS Page 1 of 2 CURRENT PENDING UFSAR UFSAR LOAD BHP-BHP Centrifugal Chirging Pump 550 480 (550 HP:
Original estimate (480 HP:
Motor BHP at the system design conditien.
This value envelops LOOP and SBO conditions.
Component Cooling Pump 518 450 (518 HP:
Nameplate HP x Service Factor.
(450 HP:
Motor BHP at the pump maximum flow rate condition. This value envelops LOOP and SBO conditions.
AIx111ary Feedwater Pump 1165 1190
-(1165 HP:
Original proposal data.
(1190 HP:
Motor BHP at the system design condition.
This value envelops LOOP and SBO conditions.
Control Room Refrigeration Unit 344 kW 254 kW
)
)
Control Room HVAC Supply Fan 125 105
)
}
UFSAR values are nameplate horsepower Containment Cooling (RCFC) 150 115
)
values.
)
Pending values are design BHP.
Dicsel-Generator Room Vent Fan 125 106
)
Auxiliary Building Charcoal (75 HP: Nameplate horsepower Booster Fan 75' 80/67 (80/67 HP:
80 BHP for first 2 hrs.; 67 BHP
(
after aux. b1dg. supply & exhaust fans
(
start Essential Service Water Pump 1247 1290 (1247 HPP Original estimate.
(1290 HP Motor BHP at the LOOP condition condition.
This value envelops the system design.
For SBO conditions, the SK pump will operate at a higher flow rate, therefore, a conservative value of 1437 BHP will be used which reflects maximum motor capability.
Residual Heat Removal Pump 440 460 (440 HI:
Original estimate.
(460 H1':
Motor BHP at the pump maximum flow rate condition.
For SBO conditions, the RHR pump requires 385 BHP.
This is based on a flow rate of 3000
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.m October 26, 1990 Page 2 of 2 TABLE 2 MISCELLANEOUS LOAD DIFFERDOCES BETWEEN CURRENT & PD6 DING REVISION OF UFSAR TABLE 8.3-5 THAT AFFECT THE SEO ANALYSIS Control Roots HVAC MU Beating Coil This load is incorrectly duplicated in the current revision of the UFSAR The current UFSAR revision is incorrect.
Cubicle Cooler Fans.
There are only 6 cubicle cooler fans rather that 8 shown in the UFSAR.
The UFSAR indicates that these loads are Diesel-Generator Room Exhaust Fan operating. However, these loads do not operate when the Diesel Generator is running.
The UFSAR incorrectly lists these heaters as Diesel-Generator Space Heaters 45 kW.
The correct value is 4.5 kW.
120/208 V Distribution Panels.
These loads are not listed in the current revision of the UFSAR, but do exist and have been included.
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page 2 of 2 UFERE STmT2cer SEACSOUT
-/
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Anc pesoplate Sa p ice Zoop Imee/ Loop 590 Dmit.
Asel 30 Unit Amal equipment Eeroepower
",ector Flowrote SEF Flowrote BWF Fle m te BEF BNF Flowrote BNF SWP Reencke 1.
Containeent 150 1.17 94,000 CDt-115 59,000 CFM 91 94,000 11$
115 2-epeed Cooling Tan CFM wotor (RCFC) 2.
Control Room 125 1.21 49,500 CFM 105 49,500 CFM 105 49,500 105 105 ffvAC System CFM Supply Yan 3.
Diesel Can.
125 1.21 90 c00 CFM 106 90,000 CFM ic6 90,C00 106 106 Room Vent Fan CFM 4.
Auxillary Bldg.
75 1.17 62,730 CFM 80 62,730 CFM 80 62,730 80 80 62,730 80 80 Charcoal CFM CFM Booster Fan 3.
Turbine Bearing 100 Powered ty oil Pump Div. 12 -
not the worst analyred esse 6.
EsF Cooling 150/37.5 150 150.
Fans will Tower Fan-Sets 5
ba shed from the black h *.
unit 7.
125-Vdc Battery 50 kVA 50 kVA So 50 50 50 50 Charger kVA kVA kVA kVA kYA Q.
Cubicle Cooler 75 1.17 Fan For Diesel Driven AFW Pump t:FsCR
- tfpdated Final Safety Analysis Report 90
- Blackout LocA
- Loss of Coolant Accident NBO
- Non-Blackout I.OOP
- Loss of Offsite Power BNP
- Brake Horsepower Ane
- Alternate AC
3.. m. 4 '
I TAnfR 4 October 26, 1990 Page 1 of 4 Commonwealth Edison Company l
Byron Station Unit 1 SBO Operating Components (all flows in GPM) i 1
COMPONENT CALCULATION SX Pump 1A Flow 27250.1 T.D.H.,
Computer.Model (ft) 171.8 T.D.H.,
Pump Curve (ft) 174.0 Suction Pressure (psig) 28.8 Discharge Pressure (psig) 102.7 cj Unit 1 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 8000.0 SX-1A Oil and Cubicle Coolers 132.0 SX-1B Oil and Cubicle Coolers 130.0 t
l l
TRAIN A L '
Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1625.0 Motor Driven AF Pump-1A Oil Cooler 39.9 i
1; Saf. Ini. Pump-1A' Bearing 011 Cooler 56.6
' Saf. In:1. Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 60.3
- R.H.R. Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 74.5
~
l CV Pump-1A Gear Cooler 30.9-CV Pump-1A Lube Oil cooler 44.1 l*
CV-Pump-1A Cubicle-Cooler 75.0 Pos. Dis. Chrg. Pump Cubicle Cooler 61.3
,i
-Cont. Spray Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 83.0 Control Room Refr. Unit OA closed
(*
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1A 1490.0 L
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1A 1490.0 l
l Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1C 1490.0-l; Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1C 1490.0 L
Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr.-1A closed I
tTRAIN B~
Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1867.2
' Diesel Driven AF Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 209.4 AF Pump-1B Oil Cooler 18.3 AF-Pump-1B Gear 011~ Cooler 31.3 AF Pump-1B Rt.-Ang. Gear Lube Oil Cooler 30.1 i
1AF Pump-1B Eng. Clsd. Cyc. Ht. Exchanger 607.7 Saf. Inb. Pump-1B Bearing 011 Cooler 39.5 Saf.'In:1. Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 85.5 R.H.R. Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 86;7 CV Pump-1B Gear Cooler 29.4
.CV Pump-1B Lube Oil Cooler 42.0 CV Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 67.0-Spent Fuel Pit' Pump 1 Cubicle Cooler 70.8 Cont. Spray Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 87.0
' Control Room Refr. Unit OB 1000.0 Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1B closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1B closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler ID closed Peactor Cont. Fan Cooler ID closed Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr.-1B closed
^
6:
TABLE.4 OctobDr 26, 1990 Page 2 of 4 3
commonwealth Edison Company Byron Station Unit 2 i
SBO Operating Components l
(all flows in GPM) 1 COMPONENT CAI.LTLATION Unit 2 Component cooling Hea't Exchanger 1000.0 SX-2A Oil and Cubicle Coolers 129.6 SX-2B Oil and Cubicle Coolers 119.0-TRAIN A Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1840.0 Motor Driven AF Pump-2A 011 Cooler 42.1 Saf. In[. Pump-2A Bearing 011 Cooler 60.0 S6 f. In:l. Pump-2A Cubicle cooler 45.0 R.H.R. Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler-45.0 CV Pump-2A Gear Cooler 34.7 4
CV Pump-2A Lube 011 Cooler 15.0 CV Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler 68.0 Pos. Dis. Chrg. Pump Cubicle Cooler 25.0 Cont. Spray Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler 78.0 j
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2A closed Reactor' Cont. Fan Cooler 2A closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2C closed l
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2C closed Chilled.Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr.-1A closed TRAIN B,
Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1790.0
'[$
Diesel Driven AF Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 205.6 O-AF Pump-2B Oil Cooler 21.1 AF Pump-2B Gear oil Cooler 36.7.
AF Pump-2B Rt. Ang. Gear Lube 011 Cooler 30.0 I
AF Pump-2B Eng..Clsd. Cyc. Ht. Exchanger
.597.0 1
Saf. Ini. Pump-2B Bearing 011 Cooler 46.5
. Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 45.0-
]
Saf. In:1.
R.H.R. Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 86.5 i
CV Pump-2B Gear Cooler 34.2-g j
CV. Pump-2B Lube 011 Cooler 13.0 CV-Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 79.7 i
Spent Fuel ~ Pit Pump 2 Cubicle Cooler 45.0 Cont.JSpray Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 74.0 t
i L' 1 Reactor Cont.. Fan Cooler 2B closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2B closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2D closed k
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2D closed Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr.-2B closed L }L L
l 1
1
10
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{
TAhtR 4 October 26, 1990 Pago 3 of 4 l
l Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood Station Unit 1 SBO Operating Components (all flows in GPM)
CAlfULATION.
CGiiFONEid 27171.1 SX Pump 1A. Flow 172.2 i
T.D.H., Computer Model (ft) 175.0 l
T.D.H., Pump Curve (ft) 21.8 Suction Pressure (psig)ig) 95.8 Discharge Pressure (ps
(
Unit 1 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 149.0 8000.0 SX-1A 011 and. Cubicle Coolers 150.0 SX-1B Oil and cubicle Coolers g
TRAIN.A 1650.0 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 44.3 g.
Motor Driven AF Pump-1A Oil Cooler 55.0 Saf. Ini. Pump-1A Bearing 011 Cooler 64.4
,1 Saf. Ing. Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 76.2 R.H.R. Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 32.6 p
CV Pump-1A Gear Cooler 46.8 CV Pump-1A Lube Oil Cooler 70.0 CV Pump-1A Cubicle Cooler 62.7 i
Pos. Dis. Chrg.. Pump Cubicle Cooler 85.0 f'! ~
Cont. Spray Pump-1A Cubicle Coolar' closed control Room Refr. Unit OA 1500.0 q{ n Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1A 1500.0 Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1A 1500.0 4
4:
Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1C 1500.0 Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 1C closed
].
Chilled Wtr.-Sys. Primary cont. Refr.-1A J
1650.0 1
TRAIN B A
Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 204.2 i
MI Diesel Driven AF Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 18.3
- ['.
AF Pump-1B 011 Cooler-27.9 AF' Pump-1B Gear 011 Cooler 28.2 1
j AF. Pump-1B Rt. Ang. Gear Lube ' Oll Cooler 596.5 i
i AF Pump-1B Eng. C1sd. Cyc. Ht. Exchanger 37.3 Y
Saf. Ini. Pump-1B Bearing.0il Cooler 73.0 Saf..Ing. Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 85.4 R.H.R. Pump-1B Cubicle Cooler 30.4 i
CV Pump-1B Gear Cooler 43.7 CV Pump-1B Lube Oil-Cooler 70.0 CV Pump-1B' Cubicle Cooler 71.5 Spent Fuel Pit Pump 1 Cubicle Cooler 85.0 Cont. Spray Pump-1B. Cubicle Cooler 1000.0 Control Room Refr. Unit OB closed Reactor Cont.: Fan: Cooler 1B closed Reactor Cont.-Fan Cooler 1B closed-Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler ID closed Fan Cooler 10 closed Reactor Cont.
Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary cont. Refr.-1B i
j
t TABLE 4 Octobnr 26, 1990 Page 4 of 4
[
Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood Station Unit 2 SBO Operating Components (all flows in GPM) i 7
COMPONENT CALCULATION Unit 2 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1003.1 SX-2A Oil and Cubicle Coolers 148.3 SX-2B Oil and Cubicle Coolers 150.0 TRAIN A D
Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1683.7 Motor Driven AF Pump-2A Oil Cooler 43.1 Saf. In[. Pump-2A Bearing Oil Cooler 56.5 Saf. In:1. Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler 65.2 g
R.H.R. Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler 78.6 31.8 i
CV Pump-2A Gear Cooler CV Pump-2A Lube Oil Cooler 45.6-70.0 CV: Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler Pos. Dis. Chrg. Pump Cubicle Cooler 69.6 Cont. Spray Pump-2A Cubicle Cooler 85.0 Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2A closed 1
Reactor cont. Fan Cooler 2A closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2C closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2C closed Ul Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr.-1A closed TRAIN B fi Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler 1650.0 Diesel Driven AF Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 179.0 19.1 AF Pump-2B Oil Cooler 26.6 i
AF Pump-2B Gear Oil Cooler AF Pump-28.Rt. Ang. Gear Lube Oil Cooler 34.6 706.1
.AF Pump-2B Eng. Clsd. Cyc. Ht. Exchanger 38.7 Saf. Inb. Pump-2B Bearing 011 Cooler 96.4 Saf. In:1.' Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 7
L 86.1 R.H.R. Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 26.9 CV Pump-2B Gear Cooler 5
38.5 CV Pump-2B Lube Oil Cooler 70.0 (N Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler 76.3 Spent Fuel Pit' Pump 2 Cubicle Cooler 85.0 Cont.-Spray Pump-2B Cubicle Cooler cloned-Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2B Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2B closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2D closed Reactor Cont. Fan Cooler 2D closed Chilled Wtr. Sys. Primary Cont. Refr'.-2B; closed l
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S&L ECAD FII.E: BYREISC.li~
FIGUltE 1 BASIC PLANT DESIGN
~
i BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY t
UNIT I UNIT 2 SWITCHYARD SWITCHYARD' I SWITCHYARD SWITCHYARD n
n i
n n
Mm MM
(
Mm MM
[
O}
Og I
O}
Og Og Og l
al 9) q)
o) i o) al g) a)
ESF 4.16Kv,
l BUS I41 BUS I42 BUS 241 BUS 242 O
O O}
l O}
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o/
o/
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o/
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I I
s U
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FEED l
i i
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W 2
l
! W 2
WO D
DIESEL DRIVEN DIESEL DRIVEN O
AUX FEED AUX FEED l
POW. 1005 I
PUW. 1001 1
I i
8
FIGURE:2
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C.
Effects of Loss of Ventilation Rec h tlant The licensee should provide an independent AAC source that provides HVAC systems that serve the Dominant Areas of Concern (DAC) or provide an analysis that verifies the operability of SB0 equipment will not be degraded for the required SB0 duration and recovery therefrom.
I Responset HVAC systems in Dominant Areas of Concern.
The revised EDG loading scenario qualifies the EDG as an AAC source which powers all normal LOOP safe shutdown HVAC Systems serving dominant areas of concern.
The motor driven ATV and l
CCW pump areas are included. Details on the HVAC systems j
which are powered are shown in Table 5.
j' The revised loading scenario provides power to the B0 unit component cooling water pump from the AAC source which eliminates concerns over containment penetration cooling.
The discussion contained is for the worst case scenario for EDG loading (Div. 11 and 21 powered). However, all ventilation systems shown to be used for SB0 can be powered f rom any single EDG directly or via electrical crosstie.
I 1.-
Control Room and Auxiliary Electrical Egalpment Rooms The control room HVAC (VC) system provides filtered and i
conditioned air to both the main control room and auxiliary electrical equipment rooms. The VC system is designed to provide environmental conditions conducive to habitability and equipment life located inside the control room envelope under all plant operating conditions including station blackout.
The system maintains the control room envelope in a l
pressurized condition with respect to the surrounding areas in l
all modes of operation except smoke purge mode.
l Pressurization is maintained by the introduction of makeup air into the system through the emergency makeup filter unit. The VC system consists of two fully redundant equipment trains, each located in separate HVAC equipmes.t rooms and powered from l
two redundant safety-related electrical divisions. The operating components of the system are the same under the LOCA/ LOOP and SB0 condition.
During SB0 condition, the VC system components located in Unit I are operable, powered from the available AAC power source.
The VC system components powered from the available Div. 11 ESF Bus are as followst i
a.
Control Room HVAC Supply Fan b.
Control Room HVAC Return Fan c.
Control Room Refrigeration Unit d.
Refrigeration Unit Chilled Water Famp e.
Dnergency Makeup Filter Unit Fan f.
Emergency Makeup Filter Unit Heating 0011 '
l 1
l 2.
Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Rooms (MEER) and Essential Battery Rooms The MEER Ventilation (VE) System provides filtered air to the room to limit the space within the design temperature range.
maintain either atmospheric cr slightly negative pressure with j
respect to the surrounding areas, and limit the hydrogen concentration in the corresponding essential battery rooms.
This system is designed to provide an adequate environment for personnel health and safety, and protect the qualified life of equipment in the room under all normal and abnomal conditions. There are four subsystems that independently serve the MEER's and ESF battery rooms.
Each subsystem consists of a MEER exhaust fan and battery room exhaust fan.
l The ventilation for MEER Div. 12 and 22 is provided by its own independent supply fan while the ventilation for MEER Div.11 and 21 is provided via the Div. 11 and 21 ESF switchgear Ventilation (VX) system respectively.
During SB0 condition, the Div. 11 and 21 VE/VX systems are j
operable and powered from the available AAC power. The components, powered from the available Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESF buses are as follows:
a.
Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Room Exhaust Fan b.
'ESF Switchgear Room Vent Fan
)
c.
ESF Battery Room Exhaust Fan 3.
Diesel Generator Rooms The function of the Diesel Generator Ventilation (VD) system is to limit the room temperature within the design temperature range, and to prevent possible accumulation of oil fumes in these rooms.
Each division of the Diesel Generator Room is provided with an indel,endent ventilation supply fan and exhaust fan.
The ven':llation supply f ans are only required to operate when the diesel generator starts. The exhaust fan is I
not required to operate when the ventilation supply fan, together with the diesel generator, is in operation.
In the event the supply fan is not in operation (diesel generator off), the exhaust fan is required to operate and provide I
ventilation to the room by inducing air irom the Turbine Building.
During SB0 condition, with the diesel generator located in Unit 1 Div. 11 starting, the following VD system components are operable and powered from the available AAC power.
a.
Diesel Generator Vent Fan Div. 11 b.
Diesel Generator Exhaust Fan. Div. 21 c.
Diesel 011 Storage Room Exhaust Fan, Div. 11 and 21 4.
Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Area and Auxiliary Feed water (AFW) Pump Area The CCW pumps and motor driven AFW pumps are located in the general areas of the Auxiliary Building at different elevations.
During normal plant operating condition.
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ventilation is provided by the Auxiliary Building Ventilation L
(VA) system. During LOCA/ LOOP condition, including SBO, the VA system supply and exhaust fans and associated heating / cooling coils are not operable. Two charcoal booster fans will operate to provide ventilation in the general areas and maintain negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building. The charcoal booster fans induce outside air through the supply m
duct work system at a reduced airflow rate and exhaust through
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the enclosed cubicles.
For the motor-driven AFW pump area, power-operated control dampers are provided in the supply duct work to divert the Induced air into the pump area. Analysis of these pump areas during this condition indicates that the temperature in these areas will be below the environmental qualification design basis. The analysis was based on both the motor-driven AFW pumps and two CCW pumps in operation.
L For the diesel-driven AFW pump rooms, cubicle coolers are provided with two fans.
One fan is coupled directly to the diesel and operates when the diesel-driven AFW pump starts.
The other redundant motor driven fan is not required to operate when the diesel-driven AFW pump is in operation, but is to provide residual heat removal from the diesel driven AFW pump after it is stopped.
Two Auxiliary Building and one Fuel Handling Building charcoal booster fans are operable during SB0 condition and powered from the avn11able Div. 11 and 21 ESF bus.
5.
Essential Service Water Pump Residual Heat Removal Pump, and Centrifugal Charging Pump Cubicles Each pump room is provided with cubicle coolers to provide the primary cooling to maintain operating temperatures within acceptable limits. The cubicle coolers are required to operate when their respective pump starts. During normal plant operating conditions, ventilation to these rooms are provided by the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) system.
During SB0 condition which is similar to LOCA/ LOOP, the VA system is not operable.
l" The cubicle coolers that are operable and powered from the l7 available ESF buses are shown in Tabic 5.
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October 26, 1990 Page 1-of 1
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TABLE 5 CUBICLE COOLERS PUMP CUBICLE ELECTRIC &L.
NUMBER OF ERMEFLRTE ERMEFLATE MEQUIEED UNIT ROOM COOLER-SEFAEATION FAN / MOTOR.
E7 FOR TOTAL EP FOR NO.
NO.
orvIsIOw eBR COOLER ERCE NDTOR PER COOLER 530-Essential IVA01SA E11 4
~3 12 YES 1
Service 1VA01SB E12 4
3 12 NO 1
Water 2VA01SA E21 4
3
.12 -
NO 2
Pump Room 2VA01SB E22 4
3 12 NO 2
Residual IVA02SA-E11 2-3 6
YES 1
Heat IVA02SB E12 2
3 6
NO 1
Removal 2VA02SA E21 2
3 6
NO 2
Pump Room 2VA02SB E22-2-
3 6
NO 2
i Containment IVA03SA E11 4
3 12 NO 1
Spray IVA03SB E12~
4 3
12 NO 1
Pump Room 2VA03SA C'
4 3
12 NO 2
2VA03SB 4
3 12 NO 2
Safety IVA04SA Ell 2
3 6
NO 1
Injection IVA04SB E12 2
3 6
NO 1
Pump Room 2VA04SA E21 2
3 6
NO 2
I 2VA04SB E22 2
3 6
NO 2
Centrifugal IVA06SA E11 2
3 6
YES 1
Charging IVA06SB E12 2
3 6
NO 1
Pump Room 2VA06SA E21 2
3 6
YES 2
2VA06SB E22 2
3 6
NO 2
i NOTE:
Cubicle coolers operation during station blackout (SBO) are based on the operation of each respective pump per Reference Table f.
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Containment Isolation Recommendations The licensee should provide an acceptable AAC power source that provides power to the needed CIVs or provide alternate means to assure appropriate containment integrity for the required SB0 duration.
j
Response
A list of containment isolation valves (CIVs) of concern was generated in accordance with the criteria in Step 1 of NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.5.
Where redundant CIVs exist in series, the AAC source will be used to close one of the two CIVs and provide indication in the con. col room. The remaining CIVs of concern are either 125VDC or can be locally operated / closed with control room or local position indication. Procedures will incorporate the necessary actions that must be
- accomplished to ensure appropriate containment integrity.
Included will be a listing of containment isolation valves which would require local verification of proper containment isolation during an SB0 event.
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E.
Reactor Coolant Inventory Rect==nandation The licensee should provide an independent AAC power source of sufficient capacity and capability to provide
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power to the make-up systems to maintain adequate RCS inventory or provide an assessment that there will be k
adequate RCS inventory to ensure continued core cooling L
for the required SB0 duration and recovery therefrom.
o Responset The revised EDG loading scenario qualifies the EDG as an AAC source. The AAC source powers a centrifugal charging pump on i
each unit to provide necessary RCS make-up for inventory control. Ilowever, an analysis using the assumptions of Westinghouse WCAP 10541 has verified that if no centrifugal charging pump were. supplied fer the entire four hour coping duration the remaining inventory would keep the reactor core covered and adequately cooled.
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f F.
Procedures and Training l
The System Power Supply procedure on AC power restoration has been reviewed and modified to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.2.
The Station severe weather procedure (tornado) has been reviewed and l
determined to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00 Section 4.2.3.
Other Station emergency procedures have been reviewed and changes necessary to meet NUMARC 87-00 will be implemented in the following areast a.
Manually lockout equipment on the blacked out unit not required for safe shutdown to limit the load on the EDG j
prior to closing the electrical crosstle; b.
Connect the Alternate AC source (the non-blacked-out unit EDG) to the blacked-out unit. AAC source is the excess capacity of the NB0 unit EDG after powering all normal safe shutdown loads on the NB0 unit, no load shedding is performed on NB0 unit; c.
Ensure operation of the diesel driven AFW pump on the blacked out (BO) uniti d.
Mechanically crosstie essential sersi:e water between non-blacked out (NBO) and B0 units; e.
Start a component cooling water pump for component and containment penetration cooling; f.
Start a charging pump for reactor inventory control; g.
Ensure the appropriate provisions of containment integrity; and h.
Restore off-site and EAC power when it becomes available. _ = _ = - -
e o
C.
Proposed Modificat.lona Recomumendation: The licensee should provide a full description including the nature and objectives of the re?uired modifications to meet the SB0 rule and a proposed schedule for implementation.
Responses No modifications are required. The plant utilizes an existing EDG as an AAC source for powering necessary SB0 equipment.
1 O
e R.
Quality Assurance and Technical Specification Recommsendation: The licensee should verify that SB0 equipment is covered by an appropriate QA program consistent with the guidance of R.C 1.155.
Further, this evaluation should e
be documented as part of the package supporting the SB0 rule response.
Response
Equipment relied upon to operate during SB0 is covered by existing QA requirements or Technical Specification programs which are consistent with the guidance of R.G 1.155.
Support documents will include a listing of equipment used for SB0 and indicate the applicable Quality Program.
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E 211abili CECO ty Pr 1 15.cur ogr r
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asa e tly has an EDG r liab e
ility program which co fo n
rms to R.C ZELECT/
LJS/
217 sms l
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EDG Reliability Program CECO currently has an ET, reliability program which conforms to R.G 1.155.
ZELECT/217 LJS/sms q _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _