Text

Forwards Commission Biweekly Notice of Applications & Amends to OLs Re NSHC Published in Fr on 900613
	ML20055F119
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/02/1990
From:	Murley T; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Graham B, Sharp P, Udall M; HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS
References
	NUDOCS 9007130317
	Download: ML20055F119 (48)
	v • d • e

1 July 2,1990 IDENTICAL LETTERS SENT TO:

(See attached list of addressees)

The Honorable Bob Graham, Chairman Subcomittee on Nuclear Regulation Comittee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D. C.

20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Public Law 97-415, enacted on January 4, 1983, amended Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the Nuclear Regulatory Comission to issue and make imediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Comission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Comission of a request for a hearing.

In addition, the legislation requires the Comission to periodically (but not less frequently than once every 30 days) publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under the new authority above.

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Comission's Biweekly Notice of Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses involving no significant hazards considerations, which was published in the Federal Register on June 13, 1990 (55 FR 23992' Sincerely, Original signed by Frank J. Miraglia Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu!ation

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice cc: Sen. Alan K. Simpson 49 DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosure:

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cc: The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Inr21er Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

20515 cc: Rep. James V. Hansen The Honorable Philip R. Sharp, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Power Committee on Energy and Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

20515 cc:

Rep. Carlos Moorhead

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111

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?.:

r 1964, as amended (the Act), to require M

the Coaumission to publish notice of any amendments issued or prop > sed to be U

issued under a new provision of section.

tas of the Act.nis alon grants the -

o Commission the au ty toissue and l

make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon -

a determinadon by the Commission that i

such amendment involves no signi8 cant -

r hazards consideration notwithstandin' g the pendency befots the Commission of

=-

' a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued. or proposed to be issued from May 18,1900 ?

I through May 31.1990. The last biweekly :

notice was published on May 30.1990 (55 FR 21958).

' NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCEOF AMENDMENTTO i

'l

. FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND L

PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT 1

HAZARDS CONSIDERATION -

DETERMINATION AND 1

OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING -

8 ne Commission has made a proposed determination that the following _

y amendment requests involve no.

significant hazards considegation. Under ~

, the Comminaion's regulations in to CFR-50.92, this means that operation of the -

facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) Involve a :

o significant increase in the probability or i

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of l

a new or different kind of accident from -

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) -

I*

Involve a signiReant reductionin a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commissionis seeking public comments on this proposed determhtation. Any comments received n

4 within 30 days after the date of -

L publication of this notice willbe considered in making any final determination.The Commission will not normally make a Anal determination -

J unless it receives a request for a -

hearing.

1.

NUCLEAR REQULATORy Written comments may be submitted COtetAISSION by mall to the Regulatory Publications

=j Branch. Division of Freedom of '

i Biweekly Notice Appiloations and Information and Publications Services.

Amendmente to Operating Licensee Office of Administration. U.S. Nuclear 3

Involving No Significant Hazards Regulatory Commission. Washington. l Considerations DC 20555, and should cite the i

publication date and page number of L Background this Federal Register nottoe. Written

' Pursuant to Public law (P.L 197 415.

comments may also be delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Room P.223. Phillipe Building. 7920 Commission)is publishing this regular Norfolk Avenue.Bethesda Maryland biweekly notice. P.L. 97 418 revised from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of section 180 of the Atomic Energy Act of written commente received may be i

L J

l

Federal Regnaler / Vol. 55, No.114 / Wednesday, June 13, 1990 / Notices.

38MS examined at the NRC Pubuc D-et Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to example,in derating or shutdown of the Room, the Gelman Building.212D L the first prehearing conference facility. the Commission aney issue the Street, NW., Washington, DC h filing scheduled in the proceeding, a pettunner license amendment before the of requests for hearing and petitions for shall fue a supplement to the petition to expiration of the 20< lay notice period, leave to intervene is discussed below.

Intervene which must include a list of provided that its Raal determination is By July 1319e0, the licensee may file a the contentions which are sought to be that the amendment involves no request for a hearing with' respect to htigsted in the matter. Each contention significant hasards consideration. N issuance of the amendment to the mud consist of a specific statement of final determination will consider all tM..eue of law or fact to be raised or public and State comments received subject facilitkose interest may be operating license and contn etted. In addition, the petitioner before action is taken. Should the any person w affected by this proceeding and who shall ps; vide a brief explanation of the Commission take this action. It will bases or the contention and a concise wishes to participate as a party in the publish a notice of lasuance and provide proceeding must file a written petition statement of the alleged facts or expert for opportunity for a hearing after for leave to intervene. Requests for a opinion which support the contention hearing and petitions for leave to and on which the petitioner intends to issuanca. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur pm e

he intervene shall be filed in accordance

'[

" )o very infraquantly, gne al with the Commission's " Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing pwv de reference to those specific A request for a hearms or a petition sources and documents of which the for leave to intervene must be filed with Pmceedings in 10 CMart 2" petitioner is aware and on which the the Secretary of the Comaussion. U.S.

Interested persons should consult a petitioner intends to rely to estabhsh Nuclear Regulatory Commission, current copy of to Cllt 2.714 which is those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner Washington. DC 20555, Attention:

avallable at the Commission,a Public must provide sufficient information to Docketing and Services Branch, or may Document Room. the Celman Building-show that a genuine dispute exists with be delivered to the Commission's Pubhc 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC the applicant on a materialissue oflaw Document Room, the Celman Building.

20555 and at the Local Public Document or fact. Contentions shall be limited to 2120 L 5treet, NW Washington DC, by Room for the particular facility involved. matters within thepcope of the the above date. Where petitions are If a request for a hearing or petition fo' amendments under consideration.h filed dartng the last ten (10) days of the leave to intervene is filed by the above contention must be one which, il proven, notice period it is requested that the date, the Commission or an Atomic wogia :;ntitle the petitioner to rehef. A petitioner promptly so inforta b Safety and Licensing Bosed. designated aetitioner who fails to flie each a Commieston by a toll-free telephone can by the Commission or by the Chairman supplement which satisflee thes*

to Western Union at 1-(800) 325 8000 (la of the Atomic Safety and Licensing requirements with respect to at least one hilosourt 1-(800) 342-6700). 'Ihe Western Board Panel, will rule on the request contention will not be permitted to Union operator abould be given and/or petition and the Secretary or the participate as a party.

Datagram identification Number 3737 designated Atomic Safety and Licanalng hee permitted to intervene become and the foDowing message addressed to Board willlasue a notice of heanng oe parties to the proceeding, subject to any (Project Dinctor): petitioner's name and an appropriate order.

limitatione in the order granting leave to telephone number; date petition was As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a intervene, and have the opportunity to mailed: plant namar, and publicatloa petition for leave to intervene shall set karticipate fully in the conduct of the date and page member of this Fedssel forth with particularity the interest of earing. including the opportunity to the petitioner in the proceeding, and present evidece and cross examine Register notice. A copy of the petition how that interest may be affected by the witnesses.

should also be sent to the Office of the results of the proceeding. N petition If a hearing is requested, the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear should specifically explain the reescas Commission will make a final Regulatory Commission, Washington, why intervention should be permitted determination on the issue of no DC 20585, and to the attorney for the with particular reference to the significant hazartis consideration. The licensee.

following factors:(1) the nature of the final determination will setvo to decide Nontimely filings of petitions for leave petitioner's right under the Act to be when the hearing is held.

to intervene, amended petitions, made a party to the proceeding:(2) the If the final determination is that the supplemental petitions and/or requests nature and extent of the petitioner's amendment request involves no for hearing will not be entartained property, financial, or other interest in significant hazards consideration, the absent a determination by the the proceeding; and (3) the possible Commission may issue the amendment Commisslan, the presiding officer or the effect of any order which may be and make it im nediately effective, presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing entered in the proceedmg on the notwithstanding the request for a Board, that the petition and/or request petitioner's interest. h petition should hearing. Any hearing held would take should be granted based upon a also identify the specific aspect (s) of the place after issuance of the amendment.

balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR suhject matter of the proceeding as to If the final determination is that the 2.714(a)(1)(!)-(v) and 2.714(d).

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

amendment involves a significant For further details with respect to this Any person who has filed a petition for hazards consideration, any hearing held leave to intervene or who has been would take place before the issuance of action, see the application for admitted as a party may amend the any amandment.

amendment which is available for public petitjon without requesting leave of the Normally, the Commission will not inspection at the Commission's Public Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the issue the amendment until the D cument Romn, the Gelman Dug &ng.

first prehearing conference scheduled ta expiration of the 30 day notice period.

2120 L Street, NW., Washington. DC, the proceeding but such an amended However, should circumstances change and at the local public document room petition must satisfy the specificity during the notice period such that failure for the porticular fac6hty involved.

requirements described above.

to act in a timely way would result, for

__ ~

l 289N Federal Register / Vol 55 No.114 / Wednesday, June 13,19e0 / Notices Cosamonwealth Edlaan 'as=pany, accident analysis eseumptions. %erefore, the the treasient analyses. However removal of r

Docket Nos. STN 5H54 and S'IN 3D.

current Mode 5 enelyste remains valid.

b AQ belpe emeure that the R}m sectico 455, Byron Nuclear Station, Unit Nos.1

2. m proposed hcense anwndment does alief vatves are available to adtigste sad 2. Ogle County, Illbooist and noch t not create the possibihty of a new or different potential overpressure trenoiente.

kind Of 8CCident Ifom 807 eCCident Previously Additionally, removtag the AQ reduces the Noo, STN EM88 and STN 5Hs'/' d 2 p wonaHeinadmtenueolanon of ae Ma Br,aldwood Stati3. Unit Noe.1 aa Acceptable Rim flowratoe that are system which can cause a low Temperature g g Canty, Illinois consistent with the plant conditions would be Overpressum (LTOP) tranetent (reduced Date of application for amendments:

ePecined in the plant procedme. The RHR letdown combined with a loss of decay heat Jrnuary 31,1990 Dowrotes would be such that:(1) the RHR rernovel) while also leolating an overpressure Description ol amendments request:

"'NIYheR$em'

. ($1 % Ne'

>r $*j f

'"&*j ont The emendments to the Technical coolant temperatum rios thronsh the com probebility or the consequences of an Specifications would (1) reduce the would not exceed reactor vemi internale accident previoue y evaluated in lect.

n residual heat removal (RHR) minimum delta T hmite. (3) the enctor coolant would flowrate during refueling operations. (2) be mixed to prevent sign 1Acant boron removalof the AQ has a poelun impact on WP dussuon.

temove the RitR autoclosure interlock streuticatim from occurras. (4) the pmasu" on the Rl!R system suction isolation dmp ocme se RHR Dwaw contml val" Analysee wm also performed to confinn valves, and (3) allow one safety w uld not result in cavitation, and (51 that one Rim relief valve has tlw capabihty of maintaining the Rim eyeten maximum injIction pump to be available for Preum mthin code limite (refer to UFSAR.

enti ed an n et d by a or e on.

injection purposes Lf normal heat prior to the reactor retumma critical.

Section 5.4.y.2.3). Removal of the AQ does tsmoval capability were lost, nue, e reduction in RHR would not a t aHoct ele analyses. ShouW a peak Basis forpmposedno significant increase the probability of a CVCS Pressure occur while the RHR system suction la avalm aM

n.eePmesm &

haran!s consideration determinatione malfunction event and the possibility of an Th3 staff has evaluated these proposed accident which te different than any already b ud h RHR n'cn lbf m

amzndments and determined that it evalujd in the UFSAR would not be The deletion of the AQ feeture has no c!!act involves no significant hazards

""fne propond licenu amendment does on the ability of the Rim system to survive 3

consideration. According to 10 CFR not involve a significant reduction in a pressure tranatents when the RHR system is 50.92. a proposed amendment to an margin of safety, connecwd to the RCS, since se RHB suchon opstating license involves no algnificant Currently, the Byron /Breldwood Technical leolation value am alow ecung and ne cmet hazards consideration if operation of the Specificatione do not spectfy Ri!R flowrote is taken for heir actuanon.nmfem, l

facility in accordance with the roposed requimmente for operation in Mode 5. Mode e mmovalof me AQ wul counwin an attendment would not:(1)Invo ve a operations, however, require a minimum RHR inemaae la the probability or conesquence of anfcd significant increase ln the probability or Dowra ei a c

. tmp f

Ev V. IDCA g

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of Tochnical Specifications place limitations on outside containment, fmquency was also a new or different kind of accident from the Rim during mid. loop operation by considemd. Analysis demonstrates that the specifying a minimum flow requirement for probability of the occurrence or any accident previously evaluated; or (3) the purpose of decay heat removal and the C"% i - of an ace 6 dent am not involve a significant reduction in a number of RHR trains which must be incmased. The dominant folhas mode le margin of safety, operable. T1wy do not, however, contain rupture of the valw disc in each of the two Afinimum RRR flowrote restrictions based on minimizing air series motor-operated value (MOVs)in the L Operation of Byron /Breldwood Unit Nos.

entrainment la the RHR as a result of RHR suction hne when closed during normal 1 end 2 in accordance with the proposed vortexing which may occur during mid. loop power operation. Als failure mode is hcznse amendment does not involve a operation under certai'i conditions.

independent of the ACI. Anotherless significant increase in the probability or The fuel cladding (fissicn product barrier) influential contributor to Event V frequency consequences of any accident previously is protected in Modes 5 and 6 by providing was found to be rupture of one valve while ev aluated.

cooling and maintaining core shutdown.

the other valve has failed open. no ruulte A reduction in RifR flow during mid-loop Adequate decay heat remosalis provided to demonstrate that,in this case, removal.of the operation will potentially impact those addrese the cooling requirements, and ACI is beneficial when compared to retaining transients explicitly analyzed in Modes 5 and sufficient mixing ensures that the boeon it.

6. The o.tly event analyzed for these modes in d:!ution analyses remain valid. Therefore, the

2. The proposed amendment wul not create Chapter 15 of the Byron /Draidwood UFSAR amount of time available to identify and the possibility of a new or different kind of is the malfunction of the CVCS that results in terminate a boron dilution event is accident from any accident previously a decrease in boron concentration in the unaffected.

considered.

nector coolant, The CVCS malfunction event Thus, a reduced RHR flowrate duriag mid.

The effect of an overpressure transient will ccn be impacted by a reduction in RHR flow loop operation does not involve a significant not change due to the removal of the ACl.

in tha following two areas:(1) e reduction in reduction in a snargin of safety.

The RHR suction relief valves were designed expth.it RHR flowrate assumptions, and (2)

Removolof the Autoc/oeurslaterlock to thaintain the Rl!R system pressure within the vessel mixing assumption cluring a boron

1. The proposed amendment does not design limits. Although the AClisolates the di!ution. The Mode 5 and e analyses do not involve a significant increase in the RCS from the RHR suction relief valves on assurne en explicit RHR flow value, and the probabihty or coceequences of an accident high RCS pressure, overpensure protection of RIIR flowintes are.sseumed to be sufficient previously evaluated.

the RHR system is provided by the RHR to provide adequate vessel circulatten to The RHR suction rel;ef valves are used as a suction relief valves not by the slow acting prevent boron stratification and eupport the rneans of cold overpressure protection. The suction isolation valves.ne purpose of the baron dJution transient mixing assumptions.

cold overpressure protection system is interlocks is to assure double isolation in addition, since a CVCS malfunction designed to ensure the hmits of Appendix G between the RHR eystem and the RCS when event in Made 6 is prevented by to 10 Cf1t part 50 are not exceeded when one the plant le at normal operating conditions.

administrative controls which isolate the RCS st more of the RCS cold lege are less than or The interlock prevents the posalbility of an from any potential source of unborated equal to 350' F. Transient analysee were Event V due to operator error.

water, only the Mode 5 analysis cos.ld be performed to determine the worst case man Removal of the ACI will not place the plani impacted. However,it has been determined input and heat input events (refer to UFSAR, in any new or unanalysed condidon.

that a reduced RIIR flow of 1000 gpm or Section 5.2.2.11.2). Removal of the Therefore, this change will not create the greater would not invahdate the Byron autoclosure interlock (ACI) does not impact possibility of a new or different kind of

4 '

Federal Register / Vol; 58. No 114 / Wednesday.' Jttne 13,19er / Notices 23ND accident bus any assident pmetoesty -

%e consequensus of en saaldest es A trorney so licensee: Michael Millee.

Flasi Esquire: Sidley and Austin. One Mret-The pmposed ansedma' t will not Salsty A al

Rap, a

e e

era, cego, s 00806, involve a eiga&Sonat redaallan la a margia et.

However, the awellet udty of at lenet ces 51 -

safey.

pump providae for the mutissuam of the NRC Actins Prefect D//ector: Rir.;aard Analysee,weie perfanned to demonstrate effects of a lose of decay heat removal mot F. Dudley the impact of removal of the ACI os Event V duttag r.ld loop operations. It has emunwea th Ma-Campany, imquency. RHR system reliabults and sobeequently been dernonstrated that for overpressure transisate.De analysee some coese i.e. the combtnetion of Docket Nos. STN 864be sad STN 36-parionned onsepared the resuhe with and inadeguate RCS venties and the edetence of eas. Bytes Nuclear namat=, Unit Nos.1 -

withmet the ACI. Wwever, the reentes were a cold leg opsains operation of et least one and 2. Ogle County, Ullmal-and Docket cemetagent upon providing as slans to alert safety insecties pusnp to mquired to prevent Nos. STN 8845s and STN 86487, the operator that a RCS RHR series euction the core from uncovering, ne opuon to vent Braidwood 8 ania Unit Nea.1 and 2 teolettoo valve (s)le not fully closed and that the RCS and use stevity feed from the RWST W ;l County, Illinois double leolation le not being maintataed. b has bee's analyzed and will have no impact modification will not tapact the opening on the probability or consequences of a Dofe of applicofion for omendments?

circuitry, nor willit effect the MOV poettion previously analysed accident.

April 26.1990 indicotten in the control room. h setpotut L The proposed essendment does not Descripfion of omendments request-for the alarsa will be within the range of the create the posaitehty of a new or d;ffer"*8 The amendments would revloe open permisolve setpoint p:essere and the kind of accident frove soy socident previously Technical Specification 3/4A3.

RHR syetese design pressure annus the RHR conaldered.

Containment teolation Valves, to delete pump head pressure. Operating procedurn The proviemna of these T=^=al will be revised to direct the operator to take Spedlication changes are for the purpose of the requirement for Type Cleakage the necessary actione to cloes the open valve n.itigating the consequences of a loss of testing for specified Steam Generator (if it le not closed). or if this le not possible. to decay 1.eet removal dcing mid. loop blowdown isolation valves and to insert retum to the oefe shutdown mode of operatione. Operuuon of et least one si pcmp a requirement for the Type C leakage

- - L..d indicates le required la some cases to prevent the com test for the 1/2 SIB 006 safety injection operation.%e analysee h doe to the an overeu inemese le an from uncoverms as supported by the valves mmoeel of the AC1,implementatiam of the performance of thermal hydtealic analysis.

Basis forPto sed no aWnificuni modthostion, and proonderal changes, ne only new configuretium anowed by this horonts cons /gerution determinationi Analyses performed ladientes that it e specifkanon is the potential of having an Si reliability of the RHR systeaa le unchanged pump avellable in hiodes 6 and & The The staff has evaluated these proposed during RHR initiatlan and that it le improved P6'ential overpressurt ation accident has amendments and determined that it during short and long tenu cooling as a result been analyrert and accounted for in the involves no significant hazarde of the deletion of the AC1.%erefore, the spacification by requirmg prewuriser level to consideration. According to teCFR margin of safety has actually increased.

be less than 6 perant if an S! pump to 50.92, a proposed amendment its an SofetyInfection Pump Opembility in avedlebk Therefore, the proposed changes operating license involves no significant' Modseiaeda do not meets the possibility of a new o' herards consideration if operation of the 1.De prepneed===an6==-t does no, diffemnt kind of accideas uom any involve e eigmAcant incroses in the previously couaidated facility in accordance with the Pmposed, prob bility se consequesome of as accidast

3. The proposed armendment does not amendment would not:(1) Involve a previously evaluated.

involve a significant reduction in a margin of ' significant increase in the probability or The probability of the occurrence of an nfety.

consequences of an accident previonely j

accident le not lacmased since proposed Opendon of the S1 pumps under tie:ee evaluated: or (2) Create the passibility of Technical SpecificaHon 3/414.1 requires that circumstanone is not a cold overpmesum a new or different kind of accident from all si pumpe be demonstrated inoperable in concern because af the amosat of air voieme-any accident previonely evaluated; or (3) which exista in the RCS which weeld anew MODE 6 with r -

level smeter than 5 Involve a algnificant reduction in a parcent and in MODE e with presserimer level the operator times to nutigate the tremetent..

gg d t tr e t whi h as Iw ter The pmposed amendment makes the

$*d en r

os Sans to cold overpiessere protection ao-lo solid RCS.To prevent the pumps from being fnllowing chamtes to Technical addition, ymposed Technical Sparirmation 3/. Inadvertently starttng t'y a signal, Specification 3/4.6.3:

l 4.5.4.2 require = the availabdity of at least one surveillance requiremente require verifytrar

1. Deletes the requtremtnt for Type C that ilw circeit breakers are achad la and leakage testing for valves 1/2 SD002A SI pump or an RCS hot side vent in MODE 8 and MODE 6 with prenurtser levalleu than open with the santrol awitch as the " pull out" through }{ and 1/2 SD005A through D by l

or equal to 5 percent to mitigste the ponN n. HeWas oder en W pump avansWe inclusion of an "*" after the above i

consequences of a loss of decay heet removat or gravity feed from the RWST wd1 help -

mentioned valves which references the e

mo a even.

fr the m of note "'Not subject to Type C leakage l$

,'" 0*

uds

,Y,"" [id

'l e staff h a ed h l}censee's 2 k)eletes the inclusion of an "*" by preschoe Mnos euffleient air voltane anism wind allows the no significant hazards consideration the 1/2 sis 968 valves.Thus. Type C operator time to mitigate the tranalent. This la determination and agrees with the leakage teeting requirements for the 1/2 in contreet to the analyzed cold overpressure licensee's analysis.%e staff therefom.

S18088 valves are indicated in the trenaienen, in which the RCS to suumed to be proposes to determine that the licensee's Technical Specification.

water solid at the oneet of the event.To request does not involve a significant 1.The probability of an occurrence or prevent an SI purrp from inedvertently beteg hazards consideration.

the consequence of an accident or starsed by a segnal. but anow them to b*

I.occ/ Public Doctement floom malfunction of equipment important to manualiy started from the contral room.

locodone For Byron Station. the Byron safety as previously evaluated in the th$e Public IJbrary District.109 N. Franklhi UFSAR is not significantly increased for l

ser breakere es P.O. Box 434, Byron. Ilhnote MD1tX for the reasons as follows:

i and open with the contac1 ewitch in the " pull,

I out" position. Therefore, the occarrance of an Drsidwood Station. the Wilmington The deletion of the requirement for l

accident previonely analyzed to the Final and Townsh!p Public 1.ibrary. 201 S.

Type Cleakage testing of the steam Updated Safety Analyste Reporte to not Kankakee Street. Wilmington. Illinois generator blowdown system (SD) valves l

I Incrossed.

60481.

is not an initiating condition for any 1

l

l t

23908 Fedecel Register / Vol. 55 No,114 / Wednesday, June 13,19eo / Notic.as h

l

. accidont analysis in the UFSAR. nere an accident the offsite done limit would Though the SD isolation valves do tre two accident analyses that consider remain within a small fraction of the 10 - autoclose on a phase A containment steam generator (SG) blowdown in their CFR 100 limita. In the event of a SGTR isolation signal to conserve SG enalysis,in the first, for the Main with some leaksge past the SD valves, secondary side mese, this not required Steamline Rupture accident analysis in there would be no effect on the -

to mitigste the effects of any accident in the UFSAR Table 15.12, the SD radiological release in the analysie since the UfTnAR.No other accident or -

blowdown valves autoclosure feature is the most conservative assumption of no malfunction would be created. Thus, the required in the accident analysis not for blowdown was used in the analysis.

possibility for an accident or the mitigation, but as an assumption for Any leakage past the blowdown valves malfunction of a different type than any the analysis. Since the SD valves will would be into a blowdown system previously created in the UFSAR is not still be tested for autoclosure and stroke designed to handla the liquid.no created. % change to include the Type i

I time when a phase A containment blowdown demineralizer outlet C leakage test for SIsoes valves does no8 j

isolation signalis present. the above radiation monitor would alarm if create the possibility for an accident or eccident analysis assumption leakage occurred.Various auxillary malfunction of a different type than any i

I concerning SG blowdown isolation building aree radiation monitors would previously analyzed, since the change is remains satisfied with the change. In the alarm on - 3ted radiation levels in the of an editorial nature and reflects the second, for the Steam Cenerator Tube Auxilla:y 5. gingin the event of type of testing already dono since it has Rupture (SGTR) accident analysis, leakage fyr the SD system p! ping to been required.

Table 15.0-5 lists under parameters used the Auxiliary Building. As designed, the 3.The margin of safety as defined in in the SGTR analysis the initial negative pressure in the Auxiliary the basis for any Technical Specification I

condition of 15 gpm blowdown per SG Building and the Charcoel Booster fans is not s!gnificantly reduced.

prior to the accident and no SG and filters would ensure that the Pursuant to NUREG-0800 6.2.4.!!.6.o blowdown during the accident. No radiation would not be released to the the SG secondary is a clood system and blowdown is the most conservative environment. Since any leakage would therefore does not meet the 10 CFR 60 l

assumption for the analysis to maximize he expected to be a small amount and Appendix l criteria for Type C leakage the potential radiological release to the localized in the Auxiliary Building no testing. That is, no direct path would environment since all the primary to adverse consequences would result.

exist from containment to ths.outside secondary leakage (tsdiological There would be no significant effect on atmosphere which might reenit in a isotopes) would rernain in the ruptured any accident analysis.

radiological release to the enytronment SG and would not be removed by Thus, for the above reasons, the and as such. satisfies its containment l

blowdown.Thus, the proposed change proposed change of deletion of Type C isolation function without'l}pe C would have no effect on this accident testing for the SD valves does not testing requirements. Technical analysis since the most conservative significantly increase the probability of Specification limits on primary to assumption (no blowdown) was used in an occurrence or the consequence of an secondary leakage and both primary the analysis and the change would not accident, or malfunction of equipment and secondary radiation limits ensure l

affect this (any leakage past the important to safety as previously that in the event of an accident (in blowdown isolation valves would evaluated in the UFSAR.

particular, a SG11t), the offette dose decrease the inventory of radiosotopes The inclusion nf Type C testing for the hmits would be only a small portion of left in the ruptured steam generator that Stacca valves is a change of an edharial the to CFR 100 limits. The contalnment would be available for release).

nature and merely corrects the isolation function of the SD valves is to i

The SG blowdown system is not Technical Specification to make it conserve the SG secondary side mass in considered in the mitigation of any consistent with the UFSAR.The Slee68 the event of an accident. Surveillances accident. With regard to the UFSAR valves have always required Type C to verify autoclosure and stroke time Section 15.2 accident analyses for testing per 10 CFR 50 Appendix j, and ensure that the SD valves are decreased heat sink. the auxiliary the testing has always been done. For functionally operable. Tbs bases for feedwater system is the means of this reason, the change does not containment isole tice n1ves Technical -

mitigation of the accidents. Isolation of significantly increase the probability of Specification 3/4.6.3 le that,"the

SG blowdown conserves the SG an occurrence or the consequence of an operability of the containtnentisolation I

secondary side water but does not accident. or malfunction of equipment valves ensures that the containment mitigate the consequence of any important to safety as previously atmosphere will be isolated from the

!i accident se described in the UFSAR.

evaluated in the UFSAR.

outside environment in the event of a l

There is no increase, significant or 2.ne possibility for an accident or release of radioactive material to the L

otherwise,in the consequences of an malfunction of a different type than any containment atmosphere ce accident previously evaluated 4 'he previously evaluated in the UFSAR is.

pressurization of the containment."

i UFSAR.

not created.

(Technical Specification 8/4.6.3. Bases l

Since the secondary side of the SG is The SD system is Category 1 Safety page B 3/4 6 4).nis would be satisfied considered a closed system, meeting the Class B piping up to and including the with the proposed change.Thus, the requirements of NUREG-oe00 6.2.4.11.6.0, isolation valves, and has manual margin of safety as defined in the bases the proposed change would not isolation valves.With respect to the for any Technical Specification is not increase, significantly or otherwise, the accident analysis in Section 15.2'of the significantly reduced.

probability of a leakage path to the UFSAR, where there is a decrease in the he change to require Type C testing environment. Thus the 10 CFR 100 limits heat removal by the secundary system, for the Slases valves is of an editorial would not be significantly affected for SG blowdown isolation is not required nature and does not reduce the margin any accident analysis. Technical to mitigate any of the accidents in the of safety as defined in the basis for any Specification limits on primary to analysis. Auxiliary feedwater initiation Technical Specification.

secondary leakage and on both primary mitigates the accidents. De amount of he staff has reviewed the licensee's and secondary radiation levels would.

leakage is insignificant with respect to no significant hazards consideration continue to ensure that in the event of the total SG secondary water mass.

determination and agrees with the m

-m--#

Ur 4

Federd'Itasisterf Vol. as. No.114 I Wednesday, June is,1999 / Notleisoi E985%

p V

" to close the licensee's analysis. The stalf, therefore; instrementation taWe are diocassed '

addition of a._lves within ene 14 proposes to detersdne that the licensee's below._

eflected toelation vo request does not lavolve a significant Table 3.11. Hot and cold shundown hour for functione currently covered by hazards conalderellen. -

opwational modo requirements for Actions C and D in the table.New teNe LocalphWicDocaementJlcom.

reactor postection lastrumentat6am have - notatione are now bolag added to nGew-

. location:For Byros 8tagon, the Byros been addressed. Flux biased Average a channelto be Inoperable for up to 2 Public 1.ibrary District. 3ce N. Franklin, Power

- Mordter(APRM), H16 hours without declartng the channel P.O. Box 4h. Byroa. Illinele sto10t for Flum Trip, ne stop Valve Closure inoperable and to deteradne which and Generator toad Rejection functions valves see in each valve group.%e high Braidwood Stauen, the Wiledagnon Township Public 1.ibrary, apt S.

have been deletedin the startup/ bot pressure coolant inlection steam supply' Kankakee Street, Wiladngton, Illinois stendby modes. Table notations are line low pressum, and the drywell belrns added to add.eas channel out of-leolation om high radiation are being

- 80481, Assomey es licenses: Michael Miller, service serveillmaces,latermediate added to the trip functione la thle table.

Esquire: 86dley and Austin, One First Range Monitor (

bypasses, and Table 312.%e udnhman tramber of National Plaza. Chicago, Illinois nosed.

exceptions Ice opera of the sareas operable channele per trip system NRC Actlig Profeet Director-Richard discharge echase. A proposed actiam coluame for the centrolrod Mock F.Dudley with the matneteam line radiation functionis being changed to the monitors inoperable will require a miniman number of operable ' channels e-wenig am-n emM Power reduction to the startup condition per trtp function. New action statements, W Neo.ISas7 moi m wie 6e maln8t**m Un* IM on V8I N thet met opwebility of Nuclear Power Statica, Unlas 3 and 3, closed within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months compared to instranentationwhen needed or Grundy County, m'h present actions which require a powet requires inoperable instrumentation to Date of applicottonforamendment reduction to b hot standby condition be placed in the safe or tripped MW888 13.1880.

within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

condition, when necessary to protect the son amendment 4:

Tabler4.1.1. Changes to functioomi rod block function, are botng added.

%

proposed arges include teettag toquency for some tastruments Table notations thatstate when the rod instrumentation tables for each amit to and the inclusion of additional tests for block monitor channele may be incorporate enhancements from the the APRM trip functions of High Flux seed and when the serem discharge BWR Standard Techeion19pect8estions and inoperative are being made to (1) b(me trtp functionis vo (STS)which result in constetency of exclade operability of the high pressure opweMein tlw rduel am being -

table format and technical cont,ent. %e - trip function with the head removed (2) added. Present Note 7, which albwe corvoepending Technical,_ tion exclude operabihty of the scram excepticas for operability detten i we (Ili) sections were modified, where discharge vehmas when control rods am paw phphs boung,k Mng MN appropriate, to reflect changes to the removed, and (3) allow entry into a Table 314 A footnote which I * "d U

8 9 'I 8 l'Id requirse flow rates to be determined by wrik of bTechnical Specification tablee 'tte,r~.sv a b = a surve.the -

.b.4.1.2.Tes, ting troquency for the 8 g,*[*, g,*,"g' "od -

not be es M w a trt, uncoonie bein, specinedin deT5 and abois nolongw frequency notations and uses the changed tem every stretdown to a utilised.-

Dresden speel8c termdnoingy of startup after a refooling outage. Table Tame 318. Action statements, that operational modos,in onier to donos notes are betog added to (1) reflect h1 win aHe alma h condnee wie se this *===taalogy b the Dresden tsmeere asutrondetectore cannot be mid. and high-range Stationary Technical Specinostions, new Tables 1.1 cahbsetad por es, (2) exalude operaWhty and 1.g to denne surveillance hequessF of the highasassar psensure trip m Particulate lodhe Noble Cee (SPING)b notatione and operetional modesL when the reactor head le removed. (3)

- lto'innP8'eMe wieouunking gra respectively, were added. Table t.1 en exclede operabsitty durtag refueling samples se long as the SPING low range monitore are operable, an being added.

surve!!!ance frequency notations

. freni the high waterlevelin the scrum Present Note i ls being deleted and new contains the STS time frames for discharge wohune trip function when footnotes are being added which specify surveillance frequencies and their-control rods are removed, and (4) allow abbreviated notations. Table 1.2 on entry into a reactor condition to perform operabilityof theinstrumentation.

Table 316. Columns for operational modes implements those required testing.

instrumentation readout location and STS requirements that are apphahl= to -

Table 311. Addition af a new Dresden and also ineerporates Dreedom column la the table to correlate isolation instrunentation range for the Post.

. spectSc operating allournemma.De instrumentation signale with the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation terminology contained in Tables 1.1 and respective valve smups. A change to the table are being deleted.

1.3 has been k- -

Into the tolerance of the reactor now. low weter Toble 411.%e surveillance revised instrementanos tables, as level initiation setpoint is being added, requirements for containment appropriate. Actionstatementsbeve Change to proposed actions are being monitoring are being deleted to replaced notes, where a to, and made to (1) allow an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months eliminate adundancy. Testing new action statements have added, to reach hot shutdown before going to reqatremente are being added to the where needed, to address new cold shutdownin the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for table to include the functionaltest operationalmodse included in the those fonctions currently covered by frequency prior to plant startup for the tables.no table actions and notadauw present Action A la the table. (2) allow a APRM downscale and flow variable and have been updated with 8115 hours0.0939 days 2.254 hours 0.0134 weeks 0.00309 months to reach startup with the the Rod BlockMonitor(RBM) upscale requirements and operational modes associated neolation velves closed or and downscale functions. Drywell High identified in Table 1.2 hees been allow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to reach isot shutdown Radiation mordtur surveillance incorporated into se reany of the presset and cold shutdown to the next 34 houre - requirements are being added. Table requiresseste ao possible.'lle for functione' currently covered by notes are being added which include the signiBeant changes to sedt of the~

present Action B in the table, and (3) the following:(1) require'applichble

. 23898 Federal Register / Vol. 55, No, ud / Wedneedey. June 13,1990 /, Noticoe functional testing within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior L Does not involve a significant increase in and surveillance tequirmnente for a function to startup if not performed within the the probebiuty or conseqwnoes of an which has already enleted and been previous 7 days. (2) will not require accident prov6ously evaluated because:

procedurally controued to the past, there can scram discharge volume level switch A. New Tables 1J and 1.2 add defmitions be ne incresee to accident probebility or r um am mqmcy notaum and conwouences due to thle change, testing during rt: fueling with control rode Operetional Modea. These tables implesient B 8 ne oltmination of the upper tolerance removed,(3) will require RBM commonly used terminology and testm8 of the Reector low low Welov (R11W1.)

opr.rability only at or over 30% rated intervels from the 811i and opereting STS Primary Containment teolation (PCIS) and thermal power, (4) will require -

BWRs. %e term " Mode" used at Dresden le undervoltage and degraded voltage idenucal to the term " Operational Condition" ECCS initiation eetpoint is striedj administrouve and cannot lacrease the monitoring of emergency busee during used in the ImL Thew tablu provide cold shutdown and refueling only under defmitions whm none currendy exist in the probability or consequences of an accident The utpoint wlU remain at greater than or certain conditions, (5) will only require

$'di o enN equal to et Inches above the top of active b

certain Emergency Core Cooling System probability of any accident previously fuel 'bmforv no reduction in the level of (ECCS) functions to be operable during evaluated sina no accident procuroove are safey wul occur as a result of the proposed cold shutdowns and refueling when tuvolved. Since the additien of theos tablee change.

associated systems are required to be will provide clarification to the user, there la B.6 ne removal of wetion C from Table operable (6) will exclude channel no significant increase in the consequences of 4.2.1 and the relocation of Section D of Table cdllbration of neutron detectort, and (7) en accident previously evaluated.

4.2.1 to tection 3/4AE le strictly will add operability requirements for the B.1 The changes to the instrumentation administrouve and cannot adversely affect refueling floor radiation monitors

tablu in the Technical Specifications er, an accident previonely defined. The proposed Table 4.2.2-A surveillance frequency needed to proinde clarification of change wtll eliminate the redundant is added for the source checks for the terminology, to provide consistent application survedlance requiremente for the of requirements throughout the Technical Containment Promure and level radioactis e hquid effluent monitoring Specificatione, and to provide a more unble Instrumentation and wiu present all of the instrumentatio's.

format for presentation of the table material.

operahihty requirernente for the Main Steam Table 4.2.4 De minimum analysis The rewrite of the instrumentation tables Safety and Relief Valves in one TB section.

Itequencies for chemical elements tetaine the necemary requirements that are The 1EOs and SRs for the containment associated with post accident ePecific to Dreeden while endorsing instrumentation are listed in Tabley 3.2.0 and monitoring has been changed to the provisions from the STS and later opereting 4.2.4 BWRs using STS. These changes do not alter B.7 The proposed changes to Section 3/4.s fre}uencY at which theY are actuall I

per ormed. Specification 2.1.G contains any estabbehed setpointo (except for 850 pois are editorial. locreasing the freq8ency of low preuure la RUN, discuand in subsection analysis for tritium, groes alpha. Sr.49, St 90 a setpoint of 850 pelg for the low.

C below) or auumptions of the accident and Fe-55 on Continuous Uquid Releases wiu pressure initiation of main steamline analysis and are proposed as an reflect the actual time it takes to procese toolation valve closure.The proposed improvement over the present table these samples. On line radiation monitore are change will reduce the setpoint to 825 presentation. Any changes to present set to alarm on the most limitin8 (.uantity, psig.

surveillance intervals are made to add and daily grab umple laotopic analysis lin in addition, numerous administrative requirements from the STS or later plante at the event of monitor failures) will provide P ace Table Note requiremente in the sufficient information to determine whether l

i

(.hanges have been proposed. to include the following: (1) clarifications, (2) applicable column in the new Table format.

or not to continue or shutdown discharge, P""

N Pmpond change in 6e reacw deletion of information not te uired to Channels per Trip S stem requirements are coolant low pressure setpoint of 850 pela for bo in the 'I,S and not used by e reactor maintained in the ta le rewrite except se lattistion of main steamline teolation velve operators, (3) table and instrumentation indicated in Table 3.2.3. Since the necesury closure affects only one transient or accident title changes. (4) deletion of redundant requiremente are maintained by the proposed analysis previously evaluated.This transient information. (5) incorporation of notes change, there is no significant incresee in the la a turbine preeeure regulator failure which lato the tables and (6) deleLion of probability or consequences of an accident would cause the control and/or bypsu referencee to the Mobile Volume previously evaluated.

valves to open. As evaluated by ANF and luduction System which is not used.

B.2 The clanneadon est 6e APW Rod CECO.NFS, the proposed change in the B

y e eful Basis forproposedno significont 8 P, setpoint to 825 psig, wiu still provide a 40 pel m

ncr th

. }

harcrds consideration determination:

occurrence of a previously defined accident safety margin for h!sh power operation at low The Cammlaelon has provided since the function of the APRM rod block is pressure as determined in Technical e.ndarda for determining whether a not required to mitigste the events of any Specifiesti n 1.1.B.The reduction of 25 pelg in sgnificant hazards consideration exists Refuel mode accident. F.erroving any the Msty leolation trip will lower the as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed requirement for the APRM rod block function

[,*talchange7n a ura7 ton tempera ure amendment to an operating license for a in Refuel will not change any precurson ng a pressure ngulator fauure transient le about facihty involves no significant hazards deogibedin the Rod Drop Accident or g,p Re 8

tion to bM openbihty conservatism in the accident an'alysis without censideration if operation of the facility B.3 e a in accordance with a proposed requinmente do not have any advene significantly a!!ecting any accident amendment would not:(1) Involve a accident impact since they do not alter the pacursort or parameters need to bound the significant increase in the probability or present requirement to havest lea 6t one RBM analysis.This change will help to enhance consequences of an accident previously operable or rod withdrawal blocked when plant reliability and safety by reducing the evaluated. (2) Create the possibility of a greater than 30% power.

probability of an inadvertent reactor isolation new of different kind of accident from B.4 The addition of the Drywell High and subsequent removal of the primary heat any accident previously evaluated, or (3) Radiation isolation function to the Technical sink nspectively. Since the assumptions of involve a significant reduction in a SPecificatione cannot adversely affect en the accident analysis are preserved by this margin of safety.

accident pre stously defined. Equipment change, there la no significant increase in the modifications arenot required not are probabuity or consequences of an accident The licensee has provided the setpoint changes needed to make this previously evaluated.

following analysis of no significant proposed change. Because the addit 6on of thie D.The change in the terminology of the hazards considerations using the isolation function to the Technical Turbine Control Valve Fut Cloeun Scram to I

Commission's atendards.

Spectfications will specify the LCOs actions,. Lose of EllC 00 Pressure Scram la enrictly an j

r l

Federal Register /.Vot 85, No'/ n4 /~ Wednesday, fund 13,1990' / -Notices' 239El

-v a-ive - r that een beve no effect - o.amline teolation val.ve closure'to a25 rr.is of the APRM,.%,ie chany dou not reduce' adsdalstrat sw

-,0me of e _soom m se ma,,in o ea e,, em se iRMs are E Does not amate the possibility of a new ' the present setpoent of geo pois. His change ~ ' requimd operable during the refuel mode. A' or di8 mat kind of ecoldent been any does not affect assumptione la the present

3.out-of.s anos rod block funcuan and a 1 pmviously evaluated haceues:

new modes of plant operation.nie setpotnt provided by the IRMs.no APRM red block -

accident analysis and does not introdum anF out-of4 taken twice scram functine oro -

A.he addition of new Tables 1.1 and 1.2 will help to clarify present requiremente and can only affect the pressum regulator failure - in Refuelis a redundant function and ite -

i will impleinent terminology and testing trenoient, as discumd in the first standard mama w n t mduce sa ma$a of safey.

interval definitions that am in coenmon use et above, and thus there le no poselbility of a 3

proPowd RBM miated chenen am OPwating 81's BWR plants.The use of this new ar diHemnt kind of eccident from any primarily clattfication statements which terminology and testing interval definitions at previousiy e.aluated.

cannot affect any inarsine to safety.

Dresden wiu provide etmilar improvement in D. W prooosed change in terminology for B.4 h addition of the Drywell f ugh undmtanding of es affected sequiremente the Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure as to other plante that have implemented :

Scram is strictly an administrative change Radiation Primary Containment isolation thm requiremente.hw new, standard -

that can have no affect on any accident function to the Technical Specifications will,

definitions do not create the bility of a analysia.,

not affect the margin of safety.Dnign or.

new or d,tNerent kind of acci at froen ant Ill. Does not involve a elsnificant reduction eetpoint changes are not required to r- -g evaluated.

in the margin of safety because:

implement the proposed changes.his B.1 h rowette of the instrumentation-A. De incluaton of Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in the reviolon to the Primary Conteinment isoletierr tabwe takes advantage of formate developed Dresden Technical Specihcations adde 1.CO and SR Tables le necenary to meet the for the SM in order to improve presentation material that wiu provide clarification of requiremente of NUREG-Or37 Topic !!E.4.2.7.

and readability of material. AU necewaq terminology and allow consistent B.5 The tolerance chanse te the R11WL requiremente are retained in the new tatJae interpretation of requirements nie change and ICIS Initiation setpoint wiu not reduce as well as some additional requiremente from will implement standard industry accepted the margin of safety since the nominal se m h oechanew wm im w the teetlag intervals and terminology at Dresden setpoint wG not be changed. llowever the A

and will not significantly reduce the added flexibuity will aDow the setpoint to be

! w thou in u

requiremente that can create thn. elbility operable by the technical specifications in probability of reportable events and allow avsDability of systems or equipment requimd set slightly higher.%Io will reduce the I

of a new or different kind of accident.

order to preserve accident analysis operauon at a slightly higher level of safety.

B.2 Restoving any requireewate for APRM eMurnptione. brefore, thle change does not B.6 ne margin of safety to not affected by i

Rod Block Function in Refuel cannot lead to involve a significant reduction in the margin the removal of Section C and retor.auon of j

the creation of any new accidents..

'I*alety.

Section D from Toble 4.2.1 since functional Modificetione to the APRM are not Nqsdred B.1 The proposed rewrite of the performance of the effected instrumentauon i

to implement the prepared chansa.h APRM wdl not be required operable during instrumentation tables providae an le not being changed.

plant conditions other than those for which improvement over present technical B.7 Changing the frequency of enslysis on specification requirements.h adoption of a IJquid Effluents for triuum. Sr.en So-en and

-)

the APW eystem was destened. No new operational conditions will be created with standard format for presentation of material Fe45 tosellect the octual analysis timm wdl the APRM Rod Block function removed from will help to improve readability and the not reduce the margin of safety because the Refuel mode.

ability to locate necessary requirements. %e isotopic analysis of grab samples are B.3 De proposed RBM related changes do standardisation of terminology will help to performed which are adequate to determine not change the times the RBM la needed.

Improve interpretation of requiremente, the reactivity release and whether or not to They strengthen and clattfy when the RBM Present trip setpointo are maintained (except shutdown 1he eyetem.

must be operable.

for the change discumud in Subsection C C.h change in the setpoint for reactor B.4 h addiuon of the Drywou Hish belowI as well as Minimum Operable coolant low pressure initiation of mein Radiation Primary Containawnt isolation Channels per Trip System requirements, steamline isolation valve closure from 650 to function to the Technical Specifications wiu.

(except as indicated in Table 313). Ne" 8 5 pels removes excese conservettom in the not increase the probability of the occurrence Actions and Teble Notes are incorporated -

analysis while maintaining the suumptione of new accidente.No new equipment le where needed by using Su and opereting of the analysis. The setpoint le provided to (1) needed to implement the proposed chanee STS BWR requiremente. nese additione protect against fast reactor depressurization nor are any design changes required of tIw have been evaluated for use et Dresden and and resulting rapid cooldown of the vessel existing eyeten, have been found to maintain operability of and (2) to prevent high power operation at ILS The tolerance change to the RI.t.WI, systems and equfpment required to preserve low pressure. As evaluated by ANF and PCIS and ECCS initiation setpoint does not accident analysis assumptions. ne changee CECO.NFS, neither of these functions will be create the possibility of a new accident.The to surveillance intervale are proposed to Mp significantly affected by the proposed existence of the upper tolerance le based on ensure operability of equipment in theA change

h reduction of the trip level setting an operetional consideration only, l.a. the required modes of operation. Present by 25 pel will still provide a 40 pel sefety prevention of spurious actueuon of the PCIS Technical Specification action requirements, margin for high power opereuon at low and ECCS during normal expected transients. in some cases, allow a hours to reach the pressure since as stated in Technical Wre is no basie in any safety analysis for STARTUP mode of operation with equipment Specification Dases 1.1, the cora thermal the upper tolerance, inoperable.no 8 hout time le necessary to ILS ne proposed deletion of Section C'end. allow an orderly shutdown from an all rode power limit for reactor pressures below 800 relocation of Section D homTable 441 wiu out. full power condition. We, in order to psia is :sn and thle limit is conservetive.nle have no effect on the fonction of the effected provide consistency in the Action provisions, small change in the degree of conservatism is.

tostrumentation. No new instrumentation le the e hour allowance la implemented offset by the benefits of the change since the twing added not is any being deleted from the-throughout the instrumentation tables. The probability of an inadvertent reactor isolation Technical Specifications therefore the proposed changes provide clarification of and subsequent removal of the primary heat '

powibility of a new kind of accident is not requiremente and consistent application of sink is reduced. A similar change has created.

requirements, and thus do not involve a previously been approved for Quad Cities B.7 Decreasing the required frequency of reduction in a margin of safety as evaluated Units 1 and L Since the assumptions of the tritium, groes alpha. Sr-e0, Se Es. Fe45 wiu for use at Druden.

accident analysis are preserved by the not create the possibility of a new or different B.2 Clarifytng the mode requirements for proposed change, there le no significana kind of accident as lootopic analyels will be the APRM rod block will not change the reduction in a margin of safety, used to determine continuance of discharge margin of safety. Requiring this function la D.De change in the terminology.for the in the event of loss of the on line monitor.

the Refuel mode would force the ApRM to be>

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram is C.%e proposed change in the reactor operable during a mode in which the flux en administrative change that cannot affect coolant low pensure lattiation of main levele are well below the design besie range any margin of safety.

24000 Federal Regiatae / Vol. 55, No.114,/ Wednesday, June 13, 1990 / Notices Based on the pres!9us discussion, the either the probability or consequences (2) Create the possibility of a new or licensee concluded that the proposed -

of a previously evaluated accident.

different kind of accident from any-amendment requal does not involve a 2.The proposed amendment changes occident previously evaluated; er significant increase in the probability or the surveillance test frequency of the (3) Involve a significant reduction in a consequences of an accident previously. EPAs only and does not involve a margin of safety, evaluated; does not create the change in the design or function of the Based on the staff review, the possibility of a new or different kind of Reactor Protection System or the proposed amendment will not:

accident from any accident previously electrical protection assemb!!es. Mso, (1) Involve a signi'icant increase in evaluated; does not involve a reductica no changes are made to any safety the probability or consequences of an in the required margin of safety.

limits, limiting safety system settings, or accident previously evaluated because The staff has reviewed the licensee's limiting conditions for operation.

relocating the Radiological Effluent no s!gnificant hazards consideration Therefore, the proposed change does not Technical Specifications (RETS) to the determination and agrees with the create any new oe ddierent kind of Offsite Dose Calculation Manual licensee's analysis.ne staff, therefore, accident than previously evaluated.

(ODCM) or the Process Centrol Program proposes to determine that the licensee's 3.The proposed amendment changes (PCP)is strictly an administrative request does not involve a significant the surveillance test frequency of the change that does not reduce or modify hazards consideration.

EPAs only and does not involve a any existing safety requirement or LocalPublic Document Room.

change in safety limits, limiting safety procedure: or location: Morrfs Public Ubrary,004 s) stem settings, or limiting conditions (2) Create the possibility of a new or Uberty Street, Morris, Illinois e0450.

for operation. Operational test data different kind of accident from any Attomeyforlicensee:MichaelI.

Indicates that the EPAs are highly accident previously evaluated because Miller, Esquire: Sidley and Austin, One.

reliable and that reduction of the no new accident scenario is created and First National Plaza, Chicago, IHinois surveillance frequency will not affect no previously evaluated accident 00603.

the operational availability of the EPAs, scenario is changed by ralocating NRC Actirs Project Director: Richard Therefore, the proposed change does not procedural requirements from one F. Dudley involve a significant reduction in the controlled document to another; or I'

Edison margin of safety.

(3)Invoi.T = significant reduc %n in a

a localPublic Document Room margin of safety Ds ac: ,a

$u ghwerS Units 2 and 3, location: Morris Public Ubrary,604 modification of any plan structure, h

Uberty Street, Morris, Illinois 0045a system, component or operatias Y

'Y' Attorneyfor //censee: Michael L procedure la associated with thin Dateofapplicatiooforamendment

. Miller Esquire:Sidley and Austin, One administrative change so all safety requese April 18,1990 First Na tional Plaza, Chicago, Illinois margins remain unchanged.

Dcscription of amendment request:

60000.

For the reasons sta ted above, the staff The licensee has requested a change to NRC ActingPmject Director: Richard believes this pmposed amendment the Technical Specifications to modify F. Dudley involves no significant hazards the surveillance frequency for the consideration.

l functional testing of the Reactor Illinois Power Company and Soyland Protection Syatem Electrical Protection Power Cooperstive Inc., Docket No.50 loco /Public Document Room Assemblies (EPAs) from once every six est, Clinton Power Station Unit Na 2 location VespasianWarnerPublic months to whenever the plants are in a De%1tt County. Illineia Ubrary,120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois $1727, i

. cold abutdown condition for more than Date of amendment request January Attorneyforlicenseer Sheldon Zabel, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

26,1990 Esq., Schiff, Hardin and Waita. 7200 Dosisforproposedno significant Description ofomendment reguest:

Sears Tower. 233 Wacker Drive, hozords consideration determination:

The proposed changes to the Technical Chicago, Illinois 6000s.

The pmposed change to the Technical Specifications, requested in response to NRC Acting Project Director: Richard Specifications has been evaluated NRC Generic Latter 8001, incorporates F. Dudley against the standards of10 CFR 50.92 programmatic controls for radiological l

and has been determined to not involve effluent technical specifications (REIS)'

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a significant hazards consideration in the administrative controls sectlan

'A because:

and relocates procedural detal!s of Y P 2,

1. The proposed change removes the RETS to the offsite dose calculation San Luis Obispo County, California requirement to perform EPA manual and the process control Date of amendment regunst: January surveillance testing at power and program.

25 and May 11,1990 (Rcterence LAR 90-i revises the surveillance test frequency Basisforproposedno significant 01) l for the EPAs to reflect that in use at.

hozords consideration determination:

Description of amendment request:

l recently licensed boiling water reactors. The staff has evaluated this proposed The proposed amendments would revise The proposed change does not involve amendment and determined that it the combined Technical Specifications any relaxation of established safety involves no significant hazards (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant limits, limiting safety system settings or considerations. According to 10 CFR (DCPP) Unit Nos.1 and 2 to allow limiting conditions for operations.

50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operation with one of the three

. De licensee has provided operational operating license involves no significant pressurizer code safety valves (PSVs) test data supporting the determination hazards considerationif operation of the inoperable and disabled'so that it i

that the EPAs are highly reliable and facility in accordance with the cannot open. Specific TS changes would have not failed either during testing or amendment would not:

include:(1) addition of a new Action when called upon to actuate since their (1) Involve a significant increase in Statement a. to TS 3.t2.2 that would initialinstallation at Dresden.Herefore, the probability or consequences of en allow continued operation with one PSV the proposed change does not in:rease accident previously evaluated; or inoperable provided that, within 24

_ _.___ g redesel assiseur / vet as, A tse l'wedneeder. June ts, tsoo / Notiosi SGOBE houn, the Inopmable valve ls disabled a.Dess the levela a ale =ina==*

c/o Pacinc Gas and E!ectric Company,

~

so thatitisincapable of opening and inomese la the bility or senesquences P.O. Box 7444, San Prnacleco, California NRYie op ab5'Ie"s"u omatic..,,

g gw C Ao/wiDhadan John T.Lukias h

opening mode with its associated block Coolant System (RCSI. A safety evolust6en Southara Cauforula Edson Company, et valve open. (2) revision of present for plant opersties with two of three PSVs aL, Decket No. 58 58, Sea Omstre Action Statoment a. of'I13.4.1.2 to operable (one PBV inopweble and disabled)

Nuclear Generstles Staties, Unit No.1.

make it Action Statement b. and require has beae perfweed.%e multe show the Su Die County, CaBfania a plant shutdown with two PSVs RC8 *"rprueum limits of the two liminne accidente prwlously anal Imes of Dole of amendmentsquest: June 7 i

inoperable,(3) change the present Externalland and/or Trip and iges, as supplemented May 3,1990 -

Action Statement b. to Action Statement c., &nd (4) revise 'IS Bases 3/4.42 to

$Dg ded on of ame ni si la wr ad py reflect the revisions to TS 3.4.1.3. la pgVs.no proposed chance mduces the Amendment entica 170*-

addition. PG&E has committed to repair or replace an inoperable and disabled Nepurteen leekin's safety valve setention.Proposed Change No.211) dateOuas' 7 i

dalfw RC5 ?

nonrealting PSV during the first outage of sufficient Thwefore, the proposed change does met 19e5(84 FR 32715). By letter dated duration following valve diabling.

invoin a signmaant incman in the Pe as.1sso, the NRC mquested Repair or replacement of a PSV would pmbebiiHy er sonuqunow of an accident that the consee revise its previous re9utre th unit to be in Mode 5 for at pentously weluated, submittal to include Limiting Conditione

b. Does the chnee create the possibility of for Operation (140s) to limit the lum 7 dsys, a new or different klad of accident from anF-amount of une that the 6-loch The requested change would be used accident previously evaluatedt containment vont valves are allowed to if a leaking PSV causes a loss ofloop -

ebange does not affect the be open, nis supplement to l

seat. Disabling a leaking valve promotes by which any safety.related system Amendment A ligation No.170 was i the>eams and the subenWed by unsee in raponse to a do en er ehl intb oPere I

""* **'**"#8 '*I

'*epoem as pria te b hqmt.

se ay ca va!ve lift pressure and bring the lift

& paped % n"e punual

'Iklicensw's request supplements l

Point close to normal operating pressure, consequensee of two vain opwatsoe have Proposed Change No til as follows:(1)

The downward shift in valve lift -

been addromed in the ufe waluation and Format changes were made to proposed l

Pressure increases the potential for demonstromd to be accepta Specification 3.6.5," Containment i

inadvertent opening of the valve and nerefore, t!m proposed change does not-Ventilation System isolation Valves m potential failure to close, which could emete the poulbility of a new or diffwent5 Valve Leakage "(2) PmposedSection result in a small break loss-of. coolant. -

kind of nacident frosa any accident " ~-

3.6JI, " Containment Ventilation System accident (IDCA). Continued operation "alaemd..

leolation Valyse. Valve Position " wae che inv n_A.

with a disabled valve poses no adverse y added to incorporate LCOs which limit

,g safMy consequenme becam adequate-A safety evaluation for operation with one the amount ofhne the 6-inch' overpressure protection capability is PSV inoperable and diabled demonetseted containment vent valves are allowed ter Provided by the remaining operable that the RCs overpressure hmits of the two' be open during Operating Modes 1. 2. 3 l

liniums meldente dy analysed Emes -

and 4. (3) De provision to lock closed -

PSVs.

Bos/sforproposedno significant of Externalload and/or Turbine Trip and manuelleolation valves CVS.301 and hosords consideration determinatiom Reactor Coolant Pump locked Rotor, are not CVS 313 was moved froen Section 1.6.2, The Commission has provided

- - - - d*d I*e plaat opwauon with two P6Vs.

" Containment leolation Valves" to -

I"

Section 3.6.6, "ConWpment Ventilation etandards for determining whether a no pOR uc m mciahg Isolation Valvee. Valve Position." to be significant hasards consideration existe J leekvalve a a candluon for opwouse b

as stated in 10 CFR 50.9t(c). A proposed with one dise PBV provida addauenal more constatent with NUREG 0463.

amendment to an operating license -

preneure alieving capability. nie provides -

" Standard Technical Specifications for i

involves no significant hasards' additional conservauem since the pORV Westinghouse Pressurized Water l.

consideration if operation of the facility, rebet onpacity is not included in the accident Reactors," and (4)De proposed i

in accordance with the pmposed analysis waluation.

reviolon to Section 3.6.2, " Containment nefore. the propomd change dom not isolation Valves," regarding opening amendment will not:(1) Involve a I""I" * 8*****' '*'**"*" i" * "*'8'" d limitations for valva CV 10 and CV 116-significant increase in the probability or

- D was withdmwn.We inforrandon was.

consequences of an accident previously ne NRC staff has reviewed the evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of t inclodedin proposed Technical a new or different kind of accident freen proposed change and the licensee's no SpectScanon Secdon 3.6%.

significant besards consideration

" Containment Ventilation isolation.

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) determination and finds them Valvee. Valve Position,",

involve a significant redaction in a acceptable.Therefore, the staff proposes Bosla forpreposedno signified, s margin d safdy.

to determine that the change does not hozordeconsidero6endeterminefiant,

ne licensee,in its submittels of involve a significant hazards,

As raiuiredby 16 50A1(a), the z january 25 and May 11,1990, evaluated ' consideration.

licensee has provided the following no the proposed change against the LocalpublicDocument Room significant hazards criteria of to CFR locotiom Califomia Polytechnic State,

significant hasards consideration determination:

50.92 and against the Commission University Library, Govemment guidance conceming application of this Documents and Maps Department. San

[,,,Y[,$,

1m y

standard. Based on the evaluation given Luis Obispo. Califomia 93407.

tin alsnmcast hasard considwauon analysis I

below, the licensee has concluded that Atforneys forlicensee Richard R.'

providedin Anwndment Appiteauon No.170.

the proposed change does not involve a locke, Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Anwndment Application No.17ttrevlees two significant hazarils consideration. The Company, P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, existing technical speciflosuon chansa and licensee's evaluation is as followe:

California 94120 and Bruce Norton, Esq.,

adde two newtechnical specification I

1

MOSB Federal Registee / Vol. 55, No.114 / Wednesday. June 13. 1990 / Notices sections.The two revloed sectione address WSTS Into the Technical Specificatione.

Localpublic Document Room containment loolstion valves and Finally, PCN til will reduce the lower test location:GenetalI.ibtery Univeralty of containment tuting.ne two new uctions pressure for the personnel airlock from 10 Cahfornfa* P*O* Box 19557'Irvine' cdd leakage Itmitations for the containment psig to 3 pois. This change will enhance the Cahfornia 92713.

ele loche and the containment natiletion rehability of the airlock oy limiting system isolation valves. Revising the two unnecessary stresses placed on airlock Alloft'eyforlicensoe: Charlet R.

existing technical specifications and adding componente during testing at 10 pels.

Kocher. Assistant Ceneral Counsel, and the two new technical specification sectione Accident consequences or probability will James Beoletto. Esquire. Southern improves the overall operetional oefety by not be increased since containment prueum California Edison Company P.O. Box further ensuring that the containment during dulgo beste LOCA wiU seal the inner 800. Rosemead. California 91770.

function of the containment structure remaine door. Based on the foregoing. operation of the NRC Prefect Directort iohn T. Larkins,

operable, facility in accordance with the proposed This supplement provides changes that are change will not involve e significant increase MD consistent with Amendment 170. It adde the in the probability or coceequences of an Soubra Califomia Edloom Conapany, et l

additional requirement to maintain the accident previously evaluated.

al., Docket No. so.aos. San Onofre i

containment vent valves closed as much es

2. Will operation of the facili la l

practicable. As indicated in the November 3, eccordance with the proposed c enge create Nuclear Genarmung Stauom. Unit No.1.

1984. NRC SER. Refetence 2 of the proposed the possibility of a new or different kind or San Diego County,Califomia Technical Specification 3.4.0, provided an accident from any occident previouely Date of amendment requesf: May 16.

en: lysis that shows the valves will close evaluated?

1990 when opened to an angle not exceeding 70'.

R88Poneer No De8Cf/ tion of ornendmenf requeste P

nese valves have been modi!!ed to limit the The changes proposed by pCN 211 opening angle to approximately 50'. This establish new technical specification Proposed Change No. 224, which was mtchanical hmitation along with h requiremente foe the conteinment pwge and submitted by Amendment Application l

procedural hmitation added by thle vent valves and the personnel airlocks These No.182 requests NRC approval to supplement will ensure the vetvu will close new requiremente are intended to enhance increase the allowed heat load for the l

or be cloud wben they are mquired to teolate the reliability of the componente in their pow spent fuel pool (SPP).The existing heat containment accident function. Reducing the lower teet load projection discussed in Section Section 3.6.6 was added to incorpora:e pressure on the personnel airlock frans 10 9.1.3.4 of the Updated Final SafatF Anay sis Report (UFSAR) are not

' Limiting Conditions for Operatico which limit pois to 3 pela le proposed to sainimise stresses y

l the amount of time the e inch containment placed on the airlock during teettne while accurale due to calculational errore and l

ventilation valves are allowed to be open maintaining a test preuure sufflcient to during Modes 1,2,3. and 4.The revielen detect degradation of components.

must be revised accordingly.'!his j

rcquires the valves to be closed as much as is Incorporation of LCOfs and ACTION revision would involve an unreviewed 1

(

procucable and only allows them to be statemente not currently in the technical safety question as defined by 10 CFR l

opened for specific purpoeco (Le. for periodic. specifications may moult in avoidens A50 and therefore requires prior NRC

(

containment pressure reduction, for lowering unnecessary plant shutdowns.nerefore, review and approval.

containment airborne radiation levels and none of the changes proposed by PCN 211 In its substittal, the licensee requcated miintaining approximately neutral pressure willcmate the possibility of a new oc that the followl"S revised UFSAR SFP during personnel entry into containment and different kind d accident frosn any accident for periodic surveillance testing) nerefore.

Previonaly evalasted, requirements be approved:

thle change does not affect the significant

3. Will operation of the facility in SFP temperoture no greater than 150'

[

hazards consideration previously provided accordann with this propoud change F for the SFP maximum normal heat with Amendment Application No, tr0L involve a significant reduction to e starsia d load case (including assumption of The licensee provided ti.e following safetyt failure of one cooling pump).

no significant hazard consideretion RMPoneer No No pool bo 1 ng for the SFP maximum i

' determination previously with D'y'8MQ'J,Ig *h pe abnormal heatload case (including I

i *'

Amendment Application No.170:

airlock is defined by the seaung capability in assumption of failure of one cooling

1. Will operation of the facility in ennot d a reew trem ne thansa pump).

accordance with this proposed change proposed by PCN 211 are intended to ensure Pumps, piping. valves, electrical lavoke a significant increase in the that the oeshng capability of these power sources, and connections will I.

oQon, sequences of an occidentcomponente le maictained and any satisfy the existing system quality and bab

{

degradauon is detected in a timely manner, seismic requirements.

Resporne No educhon d the lower tut pmuum tw ee The SFP cooling pum willbe PCN 211 will establish technical to 3 pe does specification requirements for airlock and

""g powered and controll from esparate g g,,

electrical trains.

1 solation valve leak testing acceptance pressure le opposite that which the door criteria that are not carrantly in the would exponence during an accident. Testing in order to accommodate the proposed spect!1 cations.The ecceptance criteria will at 3 is reduces stresses placed on the door revision to the UGAR. the licensee is

, ensure that these penetratione can withstand and as been demonstrated to have adequate making the following changes to the SFP h*n$,'j'e"a a'g"e's d tha grad loYof sensiuvity to detect leakage and degradation cooling system as allowed by 10 CFR Ic mponents. It is sloo noted that PCN 211 50.59: (il Permanendy connecting the j

Inkage integrity le detected in a timely l

menner. PCN 211 will eleo estab!!sh opening h"u'n"g spare SFP cooling pump to the SFP q

e aa Cooling Syatem.The additions to the limits for the conteinment wnt velves, pressure of 40.4 pois. Accordingly operation system will be Seismic Category A and J

Provisions to limit the valve openings are of the facility in accordance with this currestly in place la accordance with NRC proposed change wul not involve a quality class safety related. (2) Powering requirements,neee provtsions will minimize s gnificant reduction in a margin af safety.

the spare SFP pump from a separate the force required to close the valves during a The NRC staff has reviewed the electrical train.Due to extensive h"* *func analysis and, based on that review, it electrical system modification to be

,I I*

]

d of vcjves. no proposed change will establish appears that the three criteria are completed during the upcoming Cycle 11 satisfied.Therefare, the NRC staff outage a non-sarety related requirements to ensure the valve opantr4 hmitations are maintained. PCN 211 will proposes to determine that the construction power sources that is fed incorporata ILO's and ACTION statements amendment request involves no directly from the San Diego Cas and for the personnel air locks consistant with the significant hazards consideration.

Electric power grid, or is otherwise

Fodsval Refster / VoL' as, No: 114 '/ WednesdayJune 13,.tset'2 Noticeit. _..-. M pxvided, will be the laterim power I. Will operetten of the facui in the tellebul with which the span pump can source.De spare power accordance with this proposed create be quickly p cod in service. With the will be ded to se

-related the postbuity of a ww or difibent of modincation Ln place, no piping spool pieces priorto Cycleis and (3) accident ime any accident previoush need be installed or electric power leeda evaluatedt need be connected to twover from a Providing appropriate contro th M a n Respoasse No postulated fauure of the primary pusep.

coneistent wtth existing system The reposed change lavolves pleenas a Rather only four valves must be reahped requirements. Due to the extensive higher iload la the SFp than to currently and a circuit breaker closed to operate the electrical modincetions to be com leted allowed by the UysAR.m only accident op.,e pum m,efo,o, the spa,e pump wat during the upcoming Cycle 11 refu ling.

previouel evaluated that relates to this be able to placed in-service in sufScient non-safety related local manual controls change le loss of SFp cooling.The time to preclude pool bou under hishar will be vided.De controls will be imprend 8FP Cooling System reduces the SFP heet toede than curren specilmd in the upgrad to safety.related prior to the probability of eacurrence for thle socident vys;An.

since the redundant pump is being directly

%e NRC staff has reviewed the Cycle it refueling.

Basleforproposedno s/gn/ficonf The only er kind of eccident analysis and, based on that review,it.

hasards conslaeroflon determinoflon!

not previounty evaluated relates to the EPPeare that the three criteria are As required by to CFR 50.91[s), the potential for a ncirculation Dow path that is utlefied.Therefore, the NRC staff licensee has provided the following co introduced by connectag the spa e pump to proposes to determine that the significant hazards consideration the system. A portion of the coolant Dow amendment request involves no detenninetion' potentially could be recirculated through a significant hasards consideration.

1. Will operation of the facility in non-oPeretag pump should that pump not be hWlicDocumentRoom accordamos with this proposed change cornctly isolated. Such an.

could location.* General IJbrary, University og involve e signincent increase in the lead to degraded system performance, probability or consequences of en accident etnce only a portion of pump flow would California, P.O. Box 19557, Irvine, previously evaluatedt be delivered to the ccmponent cooling weter California 92713.

Respones No beat exchanger for cooling.

Attorneyfarlicenseet Charice R.

The loss of SFP Coohne due to pump failur, However, the probabutty of this situatica ls Kocher, Aaalatant General Counsel, and to the only previously evalented accident very low s.nce the teolation of a non-James Boolette6 Esquir,, Southere whose probabihty er ----

operating pump wul be assured throesh Cahfortda Edison Company, P.O. Box potentiaUy may be effectedby the proposed ad=htrative controle on duelleolation 800' Ro"***d. Cahfornia 91770.

che of tacreasing the mad=== SFp heet valves. Each pump wiu be teolated via two load bove that speci8ed in the UFSAR.

manuelleolation valves, one on the pump's NRCProfect Directon John T.brkins, However, because of the modifications being dische ptplag and one on the euction. For Acting completed on the SFP Cooling Systeen.

a use path to occur both of the non.

neither the probability nor consequences of operating peop's leoletion valves would have Southern CaMania h WM this acddent are cantly chansed by the to either fait er be incorrectly alismed, al., Docket Nos. 86881 and notes, San Onofre Nuclear Cenerating Station Unit higher heat load.

pmbebtheyof theloss Dual concorrent louere of both of a nom.

i of SFP ecohng due to pump fallere le reduced opere p's tasaualisolation valves le Noa. 3 and 3, San Diego County, with the addnion af redundant cooling pump, not and need act be r " M California The mod Sed SFP Coohng System assures incorrect alignment of a neo-operating.

that the consequenose of a coohng pump's valves. while possible. is not Date of amendment request / hfay 14.

failure are no worse for the higher heat significant. Any serious degredation In the 1990 than they were for the UPBAR specified cooling eyetem performance due to isolation Descrip60n of amendownt requesit maximuro abnormal heat load. With the valve misalignment would be noticed and The licensee has requested amendmente higher heat load and implementation of the corrected once the SFP high temperatum to revise San Onofre Unit Nos. 2 and 3 modification, the time to reach pool bouing is alarm was activated. 'llierefore, the potential Technical Specification 4.0.2 and let e in compartoon to the time to place the for a rectrosiation Dow path through a non-associated basee in accordance with the sp%; pump in-service. For the maximum operating pump's p6ptas loop is a new type of, abnormal heet load currently reflected in the accident, but one whose probability and guidance in NRC Generic Letter 80-14.

UPSAR. the time to pool boutng upon lose of co uances are insigni0 cant. Additiona!!y, na Technical Specification Indicates coohns le 47 hours5.439815e-4 days 0.0131 hours 7.771164e-5 weeks 1.78835e-5 months and the tirne to install the a

valve will be added to each of the that the combined time Interval for any spare pump la approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . For pump piping loops prior to the Cycle 12 three consecutive surveillance intervals the high heat loads, the switchover time to refuahng to further reduce the potential for a shall not 6xceed 3.25 times the specified the spare pump remains acceptable la recirculation flow peth.

emell!ance interval.The pro relation to the time to boll. During the

' 3. Will operation of the facihty la chan8' allows for the remov of the upcoming outage. the worst case heat load is accordance with this proposed change 3.25 hmH3e Technical Specification 8.8 MBtu/h and the time to bou upon lose of involve a significant reduction in a margin of will continue to allow eurveillance SFP cooling le 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months . During Cycle 11 esfety?

operation, the worst caos heet load (sesuming Response:No intervals to be extended up to 25% of the an unplanned full oore off.loed at the end of As discussed in response to Question No. l.

opecifled time limit.%e Generic letter the fuel cycle) le 14.7 MBes/h and the time to the SFP may experience higher heat loads has established that the removal of the boil le a hours. For the corrested hypothetical than were previously calculated.These heat 3,25 hmit results in a benefit to safety, maximum ebnormal heet load case, the heat loads are important because they determine Basis fP sed, no significant load is 17 MBtu/h and the time to bou is 8 the equilibrtum temperature wtth the SFP hazords cons / rotion determinof/on.,

hours. In each case, the lose of the primary Cooling S tem in service time to bou and pump can be compenested for without time for a ternate coohng to be established.

As required by 10 CFR 50.91[a). the approaching boiling in the pool stnce with the Because of upgrades to the SFP Cooling licensee has provided the following no modified SFP cochng System, the spese pump System, the margin to bothng is maintained significant hazards consideration will be placed in operetion within such tot adequate tirne to avausble to provide determinatiom opproximately 30 minutes of discovery of a alternate cooling. These higher heet loade

1. Wul operetion of the facility in primary pump failura. llierefore the shorter wul shorten the time for the SFP to reach accc dance with the proposed change involve timee to pool boiung are not significant slace bothng upon loes of cooling. However, this a significant increase in the probability or boiling wul be just as reliably averted with.

reduction in the time to bod intervalla consequences of any accident previously the higher SFP heet load as with the UFSAR compenseLd for by the modification to the evalustax!?

specified limit.

SFP Cooling System which great!y improvee RESPONSF No.

I

24004 I'ederal Register / Vol. 55, No.114 / Wednesday. June 13, 1990 / N tices Specific Surveillance Requirements.14., the invcive a significant reduction in a marstr of to the Commission its' analyses, using mechanics of the actual outvolllanen, are not safety.

the standarda in Section 60.92, on the modified The proposed change would ne NRC staff has reviewed this issue of no significant hazards remove the 3.25 limit frore Technical analysis and, based on that review, it consideration.Therefore,in accordance Specification 4 0.2. his Technical appeare that the three criteria are with to CFR $0.91 and 10 CFR 50.92, the Specincanon allows surveillance intervals to satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff licensee has provided the following be extended up to 25 percent of the specified proposes to determine that the analyeis.

interval his hmitation of Specificauon 4 0.2 h based on engineering judgement and the amendment request involves no TVA has evaluated the proposed TS recognition that the most probable result of significant hazarda consideration.

chany and has determmed that it does not any parucular survedlance being performed Loco / Public Document Room

,,present a significant hazards consideration is the venfication of conformance with the locotion: General Library, University of based on criterta estabbshed in to Cm Surveillance Requirements.

California, P.O. Box 19557, Irvine, so.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance The NRC staff has routinely granted California 92713.

with the proposed amendmeatis] will not:

tequests for one time exceptions to the 3.25 Aflorneyforlicensee Charles R.

n) tavolve a sisnificant increase in the

[ '"','

"'[*'d'uv'e Kocher, Assistant General Counsel, and probability or consequences an accident i

hmes Beoletto. Esquire, Southern previously evaluated.

shutdown to perform these surveillances.

Therefore. the 32.5 limitation has not been a California Edison Company, P.O. Box m proposed addition of the two smoke practical hmtt on the use of the 25 percent 800. Rosemead, California 91770.

detectore in each unit's Tse to a conservative allowance for extendmg surveillances.

NRC Pmfect Disctor John T. Larkins, change. m installation of the detectors will Genene letter 8M4 has estabbshed that the Acting provide redundant fire detection in the us of the allowance to extend the volume control tank roome' entry labyrinths.

irveillance inten als by 25 percent can also Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket

[ne fire detectors do not cause an accident; tesul: in a sigraficant safety benefit for Nos. 50-327 and 50 328, Sequoyah they respond to a fire.] The change, therefore, sarvedlances that are performed on a routine Nucimr Plant, Unita 1 and 2, Hamilton does not sigmficantly increase the probabihty basis dar ng plant operation.

County, Tenneeses or consequences of a previously evaluated The use of the allowance to extend Date of amendment mquests: May 4, accident.

s tn ant safe y e tf r m (TS M)

(21 Create the possey of a new or surveillances that are performed on a routine De80ffPtion of amendment mquests different kind of accident from any basis during plant operatiott his nefety The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) previously analysed.

beneht is incurred when a surveillance proposed to modify the Sequoyah De proposed additloo of the two smoke intervalis estended at a t:me that cenditions Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unita 1 and 2, detectore la an appropriate chsage to each are not suitable for performing the Technical Specifications (TSs). The unit's TS. %e modt!1catione ars,a met safety survedlance. Damples of this includ*

proposed changes would revise Table enhancement to SQN, and they meet the transient plant operating conditions or 3.3-11 Fire Detection Instruments, to criteria of13 incluelon for fire detection conditions doring which safety systems are ref'ect the addition, during the Cycle 4 instrumentation that protects safety-related r villa e or ma ntena ce et vities. In refuehng outage for each unit, of two equipment. [m fire detectore do not cause sach cases the safety benefit of allowing the smoke detectors in each unit's volume an accident; they respond to a fire.) he use of a 25 percent a!!owance to extend a control room. Unit 1 has recently ch*nses, therefore, do not create the surveillance interval would o tweigh any completed its Cycle 4 refueling outage possibility of a new or different kind of tienent denved by hmmng three consecutive and Unit 2 is scheduled to shut down to accident from any pravtous analyaed.

(31 involve e significant reduction in e surveillance intervals to the 3.25 limit.

begin its Cycle 4 refueling outage in The proposed change will therefore not October 1990.

'"

T" he proposed addition of the two smoke insolve a sign 2ficant increase in the Basis forproposed no signifmong d*'t " each unit s Tse reflects the.

paobabihty or consequences of any accident hozords Con 3Jderation determination previously evaluated.

planned installation of these detectore in the

Will r,peration of the facihty in The foHowing information to support the vnlume control tank rooms' entry labyrtntha.

E a-cordance with tha proposed change create proposed htnges to the TSe weg These modifications provide redundancy for tse possibihty of a new or dif'erent kind of provided by TVA in its application:

the fire detection capabihty in the volume accident from any accident previously To provide redundant fire pmtection. TVA control tank rooms and are, therefore. a net evaluated?

ts matalling two photoelectne smoke RESPONSE' No detectnes in the wohme control tank room feYduum @ hw him P.emoval of the 3 25 bmit from the entry labyrinth of each umt. The modification do not create a significant reduction in a survedlance requirement does not modtfy the wdl provide detectore crou-snned in the snargin of safety.)

same aree so that the failure of one smoke The staff has reviewed the licensee's unfiguration of the facihty or its rcode of detector will not result in a Icss of fire no significant hazards consideration operation. The proposed change wdl therefore not create the possibility of a new detection capabihty in the volume comrol determination and agrees with the or different kind of accident from any tank room entry labyrmth. The two detectore licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff previously identified.

are being added to the appropriate TS tablea.

3. Will operanon of the facility in N SQN TSs comain sumiUance pr@oses to determine that the r mrements for fire detection application for amendments involve a no L

m.corriance wnh the proposed change invoke instrumentation that proter's safety-related significant hazards considerations.

~9 angm r e t. ctton in a margin of safety' equipment. Since the additional smoke LocolPublic Document Room I

detectors in the volume control tank room location: Chattanooga. Hamilton County 4

The extens.on for sun edlante innen al wdi rrect this cntena, they are bems included in L brary,1001 Dread Street. Chattanooga.

r suit in a sdea beneht when tre sanedlance is e st< -Jcd at a time that

E$*g Tennessee 37402.

I

,h g

c mdens are rot suvatde for performmg the The Commission has provided Attomey for licensee: General E:

i affIct t e era onNb Sfy standards for determining whether a Counsel. Tennessee Valley Authority,

{

fa i 6ay method of survedlance performance, or significant hazards consideration exista 400 West Summit Hill Drive Ett B33, g

reusa any safoy analys:s conclusion.

as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).10 CFR Knoxville Tennessee 37an

=.

0;,eration of the facMy in accordance wnh 50 91 requires that at the time a licensee A7td Assistant Dirixtor Suzanne tN proposed rhange wUI therefore not requests na amendment,it must provide E!ack i'

Fedesel naalgess / Vol 58 No. U6 / Wednesday, June is, tego / Nottaes seems 1VA hee owtuated the proposed technisel TeemessesVaBey Amibedly,Desset TammessesVaBe7 Aediestly.Doaket Nos stayandOm specineaties (11) abesse and has deteneined Nee. ES 4EF and Obes.Segueyeh.

. Neeleer Fleet Unite t end 3, that it does met sprosent a signinomet Nuclear Fleet.Ushe 1 and a, Hasedian i

County,Tommessee besorde seasideration based es artseria r

sy,yennesse,2 estabushed to is CPR so.sgici. Operation of teso(11so4:

Seguerah Nulsar Meat (SQN)la accedance Doao af amendmoniregusek h4ey 4, Dole of amendesaniseguenes hear 4' wuh on propomd emendment win not-toes (Ts so13)

Desc@on rogueek (1)Invoin a stentnoont insteen tn the Deecript/os of -- i, atrequests-N Tennessee alley Authority (TVA) probability or conwownce of en accident The Tennessee Valley Authority (*!YA) propowd to modify the Sequoyah paviously evolueted.

proposed to modify Section 3/4.54 Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unite 1 and 3, no eefety considerations associated with Accumulatore, of the Sequoyah Nuclear Technical SpectSostions (TBe).b rwetor operation with higher enr6chment and Plant (SQN), Unita l and 3. Technical

proposed changes are to revlee Section extended burnep have been evaluated. no Specificatione (TSa).b proposed 8.0, Design Features, and teradd -

proposed ebenges how no adverse leffect) en changes are to revies the requirennente Surveillance Requirement 4.s14. N ttw prebebutty of any nacident.no in TS 3/4.5.1.1, Cold las injection changes would allow the liconese to inuroesed bums, may stightly change the Accumulatoes, to delete (t) Actica increase the maximum fuel enrichement mix of neeles products that might tw mleend Statenante "c" and "d" and the for fuel on the alte from the current 4.0 to the event of a serious nacidset but euch associated footnote, (2) Surveillance weight percent to 5.0 weight-percent small changes would not signtneantly @ct Requ!reme'nt (SR) 411.1.2, and (3) the Uranium (U)-238 and permit the the conseguonome of earlous accidena he prescriptive statement of SR 4.5111a.1

' substitution of Zircaloy 4 or stelnlese substitution of Illier rods or open wate' as to how to verify accumulator level steel filler rode or open water channels.

channels for fuel rode wiu be lueufied by and pressure.

for fuel rode in fuel sesemblies, cycle-spec 68c analysis melag so NRG-Scelsforpmposedno s@ificoni Basisforproposedt o significant approved methodology.nle reloed analreis hatarcir consideration determination:

hasords consideroflon determination:

will demonstrete that existing design limita W following information wee provided l

he following information was provided and eefety analyses criterte an awt.

hMM licadon pwt h by TVA in its application to support the nerefomahe propoud change does not proposed changes to the'Ille:

involve a e;gnincant incrueein the pro eWhar e 2 the'rSe-

" he change to Increces the ellowable fuel probability [or] consequences of an accident amendments to the SQN Unita 1 and 2 TB 3/

l enrichment le necessary to allow the use of preytously evaluated.

4.8.1 edding Action Statements c nad d that L

higher dischange berump fuel

( ) Crute the poselbility of a new or provide actions to fo!!aw in the evens SR discharge burnupe are achieved niondies diffmnt kind of accident from ant 45.1.12 could not be met. NRC eteffpteted in r.

l we smauer h batch frechoes wth higher previously analynd.

Its letter that the leeuance of actions.

j onttchment.no change to allow the (nere are no phyelcal modifications being statements governing the opwebuitget the eubetitution of Biler rode or water channele le swde to the plant, the new fuel will be monitoring instrumentattua for the cold-les l

I' ('"I Y g 'I 'III trradiated in the same manner as previone

[ injection] accumulatore (i.e., level and detersuru d to tw p+obable mrces c f$uture operating cycles, and the reload analysis wiu preuure inetnusente) was a genette teaue for deaccetrate that exleting doelph limite and Westinghouse IDectric Corporation's g g.,,,

Each core reloed design und et SQN ie safety analyese criteria are met}ne pressurteed water reactore (PWill. and confirmed to meet all dulga criteria and to Psopeeed change to increase the ammusman therefore these amendments would only be be within the bounds of the accident analysis aHoweble fuel ear 6chment ce ttw substitetton-affective until the restart of Unit x from its presented in Chepter 15 of the Final Safety of Aller rode or opes water channess Ice fluer cycle 4 refueling outege.This would provide Analyste Report (PSAR) by performance of a rode dose not create any new or differeas approximately to monthe far the NRC staff to work with the Westinghouse Ownere Group I

reload safety analysie. nis analysis -

kind of arW at from any previously (WOC) to dmlop a geseric Wuhon m h considere modiAcetions to the plant destyn analysed.

inue made a#6 cable fw au Wounghmas and any changes to fuel deelyn taciudia0 (3)lavolve a signiScent redoctico in a PWRs.TVA hea been in contact with both-increasse in fuel enrichement, no margin of eefoy

- d 8 "* "

pufonnance of the sled safety analysie Based on the discuselon provided in item ! '

'** ""d

" *" 8 E"

l, ensuru the unit, with its specinc core design above and the fact that no Ielsniacant]

change to inolve thle leaue for e SQN Unit and fuel enrichment, will operate within the changes m being inade la the typu or 2 Cycle 4 tofueling outage. The requested prescribed eefety hmite. Any restriction on core operetion identined through the reioed amante of any radic.llgical afBuents that change le soneistent with the accumolefor safety analysis process le dam===ted eng may be reneesed affatte, them le ne -

specificatice psoposed by the WOC MERmt any changes to the plant license are made og signincent todaction in a margia of safety,

program, that time. Therefore, operetion with revloed ne staff has reviewed the licerrsee's The Commisalon has provided Design Feature 5J.1 allowing the un of feel no significant hazarde consideration standards for determining whether a ensemblies with a mentasun enrichment of determination and agrees with the significant hazards conalderation exista 8,jg Pement wW be jwttSed fw each licensee's analyels.Retefore, the staff as stated in to CFR 50.92(c).10 CFR we Th Commissionhasprovided Proposes to deterralna that the 50.91 requires that at the tima a licaneee standards for determining whether a application for amendments invoices no requests en amendment,11 must provide significant hazarda considerations, to the Commlulon its analyres, using algnificant hasards consideration aziets as stated in to CFR 30.92(c).10 CFR LocalPtibliclbtximentRoom the standards in Section Sa92, on the 50.91 requires that et the time a licensee location: Chattanoogs. Hamilton County tune of no signifleant hazards requests an amendment,it must provide Library.1001 Broad Street. Chattanooga, con-aideretion. Therefore, in e ccordance l-f to the Commission its analyses, ue(ng Tennessee 37402.

with 10 CFR 50.01 and to CFR r,0.9% the the standards in Section 50.92, en the Attorneyforlicensee General licensee has performed and previded the issue of no significant hazards Counsel,TermesaseValley Authority, foHabg snalysW conalderation. Therefore, in accordance 400 West Saramit Hill Drive, E11 B33, (hed b

ed u

with10 CFR 50.91 and to CFR 50.92, the Knoxville Tennessee 37902.

sam dumpeseent e stantScant licensee has performed and provided the NRCAssistent Director: Suzanne haarde considention band on enterta following analyste:

Black utablished ia 10 CFR aa92(c). Opeution o!

24806 Federal Regnelse / Wl. 55. Nr. He / Wednesd:y, June 13. 1990 / N:tices 4

Sequoyoh Nuclear Plant [SQNJ in accordance Techn!cel Specifications and plate them of thle proposed change.h cycle specific wim the proposed amendment will not:

in the Core Operating Limits Report s ariabiw are caLuleted using the NRC.

(11 involve e signifkant increase in the (COLR) under the control of the plant's approved methods and submitted to the NRC

,"yQo[uences of an accident unit review group (On-Site Review to allow the Staff to continn to trend the y,,

ne requested change does not requin a Committee (ORC) for Callaway Plant).

valun of then limita. m Technical phyelcal modification to any plant system NRC will be notified of changes to the S ecifications will continue to requin P

i I

a,nd does not affect any accident analysisL COLR concurrent with plant operetion within the required core operating The cold leg accumulators are a possive implementation.

liraits and appropriate actions will be taken

[

component in the emergency core cooling Bos!s forproposed no sigmficong when or if hmits are neeeded, system and the 111 requiring the venfication hazcids consideration determination.

Thmfm, the proposed amendment does of both accumulator water.evel and pressum The Commission has provided not in any way create the possibility of a ne=

will remain unchanged. Ve ification of these parameters ensurv s that accident analysee st,andards for determinin8 whether a e di!! rent kind of accident from any ensumptions are not violated. Therefore. the stgnificant hazards consideration exists secidet previouely evaIcated.

requested change doce not involve a as stated in to CFR 50.92. A proposed 13] he Proposed amendment does not s'anificant increase in the probability or amendment to an operating license for a result in a significant reduction in the margm

[

consequences of an accident previously facilit involves no significant hazards '

I **I*'Y' PVeluated-consi eration if operation of the facihty e Inarg n of safet) is not effected by the I:) Create the possibibty of a new or j

different kind of accident from any in accordance with a proposed n m nl f Me-specine cm operating prsviously analyzed.

amendment would not (1) Involve a limits from the Technical Specificatione. ne No physical modification is being made to significant increase in the pmbabilf tY or margin of talety pn'ently provided by eny plant system as a result of this change, consequences of an accident previously rurrent Technical Specifications remains Vr'rification of the parameters (water level evaluated:(2) Create the possibility of a ushanged. Appropriate measures exist to und pressurel ensures that accident analyec, new or different kind of accident from control the value of these cycle-specific l

l.

terumptions are not violated and no chanae any accident previously evaluated; or (3) i: mite.no proposed amendment continues to

-in the analyses is being made, Therefore, the involve a significant reduction in a Mqm openum wWn ee.cm hmiu as possibility of a new or different kind of margin of safet.

btaird from the NRC. approved reload accident is not created.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a The licensee as provided the design methodologies and appropriate

[

rurgin of safety.

followin8 anal sis of no el8".if; cant violated remain unchanged. "c*

I ne TS that requiree verification of the hazards consi erations using the I

Accumuktor weter volume and pressure will Commleslon a standards.

The development of the linets for futuse l

r-main unchanged. No changes to the (1) The pmposed change does not irvoh e a reloads will continue to confsm to those eccident analysis are beicg made and e imincant meresse in the probabihty or methods described let NRC-spproved documentation. In addition, each future l

scrificatiori of these parameters ensures that em{eque. ces of an accident previously a

e d.

the accident u talyses assump' ions are not Ookted. Therefore. there is no significant De remeval of cycle-specific core revievc to assure that operation of the unit reduction in any margin c.f safety.

opneting has imm the Callaway Plant within the cycle specific hmits will not The staff has reviewed the licensee's Technical 5pecifications has no influence or involve a significant reduction in a margm of no significant hazards consideration irspect on the probability or consequences of

safety, ation and aErees with the any accident previously evaluated. %e cycle.

Based on the previous discussions, the determin,e analysis. Therefore, the staff specific core operstitu; limits, although not in licensee TechnicalSpectitcaticas willbe followedin Iicensee concloded that the pmposed proposes to determine that the the operation of the Callaway P! ant.The amendment request does not tavolve a opplication for amendments involves no proposed amendrnent still requires exactly significant increase in the probabihty or significant hazards concideratfors, the same actions to be taken when or if limits consequences of an accident previously J

l LocalPublic Document Room are exceeded as is required by current evaluated; does not create the location Chattanooga-Hamilton County Technical Specifications. The cycle specific possibility of a new or different kind of Library,1101 Broad Street, Chattanega, hmus wuhin the CMR will be implemented accident from any accident previously Tennessee 37402.

and cetrolled per Calla way Plant programs evaluated; and does not involve a Atiorneyforlic6nseet General

$d di th bkw y 1nalSa reduction in the required margin of Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority.

Analysis Report (FSAR) will be examined 88I8tY-l 400 West Summit 11111 Drive Ett B33, with resoect to changes in cycle-dependent The staff has reviewed the licensee's KnoxviMe. Tennessee 3?902.

paranitters, which are obtained from no significant hazards consideration NRC Assistani Director: Suzanne application of the NRC-approved reload determination and agrees with the htk design methodologies, to ensure that the i

licensee's analysis.The staff, the proposes to determine that the h. refore.,s transient evaluation of new reloads are Urnon Ef ectric Company, Docket No. 34-bounded by previously accepted analyses.

censee, 453, Callaway Piant. Unit 1. Callaway This examination, which will be performed request does not involve a significant Ccuaty, Missourt per requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, ensume hazards consideration.

that futun reloads will not involve e LocolPublic Document Room Octe of amendment request: March 6, s,gnificant increase in the probability o' location Callaway County Public 1990 consequences of an accidenipreviously evaluated.

IJbrary 710 Court Street. Fulton, Th, QJcriptw, n ofamendment requeste e proposed amend:nent would revisa

(:) The proposed' change dces not create hilosoub 65251 and the John M. Olin Techrt cal Specifications and associated the possibility of a new or different kind of IJbrary, Washington University. Skinker 1

Dasco, Which contain cyr134pecific core accident from any at:ctdent reviously and 1.lndell Boulevards, St. lauls, opetaling parameters la eccordance evaluated, hfissourl 63130.

wl!h Cencric Letter 88-M. "R1moval of As Hated urHer. ee rmeval of the cycle.

Chernoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts a Attorneyforlicensee: Gerald

'b '

' P -

Cycidpocific Parameter Limits from

,[cen ba bu wayoh Tcchtt' cal Specifications." The proposed-pro %btfity or conuquences of an accident.

Trowbridge,2300 N Street. NW.,

revi31on wou!ri relocate the cycle-No e.fety.related equipment. saftty function.

Washington, DC 20037, spccGe',: ore parameters frem the on pl.nt operet;ons will be ahered as e neult NRCProject D/ rector: John N. flannon i

Fedsmat RsWeber / Vol 58 No.114'/ Wednesday, June'13.195sr/ Neessel 80808

~

I.

Uudes Bhiende Coespany. Jaiket No. E signiSonnt taassese in the probability or chosen merely is en enest to enertfy, simptsst,-

488, CeBassey Flese, Up'A 1. Cabessey consegesacenof anaccident.c4 and seesminne the = " " in.

evaluated; does not creets the accordamas w6th tbs gudenes prov6ded la CE, Ceesty,Ma== d Dole of amendrient regasse March 6, Possibility of a new or different kind of -

s7.as se a part of the implementeuen of ther accident from any accident previously Commission's policy Stata==neen'technasal 19AD evaluated; and does notinvolve e BP*cification leptovememe.

Description of amendment request The proposed amendment would revise reduction in the required margin of his chanes stoes not create the possibility the Technic.al Specineauons by delsung

safety, of a new or ddlemat kind of accident from '

The staff has reviewed the licensee's - any accident previously evaluated.The.

- the power range.neutma flux, high

' negauve rete trip (NFR4 This change no significant besards conalderation Proposed change does not alter the request is consistent with Westinghouse determination and agrees with the requimmente and b nwthod and manner of WCAP.11394(P). Methodology for the licensee's analysis,ne staff, therefore, plant operetion are unchanged. Its intent to to Anal als of the Dropped Rod Event,"

proposes to determine that the hcensee's ruolve the problems regarding the general.

whick was approved by NRC on requwt does not involve a significant requirements of Section 4.0 of the Technical October 13,1988. Plant modifications to hasards consideration.

Spec $cadoes on the oppbcabikty of LocalPublic Document Room surveillance Requimmeets.nie to remove the trip circuHry wiu be location: Callaway County Public

ccomP ehad by providing shamatine to ii completedinRafael4 whichis scheduled for fall 1380.

Ubrary.710 Court Street. Fulton.

them sections using the guidance provided in 8

red ti in a n f safe. i d

PVid*d I nd on the fact that no design change le involved.

Missouri 63130.

but the intent of the Technica1 Specificatione standards for determining wtuther a Attorneyforlicensee: Gerald to clarif ed to enhance the overall safety to signincent basards consideration existe b

Tw NS e ae t to operating a

Ba a

et ve d one, the facility ineolves no significan hasards Washington. DC 20037, amendment request does not involve a -

e considerationif operation of the facility.

NRCrrofect Director: John N. Hannon g

Union Electric 'a==pany, Docket No. BD

conmquenew of an accioent previously in accordance with a proposed r

amendseent would not (1) Involve e 403,Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Callowey eveluated; nor create the possibility 61 e new significant increase in the probability or County, Missourt or diffennt kind of accident fmm a4

CCid*"8 P'i'"*I "*I"*d; "*' 18I, '

consequences of an accident previously Date of amendment requeste March 8, F

reduct$ In the required margin of fety evaluated:(2) Create the possibility of a 1990 Based 6.he fomgoingAs mquet -

new or different kind of accident frook Description of ornendment sequesp

"""d""' d " "*' P"""' ' 'i 8"* ***'

any accident previously evaluated: or (3) ne proposed amendment would revise hasard involve a significant toduction in a Technical Specifications 4.0.3<4.0.4 and Based on the previous discussions, the

"*'8I" *I'*I'( p'rovided the their associated bases to incorporate the ne licensee changes provided in Generic 14tter a7 licensee concluded that the proposed wing d no signincant 00, dated June 4,1987. Generic letter 87 amendment request does not involve a hazards tions using the 00 provided gnManca on revising significant increase in the probability or

,sj bevolve. TechnicalSpecifications to provide consequences of an accident previously C

increased flexibiuty on the application evalented: does not create the a signiscent nacrease in the probabih%erof limiting conditione for operation possibility of a new or different kind of conseq==amas of an weident - 2

, evaluated Cycle.epecinc evalisations using associated wiih surveillanoe Intervela accident from any accident previously anNRCa ed methodology willbe Basis forproposedno significant evaluated; and does not involved a perf to demonstrate that the DNB '

hazards considerot/on determinationi reduction in the required margin of design beste le aset during the course of a The Commission has provided safety' dmpped ma m ytng en e standards for determining whether a The staff has reviewed the licensee's dirwt significant hasards considerstion exista no significant hazards consideration reduction.The method and '=====e of plant as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed determinetion and agrees with the operetion will be unchanged other than the amendment to an operating license for a licensee's analysis.The str.ff, therefore.

deletion of unnecessary survaillaaram The proposed change to remove the NFRT facill involves no significant hazards proposes to determine that the licensee's.

does not create the poselbility of a new or conal eretionif operation of the facility request, does not involve a significant different kind of accident tres any in accordance with a proposed hazards consideration.

previously evaluated. No alianos le placed amendment would not (1) Involve a Loco /Public Docment Room on a dimet mutw trip er eseemene per significant increase in the probability or nducuan due to dmpped As consequences of an accident previously location: Callaway County Public evaluated:(2) Create the possibility of a Ubrary,710 Court Street, Fulton.

[i,y new or different kind of accident from Missouri 65251 and the John M. Olin abo be

- The removal of the NFRT does not involve a significant mduction in a margin of eafety, any accident previously evaluated; or (3) 1.ibrary, Washington University, Skinker

, Cycle specific evaluations using an NRC Involve a significant teduction in a and I.indell Boulevards. St. l.ouis, approved methodology will be performed to margin of safety, Missouri 63130.

demonstrate that the DNB design besie le met The licensee has provided the Attorneyfor licensee: Gerald.

during the course of a dropped rod event.

following analysis of no significant Charnoff,Esq.,Shaw Pittman,Potts at

' yh as a con derat on using the Trowbridge,2300 N Street, NW..

$toaist pobabinddrout r trip or Washington, DC 20(X17, Based on the previous discussions, the This che licensee concluded that the proposed incuese inbe does not involve a significantNRCPiviect Directorr John N. Hannon probebtitty or consequenen amendment request does not involve a

. of an accident previonely evaluated.h

I 24000 f'ederal Resister / W1. 55. No.114 / Wedn:aday, June 13, 1990 / Noticee Virginia Electric and Power Company, to the following TS sections and related - Manuscripts Department, Univoretty of Docket No. 30 338, North Anna Power tables, and the to. month requirernent in Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22921.

l Station, Unit No.1,laulaa County, the note in the tables indicated below, Anorneyforlicensee: Michael W.-

Virginia would be changed to 24 months for the Maupin, Esq., Hunton and Williams, Date of amendment requestc April U, eighth cycle of unit operation only:

P.O. Box 1535, Richmond. Virginia 2321L 3990 Table 4.3-1 Note (4)

NRCProject Director:lierbert N.

l Descriptlon of amendment request:

Tsble 4.3-2, Note (l)

DerLow Basisforproposedno signifscont hozords considereten deterrm,'notenVirginia Electric and Power Conspany, Th3 prc90 sed change would add a j

license condition to Operating License Docket Nea. so ass and so ase, North I

No.NPF-4 for the North Anna Power The Commission has provided Anna Power Statloa. Units No.1 and No.

Station. Unit No.1 (NA.1). Specifically, standards for determining whether a 2, Wisa Cmmty, Virginia the proposed license condition allows a significant hazards consideration exists onttime extension of the surveillance (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed Date of amendment requeste May 21, test intervals for certain surveillance amendment to en operating license for a 1980 l

tests as specified in the NA 1 Technical facility involves no significant hasards Description of amendment requeet:

1 Specifications (TS) for the eighth cycle consideration if operation of the facility The proposed changes would amend the l

of operation. NA 1 completed applicable in accordance with the proposed -

Technical Specifications (TS) for the Mode 4,5 and 6 surveillance tests during amendment would not:(1) Involve a North Anna Power Station, Units No.1 the seventh refueling outage which significant increase in the probability or and No. 2 (NA.1&2). Specifically, the ended on July 15,1989. It was consequences of an accident previously proposed changes would relocate the considered unreasonable to repeat these evaluated: or (2) Create the possibility of Radiological Effluent TS (RETS) to the surveillance tests during the several a new or different kind of accident from Offsite Dose Calculation Manual nhort unanticipated outages that have any accident previously evaluated; or (3) (ODCM) or the Process Control Program j

occurred since then. However, these involve a significant reduction in a (pCP), as appropriale.he yr;t::M i

unplanned outages and the unexpected margin of safety, chansas are in accordance with the length of the cycle seven refueling The licensee has evaluated the change guidance provided in NRC Ceneste i

outage has impacted the surveillance request against the standards provided Letter (GL) 89 01, dated )anuary 31.1909.

test intervals between the seventh and above and has determined that this CL e401 stated that the NRC would ci,hth reft eling outages. This delay, change will not:

approve a TS amendment te delete t

together with additional time allowed tl involve a significant increen in the FITS if the requirements would be for an optimum fuel burn.up before the probabihty or consequencu of an accident relocated to the ODCM or PCP.

next refueling. has tesulted in a deferral previously evaluated. Curmnt monitoring Basis forproposedno s/Arificant of the next refueling outage for NA 1 instrumentation and ongoing Technical hozords consideration determinatione until February 199L Currently, the NA 1 Specification surveillance teste ensure the The Commission has provided

'iS require the performance of certain equipment and systems involved in the.

standards for determird g whether a surveillance tests at 18. month intervals

',*j",d*d tEt etti spec ion t significant hazards consideration exists

, p,,b e co to the next refuelins outase.

(10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed to coincide with normal 18-month refueling cyc!es.The proposed change 21 Cnete the possib;hty of a new or amendment to an operating license for a would extend these surveillance test d.IIerent kind of accident from any accident facility involves no significant hazards l

intervals for the NA.1 eighth cycle by 8 previously evaluated. Extending the interval consideration if operation of the facility' months to compensate for several for the performance of specific surveillence in accordance with the proposed unanticipated outeges and the extended tuta does not create the possibility of a new amendment would not:(1) Involve a seventh refueling outage that occurred or different ktad of accident. Periodic significant increase in the probability or from February 25.1989 to July 15,1989 surveillance teste have been performed since consequences of an accident previously the *'

8' 1'te and evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of and to p rmit optimum fuel burnup prior g9npone e r ua de degradation. Surveillance tests will continue a new or different kind of accident from on ng.

One-time changes to the surveillance to be performed dunns the extension (nierval, any accident previously evaluated; or (3) test intervals associated with a plant

3) Involve a significant reduction in the involve a significant reduction in a shutdown cir refue!!ng outage as margin of safety. Extending the interval for margin of safety.

specified in the NA 1 TS for Operating these specific surveillance tests for the eighth The licensee has evaluated the License NpF 4 would be changed as cycle of North Anna Unit 1 does not proposed changes in accordance with follows:

significantly degrade the margin of safety the criteria above and has made the (1) The 18 month su;veillance test surveillance tests will continue to be followl^8 determination that the cycle requirement as specified in the performed during the extension interval.

following TS sections would be changed current monitonna instrumentation and proposed changes do not involve a to 24 months for the ei hth cycle of unit ngoing Technical Specificauon surveillaace significant hazards consideration as 8

tests ensure the affected equipment and defined in 10 CFR 50.92 because the "P8'"U " ""yI systems remain in an operable condition.

changes would not:

The NRC staff has made a preliminary (1) Involve a significant increase in review of the licensee's analyses of the the probability or consequence of an 4 yac 4',':,4jj 4

roposed change and agrees with the accident previously evaluated. This 4 e 21: c 4 r a:: d ficensee's conclusion that the threechange does not alter the conditions or 4 a c.J.tc 4 s.t.t.2.d 4 a.2.3 c 4 s tt s.c standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) are met.

assumptions of any accident analysis.

,,'y

,Q Therefore, the staff proposes to (2) Create the possibility of a new or 4

determine that the proposed amendment different kind of accident from any

3..

does not involve a significant hazards accident previously identified. nle (2) Table 1.2 of Section 1.0, considera tion.

change does not alter the conditions or Definitions, which definea "R" as "At Loco / Public Documerit Room assumptions of any accident analysisJ There are no hardware changes.

least once per 18 months" as it applies location:The 'Mnan Library,

~

redssel asisess./ vet as..Na,114 / Wednesday Jane 13, assot / Notises Segget (3) lavolve a algninennt seductica la a the origlaal request la its entirety,.

Loco /PublicDocument Acom..

margia of safety, his changs does not' herefore,the staRhas decided to locoties:Swem Library College of alter any of the conditions or remotice the proposed a==d==*=

William and Mary.Williamsburg.

assumptions of any aceleent analyela as Sosisforpropoemdno significant Virginia 33146,,

..~.

stated in the NA.163 Updated Flaat.

hasards conslaeroflon detestninoflon:

Afscraeyforlicensaa.unek Iw, Sefoty Analysis Report (UFSAR).

De Co==lamaan has provided Maupla Bog Heaton and WLiliams, The staff has reviewed the li=aaaa's standards for determining whether a Post Ofhos pox 1536, anchmaa.t no significant hasards consideration significant hasards consideration exista Virginia 23213.

determinauon analysis and agrees with (10 CFR so.92(c)). A proposed NRCProfect Direcion Herbert N.

the above conclusions.nerefore, the amendment to an operating Ilconse for a Berkow staff pro to determine that the facility involves no significant hasards NOTICE OF ISSUANCB OF.

pro changes do not involve a consideration if operation of the facility AMENDMENTTO FACILITY significant hazards ennsideration.

In accordance with the proposed OPERATNG LICENSE Locolpublic Document Room anwndment would not:(1)lavolve a locat'on:b Alderman Library.

significant increase in the probability or During the period since publiosuon o't Manuscripts Department. Univoretty of consequences of an accident previously the last biweekly notice, the.

Virginia. Charlottesville, Virginia taget, evaluated: or (2) Create the possibility of Commission has issued the following Attorneyforlicensee: Michael W.

a new or different kind of accident from amendments.De Ceaunission has Maupin, Esq. Hunton and Williams, any accident previously evaluated: or (3) determined for each of these P.O. Box 1535, Richmond. Virginia 23212. Involve a signincant reduction in a amendments that the application NRCProject Directon Herbert N.

margin of safety,ddromed the above complies with the standards and Berkow The licensee a requirements of the Atomic Energy'Act Virginia Electric and Power Company, three criteria in the amendment of 1964, as amended (the Act), and the Docket Nos. 88 388 and 3D.381.Surry application and made a proposed no Commission's rules and regulations. The Power Statloa. Unit Nos.1 and 3, Sorry significant hasards consideration Commission has made appropriate -

County, Virginia determination, la regard to the first findings as required by the Act and the criterion, the licensee stated that:

Commission's rules and segulations in 10 Date of amendmentivguests:Octoter m effect of the chanen will be to CFR Chapter 1; whiseso set foeth in the it.1988,as, superseded October 30.1980 increses the reliability of the euxiliary license amendment.

h Descrrpten of amendment requests?

fwdwater cross. connect feature, which is Notice of Consideration of Osuance of The proposed amendments would reued on for antisation of certain high energy License and C1,ty Operedag.

Amendment to Facili modify Surry Units 1 and 2 Technical line breaks outside containment and firn No Si t

Specifications (TS) Sections 3.6.

(Mcl.'the current UFSAR accident analysis

" Turbine Cycle," 3.9, " Station Servic, results and conclusions are not affected by -

Hasards Consideratica De tien System," and 3.16. " Emergency Power the pmposed changes.

and Opportunity for Hearingin.

Systems." he proposed modifications In regard to'the second criterion, the.

connection with these actions was licensee stated that: -

published in the. Federal Register as address the operability and redundancy The additional requirements for the indicated. No request for a hearing or,

requ!rements of the cross. connect opPoode unHe(Mcl sudary fwdweer petition for leave to intervene was filed feature of the Auxiliary Feedwater the of en$

following this notice; (AFW) System.The proposalis the init aune y

Unless otherwise indicated, the result of the identification of an in regard to the third criterion, the Commission has determined that these apparent discrepancy between the licensee provided the following amendments satisfy the criteria for analyses presented in the Updated Final statement:

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the Since the rwults of the exisung UFSAR categorical exclusion in accordance requirements of the TS.%is accident analysa remain bounding, the -

with to CFR 51.22.nerefore, pursuant discrepancy was found to result in the ufety margne are not impacted.

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental potentjal for inadequate AFW flow via The stan has reviewed the analysis impact statement or environmental the unit to-unit ctou. connect for certain provided by the licensee in support of a assessment need be prepared for these high energy line break events, proposed no significant hazards amendments. lf the Commission has Surry Units 1 and 2 AFW Systems can consideration determination.The staff prepared an environmental assessment be cross. connected. Thus. in the event of agrees with the licensee's analysis and under the special circumstances a failure of all of one unit's AFW pumps, belleves that the licensee has met the provision in to CFR 51.12(b) and has core cooling can be provided by the criteria for such a determination. In made a determination based on that other unit's AFW pumps via the cross-addition, the Commission has provided assessment, it is so indicated.

connect.he current 'Ill require that in guidance concerning the application of For further details with respect to the order to operate a unit, only one of the the criteria for determining whether a action see (1) the applications for other unit's AFW pumps need be significant hazards consideration exists-amendments. (2) the amendments, and operable.The proposed change would by providing certain examples (5151t (3) the Commission's related letters.

Increase the number of required 7751).One of the examples of actions Safety Evaluations and/or available pumps to two.This would involving no significant hazards F/wironmental Assessments as provide an additional margin of safety considerations is example (11), a change indicated. Allof theseitems are-for common mode failure events, that constitutes an additional restriction available for public inspection at th,a Allowance is made for the outage tame not presently included in the TS: e.g., a Commission's Public Document Room, necessary to conduct maintenance on more stringent surveillance requirement. the Gelman Building. 2120 L Street, NW.,

the AFW pumps.

ne proposed changes fall within the Washington. DC, and at the local public This application was previously scope of this example.Therefore. the document rooms for the particular published in the Federal Register on -

staff proposes to determine that the facilities involved. A copy of items (2)

March 8,1989 (54 FR 9936). However, proposed changes do not involve a and (3) may be obtained upon request the October 30,1989 letter superseded significant hazards consideration.

addressed to the U.!L Nuclear I

l

34M6 Fedesel Resister / Vol. 55, No.114 / Wednesday, luno 13 ;se0 / Notices RegulstoryCommission Washington, Date ofissuance: May 24,1898 Facility Opemting Goense Nos. NPF.

DC 205&5, Attention: Director, Division Effective dom Upon issuanos, to be 35 and NPF.52 Amendmsato revised the of Reactor Projects, eiplemented within 46 days from date Technical Specifications, of>suance.

Date ofinitialnotice in Federmi na Pwer &

Company, et al.

Amcodment Na 30 Register. February 7,19e0 (55 FR 42es)

FacihC Pemlig Ucense Na NPF-The Commission's related evaluation of O

' Nu Pow amt, Unit 1 W e and.

Sa This anandment revised the the amendmenta le contained in a Safety Chatbad@M Cmuu Technical Spxifications.

Evaluation dated May 17,1990.

l Date of applicationfor amendment:

Date ofinith.Inotice in Federal No signifimnt hazarde considemtion I

February 26,1990, as supplemented Register. Februa.y 24,1908 (53 FR 5496) commet'ts rece/ red: No.

L April 24,1990.

The Commisalon'a relaled evaluation of Localfublic Document Room

. Brief description of amendment: The the amendtnent le contained in a Safety location: York County Ubrary 138 East change removes the provision of Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina Specification 4.0.2 that limits the No sigmficant hcsards considerction 20730.

f-combined time intervals for three comments received: No l

consecutive surveillances to less than LocalPublic Docu nent Room Honda Pow:.t Corporation, et al.

l 3.25 times the specified intervat locadon Perry Public Ubrary,3753 Main Dor 5Mo. as.3es, Cryotal Rim Unit i

Date ofissuance: May 25,1990 Street, Perry, Ohio 440td No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus t

Effective date: May 25,1990 County, Florida AmendmentNa 18 Commonwealth Edisoin Comp.ay, Facility Opemting Ucense Na NPF.

Docket Noe.56-254 and so 385, Quad Mnf application for amendment:

63. Amendment revises the Technical Cities Nuclear Powor Station. Units 1 March 15,1990,

S 'cifications, and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois U#I'[d#8Cf'P# don of amendment:Wie P

amendment mcmasas the fuel i

Date ofinitialnotr.ce un Federal Date of application for amendments:

manufacturing tolerances as used in the

[.

Register, April 18,1990 (55 PR 14504)

October 11.1989 calculation of nuclear heat Dux hot

[

The Commission a related evaluation of Brief dascription of amendments:

channel factor from 1.4% to 2.0E the amendment is contained in a Safety Modifies the Technical Specification Date ofissuance:May 21,1990 Evaluation dated May 25.1990:demtr,on requirements for jet Pump flow Effective date:May 21'1990 No significant hazards conss indication.

AmendmentNa:120 al c

tRoom Efct

$e facil:Wemum Ucener Na DPR-ay,

u. Amendmen med theTechnical locatioa: Cameron Village Regional Amendment Nos.:124 and 121 Spumcadons.

l Library,1930 Clark Avenue, Raleigh, facility Opemting Ucense Nos. DPR-e ofinidalm#ce r,n Mral L

North Carolina 27805, 29 and DPR Ja Amendments revised the Regiaten April 18.1980 (55 FR 14506)

The Cleveland Electric illmnInating Tecimical Specincations, m CmW's relaled evaluation of Company. Duquesne Light Company, Date ofinitialnotice in Federal the amendment is contained in a Safety Ohio Ediaan Company, Pennsylvania Register. April 4.1990 (55 FR 12590) he Commission a related evaluation of the Evaluation datad May 21,1990 r

l Power Company Toledo sha No significant haraide considemtion Company. Docket No. 50-440. Perry amendments is cetained in a Safety comments inceived: No.

t Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1, Lake Evaluation dated May 23.1990L Local.Public Document Room l

County, Ohio

'8,",'l["tjf considetetion y

1 Dole of application foramendment:

LocalPublic Document Room esa N.W. First Avenus, Crystal River, Florida 32829.

September 17.1987 location: Dixon Public Ilbrary. 221 Brie description of amendment:The Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois 61021.

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et at. Docket try nt al din on.

5 who tatl n, 1

1 Daup uq l

under certain circumstances when Nuclear Station, Unita 1 and 2. York Pennsy vania compliar,ce with the LCO's related County, South Carolina Date of application for amendmsnt; i

Action Statements would allow-Date of application for amendments:

Marcis 12,in continued operation for an unlimited January 17,1990 Briefde8cr/Pfloa of amendment:

period of time.The general surveillance Brief description of amendments:%e Changes the Technical Specifications requirements are also modified to clarify amendments change the Technical '

related to inservice inspections of steam the time at which the Action Statements Specifications (TSs) for Units 1 and 2 by Sencrator tubes following a primary-to.

time limits begin relative to failure to replacing the values of cycle specific secondary leak.

petform a surveillance requirement and parameter limits in core-related Date of/ssuance:May 29,1990 to allow for a delay of the Action specifications with a reference to a Core Effective date: May 29,1990 Statement requirements for up to 24 Operating Limits Report (COLR) which Amendment No.t 153 hours0.00177 days 0.0425 hours 2.529762e-4 weeks 5.82165e-5 months to complete the surveillance if the will contain the values of these limits.

Facility Operatmg Ucense Na DPR.

allowable time is lesa than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . It These amendments also include the 5a Amendment redsed the Technical also clarines that restrictions on entry addition of the COLR to the Definitions Specifications.

Into Operauonal Conditions based on section of the TSa and to the reporting Date ofinitialnotice in Federal failure to comply with surveillance requirements in the TS Administratis e Registec March 22,1990 (55 FR 10732) requirements shall not prevent passage Controla. Additionally, the amendments The Commisalon's related evaluation of into or through Operational Conditions change the TS Table of Contents, this amendment is contained in a Safety as required by Action Statements.The Date ofirsuance: May 17.1990 Evaluation deted May 20,1990.

related Dases have also been chsnged to Effective date: May 17,1990 No significant hazards consideration tellect there changes.

Amendment Nos.:74.68 commente irceived: No.

Fedual Radster./ Vol85, No.114 / Wednesday, June 13, 1900 / Notices.

24M1 -

LaselhbueDocumentAeons Facility Opemeing Licenses Noe.

LocalPublic Document Room

_ locotton: Government Publications DPA-88andDPA-74. Amendments locotion: Reforence and Documents l

Section, State IJbrary of Pennsylvanir, revised the Technical Specifications.

Department.Penfield Ubrary, State Walnut Seest and Cosamenwealth Date afinitialnoticein Federal Univoretty of New York, Oswego. New Avenue, Box 1801 Harrisburg,

%gister: March 21,1990 (55 FR 10537).

Re York 131206 Pennsylvania ty20s.

e Commission's related evaluation of Philddybla ElecMc Company, Docht

fy',[g"ofd. e d IEmels Power Cammpany and Beyland Nos. 36 351 and 5353, Umed aY II' I"'

Generating Statloa. Units '. and 2, Power '-

2_,los Decket No. Es.

c est, Clistem Powse Stetten. Unit No.1, No significant hazards considemtion MWgomry Centy, Pennsylvania comments received: No.

DowM Couan,numens LocalPublicDocument Room

' Date of applicationfor amendments:

Date of applicadonfor omendment location:Maude Proston Palenske February 23,1990 February 5, toes Memorial Ubrary,500 Market Street St.

Brief description of amendments:The Descirption of amendment requeek Joseph, Michigan 49085.

amendments changed the Technical

%e change concis the miemnoe sero Maine Yankee Atonde Power 'n-pany,. Specifications to remove cycle specific r

and the -, is for the suppressida pool allowable vah -

, trip setpoint and Decket No, as ase, Maine Yankee parameter limits in accordance with NRC Generic letter 8816.

water levelinstrument associated with Atomic Power Shdon, Uncoln County, Maine Date ofissuance: May 15,1990 RCIC to conform to the as built design.

Effective date: May 15,1990 Date ofissuance:May 21,1990 Date of applicationfor amendment Amendment No. 37 and 4 Y

e r tion of amendment:Tbe

&c!lity Operoting Ucense Nos. NPF.

' Ay, g

g amen nt modifies the Technical 39 andNPF as. This amendment revised y OpemdagUmnse Na MA Specifications to tellect the operating the Technical Specifications.

limits for cycle 12 cote reload.

Date ofinitialnoticein Tederal Date ofissuance: May 17,1990 Register: March 21,1990 (55 FR 10543)

Date afinitiolnotialn Federal Effectivedate Dateofissuance The Commission's related evaluation of Register: July 27,iges (53 FR 28291) %e Amendment No.:116 the amendment is contained in a Safety Coaunission's related evaluation of the Facility mt/ng Ucense No. DPR.

Evaluation dated May 15,1990?

- 0 S*I*W 36: Amen ont revised the Technical No significant hazards considention g,

g Y g, Specifications, comments received:No No significcat hasards considention Date ofinitialnoticein Federal LocalPublicDocument Room manwnts acehed:No Register: February 21,1990 (55 FR 6107) location: Pottstown Public Ubrary,500 LocalpublicDocumentRoom The Commission's related evaluation of High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania locatios:%e Vespaalan Warner Public the amendment is contained in a Safety 19464.

Ubrary 120 es ohnsonStreet, Evaluation dated May 17,1990.

Philaddphia Electdc Company, Docket No significant hazards considerate.rr y,,, gs.ssg,,4 go.sgs, u,,,sey ladlana hGehigan Power Campsey,-

commentsivceived:No-Generating Station, Units 1 and1 Deeket Nee, as sis and 58414.Demeld LocolpublicDocumentRoom Montgomery County, Pennsytyanla i

C. Cook Numiner Plant, Unit Nos.1 and -

location: Wiscasset Public Ubrary, High 2, Berrien County, Michigan Street, P.O. Box 367 Wiscosset, Maine Date of application for amendments:

i 04578.

March 23.1990 Date ofapplicationforamendments:

Brief description of amendments:

\\

Doce 900 as supplemented N

obaw P wer Corpo on,

%ese amendments changed section i

l Briefdescription ofamendments:

Nuclear Station, Unit No.1. Oswego i;

ated B,ase' nd the ass g.

g

{

g99, 9,em the l

%ese amendments modify Technical County NewYork limitation that for any three consecutive j.

Specifications

) so that Date of application for amendment:

surveillance intervals, the combined l

Westinghouse I assemblies with March 27,1990 time shall not exceed 3.25 times the.

enrichments of up to 4.96 weight percent Briefdescription amendment:This specified surveillance interval.

U-235 ma be received. A new amendment revises e Technical Dofe ofissuance: May 21,1990 Techni S

ification ('lli 3/4.9.15) is Specification to reflect that the normal

.Effecuve date: May 21,1990 added for th units to require a -

osition of the drywell and suppression Amendment Nos. 38 and 5 minimum boron concentration in the fuel hamber oxygen sampling line isolation Facility Operating License Nos. NPF; storage pool whenever fbel assemblies '

valves is open. -

39 andNPF45. These amendments with enrichment greater than 3.95 weight Date ofissuance:May 24,1990 revised the T5chnical Specifications.

percent U-235 and with burnup less than Effective date: May 24,1990 5,550 MWD /MTtrare in the fuel storage Amendment'No.1116 Date ofinitiolnotice m Federal pool. TS 5.6.1.2, 5.6.2 and 5.3.1 (for Unit 2 Facility Opemting License No. DPR.

Register: April 18,1990 (55 FR 14515) -

only) am modified to reflect the '

63: Amendment revises the Technical The Commission's related evaluation of these amendments is contained in a incnesed allowable fuel enrichment. In' Specifications.

addition, the license for both units is Date ofinitiainctico in Federal Safety Evaluation dated May 21,1990..

modified to reflect a maximum Register: April 20,1990 (55 FR 15041)

No significant hazards considemten enrichment of 4.96 weight percent U.235 The Commission's related evaluation of comments received No for fuel stored in spent fuel pool.

the amendment is contained in a Safety Loca/Public Document Room Date ofissuance:May 17,1990 Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

location: Pottstown Public Ubrary, 500 Effective date:May 17,1990 No significant hazards considemtion iilgh Street. Pottstown, Pennsylvanla Amendments Noe.:136 and 12t comments nceived: No 19464.

- l

24012 Federal Register /'W1. 55, No.114 / Wednesday, June 2L1990 / N:tices

- Pldladelpinia Electric Compasry, PubEc Date ofinitialnodce in Federal proposed finding of no significant Service Elecinc and Gas Company -

Regisesr: January 24, teso (55 FR 2444) hazards consideration.

Delmarva Power and IJgist Casspany.

The f'mamianian's related evaluat6on of Date ofissuance May 24,1NO

- and Atlantic City Electric Comp==y, the a pendment is centained in a Safety Effectim dote:Msy 24.1990 Docket No. 50 278, Peach Battom Evaluation dated May 25,1990.

Amendment No. 181 Atomic Power Station Unit No 3, York No significant hazarde considemtion Facility Opemting License No. DPR.

County. Pennsylvania comments received: No.

52 Amendment revised the Technical LocalPublic Document Room Specification.

Date of application for amendment.

April 12,1990 as supplemented on May location Portland State University Date ofinitialnotice in Federal l

18.1990.The supplementalletter -

1.ibrary,934 S.W. Ilartison Street, P.O.

Register: March 7,1990 (55 FR 8234) W I

provided clarifying information related Box 1151. Portland, Oregon 97207.

Commission's related evaluation of the to the licensee's safety evaluation in NRCPmfect Directon John T. Larkins, amendment is contained in a Safety support of the requested license Acting Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

No significant horords considemFon amendment.The staff has determined Power Authority of the State of New commente received: No that the supplemental informetion does York, nn.4.s No,IN3S James A.

LocalPublic Document Room not affect the proposed no significant FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

location:Penfield IJbrary, State hazarde determination.

Oswego Caety, New York Bnef description of amendment:%is University College of Oswego. Oswego, amendment changed the Technical-Date of applicationfor amendrnent New York.

te i a of a out se en nths for the Br d ion of amendment:W Sojth na ec c as m n,

performance of required visual amendment changes the setpoints of the Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summog Inspections of inaccessible snubbers.

4KV emergency bus undervoltape relays Nuclear Station. Unit No.1* Fairfield Date ofissuance: May 25.1990 used for degraded voltage conditions to Effective date: May 25,1990 reflect changes to the reserve station Amendment No.15e transioemer tap mettings widch are being Bate of applicationfor ameadment:

Facility Opemting License'No. DPR.

made during the current refueling November 20.19a9 S& Amendment revised the Technical outage.The amendment also removes Brief description of amendment:W Specifications.

operating restrictions imposed by the amendment revises Terh*hl Date ofinitialnotice in Federal NRC in Amendment No.120, widch was Specification 4.7.1.5, Maia steam 1)ne Register: April 24,1990 (55 FR 17328) issued on November 19.1988.

Isolation Valves (MSIV). to change the The Commission's related evaluation of Date ofissuance: May 18,1990 acceptable full closure time for the the amendment is cor*ained in a Safety Effective data May18,1990 MSIV from five seconds to seven Evaluation dated May 25,1990.

Amendment Na 180 seconds.

No eignificant hazards considemtion Facility Operating Ucense Na DPN-Date ofissuance: May 17.1D00 commentsreceived No 5.9: Amendment revised the Technical Effective date:May 17,1990 localPublic Document Room SpectfIcation.

Amendment No.:92 location: Government Publicatiocs Date ofinitialnotice in Federal Facility Opemting ime=== Na NPF.

Section. State Library of Pennsylvania, Register: April 4,1se0 (55 FR 125en) The

12. Amendment revises the Technical (REClONAL DEPOSITORY) Education Cornmission's related evaluation of the Specificationa.

Dullding. Walnut Street and amendment is contained in a Safety Date ofinitiolnotica in Federal Commonwealth Avenue,BoxItot, Evaluation dated May 18,1990.

Register: January 10.1990 (55 FR MO) liarrisburg. Pennsylvania 17105.

No significant hazards considemtlan

%e Commission's related evaluation of comments received No the amendment is contained in a Safety Portland General Electric Compan et LocalPublic Document Roam Evaluation dated May 17,1990.

f fc,**,*'

location:Peafield Library, State No significant hazan!s considerotica University College of Oswego, Oswego, comments received: No Date of applicationforamendment:

New iork.

Lo~alPublic Docuruent Roora November 30,1989, as supplemented locat.bne Fairfield County Library, Power Authority of the State of New Cardea and Washington Streets, January 25.1990 and April 18.1990.De supplementary information sent by _

M, DockeN 5H13 James A.

Winnsboro. South Carolina 2D1806 Fitr.Patdek Nuclear Power Plant, letters of January 25 and April 18.1990 was clarifying in nature, was within tlie Oswego County, New York -

Tennessee Valley Authority. Docket No.

SM274equoyaWucisar M Unk 1 scope of the action originally noticed in Date of application for amendmene Hamatom County,Tannesene the Federal Register, and does not alter January 12,1990, as amended May 4.

the Staff's proposed No Significant 1990.

Date of application for amendment llazards Consideration determination.

Briefdescription of amendment The January 24.1990 as revised by latters Brief description of amendment:The amendment reflects removal of two dated April 25 and May 15.1000 (TS 89-amendment modifies the Technical primary containment penetrations and 27)

Specification requirements for steam their isolation valves which results from Briefdescription of amendmonte nis generators to allow tube repair by replacing the present four. channel amendment modifies the Sequoya'a sleeving as an alternative to plugging Traversing Incore Probe System with a Nuclear Plant. Unit 1. Technical Date ofissuance: May 25.1990 new three-channel system. %e letter of Specifications (l'Ss) ne changes revise Effective dater May 25,1990 May 4.1990, revising the amendment, the definition section: the Specifications Amendment No.:160 reflected a change to the penetration 2.2.1,3/4.3.1.1, and 3/4.3.2.1: and the facilities Opemtirw License No. NPF.

numbers, and a change to the format of associated butes for the specifications l

t: Amendment changed the Technical a Table to incorporate previously to reflect reactor protection system Specifications.

approved changes, and did not effect the upgrades and enhar cements which were i

l 1

4 4

'S SW

.m.o.

.m.o C,e.e.

,- h scounts.

Amenden dNo.,as De which were revised Fostkey opereatsLiseaseNmMPA-aos the 1)edeDetaltion1As 22: Amendensat ebenged the Techmiset

- and asascensym(fue RatedMrmal Speci8 canons..

Powert(2) evise or add patsasters in Dose etAn/WeJmetleein Fedeses Tables 121. 3.31,3.3-a, s.s a. 3.5 4,3.3 Regintort Apoin 4. inse th FR tages) The 5,4.31. and 4.3-4 (3) add rootnotes or Commienion's related evahneelen ei the action statemente in Tables 3.31. 8.3-3 amendment le comisiandlae nelety and 3.3 4 and(4) delete outdated Evaluation deand May 38,1est, footnotes and anseed action statements No sign /flesad Assesde essessiesodes in Tables 3.3 3,3.3 4,4.31 and 4.5 4.

commande eseelved No.

These ebenges reSeet reek drift Asse/PkWie Desument Asem atewablee ne the Eagle.at dignal loendom,ni u d City Liheney.Swiat process pretnotion systemt the and Northgate Baseses,Rieldend imeerparates of the envercamental Washingles seast

=1ta====== mediaen the trty nine deley Detes et RealwllieJAssyland, this eth day fee ire, and the median signal selsetet ofMayleBe.

eheselaf thefeedstmase For the Maelser Regulaterfa=='a=aa=

temperetse detector bypeso maalfondes steven A. Verga, i

the additiesof a new steemkan beoels Ditesser.Dirledesela anaenoissept/s, protesties leght the 1erplementaales of opeee/MacAserAessterAgastedse enginessed safety fasemos entusnes (Dee.solans ruede,13. easies es4 l

system enhanasunestes and the deleties seasesesos seeme64 l-of ent,e6 dais footnotes and unseed action statements. -

'i

% applications also T

changes to the Unit a Tse.

changerwdtbetesued MENinoctober 1981L De madlBastione to Unit 2 wtR incorporate the above upgrades and W dertagther estage.The liefety Evelastion for Unit 1 alee appber to Unit 3.

Dode lessenserMay18, SW diess nGay18,1980 l.

AmendmandNo 141

. Fond /(y@erosingLicenesNo DPS-17 Amendment sevised the Uniti TechnioniSpoetasatione.

asaserinidrimousela redmet nacimens reinary 21.1ssa tsa ya esist The Comadselen's telsted evaluatiam of the==maad===* is aaa*='=a'i la a Safety Evaluatica da.ted May 16,1980.

No significant hasardt considesation comumenersucehad Ne I.aoelPuMieDecament Racer loosebre Chattanoogs-Hemplea County

!Jtwary,1001 kead Street. Chettanoogab Teensesse37405.

Wemblagpen PubusPeweeSepply sysessa, Decisat Na, aHEF.Nuciame Pseleet Me,3 BestamGeomer.

WaaMagfan Doen ofappilcationforamendment:

March I,1980 as supplementedon April 5.1900.

l Brief.L l,,.^l.,,, ofamendnent *. hts amendment revises Technismi SpostSenatom Aaaaaa= 3/442.*111'atrient PowerSysseus,DESoareen,"iap - -

repla thebetterylead pueG*e e

la surveillance requissment 4.81141, Date ofissuance: Mag 23,1'B6-

e V

l e-ld '.

. g; UNITED STATES n stcoum man.

-3

! ~ ! NUCLEAR REr*ULATORY COMMISSION '

'*"a*g,",'*

~

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 peaun es. e et.

OFFICIAL' BLSINES$

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE,6300 4

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- aggE Federal

/ Vol 88. No.114' / Wednesday. June 13.- 1990 / Notices N

i 1984, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any 1

amendments leeued. or proposed to be leeued, under a new provision of section a

189 of the Act.his alon grants the Commission the au ty to issue end make immediately effecuve any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that j

i >-

such amendment involves no significant

,4 hasards consideration, notwithstandin' g g

the pendency before the Commission of-

~

CH a request for a hearing from any person.

A This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued. or.

4 proposed to be issued from blay 15.1990 through May 31.1990. The last btweekly notice was published on May 30,1990 (58 FR 21988).

NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF '

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING IJCENSE AND l'

PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT lL HAZARDS CONSIDERATION '

t DIEI'ERMINATION AND -

i' OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARINC 6.

4 The Commisalon has madea proposed l-determination that the following i-amendment requests involve no

[

significant hasards considetetion. Under.

E the Commission's regulations in to CFR '

'. 50.92, this means that operation of the =

facility in accordance with the proposed i.

amendments would not(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or I-consequences of an accident previously E

evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from l

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) -

Involve a significant reduction in a :

margin of safety. De basis for this p

proposed determination for each -

3 amendment request is shown below.'

q He Commissionis seeking public '

comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of -

publication of this notice willbe consideredin making any final:.

1

+'

L determination. The Commission will not normally make a Anal determination unless it receives a request for a bearing.

j t

NUCLEAR REGULATORY Written comments may be submitted 3'

CoddRNSSION by mall to the Regulatory Publications C'

Branch. Division of Freedom of

. T',

Beweekly Notice Appuestions end Information and Publications Services.

Amendments to Operating Licensee Office of Administration. U.S. Nuclear involving No Significent Hoserde Regulatory Commission. Washington.-

l Considerations DC 20585, and should cite the publication date and page number of I. Backssound this Federal Register notice. Written L'~

Pursuant to Public Law (P.L) 97 415, comments may also be delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Room P.223. Phillipe Building. 7920 4-Commission) is publishlag this regular Norfolk Avenue Bethesda. Maryland biweekly notice. P.L 97-418 revised from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of section 180 of the Atomic Energy Act of written commente received may be

,j

.o Federal p / Vd. 58. No.114 / Wednesday, June is. isso / Nations. '

sages examined at the NRC Public Document the first prehearlas confere)nceNot later than fifteen (15 days prior to.

Room, the Gelman Buu 21.30 L facility, the Commissica may issue the

' Street. NW, Washington, N Aling schadeledla the a petitioner license =H=w before the of reqmte for and petitions for shall fue a t to the petition to expiration of the 30 day nouas period, leave tolaterveneis below.

latervene mostinclude a het of provided thatits Analdeterndantionis By Jul 131300, thelicensee may Rio a the contentions which are sought to be that the amendmentinvolves no request for a hearing with' respect tolitigated in the matter. Rach contention significant hasards consideration. N lesuance of the amendment to the must consist of a spectDc statement of final determination will consider all subject facilit opereting license sad theissa oflaw orfact to be raised or public and State comments recalved any person w(ase interest may be controverted. In addition, the petitioner before action is taken. Should the affected by this proceeding and who shall provide a brief explanation of the wishes to participate as a party in the bases of the contention and a concise Commission take this action,it will ublish a notice oflasuance and provide for opprtunity for a hearing afur proceeding must file a written petition steement of the alleged facts or expert

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N for leave to intervene. Requests for a opinion which support the contention hearing and petitions for leave to.

and on which the petitioner intends to issuance. The Comunisalon expects that the need to take this action will occur intervene shall be filed in accordance

{

pm ng con p

t al very infrequently.

with the Commisalon a ' Rt4s of Practice for Domestic'l%

provide refmaca to be spoiSc A request for a hearing or a petition Pmceedings"in to CMart 3.

sources and documents of which the for leave to intervene must be filed with Interested persons should consult a petitioneris aware and on which the the SecrMary of the Commission. U.S.

petitioner intends to rely to establish Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l

current copy of to CFR 2.714,whichis those facts or expert opinion. petitioner Washington. DC aosas. Attention:

available at the Commission s Public must provide enfficient informatkn to Docketing and Servlees Branch, or may Document Room, the Gelman Building.

2120LStreet.NW Washintton.DC show that a genuine dispute exists with be delivered to the t'ammi=lon's Public 20555 and et the Local Public Documsat the applicant on a materialissue oflaw Docununt Roose, the Gelman Bull or fact. Contentions shall be limited to 2120 L Strost. NW., Weekington. DC.

Room for the particular facility involved. matters within thepcope of the.

the above date.Where petitions are If a request for a hearing or poudon for amendments under consideration.h filed dering the lad ten (to) days of the leave to intervene is filed by the above.

date. the Commission or an Atomic contention emot be one which. If proven, notice period, it is requested that the would entitle the petitioner to reliel A petitioner promptly so informthe Safety and ucensingBoard daignated petitioner who fails to file each a Commieston by e toll. free telephone caH by the Commission or by the Chairman supplement widch satisflee thee to Westep Union at 1 (300) 325 g000 (in of the AtomicSafetyandLicensing requirements with respect to at least one hilmoud 1-(g00) 342 8700).%e Western Board Panel, will rule ou the request contention will not be permitted to Union operator should be given Igna t

Safe ad D

a[iUou it intervene beceans Board will issue a notice of hearing o' parties w es proceeens subject to any ne d to limitations la the order granting leave to (Project Dhector): petitioner's name and an appropriate order.

tolephone numbn date pehn was As required by 10 CFR 2.714. a intervene, and have the opportual to -

petition for leave to intervene shall set articipate fully in the conduct of mailed plant name: and puh*icatloa forth with particularity the interest of eating. Including the wmbity to date and page man.ber of this Fedesat the petitioner in the proceeding, and present evidence and cross-examme Register monos. A copy of he poma how that interest may be affected by the witnesses.

should also be sent to the OfBee of the i

l-results of the proceeding. The petition If a hearingis to usted, the Cenal Cmaml.E8. Nuclear should specifically explain the reasons Commission wulnuke a final Regulatory Comminion. Washington, why intervention should be permitted determination on the issue of no DC 20586, and to the attorney for the with particular reference to the significant hasards consideration. The licensee.

following factors:(1) the nature of the final determination will serve to decide Nontimely filinp of petitions for leave petitioner's right under the Act to be wtwa the hea.ing is held.

to intervene, emeuded petitions, made a party to the proceeding: (2) the if the firial determination is that the supplemental petitions and/or requests nature and extent of the petitioner's amendment request involves no for hearing willnot be entertained property, financial, or other interest in significant hazards consideration the abeent a determinetion by the the proceeding: and (3) the possible Comm]ssion may issue the amendment r'ammia= ion, the presiding olocar or the effect of any order which may be and make it inunedsately effective.

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing entered in the proceeding on the notwithstanding the request for a Board, that the petition and/or request petitioner's interest. no petition should hearing. Any hearing held would take should be granted based upon a also identify the specific aspect (s) of the place afterissuance of the amendment.

balancing of factors specifled in 10 CFR subject matter of the proceeding as to If the final determination is that the 2.714(a)(t)(I)-(v) and 2314(d).

- which petitioner wishes to intervene.

amendment involves a significant

,3 Any person who has filed a petition for hazards consideration, any hearing held For further detaus with respect to thie leave to intervene or who has been would take place before the issuance of action, see the application for admitted as a party may amend the any amendment.

amendreent which is available for public petition without requesting leave of the Normally. the Commission will not impection at g, Co,,julon.i Public Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the issue the amendment until the Document Roma. Se Geltnan BuMag, first prehearing conference scheduled in expiration of the 30-day notice period.

21

1. tme W., Wa the proceeding, but such an amended However, should circumstances change publig petition must satisfy the specificity during the notice period such that fallare for the particular facility involved.

requirements described above.

to act in a timely way would result, for

No 114 / Wednesday. [une 13, 1990 / Notices

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CAnenoswealth Edson Comepony, accident analysis eseumptione.nerefore, the the transient analyses. However, removal of Docket Nos. S'IN 8D.454 and STN 2-current Mode a analysis rema;ne valid, the AQ belpe ensure that the Ridt section 455, Byron Nuclear Station, Unit Nos.1

2. no proposed 16 cones anwndment does relief valves are evallable to mitigste h and Md not create the possibthty of a new or different potential overpressure trenelents.

ead 2. Ogle County'd STN 86457 cc imm any accide pm y Adenomah, mamns es AQ reduces the Nos. STN 864t9 an evaluated, potential for inadvertent teolation of the RHit i

Brandwood Station, Unit Nos. I and 3.

Acceptable R}R Dowrotes that are system which can cause a Low Temperature Will County,Illinolo consistent with the plant conditions would be Overpreuure (L1DP) transient (reduced Date of oppl! cation for amendments:

8Pecified in the plant procedurw. The RHR letdown combined with a lose of decay heat Jtnuary 31' 1900 fl wretea would be such that;(1) the RIDt removsll while also leoieting an overpressure e

would be capeble of decay heat removal to mitigation path.nerefore,amovalof the Description of amendments requesti control the RCS temperature, (2) the reactor ACI does not involve an increase in the The amendments to the Technical coolant temperatum rise throush the com probabluty or the consequanese of an g

Specifications would (1) reduce the would not exooed reactor veneel internale accident previous)y evaluated. In fact, residual heat removal (RIIR) minimum delta T limita, (3) the mactor coolant would removal of the ACI has a poeluve impact u flowrate during tefueling operetions,(2) be mixed to prevent significant boron 1.1DP mittention.

temove the RitR autoclosure interlock etmeceu n tmm occurring.14) the pmes" Analysee were also performed to confirm on the RilR system suction teolation drop across the RHR flow + ate control valve that one RHR relief valve has b capability valves, and (3) allow one safety ma mining ee RHR syeem mammum in v t bo dilu tot eve to could be Preneure within code limite (refer to UFSAR.

injection pump to be avallable for identified and termineted by operstor action 8**"" 8dM **"*I '** ^U d "

Injection purposes if ncrmal heat prior to the reactor returning critical.

" a ect ana removal capability we e lost.

nue, e reduction in Ri!R would not p

ction Basis forproposein 5 significant ineman the probability of a CVCS hazards consideration determinationt malfunction event and the ponibility of an isolation valvn are open, the pressure effect Tha staff has evaluated these proposed accident which is different than any already on the low pressure RHR system would be emindments and determined that it evaluated in the UFSAR would not be raitigated by the RHR suction relief valves.

The deletion of b ACI featum has no effect involves no significant hazards 3 e proposed licenu amendment does on the abuity of b RHR syetes to survive consideration. According to 10 CI'R not involve a significant mduction in a pmseure transtants when the RfCL system is c nnected to the RCS, sinos the Rkqt euction 50 92, a proposed amendment to an margin of safety' Byron /Dreldwood Technical isoladon valva am slow acting and na cmdit operating license involves no significant Currently, the is tahn for &eir actuence.neh, hnards comideration if operation of the Specificatione do not specify RHR flowrote m e aW 2eAQ wGnoun W an facility in accordance with the roposed requirements for operation in Mode 5. Mode e amendment would not:(1)Invo ve a operstions, however, require a minimum RHR inemaae in the probability or conspquenos of

[ q*,',*j',0[, Q % {i,a{ce $ 'The sigMilcant increase in the probability or e t.

f the to von V.1DCA 2

consequcnces of an accident previously Technical Specificatione p limitattone on outelde containment, frequency was also evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from t e RHR during mid-loop operation by considered. Analyste demonstrates that the S

80ecifying a minimum flow requirement for probability of the occurrence or ary accident previously evaluated, or (3) t: e purpose of decay heat removal and the consequenen of an accident am not involve a significant reduction in a number of RHR trains which must be incrused. The dominant feaure mode le margin of safety, operable. They do not, however, contain rupture of the valve dies in each of the two Mmimum RHR flowrote restrictione beoed on minimizing air series motor operated valves (MOVE)in the

1. Operation of Dyron/Braidwood Unit Noe, entrainment in the RHR as a result of RHR suction hoe when closed during normal 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed vortexing which may occur during mid loop Power operation. This failure mode to hesnse amendment does not involve a operation under certain conditmna.

Independent of the AQ. Anotherless signifiant increase in the probabihty or The fuel cladding (fission product barrier) influential contributor to Event V frequency consequences of any accident previously is protected in Modes 5 and 6 by providing was found to be rupture of one valve while evaluated.

cooling and maintainirs core shutdown.

the other velve has falled open. The resulte

+

A etduction in RHR flow dunr,g mid-loop Adequate decay l'est removalis provided to demonstrate that, in this case, removal of the operation will potentially impact thosa address the coohns requirements, and ACI le beneficial when compared to rotatning transients explicitly analyzed in Modes 5 and aufficient mixing ensures that the boron it.

6.The o.dy event analysed for thesa modes in d:!ution analyses remem vahd.Therefore, the

2. no proposed amendment will not create Chapter 15 of the Byron /Breldwood (FhAR amount of time evallable to identify and the ponibility of a new or ddlerent kind of is the malfunction of the CVCS that results in terminate a boron dilution event is accident from any accident previously a decrease in boron concentration in the unaffected.

considered.

rvector coolant. The CVCS malfunction event Thas, a reduced RHR flowrate duttag mld, ne effect of an overpressure transient will een be impacted by a reduction in RHR flow loop operation does not involve a significant not change due to the remova!if the ACl.

In the following two areas:(1) a reduction in reduction in a margin of safety.

The RitR suction relief valva were designed expikit RllR flowrate assumptions, and (2)

Removolof the Autoclosum fraterlock to rtialntain the RHR system pressure within the vessel mixing assumption during a boron 1.The proposed amendment does not design hrnits. Although the AClisclates the dilution The Mode 5 and 6 analysee do not involve a significant increase in the RCS from the RHR suction rehef valves on assume an explicit RilR flow value, and the probabihty or consequences of an accident high RCS pressure, overpressure protection of g,

RilR flowrotes are assumed to be sufficient previously evaluated.

the RHR system is provided by the RitR to provide adequate vessel circulation to The RHR suction rel;ef valves are used as a suction relief valves not by the slow acting prevent boron stratification and support the means of cold overpressure protection. The suction isolation valves.The purpose of the boron dJution transient mixing assumptions.

cold verpressure protection system is interlocks le to assure double isolation in addition, since a CVCS malfunction designed to ensure the limits of Appendix G between the RHR system and the RCS when event 'n Made 6 la prevented t'y to 10 CFR Part 50 are not exceeded whan one the plant le at normal opereting conditions.

adrainistrative controls which isolate the RCS or more of the RCS cold lege are less than or The interlock prevente the possibthty of an froci eny potential source of unborated equal to 350* /. Transient analysee were Event V due to operator error.

water. only the Mode 5 analysis cot.ld be performed to determine the worst case masa Rernovel of the ACI will not place the plani impacted. However, it has been determined input and heat input events (refer to LTSAR, in any new or unanalyzed condition.

that a reduced RHR flow of 1000 gpm or Section 5.2.2.11.2). Removal of the Therefore, this change will not create the greater would not invalidate the Byron autoclosure interlock (ACI) does not irnpact possibility of a new or different kind of

Fedssal assher I vet ss No.114 / Wedneedey.' }une 13.19er / Nodoes taggt acc6 dent ima est amaldest pmmamely.

He semesquenene of en eseldent es A fterney to licensee: Michael Miller.

- - - "'"d-pomely mired ha the Updeced and Fleel Estfuire". Sidley and Austin.One First-3 N Papeeed amendemot will est Selety Analysie Repone are est leasessak Nat6on*i M***' Chi8 Illin"' ennen involve a signiteemt reduemos in a mercia of However, the evetleb4Any of et innet ene al -

selety.

pump prov6 des for the mitassuan of b NRC Acting Prefect Director: Richard Ahalyses'wese perfanned to demonstrate effects of a lose of decay heat toeievel event T. Dudley the impeM of removal of the ACI on Event V dufteg ald loop operettorie. It hoe Comuusamalth Edleen Censpanye imquency. RHR system rollebthty and subsequently been demonstrated that for Dacket Nos. STN 86454 and STN 36 overpressure traneneste.The analysee some oness. l.a. the combinetion of Perfonned sisipated the meuhe with and inadeguete RCS venttes and h ealetence of 455. Bysen Niaclear $&ation. Unit Noe. I and 2,43 e Cototy,Illimalet and Dookal withmet Gio ACL However, the seenlee were e cold les speales, operetton of et toest oss ammessent open provedess as eiene to alert safety tasesties pump to mquired to pmvent Noe. STN 864Es and STN 86457, the operster that a RCS R)IR ser6ee eucties the core from uncovering, N option to vent Braldwood Stat 6aa. Unit Nee.1 and 2, e

tooletion valve (s) la act Mly closed and that the RCS and un gravity lud from the RWST WLIl County, UMaale double leeletion le not belns meintained. De Lu been analy ed and willhave no impect modification will not impact the opening on the probability or consequences of a Dole of application for amendmenfs-ctreeltry. nor will 11 effect the MOV position previously onelysed sculdent.

April 26.1990 indiestten in the control toom. We setpoint

1. ne proposed amendmeet daso not Description ofomendments request

ter the alarmi will be within the rence of the create de puestbility of a new or diffenet The omendments would revise open permisolve setpoint ptensure and the Lind of stridest from any eastdont prev 60usif Technical Spe cification 3/4.6.3' o delete RHRe conaldwed.

pusep btem design propure eunus uw RFIR Containment leolation Valne, t pressure. Operating procedurn ne provtsions of these Todamel will be revteed to direct the operator to take Spectacedon dansu me fot (1 e purpose of the requirement for Type C leakage the necessary actions to cLw the open valve rr.tugeting the cormequences cf a loss of testing for specified Steam Generator (if it le not closed). or if this is not possible, to decay lint temoval dt: ring mid loop blowdown isolettion valves and to inseri vetum to the oefe shutdown mode of operations. Opereuen of et least tme El pump a requirement for the Type C leakage opeesttoa he enelysee petformed indicates le regelred in some cases to prevent dw oore test for the 1/2 S19908 safety (njection en overell incrosse is salery des to the from useovents as supported by the valves.

mmoealof the All,empisemmeneusaof the perfoemmass of thermal hydrenlic esetrois.

his forNMno aN"iW modtheaden, and p=,enderal denges, N only sww conhereasuon allowed by thee rds cons /deration determinotioni Analyses parlermed tedlestee ht h specifxanan le We po;ential of having en 51 reliabiluy el the RHR syveni se umahanged pump stellebte in hludes 6 and & The The staff hne evaluated these proposed during R)(R initiation and 6st 11 e improved Hential overpreuual.etion occident hn amendmente and determined niet it s

during ebort and long term cohne se e ruult been analyrert and accounted for in the involves no significant hasardD of the deletion of the ACl.%eNote. the specificetion by reqeimig prenonser level to consideretion. According to15CPR margin of eefety has actually tncitened.

be h'es then 5 ponent if an 8! punip le 50.92. a proposed amendment to an SofetyInJ ection Pump Opervirl#ry en availabla herefore, the grepneed chene'*

operating licemse involves no significartt' i

Afodse 8 and#

do not create the peensbdity of a new or hazards consideration if operation of the 1.De propeemd aeht does not different kind ef aos6 dent (me aey involve e sten 4Acent Amereses in h previously==*ed fact!!ty in accordance with the Proposed, probabaty se consegueene of as acrideo:

3. The proposed armoediment does not amendment would not:(1) involve a el nificant increase in the probability or previously evahisted.

involve a significant reduction in a maryle of 6

The probability of the occorrence of an

n8ery, consequences of an accident previotiely accident le not lacreased since propoud Operetion of the 81 purnpo under ttr;ee evaluated: of [2] Create the possibi', tty of Technical Spectftcation 3/4M1 tequires ht circumstanon is not a cold everpmesum a new or different kind of acclrbat from concem beamuu of ow ascent of air vahm*

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) all SI pumpe be demonstrated inoperable in whid esosas in the RCB whle maki allow Involve a significant reduction in a MOOR 5 with peseemtser level greater than 8 i

percent and to MODE 6 with presserteer level the operatae tems to nutigene the transient.

gg g gg (d

d I an er e t whi h as Iw te, The proposed amendment makes the en he ee l

to said overpioseere protectsen senaeres la aohd RCS. To prevent the purnpa from being following changt e to Technical

(

addition. pmposed Technkal Spraticetma 3/. Inadverpatty starttng t y a signal.

Specificstion 3/4.6.3:

4.5 4J requires the swallahdity of at least one surveillance re(iremente require verifylM

1. Deletes the requtrement for Type C that de circen kan am mched le and leukage testing for valves 1/2 SD002A E' puetD or se L;$ hot side vent in MODE &

ana MOtm 8 with propurtzer levellees than opset srteh the cantrol swab to the "rull out" through ll and 1/2 SDUO5A through D by or equal to 8 percent to mitigate the p om n. HoHg one se Q=; evenshie inclusion of an "'" after the above I

consequenose of e ines of decoy heet removet or grovtry feed frors the RWST will help -

mentioned valves which references the e

mo e en fr t a arg of note "'Not subject to Type C leakage f, $

pump eafety is not si;:mficantly reduced

tests,

,f y

he staff h43 reviewed the beensee's

2. Deletes the inclusion of an "*" by s

suffisent air volume amaam whid allows the no significant hazards conalderation the 1/2 S18968 valves. Thus Type C operetar time le mitigans the transient. This is deiermination and agrees with the leakspe testing requirements for the 1/2 in contrast to the analysed cold overpressure licensee's analysis.ne etsff. therefore, S19008 valves are indicated in the a

transiente,in widch the RQile enumed to be proposes to determlae that the licensee's Technical Specification.

water sobd at the onset of the event. To request doce not involn a signi!! cant 1.The probabflity of an occurrence or prevent an SI purrp from inedvertent teh'8 hatards considerstion.

the consequence of an accident or

tereed by e engeal, tot allow them to I.oculPublic Doctimenf Re,rn nalfunction of equipment important to mannePy marted Inen en coewid too"'

locotione For Byron Station, tha Byron eWy as previously evaluated in the

"7

,",,""*g',",,g,,,

',',"M Public Library District.109 N. Franklht k%AR is not significantly increased for sad open with the canunt switch in the " pull P.O Ba M Byron. Illinois 61010; for the reasons as follows out" poeluon nerefore, the occurrence of an Braidwood Ststion, the Wilmington The deletion of the requirement for accident previously analyzed in the Final and Township Pubtle Library. 201 S.

Type C leakage testing of the steam Updeied 9efvey Analyste Reports to not Kankakse Street. Wilmington. Illinois generator blowdown system (SD) valves increeped.

604B1.

is not an initiating condit4n for any l.

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23908 Federal Registee / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wedneedoy. June 13. teso / Notices accident 6nalysis in the UFSAR.nere an accident the offette done limit would Though the SD leolation valves do cre nvo accident analyou that consider remain within a small fraction of the 10 autoclose on a phase A containment steam generator (SG) blowdown in their CFR 100 limits. In the event of a SGTR isolation signal to conserve SG enalysis. In the first, for the Main with some leakage past the SD valves.

secondary side mesa, this not required Steamline Rupture accident ar.alysis in there would be no effect on the to mitigate the effects of any accident in the UFSAR Table 15.12. the SD radiological release in the analyste since the UfTnAR. No other accident or j

blowdown valves autoclosure feature is the most conservative soeumption of no malfunction would be created. Thus. the

[

required in the accident analyele not for blowdown was used in the analysis.

possibility for an accident or the mitigation, but as an assumption for Any leakage past the blowdown valve 6 malfunction of a different type than any I

the analysis. Since the SD valves will w ould be into a blowdown system previously created in the UFSAR is not

)

still be tested for autocloeure and stroke designed to handle the liquid.The created.no change to include the Type time when a phase A containment blowdown demineraliser outlet C leakase test for Slases valva does not isoletion signalis present, the above radiation monitor would alarm if create the poselbility for an accident or cccident analysis anumption leakage occurred. Various auxiliary malfunction of a different type than any c.oncerning SG blowdown isolation building area radiation monitors would previoudy analysed, sinceithe change is remains satisfied with the change.In the 61 arm on elevated radiation levels in the of an editorial nature and reflects the j

second, for the Steam Generator Tube Auxiliary Building in the event of type of testing already done since it has Rupture (SGIR) accident analysis.

leakage trom the SD system piping to been required.

Table 15.6-5 liste under parameters used the Auxiliary Building. As designed. the 3.The margin of safety se defind in in the SGTR analysie the initial negative pressure in the Auxiliary the beslo for any Technical Specification condition of 15 spm blowdown per SC Building and the Charcoal Booster fans is not o!gnificantly reduced, prior to the accident and no SG and filters would ensure that the Pursuant to NUREG-0800 6.14.II.6.o blowdown durina the accident. No radiation would not be released to the the SG secondary is a closed system and 1

blowdown is the most conservative environment. Since any leakage would therefore does not meet the 10 CFR 50 casumption for the analysis to maximl e be empected to be a small amount and Appendix l criteria for Type C leakage the potential radiological release to the locahsod in the Auxiliary Building no testing.That is, no direct path would environment since all the primary to adverse consequencre would result.

exist from containment to the.outside secondary leakage (radiolc9 cal There would be no signihcant effect on atmosphere which might teenit in a 1

isotopes) would remain Ln the ruptured any accident analysis, radiological release to the environment l

SG und would not t>e removed by Thus, for the above reasons, the and as such, satisfies its containment l

blowdown.Thus, the proposed change proposed change of deletien of Type C isoletion function without T)pe C would have no effect on this accident testma for the SD valves does not testirig requirements. Technical analysie slace the most conservative significantly increase the probability of Specification limits on primary to ensurnption (no blowdown) was used in an occurrence or the consequence of an secondary leakage and both primary the analysis and the change would not occident, or malfunction of equipment and secondary radiation limite ensure affect this (any leakage past the important to safety as previously that in the event of an accident (in blowdown teolation valves would evaluated in the UFSAR.

particular, a SCTR). the offsite does decrease the inventory of radiosotopes The inclusion of Type C testing for the lunits would be only a small portion of left in the ruptured steam generetot that stb 068 valves is a change of an editorial the 10 CFR 100 limits.The containment w ould be available for release).

nature and merW corrects the isolation functi6n of the SD valves is tc.

The SG blowdown system is not Technical Specha.: tion to make it conserve the SG escondary side mass in considered in the mitigation c.f any consistent with the UFSAR.The Sleses the event of an accident. Surveillances l

sccident. With regard to the UFSAR valves have alwsys required Type C to verify autoclosure and stroke time l '

Section 15.2 accident analyscs for testing per to CFR 50 Appendix j. and ensure that the SD valves are l

decreased heat sink, the auxiliary the testing has always been done. For functionally operable.The bases for ferdwater system is the means of this reason, the change does not containment isola tion valves Technical -

mitigation of the accidente. lsolation of significantly increase the probability of Specification 3/4.6.3 le that. *the

' SG blowdown conserves the SG an occurrence or the consequence of an operability of the containment isolation secondary side water but does not accident. or malfunction of equipment valves ensures that the containment rnitigate the consequence of any important to safety as previously atmosphere will be isolated from the accident as described in the UFSAR.

evaluated in the UFSAR.

cuiside environment in the event of a There is nu increase, significant or

2. We possibility for an accident or release of radioactive material to the o'herwise,in the consequencu of an malfunction of a different type than any containment atmosphsre ce accident previously evaluated in the previously evaluated in the UFSAR la pressurisation of the containment."

UFSAR.

not created.

(Technical Specification 3/4.6.3 Dasee Since the secondary side of the SG to The SD system is Category 1 Safety page B g/4 64). '!his would be satisfied considered a closed system. meeting the Class B piping up to and including the with the proposed change.Dus, the L

tequirements of NUREG.00006.2.4.!!.tko.

Isolation valves, and has manual margin of safety as defined la the bases I

the proposed change would not isolation valves. With respect to the for any Technical Specification is not increase, sigmficantly or otherwise. the accident analysis in Section 15.2'of the s!snificantly reduced.

probability of a leakage path to the UFSAR, where there is a decrease in the ne change to require Type C testing environment. Thus, the 10 CHL 100 limits heat removal by the secondary system.

for the S10903 valves is of an editorial w ould not be significantly affected for SG blowdown isolation is not requi:id nature and does not reduce the margin 1

uny accident analysis. Technical to mitigate any of the accidents in the of safety as defined in the basis for any Specification litnits on primary to analysis. Auxiliary feedwater initiation Technical Specification.

secondary leakage and on both primary mitigates the accidents.The amount of

%e staff has reviewed the licensee's and secondary radiation levels would.

leakage le insignificant with respect to no signifloant hazards consideration continue to ensure that in the event of the total SG secondary water mass.

determination and agrees with the

\\

1

~

j Fedesul'andsger / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wednesday,' }unr'ts,1989 / Noticosi EMP!

licensee's analysis. De staff, themfore; instrumentation tables are aeonesed adaties of a 4 --

to close the propone to deterudne Ibet the Beensee's bdow, affected leeleton onives within one t -

mquest dose notinsoles a slanthcant Table M1. Hot and cold shutdown hour for fenettone curromuy covered by hasarde conaldereuen.

OPeretjanal made requiremonta ler Actione C and D in the table.New table Loca/AshiteDesumaelJBoom -

reactor protection lastrumentatten have ' notatione are now being edded to aBoer location: For Byron Steuan, the Byrea been addressed. Flus b6esed Average a channel to be inoperable for up to a Publ6c Library Distrist. nes N. Frankun, Power Reage Monitor (ARLMI High hours without declaring the channel P.O. Box 434, Byron, Ilhaele stata for Flum Trip Tietdne stop Valse coeure inoperable and to determine whleh and Generette lead Rejection fonctione valves are in each valve group. %e high Breldwood Station, the Wilmdeston a

Township Pnblic Library, apt 5.

have been deletedin the startup/ hot pressere coolant Injection steam supply Kankakee Street, Wilmington. tillmote standby modes. Table notatione are line low pressere, and the drywen 90401.

being added to address channel out of-looletion on high radiation en being i

Amerney se licenses Michael Miller, senloe serveluences,latermediate added to the trip fonctione in thle table.'

Esquire: Suury and Anetta. One First -

Range Monitor (IRM) bypeseen, and Table 312.Se adalunne munbar of i

i Notional Plaza. Chicago Illinole nneen exceptions Ier operahmey of the seem operable clu'nnels per trty eyotem j

NRCActlry Project Director Richard discharge echme. A proposed acttee columns for the controlrod block F.Dudley with the maineteam kne radiation functionle being chanpd to the i

monitore knoperable wiu regelre a mkdmera nember of operable channele r.-weelsh Easen m'oeden power reduction to the startup condities per trtp fonction. New action statements.

r tw Nes M and m th w e 688n8188t**M hh8 08 V*IV#

that ensure: perebuity of Nuclear Poseer Stellen. Uelle B and 3, closed within a bours compand to instrumentation when nuded or i

Crundy County,IRimate present actions which regelse a powe' requirse upperable instrumentotion to Date oppdicotlanforamendmesi redocuon to the hot standby condities be placed in the safe or tripped i

umst-186 taen, within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , condition, when necessary to protect the mn amendment Table 41.g. Changes to lensuomal rod block funetton, are being added.

The proposed angesineinds testies hegeamcy for aume teatruments Table notetteru thatstate when the rod instrumsstaties tobias for each unit to and the inclusion of addittonal teste for block monite chamiele may b incorporate enhancements from th*

the ApRM trip functions of High Flex b

md and wk duras dis BWR Standard Tecludsel Spect8estions and inoperative are made to (1) voTine trty thnctionle (STS) which resalt In constetency of exclade operability of high pressure bk k es refuel m being table format and tecimical content.De trip function with the head removed (2) o[d. Pmeent Note F, which allows a

oormopondtag Techttica19pecification exclude operabt!Ity of the screen g,, - o + - d low (11i) esctions were modtBod, where discharge solume when sentral rode are physlesEk[behg e d.

P' appropriate, to reflect chanpa to the removed, and (s) anow entry into a Table Sie. A footnote which

'"Nrewrik of theTechalca

"*C'" *""Ud**

P"'" M"d"d requires flow retes to be determined by a

k peep amn le being speciacadon tables l=N-h the 4,tJ. Testing begeeney for the ed since 6e metod and not be terminolasyof thesuof aureuillense IRM high ihm trtp funcuenle being specinedin &e W and also le nolonge frequency notatione and esse the changed from every obetdown to a uuhed Dmedan spectSc seeminoles of startg after e steeling outage. Table Table 318. Action statemente, that oPeretimal modes. In order to deams notes are being added to (1) reflect that wlH aHow rolesece to continee with the this tasadaelegy in the Dresden Ismos moutron dectore unnat be Technical Specaneettons, new '.%blas t 1 cahbested per es, (2) amalude opershikty mid and bish-range Stationary and 1.3 to denne seresulence f egeuser of the high sesotor preneure trip fummian Particulate lodine Noble Gas (SptNC notetions and operational modesh when the reactor head is resweed,(8) monhwinopenble wiewHe % gre samP es as long as the SPtNG low range l

rupectively, were added. Table t.1 en exclude operabikty durtne refueling monitore oro operable, are being added.

surveillance fregesney notettone Imm the high water levelin the scrum contains the SW time frames for discharge schone trip function when Pmunt Nelle beins deleted and new surveillance frequencies and their-control rode are removed, and (4) aBow footnotes are being added which specify abbreviated notations. Table 1.2 en entry into a reactor condition to perform operability of the instrumentation.

operetional modes l=p-u those required testing.

Tobk Sie. Columns for Su requiremente that are applicabis to Table 311. Addition af a new instrumentation readout location and Droeden and aime laserpeestae Dresdes columa la the table to correlate isolatlan instrumentation range for the Post-i spectac operating alloweases.De instrumentauon signale with the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation term % ology osatutsed ta Tables 1.1 and roepective valve groups. A change to the table are being deleted.

12 has beeninsorysseted beo es toleranos of she reactor now. low water Table 411.no eurveillance revloed instrumentellen tables, se level initiation setpotat is being added, requiremente for containment appropriate. Actica statemente bove Change to proposed actions are being monitortng are being deleted to replacod notes, where a te, and made to (1) allow an additionalit house eliminate redundancy. Testing new action statemente have added, to reach hot shutdown before going to requiremente are being added to the where needed, to addrese new cold shutdown in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for table to include the functionaltest operational modes included in the those functione currently covered by frequenef prior to plant startup far the tables.%e table actions and notations presamt Action A la the table. (2) aDow a APRM downscale and flow variable and have been updated with SM hours to reach startup with the the Rod Block Monitor (RBM)opecole requiremente and operatiemal modes associated neolation valves closed or and downscale functione. Drywell High ldentifled in Table 1.2 heos boem allow 12 bours to reach loot sholdows Radiotion monitor surveillance l

incorporeted tote as taeny of the presamt and cold sheodown in the next 34 hours3.935185e-4 days 0.00944 hours 5.621693e-5 weeks 1.2937e-5 months - requirements are being added. Table requiremente es possible.De for functione'correndy covered by notes are being added which include the elsntSoest ebenges to oech of the-present Action B in the table, and (3) the fo1Wwing-(1) require'applickble

--mm-..--,-

1 39988 Fedecel Regislar / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wedenedey, June 13,19eo /> Noticoe

)

i functional testing within 3d hours prior i Dow not involve a ensnincent tnerease in and surwillanos requiremente for a funct6on to startup if not performed withis the b probebility or consequences of as which has already edeted and toen l

previous 7 daya,(2) will not require scendent prmonly evaluated because:

procedurauy controUed to the put, thm can scram discharge voluane level switch A. New Tables 1.1 and 1.2 add definitiorm be no incrosos in accident probabuity or I ' ur" 88 #

9Uncy not*U ne an conmqvences due to thle change.

testing during refueling with control rode peu nelM dw.Thne tablwimplement B.s The eitmination of the upper tolerance temoved (3) will re9utre RDM commonly used tersninology and teoun8 of h Reector low low Wawe (R11W1.)

operability only at or over 30% rated intmole from tlw BW and operetire su thennal power. (4) will require BWRs. We torta " Mode" used et Droeden le Primary Containment leoleUon (PCIS) and undervoltage and degraded voltage idenucal to b term 'Operenonal Condition" ECCS initiation eetpoint le strictly monitoring of emergency buses during used in the STE Wee tebin provide administrouve sad cannot incremos the cold shutdown and refueling only andur deSnitens whm none cumntly exist in the pmbbHW w eque d u Mdm The setpoknt wiu rmain at greekt hn ce certain conditions, (5) will only require calgci equal to se taches above the top of active y

g d

not h

certain Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) functions to be operable durin8 probbulty of any socident previewly fust nereforu no reduction in the level of evaluated etnoe no accident precursore are safety wiu occur as e rwult of Llw propowd cold shutdowne and refueling when involwd. Since the addition of thsee tables change.

associated systems are required to be will provide clartfication to the user, there g B e ne removal of section C from Toble (perable,(6) will exclude channel no significant taarense in the consequences of 4.1.1 and the relocation of Section D of Table calibration of neutron detectors, and (7) en accident previously evaluated.

411 to section 3/4.s E le strictly will add operability requirements for the B.t h changw to the instrunwntatie administrative and cannot edwruly affect tefueling floor radiation monitors' tables in the Technical Specificatione e a an accident promously defined.m proposed Table 4.2.2 A surveillance frequency needed to provide clarification of change will oltadnete h redundant is added for the source checks for the terminology, to provide constetent application surveillance requiremente for the of requinments throughout the Technical Containment Pinauro and I. awl ri.dioacth c hyuid cilluent monitoring Specifications, and to provide a more usable instrumentation and wiu present au of the instru:nentation.

format for presentation of the table materiel operebility requireteente for the Main Steam Table 4.2.4 The minimum analysis The rewrite of h instrunwntation tebles safety and Relaf Valves in one 13 section.

Itequencies for chemical elements retains tlw rwcenary requirements that are W LCOs and SRs for the containtnent associated with post accident specific to Dresden while endming instrumentat6on are tieted in Tablep 3.18 and monitoring has been changed to the pmvistors from the STi end later opereung 4.24 BWRe using STS. Thou changes do not alter B.y W proposed chanew to Section 3/4 8 fre}uency at which theY are actuall Y

per ormed. Specification 2.1.G contains any estabtlehed actpointe (except for 850 pe63 ' are editorialincreaems the frequency of low prusm in RUN, discuued in subsection analyele for tritium, groes alpha, Sr,se, Br-90 a tsetpoint of 1550 psig for the low

C below) or asaumptions of the accident and Fe45 on Continuous Liquid Releases will pressure initiation of main steamline analysie and are proposed as an reflect the actual time it taku to procen laolation valve closure, %e proposed improvement over the present table stew samples. On line radiation toonitors are change will reduce the setpoint to IC5 prnentation. Any changes to present eet to alarm on the most limiting quantity,

psig, surveillance intervals are made to add and daily grab sample lootopic analyste (in In addition, numerous administrative requirements from the STS or later plante or the ennt of monitor failureel will provide changes have been proposed. to include to Place Table Note requirements in the sufficient information to determine whether the following: (1) clarifications. (2) oppbcable column in the new Table frenet.

or not to continue or shutdown discharge.

pnHn n mum Num PmWe C. b propopd change in Se nector deletion of information not te9utred to Channele per Trip System requinmente are coolant low pressure eetpcInt of 880 pela for bo in the TS and not used by the reactor maintained in the table rewrite except es initiation of main eteemline teoletion valve operators, (3) table and instrumentation indicated in Table 3.2.3. Since the necusary closure affects only one tronalent or esccident title changes (4) deletion of redundant requinmente m maintained by the proposed analysis previously evaluated.This transient information, (5) incorporation of notes change, there le no significent increen in the is a turbine pressure regulator failure which Lito the tables and (6) deletion of probability or consequences of an accident would cauw the control and/or bypsee references to the Mobile Volume previously enlueted.

Paduction System which is not used.

B.2 m clanneedon est es APRM Rod valvu to open. As evaluated by ANF and

'pp ee nel CECO.NFS, the proposed change in the Basis forproposedno sign /ficant UN" Min j th p,9.

setpoint to 825 palg. will still provide a 40 pel tty o hascids consideration deterndnation occurrence of a previously defined accident safety mergin for high power operation at low The Commlulon has provided since the function of the APRM tod block is prueure se determined in Technical sinndards for determining whether a not required to mitigate the events of any Specification 1.1 B. The reduction of 25 pois in significant hazards consideration exista Refuel mode accident. I;en oving any the MS!V le letion trip willlower the as str ted in 10 CFR 50.02. A proposed requirement for the APRM rod block function t l te tu ng amendment to an operating license for a in Refuel will not change any precursors Rod etdent or a pressure regulator failure transient la about f,oergjg din fac!!it involves no significant hazards p

censi eration if operation of the facility ena in accordance with a proposed B.3 The clartfications to RBM operability conservatism in the accident analysis without requinmente do not have any edvme significantly affectir: any aceident arnendment would not:(1) Involve a accident impact since they do not alter the precursors or parameters used to bound the significant increase in the probability or present requirement to have at least one RBM enelysis, nie change will help to enhance consequences of an accident pieviously operable or rod withdrawal blocked when plant reliability and safety by reducing the evaluated. (2) Create the possibility of a greater than 3o% power, probabi!!ty of an inadvertent reactor isolauon new or different kind of accident from B.4 & addition of the Drywell Hiah and subsequent removal of the primary heet an# accident previously evaluated, or (3) Radiation Isolation function to the Technical sink respectively. Since the enumptions of Invo1ve a aIgnificant teduction in a Specifications cannot adversely affect en the accident analysis are preserved by this rnargin of safety

accident previous ly defined. Equipment change, there is no significant inctnoe in the modtfications arenot required nor are probability or consequences of an accident The licensee has provided the setpoint changes needed to make this previously evaluated.

following analysis of no significant proposed change. Because the addition of this -

D. no change to the terminology of the hatards considerations using the isolation funcuan to the Technical Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram to Cammission's standards.

Specifications will specify the trOs. ectione,. Ime of EllC Oil prueure Screta le strictly an

Federal Ragletar / Vol. 85. Neil nd /%dnesday. June 13, 1980 / Notices-2 ages i

adottaistrouve that can have no efloot steemline toolation valve closwo to g25 pets of the ApRM.Wie change does not reduce' on any see64 pet asm yeteL only removee some of the conservatism tro n the margin of ufery str>ce the IRMe are E Does met smate the poesib6lity of e new the present setpoint of geo pois.nle change required operable durtr,5 the refuel modd,A'

or d49erent bind of neoldaat from ser does not affect assumptione la b present '

g. cst.of4 coco rod block funcuos and a 1 provisuoly evaluated beamuse:

new modes of plant operation.nle setpoint providud by the IRMa.h APRM rod block a accident analyale and does not introduce any ouwf4 taken twlos scram function am A.h addit 6am of een Tables 1.1 and 1.2 twy to clarify present requironwate and can only affect the propure regulator faGure in Refuelis a redundant functioe and ite -

w enmal w a t m o e the margin of eaMy.

~

laterval definitione that eTo use et nd th ton pom 11 y o BJ h pmposed RW mlawd dangm am operating STS SWR plante De use of thne new or diffemnt kind of accident from any primardy clanticetion stakments which terminology and testang interval definitions at pr,viously evaluated.

cannot anect any ena$ne to safety, Dresden will pmvide staller improvement in D.h proposed change in terminology fo*

B 4 h addiuon of the Drywen High undestanding of the affected requiremente the Turbine Control Valve Foot Closure Radiation Primary Containment teoladon as to other plante that heve implemented,

Screa le etr6ctly an adminletretive change function to the Technical Specifications will these mquimmente. Does sww. Mandard

that can have no affect on any accident dehnitione de not omste the possibility of a

analysts, not affect b margio of safety. Design or.

new or difluent kled of accident from anF In. Does not involve a olgnificant reduction setpoint changw are not required to Pevlously smaluated, in the margin of safety because:

implement the proposed changet.nle 8.1 he rewrite of the lnotrumentatico A.no incluelon of Tablee 1.1 and 12 in the reytolon to the Primary Containment teolation tables takes advantage of formate developed Droeden Technical Specificatione adde 140 and SR Tables le necenery to meet the for de SH ta order to naprove pmeentation. motorial that will provide clarificetton of requiremente of NURPaar37 Topic 11.F.41y.

and readability of maternal AU neoneary terminology and allow consistent B.8 h tolerance change to the R11WI, requiremente are retained In the new tables interpretation of requironwnts.nia change and PCIS initieuon eetpoint will not reduce as wou as some additional requiremente from willimplement standard industry accepted ~

the margin of safety atace the nominal h SM nue change wiu impme the testing intervale and terminology at Droeden setpnint wiu not be changed. However the ability to acesse and use the information in snd wiu not eigruficantly reduce the added flexibility will allow the setpoint to be the tables without introducing any availability of systems or equipment required set slightly higher.%Is will reduce the OPorable by the technical specifications in probability cf reportable evente end allow

[a"new e e di k

accident.

order to Preserve accident analyste operation at a slighdy higher level of safety.

B.2 Removing any requiremente lor ApRM apumPtions,brefore, this change does not B.6 h margin of safety le not a!!ected by Rod Block Function la Refuel cannot lead to Involve a sign 6ficant reduction in the margin the removal of Section C and relocation of the creation of any new accidente.

of safety.

Section D from Table 4.11 eince isoctional -

hoodinostions to the APRM are not required B.1 The proposed rewrite of the performance of the effected instrumentation to implement the propoemd changa N.

instruruntation tables providee an is not being changed.

ApRM wiu not be required opetable during improvement over present techracal B 7 Changing the frequency oiknalyose on plant conditions other than those lot which ePecification requiremente.N adopt!on of a (Jquid Effluente for triuum. Sr te. Sn-se, and the APRM system was deotened. No new standard format for presentation of n.aterial Fe-65 tooeflect the actual analyels timme wdl operational condations wlH be created with the ApRM Rod Block function removed from will help to improve readability and h not reduce the margin of ufety because the Refuel mode.

ability to locate neceuery requirements. De lootopic analysis of grab samples are BJ ne propneed RBM related changes do standanitsauon of inmlnology will help to performed which are edequate to determine not change the times the RBM to needed, improve Interpretation of requirements-the reactivity release and whether or not to ney strengthen and clattfy when the RBM Present trip eetpoints are emaintained (except shutdown the system.

must be operable, for the change discuned h. Subsection C C.h change in b setpoint for reactor B 4 he addittom of the Drywell High below) as wou se Minimum Opereble coolant low pressure initiation of main Radletion primary Contatrument teolation Channele per Trip Systeen requiremente, steamline toolstion valvo closure from 850 to functica to the Technical Specifications wlU (except as indicated in Table 3.13). New 825 pelg removes excese conservattom in the not increase the probability of the occurrence Actions and Table Notes are incorporated ~

analysis while malntelning the assumptions of new accidents. No new equipment le where needed by using STS and opereting of the analysis.h wepoint is provided to (t) needed to implement the proposed channe ST15 BWR requiremente. These additione protect against fast nactor depreneurisation not are any design changes required of he have been evaluated for use et Dresdeo and and resulting tepid cooldown of the vessel existing systesa.

have been found to maintain operability of and (2) to prevent high power operation et B.5 ne tolerance change to the RLLW1.

systems and equipment required to preserve low pressure. As evaluated by ANF and PCIS and ECCS taitletion utpolat dow not accWnt analysis apumptiona. no chanpoo Ceco.NIS. neither of these functions wiu be create the possibility of a new occident.no to surveiUance intervale are pmposed to help sIgnificantiy affected by the pmPMed existence of the upper tolerance le booed on ensure operability of equipment in their change.no reduction of the trip level setting an operational considerat6on only. l.a. the required inodes of operation. Present by 25 pel will still provide a 40 psi safety prevenuon of spurious actuation of h pCis Technical Specification action requirements, margin for high power operetion et low and ECCS during normal expected trenelents. in some cases, aUow 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to reach the pressure since as stated in Technical here is no beels in any safety analysis for STARTUp mode of operstion with equipment the upper toletanos.

inoperable. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months time la necessary to Specification Baus 3.1 the core thermal B.a h proposed deletion of Section C'end. allow on orderly shutdown from an all rods power limit for reactor preuures below too relocation of Section D frosa Table 4.2.1 wiu out, full power condition. noa. in order to psie is 25% and this limit la conserveuve.nie have no effect on the function of the effected provide constatency in the Action provisions.

small change in the degne of conurvatisrn is.

Instrumentation. No new lastrumentation is the a hour allowance is implemented offset by the benelite of the change since b being added not to any being deleted from the throughout the lastrumentation tables. N probability of an inadvertent reactor isolation Technical Specifications therefore the proposed changes prottdo r.larification of and subsequent removal of the primary heat ~

poselbdity of a new kind of accent is not requirements and consistent application of sink is reduced. A elmilar change has created.

requinments. and thus do not involve e pnviously been approved fot Quad Cities B.y Decreasing the required frequency of reduction in a margin of safety as evaluated Units 1 and 2. Since h auumptions of the tritium, groes alpha. St co. Se.se. Fe45 will for use et Droeden.

accident analyens are preserved by the not create the poulbt!ity of a new or different B.3 Clarifytng h mode mqut*ements for proposed nhange, there la no significant kind of socident as tootopic analysis wiu be the APRM rod block wiu not change the reduction in a margin of safety, used to determine continuance of discharge margin of safety. Requiring thle funcuon in D.no change in the terminology for the in the event o(loes of the on line monitor, the Refuel mode would form the APRM to be' Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram is C.De proposed change La the reactor operable during a mode in wbhh the flux en administrative change that cannot affect coolant low prwovre initiation of matn levels are wou below the design basis range any taargin of sefety.

24000 Federal Register / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wednesday, June 13, 1990 / Notices Based on the previous discussion, the either the probability or conseguences (2) Create the possibibty of a new or licensee concluded that the proposed of a previously evaluated accident.

different kind of accident from acy amendment request does notinvolve a

2. De proposed amendment changes accident previously evalueted or significant increans in the probability or the surveillance test troquency of the (3) Involve a significant reduction in a consequences of an accident previously EPAs only and does not involve a margin of safety.

evaluated; does not create the change in the deelgn or function of the Based on the staff review, the pcssibility of a new or different kind of Reactor Protection System or the proposed amendment will not:

accident from any accident previously electrical protection assemblies. Also, (1) Involve a significant increase in evaluated; does not involve a reduction no changes are made to any safety the probability or consequences of an In the required margin of safety.

limits, limiting safety system settings, or accident previously evaluated because The staff has reviewed the licensee's limiting conditions for operation.

relocating the Rdolegical Effluent t o s!gnificant hazards consideration Therefore, the proposed change does not Technical Specifications (RETS) to the determination and agrees with the create any new or different kind of Offsite Dose Calculation Manuel licensee's analysis.De staff, therefore, accident than previously evahiated.

(ODCM) or the Process Control Program proposes to determine that the licenaae's

3. The proposed amendment changes (PCP)is atrictly an administrative request does not involve a significant the surveillance test frequency of the change that does not reduce or modify hazards consideration.

EPAs only and does not involve a any exleting safety requirement or localPJlic Document Room change la safety limits. Itmiting safety procedure; or location: Morris Pubile Ubrary. 006 system settings, or limiting conditions (2) Creete the possibility of a new or 1.lberty Street Morris. Illinois posso.

for operation. Operational test data different kind of accident from any Attomeyfor licer>see: Michaell.

Indicates that the EPAs are highly accident previously evaluated because Miller, Esquire: Sidley and Austin. One reliable and that reduction of the no new accident scenario la created and First National Plaza, Chicago Illinois surveillance frequency will not affect no previously evaluated accident l

00603.

the operational evallabiltry of the EPAa.

acenario is changed by relocating l

NRCActing Pm/ect Director-Richard Therefore, the proposed change does not procedural requirements from one F. Dudley involve a significant reduction in the controlled document to another; or Cannmoweah Edison Gmpear.

margin of safety.

(3)lnvolve a significant reduction in a Docket Nos.56-237 and 30 849 Dweden LocolPublic Document Room margin of safety because no Nuclear Power Statloa. Units I and 3, locotion Morris Pub!Ic 1.ibrary.004 modification of any plan structure.

Grundy Gunty, Maola I.iberty Street, Morris, Illinois 6045n system, t;omponent or operating Attorneyforlicensee: Michael 1.

procedure la essociated with this Date of application for amendment Miller. Esquire: S!dley and Austin One administrative change ao all safety request' April 18,1990 First National Plaza, Chicago !!!inois margins temain unchanged.

Dcscription of amendment req 0est:

80tmo.

Vor the reneons stated above, the etsff The licensee has requested a change to NRC Acting Pm/ect Director Richard believes this proposed amendment the Technical Specifications to modify F. Dudley involves no significant hazards i

the surveillance frequency for the consideration.

functional testing of the Reactor Illinois Power Company and Soyland Protection System Electrical Protection Powse Cooperative,Inc Dodat No.so.

g jpgjj,pg,y,,,,g,

Assemblies (EPAs) from once every six 481. Clintos Power Station. Unit Nos 1, location: Vespostan Warner Pubhc monthe to whenever the plante are in a DeWitt County, Illinois 1.ibrary.120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois 61727, cold shutdown condition for more than Date of amendmentrequest January Atromeyforlicensee: Sheldea Zabel.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

20,1990 Esq., Schiff. Hardin and Waita. 7200 Bosisforpmposedno aignificant Description of amendment requeet:

Sears Tower,253 WacLet Drive, hozards coneidemtion determination:

The proposed changes to the Technical Chicago, Illinois 60008.

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications. requested in response to NRC Actir's Pm/cct Director: Richard Specifications has been evaluated NRC Generic latter 80-01, incorporates F. Dudley assinst the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 programmatic controle for radiological and has been detennined to not involva effluent technical specifications (RETS)-

Pecific Cas and Electric Company, a significant hazards consideration in the administrative controls sectlan at N 2

,p e

2, 1.

e proposed change removes the to t e fis te o e c

'fon San Luis Obispo County, California requirement to perform EPA manual and the process control Date of amendment request: January surveillance testing at power and program.

25 and May 11,1993 (Reference L.AR 90-revises the surveillance test frequency Basisforproposedno significunt Ot) for the EPAs to reflect that in use at hozords considention determination:

Description of amendment request' recently licensed boiling water reactors.

The staff has evaluated this proposed The proposed amendments would revise The proposed change does not involve amendment and determined that it the combined Technical Specifications ony relaxation of established safety involves no significant hazards (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant limits. limiting aatety system settings or considerations. According to to CFR (DCPP) Unit Nos.1 and 2 to allow limiting conditions for operations.

50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operation with one of the three The bcensee has provided operational operating license involves no significant pressurizer code safety valves (PSVs) test data supporting the determination hazards consideration if operation of the inoperable and disabled so that it that the EPAa are highly reliable and facility in accordance with the cannot open. Specific TS changes would l

have not failed either during testing or amendment would not:

include:(1) addition of a new Action when called upon lo actuate since their (1) Involve a significant increase in Statement a. to TS 3.4.2.2 that would I

initial Installation at Dresden. Therefore, the probability or consequences of an allow continued operation with one PSV the proposed change does not increase accident previously evaluated; or inopetable provided that, within 24

.m

I Fedesel

/ Yet as, Nin,114 l'W

, June it, tem / Notless Sm bows, the inoperable valve'le disabled m.Desethe involve a sigstbeest c/o Pacine Gas and Elbetric y,

so thatit le lacapable of and ineesee la the bihty or -

P.O. Box F444, San Francleon, s

d ** **'id**' p"Md'"l "*

94130.

' that one pewar operated alve

""g e,

n"g*m'"8'."g. m, NAChe/sef Disocian John T.14rklas (PORV)le operablein the automstic g

opening mode with its associated block Coonant System (RCBl. A sa mluetten Soutbert Cablerala Edsea Company, et valve open,(2) revision of present for plant operet6am with two esw psve el., t'eeket Na,39 388, Sea Onette Action Statement a.of 75 s.4At to operable (one psv ble and dienbied)

Nuclear Gemeesting Stellen, Unit No.1.

make it Action Statement b. and require has been perfM mulie show the Sea Diego County, Cabferais a plant shutdown with two PSVe RCS oweprenewe limits of the two uniting

ecidente ously ans less of Dole of amendment vest: June 7.

inoperable.(8) change the present Eawreal and/m Trip and itse, se supplemenkd ay 8. 2m A ti Stat t b, to Action Stat t

""E

[g, W of camdmenWmt.-

c en (4)19 75 Basee 3/4.4.8 g

reflect the revisions to15 8.4.1.2. In p0Vs.De proposed change reduoos the h"

addition PG&E has committed to tenualfor mas depseewtaenen omleis I

No* attI dated' 7'

spurlaue aaHe9 enlety valve estantles.

n or replace an inoperable and PSV during the Bret ou of sulhcient nerefore, the propseed ebense dose nog 1 m (64FR 33F18h louer deled duretion following vel sabling.

Irrvolw a eipmoant inerme in the Fe 31, im, NRCmqm kd Repalt or replacement of a PSV would pebemty w commlumou of an sonidet that he lomu rwise lh pmvlous

"*1yevalueled.

Submittal to include Limiting Conditione te9utre the unit to be in Mode 8 for at -

P*'.'Does the change areste the poselbihty of for Operation (140s)to unit the b

east 7 dsys.

a new or diflerent kind of sooident from any amount of thne that the 6-inch 1

ne requested change would be used occident ymmmely mlustedt containment vont vaine an allowed to If aleaking PSV causes a loss ofloop The shaose does not affect the be open.nle supplement to l

seal. Disabling a leaking valve promotes me by wh6eb any enlety related eyewe AmadmM bum No.170 wu safetyin a attuation where loss of perferen tu fumetloa.De two pSVe w60 submitted by 1iconsee in twoponse to p a' coun a downwed ehlftin Operate la the$aame manner and provide the same eherestertouc volw reopease as pr6er a the NRC request.

vaIve 11 t pressure and bring de kh b propend h m powoual Whoenm's requwt supplemente point close to normal opereting pressure, eeaseenemens of two volw opereuem have Proposed Change No. til as follows:(

ne downward shinin valve hit been addressed la the safety evalueuen sad Format changes were inade to Pressure increases the potential for demonstrated to be saceptable.

Specincauon 3.4.5,"Containssent inadvertent opening of the valve and nerefore the proposed change does set Ventilation System teolation Valne..

potential failure to close, which could er aw the pseeibility of a new or different.'

Valve fank

'- "Section 3.8.e, "Contb." (t) heItalation Sy' st roult in a small break lose of. coolant-klad of ""'aat from any soondent putously t

mleewd.

leolation Valves. Valve Position. was accident (l.OCA). Continued operation

,,d no, to a me,,se hvde a ya

.a added to incorporate IIOe which hmit

, p dw dan with a disabled valve no admoe i g o g,ipt.

l oalety consequences use adequate' A safety evalueuen for operation with one the amount of time the 6 inch' overp ection capability le pBV inopweblo arid dmabled dessenegoted contalament vent valves are allowed to provided by rematales operabl*

that the Rcs overprenewe hatte of the two -

be open during Operating Modes 1, s. 8 haittes een6dente previously analysedL lass -

and 4, he provision tolook closed -

PSVs.-

Boeiefor edno algnificant of Externalland and/or Turbine Trip and man tion valves CVS 301 and hosoMecone tion determInotion Reactor Coolan' pump isched Roter, are not CVS 318 was moved from Section 312,

'"***d'd I*' plant operation with two p5Va.

"Codaland lulaum Valm," to -

no Commiselon has provided standande for determining whether e ao I"a'g

((i",,,,g'ag' Section 3.4.4, "Contalement Ventilation p

toolation Valves. Valve Poettion " to be algnificant hasards consideration exists bhish vdw m a undinos Iw opwouse as etttod in 10 CFR 80.03(c). A proposed with e w dies pBV provides addit 6enal more cenelatent with NUREG 0653.

I amendment to an operating license presow r rehovtag capabihty. nle provideo -

" Standard Technical Specifications for i

(

involves no significant hasarde sehel oeneerveuse etnoe the p0RY Westinghouse Pressurtsed Water conalderation if operatica of the facility. mhof senty le not included in tlw esendent Reactors." and (4) ne propowd I

in accordance with the proposed analyets mineuen.

reviolon to Section 3.6.1, " Containment nemfon. the pmpmed change due not teolation Valves," regarding ope amendment will not:(1) Involve a tentw a signanc. ant mducuan in a margw d undtations for valves CV 10 and 114-algnificant increase la the probabihty or was withdmwn.We taformanon was consequences of an accident prWlously NRC staff has reviewed the evaluated: or (2) Create the poselbility of t includedla pmpond Tuhnical a new or different kind of eenident from : proposed change and the licenm's noSPociRcaum Secuan 3R,

sigrificant besarde conalderation

" Containment Ventilation lentation -

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) determination and finde them Valves. Valve Poaltian, lavolve a el cant sedaction in a acceptable. narefore, the staff proposee BoeJefor no significant :,,,

margin of ety...

to determine that the change does not hosade one on determinh.

ne licensee,in its submittels of involve a significant hasards.

As mquired by 10 CFR Wa), es january 25 and May 11.1990, evalueled

consideration.

hcenew has provided es fouowing no the proposed charige asennet the Locof f'ublicDocument /toom elsnificant hasards criteria of to CFR location: Califomia Polytechnic State.

signincent hasarde conalderation determination:

50.92 and against the Commiselon Univeretty Ubrary, Government

,Y,gj'ha m

y guidance concerning application of thle Documente and Mope Department. San g

atandard. Based on the evaluetion given I.ule Obispo, California 93407.

Ow elsnmcat homard considwouan aulysis below, the licensee has concluded that Atsorneys rheensee: Richard R.

provided la Amendewet Appliceuen No. tm the proposed change does not invoin e locke, Esq.,

clfic Cao and Electric e7' t Appucetiae No.17travlees two elsnificant hazarile consideration. De Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, extenes technical specinoeuen chansee and licensee's evaluation le as follows:

California 94120 and Bruce Norton. Esq.,

adde two new technical specification

..- - ~

~

MGM Federal Reale6ee / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wednesday. June 13. 1990 / Notices sections.The two revised sections addrwe WSTS into the Technical Specincationk facolPublic Document Room containment toolstion valves and Finally, PCN til will reduce the lower test locolion GeneralLibetry.Univtreity of contatament teeting. De two new sectione pressure for the pmannel airlod from 10 California. P*O. Box 19557'Irvine' add leakage limitsuono for the containment pets to 3 pois.nle chadn Cahfornia 92713.

will enhance the air locks and the containment ventiletion rebebihty of the airloc y limitles system isolation valves. Revising the two unnecessary streues placed on airlock AftotDeyforlicensoe: Charles R.

esisting technical spec:ficatione and adding componente during teetmg et to peis.

Xocher. Assistant General Couneet, and tb two new technical specification sectione Accident consequences or probability will james Booletto Esqtdre. Southern improves the overall operetional eefety by nnt be increased slnce containment pressure Cahfornia Edloon Company. P.O. Box further ensuring that the contelament during design beets LOCA will seal the inner 800, Rosemosd. Cahfomia 91770.

fanction of the contalament structure remaine door. Band on the foregoing. operetion of the gagpyg,fect Dimetor: John T.1.atL!ne, facility in arcordance with the reposed

operable, This supplement provideo changes that are change wtU not trivolve a eignifcant increaseMN conelstent with Amendment I?0. It adde the in the probability or consequences of an Southern Cahlossia Edses Cesapesy, et additional requirement to maintain the accident previously evaluated.

al Dachat No. 86 a88. See Onofre containment vent valves elooed as much as

2. Will operetton of the fee!!! la practscable. As indicated in the November 3, accordance with the proposed c enee cente Nuclear Generating Staties. Unit No.1.

19M. NRC SER. Referemos I of the proposed the possibility of a new or diffent kind er San Diego County.Caldernia Technical Specification 3.368, provided an accident frore any occident prwlouely Dateofamendmentrequest May te, analy to that shows the valves will close evaluated?

1990 when opened to an engle not exceeding 70*.

Response No nese valves have been modified to limit the The changes proposed by pCN 211 Descript/on ofcmendment request.-

opening angle to apprortmetely So'.nie establish rew technical specification Proposed Change No. 2:4, which was m:chanical hmitation along with the requiremente for the conteinment purge and submitted by Amendment Application procedurallimitetton added by this vent valves and the personnel airlocks. The No.182, requeste NRC approval to

[

supplement wdl ensure the volves wiu close new requiremente em Latended to enhance increase the allowed heat load for the or be closed when they are required to neolste the rehability of the componente in thew poet opent fuel pool (SFP). The existing heat containment accident funetton. Reducing the lower test load projection discussed in Section Section 3.6.8 wat added to incorporate prouare on the personnel otr6ed fram ic 9'1.3.4 of the Updated Final Safety Limiting Conditions for Operation wh6ch limit pois le 8 pois le Proposed to martimise etweesse Anay ets RepoM WFSAR)am not y

th) amount of time the 6 inch containment placed on the airlock during teettag while ventilation valves are allowed to be open mainteltdne a test preuuro suffweet to accurels due to calculationnl errore and durtris M:xtes 1. 2,3, and 4. ne twielen detect degradation of components.

must be revised accordingly. Ele I

requires the valvu to be cloud me much en le incorporation ofIEO's and ACTION revlolon would involve an usreviewed practicable and only allows them to be statemente not carrently in the tee.hnical safety question as defined by 10 CFR opened for specific purposes (La. for periodic specifications taev result in evo6dmp 50.89 and therefore requires peior NRC contairunent preneure reduction for lowering unnecessary plant shutdowma. nerefore, review and approval containment sirborne radiation levels and none of the changu proposed by pCN 211 In lie oubenittal, the licensee requested miintaining approximately neutral propure will croots the possibdity of a new se during personnel entry into containment and different kind of accident fran any accident that the followl"E revised UFSAR Sf?

for penodic surveillance testinal.nerefore.

Previonaly evalmsted, requirements be approved:

thle change dou not affect the eignificant

8. Will operettee of the facihty in SFP temperature no greeter than H&

hisards consideration previously provided accordance with this proposed change F for the SFP maximum normal heat with Amendment Application No.170.

Lavolve a significant reduction in a earpa of load case (including assumption of The licenece provided the following HfetFI failun of one cooling pumph n3 sigmficant her.ard consideration A" M "!N' No pool bouind for the SFP maximum determination previously with D ' "*'8'"'I'"I"FI ' * '"*'"i""

abnormal heat load case (including Amendment Application No.170:

bfock deNdybwelE*

ty in asemaption of failure of one cooling

1. Will operetion of the facility in the event el e reactor troneient. no changes pump).

secordance with this propoud chansa proposed by pCN til are intended to enowe Pumps, piping, valves, electrical invoh e e significant tacrease in the that the onling capability of these power sources, and connections will probabt!6 y or consequences of an ucident coniponente to maintained and any satisfy the existing system quality and P'y

,fy.guaw degredation le detected in a umely manner.

selsmic requirements.

Reduction of the lower test preuure for the The SFP coolms pum wulbe pCN 211 will establish technd

$N7,""g

$8pe$

powered and controll from separeto d

specificetion requiremente for striock and teolation valve leak teetles acceptance pressure le opposite that which the doo, electrical traba, j

criterie that are not omrrently in the would exponence during an occident. Testing la order to accommodate the proposed opscificattor.s. no ecceptance cnteria will at 3 pets reduces strenes placed on the door revialon to the UFSAR, the licensee is

, ensure that then penetrations can withstand and has been demonstrated to have adequate making the following changes to the SFP uh alfea esea thatYpraYtion of eenettivity to detect leakage and degredation cooling system as allowed by 10 CFR in I Mmpente. it is alu nokd eat KN M1 50.59: (1) Permanently connecting the Inkege integnty le detected in a timely p,,[",

epare SFP cooling pump to the SFP

"*""**i

E*"

minner, pCN 2t1 will eleo estab!Ish opening ing

,g,

pressure of 48.4 pois. Accordingly,operetten Cooling System. The additions to the limite for the containment vent eelvm.

provistore to llmit the valve openenes are of the facility in acc.ordance with this system wul be Seismic Category A and

)

l currently in place la accordance wtth NRC proposed c.hange will not tavolve a quality class safety related. (2) Powering requiretnanta. %een provisions will minlades sigmficant reduction in a margin of safety, the spare SFP pump fmm a separate the force required to close the valves during a The NRC staff has reviewed the electrical train.Due to extensive u"

j analysis and, based on that review. It electrical system snodification to be n

valves. ne propoud change will utablish appears that the three criteria are completed during the upcomtra Cycle 11 requirements to erwure the valve opening satielied.Therefore, the NRC staff outage, a non-safety related t

timitsuons are maintained. PCN n1 will proposes to determlne that the construction power sources that is fed incorporata LCO's and ACTION statements amendment request involves no directly from the San Diego Gas and far the personnel air locks canalstent with the significant hazarde considerstica.

F.lectric power grid. or la otherwise

. -. - ~.-

1 Fedesel Rf / Vol A5, No: 114 / WednesdayJune 13 19pti Notices _.... M e -m be se it rim, wer t wm o,eron a u fe ut,.

.e,enown wi. wehe e-pum,.en souros.De spare power supply eccordance with thne proposed chases create be quickly p cod in-servios. With the

-ill be dedtosa

-#eleted class the poselbility of a new or dtflorent klad of modtnee tion in place. ne P ptng spood pieces I

acc6 dent from any accident prev 6eudy need to trwtalled or electr6c power loada prior to Cycle it ref

d a

,,,eidin,,,,,c,,iet,,,,,t,',ts.nd (3) mi=we n.d i. connected io, cover iron a at a,e coa *=nt -** wa*is eram "n", *",on"J ban e.vaves,iesi e R"ad*djt',d

r's*im'"P,,ed ai ee requirements. Due to the extensive hisher Iient load na ihe Srp than is currenur and a circuit brenher closed to operaie the electrical modifloations to be cotopleted allowed by the UFSAR.m only nacident opm pdhmfore, h apm pump wul during the upcomins cycle 11 refuehns, previouly evaluated that relates to thte be able placed in..orvice in eumcLent i

non-safety related local manual controle change le the lose of SFP cooling ne time to preclude pool boutot under higher will t e provided. De controle will be improved SPP Cooling System toduces the SFP hett losde then currenty specified la the uppiedad to safety related prior to the Probability of occurrence for thfe socident UPSAR.

i Cycle 12 refueling.

stace the redundant pump le being direc0F N NRC Mdf bu Mwed se l

80 sis forpmposedno s/gnificant

"*[,,g,,,",,h addiacc6 dest analyple and, bened on that review,11 di i

hosorcir cons /deroflon determ/not/on!

not previeuely evalueled relates to the appente that th.# three criterte ere As required by 10 CPR 80.ri(s), the ooteaual ler e rectroulation Dow path that le satisfied.Derefore, the NRC staff licensee has provided the following no introduced by conmocung the spare pump to proposes to determine that the significant hasarde conalderation the system. A portion of the coolant Dow amendment requestinvolves no determination:

PotentieUy could be rectreulated through a algadficant hasarde conalderatiott 1.Wlu operation of the facility in non. operating pump should that pump not be g

socordamos with thle proposed change correcdy testatest Such an occurrence oeund locofiont General 1.lbrary, Univerolty of involve e signinennt increase in the lead to dayaded eso - eyotem- "

probabihty or annesquences of an accident since only a portton of pump few ; ----

Califomia. P.O. Box 19557. Irvine, would I

previously evaluntee be deUvered to the component cochag water Californis 92713.

l Mayones No hut exchanger for cooling.

Attorneyforlicenses: Charles R.

l

'the loss of SFP Cooling due to pump fe6lwe Howeeer, the probabthty of this situetson is Kocher. Annistant Gene.ral Counsel, and 4 6. e only peerteuely evalasted seedent very low slaae the teoleuon of a ame-James Booletto6 Esquire. Southern whose probabu6ty er uences oPereting pump will be aeoured threesh Califorrde Edison Comp *nY' P.O. Box potentiaDy may be aflected the peepened admin 6strauve controla en dual leolauon cheogo of inossaskip the me=t=== SFP best valven. Each pump wiu be toolated wie two 800. Rosemeed. Califwnia 9177E load above that specined to the UFSAll manual leolation valves, one on 3e pump's NRCPmfect Dincton JohnKLarkins, However, because of the noodificadone being discharge ptplag and one un the euction. For Acting g

completed on the EFP Coottog System.

a rectreulouse path to occur, both of the non-neither the ptobablifty nor consequences of operating Pump's toolation valves would have Southore Califoenia RdEsen Ceppany, et thle osoldent om signtncenth changed by the to either lad a be inmorvoedy aHpied.

al., Dodtet Nos. 80 881 and seem, Ses higher heelloed.no probabutty of the loss Deal consunosa ledare of both of a nom. i Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, F nit of Sep esehas des to pump lauuo le reduced opere p's saanuelleoneuco valves la Nos.1 and 3. San Diego County, with the addeteos ed sedendant ooches peg not and need not be n=&ed Cakfortda ne modited SFP Cochag Byeness asewee incorrect abenment of a non operating,

that the consequences of e emeleng pump's valves, while possible, to s.ot Date o/ amendment request: May 14 failure are no worse for the higher heat signtncant Any serious de6redation in the 1990 then they were for the UPSAR opectned cooling system performance due to loolstion Description of amendment requsett merimum ebnormal heat load.With the velve misalignment would be noticed and The licenece has requested amendmente higher heat load and implementation of the corrected once the Srp high temperotare to revi e Sat: Onofre Unit Nos. 2 and 3 m.dificeLion, the time to reach pool boiling is alarm wee activated Therefore, the potential Technical Specification 4.0.2 and j

large in compartoon to the time to place the for a rectrealetion flow path through a noo.

spere pump in-service. For the monimum operating pump's pepise loop to e new type of.

associoted bases in accordance with the i

ebnormal heat loed currently reflected in the accident, but one whow probability and guidance in NRC Generic Letter 8014.

)

UFSAIL the time to pool bothng upon lose of cono vences are insigmficant. AddiuonaDy.

De Technical Specification indicates i

cooling le of home and the une toinstou the e

valve will be added to sech of the that the combined time Interval for any spare pump le approximately 1g hours. For pump piping loops prior to the Cycle 12 three coneccyttye surveiUtnce interyals the high heat loads, the switchover time to refuehng to further reduce the potential for a shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified the spero pump menine scooptable le recirculation flow petha surveillance interval.The pro relation to the time to boil. Dur the

3. Will operation of the facihty la change aHows for the mma of the l

upcoming outape, the worst case tload le accordance with this propoemd change 3.25 limit. no Technical Specifice tion l

a.6 MBtu/h and the time to bou upon loss of involve e significant reduction in a marpm of will continue to allow surveillance SFP cooling to 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months . During Cycle 11 sefetyf operetion, the worst case heet load (sesuming Asoponea No intervals to be extend sd up to 25% of the en unplanned full core off loed et the end of As discussed in rwponse to Question No. l.

opecified time limit. 'I he Generic letter l

the fuel cycle)le 14.7 MBeu/h and the tiene to the SFP may experience higher heat loads has estabushed that tae removal of the boll te e bours. For the earsested hypothetical than were previously calculated.These heat 3.?.5 limit results in a benefit to safety.

maximum ebnonnal heet load case, the heat losde are heportant because they determine Basis forPtoWodno signifi hazards consideration determmcant load le 17 MBtu/h and the tkne to boil le 8 the equilibrtum temperoture with the SFP ot/on.,

hours. In each ceae, the lose of the prunary Coolms S tem in service, time to boil and pump can be compenested for without time for a emete cochna to be estabhehed.

As required by 10 CF1t 50.91(e), the approachtna boiling in the pool since with the Because of uppedes to the SW Coohns licensee has provided the following no modified SFP coohng System, the opere pump System the margin to bothng is maintained algnificant hazards consideration will be placed in operation within such tot adeguate time to available to provide determinetiort opproximately 30 admutes of discovery of a attemete cooling. Thew hisher heet toede

1. Will op.retion of the fact 11 in prtmary peep failure. Derefoes, the shorser will shorten the time fur the SFP to reach accordance with the proposed ange involve I

times to pool boiling are not engmBeant since boiling upe loos of coohng. However, thle a significant increene in the pmbebility or boiling will be just as reliably averted with.

reducuon in the time to bod intervalis consequences of any accident previously the higher SFP heat load as with the UfYiAR compenested for by the modification to the evaluetod?

specified limit.

SPP Cooling System which greatly improvee

/IESPONSE No.

24004 Federal Register / Vol. 55. No.114 / Wednesday. June 13.19e0 / Notices Spedlic Surveillance Requiremente, i.e., the intoh e a elsnificant reduction la a margin of to the Commission its' analyses, using riechanics of the octual eurveillances, am not eefety, the standartis in Section 80.92 on the modined.h proposed cherige would he NRC staff has reviewed this loeue of no sigidAcant hasards remove the 3.25 hmit trorn Tuhrdcal analysis and, based on that review, it consideration. Therefore, in accordance I pecification 4.0.g. nie Technical eppeare that the three criteria are with to CFR 50.91 and 10 QR 50.92, the Fvecification aDows surveillance intervals to satisfied.%erefore, the NRC staff licensee has provided the following

(([g",d("gQE8 Ml,'

proposes to determine that the analysle:

ed g

3 gg 16 besed on engineering judgement and the amendtnent raiuest involns rio TVA has evoluted the proposed TS recognition that the most pmbable result of significant hatards consideration.

change and has detonnined that it does not any particular survelDance being performed LocoIPublic Documenf Room

,,pe,sent a significant hasards ceneidemtion la the verificetion of corJormance with the facct/ont General Library. University of based on criterte established La to OR Smeillance Requiremente.

Cahfornia, P.O. Box 19557. Irvine, 50 g2(c). Opmuon of SQN in accordance The NRC staff has routinely granted California 92713.

with the preposed amendmeat[ej wiD not requeste for one time enceptions to the 3.28 Attorneyforlicenseet Charles R.

D)levolve a significant increase to b l tnit t.ecause the risk to safety is low in Kocher. Aselstant Genered Counsel, and probab!Dty or consequences an accident Iamn ho uo, Esquire, Sah p m in sly n elu kd.

t to pe or e e sun nces.

Wrefore, the 3.25 timitation has not been a California Edison Company, P.O. Box b propowd addition of the two smoke practir:ellimit on the use of the 25 percent 800. Rosemead, Cahfornia 91770.

detectm la each unit's 15e le e conarveuve ellowance for estending survelliances.

NRC Project Directorr John T. Larkins, change.h insteDeUon of the detectom will Generic letter es.14 has estabhehed that the Acting provide redundant fire detection la the use of the allowence to extend the volume control tank roome' entry labyrinthe, e arvelllence intervals by 25 percent can eleo Tenonese VaHey Aut%rhy. W

[1he fim detectore do not cause an occident f esult in a significant safety tjenefit for Noa. M7 and 3@ Seapuoyab survel!!ancco that are performed on a routine Nuclear Plant Unite 1 and 2. Hamilton they twpond to a Art.)M change, thmfm.

doce not Manificandy increw h probabmty basta durins plant operatiort.

County,Tenneesee or consequences of a previously evoluted The use of the allowance to extend Date of amendment requests'May 4,

accident, e It a e i ant safety t fo,"

1990 (TS 9007) f amendmenf requntst f2) Create the poulbliity of a new or Uf8Cfi flon o diffent kind of socident from any surveillances that are performed on a routine P

bleis during plant operation.This safety The Tennessee Valley Autho:ity (TVA) pmrtously analysed.

btnefit is incurred when a surveilhnee proposed to modify the Sequoyah N proposed additics of b two smoke intmal to extended et a time that cenditione riuclear Plant (SQN). Units 1 and 3, detects is na appropriate chasse to each are not suitable for perfctming the Technical Specifications (We).%e enhancement to SQN and they m;a set safety unit's 15.N modincetione are surveillance. Damples of this include proposed changes would revise Table eet the transient plant cpereung conrhtlone or 3.311, Fire Detection Instrumerits, to criwrta of 75 inclusion for Am detection condluons during which safety systems are out of service becauw of ongoing re!!act the additiork during the Cycle 4 instrunwatettaa that protecte safety.related oute88 for each unit, of two equipment. [N fire detectm do not cause rduchn[ electors in each unit's yo)uma e,trvettlance or maintenance oeuvities. In smoke en accident; they respond to a fire.l h sur.h cance. the selet benefit of sllowing the use of a 25 percent a lowance to extend a control roont Unit 1 has recently chansa. &mfm do not cmew he surveillance intmal would ostweigh any completed its Cycle 4 refuehng outage p uibuuy M a new or diffenWad d bsnefit derived by limiting three consecuute and Unit 2 is scheduled to shut down to occident fran any pm@ue analynd, surveillance intervals to the 3J.5 limit.

begin its Cycle 4 refueling outage in W Inn a signincenmdueden in a h proposed change w til therefore noi October 1990.

I' involve a eigmficant increew in the BasleforE no a# ificant proposed addition of the two smoke probabihty or consequences of any eccident hows cons / milon determinationi detectore in each unit's 1 Tie reflects the previously evaluated.

planned instausuon of hoe detectm in the

2. Will operauen of the facility in ne folloMng information to support the volume control tank roome' entry lebpinths, accordance with thle proposed change create Pr0 Posed i.hanges to the %s was Wu modificauons provide redundancy for the possibihty of a new or dif'erent kind of provided by TVA in its application:

the fim detection capability in b volume accident from any accident previously To provide redundant fire pmtection TVA control tank rooms and are, therefore, a net evaluatedt is installing two photoelectric emoke ilESPOA'SC: No d*4c'a's in the vohrme control tank room safetF enhancement. (The changes, themfore, l

Pemoval of the 3.5 hmit from the entry lubrinth of each unit. The modificauon do not mate a significant reduction in a surveillance requirement does not modify the will p* ovide detectore cross anned to the snargin o ety.l c onfiguration of N facility or its mode of enme area so that the failure of one ernoke The staff has reviewed the licensee,e cperation. The proposed change will detector will not residt in a lose of fire no significant hazards consideration therefore not create the possibility of a new detecuon capabiht in the plume co strol determination and agrees with the or different kind of accident from any tank room entry la rinth. The two detectore licensee's analysis. %erefore, the staff previously identified.

are being added to e appropriate TS tabica, urve lhtnce proposes to determine that the

3. Will operstion of the facility in d n'e g

t accordance with the proposed change involve ed etion in a margin of safety?

instrumentation that protects safety related significant hazards considerations.

e sign n

equ!pment. Since the additional smoke Locc/Public Document Room

[

The extension for survedlance inten el will detectm in h volume control tank ran location: Chattanooga-liamilton County j

result in a safety benefit when the U

I" Library,2001 Dread Street, Chattanooga, T

c survedlance le extended at a time that conservative addition to the TSe.

Tennessu 3N2.

i conditons are not suitable for performma the The Commission has provided Altameyforlicensee General 8

survedance. The proposed change does not standntds for determining whether a Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, significant hazards consideration exists 400 West Summit Hill Drive, Ett B33, y thod s n e 11 n pe fo ance,or revlu any safe'y analysis conclusion.

as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).10 CFR Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, Operation of the facihty in accordance with 50.91 requires that at the time a lleensee A7(C Assistant Dimetor: Suzanne t'a propased change wdl therefore not requests an amendment,it must provide E!ack

redsmet y / vol. as, No. He / Wedneedep 13, tegen/ Noeless 303 5

- TeasesseeVatsy Aetesity nashme TVA has enluated the propeesd tesheisel TommessesVaRoy AmeseJr.Danket Nos.59 5"andIM g spesinesties (15) cheese and has desmemined Nos. OMEP and EMas, seguayah i

Numiser Plant. Units 1 and 4, that it dose not repseeemt a sipinomat Nuoteer Flemt. Undes 1 and 3. Hasalhen County.Tammesses beenede sene6demusa based on artwde Ceumey. Tennessee established be to trR so.aste). Operation of i

Dole of ammedseend roguesia bday &

Segueysh Nuolest olent (SQN)in socordance Does of aseendmanisguesistIday 4,

~

teso (153013) f amenshriest messede-we die proposed sewedowne wul not.

19ee(15to13-D'ect@tden o (t)lavoin e enga'nomat eneroen in the Descr$stlan amendment reguseist l

noTennesseeVe Astbortty (TVA) probability or conseawnow of an eeeldest he Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) sed to Segeoyah p,,viously evolusted.

proposed to modi Section 3/4.5.1 at Plant (

Units 1 and 3, ne afety eeneldmoons empelewd with Accumulatore, of a sequoyah Nuclear Technical Spectnestions (15e).%e twetar operaties with higher ear 6chment es.d Plant SQN), Units 1 and 2. Technical,

j proposed changes ate to revloe Section extended barnap have been evaluated.no cations (111e).He propoemd 8.0, Design Features, and teradd proposed ebenges have no adverse (eNect) en ase to revlee the requireemente Surveillance utrossent 4.g.1A %s the peobabiuty of any asendsat.no in11i 3/4.5.1.1. Cold lag injection changes would thelloonoce to inereened barn, may slightly shaage the Accumulatore, to delete (1) Action increase the maximwn fuel enrichment mix of Seesse producer that might be mia-d Statements "c" and "d" and the 1

for fuel on the alte from the current 4.0 la the event of e ser6eus socident but eueh associated footnote (2) Surveillance weight. percent to 5.0 weight percent small changes would not sign 68enntly a5ect Requirement (8R) 4A1.11 and (3) the I

l.

Uranium [U).238 and permit the the conseguemose of earleue ese6denis.h prescriptive statement of SR 411.1.1.a.1 I

' substitution of Eltceley 4 or stainless subeutut6es of fluer rode er open welw as to how to vwify accumulator level steel filler rode or open water channels channels for fuel seds wiu be lueuned bY and pressure.

for fuel rode la fuel ensemblies, cycle.epoolBc analye6e unos na NRC-Doelsfor nosignificoni l

Boolefor no altnificant approved enthodobosy.nie mioed oralyeas hasards cons tion determination:

hasards cone lion determlnollong will demonstrate that existing design limite he following information wee provided

)

De following information wee provided and esfety analyses cruerta m met.

by'I'VA in h applMon to suppwt the by TVA in its applicotton to support the NMfom. th* ProPo**d change does not p

ohe to the T9e:

Involve a sientAcant increasein the PQeed che 8'e to the TSo-d h letter dawd August it.1.ges, ebangeto se the nuoweble fuel probabihty (or consego&nces of an accident amendments to the SQN Unite 1 sad 1 !S 3/

I enrichment is neceseary to eBow the ese of previouslyeve sted.

4.5.1 adding Action Stetenwoes e and d that higher discheese bureup fuel.Hoher (2) Create the possibulty of a new or provide actions to follow in the eved SR dischasse burmups are achieved by solending diMemnt kind of acc6 dent frora any' 4,8.1.1J could not be met.NRC etelfpteled in with emeller troeb batch fractices with higbee previously entlysed.

Its letter that the imuance of actio enttchaeot.%e change to allow the

{nere are no phyelcal modifications being statemente goveming the operebuit subeutuuon of filler rode or weter abannels is made to the plant, the new fuel wiu be monitorire instrumentation for the cold-leg deelteble to permit timely removal of fuel trradiated in the earne manner as previous

[injoction] accumulatore (i.e. level and sede that are found to be leaking or are -

operaties cycles, and b reload analysis will wure instrumente) was a generic Leave for 1

detennined to be pmbeW eoume dfutum demonstrate that esisting design hmite and pmmuneed water mectm M. 's estinghouse Electric Corporation Yoore mia.d design und at SQN le safety analyue ernerte em an)b and conArend to seest all muer6e and to proposed change to inemene the==i=ea therefers them amendments would only be be wuhin the bounde of accident analysis allowe* haf seriemeni e b outnisteile - effecun unto the miert of Unit a from its presented in Chapter 15 of the Final Safe of Auer sede er open water etia-male for funer Cycle 4 sofueling outage.nie would provide Analysis Report (FRAR) by performance a rode does not ersete any new or ddlereal approximately to emethe far the NRC stoff to reload enfety actlysis. This analysie kind of marel==8 from any previously work wuh the Westinghouse Owners Group coseidese seedinaatione to the plant design analysed.

(WDC)to dmiop w6c plucom to thle f

sign cent mdection b e m

has been la con wAboth WOC and MC ad conewning reeduha of perfonnance of the soloed salsty analyste Based on the discuselos provided la Itos 1 thle leeue and le subenitting thle po mt ensures the unit, with its speci8c core design

be" and b fact bt "O I*I DI **8 ]

change to ruolve this leeue for e SQN Unit 8

and fuel enrichment, will operate withis the change am being made la the typw or 2 Cycle 4 refeeling outese. W requested preecnbod on lisalte. Any restriction on core operation enufted through the releed announts of any radioligical alBuente that che le ecosietent with the accumulator safety analyste eresses la ela=====ted ang sney be pleased offeite, there le no e

tion proposed by the WOC MIRffR any changes to.he plant license are made et signidcant sedestien la a mergia of safety, program.

that time. norofore, rauon wuh mvloed ne staff has reviewed the heensee's The Commisalon has provided Deelga Feature 83.1 the use of fuel no significant hasards consideration standards for determining whether a essemblies with a maximen enr6chment of determination and agrees with the Mgnificant hazarde consideration exists

[0we pomnt wGl be jusHAed for oed gge,,,,,.s analysis.%erefore, the staff as stated in to CFR 50.92(c).10 CFR

,d Commlulon has provided Proposes to determine that the 50.91 requires that at the time a licensee standards for determining whether a ePplication for amendments involves no requests an amendment,it must provide signi!! cant hasarde consideration exists significant hasards considerations.

ta the Commisalon its analyses, using as stated in 10 CFR 80.92(c).10 CFR l.oco/PublicDocument Aoorn the standarde in Section 50.92, on the 1

50.91 requires that at the time a licensee location / ChattanooCa.llamilton County issue of no significant hasards requests an amendment,it must provide Library,2001 Broad Street. Chattanooga, conalderetion. Herefore, in accordance i

to the Commlesion its analyses, using Tennenee 37402.

with to CFR 80.91 and to CFR 5092, the 1

the standards in Section 50.92, on the Attorneyforlicenree General licensee hee performed and provided the leeue of no significant hasards Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority, I0ll0"I"8 ""*I '18 Y

' n a d

iI consideration. brafore, in accordance 400 West Summit hcl Drive, Ett B33, uen with 10 CFR 50.91 and 10 CFR 80.92, tha-Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

that u does set repneant a eter.1Acant l

licensee has perforsnad and provided the NRCAss/stant Dfrector: Suzanne huarde considestion bend on cruerta foUowing analyels:

Black established la 10 CFR 80.02(c). Opention of l

1

MOOS Fedaeol Registee / V:1. &&, NA 114 / Wednesday June 13, 1900 / N:tices Sequoyoh Nuclear plant (SQN)in scoordance Techn!cel Specifications and f, late them of this propowd change.The cycle specinc with the proposed amendment wiu not:

in the Core Operating Limits Report uriables are calculeted using the NRC.

(111nvolve e signincent incruee in the (COLR) under the control of the plant's

pproved methode end submitted to the NRC 8'

v ou I e e$at unit tedew group (On-Site Review to aUow the Staff to continue to trend the The requested change does not require a Committee (ORC) for Callaway Plant).

valun of thew limite.The Techntui physical modification to any plant system NRC will be notified of changes to the

!;pecificat one will continue to require and does not affect any occident analysis, COLR concurrent with plant operetion within the requimd oore operstma The cold les occumulatore are a peserve implementation, limits and appropriate actions wiU be eken e

camponent in the emergency core cooling Bosis forproposed no sign $icong m hen or illimite are enceeded.

) tem and the TS requiring the verification horcrds consideration determination:

Thmfore. the proposed amendment doce of both accumulator water level and pressure The Commission has provided not in any way crute the poutbility of a new will mmeln unchanged. Verification of these standards for determining whether a or different kind of accident from any su5puonsYre t violet fo the significant hazards consideration exists occident previously evaluated.

requested change does not involn e as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed (3Me ProPowd amendment dow not s'gnificant increase in the probability or amendment to an operating license for a roult in a signincant reduction to the margin consequences of an eeeldeo,'previously facility tavolves no significant hasards N **IY' evclusted.

consideration if operation of the facility D'**'8" I'*fety is n i affected by the i

(2) Create the possibibty of a new or in accordance w,th a ptcposed rtinMal d cycle 8Pecinc com opwoung uifferent kind of eccident from any amendment woul0 not (1) Involve a lunits fr m the Technical SpeediceuoneD previously cnalyzed.

"'*'8'""I'"I'ty pre #ntly Provided by No phy sical modification is being made t significant increast in the probabilit or sny plant s3 stem as a result of thee change.

c nsequences oIan tecident prninsly nannt Technical Speedicahone mmains Verificahon of the parameters (water level evaluated:(2) Create the possibility of a unchtnged. Appropriate sneasures esist to und pressure) ensures that occident analyses new or different kind of accident from control the salup of then cycle specinc assumptions are not vlolated and no channe any accident previous ly evalua ted; or (3) hmits.The proposed amendment contlnues to in the analpas is bems inade. Therefore, the involve a significant ieduction in a require pereuon within the.com limits os pcceibility of a new or different kind of raargin of safety, obtained from the NRC approved mioed accident is not created.

The licensee has p ovided the design inethodologies and appropnate (3) involve a significent reduction in e r-cram of safety.

followin8 anal sis o. no signif' cant The TS that requires serification of the h.izards consi erations using the riolated remem unchanged.."

6ccumulator weter volunie and prenure will Commission a standards.

The denlopment of the lindte for futuse

(

reloads will contmue to conform to those

. t)The p oposed change does not trvolve e r-main unchan8ed. No chenpes to the accident analysis are beira made and a gni!! cant ncrepe in the probabdity or methods described in NRC spproved i

senfication of these parameters ensures the, meequences of an accident previously d e e m b ad h M f m g'dCI

[nt He removal of cycle-specific co,e review to assure that operution of the unit P

d f

thne n reduction in any snugin of safety.

operating limits from the Callaw ey Plant within the cycle specific limits will not l

The staff has reviewed the licensee's Technical specifications hu no tnfluence or involve a sigmficant reduaion in a margm of no significant hazards consideration leip *d on e probability or consequences of ufety.

determination and agrees with the eny accident previouely evaluated. ne cycle.

Bued on the previous discussions, the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff

$c iceYs"p,cNhn, w licens3e concluded that the proposed I

we I.roposes to determine that the the operation of the Callaway Pl ant.no amendment request does not involte a application for amendments involves no proposed amendment stilt requires exactly sigmficant increase in the probability or significant hazards consideratfor's.

the same actions to be taken when or if limite consequences of an accident previously Loco / Public Document Room are exceeded as is required by current evaluated; does not create the location: Chattanooga Hamilton Count)

Technical Specifications. The cy cle specific possibility of a new or different kind of Library,1101 Droad Street, Chattanooga, lantts within the COLR will be implemented accident from any accident previously Tcnnessee 37402.

and controlled per Callaway Plant tograms evaluated; and does not involve a l"dr[,,#'P,d th 1 sw y n iSah reduction in the required margin of Attorneyforlicensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority.

A nalysis Report (FSAR) will be examined

safety, 400 West Summit 11111 Drive E11 B33, with rupect to chansee in cycle-dependent ne staff has reviewed the licensee's Knoxville, Tennessee 07902, parameters, which are obtained from no significant hazards consideration NRC Assistant Dimcton Suzanne application of the NRC-approved reload determination and agrees with the Blnk design methodologies. to ensure that the transient evaluation of new reloads are licensee's analysis,he staff, therefore, Urdon Electric Company, Docket No,30 bounded by previously accepted analyses.

proPoaes to determine that the licensee s 483, Callaway Plant. Unit 1. Callaway This examination, which will be performed request does not involve a significant County, Missourt per requbements of to CTR 5o.59. ensures hazards consideration.

that future reloads will not involve e LocolPublic Document Room Date of amendment equest: March 8, significant increase in the probability o' lxotiorre Callaway County Public fa cc dent previously Library,710 Court Street, Fulton, escription of cmendment request /

$a' uag((

The proposed amendment would revise pl The proposed change does not cresie hfissouri 65:51 and the John M. Olin Technical Specifications and associated the possibility of a new or different kind of 1.ibrary, Washington University, Skinker Dases, which contain cycle-specific core accident from any accident previously and Lindell Boulevards, St. Imule, cirratir:g parameters in accordance evaluated.

Missourl 83130, with Generic 14tter 8816, "Remo ral of As stated earlier the rem val of the cycle Attorneyforlicensee Gerald Cycle Specific Parameter Limits from sacmc vanabin has no influence or impact.

Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman. Potts &

Technical Specifica tions? The proposed $ta$i$i rNnsequIn$of ana dent.

Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW.,

revision would relocate the cycle.

No ufety related equipment. safety function, Washington, DC 20037, specific core parameters from the on plant operations will be altered as a roult NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon

i

)

I J

Padmet Reglutar / Vol sh, Noi 114'/ Wednesday, June'13. tesy'/ Neessed seest l

ar change missely le en eneet en energ, etsippy.

Uh M %, O NeiE elp!Bount insemos la the probability ;or consegmencesof asaccident,

.m andiseemlens th nfiannene te 40% Censway Pleen,Ueb L CaBeney accoi danse weet the gendense prooided in Ch Coum**, Misseed.

evaluated; does est seeste the Dodo of amenchnentyt March 4, poselbility of a new or different kind of -

sM es a part of the implesmestatson of the 1 asp act:ident from any accident previously cc meine6en e poucy Steinmaat en Teche6est

~ Deterptionp/amendmenttypset, evaluated;and does notinvolve e Specification improvemente.

he proposed amendment would revise reduction in the required margin of nie charge Aou not wesse the possibility l

the Technical Specifloations by deleting s*Iety, of a new or &flerent kind of acadent fruas The staff has reviewed the licensee's - any accident pmiowly evaluated.no l

the power range, neutron flux. high negetive rete trip (NFRT). his change no significant hasards conalderation Proposed change does not alter the request le consletent with Westinghouse determination and agrees with the requ6mmente and h nethod and imanner of WCAP 11396(P). "MNdology for the licenase's analysis.The staff thenfore, plant opwetion m unchaned its intent to to Analyste of the Drophed Rod Event,=

proposes to determine that the hcensee's

'"olve the Problems regarding the gecasel.

which was approve,. by NRC on request does not involve a significant mquimmute of Secti n u of the Tww al October 38.19ss. Plant modifications to hasards consideration.

Specificaticas on h apphoebihty of locn/MicDocaunent Room Sundam Regulmroeste.We le remove the trip circuitry will be completed in Refuel 4, which is location:CaHaway Cointy Public secomplished by providing attemetive to scheduled for fall 1850.

Ubrary,710 Court Street. Fulton, thm sections veing h guidance provided la E8*

Boeiefor no significong Missourt e6251 and the John M. Olin hasandr ration closerminatiom Ubrary, Washington Univerolty, Skinker This change don not involve a slanificant mducuan in a margin of safety.This le b$ eed and undell Boulevards.St. Wis.

The Commia=ta= bas provided on the fact that no design change le involved, Missouri 63130, i

standards for deteronining whether a but the latent of the Technical specifications signifloant bassede consideration exlew Attorneyforlicensee: Coreld le clarified to enhance the overall safety to as stated in to CPR 80.93. A Charnoff. Esq., Shaw. Pittman. Potts &

i Trowbridge,2300 N Street.NW Pj'""d8'5*ve b

h amendement to an operating or a facillt involves no signifloant hasards Washington. DC 20037.

9 d

i canal easties if operation of the faculty -

N8Cel"/ect Director: John N. llannon * **"g,'"t E*y'oe h

n Ia e l

in accordence with eide d Union Electric Casapany, Decket No sp. cone,quences of an accident previously amendaient would not (1) Involve a 488, Callaway Plant. Unit 1. Callowey evaluated, nor emete the poselbthty 6la new significant inesese in the probebility or County, Missourt or d& rent klad elaccident from si$

consequences of an accident previonely Date of amendment request March I, accident previonely evaluetd nor isvolve a reduction in N required margin of sploty, evaluated:(1) Create the possibility of a 1990 Beeed on the foregoins. the requeettd new or difleront kind of accident froin Dneai#/on of amendment ropest.

amendment dow not preunt e significant any accident previonely evaluated; or (3) he proposed amendaunt would W henard.

a cent mduchonin a Technical Specifications 4.0.3. 4.0.4 and

""g giconsee(providedthe their associated besee to incorporate the Based on the previous discussions, the changes provided in Generic Letter 87 licensee concluded that the proposed

09. dated June 4.1987. Generic 14tter 87 amendment request does not involve a gogg I

hasards tione 09 provided guirlanra on revising significant increase in the probability or

& remord of the NFRTdoes eminvdve ' Tedmical SpecLfications to provide consequences of an accident previously Cesamiselon's standards.

increased flexibilhy on the application evalasted; does not create the a sign 18 cant inossese le the probabiht er consegasmose of aa accident 2-y--

of limiting conditione for operation possibility of a new or dafferent kind of evaluated. Cycle specine evaluations ustag.

associated with surveillance inte,rvalet accident from any accident previously aa NRC a ed methodology will be Basisforproposedno s/gn/ficant evaluated; and dose not involved a Perf to dessonstrate that the DNB '

hazards considerot/on determlaat/or reduction in the required margin of design beste le snet duttne the coume of a he Commission has provided safety' M ytng en e standards for determining whether a he staff has reviewed the licensee's

",,,",("I signif cant hasards consideration exists no significant hazards consideration reductices N method and====== of plant as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed determination and agrees with the operation will be unchensed other then the amendment to an operating license for a licensee's analysis. The staff, therefore deletion of maneceaeary surv.m.

- The proposed change to reumave the NFRT facility involves no significant hasards propones to determine that the licensee's does not create the ponibility of a new or consideration if operation of the factitty request does not involve a significant difieront kind of accident from any in acco 11ance with a proposed hazards consideration.

previously evalueted. Ne sahmane le placed amendment would not (1) Involve a loca/ Public Document Room on a diseet reactor trip er sensinatic power significant increase in the probability or

$"jC "dA consequences of an accident previously locofion: Callsway County Public evaluated;(2) Create the possibility of a Ubrary. 710 Court Street. Fulton.

t nos ne ted circuitry has been abows to be man emnual new or different khtd of accident from Missouri 65251 and the John M. Olin ne removalof the NFRT does not involve a significant reluction in a marpn of safety.

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Ubrary, Washington University. Skinker Cycle-opec 6Ac evaluatione using on NRC Involve a significant reduction in a and Undell Boulevards. St.14uis, approved methodology will be performed to margin of safety.

Missouri 63130.

demonstrate that the DNB design beste is met The licensee has provided the Attorneyforlicensee: Gerald.

durine the euwse of a dropped rod event.

following analysis of no significant Chamoff. Esq. Shaw. Pittman, Pottr &

w t

os reector trtp or hasards considerations using the Trowbridge. 2300 N Street. NW.,

I "8' "'

Based on the previous discussions, ther n

inv lve a significant NRCPiviect D&ceforr John N. Hanson d n licensee concluded that the proposed increses in probebility or consequences amendment rottueet does not ineolve a.. of an accident previonely evaluated.no

.-_,..-,-_,,_.e.

-...e,..-m_,,..~,,,..

-.r.,...,

-_.,,,4%__,,,.y,

.n,-

c_-,

34000 Federal Resistee ] Vd. 55, No.114 / Wednesday. June 13, tauo./ Noticoe Virginia Electric and Power Company, to the following TS sections and related - Manuscripts Department. Univoretty of Docket No. 3s438, North Anna Power tables, and the to month requirement in Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 2280t.

Station. Unk No.1, tauisa County, the note in the tables indicated below, Attorneyforlicensee: Michael W.'

Vissinia would be changed to 24 months for the Maupin, Esq., Hunton and Williams, Date of amendment request-Apnl 27 eighth cycle of unit operation only:

p.O. Box 1535. Richmond, Virginia 2321L Table 4.31, Note (4)

MIC Project D4recton Herbert N.

i990 Descripilon of omendment re vest.

Table 4.3 2, Note ti)

Derkow The proposed change would ad a Bo8/8/orpropo8edno8/ nificorg Virginia Electric and Power Company, licInse condition to Operating License hozords considerotion determinotwn Docket Nos. 38 338 and 3e.338, North No. NPF-4 for the North Anna Power The Comminolon has provided Anna Power Statlan, Unita No.1 and No.

Station, Unit No.1 (NA.1). Specifically, standards for determining whether a 2, Emle County, Vir5 als 1

the proposed license condition allows a significant hazarde consideration exists one. time extension of the surveillance (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed Date of amendment request May 21, itst intervals for certain surveillance amendment to an operating license for a 1990 tests se specified in the NA.1 Technical facility involves no significant hasards Description ofomendmentrequeet Specifications (TS) for the eighth cycle consideration if operation of the fecility The proposed changes would amend the of operation. NA.1 completed applicable in accordance with the proposed Technical Specifications (TS) for the Moue 4. 5 and 8 surveillance testa during amendment would not:(1) Involve a North Anna Power Station. Unite No.1 thi seventh refueling outage which significant increase in the probability or and No. 2 (NA.1&2). Specifically, the ended on July 15,1989. It was consequences of an accident previously proposed changes would relocate the considered unreasonable to repeat these evaluated; or (2) Create the poselbility of Radiological Effluent 'IS (RETS) to the surveillance tests during the several a new or different kind of accident from Offsite Dose Calculabon Manual short unenticipated outages that have any accident previously evaluated; or (3) (ODCM) or the Process Control Program occurred since then. However, these involve a significant reduction in a (PCP), as appropriale.%e proposed tinplanned outages and the unexpected margin of safety.

changes are in accordance with the length of the cycle seven refueling The licensee has evaluated the change guidance provided in NRC Gener6c outage has impacted the surveillance request against the standarde provided latter (GL) aset, dated January 31,1989.

test intervals between the seventh and above and has determined that this CL 8s41 stated that the NRC would eighth refuehng outages.This delay.

change will not:

approve a ls amendment te delete together with additional time allowed 11 involve a sigmficant incresee in the FEIS if the requirements would be for an optimum fuel burn.up before the probabihty or consequences of an accident relocated to the ODCM or PCP, next tefueling. has resulted in a deferral previously evaluated. Current monitoring Bosis forproposedno si$ificoni of the next refueling outage for NA.1 inetnunentation and ongoing Technical hozords consideMion determination until February 1991. Currently, the NA.1 specificati n survenience teete eneum the no Comadesion has provided j

standards for determining whether a TS require the performance of certain 1

ds e o

I 11 main la j

en opaabte condition until their ir.epection at significant hasards consideradon exists surveillance tests at 1tLmonth intervals (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed Io coincide with normal 18-month the neat refueling outa[ty of a new or amendment to an operating license for a refuelleg cyc!es.The proposed change

2) Create the possib would extend these sun elllance test different kind of accident from any accident f acility involves no significant hazards l

intervals for the NA.1 eighth cycle by 6 previously evaluated. Extending the interval consideration if operation of the facility' I

months to compensate for several for the performance of specific surveillance in accordance with the proposed untnticipated outages and the extended tuts does not create the poselbility of a new amendment would not:(1) Involve a seventh refuelmg outa2e that occurred or different kind of accident. Periodic significant increase in the probability or from February 25,1989 to july 15,1989 surveillance testa have been performed since consequences of an accident previously and l

snd to permit optimum fuel burnup prior

$' ',"j 0y*8[,"j,"jYst evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of p

d degradation. Surveillance tests will continue a new or different kind of accident from 8'

One time changes to the surveillance to be performed dunna the extension interval. any accident previously evaluated; or (3) test intervals associated with a plant allnvolve a significant redaction in the involve a significant reduction in a shutdown or refueling outage as margin of safety. Extending the interval for margin of safety, specified in the NA 1 TS for Operating thne spectric surveillance tests for the eighth The licensee has evaluated the Iicense NpF-4 would be changed as cycle of North Anna Unit 1 does not proposed changes in accordance with follows:

significantly degrade the margin of safety' the criteria above and has made the (1) The 18 month surveillance test surveillance tute wdl continue to be cycle requirement as specified in the performed during the extension intervel.

following determination that the following TS sections would be changed Current monitoring instrwnentauon and proposed changes do not invoyve a to 24 months for the eighth #Ycle of unit ong ins Technical Spumcauon turnulance sigdcant hazds consMe@n as tests ensure the effected equipment and defined in to CFR 50.92 because the operation only:

systems remain in an opereble condition.

changes would not:

The NRC staff has made a preliminary (1)lnvolve a significant increase in

review of the licensee's analyses of the the probability or consequence of an

$'c

'lj,'b, Proposed change and agrees with the accident previously evaluated. This 4s2t 47a i 4n221c 4 s utd licensee's conclusion that the three change does not alter the conditions or 4 sue 4ause standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) are met.

assumptions of any accident analysis.

l,j]'

l,shsj Therefore, the staff proposes to (2) Create the possibility of a new or 8

determine that the proposed amendment different kind of accident from any does not involve a significant hazards accident previously identifled. nis (2) Table 1.2 of Section 1.0.

consideration.

change does not alter the conditions or Dzfinitions, which definea "R" as "At LocolPublic Document /toom assumptions of any accident analysis.'

There are no hardware changes.

least once per to months" as it applies locotion:The Alderman Library, l

1

Fedusel Rahstes,/ Vol. St..Now 114 /-Wednesday.. June 13. 'ineet / Netimes negger (3) levolve a aisninomat vedeottom in a the originalrequestin its setirwy.

LoontMlic Cocument Acom a argin of salsty.his chases does not herefore, the sta8 has decidad to locos /an: Swem Librwy, College of-alter any of the conditions or renottee the proposed ameedowite, William and Mary.Walleineburg assumptions of any accident analysis as Desteforproposedno significent Virginie 231g6.,

stated in the NA 162 Updated Final.

hosonie considention deserrnicoUon:

Attomeyforlicenser:Wkea\\ W.

Safety Acalysis (UFSAR).

no Co==iamian has provided Maupla.Esq., Hanlon and WWism i

ne staff has wed the licensee's standards for determining whether a Post Ofhos Des usS. Richmond.

no significant hasards consideration significant hasards consideration existe Virgirda 23213.

determination analysis and agrees with (10 CFR 90.92(c)). A proposed NRCProfect Directon Herbert N.

the above conclusions.nerefore, the amendment to an operating incense fue a Berkow staff pro e to deterndne that the facility involves no sign 16 cant hasards NOTICE OF fSSUANCE OF, pro changes do not involve a consideration if operation of the facility significant hasards consideration.

in accordance with the AMENDMDff TO FACIUTY Loco /Public Document Room amendment would not:(1) volve a OPERATING UCENSE location:ne Alderman Library.

significant increase in the probability or During the period since publication of Manuscripts Department. University of consequences of an accident previously the last blweekly notice, the Virginia. Charlottesville V le 22 set, evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of Comminston has issued the followtag Attorneyforlicensee Mi 1 W.

a new or different kind of accident from anendments.no Commiselon has.

i Maupin. Esq. Hunton and Williams, any accident previously evaluated; or (3) determined for each of these p.O. Box 1835. Richmond. Virginia 23211 involve a significant reductionin a amendments that the application NRC Project Directon Herbert N.

margin of safety,ddressed the above cornplies with the st6ndards and Berkow ne licensee a requinnanta of the Atomic Energy Act Virginia Electric and power thramy.

three criteria in the amendment of t#M.se amended (the Act), and the Docket Nos. 55 350 and 30 381.Surry application and made a proposed no Commision's rules and regulations.no l

Power Station. Unit Nos.1 and 2. Surry algnificant hazards consideration Commission has made appropriate County. Virginia determination. In regard to the fint findings as required by tim Act and the 11 e u r Oct n

ee I

of a

ry Descrrpt:on of amendment requests.'

feedwater crone. connect feature. whick se P

Notice of Cons &deration of Esuance of ne proposed amendments would relied on for mitigation of certain hish energy modify Surry Units 1 and 2 Technical line breaks outside containment and nrw Arnendment to Facility Specifications ('13) Sections 3.6, (sic).W current tl MAR accident analyons License and E M No t

"Tu'bine Cycle " 3.9. " Station Service resulte and conclusions are not affected try Hazards Consideration Ihti t6on System." and 3.16. " Emergency Power

'h' PP***d Ch*"8"-

and Opportunity for Hearinain.

Systems." ne proposed modifications in regard to the second criterion, the.

connection with these actions was licensee stated that:

published in the. Federal Register as address the operability and redundancy requirements of the cross connect The additional requirements for the indicated. No request for a hearing nr.

oPPosHe onHe (elc] auxiliary fwdwater tition for leave to intervene was filed feature of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.The proposalis the Eit eYy 11 wing this notice uns en o eed.-

Unless otherwise (ndicated. the result of the identification of an in regard to the third criterion, the Commission has determined that thoas apparent discrepancy between the licensee provided the following amendments satisfy the criteria for analyses piteented in the Updated Final statement:

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the since the resulte of the exioung UmAlt categorical exclusion in accordance requirements of the TS.nis accident analyses remain bounding.tho -

wsth to CFR 51.2L Therefore, persuant discrepancy was found to result in the ~

safety margine are not in.pacted.

to 10 CFR 51.22(b). no environmental potential for inadequate AFW flow via ne start has reviewed the analysis impact statement or ' environmental the unit.to-unit cross. connect fo< certain provided by the licensee in support cf a assesser:ent need he prepared for these high energy line break events, proposed no significant hazard.

amer.dments. If the Commission has Surry Units 1 and 2 AFW Systems can consideration determination.Tne staff ptepared an environmenta! assessment be cross. connected. Thus. in the event of agrees with the licensee's analysis and eder the epecial circumstances a failure of all of one unit's AFW pmnps, believes that the licenees has met the provtvlon in to CFR 51.12(b) and has core cooling can be provided by the criteria for such a determination. In miido a deteenination based on that other unit's AFW pumps via the crose-addiuon. the Commission has provided usessment. ilis so indicated.

connect, he current 11 require that tu guidance concerning the appligation of Wr further details with respect to the order tu operate a unit, only one of the the criteria for determining whether a action see (1/ the applications for other unit's AFW pumps need be significant hazards consideration exists - amendments.(2) tlm amendments, and operable.The proposed change would by providing certain examples ($1 FR (3) the Comtr.holon's nlated lettere, increase the number of required 7751). One of the examples of actions Safety Evatuatuns end/or available pumps to two. nis would involving no significant hazards Environmestal Assessments as provide an additional margin of safety considerauono is example (U). a change indicated. All of ther items are -

for common mode failure evente.

that constitutes an additional restriction available for pt blic inspectics at th,e Allowance is made for the outsge time not presently included in the TS: e.g., a Commis sion's Pn'elle Document Itoon, necessary to conduct maintenance on more stringent surveillance requirement. the Cel nan Building. 2120 L Street. NW.,

the AFW pumps.

The propend changes fall within the Washi:qton, DC. and at the local pubh-his application was previously scope of this example.Therefore, the documr.st rooma for the particuler published in the Federal Register on -

staff proposes to determine that the facilitin 2nvoh ed. A copy cf iteme (2)

March 6.1930 (H FR 9936). However, proposed changes do not involve a and (3) mu be obtatoed upon request the October 30.1989 letter superseded significant hazards consideretion.

addressed *o the UA Nucin.r

?

~

84H6 Fedesel Resister / Vol. %, No.114 / Wednesday, June 13, lago / Not6ces i-Regulatory Connadasion. Washington.

Date ofissaanest Wy 24,18e0 Enciltty Operating Maense AW. NPF.-

DC 20!E Attentbat Dhector, Division E'fective dese: Upon lesennas, to be 35 andNPF42 Amendments reviend the t

of Reactor Projecta.

(mplemented withta 45 days from date Technical Specifications.

of issaance.

Date ofinitiolnotice in Fedeml Cardna Peer & U t Compsey, d ab AmendmentNa 30 Regnses,r: Febmary 7,19eo (55 FR 42mb)

Nc r INw e4 UY1, W eand Facility Opentmg cense Na NPF-The Commission's related evalurriem of t.s. This emendment revtued the the amendments le entsined in t Safety Chatham Counties Noeth Carolina Technical Specificat!ons.

Evaluanon deted May 17,1990.

Data of applicationfor omendment:

Date ofisidainotice in Fedwal No significont hntards considerotion Februaty 20,1990, as supplemented Registan February 24.1908 (53 FR 5490) cornmet'ta receked: No.

April 24, it%

The Commission's related evaluation of LocalPub#c Document Roorn Brief descriptiotr ofwendment:The the amendment is contained in e Safety lection: York County Ubrary.138 East change nmoves the nrovtalon of Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

Wck Street, Rock Hill. South Carolina Epecificallon 4 0.2 th'at limits the No sgnificar,I hazards censidemtion 29730.

combmed time intervals for three comments received: No consecutive surveillances to less than LocalPublic Dximent Rootn Moce Powes Corporation, et aL 3.25 times the specified interval.

location:Parr) Pub!3c Ubrary,3753 Main Docket No. st.3et, CrWat nUver Unit Date ofissuance:Msy 25,1990 Street, Perry, Ohla 64061 No. A Nuclear Gemeenes Non Citmo Effective date: May 25,1990 County, Flodda Amendment No.15 Comunmwealth E6en Company, Focihty Openting Ucense No. NPF.

Docket Non. 80134 and 804ss, Quad Date of qpplicationfor timendment:

tit. Amendmer,t revises the Technical Cities Nudoar Power Station, Units 1 lC 15d8 df80f'P on ofomeadment;nis d

8f and 2, Rock talatrd County, Illinois Specificatiens'alnotice in Federal Date ofiniti Date of applicationfor amendmwis:

,dect g eran od Ln the Register April 18.1990 (55 FR 14504)

October 11,1999 calculation of nudear beat Dua hot The Commission a related evaluation of frief ductiption of ometadments:

channel factor from t.4% to 2.0E the amendment is contained in a Safety Modifies the Tednical Specifics tion Dde ofhsuance' Wy 21,1990 Evair..on dated May 25,12 reuuttements for jet Pump flow Effective date: May 21,1990 No s:gmficant barants considerorlon inkcuion.

pagg.m comments received:No Date ofhavanw Wy 23.19a0

'*'ih'Y OY*'*'I#8 Ucenen Na DPA*

localFvblic Docunnt Room Effeclive date Msy 23,19eo Amendment mW eeTechal location: Catseten VQlage Regional Amendment Nos.:124 and 123 E 80lIIC*IIO"**

P ut,rary,ilm Clark Avenee, Rale %h, Focdity Ope +oting Ucense Nos. DPR-North Carulina 27005.

'9andDPR40. Amendmente mised the I" I[

p 55FR1

'l The Cleveland Electdc !!1uminating Technical Speci'ications.

y

,s related evaluston of L

Company, Duquesne Oght Coropany, Date ofinitialtotice in Fedatal the amendment is coetained la a Safety l

Ohio Edinan Campany, Pennsylvania Resisten April 4.1990 ($$ FR 12590) %e Commission a rdated evaluation of the Evaluation dated May 2L 1990 Power Conopany. Toledo Edimon Company, Docket No 80440, Perry emendments is contained in a Safety No si nifa at Acraids cassidervtion t

g

,gg g,,

Ev luati ted May 23,1990.

. lear Po er Plant, Unit No,1, Lake ggg g

unty,0 LocaHo&'Ma% Mhc hary, comments received: No Uate of applicationfaramendment:

LocalPublic Document Room aos N.W, First Avenue, Crystal River.

Morida32823.

September 17,1987 location: Dixon Public ubrary,221 Brmf description of amendment:The Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois 61021.

GPU Nudear Corporstion, et aL Docket l

amendment tnodifies the generallimiting No. 50-2as,name Mile taland Nuclear Station, Unit No.1, Daupidn County, a

t.

an ti n. !

tc

' 13

I under certain circumstarn.cs when Nuclear Statloa, Unita 1 and 2. York Penns)lva a l

compliancs whh the LCO's related County, South Carolina Date of applicationfor cmendmsnt:

Action $tatenw.nts would allow Date of applicationfor amendments:

March 12,1990 continued operation for an unlimited Ianuary 17,1990 Briefdescription of ameadraette period of time.The general surveillance Brief description of amendments:no Changes the Technical Specincations requiremente are aleo modified to clarify amendma.nta change the Technical related to taservice inspections of stenta the time at which tho Action Statements Spex:ific Tous (TSs) for Units 1 and 2 by generator tubes following a pnmary to-tit,'e limits begin telatne to failure to replacing 'he values of cycle. specific secondary leek.

petform a surveulance requirement and parsmeter limits in core-related Date ofissuance: May 29.1990

+

te a' low for a dt: lay of the Action specificatione with a reference to a Core Effcettve detr May 29,1990 S!stement requirements for up to 24 Operating Limits Report (COI.R) which Amendment No.1153 les to complete the surveillance if the will contain the vehics of these !!mits.

Focility Operating License Na DPR.

a!!awable time is less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . It These amendments air,o include the

50. Amendment revised the Technical also clarines that restrictions on entry addition of the COLR to the Definitions Specifications.

inta Operational Conditior:a based on section of the TSa and to the reporting Date efinitialnocim in Federal failure to comply with earveillance -

requirements in the TS Administratise Registec March 22,1990 (55 FR 10732) requirements shall not prevent passage Controls. Additionally, the amendments The Commission's related evatustion of into or 'hrough Operational Conditions change the TS Table of Contents.

this amendment to contained in a Safety '

as required by Action Statements.The Date ofissuance: May 17, IMO Evaluation dated May 29,1993.

related Itnee have also been changed to Effective date: May 17,19u0 Na signifimal hatanir consideration i

reflect there changes.

Amendment Nos.:7L 68 coiumente rrveived: No.

L NA X-m a

0-t g

Fedesse aedster / Vol..ss No.114 / Wednesday, June 13,1e00 / Notices 34811 k

mmaw--

^

lam!ho%eDarument nosws Focihty Operating Ucensee Noe.

LocalPublic Document Room

. INc6aest Governaast Publ6caucas DPA4sandDPN.78. Amendments location: Reference and Documente Sectu Statolebeerr of PennsyleeMa.

revised the Technical Sp+cifications.

Department. Penfield Ubrary. State Weinut Seest and kramenwealth Doisof mitiolnoticein Fedesel University of New York. Dewego. New Av0an Boa te0L. intrrisburg.

Regletw. Mamh 21.1990 (56 FR 10537).

York 1312es Motuasylvania 1Titt%

The Caram'.uion's retated evaluation of Pldledelpbla Electric Company. Docket thhw WW Soyland

the ar, epdmente le contained in a Safety Nos.16 ast and 36358 umerkd Evalut en (died May 17,1990.

Generetteg btation, Units 1 and 2.

g p,,,,

,,g g,,g,g y,, g No s/gnificoat horords considemuon Montgomery County, Pennsylventa w

481. CHa.tm Possa Smeau. Ud No. L commente rettived: No.

g p,wsg 4,gg,g

.f.ocalPublic Document Room note of application foramendments:

Date of epplicottonfor cmsrdment:

location:Maude Pruton Palenske february 23.1990 rebruary L1M8 Memorial Ubrary. 500 Market Street. St.

Briefdescrrption of amendments %e Descr/ t(ton of amendment tenuset heeph. Michigan 49085.

amendmenta changed the Technical I

i Specificatione to remove cycle specific h

' W change wrects the rete anm raro Malu Yankee Atenc Power Compa'ty'. parameter limits in accordance with and the corteoponding trip petpcint sad D% W No, m W Y h P

rJ!owable vak for the suppendo pool Atoes. Power Station, uncoln County' NRC Ceneric latter 881tL g

water level taptrument aseodated with Date ofissuance: May 15,1P90 Me,%

MClc to confonu to the at-btill design.

Egeuve date: May 15.1990 Octe of cpplicationfor omendment:

Amendment No. 37 and 4 1

Dak ofissuancr:May 21,1gg6 r

at tien of amendment:%e Focility Opemting Ucense Non Nr*F.

g,. y amen.rcent modities the Technical 39 andNPF41 nis emendment revised

\\'th '

SPecificaticns to reflect the operating the Technical Specifications.

d

$2.

a lim'te for cys.le 12 core nioad.

Date ofin/tio/noticein Federal re Date of/nlu"olaoumin Fedmel Date oflavuonce: May ty.1980 Repetee: March 21.1993(55 FR 10543)

P I"

E#ccura data:Date ofissuance he Commisvion's reistW es atuation of g

ReWeter: July 2Y.1888 (55 Pat 2e291) he Amenda ent No.: Sta the amendment le contained in a Safety Coramlaston's related evolution of the facility Opemuss Dcense No. DPR.

Evaluation dated May 15,1990. -

M AmendeMvised ee Technical No sign @n&sWs Mehn uat dat MeY 21 Speciflcatione.

comments received: No No algnificant hosonis cons (domtion Date ofinitialnoticein rederal LoctdPublic Document Room Register. February 21.1990 (55 FR 6107) location: Pottstown Public Ubrary, 500 locol#ublic Document RGom We Commlacion's related evaluetion of iligh Street. Pottstown, Pennsylvanla loctflon:he VMpaalan Womer Public the amendment la contained in a Safety 19464.

w neon Staat -

Evaluation dated May 17,19su.

PMlalpMa E'idric Capany. Dodet No essmfacont horords consideration y gy.,gg,g go.ggg, u,,,seg lediana Mkhtaa Pourse Ceespanyg comments received: Ne' Gwating Station, Unik 1 and 2.

Dessa Nee 85415 amt e6818. Dounid LocclptiblicDocun:snfRoom Mwsmery County, Penneyhaala G Cook Nue3eer Plasd Unit Nos.1 and locat.'on: Wiecapet Public Ubrary, High 3.Beeries causty.Micktgen Stnet, P.O. Box Sc7, Wiecanet, Maine Date ofopphcotion for amendments:

045 March U M Dateofepp!Icotionfor amendments:

8/iff d**cription of amendments.

December 2,1980 as stipplemented Mohawk Power Corporation, hse amendments chanaed sec March 8 iWSOL et No. 30 2304 Nine Mile Point Briefdescription ofpendments:

Nudear Station, Unit No.1, Oswego 4.;0 B,sses e a a o

9,,

the Noe amendmenu stodify Technical County.New York limitation that for anf,three consecutive Specifications ('lli) oo that Date of application for amendmert' surveillance interval the combined Weetinghous& fuel meesmblies with March 27,1990 time shall not exceed 3.25 times the -

eorichments c.f up to 4.06 weisht percent Brief description of amendment: This specified surveillance interval.

U-2# ma be received. A new amendment revises the Technical Date ofissuance: May 21,1990 Techslea(Specif cation (TS 3/4.9.15) isSpecification to teflect that the normal

.Meun date: y,y 2g, gggo added for both unna to t'equire a position of the drywell and sirpbaolationAme-dment Nos. 38 and 5 reeston mir.imtan boron teocentration in the fuel chamber oxygen sampling line Facility Operating License Nos. NPF; storege Gml whenevecfbal seemblies vaives is open.

39 and NPF41 These amendments with entidment greahat than 3.95 weight Date ofissuance: May 24,1090 revised the Technical Specifications.

percent U-235 and wHh im:nur le=a than Effective dote:May 24.1990 Date ofinitialnotice la Federal 5.5to MVr1DJM1Vurs in the fuel etorage Amendinent' o.: us N

Register: April 18,1990(55 FR14515).

pool, % E8.1.2,5.6.2 and 5.3.1 (for Unit 2 facility Opemting Ucense No. DPA.

Ths Commission's related evaluation of only) am nr.odified to reflect the tu Amendment revises the Technical these amendments is contained in a incr%aed allowable fv=1 enrichtnent. lu Specifications.

Safety Evaluation dated May 21,1990..

siddition the license forboth units is Dore ofinitiolnotice in Federal roodified to reflect a manmum Registen April 20.1990 (55 FR 15041)

No significant horords considerat on tmrichrcent of 4.95 weight nercent U-235 The Commission's related evaluation of comments received: No for fuel etered in apent fuel pool.

the amendment is contained in a Safety LocolPublic Document Iloom Date of t.sserence: May 17.1990 Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

location: Pottstown Public Ubrary, 500 Effective dote: May 17,1900 No,!gr,ificoat borordmanoidemtion fileh Street. Pottstown. Pennsylvania Amandacente Noe.:136 and 121L comments received: No 19464.

24012 Feeleral Reglotae / Vol. 55, No.114 / W:dnesday, June 13, 1990 / N: tiers "hiladelsdais Electree Cesapesy, PuhEc Dose ofirutialaacice in Federet proposed finding of no significant j

Eervice EbscArtc and Ces Company Regiseur: lannary 24.19eo (55 FR 2644) hatards ennsiderst6cn.

Delmarva Power and uglut Comspesy.

The cammisalon's related evaluet6on of Date ofissuance: May 24, lean and Atlantic City Elecar6c Cosmpsey, the stoendment is contained in a Safety LFecthe dote:May 24,1990 Docket No. 50-278 Peach Bostons Evaluation dated May 25.19Wo.

Amendment No.:161 Atomic Powet Station, Unit No. 3, York No significant hasarde considewtion Tccility 0;>ewtir>g Linnse No. DpR.

County.Poonsylvania comments roosked No.

59: Amendment revised the Tec!mical LocalMbc Document Room Spectilcation.

Date of applicationfor amendment:

April 12,1990 as supplemented on May locatforr Portland State Univeratty Date ofinitialtetk.e in Federal 18,1990. The supplementalletter 1.ibrary,934 S.W. liarrison Street. P.O.

Reglaten March 7,1990 ( 3 i$ 8234l %

provided clanfying information related Dox 1151, Portland, Oregon 97207 Commission's related evaluation of the to the licensee's safety evaluation in NRC Pro /ed Directorr lohn T. Larkins, amendment is contained in a Safety support of the requested lleente Acting Evaluation dated May 24.1990.

amendment.W staff has detennined Power Authority of the State of New No significant haroids considemtion comments receked: No that the supplementalinformation does York, Docket No. 38 331, lasses A.

LocoWhc Document Room not affect the proposed no significant fitsPatrks Nuclear Pewse Plant.

location:Ponfield Ubrary, State haretds determination.

Oswego County, New York Briefdescription of amendment;his University College of Oswego. Oswego, amendment changed the Technical Date of opplication for amendmenti New York.

ut Car El c.c as t slon of out se en n

for the B

d cr ion o/cmendrnene N Ins e a o inaccess b e an bbers.

4 em y

pe rfielj ch Se Date ofissuance: May 25,1990 used for degraded voltage conditions to Effectke date: May 25,1990 reflect changes to the reserve station Amendment No.156 transfarmer tap settings wMch are ceing Mate of cyplicationfor mnecdment Focility Opemt.Sp License' o. DPR.

made dudag the current refueling November 20,19ao N

5& Amendment revised the Technical outage.W amendment also removes Brief description of amendment W SpeciPeations.

operating restrictions imposed by the ameruiment revises Technach!

Date ofinitialintice in Federal NRC in Am=Mm=t No.120, which wea Specification 43,1.5 Mata steam 1.ine Registen April 24,1990 (65 Tr417328) issued on November 19,198L

! solation Valves (MSIV). to change the The Commission's relateti 6 raluation of Date ofianuance: May 18,1990 acceptable full closure time far tLe the amendment is contained in a Safety Effecthe data May 18,1900 MS!V from five seconds to neven Evaluation dated May 25,19ea Amendment No. 1e0 seconds.

No aIgnificant hazards consideratim facihty Operesting Licenae Na DP%

Date ofissuance: May 17,1030 comments niceked No SR Amendment revised the Technical Effecthe date: May 17,1990 l

localPublic Document Room Specifloation.

Amendment No.:92 location: Covernment Publications Date ofinitialnotice in Federal Foality Operatirm ixense No. NFF-Section. Stste Uhrary of Pennsylvania, Registen April 4,19eo (55 FR 12308) The

12. Amendment revwee the Tedniaal (REClONA1.DEPOS! TORY) Education Caramission's related eve % tion of the Specifications.

Dullding. Walnut Street and amendment is contained in a d fety Date ofinitselsamtice In Federal Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1001, Evaluation dated May 18,1990.

Registan january 10,1990 (55 FR MO) 1Iarrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105.

No significant hazards considemtion W Commission's related evaluation of comments receked No the amendment is contained in a Safety LocalPubhc Document Roam Evaluetion dated May 17,1990.

sl., I eN

344, an N a locatwn:Penfield Ubrary, State No sigmficant Aazards considemtion Plant, Columbia County.Omgon University College of Oswego, Oswego, comments reaeked: No Date of application for ometodment New York.

LocalPubhc Document Room November 30,1980, as supplernented location Fairfield Caunty Ubrary, January 25,1990 and April 16,1990.W Power Authority of the State of New Carden and Weshington Streets, supplementary information sent by York Docket No. Alames A.

Winnsboro. South Caro!!na 2918a Natrick Nuclear Power Plant, letters of January 25 and Aprille,1900 was clarifying in nature, was within tlie Oswego County, New York Tennessee Valley Authority. DncLat No, 50 327 Sequoyab Nuclear Plant Unit 1 j

scope of the action originally noticed in Date of application for amendment 1".amilton Cosmty Taumosene the Federal Registee, and does not alter January 12,1990, as amended May 4.

the StafTs propoeed No Signiflcent w90.

Date of cpplication for amendment:

liarards Consideration determination.

Briefdescription of amendarne The January 24 w90 as revised by letters Brief description of amendment:b amendment reflects removalof two dated April 25 and May 15.1990 (TS 89-amendment modifies theTechnical primary containment penetrations and 27)

Specificatios requirements for steam thett isolation valves which results from Brief description of amendaunt: %1s f

generators to allow tube trpalt by replacing the present four. channel amendment modifies the Sequoyah sleeving sa an alternative to plugging.

Traversing incore Probe System with a Nuclear Ptant. Unit 1. Technical Date ofissuonce: May 25.1990 new three channej system.The letter of Specifications (TSs).h changes revise i

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.s UNITED STATES SEe[YNeUIe

NUCLSAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20566 neune,. w opriciAt susiwEss L

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE Ust. 6300 i,:

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosure:

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