ML20054J519

Transcript of 820624 Oral Argument in Bethesda,Md.Pp 1-114

ML20054J519
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/24/1982
From:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
To:
References
NUDOCS 8206290166
Download: ML20054J519 (116)

Text

NUCIIAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN @

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD l

l In the Matter of:  :

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.  : DOCKET NO. 50-289 (Three Mile Island, Unit 1)  : (Restart)

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'DATE: June 24, 1982 PAGES: 1 - 114 AT: Bethesda, Maryland 3

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zv Q ALDERSON

) / - (REPORT 1XG 400 Virginia Ave. , S .W. Washibg .c= , D . C. 20024

) Telephene: (202) 554-2345 8206290166 820624 PDR ADOCK 05000289 T PDR

1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD O 4 - ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 5 In the matter of s s 6 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.  : Docket No. 50-289 7 (Three Mile Island, Unit 1) a (Restart) 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 9 4350 East-West Highway 10 Bethesda, Maryland 11 June 24, 1982 12 The oral argument in the above-entitled matter 13 convened, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m.

() 14 BEFORE:

15 GARY J. EDLES, Chairman, 16 Administrative Judge 17 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 18 DR. JOHN H. BUCK, Member 19 Administrative Judge 20 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 21 DR. REGINALD L. GOTCHY, Member 22 Administrative Judge 23 Atomir Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

(:)

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1 APPEARANCES:

2 On behalf of Petitioners, 3 Metropolitan Edison Co., et al.s O 4 ROBERT E. ZAHLEE, Esq.

5 On behalf of Petitioner, 6 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 7 ROBERT A. ADLER 8 On behalf of Respondent, the NRC Staffs 9 JOSEPH R. GRAY 10 11

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3 EL2EL.al 2f.i Pace O 4 ROBERI E. ZAHLER, on behalf of Petitioners, 5 Metropolitan Edison Co., et al. 4 6 ROBERT W. ADLER, on behalf of Petitioner, 7 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 43 8 JOSEPH R. GRAY, on behalf of Respondent, 9 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff 62 10 ROBERT W. ADLER, on behalf of Petitioner, 11 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvinia - rebuttal 85 12 ROBERT E. ZAHLER, on behalf of Petitioners, 13 Metropolitan Edison Co., et al. - rebuttal 104 O 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22g 23 O 24 25 O

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E_E O C E EDING?

2 JUDGE EDLES: Please be seated.

3 For those of you who were not here this O 4 morning, let me introd uce myself. I am Gary Edles. On 5 my right is Dr. John Buck. On my left is Dr. Recinald 6 Gotchy. We are the Board constituted to hear the 7 appeals filed by the Licensee and the Commonwealth of 8 Pennsylvania from that portion of the Licensing Board 9 decision that desis with certain emergency planning 10 issues.

11 The order of appearances and the time 12 allotment for this afternoon's argument are. set out in 13 the printed information at the counsel table.

() 14 Let me make one modification. Mr.'Zahler has 15 advised us that he would like to t:ke 20 minutes for his to affirmative presentation and 25 minutes for his 17 responsive presentation, and we have noted that change.

18 I will now ask each counsel to introduce 19 himself formally for the record, beginning wi th staff 20 counsel.

21 MR. GRAY: I am Joseph R. Gray, counsel for 22 the NRC staff.

23 MR. ZAHLER I am Robert Zahler, counsel for

() 24 Licensee. I am a member of the law firm of Shaw, 25 Pitman, Potts and Trowbridge. With me today is Delissa O

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(} 1 Ridgway from our office and Pat McCoy, who will be a 2 third year law student at Boalt Hall and who is clerking 3 with our law firm this summer.

O 4 MR. ADLER: My name is Robert W. Adler. I 5 represent the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

6 JUDGE EDLES: We will begin with Mr. Z'ahler.

7 You have 20 minutes.

8 ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS, 9 METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., ET AL.

10 MR. ZAHLER: May it please the Boards 11 I have an introductory statement which I hope 12 will frame the issue with respect to Licensee's 13 exception, and then I would like to address two separate

() 14 points that relste to that exception.

15 Licensee has tremendous personnel resources 16 available to it. The issue raised by Licensee 's 17 exception is how best to deploy and use those 18 resources. In making the decision how best to deploy 19 and use the resources available to it, Licensee 20 considered the particular talents of the people 21 currently available to it.

22 There is nothing magical about Li ce nsee 's 23 proposed organization. It represents what in Licensee's

() 2,4 judgment is the best use of the talents available to 25 it. And in making the assignment of people, the O

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5 1 keystone of Licensee's decision was that you put so m eon e 2 with substantial operating experience in a control 3 room.

O 4 The second basic tenet of Licensee's decision,

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5 at least with respect to making protective action 6 recommendations, is that from the point of view of a 7 Licensee or a utility the most crucial piece of 8 information in making protective action recommendations 9 is the current sta tus of the plant and, even more 10 importantly, the future status of the plant. What 11 releases are at the present time is important, but the 12 crucial issue is, what are potential or likely releases 13 in the future.

() 14 The answer to that question in ~1arge measure 15 depends upon operational experience. Therefore, from 16 Licensee's point of view the most important piece of 17 information with respect to asking protective action 18 recommendations is the ability to assess current plant 19 conditions and to predict f uture or likely plant 20 conditions.

21 With respect to placing the senior operational 22 person in the control room, the third element of our 23 consideration is that you relieve that person only by

(} 24 senior, experienced and mature company personnel. That 25 is, when you transfer that function offsite to another O

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{} 2 1 location, the important f act you want to highlight is that the person you charge with taking responsibility 3 for protective action recommendations has the maturity O 4 to recognize that he does not have the crucial 5 information personally available to him. He has to rely 6 on other people and on othe readings to get that plant 7 information, and he therefore must have the experience 8 to recognize the limitation of information available to 9 him and act on that basis.

10 I wouldd suggest to you that that capability 11 is one that is exercised only by senior and mature 12 company management personnel. You may have the 13 brightest whiz kid around, but if he hasn 't had the

( 14 experience to realize the potential limitations on the 15 information available to him he may jump to a conclusion 16 or may act too quickly and not reach the proper 17 recommendation.

18 Considering these factors, then, Licensee 19 determined that for the function of making protective 20 action recommendations during the early hours of an 21 emergency, when the potential for confusion is highest 22 --

I'm not going to say it's Joing to exist, but when 23 the potential for confusion is highest -- you put a

() 24 person with substantial operating experience in the 25 control room and you task him with making O

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recommendations for protective action.

Quite frankly, that is in sharp contrast to 3 the staff's position. The staff says, within one hour O 4 you move tha t f unction of f site.

5 You can look at the most recent piece of paper 6 the staff filed. You can look throughout the entire 7 record of this proceeding. I suggest you could ask Mr.

8 Gray this afternoon. You won't find one piece of 9 evidence to support the conclusion that making 10 protective action recommendations is better done offsite 11 than in the control room.

12 It's a judgment call, and the staff doesn't 13 have any evidence in support of it.

() 14 JUDGE EDLES: That would be true even eight or 15 ten hours after the accident begins?

1 16 MR. ZAHLER: It's true forever. You're right, 17 Chairman Edles. The question is, at some point into the

( 18 accident is it likely that people will have a sufficient 19 handle on the facts that if you were going to transfer i

20 that function offsite it makes sense to do it at that l

l 21 point in time. -

22 Licensee's plan says we expect that at the 23 four-hour point we will tra nsf er tha t f unction of fsite.

24 That's based on two factors. I will readily concede

({}

25 there are two competing factors: One, we think that's O

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() 1 long enough in to the accident that if there is confusion 2 there will be sufficient people around so that one can 3 minimize the confusion.

()

4 But second - - a rid we readily concede this --

5 the senior, mature management people we would like in 6 that offsite facility cannot be there any quicker than 7 four hours. But even if they get there, let's suppose 8 an accident happened at TMI tomorrow and let's suppose 9 that the senior management people that we would like are 10 on site, so tha t they could be there immediately.

11 Licensee 's plan and procedure specifically 12 state that the offsite person doesn't assume 13 responsibility at some arbitrary point in time. He 14 assumes that responsibility only after he has made the 15 decision that he is fully up to speed with respect to 16 the accident both in terms of the history, what is '

17 currently happening, and the projections of what will 18 happen in the future.

19 And if, because of the circumstances of the 20 accident, that offsite senior manager is of the view 21 that he is not up to speed to accept th a t 22 responsibility, he will be in the EOF but he will not 23 have declared his readiness as the emergency support

() 24 director and he will not have assumed that 25 responsibility.

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JUDGE EDLES4 Is that true even after the four

(]) 1 2 hours?

3 MR. ZAHLER: I am saying there is a situation 4 where it is conceivable that at the four-hour point, if 5 the emergency support director was of the conclusion 6 tha t he was not up to speed, he would not assume that 7 function. I suggest to you that this is a basic tenet 8 of turnover procedures.

9 JUDGE BUCK: Let me ask one question about 10 that. I agree with you that the conditions of the plant 11 and tha t sort of thing should come into this, but you 12 put it as though it was going to be a decision of your 13 senior corporate official who comes into the emergency

) 14 operating facility and, after a half hour or so, he 15 says, I as ready.

16 I would like to know if that is his decision 17 alone, or is this subject to some approval on the part 18 of the emergency director, who knows whether or not 19 there is a critical situation, that the plant can go one 20 way or the other at that particular moment, and he says, 21 I don't want to send it over to you for the moment, we 22 have to clea r up a few things first. Is that feasible 23 and is it an allowable situation under your plan?

() 24 MR. ZAHLER: Dr. Buck, I have inquired 25 specifically to that question. My understanding of how O

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1 it would work is that the emergency support director, 2 the offsite person, is the sole person with respect to 3 which that decision, responsibility for that decision, 4 rests. That is, even declaring his readiness.

5 He will, however, consider the recommendation 6 of the onsite emergency director, and we would expect 7 that if the emergency director says things are not 8 appropriate to transfer offsite, that will weigh 9 heavily. I can't tell you presumptively or 10 conclusively, but it will weigh heavily in the decision 11 of the offsite person before he declares his readiness.

12 That's an additional factor why we believe a 13 mature and experienced company manager person should 3 -

14 fill that position.

15 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Zahler, let me ask you 16 this. If we should determine that offsite 17 responsibility should start within an hour or right at 18 an hour, I appreciate that at the moment your client may 19 not have a nature, experienced manager capable of taking 20 that on, except if he comes down from New Jersey. But 21 why couldn't you then find someone who could have the 22 maturity, the background, the technical training, 23 whatever else is necessary, so that we could accommodate 24 not only your concerns but the other concern about the 25 one hour?

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() 1 MB. ZAHLERs Mr. Chairman, we could and we 2 will. Let me tell you what I understand to be the

- 3 company 's position if we lose on this appeal. The G

4 company intends to transfer its present number one 5 priority emergency director, Mr. Hukill, who is the vice 6 president-TMI, and designate him as the emergency 7 support director, and replace him on the staff of 8 emergency directors with another qualified person. And 9 ve would supplement the emergency support director 10 roster in a similar fashion.

11 That is part of my argument. We could have 12 done that yesterday. The company, however, believes 13 that it's amergency response will not be as effective if -

%- 14 ve do that. That is the bottom line.

15 JUDGE BUCKa Let me get this cleared up. It's 16 the company's philosophy, as I understand the 17 sta tem en ts , the affidavits, and so on, that they feel 18 that in the early hours of the accident that the 19 protective guidance situation is best done from the 20 reactor building itself, the control room or wherever it 21 is that the emergency director sits.

22 Now, if that is the case I am concerned -- and l 23 I can understani t'aat philosophy, that's the best place

() 24 to do it. But I am now concerned about somebody coming 25 in from the outside, be it a top official or a non-top O

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() 1 official, who takes over the emergency support 2 situation, and he pulls rank on the men in the control 3 room.

4 And perhaps the man doesn't quite explain the 5 true emergency that they are going through at that 6 particular moment. Say it's in three hours or three and 7 a half hours, and at that time he gets the control of 8 the protective action situs tion, when it might be a very 9 critical time in the accident, when something new may to come up, when immediate reaction has to be made towards 11 protective guidance.

12 Is the emergency director from tha t point on 13 barred from calling PEM A with a protective action 14 recommendation?

15 MR. ZAHLER If the emergency support director 16 has assumed that responsibility, the answer to your 17 question, Dr. Buck, is yes. There is a colloquy in the 18 transcript where that specific question was raised, l

! 19 where it was initially raised, and I can give you the

(

20 cite when I come up the second time.

21 We didn't have an answer and Chairman Smith 22 directed us to go back and get an answer. And a few 23 hundred pages later in the transcript Mr. Rogan

() 24 testifies, and what he says is, when the emergency 25 support director declares his readiness he assumes total O

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() 1 responsibility.

2 The principle behind tha t is there is only one 3 commander in chief.

4 JUDGE BUCK: But you are making a case here l 5 that the best place in the early hours of tha t accident 6 to initiate protective action guidance is the control 7 room.

8 MR. ZAHLERs That's correct.

9 JUDGE BUCK 4 'Now you are telling me that your 10 top officer comes trotting in there after half an hour i

11 after the accident and that he can take over. How can 1 12 this be if the company firmly believes that the best i 13 place in the early hours, when things are changing

()

14 rapidly, that the best place for protective guidance 15 notification is the control roon?

16 MR. ZAHLER Dr. Buck, that is our presumptive 17 position. Without knowing the specifics of any i

18 situation, the company comes to a conclusion based on 19- its experience in running drills and the TMI accident 20 that the best place to make that decision is in the 21 control room. .

22 But scenarios differ. Situations differ. If 23 the emergency support director arrives on the site

) 24 earlier than four hours and can determine that he can 25 assume those responsibilities to make protective action ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINtA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

14 O 1 re=o =end,tiene in an efficient wer, then he w111 de 2 that.

3 But the corrolary to that is that if he 4 determines he cannot, then he won't assume those 5 responsibilities.

6 JUDGE BUCKa My problem is, here we are say an 7 hour and a half or two hours into the accident. It may 8 be a very critical time. It's likely to be. It wa s a t 9 THI-2 a particularly critical time.

10 This man comes in and he has all the 11 confidence of a top official that he can handle 12 anything, okay. So he says, well, I'm going to take , . -

13 over at this point. Now, it seems to me that if that O 14 can happen then you really don't believe that in the 15 early hours of the accident tha t the control room is the 16 best place to handle this.

17 HR. ZAHLER: That conclusion doesn't 18 necessarily follow. What we are saying is that in our 19 e xpecta tion, without knowing the facts of the situation, 20 we would prefer to have the decision come from the 21 control room.

22 What we are also saying is, if the situation 4

23 is not as severe as we think, if the accident is well O 24 understood -- end 1et me give zou en exempre --

25 JUDGE BUCK. Who makes that decision?

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15 1 MR. ZAHLER: The emergency support director, 2 the offsite guy.

, 3 JUDGE BUCK How can he make that decision?

O 4 HR. ZAHLER: Dr. Buck, we really view it as a 5 consultative decision. He is going to talk to the 6 emergency director. You are assuming that he is without j 7 good reason going to overrule a recommendation from his 8 emergency director.

9 The basic reason why I told you we wanted a 10 senior guy offsite even in making protective action 11 recommendations is, he has the maturity to understand 12 that he doesn't have first-hand knowledge and he has to 13 rely on the emergency director. He's going to do that O 24 for .aking protective ection reco..endations and he's 15 going to do that in terms of declaring his readiness, 16 too.

17 I agree with you, if the guy unreasonably 18 takes responsibility too early in the accident it's 19 wrong, a potential catastrophe. On the other hand, you 20 have to balance that against having a clear chain of 21 command. Everyone knows who they report to and there 22 isn't any confusion during the hectic moments of an 23 accident is to who reports to whom and who has 24 responsibility.

25 JUDGE BUCK: Well, you see, Mr. Zahler, what O

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C 1 is bothering me is the way you are putting it this now 2 becomes a matter of ranking of people, whether it's 3 important that the protective action guides be made at 4 the control panel, the control room, or whether it is 5 out at the EOF.

6 That is entirely different in my mind from 7 where he appeared in you first statements and in the 8 Licensee statements in the beginning here; that the best 9 place to make the protective action guidance in the 10 first part of the accident was right there at the 11 control room, where all of the information was there, 12 you had a big support group, and the emergency director 13 was there, who knows the plant, he knows the reactor, 14 and has everything in his favor to be able to make that 15 decision quickly and correctly.

16 Now, however, you are telling me, that's fine, 17 but if we have a senior official who comes into the 18 emergency facility, he may not be as f amiliar with that 19 reactor, but that's all right, he's a senior official so 20 ve will put that burden on him.

/

21 MR. ZAHLER: Dr. Buck, where I disagree with 22 you is our emergency support directors are not just any 23 senior official pulled out of the air. Without any O 24 diere oect to the chairman of the board of cru, he i-25 not an emergency support director. He happens to be a O

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() 1 financial whiz, but he doesn't know much about nuclear 2 power plants.

3 The emergency support directors that we have 4 designated are not just the highest guy in the company, l 5 they are senior management people with nuclear 6 experience. They may not have as much operational 7 experience, but they have lots of nuclear experience.

8 JUDGE EDLES: Your basic argument then is, 9 given his naturity and h'is background, the minimum 10 likelihood of there being any wrong transfer decision is 11 if you want until the senior official gets down there to 12 help parti:1pate in that decision?

13 ' HR. ZAHLER: That's correct.

14 JUDGE GOTCHYs Mr. Zahler, I had a question 15 with regard to this nature and experienced company 16 person in the control room. Isn't it true that 17 according to the plan as I read it, that the person who 18 becomes the emergency director in the event of the onset 19 of an emergency is not the senior personnel; it is 20 either the shift supervisor or, if he is not available, j 21 it is the shift foreman?

22 This people will presumably have hands-on 23 operating experience, but nevertheless they are not

( () 24 necessarily the kind of nature, experienced company 25 person you are talking about, and they could be there O

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() 1 for as long as an hour, isn't that right?

2 MR. ZAHLER That's correct, Dr. Go tch y . But 3 let me explain the situation. They are the people who 4 immediately declare the emergency and become emergency 5 director. If we are talking about the day shift, where 6 in fact the vice president of TMI is on site, he will 7 become emergency director in a matter of minutes.

8 If we are talking about the back shift, the 9 shift supervisor is the most senior person at the 10 plant. So in any case, what we are saying is we are 11 res ting responsibility with the operational people that 12 have experience, are the most senior people in the 13 plant.

14 We would expect during the day shift, where 15 the vice president of TMI is readily available, that he l

16 will become emergency director very quickly.

17 JUDGE GOTCHYa Would you argue that a shift 18 supervisor or a shift foreman is a kind of person that 19 you would feel confortable with making a protective 20 action recommendation?

21 MR. ZAHLER: Definitely. They are trained to 22 do it, and on the back shift they are going to have to 23 do it. There is no one else available, and we, train

() 24 them to do that and we have confidence in their ability 25 to carry out that function.

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19 O ' aUo=E suck. ner we switch tracks e 11tt1e bit 2 here? I would like to get into some of the things that 3 you said in a recent submittal to us on the people that 4 you have in the EOF. There seems to be some discrepancy S between the people that you have, say, in your Licensee 6 Exhibit 58 and one of the pager in your recent 7 submittal, which is number EPIP-100427.

8 This may be a matter of names, but the names 9 are different. I would li.A to know which you are going 10 to follow and why. May I read the list to you. Under 11 58, number one was the emergency support staff 12 representative. Over on EPIP it's emergency support 13 director. Okay.

O 14 HR. ZAHLER: Let me back up. There is an 15 inconsistencI in titles. Let me tell you who are the 16 same people.

17 The emergency support member, staff member, is 18 what's called the assistant emergency support director 19 in the procedure. They're the same person.

20 JUDGE BUCK: Oh, that is the number two on the 21 1004, right?

22 MR. ZAHLER: Yes.

23 JUDGE BUCK: Okay. So he is the one who will O 24 get to the p1ent in en heur2 .

25 NR. ZAHLER: That's correct.

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() 1 2

JUDGE BUCK: Can you tell me at what level of management that person is?

3 MR. ZAHLER: At the present time it's a senior

() 4 engineering, plant engineering staff member, a senior 5 person from the training department, and I can't 6 remember who the third one is, but when I stand up again 7 I will have that inf orma tion f or you.

8 JUDGE BUCK: These are alternates, so if one 9 isn 't svsilsble the other is?

10 MB. ZAHLER: That's right. We have a 11 three-person duty roster for each position.

12 JUDGE BUCK: But in any case, the other people .

13 who are going to report to the EOF will know who that

) 14 man is?

15 MR. ZAHLERs Yes. The roster is published 16 either weekly or monthly. Everyone knows who it is.

17 JUDGE BUCKa Okay. He is charged with the 18 responsibility of coordinating the activities of the 19 others a t the EOF during the period from the time he 20 arrives until the support director arrives, is that 21 correct?

22 MR. ZAHLERs That's correct.

23 JUDGE BUCK a All right. Going on down the 24 list here, you have number two on Exhibit 58, an

(])

25 emergency preparedness department representative. I

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() 1 don't see another name like it.in 1004.

2 MR. ZAHLER: That's correct. He is not in 3 that procedure. The emergency preparedness department 4 representative does not have any online responsibility.

5 He is essentially there as an adjunct to ensure that the 6 emergency plan is being implemented correctly.

7 JUDGE BUCKS But he's not considered one of 8 the six key people?

9 MR. ZAHLERa No, he is considered one of the 10 six key people. Dr. Buck, let me explain part of your 11 problem, which is no board has yet authorized us, has 12 accepted our concept of operations in Licensee Exhibit 13 58. And therefore if an emergency were to happen 14 tomorrow wa wouldn 't f ollow Licensee Exhibit 58. That 15 hasn't been approved.

16 What we are going to follow is the procedure 1

17 that's set forth there. The procedure that was enclosed 1

18 with the affitavits provides guidance to you as to how 19 these functions are going to be fulfilled. Licensee 20 Exhibit 58 as what we a re proposing, what we proposed to 21 the Licensinc Board and wha t we are now proposing to 22 this Board. Ile would like you to accept it.

23 You are not going to find a one to one

() 2,4 correspondence between it and the presently existing 25 procedure.

O l

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22 1 JUDGE BUCKa All right. What you are saying 2 is, if you win this appeal you will go on EPIP-1004, 3 right?

4 MR. ZAHLERs Well, 10,004.27 will be revised 5 to conform to Licensee Exhibit 58 in all respects.

6 JUDGE BUCKS It will be revised to conform, I 7 see. So if you vin this appeal, your listing would be 8 under Licensee Exhibit 58?

9 MR. ZAHLER That's correct.

10 JUDGE BUCK: So that drops off. For example, f 11 the group leader, chemical, chemistry suppor t --

12 MR. ZAHLER: The group leader, chemistry 13 support, would still report to the EOF, but we are not O 14 committing that he would be there within an hour.

15 JUDGE BUCKS Ehy not?

16 HR. ZAHLER: In the functions that we 17 determined, after listening to all of the evidence in 18 the proceeding th'at the staff wanted at the EOF, we 19 didn't believe that additional offsite chemistry support 20 was needed within one hour. There is onsite chemistry 21 support available.

22 JUDGE BUCK 4 Okay. Now, you do ha ve, however, 23 the environmental assessment command center 24 representative?

25 MR. ZAHLER: That's correct.

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23 1 JUDGE BUCKa And you hnve the technical

(])

2 functions group representative?

3 MR. ZAHLERs That's co:. rect.

,O 4

JUDGE LUCK: And the Communications department 5 representative?

6 HR. ZAHLEP That's correct.

7 JUDGE BUCK And a primary communicator?

3 BR. ZAHLER: Yes, tha t 's correct.

9 JUDGE BUCK: Okay. So you will start out, 10 then, with the six key people as listed in Licensee 11 Exhibit 587 12 MR. ZAHLER: Yes.

13 JUDGE BUCK: Under your philosophy, what do 14 you see as the major function of the EOF during the 15 first one to three hours, or one to four hours, shall we 16 say?

17 HR. ZAHLER The major function of the EOF 18 during that period and later into the accident is as a 19 support organization to the onsite staff. During those l

20 first one to three hours, we would expect tha t they 1 21 would be geared up, the data links would be put into 22 place, they would come up to speed with respect to the 23 accident and would begin logistical support to prepare

() 24 for a potential long-term response to the accident.

25 They would answer any specific questions and inquiries O .

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() 2 I that the onsite staff might have in the acess of technical functions or radiological assessment.

3 JUDGE BUCK 4 Do they send out the monitoring O 4 teams?

5 MR. ZAHLER: No. The monitoring teams 6 initially are dispatched from the plant site itself. At 7 some point into the acciden t, responsibility is 8 transferred to' what is called the environmental 9 assessment command center, which happens to be where the 10 company's environmental group is located. It happens to 1

11 be at Olmstead Airport. They have lots of fancy 12 in-place equipment that is not easily moved around.

13 When the head of the environmental assessment 14 command center declares his readiness, he' picks up a 1

15 dedicated telephone telephone line to the radiological 16 assessment coordinator in the control room, tells him, I 17 am now taking responsibility in this area, and then 18 directs the positioning of the mobile teams. But the i 19 mobile teams are still dispatched from the plant site 20 itself.

21 Now, he may also dispatch some additional 22 mobile teams from his facility, but to meet the NRC's 23 minimum requirements we don't rely on those.

() 24 JUDGE BUCKa Okay. So your initial mobile 25 monitoring teams are basically present at the reactor at s

O

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25 i

() 1 all times, is that correct?

2 MR. ZAHLER: Yes, sir.

3 JUDGE BUCKa And they are dispatched 4 initially. How.many go out, two or three teams, 5 something like that?

6 MR. ZAHLER: We have the capability f or two 7 teams initially.

8 JUDGE BUCK: Two teams, and then more people 9 come into your other center and get sent out as soon as 10 they arrive?

11 MR. ZAHLER: . Initially, more people come to 12 the plant and get sent out from the plant, and then even 13 more people come to this offsite facility.

O' 14 JUDGE BUCKa Where do they report at the 15 plant?

16 MR. ZAHLER: They report to the operational 17 support center, which is the radiological controls 18 area. And that's essentially a mustering point for all 19 personnel who don't have assignments.

20 JUDGE BUCKS Okay. That part I didn't 21 understand. I understand now.

22 MR. ZAHLER: If I could briefly take two 23 sinutes just to aske my last two points. One was with

() 24 respect to staffing. If we took the emergency director 25 in our present plant and moved him to the EOF and we O

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26 I took the person that we call sn operations coordinator

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2 and designated him emergency director, we would comply 3 in every respect with what the staf f wants.

O 4 JUDGE EDLES: I will ask the staff to pick up 5 on this, but that is not the way I read at least th e 6 Licensing Board's decision in this. I read their 7 decision as requiring a transfer of the responsibility, 8 but not the individual necessarily. Is that right or 9 vrong?

10 MR. ZAHLER: I think you are correct in 11 reading their decision. I have never figured out 12 whether they were telling us that we could not do what I 13 just proposed to you. I don't read it at that.

14 JUDGE EDLES: But I think they are saying that l 15 you need not do it that way.

l l 18 MR. ZAHLER: That's my reading of it, that's 17 correct, that we need not do it that way. All I am 18 saying is, if we did it that way we would comply in 19 every respect with what the staff wants and the 20 operations coordinator would have the appropriate 21 training for the functions that remain to be done, so 22 that we could do it.

23 And I tell you this just to highlight that it

() 24 isn't a resource limitation. The Licensing Board 25 thought it was and they are wrong.

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() 1 JUDGE EDLES: I appreciate that.

2 MR. ZAHLER: The second point I want to make 3 is in response to the Commonwealth's position in their 4 brief. Let me point out first of all that as I read the S Licensing Board decision, while they identified the 6 Commonwealth as opposing us, they did not rely on the 7 reasons advanced by the Commonwealth for transferring 8 the function offsite.

9 Just two brief points of history. When we to initially litigsted this issue, or when we initially 11 formulated this position, Licensee spoke to the 12 Commonwealth and got their approval. The concept of 13 operations was worked out jointly and the Commonwealth

( 14 agreed that we did not need to put an emergency support 15 director offsite within one hour, and Miss Reilly so 16 testified in her testimony.

17 At a later point in time the Commonwealth 18 changed their position. I accept that they can change 19 their position, but let me point out that we didn 't knov 20 sbout it until the second to the last day of the 21 hearing. It is based on.the testimony of a single state 22 person, based on his particular experience at one drill 23 and one exercise. And while he may be an experienced

() 24 nuclear engineer, he has no background in management or l 25 responsibility.

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() 1 Finally, we have provided for direct contact l

2 with the sta te. Regardless of how you do it, there is 3 going to be a telephone call there. Either we put the O 4 emergency support director offsite, he talks face to 5 face with the state representative, but the information 6 they talk about came from the control room across the 7 telephone link , so he's getting second-hand information 8 across the telephone link.

9 The alternative, which is set forth in our to affidavit, is that the state representative is at the 11 EOF and he can speak directly to the person in the 12 control room across the telephone link and find out 13 about plant operations.

( 14 N ow, I understand that the state hasn't had 15 experience in that concept of operations because in the 16 drill, the one drill where the state fully participated 17 tha t we ran, the energency support director was there 18 quickly. But I would suggest to you that is not a 19 reason to say our proposal is not an appropriate way of 20 doing it.

21 The last point is, the state, despite tellino 22 us that they want the emergency support director at the 23 EOF within one hour to spesk to, has not committed to

() 24 send their nuclear engineer to the EOF, and if they 25 believe that f ace to f ace responsibility is tha t O

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() 1 important I would have expected them to mak e that 2 commitment.

3 JUDGE EDLES. I know Dr. Gotchy has a couple O 4 of questions, but let me follow up on one little item 5 here. I am not disagreeing with you that your proposal 6 is an appropriate proposal. My problem is that the NRC 7 has weighai and bsisneed the same conflicting factorsa 8 the congestion in the control room, the need for direct 9 face to face contact, presumably, with the stste and 10 local officials, the need to communicate information 11 from the control room to the of fsite f acility.

12 All of those factors went into their 13 decision. Now, in 50.47, while I appreciate it is not l

( 14 very detailed, nevertheless it requires the 15 establishment of onsite and offsite facilities. Why 16 shouldn 't I inf er f rom tha t tha t in the balance of all 17 of these decisions the Commission at least has .

18 determined that these two facilities should be set up, 19 and why shouldn't I infer that they intend for those to 20 be set up as promptly as possible and fully staffed?

21 MR. ZAHLER Chairman Edles, I would answer 22 that by telling you that I think you might be correct in 23 saying thst the Commission impliedly said that if what 24 you had in front of you was the minimum staffing set

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25 forth in 0654, which was the minimum staffing in front O

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30 1 of the Commission when they set up those regulations.

)

2 The problem I have with that -- and I am not 3 saying that's not an acceptable approach. The problem I O 4 have with that is it hasn't considered the way Licensee 5 has staffed its organization. And given that the 6 regulation says "have offsite facilities," we have them 7 and they are functioning. They are not just empty 8 shells. ~

9 Mr. Chesnut's testimony implies that it's an 10 empty shell, but it isn't. They are functioning. But 11 we think that function is better done on site and I 12 don't read the regulations to preclude that.

13 JUDGE EDLES Okay. But my problem is, as a

() 14 subordinate body I am bound by not only the words of the 15 regulation but what I perceive to be reasonable 16 inferences drawn from that regulation. I may not 1

17 disagree with you that your plan may even be better, but 18 as I authorized as an Appeal Board member to adopt your 19 plan? Or tell me how I can adopt your plan if, as you 20 tell me, yours is an appropria te reading and the 21 Commission's is an appropriate reading?

22 MR. ZAHLER: So long as our plan is not 23 inconsistent with the words of the regulation, you have

(} 24 the authority to bless it. And I don't think anyone has-25 pointed out how our plan is inconsistent with any part O

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() 1 of the regulations.

2 Let me give to you a hypothetical which is a 3 question I did not ask at the hearing, but I should have 4 asked at th e hearing. The hypothetical is -- and it is 5 to Mr. Chesnut, the staff witness -- which would you 8 prefer, Licensee's plan as it is or a plan that had a 7 minim um stsffing of just ten people on site but had an 8 emergency support director all by himself offsite?

9 JUDGE EDLESa' But counsel, that is really a to hypothetical that is almost a reductio ad absurdum.

I 11 MR. ZAHLER: I would hope so.

12 JUDGE EDLES: I would commend you for putting 13 more people around and making them available. But that 14 doesn't really, I think, get to the question that I am 15 raising, which is that I think the reasonable inference, 18 or I na suggesting -- I haven't decided, but I am 17 suggesting -- that a reasonable inference from the 18 Cosmission's reguistions is that they expect both i

19 offsite and onsite facilities to be set up as promptly l 20 and possibly fully staffed.

l 21 And your client is to be fully commended 22 because it can do it within an hour.

l 23 NR. ZAHLER: As a lawyer, I would disagree

() 24 with your reading of the regulation.

I don't know that 25 I have any other answer to you. I don ' t think the C)

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32 regulation requires that, and if it does then I think

(]) 1 2 the Commission should be apprised of that, because there 3 is something wrong if you come to the conclusion that 4 our approach is better but the regulation precludes you 5 from doing it.

6 I don't see that in the regulation at all.

7 The regulation is purposefully general. The emergency 8 pisnning is different in some respects from every other 9 one of the Commission's regulations. The notion.that 10 the Commission would direct a particular concept of l

11 operations I don't believe can be read in the 1

12 regulations.

13 To the contrary, if you read the statement of 14 considerations that went with the regulations you will 15 see every place that the Commission bent over backwards 16 trying to say, we are being flexible, we are allowing 17 for room here, there and everyplace. And there is 18 nothing in the regulation that is inconsistent.

19 JUDGE EDLES: Okay. I think I have your 20 point. I don't want to unduly infringe on Dr. Gotchy's 21 time.

22 JUDGE GOTCHY Thank you.

23 Mr. Zahler, I had some questions about the

() 24 Rogan affilsvit. As I read it, it says on page 4 that 25 the EOF will be fully functional within one hour after O

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() 1 notification that a site emergency has been declared.

2 And then I read item 6 on that page, which looks to me 3 like the Licensee has no intention of allowing anyone 4 except the emergency director to make any decisions 5 regarding protective action recommendations for the 6 general public.

7 Now, that's consistent with what I read in the 8 GPU emergency plan, which says that, as a matter of 9 fact, that that responsibility can't even be delegated 10 to anyone else.

11 Now, would you reconcile the reading of the 12 Rogan affidavit and Licensee Exhibit 30, which is your 13 emergency plan, with what you're telling me with regard 14 to an emergency support director coming out and taking 15 over whenever he feels ready?

16 NR. ZAllLER: Yes. The statement saying that 17 this function can't be delegated by the emergency 18 director is there because the staff requires it there.

19 NUREG-0654 requires a single individual be designated by 20 Licensee to make protective action recommendations to 21 the sta te . Now, that function can be transferred among 22 people, but at any point in time it has to be one guy.

23 What we are saying is it's the emergency

() 24 director until he's relieved by the energency support 25 director. We sa y if the EOF is fully functional they're O

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30 1 going to provide assistance and recommendations, but it 2 has to be funneled through one guy and that one guy is 3 the. emergency director until the emergency support O 4 director takes over, and then he is the one guy, and all 5 input and recommendation, ideas and advice get funneled 6 through him. And the staff requires that.

7 JUDGE BUCK: You are talking about a staff 8 delegation, then, that is not allowed? You are talking 9 about a delegation to the man's staff?

10 MR. ZAHLER: That's right. He could not 11 delegate to his staff the responsibility for making that 12 protective action recommendation. If there is any 13 confusion, that is what the emergency plan is meant to 14 say.

15 JUDGE BUCKa Okay?

16 JUDGE GOTCHY: Okay. Let's consider that on 17 the Rogan affidavit on page 4 it says communication 18 between the emergency operations f acility personnel and 19 the emergency director will be through the emergency 20 director's hotline, but that will go through the 21 emergency support staff member, according to that 22 thino. Thit is presumably, early in the game, the 1 23 assistant emergency support director.

O 24 na. ziatta, someoae n s to a te1evao e 25 lines and be responsible for controlling that. What we O .

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35 are saying is, the emergency support staff member is the

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1 2 quy tasked with the responsibility to control the EOF 3 end of the emergency director's hot line.

4 But let me' point out, elsewhere in that 5 affidavit -- and this was specifically addressed by the 6 company's highest level of management -- th ey expect in 7 appropriate situations that the state's representative 8 will pick up the end of the emergency director's hot 9 line and talk to the emergency director, and they accept 10 that.

11 JUDGE GOTCHYa It says that on page 7. I was 12 getting to that next.

13 HR. ZAHLER But someone has to be talked with 14 the responsibility for controlling that telephone. That 15 is the emergency support staff member.

16 JUDGE GOTCHYs It says also that the emergency 17 suppc.rt director -- and this is in the Rogan affidavit 18 -- if the emergency support director had been present 19 instead of the emergency director, " formulating and 20 transmitting the ;rotective action recommendations to 21 the sta te, the emergency support director would have 22 performed that function."

23 Now, again -- well, I guess you have already

() 24 answered that. It is a question of whether or not the 25 responsibility, according to the emergency plan on page O

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36 i 1 5-8, whether or not that responsibility could be 2 delegated. You are saying that it could be assumed, but 3 not delegated, okay.

O 4 Just out of curiosity, wha t is the f unction of 5 the public affsirs guy who is going to be at the EOF? I 6 understood that you have the media center at the 7 Crawford Station. What is the function of the Crawford 8 Sta tion if the public affairs representative is at the 9 EOF? You're not planning on having any media 10 conferences or anything of that nature at the EOF 7 11 MR. ZAHLER: No. The conferences where the 12 media would go would be at the Crawf ord Station, and 13 Appendix B to the emergency plan provides information to 14 the public media to know to go there.

15 The public information or public affairs 16 representative at the EOF is an information gatherer.

17 There is lots of information at the EOF. He is to get 18 that information together and, for example, to draft 19 press releases for the company that would be released 20 from the Crawford Station. His job is to get technical 21 information, primarily, radiological too, not just 22 operations, and get that information together.

23 One of the lessons the company learned is that O 24 ene oustic ff it- nd oustic te1 tioas veo 1e =eeaed to 25 have access to the information firsthand to be able to O

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37 Q 1 respond to the media, and that's why they put that guy 2 at the EOF.

3 It turns out that in lower level accidents, 4 that is in unusual events and alerts, that person 5 actually will be in the plant, but at the higher level 6 he may then move over to the EOF.

7 JUDGE GOTCHY: Okay. Going to your EPIP 8 1004.34, Revision 2, which deals with the activation of 9 the GPU Parsippany technical support center. You have 10 in there the emergency support director listed whose 11 responsibility it is to activate the Parsippany

, 12 technical support center. Is that the same emergency 13 support director who is supposed to be on his way to the 14 emergency operations facility at the site?

15 MR. ZAHLER: No.

16 JUDGE GOTCHY: You have two emergency support 17 directors?

18 MR. ZAHLER: This is one where I may want to 19 con sult with my client and get back to you later. If it 20 says emergency support director, it is intended to mean 21 the emergency support director at Parsippany. It is not 22 the guy who is at the EOF. They are very separate 23 people.

O 24 a6DGE GOTCHY, I wanted to make sure they were 25 two separate people, because they can't, obviously, be ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345

38

() 1 in two places at the same time.

2 According to your original emergency plan on 3 page S-7, the emergency director, among other things, is 4 to organize, direct and coordinate emergency teams.

5 Does that mean that he does this both onsite as well as 6 offsite?

7 MR. ZAHLER: The answe r is yes, b ut those 8 responsibili' ties -- and I hope they're not ones that he 9 can 't delegate -- he's the guy ultimately responsible 10 for the teams. But that's something, for example, that 11 the operations support coordinator is directly 12 responsible for, which is getting the people together 13 and dispatching them.

O 14 He would probably take his directions where to l

15 dispatch on-plant people from either the operations 16 coordina+.or, who is in charge of the plant generally, or 17 the technical support center coordinator, who might want 18 a particular meter reading someplace. And for offsite 19 teams he would take that direction from the radiological 20 assessment coordinator or from the environmental 21 assessment coordinator.

22 If you'll look at the organization chart, 23 you'll see tha t the operations support center, the teams

() 24 have dashed lines to like the radiological assessment 25 coordinator, which is to indicate that he tells him O

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{} 1 where to do it but the person actually responsible for 2 getting the people together and sending them out is 3 somewhat dif ferent.

4 JUDGE GOTCHY Okay. That's all the questions 5 I have.

6 JUDGE EDLESa Dr. Buck, do you have any other 7 questions?

8 JUDGE BUCKa Yes, I would like to ask a few 9 more questionf, if I say.

10 The staff seems to have a problem with the 11 number of people you have in the control room. How many 12 people do you have, actually, within the reactor 13 facility and how many of them are really in the control 14 room, and how many are down in the secondary control 15 room? Do you know offhand?

16 HR. ZAHLER: Well, I can tell you that at a 17 minimum we have 20 people in the plant, and of that 18 minimum in the control room at the start of an emergency 19 there would be four, and that would be increased, let's 20 say between hour zero and hour one -- I don't know the 21 exact number. I think it is seven or so. One can add 22 them up.

23 But let me, if I could, short-circuit. Mr.

()

• 24 Chesnut testified that the people we were going to have 25 in the control room were not too many. And if you look ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345 l

l

40

() 1 also at the staff response that was just filed, while 2 they talk about overcrowding in the control room, the 3 salient point is the staff says at the bottom, our 4 concern is not the number of people in our control 5 room. The staff has reviewed the number we are going to 6 have in the control room and they don't have a problem.

7 We don't have too many. They are dispersed in other 8 facilities for the most part.

9 JUDGE BUCKa. All right. Now, let me ask 10 this. The staff in its recent submission to us 11 indicates that they are going to want to put three 12 people in that control room, one of whom is a health 13 physicist. Was that coordinated with you?

O 14 NR. ZAHLER It wasn't coordinated with me, 15 but it was coordinated with my client, yes. That is my 18 understanding.

17 JUDGE BUCKS Have they agreed to those three 18 people?

j 19 MR. ZAHLER: Yes. Let me say this. The 20 control room, what is referred to as the control room at 21 TMI, the emergency control center, is actually two 22 separate rooms. There is actually a shift supervisor's 23 room that directly attaches to the control room where

() 24 there's a window and a door, and I believe at least one 25 of the NRC people would be in that f acility . There's I ( -

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41 ll) 1 also a dose assessment area in the control room that is 2 behind some cabinets and out of the operations area of 3 the control room.

4 JUDGE BUCK: All right. Now, the other point 5 I have about the staff's statement is that your client 6 has agreed, according to the staff, that these people 7 sre allowed to talk to the opera tors. Why, if I may 8 ask, in the interest of safety, are people allowed, NRC 9 people allowed to go down and talk to the operators in 10 the middle of an accident?

11 MR. ZAHLER: Well, I think if you read the 12 staff affidavit it ssys that that's to be judiciously 13 used and only when the operators feel comfortable 14 talking to the NBC people.

15 JUDGE BUCKS But they've already been 16 interrupted by tha t time, whether they know they're 17 comfortable or not.

18 ER. ZAHLER: Well, you have to see the 19 hierarchy of operations in the control room during a 20 drill. For the most part, the control room operators, 21 the people turning the knobs, are very forward in the 22 control room. There's an operations coordinator that 23 has a headset plugged in. He's walking around. And I lll 24 would expect that the staff people are going to come to 25 him and ask to talk to the operators.

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() 1 JUDGE BUCKS Well, that's all right if there's 2 some permission, and I think if they have a Licensee 3 supervisor along with them. But I am conearned with any 4 member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission just 5 trotting up to an operator in the middle of an accident 6 -- these guys are busy -- and asking him some questions 7 or even attempting to talk to them.

8 To me that's the most dangerous thing that can 9 be done at that point.

10 MR. ZAHLER: I don't disagree.

11 JUDGE BUCK: I wondered why your client agreed 12 with this, and I's just trying to find out, did he agree 13 with a lot of provisos or what.

O . 14 MR. ZAHLERa Dr. Buck, I don't think I 15 disagree with what you said. I thought I knew 16 e ve ry thing about the emergency plan, but you're at a 17 level of detail that I cannot respond to.

18 JUDGE BUCKa Well, I agree.. I was just trying 19 to find out if you knew what had happened here on this 20 situation, because it really does bother me.

21 MR. ZAHLER: The one thing I would add, for 22 the most part the NBC inspectors at the Island have been 23 there for a while and they are well known to everyone. ,

) 24 It isn 't a situation of people, which may be the case at 25 other plants, unknown just flying in for the day or O

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l 84 3 1 something like that.

2 But beyond that, I really can't tell you the 3 nitty-gritty of how they're going to interact.

4 JUDGE BUCK: Okay. Hold on just for one 5 second.

6 (Pause.)

7 JUDGE BUCK 4 Okay, I think I have everything.

8 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Zahler, thank you very 9 auch.

10 Mr. Adler for the Commons alth of 11 Pennsylvania, would you please come forward.

12 (Pause.)

13 ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER, 14 THE COMMONiiEALTH OF PENNSYLV ANI A 15 NR. ADLER: Good af ternoon, Hr. Chairman and 16 members of the Board.

17 I would like to begin my dosimetry argument by 18 trying to carefully define the issue that is presented 19 to the Board for resolution, because I believe that in 20 the briefing the issue may have been obscured in two 21 respects.

22 In particular, I believe the Licensee 23 incorrectly stated the issue in its brief when it stated O 24 taat the issue is whetner there is reeson 81e essurence 25 that adequate protective measures can and will be O

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44

() I taken. Now, that is true in the general sense, that the 2 target set f orth in the emergency planning rule is the 3 ability to take adequa te protective actions to protect 4 members of the public.

5 But there is an independent legal requirement 6 to ensure that the health and safety of the emergency 7 workers are protected. So the question is not only 8 whether the comprehensive emergency plan will be 9 functional, but whether the emergency workers carrying 10 out tha t plan are adequately protected.

11 The second possible misconception in terms of 12 issue involves the function-of dosimetry. There are s

13 essentially two major functions of dosimetry for 14 emergency workers. The first function is to ensure that 15 emergency workers do not exceed the protective action 16 guidelines for dosage accumulated while responding to an 17 emergency. Fo'r that purpose -- and this is a factor 18 that was focused upon in the staff's brief --

19 self-reading dosimeters are the primary instrument and 20 TLD 's, thermal luminescent dosimeters, are of very 21 limited value.

22 The second f unction of dosimetry is to 23 establish an accurate, reliable, permanent record of the

() 24 dosage accumulated by each individual emergency worker.

25 This is critical in terms of medical records and in

(~\

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45 terms of receiving medical treatment following the

(])

1 2 emergency. For that purpose permanent record dosimetry 3 is essential.

4 I would like the Board to focus on the 5 specific relief requested in the Commonwealth 's brief, 6 on the last page, page 18. The requested condition on 7 TMI restart is: "To the extent that sufficient supplies 8 of permanent record dosimetry have not been 9 predistributed, state and county plans include other to means to provide reasonable assurance that the health 11 and safety of emergency workers will be protected."

12 So the question is not how to establish 13 adequate means of permanent record dosimetry. In other 14 words, the question is not whether TLD's per se are 15 required. The question is whether as a matter of law 16 permanent record dosimetry is necessary to protect the 17 health and safety of emergency workers.

18 JUDGE EDLESs I understand that, but let me 19 a sk you this. 0654 provides, as I understand it, that 20 each organization, namely the Licensee, state covernment 21 and local government, shall provide for its own people 22 the TLD's. Why don't you just go out and provide them 23 for your people? Are they not on the market, not

() 24 available?

25 MR. ADLER: They are in the market. They are O

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46 1 not, for the Board's information, a device that is 2 normally parchased, but rented from the TLD vendor. You 3 purchase the loan of the device and reading.

4 JUDGE EDLES: Apart from my faulty 5 terminology, why don't you procure them for your cwn 6 peo ple?

7 MR. ADLERs There is currently not the money 8 in the budge t, to be honest with the Board.

9 JUDGE EDLES So what you are really asking is 10 a transf er of budgetary responsibility to someone else?

11 I mean, underneath all of the lawyerisms, what are you 12 asking?

l 13 MR. ADLER: We are asking f or a d efinitive 14 determination that TLD's are required. Then I will get 15 to the question of who provides --

16 JUDGE EDLES: Okay. If we determine that they J 17 are indeed required and the Commonwealth concedes that 18 it doesn't have the money, someone else is going to have 19 to come up with the money to pay for them. Is my logic 20 correct?

21 MR. ADLER: That's correct.

22 JUDGE EDLES: Who is that some other person?

23 MR. ADLER: The Pennsylvania Emergency O 24 Manegement Agency has provided reauests to the redera1 25 Emergency Management Agency for the past year indicating O

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14 7 l

1 that there is a shortage of dosimetry. To date our 2 requests have gone unresponded by FEMA.

3 JUDGE EDLES: Okay. But am I correct, though, O 4 tha t because of the conflict between the state and the 5 federal government on this we have to keep the plant 6 shut down? Is tha t a necessary conclusion from your 7 argument?

8 MR. ADLER: Yes, sir, it is. That is a fact 9 that the Commission recognized when it established the 10 emergency planning rule. In fact, in the preamble to 11 the emergency planning rule the Commission determined 12 that there was a possibility that lack of proper 13 coordination or response by state or local governments 14 could concaivably keep a plant closed.

15 Now, that isn't the case here. The 16 Commonwealth and the risk counties for THI have done the 17 utmost to attempt to support the emergency response 18 around TMI. However, given limited resources, there is 19 a question of how to provide sdequate resources and 20 equip men t to respond to the emergency.

l 21 JUDGE BUCKa May I ask, how many are you 22 short? Well, first of all, what is the basis for your 23 saying you have a shortage? Is this on the basis of TMI O 24 tooe or 1 it oatae a 1=or the tot 1 rive r te 25 plants that you have in Pennsylvania, either operating J

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14 8 l

Q 1 or going to operate, and if so how do you propose to 2 handle the distribution of the TLD's?

3 What I am really asking is, do you have a O 4 central supply which you can ship out to any one of your 5 five operational plants in the case of an accident, or 6 are you proposing that each area, each plant, be fully 7 supplied-at all times?

3 MR. ADLER I can answer that in two parts.

9 First of all, it was originally the intention of the 10 Commonwealth to have centrally located supplies of 11 dosimeters. However, during exercises --

12 JUDGE BUCKS Does this include the TLD's?

13 HR. ADLER: That's correct.

14 During exercises it was determinai that it 15 would take too long to transport those dosimeters to the 16 people who would actually respond to the emergency.

17 JUDGE GOTCHYs FEHA made that determination?

18 MR. ADLER: Yes, FEMA made that determination 19 and we agreed with it. You have'to understand that some 20 of those people are farmers, local policemen, local 21 firemen, et cetera, and it takes time to get it to 22 them.

23 Based on FEMA's critiques and recommendations, O 24 we made the determination that we would predistribute 25 supplies of dosimetry to the county emergency management O

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49

() 1 officials for distribution immediately prior to an 2 emergency --

prior to them Toing to --

3 JUDGE BUCKS Tha' predistribution goes to O 4 counties? Is that your predistribution?

5 MR. ADLER: That's correct, not to individual 6 workers. To answer the second part of your question, 7 there are shortages statewide now. The only record 8 evidence in this proceeding is that there a re adequa te 9 supplies of self-reading dosimeters for TMI and these 10 have been predistributed at this point. But there are 11 shortages of TLD's.

12 JUDGE BUCKS Even for TMI?

13 MR. ADLER4 That's correct. I can tell you

) 14 personally that there are approximately 9,000, which is 15 the number of shortage for TLD's. That is not record 16 evidence.

17 JUDGE BUCK: What is the total cost involved 18 here?

19 NR. ADLER: Approximately $3.50 per dosimeter 20 per year. As I said, it is a rental, not a purchase.

21 JUDGE BUCK And you are short how many?

22 MR. ADLER: 9,000.

23 JUDGE BUCK 4 So that is roughly $30,0007 24 MR. ADLERs Per year.

(])

25 JUDGE BUCK: And if you can't come up with ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

50 1 that you are willing to see this plant shut down because 2 of that factor, to put it bluntly?

3 3R. ADLER: Well, I can't say what the O 4 political officials --

5 JUDGE BUCK: Well, we've got an oral argument 6 going on here about this par ticula r point, so I think I 7 have to ask that question.

8 MR. ADLER: Resources are limited. It's not 9 line-itened in the b'udget. It's not a question of total 10 budgetary resources; it's a question of whether there's 11 money for that item.

12 Now, one of the problems is that there are 13 statewide shortages of dosimeters, and as you may have 14 read in Attachment 1 to the Commonwealth's brief, the 15 Commonwealth is still waiting for a definitive

, 16 determination from FEMA national as to what dosimetry is 17 required.

18 We can't expend resources until we have an 19 adequate determination of what to spend the money on.

20 That is part of the problem.

21 JUDGE BUCK: I think we have a lot of the 22 vrono parties here. We ought to have FEMA up here.

23 MR. ADLER: One of the problems that the O 24 co oa e ten ==cre etr r>=e= 1 thet there 1 -

25 divergence of the opinions that we have gotten in this O

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51 ggg 1 proceeding, with the briefs submitted by the lawyers and 2 the opinion of FEMA in the official critiques and review 3 of our emergency plans.

O 4 In the of ficial critiques of the emergency 5 plans, the federal position is that TLD's are necessary 6 to comply with the emergency planning rule. In this 7 proceeding, we have the legal briefs which say that they 8 are not. And of course we have to deal with the real 9 world and not with legal niceties in terms of this 10 proceeding.

11 JUDGE EDLES: By the way, the Commonwealth is 12 not entirely in a solitary position, since it concludes 13 that they are absolutely necessary, you are obligated to h 14 provide them and your state legislature or whatever 15 isn 't going to provide the money. You know, everybody 16 is hurting at this point. It seems to me b udgetary 17 constraints are problems that are just going to crop 18 up.

19 JUDGE GOTCHYs I have a few questions that I 20 would like to ask. Ge tting back to the FEM A 21 recommendation that you pre 4tstribute all of the 22 self-reading dosimetera 133 TLD 's to the five risk 23 counties, that was L .y ed . . i understand the record, on lll 24 a decision by FEMA that you could not distribute those 25 dosimeters from a central facility, like Fort Indiantown 9

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52

(} 1 Gap.

2 By the way, how far is that from THI?

3 MR. ADLERs I would e stims te 20 miles.

() 4 JUDGE G3TCHY Okay. That's about what I 5 thought.

, 6 Er understanding was, though, that the reason 7 they did not go slong with your original plah was 8 because the original plan called for delivery of those 9 dosimeters within three hours af ter declaration of an 10 accident. And had you given any consideration to the 11 possibility of bringing in supplies of additional 12 dosimeters, for example, in a five, six, or ten-hour 13 period, or did you just say, FEMA says three hours is

() 14 enough, therefore you have to predistribute all the 15 TLD's for the emergency workers?

16 Or does it seem reasonable that perhaps the 17 Commonwealth has an option to predistribute some of its 18 dosimeters to each of the risk counties, holding a 19 majority back at Fort Indiantown Gap, which would make

20 it available for these other f acilities also, and have 4

21 them there say within six hours, predistribute enough so 4

22 that you could get by for six hours? You know, somebody 23 could walk 20 miles in about six hours easily.

() 24 Granted, if there is an evacuation situation l 25 it's going to be very difficult to get in there in three ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

53 1 hours. I don't think three hours is enough either. But

{

2 it seems to me there was an alternative there which was 1

3 never explored by the Commonwealth.

O 4 MR. ADLER: The original planning was to have 5 enough dosimeters available for any given plant and 6 store them at a central location and transport them to 7 the site at the time of an emergency. Now there are 8 currently 300 TLD's that the state has for this purpose, 9 and that is far short of the 9,000 necessary to respond 10 to an accident. So at this point that would not be a 11 viable option.

12 When the plans' vere originally written, they

! 13 still relied upon the purchase or the lease of

() 14 additional dosimeters. So that alone would not solve 15 the problem', notwithstanding FEMA's critique, which we 16 agree with, that it is far preferable to have the 17 dosimeters available at the beginning of the accident.

18 JUDGE GOTCHY You have 300 TLD's of your 19 own. You have a Panasonic TLD system, as I recall 20 somewhere in my readings. Do you have a reader in 21 Harrisburg?

22 MR. ADLEEa The TLD's are read by the vendor.

l l 23 JUDGE 30TCHYs You have only a vendor? You I

{} 24 don't have any kind of central facility for reading out 25 TLD's in Pennsylvania?

()

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54 lll 1 1R. ADLER Not for emergency workers. I am 2 not sure. I would have to check. I think maybe the 3 state, the BRP workers, have their own TLD's. I would 4 have to check that.

5 JUDGE GOTCHY: I think there was also some 5 6 mention of a reade;r for your TLD's being taken around in 7 some mobile van or something.

8 MR. ADLER: That would be the BRP f acility.

9 JUDGE BUCK: What is the time involved for 10 getting a vendor? You say you would get a vendor for 11 the TLD's. What is the time involved for getting those 12 readings and getting the dosimeters back?

13 MR. ADLER: The minimum time is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, 14 approximately. In a non-emergency situation it would 15 extend anywhere up to five days.

16 To a certain extent a TLD is a backup to the 17 self-reading dosimeter, and in an emergency if there 18 vere some reason to believe that the self-reading device 19 was not accurate we could send the TLD on an emergency 20 basis and have it read in half a day.

21 JUDGE GOTCHY: Where are these going to be 22 read, TLD's?

23 HR. ADLER: In location, I am not sure.

lll 24 JUDGE GOTCHY: Something is not matching up 25 here. You are saying your vendor may be 100 miles or I O

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55

(]) 1 don't know how far away. But in a real emergency 2 situation where you have people galavanting in and out 3 of control points, into a contaminated zone -- and I had 4 a lot of experience with this in years past working in 5 weapons testing. People come in one area, they come out 6 another, and it is very hard to keep track of people, 7 particularly, for example, a medical worker or med-evac 8 team coming in one place and coming out another place.

9 If you have people evacuating an area, are you 10 telling me tha t you're going to go around and pick up 11 these TLD's and send them back to a vendor and get them 12 back in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />?

13 MR. ADLERa I said in an emergency.

14 JUDGE GOTCHY That's exactly what I'm talking 15 about, a serious accident.

16 HR. ADLER: In an emergency, meaning where 17 there is some reason'to believe that the self-reading 18 dosimeter was not functional or was inaccurate. Now, 19 again, you are getting into the distinction between the 20 major function of a self-reading of a self-reading 21 dosimeter which can be read at any time and a TLD, the 22 major purpose of which is to establish a more accurate 23 and a more reliable permanent record of accumulated O 24 dose. .

25 So for the main part during the accident each O

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56 1 emergency worker would be reading the self-readino 2 dosimeter for purposes of coming in and going out of the 3 emergency planning zone.

O 4 JUDOE 00TCHY: I understand that very well.

5 You are telling me that you can 't get dosimeters brought 6 from Fort Indiantown Gap, which is 20 miles away, in 7 three hours to distribute out to these areas, but you 8 sre telling me you can pick them up and send them back 9 on an emergency basis and get a readout back in 12 to hours? I find that hard to believe.

11 If you have the kind of emergency that we are 12 talking about, which really involves the distribution of 13 dosimetar; in the first place to emergency workers, it's 14 not going to be a situation like the TMI-2 ace'ident.

15 MR. ADLER The distribution of the entire 16 supply of TLD's would be to the approximately 9,000 1

17 emergency workers going throughout the EPZ. An 18 emergency use of the TLD, which again is only a 19 contingency, would be only for those workers who had 20 some reason to believe that the self-readir e dosimeters 21 were inaccurate or that they had received a dose higher 22 than wha t was demonstrated on the self-reading 23 dosimeter.

O 24 auoce corcur- - **e1 c=rtr t o 25 self-reading dosimeters that have an overlapping range O

ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

57 1 bet ween 4 and 20 rem. Now, that is a critical area, I 2 think, for most emergency workers. They can go up to 25 3 rem on emission and have essentially all of it covered O 4 by both dosime ters.

5 Ihere is something else about pocket 6 dosimeters that's very well known to people who work 7 with them, and that is they don't read high -- I mean, 8 they don't* read low. If there is something wrong, they 9 are going to read high, because all you are doing is 10 discharging electrostatic charge on that fiber inside 11 that thing.

12 If, for example, the chamber leaks or it's 13 dropped or is broken and it reads high, you can 14 generally disregard those numbers and go with the other 15 one.

16 Well, at any rate, please continue.

17 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Adler, is there anything in 18 the record on how long it would take to distribute the 19 dosimeters if it were necessary to distribute the 20 permanent dosimeters?

21 MR. ADLERs There is no direct proof, in that 22 it was never actually done during an exercise.

23 JUDGE EDLES Is there an estimate in the O 24 recorav 25 MR. ADLERa I'd have to go back and check.

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58 1

JUDGE EDLES: Okay.

)

2 JUDGE GOTCHY: You reference in your briefs 3 twice FEMA Rep 2, which is one of the guida nce things O 4 that come out. That is not in evidence in this case, is 5 that right?

6 MR. ADLER: That's correct. It was cited in 7 the Commonwealth's emergency plan.

8 JUDGE GOTCHY: I see. You say that that 9 supports your position, and yat, if I can read from this 10 thing, it says " Direct reading personal dosimetry that 11 accurately measures whole body gamma radiation dose 12 below the minimum detectable level of the zero to 20 13 roentgen direct reading pocket ionization chamber, i.e.,

D)

( 14 about 400 ER, is not considered essential for emergency 15 workers such as police, firemen, et cetera, who are not 16 likely to ever be involved in another abnormal exposure 17 to radiation."

18 Now, tha t presumably -- a TLD, one of the 19 advantages is that it can read below this 400 millirem 20 value. The other one, of course, is that it can read 21 above the 200 rem value at the upper end of the second 22 self-reading dosimeter. That seems to me to remove one 23 of the advantages for that thing.

() 24 And it goes on to saya "In view of the above, 25 it is recommended that all local emergency workers be ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, l 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

59

(} 1 equipped with two direct-reading gamma dosimeters, one 2 in the range of zero to 20 R and one in the range of 3 zero to 100 R. These dosimeters should provide for O 4 continuous coverage from about .4 to 200 R, which is 5 well beyond any anticipated whole body gamma expose '.

6 They also provide some redundancy" -- and I could 7 emphasize that -- " based on their overlapping ranges."

8 And they also say that in effect this 9 dosimeter would also measure whole body gamma radiation 10 dose for the purpose of prc.viding a redundant measure of 11 the accrued dose. Now, that seems to se that when 12 something is redundant it's hard for me to agree that 13 that's a reason not to grant a license to a plant. If

( 14 it's backup as opposed to something that's essential to 15 protect the health and safety of the emergency worker, 16 those I find quite different and distinct.

17 As a health physicist, I think TLD's are 18 great. I mean, you know, you ought to have them if you 19 can. But on the other hand, in an emergency situation 20 it seems to me that the-health and safety of emergency 21 workers is very well compensated by having two pocket 22 dosimeters which have an overlapping range in the range 23 of concern for emergency workers.

() 24 Do you care to comment on that?

25 HR. ADLER: The basis for our statement that O

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60 1 FEM A requires a TLD in addition to self-reading

(])

2 dosimeters is multiple, and in every single critique of 3 the Commonwealth's emergency plan they have cited as a O 4 deficiency, a deficiency that indica tes tha t the 5 emergency planning rule, planning standards are not met, 6 is inadequate supplies of permanent record dosimeters.

7 The Commonwealth's emergency plan has 8 currently been approved by FEMA on a contingent basis.

9 One of the contingencies being the procurement of 10 adequate suppies of both self-reading and permanent 11 record dosimetry.

12 I think it's important to keep in perspective 13 f rom the THI-2 accident that one of the most frequently 14 asked questions and highly debated questions is, what 15 was the actual dosage received by individuals as a 16 result of the accident. It's not a question that you 17 answer on the spot at the time of the accident. It's 18 something that you need adequate, accurate records of 19 based on permanent record dosimeters.

20 JUDGE GOTCHY: Well, I would submit in the 21 event of a serious accident cha t every drugstore in 22 Pennsylvania vill be filled with dosimeters called 23 films.

() 24 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Adler, why don' t you take 25 another minute to sum up your position for us, please.

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61 1 MR. ADLER: Again, I would like to emphasize 2 that the question is not who should pay for them in 3 terms of the legal question presented for resolution to 4 this Board, and the question is not whether TLD's per se J

j 5 are required. The question is whether some form of 6 accurate, permanent record dosimetry can be provided for 7 during an accident.

8 We submit that this cannot be reliably 9 provided through the use of self-reading dosimeters.

10 JUDGE EDLES: Okay. Thank you very much.

11 I appreciate that we have asked some questions 12 that are parhaps politically delicate, but I appreciate

13 your being forthcoming and candid with us. Thank you i O '4 veer ch.

l 15 'Mr. Gray.

I 16 17 J

18 I

l 19 l

20

21 l

l 22 23 24 25 O

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62 1 ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF

(]}

2 RESPONDENT, THE NRC STAFF 3 MR. GRAY: Mr. Chairman, members of the Appeal O 4 Board 5 I will address here both matters raised on the 6 appeals of the Licensee and of the Commonwealth.

7 As to the Licensee's appeal on the staf fing of l

8 its emergency operations facility and the transfer of 9 protective action recommendation to an emergency support 10 director in that facility, the Licensee has stressed the 11 aakeup of its emergency response organization, the high 12 level of staffing of that organization, as one reason 13 why it is unnecesary to transfer a protective action 14 recommendation authority early on in the course of an 15 accident. '

16 I would point out, however, that while the 17 emergency director in a control room does have a 18 substantjs1 staff to assist him and to whom he can 19 delegate the performance of emergency response 20 functions, he also has a large number of functions to 21 oversee. Important among those functions are the 22 functions of accident assessment, plant control and 23 accident mitigation, in addition to the function of

(]) 24. formula ting protective action recommendations.

25 One of the principal functions that an

(

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63 1 emergency director in a control room has is to formulate

(}

2 protectiva action recommendations and communicate those 3 to the state. That is one that he cannot delegate to O 4 any of the support staff.

5 To the extent that the emergency director in 6 the control room must devote his time and efforts to 7 formulatin7 protective action recommendations and 8 communicating them to the state, he necessarily will be 9 unavailable to oversee and direct the performance of 10 other emergency response functions for which he ic 11 responsible.

12 In turn, to the extent that he must devote his 13 time to the oversight of other functions, he necessarily

()- 14 will be unavailable to formulate protective action 15 recommendations and communicate them to the state.

16 JUDGE BUCK: Mr. Gray, in this word

.17 " formulate," I don't read the Applicant's organization 18 that the emergency director has to formulate the I

! 19 protective action guides. I think he has a staff who 20 can put the formulation together and discuss it with 21 him, and he has to make the final decision as to whether 22 that is correct or not correct and issue it.

23 But I don't think he sits there and does the

() 24 calculating and the writing down of the pla n. I think 25 what he comes down to is the same as in any industrial

)

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64 l

1 o rg aniza tio n . You have a staff to present you with the 2 facts and their cacommendations, and it's his 3 responsibility and his cnly to decide whether that goes O 4 out or not.

5 MR. GRAY: I believe that is correct.

6 JUDGE BUCK 4 That is a little different than 7 with formulating.

8 MR. GRAY He does have a staff which, among 9 other things, will calculate or project doses.

10 JUDGE BUCK 4 I think that is a little 11 different from " formulating." He can't delegate the 12 decision. -

13 HR. GRAY: I guess to the extent that I said 14 " formulate" I meant the collection of the 15 recommendations fron his technical support' staff and the 16 determination by that emergency director himself that 17 those recommendations are indeed the ones that should be 18 made to the state.

19 JUDGE BUCK 4 That I understand.

20 JUDGE GOTCHYa Is that what you mean by raw 21 data?

22 MR. GRAY: Among other things, yes. Some rav 23 data will be involved in the formulation of the O 24 protective action recommendation.

25 JUDGE GOTCHY a By the emergency director? Are O

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65 O ' = te11tna =e ne i= coina to =1t there en* 1oo* et tw 2 data coming back from monitoring teams and from stack 3 monitors?

4 MR. GRAY: He may well look at some raw data.

5 Likely he sill first rely on his support staff who is 6 taking that raw data and working with it and working it 7 into parameters that can be compared to protective 8 action criteria. But it may well be that he will need 9 to look at some raw data in tha t regard.

10 JUDGE EDLES Mr. Gray, are there no 11 circumstances under which the Licensee's scenario might 12 not be right, that there are certain things that are so 13 fast-breaking, but that they take more than an hour, 14 under which really the emergency director maybe ought to 15 be making some of these decisions at the hour and a half 16 level or at the two-hour level, and maybe we ought to 17 have a kind of fluctuating period here from one to four 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> in which these officials might confer or in which 19 one may have the responsibility until the other one gets 20 there?

21 Can you conceive of my situation in which that j 22 might mak, sense?

23 HR. GRAY: I guess I cannot conceive of a O 24 situetion -- ef n= situation in which it wou1dn t meke 25 sense --

O l

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() 1 JUDGE EDLES: Wasn't that a double negative?

2 You cannot conceive of no situation?

3 MR. GRAT: I agree with you, there may be 4 situations.

5 JUDGE EDLES: Okay.

6 MR. GRAY: Certainly during the very early 7 minutes after declaration of an emergency, when 8 technical people at the plant are simply attempting to 9 determine just what is going on, that is a time when it 10 just would not appear to be reasonable to have to bring 11 someone in from elsewhere.

12 JUDGE BUCKa But those situations go on for 13 more than a few minutes. You take a look at the Three O 14 Hile Island 2 accident itself. Things didn 't become 15 critical in the first five minutes. They didn't become 16 critical, really, in the first hour. And as a matter of 17 fact, some of the decisions that really caused the 18 problem were into the two-hout range.

19 This can very easily happen. Plants can

- 20 change. Now, I agree, the further it goes the less 21 chance there is of this. But certainly the accidents 22 thst one =sn look at, particularly the Three Mile Island 23 accident, didn't go in the first hour.

() 24 MR. GRAYa That's correct, it did n ' t. I did 25 concede that there can well be, depending on the type of O

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67

() 1 accident and what occurs, it can well be that well af ter 2 four hours is when the problenc arise.

3 JUDGE EDLES: Why isn't the Licensee's O 4 approach a sensible accommodation of all those 5 considerations?

6 MR. GRAY: For one thing, the Lic en see 's 7 approach, as I was about to get into, nevertheless and 8 despite its high levels of staffing, does have imposed 9 on that emergency director in the control room, who 10 res11y primarily and most importantly should be 11 concerned with accident mitigation or determining what 12 the accident is, it burdens him with a duty and 13 responsibility which can reasonably, we believe, be

() 14 transferred to another person, a qualified person.

15 JUDGE EDLES: But which he chooses to burden 16 himself with, I presume?

17 MR. GRAYa He chooses to burden hf aself with 18 it insof ar as the Licensee's concept of operation, which 19 he has agreed to carry out, he is burdened with that 20 responsibility.

l 21 JUDGE BUCKa Even on the staff's plan, he is l

22 burdened with it for an hour.

23 MR. GRAY: Yes. But by transferring that t

24 protective action recommendation authority to another

(])

25 qualified individual, he is relieved a t lea st of one of O

l l

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68

() 1 those critical functions. And that is in part the 2 reason for the staff's position on this issue.

3 Now, the Licensee has asserted that the early 4 transfer of that protective action recommendation 5 authcrity to the emergency support director in the EOF 6 will increase the likelihood for a misunderstanding for 7 o pe ra ting pa ra mete rs , radiological releases, on the part 8 of that person making the protective action 9 recommendation.

10 The evidence in this proceeding does not 11 necessarily show tha t that is the case. The emergency 12 support director in the EOF will have available to him 13 very adequate communication links between the EOF and -

14 various support personnel who would provide input to the 15 protective action recommendation in the control room.

16 In the EOF there will be a cathode ray tube nonitoring 17 and display system for displaying plant parameters of 18 the same type that is used in the technical support 19 center, where accident analysis is going on.

20 There is some evidence in the proceeding that 21 information pertinent to protective action 22 recommendations are displayed better in the EOF-than 23 they are in the control room.

l

() 24 In short, there is no reason to believe that 25 the likelihood of misinformation or misunderstanding O

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69 inf orma tion is substantially greater for an emergency

(]) 1 2 support director in the EOF than it is f or the emergency 3 director in the control room.

()

4 JUDOE EDLES: Let me ask you s question 5 similar to the one that I asked earlier about the 6 Commission's actual regulations. I assume you would not 7 disagree with me tha t my reading of the Commission's 8 regulations is at least a reasonable construction.

~

9 Would you also agree with Mr. Zahler that nothing in the to Licensee's plan is affirmatively foreclosed by the 11 regulation?

12 MR. GRAY: I believe that the regulation is 13 general enough in nature that it is subject to 14 interpretation, and I would have to concede that the 15 Licensee's plan is not necessarily foreclosed by the 16 words of trose regulations.

17 There is regulatory guidance that purports to 18 interpret the regulations and what the regulations 19 require, that would indeed say Licensee's plan is not 20 the right way to go.

21 JUDGE EDLES: I appreciate that.

22 MR. GRAY: There is another reason why the 23 protective action recommendation authority should be

() 24 transferred to the emergency support director in the EO" 25 early in the course of an accident. That involves the O .

ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC,

70 O co===atcetioa or tae d 1= ror two e reco==eaa tie == to 2 the state officials.

3 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, whose 4 Governor ultimately has to make the decision on what 5 protective actions are geing to be taken offsite, has 6 indicated that he perceived a critical need for some 7 direct, face to face communication with --

8 JUDGE BUCK Wait a minute.

9 JUDGE GOTCHYs Are you saying Mr. Dornsife or to Governor Thornburgh?

11 MR. GRAYS No, with state representatives, 12 with direct communication between state representatives 13 and that person who makes a protective action O 14 recommendation f or Licensee , in order to ascertain the 15 basis.

16 JUDGE BUCKS But I think that was stated first 17 by Mr. Dornsife, because he wanted to have face to face 18 contact here. Now, that was contrary completely to what 19 Miss Reilly had to say. She wanted to keep her people 20 with her and she said she was perfectly satisfied by the 21 phone conversation.

22 But a more serious situa tion is, while this 23 may be for Mr. Dornsife a perfectly good situation for 24 the state to have this face to face contact quickly in 25 THI, this is not the case for any one of the other five O

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] 1 situations in Pennsylvania. They can't go in half an 2 hour and be out at Beaver Valley, for example, or 3 Limerick or any of those. They have a different O 4 situation altogether.

5 Vow, if they don't have to have face to face 6 contact with these other people in the first f our hours, 7 why do they have to have it at TMI?

8 MR. GRAYS Well, I am not sure how much 9 different it is for other facilities. I believe the re 10 is some indication that the state does have other 11 nuclear engineers in other regions of the state, who 12 they would --

13 JUDGE BUCK: Not as I understand the 14 statement. Miss Reilly said if an accident were to 15 happen at some of the other facilities she would have to 16 send people out. She is the head of the . Department of 17 Radiation Protection or whatever they call it, and it 18 was her statement that people would gather at her 10 office, not just for a TMI accident but for any 20 sccidents in the state of Pennsylvania.

21 MR. GRAYa Yes, that was her statement at a 22 time at which the Commonwealth's position, at least, was 23 that there was nu need roc th= EOF staffing called for O 24 or xea for er the tate-25 JUDGE BUCKa Well, how were they going to do O

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() 1 that immediate face to face contact between Mr.

2 Dornsife, for example, who seems to be the one who would 3 to out in the first two hours, if that accident happens 4 out at Beaver Valley?

5 MB. GRAY: As I say, I do not know tha t in 6 fact that could occur. However, the reason, as I 7 understand it, for the state's change in position on how 8 early the emergency --

the EOF should be manned by the 9 emergency support director was that there were several 10 drills for specifically IMI --

11 JUDGE BUCK But Mr. Dornsife said that the 12 contact by phone was satisfactory, when he got through.

13 MR. GRAY: No.

() 14 JUDGE BUCKS Yes, he did.

l 15 JUDGE GOTCHYa Let me read you a quote from i

16 the transcript: "Information that flows to the BRP 17 headquarters would have been sufficient to protect the 18 public health and safety.

19 And why, then, is this information -- is that 20 information being present at the EOF regardless of 21 whether the ESD is there or not, plus that flowing to ,

22 the BRP headquarters, somehow might have been only for 23 THI-2 and' not for the other stations in Pennsylvania.

) 24 MR. GRAY: My understanding of Mr. Dornsife's 25 testimony -- and I may be wrong and would have to check i

I l

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- taet ta 1 ct ne aie aerceive ter ene 2 contact, not --

3 JUDGE BUCK: He started out that way and he 4 changed his tune on cross-examination. I think you will 5 find th a t is correct if you reread the transcript.

6 JUDGE EDLES. Mr. Adler might also want, when 7 he gets back, to address that particular point about th e 8 dispatching of people to other facilities or not.

9 MR. GRAYS In any event, from the standpoint 10 of relieving the emergency director in the control room 11 of burdens which he does have, the staff believes it is 12 prudent to transfer that protective action 13 recommendation authority early in the course of an 14 accident and within one hour.

15 Now, the Licensee seems to assert that the 16 Licensing Board 's imposition of the condition that it 17 did impose is an improper intrusion on Licensee's l

18 management's judgment. That is not necessarily the l 19 case. What the condition requires simply is that l

l 20 Licensee provide a person qualified to make protective i

21 action recommendations at its EOF within an hour of l

22 declaration of an emergency, rather than within four 23 hours, as the Licensee desires to do.

1 O . 24 rhe ticensee has consistently asserted in this 25 proceeding that it does have ample resources, ample O

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() 1 numbers of qualified individuals who in f act are trained 2 and can make that protective action recommendation. It 3 seemed incongruous to argue tha t it should not be done 4 when indeed the Licensee has been asserting consistently 5 that it can do it.

6 As to the appeal by the Commonwealth on the 7 matter of dosimetry for emergency workers, I would point 8 out that the regula tory requirement that 's set out in 9 the regulations is that means for controlling ex posu res 10 of emergency workers be established. Guidance in 11 NUREG-0654 does in f act indicate that for controlling 12 exposures of emergency workers two types of dosimeters 13 should be used, self-reading dosimeters and permanent O 14 record dosimeters.

15 Deviations from that guidance, however, can be 16 permitted if there is a suitable alternative or it can 17 be shown that the guidance is not applicable in an 18 individual case. In this case we believe the record 19 does establish that through the use of existing 20 procedures in the Commonwealth and risk county emergency 21 plans and through the use of self-reading dosimeters 22 which are available in ample supply, adequate protection 23 or control of emergency worker exposures can be

( 24 accomplished.

25 Specifically, as Mr. Adler indicated, the O

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75 O i Common ee1th end risk count 1 emergency p1ans de re1r 2 primarily on the use of the self-reading dosimeters for 3 the exposure control of emergency workers in the field.

4 Beyond this, however, an examination, for example, of 5 the risk county emergency plans indicates that there is 6 a set procedure for recording the doses of the exposures 7 using the salf-resding dosimeters, and that emergency 8 workers are instructed to read those dosimeters 9 periodically in the field, to record it, and in this 10 manner those workers can determine at any time the total 11 accumulated exposure they have received on that 12 mission.

13 Through the use of those self-reading O 14 dosimeters and the recordkeeping, which a.re established 15 in the existing emergency plans, what the staff believes 18 to be an acceptable longer-term record of exposure can 17 he generated.

18 JUDGE BUCK: Would these records be kept at 19 the collection point or where they pick up the 20 dosimeters or where they return them? Is that the 21 idea?

22 MR. GRAY: Yes. In this instance, and in view 23 of this specific planning, the self-reading dosimeters 24 with the recordkeeping that is already provided for 25 would provide an acceptable alternative for the O

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76 O i ,emenent n=xe usuet-s, x nD e. .h1=h ue not ne.

l 2 available. And that would occur without any 3 modification to the Commonwealth and risk county 4 emergency plans, as called for by the Commonwealth.

5 In short, then, we believe that the relief 6 sought by the Commonwealth here is not warranted.

7 JUDGE BUCK: Mr. Gray, have you finished your 8 presentation?

9 HR. GRAY: Yes, I have.

10 JUDGE BUCK: I would like to go over another 11 point, and that is the questions that we asked you in 12 your June 17 reply to our order. I have some questions 13 on it of June the 1st. And we find a considerable lack O

14 of information in that reply, if I may say so.

15 NR. GRAYS Is this with reference to the NRC 16 response?

17 JUDGE BUCK: Pardon?

18 NR. GRAYS Is this with reference to the NRC 19 incident response?

20 JUDGE BUCK That's right.

21 As I read the two affidavits, I find that one 22 of the main support documents that they talk about in 23 here is a document called 0845, NUREG-0845, and the 24 supplement, the regional supplement to that. And both 25 Mr. Gallins and Mr. Himes say this is answered in that O

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() 1 document. l 2 Now, we don't have that document. We did n ' t 3 have. It was never sent to us as a Board notification.

4 It wasn't sent to us with your reply.

5 We finally did get the document 0845 1

6 yesterday. We got the regional supplement early this 7 morning, just a few minutes before we came in here. And 8 such to our surprise, after reading the affidavits, 9 which indicated that 0845 was the document to end all 10 documents in this region, we find that it is a temporary 11 document now out for comment, an interim document out 12 for comment.

13 Now, this was all brought about, as you O 14 recall, by the fact that in reading the transcript we 15 came across the cross-examination of two staff witnesses 16 concerning the staff's response and the implementation 17 of that staff emergency response. And over about 60 18 pages of that, as we referred to you in the document or 19 the order that we put out, we found statement after 20 sta tement in which these two people, one of them the 21 head of the emergency response planning for the NRC, 22 said, well, I don't know the answer to that, well, we 23 haven 't quite finished that, part of that is done but

( 24 the rest isn't.

i 25 This was all done, I think, in a hearing of O

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78 1 about April 1981, which is a full two years after the 2 Three Mile Island accident which started all of this, 3 and in a hearing in which the Licensee was being 4 required to come up with a final plan, emergency plan, 5 and have it reviewed.

8 It bothers me to see the staff in a situation, 7 as they were in that particular situation, tha t 8 particular hearing, where they didn' t have a final 9 plan. And how the Licensee could coordinate its plan 10 with the NRC's plan is beyond me.

11 Let me go to a couple of the questions that 12 you may or may not be able to answer, and. if you can 't 13 we're going to have to make some other approach here.

O 14 But in Mr. Gallina's testimony on page 6, 15 there's a table there which lists the people that are 18 available in Region I office, and there are three 17 division directors and six branch chiefs and 14 section 18 chiefs and so on and so on, it goes down the line.

19 When the witnesses in the hearing in 1981 were 20 asked whether or not expertise would be available f rom 21 Region I -- and I mean expertise, people familiar with 22 B&W reactors -- the answer was, well, we're not always 23 sure that we will have, we may have. And when I review 24 the number of reactors in areas that Begion I has, I see 25 that the TMI plants are the only BCW plants. They have O

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() 1 several different -- two or three different kinds of 2 boiling water plants and they have several different 3 kinds of PWR's in various locations.

)

4 And I had hoped that in answering these things 5 we would hsve gotten the snsvar, rather than the long 6 listing of the total people in Region I, how many of 7 these people have expertise in TMI. I noticed tha t your 8 plan, they said they were sending three people to TMI; 9 that two of these were inspectors at TMI. So presumably to they have some familiarity with the plant. And the 11 other was a health physicist, and I have no idea whether 12 he is familiar with the plant or not.

13 But I question, first of all on this thing, do O 14 either of those two, are they familiar with the 15 operations of the plant, are they for example licensed 16 operators on a plant like THI?

17 MR. GRAYS I do not believe that they are 18 licensed operators.

19 JUDGE BUCK: Okay. I have a further question 20 that I asked Mr. Zahler a little while ago, which is, 21 why are these people trotting up and asking questions of 22 the operator of that plant?

23 But let me go on on this. Mr. Gs111na has in

() 24 here the THI program office and he lists nine peoples 25' four resident inspectors, one section chief, and four q -

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$ 1 hesith physicists. How many of those are presently

, 2 occupied f ull-time a t TMI-2 ?

3 HR. GRAYS I believe all of those are occupied 4 st the TMI progess office. I cannot say that they a re 5 all directly occupied full-time at TMI-2.

6 JUDGE BUCK 4 Well, my question is, how much 7 time do they have available at TMI-1 and are they 8 familiar with TMI-1 operational procedures? Well, that 9 is one of many, many questions that I have here. When I to go through the 50 pages that we have here and the staff 11 vent through the 50 pages, they picked up, I think, 12 about 30-odd statements in there which have not been 13 answerad to our sstisfaction in your reply. Now, I 14 don ' t 'va nt to go through all of these 30-odd items here 15 today, and I don't think you could answer them. I don't 16 expect you to ansder them.

17 But I am concerned about how we get the 18 answers to these things, because we do have some real 19 problems about the staff's readiness to implement the 20 response plan. So I am asking you, wha t do we do, ask 21 these questions again for renewal of answers or full 22 answers or what?

23 MR. GRAY Our understanding of the Appeal h 24 Board's questions may not have been correct. The 25 question I think basically said, give a complete update ,

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() 1 of the status and coordination of the NRC incident 2 response plan with licensee, with federal agencies, and 3 with state and local agencies.

4 In responding, we attempted to give the update 5 as requestad on thtt general question.

6 JUDGE BUCK: Well, we gave you threa or four 7 specific points and we said, those are examples.

8 MR. GRAY: Well, on the specifics that you 9 gave as examples, we also attempted to provide 10 information in response to those question areas. Quite 11 frankly, we simply were not aware of what further 12 questions and detailed questions the Appeal Board did 13 have.

O 14 JUDGE BUCKa Well, if you weren't aware of 15 quite all that we wanted in here, I find it peculiar to that you reference in here, Gallina and by Hines both, 17 reference -- they say that the NRC plan 0728

, 18 implementing procedures NUREG-0848 have been provided to 19 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation 20 Protection, and so on.

21 On page 3 of Mr. Gallina 's af fida vit, he 22 refers to 0845 and he reers to the implementing 23 procedures. Well, that's fine, but what do we know how

() 24 complete they are? It turns out when we get it that 25 0845 isn't the final document, it's an interim 1

!()

l l

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82 lll 1 document.

2 We haven't the foqqiest idea how good the 3 interim procedure is, because even you: office didn't 4 have one. Apparently nobody here at NRC had one. We 5 had to have that mailed in from the district. And so I 6 don 't see how that could be considered in answer to 7 anything, when you say, wall, all your answers are in 8 that document, and you don't send us the document.

9 MR. GRAY: What I can do is to review tha t 10 record over the entire 100 or so pages --

11 JUDGE BUCK It's 50 or 60 pages. I have 12 forgotten exactly.

13 MR. GRAY: -- which you have referenced and 14 draw out of that all those areas in which the NRC staff 15 witnesses were unable to provide a response at the time, 18 and to provide responses now in the form of affidavits;

~

17 in addition, to procure these various so-called 18 implementing procedures which have been generated, not 19 including the regional supplement and what is supposedly 20 referred to as the site-specific supplement.

21 JUDGE BUCK: When does the staff expect to 22 wind up and get something finished on this?

23 MR. GRAYS As far as the site-specific lh 24 supplement, it supposedly is in final form and it has 25 been since November of 1981. It is revised periodically O

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83 h 1 as new personnal come on board and replace others and 2 telephone nunbers change and tha t sort of thing, the 3 kind of detailed information that is contained in a 4 procedural document, when the more detailed you get the 5 more frequently it has to be changed as those details 6 change.

7 That has been in effect, actually, for longer 8 than since last November, '81. It was revised the last 9 time in November of 1981.

10 JUDGE BUCK: Does this regional document 11 outline, for example, what type of people would be sent 12 to an sccident and how the press relations are handled 13 and who talks to the press, and all that sort of thing?

O 14 MR. GRAY: I believe it does.

15 JUDGE BUCK: As you can probably understand, 16 the reason I an asking is because such a mess was made 17 of it during the THI accident, and I think it is only 18 fair that the Licensee, or any Licensee or any plant 19 operator, know what it is that the NRC proposes to do 20 and how they are going to coordinate it with the 21 Licensee.

22 I haven't seen that yet. That's ny problem.

23 JUDGE EDLES: Perhaps we ought to take you up h 24 on your offer to go back through the materials'and have 25 those submitted in affidavit forn and served on all of 9

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() I the parties as well.

2 Do the other parties have copies of all of the i

3 underlying documents, such as the site-specific 4 material?

5 HR. GRAYS No, I don't believe they do.

6 JUDGE EDLES: Would it be burdensome to serve 7 those documents on the other parties as well?

8 MR. GRAY: No more burdensome than copying 9 wha t we got here at the headquarters of fices last night 10 and providing those to all the other parties.

11 JUDGE EDLES Okay, I would appreciate it if 12 you would do that. If we then have further problems, we 13 can get back to you and the rest of the parties in O 14 writing. I think that is probably the best approach.

15 JUDGE BUCK: Do you have anything else on this 16 item?

17 JUDGE GOTCHY: (Nods in the negative.)

18 JUDGE EDLESa Oka y. Why don 't we take a 19 ten-minute recess and then we will come back.

20 (Recess.)

21 JUDGE EDLES: Please be seated.

22 Mr. Gray, I talked to my colleagues during the 23 recess and what we are going to do is prepare a short

) 24 list of questions.which might f acilitate the answers 25 that you will provide us. I would start going back O

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O 1 oro=ottr tarouca the meteri 1= enrnow >=t 1 tainx it 2 would help you if we put together a short list of 3 materials that we would like. We will serve that on all 4 of the parties and offer other parties an opportunity to 5 respond to whatever it is you put in.

6 MR. GRAYS Thank you. That would be helpful.

7 JUDGE BUCKS Excuse me. I left my glasses in 8 the next room. I'll have to go and get them.

9 JUDGE EDLES: I will take a one-minute glasses to recess. Szoke if you have to, but not in this room.

11 (Pause.)

12 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Adler, you have 40 minutes 13 or, let us say, no more than 40 minutes.

14 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT, 15 THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 16 MR. ADLERs I as glad you said that. I doubt 17 that I will actually use up my entire 40 minutes.

18 JUDGE EDLES: Since you work for the 19 Commonwealth, you are not paid by the word, I take it?

20 HR. ADLER: No, sir.

21 JUDGE EDLES: Or the page.

22 MR. ADLER: No, sir.

23 I have a few items to clear up on dosimetry.

24 One is to attempt to respond to one of Dr. Gotchy's 25 questions about whether there was any estimate on the O

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86 lll 1 record of the proceeding of how long it would take to 2 distribute TLD's to emergency workers. In Stsff Exhibit 3 21 at page 20, there is no estimate of distribution time 4 for TLD's. They merely sta te that it would be far 5 better to predistribute TLD's. There is a 12-hour 6 estimate for the distribution of geiger counters to 7 decontamination monitoring stations.

8 Now, there is a problem with using that 9 estimate. First of all, you are directing your 10 distribution efforts to fixed locations, whereas 11 hopefully by 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> into an emergency, emergency 12 workers would already be deployed in the field. So in a 13 sense it is really an on-off question rather than a time 14 questions Can you get them there bef ore the workers are 15 deployed? -

16 The staff in its argument argues that there 17 are suitable alternatives to the use of TLD's for 18 purposes of permanent record dosimetry. And while we to don't quarrel that it is possible for given workers to 20 establish records, given perfect circumstances, our 21 problem with that mechanism is that it does not 22 guarantee a reliable record for all of the emergency

, 23 workers in the EPZ.

h 24 It req uires essentially volunteer, untrained 25 emergency workers to read their dosimeters approximately O I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

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l 87 1 every 30 minutes, accurately record the readings, and to 2 turn them 111 in and have them calculated. A TLD 3 provides a far more reliable record of permanent dose O 4 sc:umuistal.

5 Moving on to the EOF staffing question --

6 JUDGE EDLES: May I ask you one question on 7 TLD 's ?

~

8 MR. ADLER: Yes, sir.

9 JUDGE EDLES: What sbout using a selected 10 group of TLD's, some small number, and assign them only 11 on a randon basis to emergency workers, so that you will 12 have a kind of single dosimeter to reflect the dosage 13 sceumulated by a number of workers in the same area? I 14 realize it won 't be quite as accurate, but what about 15 tha t as an alternative?

16 MR. ADLER: It's a possibility. The problem 17 is you need to make certain assumptions about where the 18 workers are deployed, whether or not there is a uniform 19 dosage at various times and various places in the EPZ, 20 and of course you would need to take accurate records of ,

21 who had the TLD, where they traveled, and so on.

22 The Licensee in its brief suggests that 23 perhaps TLD's can be distributed among groups of O 24 e ero acr orxer - 1a < ct- it i= oatr sa r re 25 circumstan:es that workers sctually work throughout the ALDERSoN REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

88 1 emergency in groups. There might be cases where 2 ambulances have a team of two or three workers, but it 3 reduces flexibility. You have to plan for those groups O 4 to work together, and in fact it would present 5 significant problems in terms of logistics during the 6 emergency.

7 In terms of the EOF staffing issue, I think 8 all the parties agree that it reduces to a question of 9 judgment, and the Commonwealth is not suggesting that 10 there is only one way to manage an emergency, nor do I 11 think the Licensee is. What we have now is simply an 12 exercise of judgment on behalf of the staff and the 13 Commonwealth, and now the Licensing Board, that the 14 preferable mechanism is to establish a completely 15 functional EOF as early as possible into the emergency. -

16 The key to the Commonwealth's position, as I 17 think I communicated in the brief, is that you can have 18 a perfect onsite emergency response organization -- and 19 f ra nkly, we think that Licensee's onsite organization is 20 good. Licensee f ocusas on the ability to perform their 21 functions during an emergency, and we don't quarrel with 22 that.

23 You can also have a perfect offsite emergency 24 response organiza tion. But if you cannot establish an 25 interface, a workable interface between those two O

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89 lll 1 organizations, you're going to have a reduced capability 2 to actually implement protective actions for members of 3 the public. And that's the focus for our position.

4 JUDGE EDLES: But now you are going to tell us 5 about why it is okay not to have that interface at all 6 the other plants.

7 MR. ADLER: It's not okay. We can do a job.

8 We can perform certain functions at other facilities.

9 The question is whether the Commonwealth and the 10 Licensee should do the best they can at each given 11 facility. We can get a nuclear engineer to TMI within 12 an hour and we 've done it during drills.

13 Our focus for each individual f acility in the 9 14 Commonwealth is to provide the best possible protective 15 actions for those members of the p ub lic . Now, the 16 Commonwealth has committed in terms of philosophy to 17 eventually have one nuclear engineer per site in the 18 Commonwealth, and within the last couple of years we 19 have hired two additional nuclear engineers and they are 20 in the process of being trained to the point where they 21 have the knowleige and experience that Mr. Dornsife 22 has. Of course, that doesn't happen overnight.

23 JUDGE EDLES: Am I correct that the llh 24 Commonwealth in this case is committed to having its 25 individual to the of fsite f acility within three hours?

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90 g 1 Is the three-hour number accurate or am I misstating 2 something?

3 MR. ADLER: There was a colloquy between Mr.

4 Zahler and Mr. Dornsife where Mr. Dornsife on the 5 witness stand was not prepared to commit to change the 6 emergency plans to provide f or a one-hour response 7 time. And there are logistical problems with making an 8 absolute commitment.

9 In philosophy, there is a commitment on the 10 part of the Commonwealth to get there as soon as 11 possible.

12 JUDGE EDLES: I understand that. But 13 nonetheless, you are asking us to require the Licensee 14 to set up the f acility within an hour, although there is 15 no guarantee -- and to do it in part because your 16 nuclear engineer is going to be there, although we don't 17 really have a guarantee that he will be th e re .

18 It will be quite an expense. Mr. Zahler said 19 earlier today they are going to move this vice president 20 down from Parsippany, with his f amily presumably, all 21 tha t kind of stuff. And then we could have your nuclear 22 engineer showing up in three or four hours.

23 MR. ADLERs Logistically, it is conceivable.

h 24 It is possible. It is quite possible for the Licensee 25 to establish a fully function EOF within one hour. The O

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() 1 testimony in the record is tha t there are f our possible 2 emergency support directors in the oroanization. Two of 3 them are in Parsippany, two are located at THI. So it 4 does not necessarily encompass that added expense in 5 terms of getting to the EOF between one hour and four 6 hours.

7 The expense of transporting someone from 8 Parsippan would happen anyway, because they have 9 committed to getting that senior-most official to the 10 site within four hours.

11 To make sure you understand the background for 12 our concern, it's not a concern that arose overnight, as 13 Mr. Zahler suggested. It's true tha t the Commonwealth's 7-V 14 testimony was changed during the hearing. The reason 15 for that is that drills were occurring during the 16 hearing and the ultimate complete emergency planning 17 exercise occurred in early June.

18 The basis for the Commonwealth changing its 19 testimony was simply that the mechanism suggested by 20 Licensee did not work nearly as well -- and again, we're 21 talking in relative terms -- it did not work nearly as 22 well as the June 2nd exercise, where there was direct 23 face to face contact between Licensee's representatives

( 24 and the Commonwealth 's representatives.

i 25 And I would encourage you to read, as I'm sure ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE., S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

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() 1 you already have --

2 JUDGE BUCK: Is that because thara was face to 3 f ace contact or because they were more f amiliar with the

)

4 problems?

5 MR. ADLERs Mr. Dornsife's testimony was that 6 it was a little bit of both. His primary concern was 7 the ability to obtain information at the site, 8 opera tional informa tion, in addition to the purely 9 numerical parameters that you could receive over the CRT 10 or over the operational line in the midst of an 11 emargency.

12 JUDGE BUCKS Oh, that doesn't depend upon the 13 emergency director, the emergency support director being O 14 there, if it picks up off the CRT and that sort of 15 thing.

16 HR. ADLER: In theory, as-Mr. Zahler pointed 17 out, it is not necessary for the EOF to be staffed in 18 order for the Cossonwealth to obtain sny verbal 19 inf orma tion it . vants f rom the plant via the radiological 20 line.

21 Mr. Dornsife's testimony was that in practice 22 it did not work. People in the control room had other 23 things to do. There are always priorities in terms of 24 time. And it was only when the responsibility of 25 directing the emergency and making the protective action O

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() I recommendations was transferred to the EOF that Mr.

2 Dornsife was able to get a complete and accurate picture i

3 of what occurred during the accident.

4 In terms of the information that you receive 5 on a CRT, the plant status boards, igsin you can get 6 numerical parameters. Mr. Dornsife cited a number of 7 examples of types of information that cannot be received 8 via those mechanisms. For example, a system in the 9 plant is nonfunctional. You need a judgment as to how 10 long it bill take to repair that system.

11 JUDGE BUCK: But my point is that sort of -

12 thing can come from the communicators at the site, at

, 13 the pla n t , just as well as it can come from the O 14 telephone communicators at the EOF or from Mr. Dornsife 16 being there, you know, poking his nose into it.

to MR. ADLER: Again, it's true in theory that

! 17 that information could be conveyed. Mr. Dornsife's 18 sctual experience during the drills and exercises was 19 that it was not, whereas when Mr. Arnold, the emergency 20 support director, was present in the EOF the people in

21 the control room made sure that that information got 22 there because Mr. Arnold needed it in order to handle 23 the mock energency.

( 24 JUDGE GOTCHY I have a question. About the 25 Rogan affidavit which makes the protective action

)

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() 1 recommendations a consultative effort, they said, with 2 NRC and BRP and EOF, whether the emergency support 3 director is there or not they could do it directly on 4 the emergency director's hotline, be in consultation 5 with him in formulating a protective action 6 recommendation.

7 Wouldn't tha t really satisfy a la rge part of 8 the Commonwealth's concern about face to face 9 communication with the decisionmaker?

10 MR. ADLER: If the official within Licensee's 11 organization who is making the protective action 12 recommendation andeavors to contact the state

, 13 representatives, it is true that adequate information 14 could flow from the state to the Licensee. And there is 15 a two-way information exchange. Basically, it would 16 involve describing the status of the offsite response 17 orga niza tion s. That is correct.

18 Er . Dornsife 's point was more tha t in order to 19 make an accurate and intelligente and reasoned 20 recommendation to the Governor, who is of course the 21 ultimate decisionmaker, he needs to understand not only 22 purely numerical parameters in the plant, but the 23 nuances of the plant operation, the nuances of what the

( 24 response capability of Licensee is in terms of 25 recovery.

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() 1 Mr. Dornsife's point, as an engineer and not 2 as an industrial aansger, is that it's a ve ry 3 complicated situation, as everyone learned during the 4 THI-2 accident. You can't simply tell Mr. Dornsife, we 5 anticipate the following release at the following time.

6 Mr. Dornsife wants to know why and what the chances are 7 that it can be fixed, and he wants to be able to balance 8 that in a rational fashion against what the risks are of 9 evacuation or what the risks are of sheltering.

10 JUDGE BUCKS I frankly don't see what 11 difference it makes whether I am talking to you like 12 this or we're talking on the telephone. If he has 13 certain questions to ask, he asks them. What difference O 14 does it make? I really don 't see this at all.

15 I suspect that if there is any difference in 16 the two situations, one was because everybody was 17 familiar with it the second time. I frankly do not see 18 -- there is no information coming from Er. Dornsife back i

19 to you people. It's questions. I think I can ask 20 questions over the telephone as well as I can ask them 21 to you at this distance.

22 MR. ADLER: That assumes that Mr. Dornsife, 23 sitting in the Bureau of Radiation Protection

( 24 headquarters, will get the right person at the other end l

25 of the radiological line, who has all of the I

()

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96 1 information.

2 JUDGE BUCK: But there is s communicator who 3 can find out.

4 MR. ADLER: There is an assurance in the 5 emergency operations facility that you have someone 6 who's in command of the operation and who necessarily 7 has all the information at his fingertips.

8 JUDGE BUCKa He may not know all of the things 9 Mr. Dornsife wants to know. That's my point. I don't 10 think any one man will be a ble to an'swer all of 11 Dornsife's questions.

12 JUDGE GOTCHYa Except maybe the emergency 13 director.

14 MR. ADLER That's the point. It's the 15 emergency director's job to have all of that information 16 a va ila b le .

17 JUDGE SUCKa But he is in the control room.

18 Se can keep him there all the time, if that's what you 19 vant.

20 MR. ADLERs There are a lot of people in the 21 control room, and in the middle of an accident 22 activities may be rapidly escalating and it simply may 23 not be feasible for the communicator to walk around the 24 control room, answer Mr. Dornsife's question, go back 25 and answer another question.

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() 1 JUDGE BUCKa But he is not in the control 2 room, is he? He's in the EOF. That's where he wants to 3 be, not in the control room, I hope.

[}

4 MR. ADLERs I'm sorry , I'm confused.

5 JUDGE EDLES: I think we used the term 6 " emergency director" when we meant " emergency support 7 director."

8 JUDGE GOTCHYs No, I meant the emergency 9 director. He's the only one in charge of the operation to of that plant, not the emergency support director.

11 MR. ADLER: But the emergency support director 12 has access to the same types of information that the 13 emergency director has, by definition.

O, 14 JUDGE GOTCHYs Of course.

15 MR. ADLER: That is the theory of transferring 16 responsibility and control to the EOF at some point 17 during the accident.

18 JUDGE EDLES Le t ma see if I can sort of sum 19 up and at least maybe clarify f or myself a little of 20 what you are saying and maybe pick up on what Mr. Zahler 21 said earlier. I gather that what you are telling me is 22 the fact that you have a senior official in the offsite 23 center who, when he calls on the phone, if he must do C

24 that, gets a good response because he's a senior 25 official and not a low ligh t. For some rea son he's more O

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98 O 1 capab1e of settino better informatien or the 2 communication moves faster, so he can communicate that 3 to you.

4 That seems to me somewhat of the same kind of 5 consideration that Mr. Zahler was talking about in 8 explaining why the company also wants a senior official 7 there. Is that a fair analysis?

8 MR. ADLER: That may be the case. Mr.

9 Dornsife's testimony was that for some reason -- and not to being a psychologist, perhaps he couldn't explain that 11 reason, but f6r some reason -- when he was in his office 12 and on the radiological line trying to fully understand 13 the accident in the area, he could not obtain adequate O 14 information to understand the scenario completely. But 15 when he was in the EOF with access to all the 18 information, with the emergency support director at his 17 command and at his fingertips, the ability to obtain all 18 that information -- the information was able to be 19 adequately transferred to the state.

20 JUDGE EDLES: All I am saying is, perhaps when 21 . M ce president of the company calls in and asks for 22 that, that might get a little quicker response or a 23 little better response. I mean, that wouldn't be a 24 shock to me if that were the result. That is all I am 25 suggesting.

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(_/ 1 JUDGE GOTCHY Is it also possible that in the 2 second circumstance they learned f rom mistakes in the

() 3 first exercise and that the exercise just was running 4 smoother because it was a second chance?

5 MR. ADLER: That is a possibility.

6 Io respond to you, Judge Edles, it may be tha t 7 he was the vice president. It may be that he was the 8 emergency support director and the people in the control 9 roon knew that the emergency support director needed 10 tha t information as a critical input into performing his 11 functions, whereas if the EOF is nonfunctional at that 12 time, in terms of not making protective action 13 recommendations there, then the priorities in terms of O 14 the control room personnel are not quite as shifted in 15 terms of making sure the EOF receives the information.

18 JUDGE EDLES: All I am saying, in summary, is 17 the same reason Mr. Zahler gives for wanting top-flight 18 sanagement down there to talk to people is I believe in 19 part at least some of the same reason why you want 20 top-flight managemen t in there as quickly as possible so 21 that your people can talk to them.

22 MR. ADLER: I believe that is correct. It's a 23 slightly different focus. We want top-flight 24 information to transfer to the top of our organization, 25 to the Governor, who is responsible for making the O

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100 0 1 #1timete decision.

2 JUDGE GOTCHY Within an hour, not four 3 hours.

4 JUDGE BUCK Wait a minute. In both of these 5 accidents, where was Mr. Dornsife? In both of these 8 tests where was he?

7 MR. ADLER: The initial emergency drill, which 8 was not a full-scale exercise, in which Mr. Dornsife 9 participated, he was at the BRP headquarters in 10 Harrisburg, on the radiological line between BRP 11 headquarters and the control room.

12 JUDGE BUCK: Where was he the second time?

13 NR. ADLER: As background, perhaps I should O 14 say that he reported to the Licensee that he did not 15 feel that he had accurate information or adequate 18 information for his purposes. At Licensee's suggestion, 17 he reported to the EOF. During the full-scale exercise, 18 he received there approximately a half-hour after 19 declaration of site emergency --

20 JUDGE BUCK: Now wait a minute. Is there not 21 greater information at EOF than at the other site?

22 MR. ADLER: Than at BRP headquarters?

23 JUDGE BUCK Yes, on the condition of the 24 , reactor particularly?

25 NR. ADLER: Yes, there is.

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() 1 JUDGE BUCK: Well, isn't this likely what 2 happens: In the first test he was at the far site and 3 doesn't have all of the reactor informa tion. Tha t's my 4 understanding. I may be wrong, but he doesn't have all 5 of the full reactor information, whereas the EOF does 6 have a grett demi more information available for him to 7 look at and all that sort of thing.

8 It seems to me you are comparing apples and 9 oranges here.

10 HR. ADLER: Assuming that the equipment is 11 functioning properly in the EOF, he does have more 12 numerical and plant status information than he would 13 have a t BBP headquarters.

O 14 JUDGE BUCKS That's my point.

15 HR. ADLER The examples that were cited in 16 Er. Dornsif e 's testimony we re types of information that 17 could not always be obtained .on the plant's status 18 board.

19 JUDGE BUCK: But sometimes?

20 HR. ADLER: For example, the fire that he 21 cited in the cire water pumps.

22 JUDGE BUCK: But he didn't have that situation 23 in the first test.

( 24 NR. ADLER: That's correct.

25 JUDGE BUCKa I think you are comparing apples

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() 1 and oranges. I am sorry, but I just get that conclusion 2 out of it, because he was at two different sites and 3 under two different situations.

4 That's all I have.

5 JUDGE EDLES: You know, there is obviously a 6 mix of f actors that go into the differences, and maybe 7 one of them is the fact that it is a senior person.

8 Maybe there are other f actors as well, and lack of 9 information. I think we will ferret all of tha t 10 through.

11 MR. ADLER: Of course, in order to correct 12 that void in the record, we would have had to have had a 13 third exercise where Mr. Dornsife went to the EOF but O 14 the emergency support director didn't. Unfortunately, 15 ve did not have that third exercise.

16 JUDGE EDLES: Please continue.

17 MR. ADLER: I believe I have covered all the

. 18 points that I had intended to.

l l 19 JUDGE BUCKa Okay. Go ahead and finish, but 20 before you sit down~I want to ask a couple of questions 21 tha t are not on this thing , on wha t happened this 22 morning.

23 MR. ADLER: The main point is the interface l () 24 between the onsite and offsite emergency response 25 organizations. We feel that on balance that is a more

()

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() 1 important f actor to consider than Licensee's f actor, 2 which we don't argue has no merit whatsoever.

3 JUDGE BUCKa You weren't here this morning, 4 but we had M r. and M rs. Aamodt here.

5 MR. ADLER: I was in the audience.

6 JUDGE BUCK. Oh, good. So you know some of 7 the things that went on. I don' t know whether you would 8 want to make any comment or not about the pamphlet that 9 you are putting out and whether or not the f armers have 10 more information or what your schedule is on that.

11 Could you comment on it?

12 NR. ADLERa I did not come prepared this 13 morning, as I indicated on the telephone, to respond to O 14 the specific exceptions raised by the Aamod t's. The 15 Commonwealth's position during the evidentiary hearing 16 with respect to the viability of its own emergency 17 planning was not to take an adversary role, to try to 18 convince the Board that what we were doing was 19 sdaquate. Rather, our position was to present pure 20 information to the Board, for them to make the judgment l

l 21 as to what was adequate.

22 Now, there vera certain $3ficiencies that 23 arose during the hearing and in the course of the

( 24 exercises and the FEMA critiques, and the Commonwealth 25 has endeavored to correct those deficiencies since the O

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() I hearing. They are not necessarily matters of record.

2 Ihere have been significant improvements in 3 the emergency planning effort since the hea ring. To the 4 extent that there is non-record information that the 5 Board would like to help it make its decision, I would 6 be happy to convey those questions back to the 7 responsible officials and provide that information to 8 the Board.

9 JUDGE EDLES I think maybe we ought to do 10 that in due course, rather than attempt to take up the 11 time this af ternoon.

12 JUDGE BUCK: I didn't know you were in the 13 audience this morning. Anyway, we discussed it with you

() 14 now. So thank you.

15 JUDGE EDLES: If there are no other questions, 16 thank you very much. Do you have anything else to say?

17 HR. ADLER: No, sir.

18 JUDGE EDLES: Thank you very much.

19 M r. Zahler.

l 20 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS, 21 METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., ET AL.

• 22 MR. ZAHLER: Eay it please the Board:

23 I will attempt to be very brief. I am not

() 24 going to use all of my time.

25 On the question of dosimetry, the Commonwealth l ()

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() 1 today stated the question, not whether there is a need 2 for TLD's, but whether there is a need for some form of 3 permanent record dosimetry. If that's the question that 4 they are presenting to the Board, then I submit there is 5 no issue for you to resolve, because the vsy they 6 present it to you is that the staff certify to the 7 Commission that there is adequate forms for permanent 8 record dosimetry and the staff's position is that, in 9 the absence of TLD's but with self-reading dosimetry and 10 recordkeeping, there are adequate means for permanent 11 record dosimetry.

12 In fact, I think the Commonwealth is asking 13 more. Their statement of the question is not as simple 14 as they have presented it to you this morning. They are 15 seeking TLD's. In fact, they are seeking 9,000 TLD's.

16 I don't really have anything further to say 17 with respe=t to the merits. I think it has been 18 adequately handled.

19 Let me point out one problem, and I will be 20 quite direct with the Board, one problem that faces the 21 Licensee. We have worked throughout on emergency 22 planning with the Commonwealth in negotiating lots of 23 issues. The problem we have run into with TLD's is,

() 24 quite frankly, under the regulatory gun we haven't been 25 able to reach an adequate resolution of this issue.

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() 1 I point out that in the le tter that is 2 attached to the Commonwealth brief, for example, they 3 say they need 11,000 TLD's for the whole state. Well, 4 we haven't yet received the letter that Mr. Adler 5 referred to asking for 9,000 TLD's for TMI. If that's 6 what th ey are now asking for, then I can't reconcile the 7 11,000 TLD's for the whole state plus the 9,000 for 8 which they are now asking from us.

9 If you look at what is in the record and you to go to the county plans and you turn -- I think it is 11 generally Appendix R, but it varies generally from each 12 county plan -- you will see a listing of how many TLD's 13 each of the counties saf they need, and that number 14 doesn't amount to anywhere near 9,000.

15 JUDGE EDLES: Mr. Zahler, let me cut through 16 this a little bit. When you say you have been unable to 17 reconcile the TLD problem, does " reconcile" mean who 18 pays for them? What does " reconcile" mean?

I 19 MB. ZAHLERs " Reconcile" means who pays for 20 how many of what type of dosimeters.

21 JUDGE EDLES Well, Mr. Adler, I believe, or 22 perhaps Mr. Gray, suggested that that was a problem 23 between FEMA and PEMA. Are you suggesting now that the

() 24 Licensee may ultimately have to pay for these in the 25 interest of getting the plant started up?

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i MB. zintta- We11, c1eer1r if the r=11no of 2 this Board is that we have to pay for them, otherwise we 3 can't start the plant, yes, we are going to have to pay 4 for them. 'J e don't think that is a proper resolution of 5 the issue, however.

6 Let me just be clear, so that I don't mislead 7 you. From our point of view, FEMA has been woefully 8 inadequate in the dosimetry area. But I ca nnot tell you 9 that tha t has much influence in this case, because here 10 the question is TLD's and it's either you need the TLD's 11 or you don't need the TLD's. There may be other issues 12 where FEMA has complicated the problem, which is how 13 many self-reading dosimeters do you need and what types O 14 of se1f-reading dosimeters do you need.

16 But I think the question of whether you.need 16 TLD's or you don't need TLD's this Board can resolve on 17 the record before it, and I think the evidence shows 18 that you don't need TLD's to protect emergency workers.

19 With respect to the issue on the EOF, let me 20 frame a big issue for,you. From Licensee's point of 21 view, the issue has always been, we want to put the best 22 people in the best places.

23 Let me clear un one misunderstanding. When I 24 said a TMI vice president. that TMI vice president is 25 already on site. We are not talking about moving him O

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(]) 1 from Parsippany. But he happens to be the person with 2 lots of operational experience, so he is the person that 3 the ccmpany prefers to station in the control room, and 4 he himself prefers to be stationed in the control room.

5 JUDGE EDLES: There is just one vice president 8 at the plant, is that correct?

7 MR. ZAHLER: There is also a vice president 8 for TMI-2, but there is one vice president for TMI-1.

9 He is at the plant, and his preferred position 10 in the company's judgment is that he is ststioned in the 11 control room. What goes along with what I said to you 12 earlier this afternoon about a nature and senior 13' representative at the EOF is that we either have two O 14 options. If we have to put an emergency support 15 director at the EOF within let's say one hour, we either 18 have to move this TMI vice president out of the control 17 room to the EOF, which we prefer not to do -- we think 18 it will degrade emergency response -- or we have to put 19 a more junior person in the EOF than the senior guy who 20 is in the :ontrol room, and we think that make little 21 sense from an organizational point of view.

22 Because what you are saying is, not only are 23 we putting him in the EOF, but then he is the emergency

() 24 support director because the staff requires that there 25 be only one person who can make protective action O

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() 1 recommendations, and he is the person who makes 2 protective action recommendations. And if it were me 3 and my boss were in the control room, there is no way I 4 sa going to make a recommendation without having gotten 5 his approval, and there is no purpose for that.

6 JUDGE EDLES: I must have misunderstood what 7 you said this morning. I thought that you said this 8 morning that if the Licensee loses on this issue that 9 the senior officer now living in Parsippany would be 10 transferred to TMI.

11 HR. ZAHLER: No. That's what I want to clear 12 up. What would happen is, if we lose this appeal the 13 senior officer who now stands in the control room will 14 stand in the EOF, and we will replace the person in the 15 control room with someone else to become emergency 16 director in the control room.

17 JUDGE EDLEss Because in the worst of all 18 possible worlds, from your perspective, it is more

! 19 important to have a senior official in the EOF than in 20 the control room. Now, I understand that is not your 21 preferred position, but what you are saying is, given 22 that choice, you would rather have him in the EOF than 23 in the control room?

() 24 MR. ZAHLERs Yes. We are not going to adopt 25 wha t I view as the organizational absurdity of putting a O

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() 1 more junior guy making the most important decision 2 offsite when there is a more senior person someplace 3 else.

4 It is clear that you have read the record and 5 the colloquy that took place the last two days.

6 Unfortunately, given the give and take of l

7 cross-examination and questions and answers, it is not 8 always so clear. But all of these threads were wound 9 through those last two days of the hearing.

10 Let me suggest, when you read it -- while the 11 state said today that their position was they wanted 12 top-flight people in the EOF, in fact -- and Chairman 13 Smith asked both the state and the staff this a couple O 14 of times -- their position in the hearing was ther 15 wanted someona, anyone, they didn't care who, as 16 emergency support director in the EOF. And that's 17 what's in the record and that is what Licensee has been 18 fighting.

19 JUDGE GOTCHT: Let me make sure I have this 20 straight. You say that you would take the best 21 q ua lified person that you have and you could mitigate an 22 accident in the plan t, control releases, and if it were 23 a question of making emergency recommendations, that if

() 24 ve forced you to you would take that' man out ~of the 25 reactor building or out of the control room, put him in ,

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111 O the tor- aa ==t - 3=aio= ver=oa with ie== experieace ta 2 the control room to ge t the plant under control?

3 MR. ZAHLER: Yes. But let me add one caveat 4 to that, which is as a practical matter the re a re mo re 5 people available onsite to the company who have l

6 operational experience who we have trust in to control 7 the plant. We do have a three-section duty coster, and 8 while we have a preferred person'to fill each position, 9 any of the people on the duty roster we are comfortable 10 with.

11 But let me talk about that for a second. Mr.

12 Gray stated to you that under their concept the 13 emergency director should be most concerned with 14 accident mitigation. That comes directly from the fact 15 tha t the staff 's concept of operations has ten people, 16 the most senior of which is the emergency director, and 17 he should be thinking shout plant mitigation.

18 In fact, the very philosophy of this 19 Licensee's onsite emergency organization is very 20 different. The emergency director's most important 21 function under this Licensee's plan is not necessarily 22 accident mitigation. If you look at the organizational 23 chart, the operations coordinator is the person who has O 24 1mmediate and direct responsibility for accident 25 mitigation, including accident assessment and plant O

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() 1 control. He happens to be an SRO-licensed senior 2 management official.

3 If you read through the transcript and you're 4 familiar with any of Licensee 's personnel, the primary 5 person that Licensee is picking is one the Licensing 6 Board had a lot of faith in to do that job.

7 In our concept of operations, the emergency 8 director in the control room really is the commander of 9 the ship. He has his lieutenants doing accident 10 mitigation, radiological assessment and technical 11 f unctions, and he integrates all of those inputs.

12 Clearly he is knowledgeable about what is going on in 13 all of them and provides some assistance, if necessary, i

14 and then is in a position to formulate protective action 15 recommendations. _

16 Implicit in the staff 's analysis of the 17 function of the emergency director and the function of 18 the emergency support director is that one can make 19 protective action recommendations somewhat divorced from

! 20 plant status. Now, I am not saying that they discount 21 plant status. But what they are saying is you can move 22 the person making protective action recommendations out 23 o f the con trol room , he doesn ' t have to be so concerned l

() 24 with plant mitigation because he will somehow get the l 25 information to make protective action recommendations.

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() 1 The Licensee's view is you cannot separate 2 those functions as neatly as the staff would ack, 3 especially during the early hours of an accident. To 4 make informed decisions with respect to protective 5 action recommendations, you have to know where the plant 6 is going to be in an hour or two hours or three hours, 7 because those are the minimum times to do anything with 8 the population.

9 If you are going to -- say you are going to 10 evacuate the population. The important question is, 11 wha t is the plant going to look like in five hours?

12 That is the median time for how long it's going to take 13 people to move. That's when people are going to be on O 14 the road and most exposed. If you don't know what the 15 plant is going to be like in five hours, I would suggest 16 that you think long and hard before you recommend 17 evacuation.

18 The situation has to be pretty desperate.

19 There have to be no other alternatives, because you may 20 not be choosing the right one.

21 And Licensee is heavily influenced by that and 22 says, so long as we give the emergency director his 23 three primary lieutenants to take care of the plant, to

( 24 take care of the radiological matters, and to take care 25 of general technical functions, he can stand in the O

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() 1 control room and take protective action 2 recommendations.

3 We would urge you to accept Licensee's concept 4 of operations. Let me tell you that if you don't I 5 don't know of any case where the staff is going to allow 6 any Licensee to have any flexibility in developing 7 emergency plans. All of those NUREG documents say that 8 they are only guidance and they are flexible and you can 9 do other things.

10 If this is not the most compelling case for 11 authorizing an alterna tive concept of operations, there 12 never will be any, and the result is the staff will have 13 dictated a particular concept of operations for O 14 emergency planning. And I would suggest, if you look at 15 the record to find what the basis is of tha t particular 18 concept of operstions that they are imposing on every 17 single licensee, there isn't any support for them.

18 Thank you.

19 JUDGE EDLES: Thank you all very much.

20 The case now stands submitted.

21 (Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the esse in the 22 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

n * *

• 24 25 O

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.94ISSICN

, This is to cer*,1fy that the attached proceedir.gs before the l

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD in the satter ef: Metropolitan Edison Company, Et A1., (TMI Unit 1)

Date of Proceeding: June 24, 1982 Docket !!u=ber: 50-289 (Restart)

Place of,Frcceeding: Bethesda,. Maryland were held as herein appears, and that this is the original  : anscri"c therec f for the~ file of the Coc=ission. , ,

Anne Horowitz Cfficial Reporter (Typed)

& c. gg Official Repceter (Signature)

S m

O .

O

?

_ - _ - - - - - - -