ML20058D620
| ML20058D620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-09-03, TASK-9-3, TASK-RR LSO5-82-07-048, LSO5-82-7-48, NUDOCS 8207270242 | |
| Download: ML20058D620 (11) | |
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July 20,1982 s
Docket No. 50-155 LS05-82-07-048
!!r. David J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W. Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. VandeWalle:
SUBJECT:
EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC IX-3, " STATION SERVICE AND COOLING WATER SYSTEhS" BIG ROCK POINT Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic IX-3, Station Service and Cooling Water Systems. This evaluation
/,e is based on your safety assessment of this topic.
This evaluation compares your facility, as described in. Docket No. 50-155, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. The differences are summarized as follows:
>, 1.
The licensee should verify the existence of procedures which would ensure _ that system ficw requirements are met.
2.
The licensee has not addressed the effect of a passive failure in the Fire Protection System.
/
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment
/
for your facility. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if
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your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
@Y Sincerely, j;g)
$ D D '.
2.56g6[/'
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief i
l 8207270242 820720 Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 '
l PDR ADOCK 05000155 Division of' Licensing P
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1 I wac ronu ais oo-ea Nacu oao OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usaao-au-u m
m Mr. David J. VandeWalle CC Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary U. S. Environmental Protection Co'nsumers Power Company Agency 212 West Michigan Avenue Federal Activities Branch Jackson, Michigan 49201 Region V Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative Judd L. Bacon, Esquire 230 South Dearborn Street Consumers Power Company Chicago, Illinois 60604 212. West Michigan Avenue
' Jackson, Michigan 49201 Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Joseph Gallo, Esquire U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Isham, Lincoln & Beale Washington, D. C.
20555 1120 Connecticut Avenue Room 325 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Washington, D. C.
20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Peter W. Steketee, Esquire Washington, D. C.
20555 505 Peoples Building Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman U. S. N0 clear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Rig Rosk Point Nuclear Power Plant ATTN:
Ec. C. J. Hartman
.r-Mr. John O'Neill,11 FTant Superintendent Route 2, Box 44 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Maple City, Michigan 49664
.c s
Christa-Maria
' '"~ Mr. Jim E. Mills Route 2, Box 108C Route 2, Box 108C Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 William J. Scanlon, Esquire Chairman 2034 Pauline Boulevard County Board of Supervisors Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Charlevoix County Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Resident Inspector C
Big Rock Point Plant 0'ffice of the Governor (2) clo U.S. NRC Room 1 - Capitol Building RR #3, Box 600
_ Lansing, Michigan 48913 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720
~ Herbert Semmel Hurst & Hanson Counsel for Christa Maria, et al.
311 1/2 E. Mitchell Urban Law Institute Petoskey, Michigan 49770 Antioch School of Law 2633 16th Street, NW Washington, D. C.
20460 f
s Mr. David J. VandeWalle CC Dr. John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Ms. JoAnn Bier 204 Clinton Street Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cor. mission Washington, D. C.
20555 James G. Keppler, Regional Admin'.strator Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 m
5 4
4
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC IX-3 BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION TOPI C:
IX-3, Station Service and Cooling Water Systems I.
INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Topic IX-3 is to assure that the cooling water systems have the capability, with adequate margin, to meet design objectives and, in particular, to assure that:
A.
systems are provided with adequate physical separation such that there are no adverse interactions among those systems under any mode of operation; B.
sufficient cooling water inventory has been provided or that adequate provisions for makeup are available; C.
tank overflow cannot be released to the environment without monitoring and unless the level of radioactivity is within i
acceptable limits; D.
vital equipment necessary for achieving a controlled and safe shutdown is not flooded due to the failure of non-seismic Class 1 fluid systems.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The current criteria and guidelines used to determine if the plant systems meet the topic safety objective are those provided in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Sections 9.2.1, " Station Service Water System," and 9.2.2, " Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems."
In determining if plant design conforms to a safety objective, use is made, where possible, of applicable portions of other staff reviews.
For example, safety objective D, identified above, is being reviewed as part of SEP Topic III-5.B. " Pipe Breaks Outside Containment." Therefore, it is not addressed in this topic.
i III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of efforts since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics. The related topics and subject matter are identified below. Each of the related topic reports contains the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
i II-2.A Severe Weather Phenomena II-3.B Flooding Potantial and Protection Requirements l
II-3.B.1 Design Basis Flooding t
l II-3.C Safety-Related Water Supply III-3.A Effects of High 'n'eter Level on Structures 111-3.8 Flooding of Equipment (Failure of Underdrain System)
III-3.C Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures III-4.A Tornado Missiles III-4.C Internally Generated Missiles III-5.A HELB Inside Containment III-5.B HELB Outside Containment III-6 Seismic Design Considerations III-12 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment VI-2.0 Mass and Energy Releases VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation Systems VI-7.C ECCS Single-Failure Criterion VI -7. C.1 Independence of On-Site Power i
VI-7.C.2 ECCS Failuie Mode Analysis VI-7.D Long-Term Cooling Passive Failures VI-7.E ECCS Sump Design and Test for Recirculation Mode Effectiveness VII-3 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII-2 On-Site Emergency Power Systems - Diesel Generator IX-1 Fuel Storage IX-6 Fire Protection
,-,_7_-,
. The following topics are dependent on the present topic infonnation for completion:
VI-3 Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability V-5 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES In addition to the guidelines of SRP Section 9.2.1 and 9.2.2, in determining which systems to evaluate under this topic the staff used the definitions of " systems important to safety" provided in Reference 1.
The definition states systems important to safety are those necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10 CFR 100,
" Reactor Si te Criteria." This definition was used to determine which systems or portions of systems were " essential." Systems or portions of systems which perform functions important to safety were considered to be essential.
It should be noted that this topic will be updated if future SEP reviews identify additional cooling water systems that are important to safety.
V.
EVALUATION The systems reviewed under this topic are the Service Water System, Reactor Cooling Water System, Demineralized Water System and the l
l Fire Protection System. The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is discussed in the SEP review of Topic IX-1, " Fuel Storage."
A.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The Service Water System (SWS) takes its supply from Lake Michigan to provide the cooling water services in the turbine building, service building and the reactor building.
The system consists of two vertical turbine type centrifugal pumps, piping, instrumentation and controls. The pumps, each having a capacity of 2100 gpm, take their suction from the center of the intake structure. One pump supplies the normal needs of the service water system.
4-The pumps are powered from 480 volt Motor Control Center 1C and 2C. The two pumps discharge into a common header which supplies cooling water to the following heat loads:
1.
Generator Hydrogen Coolers (4) 2.
Turbine Lube Oil Coolers (2) 3.
Reactor Feed Pump Lube Oil Coolers (2) 4.
Turbine Building and Reactor Building Air Coolers 5.
Air Compressor Jackets and Aftercoolers (3) 6.
Chlorinator 7.
Condenser Circulating Water Pump Seals (2) 8.
Turbine Bypass Valve Oil Cooler (1) 9.
Condenser Vacuum Pump Seals (1)
- 10. Heating Boiler Blowdown
- 11. Miscellaneous W6shdown Connections 12.
Reactor Cooling Water Heat Exchangers (2)
Based on our review of the Service Water System (subject to the findings of the additional SEP reviews noted above), we have determined that the service water system is not important to safety as defined in Reference 1.
B. REACTOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM The Reactor Cooling Water System (RCW), provides cooling water to the reactor shield cooling panels and other radioactive cooling systems. Since it is potentially radioactive (due to tube leaks),
it is contained in a closed loop independent of the Service Water System and located inside containment.
For normal plant operation, one RCW pump and heat exchanger are placed in service. The RCW system is composed of the following equipment: A concrete tank of approximately 5300 gallons, two full capacity vertical four-stage pumps with a capacity of 1500 gpm each,6two full capacity heat exchangers with a design capacity of 9 X 10 Btu /hr each, piping, level indication, pressure controls, radiation detection devices, valves and associated equipment to and from the various equipment serviced by the RCW system.
. The pumps are powered by 480 volt Motor Control Centers l A and 2A.
The RCW pumps discharge into a comon header which supplies cooling water to the following heat loads:
1.
Reactor Recirculating Pump Coolers (2) 2.
Shutdown Cooling Pump Gland Coolers (2) 3.
Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger (1) 4.
Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (2) 5.
Shutdown Heat Exchangers (2) 6.
Reactor Shield Cooling Panels (8)
Based on our review of the Reactor Cooling Water System (subject to the findings of additional SEP reviews noted above), we have detemined that the RCW system is not important to safety as defined in Reference 1.
C.
DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM Although no credit is taken for the Demineralized Water System (DMW) in mitigating the consequences of a loss-of-coolant-accident, it is being considered here because it is a source of make-up water to the Reactor Cooling Water supply tank and the Emergency Condenser which may be used for plant cooldown.
Upon the loss of the normal heat sink and/or loss of station power, the Emergency Condenser is used to cool the primary system. Water contained in the shell side of the Emergency Condenser is sufficient for approximately four hours without make-up.
The Demineralized Water System or the fire system can be used for make-up water to the Emergency Condenser if required.
The DMW feed pump is driven by a 480 volt, 7.5 hp motor supplied by motor control center IC. The pump takes its suction from a 5000 gallon demineralized water storage tank. Make-up water is automatically supplied to the Emergency Condenser when required to maintain a proper level.
. Based on our review of the DMW system (subject to findings of the additional SEP reviews noted above), we have determined that the DMW system is not important to safety as defined in Reference 1.
D.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM The Fire Protection System (FPS) is discussed under this SEP topic because of its role in providing back-up cooling water supply to the emergency condenser, the RCW heat exchangers and in providing the necessary water supply to the core spray heat exchanger, which is part of the post-incident (ECCS) system.
While the role of the FPS in mitigating the consequences of a loss-of-coolant-cccident is discussed here in general terms, more specific and detailed information on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) can be found in other SEP topics listed in Section III of this document.
The FPS contains three fire pumps; jockey, electric and diesel.
These pumps take their suction from the condenser circulating water intake structure and discharge into the fire system header.
The fire system header exits ihe screenhouse, where the pumps are located, as a single underground pipe that connects to an underground yard loop that circles the containment, turbine and service buildings.
Fire water enters the containment either through the turbine building pipe tunnel or, as a back-up, through the core spray pump and heat exchanger room.
Inside containment, the fire protection system provides cooling or spray water to the following equipment:
1.
RCW Heat Exchangers (in lieu of service water) 2.
Emergency Condenser Make-up (in lieu of demineralized water) 3.
Primary Core Spray 4
Redundant Core Spray 5.
Primary Containment Spray 6.
Redundant Containment Spray 7.
Fire Protection
. A separate fire header runs from the underground yard loop to the core spray pump and heat exchanger room. This fire header provides a redundant path for providing cooling or spray water to the above equipment. In addition, this line provides cooling water to the shell side of the core spray heat exchanger. A fire hose is located in the screenhouse that can be used to provide cooling water to the core spray heat exchanger in the event that the single header connecting the screenhouse to the under-ground yard loop fails. Operators would be required to attach this hose to a hose manifold outside the screenhouse and to a hose connection on the core spray heat exchanger. The hose is dedicated for this purpose only. This arrangement has previously been reviewed and found acceptable (see Reference 4). Wi th respect to the piping inside the screenhouse, the licensee's evaluation failed to address the potential for a passive failure of the common non-redundant pipe header. The licensee should evaluate the effect of a passive failure of this non-redundant pipe header (see Reference 3).
In addition to the piping described above, the main component of the fire protection system are*the accumulator, jockey fire pump, diesel fire pump, electric fire pump.
The fire system accumulator is a 670-gallon tank located in the screenhouse. It provides a reserve water supply and pressure head for the system. The jockey fire pump is a vertical turbine pump driven by a 3 hp, 480 Vac motor powered from MCC-2C. The jockey pump starts when the system pressure drops to 80 psig to maintain the proper level in the accumulator tank. Both the electric and diesel-driven pumps are vertical, four-stage, turbine type pumps having a capacity of 1000 gpm at 100 psig. The driver for the electric pump is a 480 Vac,100 hp motor. The motor is powered from emergency bus MCC-2B which is connected to the emergency diesel generator. The driver for the diesel-driven pump is a six-cylinder,103 hp,1750 rpm diesel engine. The electric driven pump automatically starts when system pressure drops to 70 psig and the diesel-driven pump automatically starts when pressure drops to 60 psig. Both pumps are automatically started upon receipt of a signal from the Reactor Depressurizing System in order to assure availability of core and containment spray water prior to depressurizing the reactor coolant system.
During the post-accident recirculation mode, water is drawn from the containment sump, cooled by the core spray heat exchanger and returned to the core spray header. The recirculation mode starts between 4 and 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> after the accident, depending upon the rate of water addition to the containment through the core and containment sprays. Tge core spray heat exchanger has a heat removal rate of 8 X 10 Btu /hr. The decay heat generated, assuming
. regctor power was at 240 Mwt prior to the incident, is 8.19 X 6
10 Btu /hr at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 5.6 10 Btu /hr at 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />. The Post-Incident System capabilities will be discussed in greater detail in other SEP topics.
In the event that the condenser circulating water system piping ruptures, it is possible that a portion of the screenhouse can become flooded, jeopardizing the operation of both the diesel and electric fire pumps. Any flooding of the screenhouse due to piping failures will be assessed in SEP Topic III-5B.
Based upon our review of the fire protection system, we have concluded that the design of the FPS provides sufficient redundancy to ensure reliable operation, with the exception of connon piping.
The licensee should evaluate the effect of passive system failures (including common piping).
VI.
CONCLUSION Based on our review of the service and cooling water systems for Big Rock Point, only the Fire Protection System is considered essen-tial and within the scope of this topic (see Section V.D).
We find the design of this system is acceptable with the following exceptions:
1.
The licensee should verify the existence of procedures which would ensure that system flow requirements are met.
2.
There may be a need for system modification to eliminate potential passive single failures.
VII. REFERENCES 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.105, " Instrument Setpoints."
2.
Licensee's SEP Topic IX-3, SAR dated December 10, 1981.
3.
Branch Technical Position MIEB 3-1, " Postulated Rupture Locations in Fluid System Piping Inside and Outside Containment," NUREG-0800.
4.
Amendment No. 25 to Facility Operational License No. DPR-6 for Big Rock Point, dated April 4,1979.
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