ML20055G719
| ML20055G719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1988 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Mark Resner NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055C208 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-540 NUDOCS 9007240105 | |
| Download: ML20055G719 (6) | |
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WGvember'26, 1986 Memorandum ' For t Mark E. Resner, Assistant Director for Investigations p
office of Inspector and Auditor u
Subject:
Review of Transcript Y
Returned is the transcript of my November 9,1988 interview with a representative of the of fice of Inspector and Auditor which you forwarded to me under a memo dated November 17,.1988.
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,The copy is clean and accurately reflects my answers as to the best of l
lty recollection.
However, the main issue remains unanswered.
Ms.
Connelly, who-was conducting the interview, stated that an allegation i
had' been made that I applied f or a job at the south Texas Project L
during the summer of 1987.
Ms. connelly gave me the impression that Loince I denied that I applied for a job she was seeking to have me indicted for perjury.
She started that the basis-of that charge was' a i
handwritten memo-from Larry George to Andy-Hill.
It was dated August 21,.1987.
The. memo' was read into the record and appears starting on t
L page 23 line 10.
Larry George is.an employee of the south Texas
- SGcurity Department. who had been a confident of the NRC inspectors.
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'The 'memonseems to raise more questions than it answered.
I had conversations with Mr. George on almost a daily basis.
The memo is
- cluttered with ideas and responses to questions raised by Mr. George during theseLintervening weeks.
Note that he starts his memo with
'Sentor about the week of August 10th, 1987".
Why is he writing this culti-topical meno to Andy Hill who is apparently no longer in the job of; security penager?
After-reflection some thoughts come to mind. In on' ef fort to clarify sone of this, I include those reflections.
12 did respond-to Mr. George's request for ideas about where STP might
' find personnel for the Sergeant and Lieutenant jobs' that they needed to fill.
I' recommended that they recruit at the junior and senior colleges that were _ graduating young criminal justice and police coministration ' majors.
That is one isolated. topic which relates to
' n31ther Mr. caldwell or myself nor to Mr. Hill's vacated position.
Why George is1 belatedly conveying that information to the dismissed-Mr. Hill, I can't even venture a guess.
"Concerning the headhunters making contact with me and other security
< professionals, I. did: share that information with Mr. George and maybe-Mr.' Kern.
However, Mr. George is mistaken when he says that I spoke
_obout myself as a replacement for Mr. Hill.
However, if you replace 1
the word " him " which appears on line 16, page 23, with the phrase JMRC inspector we are approaching accuracy.
It was more like me m
coying,:
can you imagine that your management would consider another a
MRC: 1nspector for Hill's job ?"
I was referring to the caldwell contact sof which I thought that Mr. George was aware.
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V I have. stated earlier that I thought the Caldwell contact, however legal,,was a mistake.
This was all in the context that-both Andy Hill ond-Dave Moore were former NRC inspectors hired by. HL&P and that did not'workiout.
Notice on line 18, that Mr. George acknowledges that I sold'it-was a bad idea.
All-in all this is an academic discussion anyhow because Mr. George was not in a position to hire or recommend any. senior candidates.
He was concerned with his own survival and had in the past asked me to put in a good word for him.
I was happy to-i
. consider that because I thought that Mr. George and Mr. Kern were icportant assets to the development of the security program.
This is o significant point because I had almost daily contacts and meetings with Mr. Vaughn.
Mr. Vaughn was the vice President of Nuclear-
' Production and the hiring authority for the security department.
I never atehinted nor asked for a job, filled out an application, oubmitted-a resume or otherwise had any communication about employment for any individual with Mr. Vaughn, the hiring authority, of the STP Decur ity department.
If I was interested in such a position, I had dolly-onsite personal opportunity to approach Mr. Vaughn.
I do not t
mean to insult Mr. George, but if I was inclined to seek employment at R
STP I would have contacted Mr. Vaughn directly and not Mr. George.
I have become suspicious of the real intent of this process as conducted by Ms. Conne11y's office.of Inspection and Auditor.
It has
.bscone quite clear to me that if an NRC inspector finds and reports oecurity or safety risks, it is his own security that is placed at risk..Lest we forget, this whole otA overview began because.the cliegers, who had f alsified documents to coverup their tremendous cistakes in the development of the ' security program at STP, attempted to: shif t blame to the NRC Inspectors.
The inspection findings were verified.by investigations conducted by the NRC Office-of Investigations and the State of Texas.
Findings by the HL&P Auditors brought-about.the dismissals of the allegers.. The NRC has declined to
.cct against those perpetrators and instead has turned against those NRC? inspectors who found the acts of wrong doing.
Whether it is i
intended or not, these nonjudicial personal attacks on the. integrity of the: Inspectors is debilitating to the overall inspection process.
I find that I have a moral responsibility to go beyond my own defense i
in defense:of regulated quality security programs at licensed nuclear power reactors.
I intend to resist this intimidating process, as corried out: by OI A, which appears' to have as a oal the frightening of MRC. Inspectors-into overlooking wrongdoing by a ents of licensees, cc: L. ~ 2eck, Chairman, NRC R. Martin, Regional Administrator, RIV R. Bangart, Division Director, RPSO, RIV W. Dressler, NTEU, Attorney
u.s NuctsAn atoutAtony couuissioN ott.ce et imoeooe ano Am December 1, 1988 f
1 Report of interview David MOORE, former Supervisor for Investi lations and Assessments, Nuclear f
Security Department, Safeguards Services Dtvision, HL&P, and currently, Nuclear Security tranch, Tennessee Supervisor of Security, Compliance Sectionwasinterviewedtelephonicallyregardinghisknowle v
- Valley Authority (TVA) flame retardant material in the area above the control of the testini) of the In addttion,1100RE responded to Questions concerning the reorganizatio's MOORE stated room.
plan that was alleged to have beu drafted by James A.F. KtLLY.
essentially the following:
MOORE related that he was not 1 resent with A.B. EARNEST and David SHEESLE Hydrosil-is during the time the material, Gdrosil, was initially scratched.
the material that was used to seal several unused pgnetrations that existed MOORE l
between the control room and the cable spreading room directly below.
said the titility engineering staff aged the material and Rex N00RE was in charge of the actual bullet-resistance testing and video taped the procedures.
He stated that he and the utility's QA personnel were present during the testing which occurred on the firing range and involved shooting through the MOORE further explained that because Hydrosil with a high-powered rifle.
Region IV would not accept the responsibility that the material was acce) table L
(could not be penetrated) and met the UL 752 standard (level 4), they (tu i
utility) contacted Mr. SKELTON and Mr. BUSH of the NRC Headquarters, who resolved the matter and other security related issues during an onsite visit.
CIA asked MOORE to address the allegation that KELLY " drafted a reorganization plan for the STP security personnel that was subsequently implemented by HL&P MOORE recalled that when the staff was informed of the impending management.
MOORE reorganization An@ HILL was manager, Nuclear Security De>artment.
further related that HILL called a meeting and presented' tie plan in a manner such that, ' effective today, this is the new reorganization.' He said they were also informed of new procedures, e.g., they would start wearing ties.
MOORE opined that HILL was probably directed by HL&P management to reorganize.
ia He affirmed that he obtained the plan from David SHEESLEY, who had been given the plan from KELLY. MOORE was not certain, however, about the manner in.
He speculated that KELLY which the plan was presented to SHEESLEY by KELLY.
may have said something similar to "this is what you guys should look like.'
MOORE added that he understood if SHEESLEY was reluctant to address the matte Specifically because SHEESLEY is currently involved in the STP inspection effer.s for Unit 2.
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December 6, 1988 o.................
Report of Interview l
David LAMB,lly regarding his knowledge of the allegation tiat KELLY drafted telephonica proposal to reorganize the nuclear security organization at SOUTH TEXAS. LAMB
. stated essentially the following:
j LAMB related that during July 1987, HILL had been removed from his position as Manager, Nuclear Security Department, and reassigned to a position in another L
building. Within this time frame, LAMB recalled that executive management, specifically, Mr. Larry KERN and Mr. Gerald VAVGHN, decided to recrganize the nuclear group to improve management effectiveness.
LAMB said to his knowledge.
James KELLY was not involved in the development of the plan or personnel decisions relative to the implementation of the plan.
He further stated to-his knowledge-that other than possible suggestions offered in the spirit of
" assistance," KELLY was not involved in any meetings that HL&P held concerning.
this matter. LAMB related that he did not remember what the reorganization chart dated July 5,1987 said, nor did he recall receiving it. However he was aware that KELLY was extremely concerned about STP's poor management to the point that their management effectiveness was an open item until just a few months ago. On a personal note, LAMB related that KELLY was probably the I
finest of all the _NRC inspectors, and he found KELLY to be knowledgeable and
. helpful.
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December 6, 1988 Report of Interview Mark ItcBURNETT Manatter Operations Support Licensing Department, HL&P, was interviewed telephon'ca$1y regarding his knowledge of the discussions between l
HL&P management and the Region IV inspectors about reorganizing the nuclear security organization. McBURNETT also provided information about the testing
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procedures em)1oyed by A.B. EARNE$7 and the alleged threat by EARNE$T to David
$HEESLEY and.arry GEORGE. McBURNETT stated essentially the following:
McBURNETTrelatedthatduringthemiddleofthesunnerof1987(June-July),
the Licensing Department became aware that the Nuclear Security Department was not gettinti the job done. He recalled several discussions with Andy HILL about spectfic problems - one of which was Larry RYLEY, Panager,ization toOperations Division. Together, he and HILL presented the idea of a reorgan Initially, the focus o.
to~ remove RYLEY from his executive management.
l position to a different slot and thereby facilitate more direct reporting to HILL rather than to RYLEY. He said that the current organization was not t
working well because RYLEY was 'a people problem when it came to j
interarsonal relations particularly with the NRC. McBURNETT further related J
i that ie and HILL wanted to ' flatten the organization out' particularly in the He added that they met with Mr. GOLD 8 ERG and Mr. VAUGHN and area of training.
McBURNETT stated that the NRC was collectively finalized the reorganization.
I not involved in any meetings or discussions with the' utility relative to the but he did reorganization. He recalled that HILL had some sketches of a plani were suggested to HILL oct he did not know this to be factual.
i not know where HILL hed obtained them. Mc8URNETT opfned that He added tsat as the reorttanization materialized executive management decided to remove HILLfromh'spositionaswellaskVLEY. However, this occurred later in the agenda.
HcBURNETT also related that he was present during the testing of the flame retardant material,he material was scratched.Hydrosil, on the firing ran With regard to testing, he said
- ontrol room when t he witnessed testing by EARNEST that he considered to be 'potentially destructive,' particularly, in the area of the vnel area doors. He explained that there are metal fire doors that access the control room. The doors are supposed to be resistant to penetration, but how that system is tested raises Mc8URNETT said that EARNE$T
' the issue of what is appropriate and what is not.
used crowbars on the doort to determine whether they could be,g g d.
iMcBURHETT viewed thLs as excessivt, although he said that thqy Nhe utilit;r) through conversation with other ttilities in the Region, tgat 1 earned later,is is the way Region IV normally conducts their inspections.
He apparently, th added "I guess we would just have to repair or replace the doors',if necessary, oi a^
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McBURNETT expressed another concern regarding EARNE$T's testing of the Herelatedthatthereappearedtobe'hazardoustestinp'ofwith "E* field."
The utility was very uncomfortable with the leve their personnel.
performance required by EARNEST, such as hurdling between two wires and falling into broken rocks as a direct result. McBURNETT further stated that by conducting these tests, EARNEST apparently had a hidden agenda to discredit the E. field, to show that it was not an acceptable system.
McBURNETT recalled the aftermath of the alleged physical threat by EARNEST directed at LAMB and SHEE5 LEY. He stated that although he did not witness the incident (not sure exactly) af ter it occurred, the subject surfaced during a He could not meeting McBURNETT attended with Mr. VAUGHN and Mr. YANDELL.
recall specifics about what was said because it had happened over a year ago, i
but ha offered that perhaps a few of the utility's instrument controls technicians may have witnest.ed the incident. McBURNETT said that EARNE$T can be extremely intimidating for a host of reasons he is very loud and vocal and he is fairly large in stature (LAftB was described as 5'7*-5'8' tall and SHEESLEY, 5'10*-5'11 tall; and both men are under 200 lbs) and he is from the NRC.
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