ML20054E309
| ML20054E309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1982 |
| From: | Potterfield A PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN POINT, PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, NEW YORK, ROCKLAND CITIZENS FOR SAFE ENERGY, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WEST BRANCH CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION |
| To: | CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC., NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD), POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054E310 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8206110054 | |
| Download: ML20054E309 (350) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION .< O ' 9 - t , *. 0 9- h
~BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD , .
, Docketing & Service Branch
% 4*
!\) J /
In the Matter of .
)
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. S0-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) S0-286 SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) June 7, 1982 SUPPIEEfEAL ANSWER 'IO IMERROGA'IORIES - SUBMITIED BY INIERVENORS: II'S, NYPIRG, RCSE, WBCA, PARENIS, WESPAC, EDE, AND AUDUBCN I
'IO NBC STAFF AND LICENSEES: Please consider as a supplemental list o~
intervenors' witnesses cri emergency planning,in answer to interrogatories posed by the NRC Staff and Licensees, the Index of Witnesses Presenting Testimony on Emergency Planning Issues on Behalf of the Intervenors and the information contained in U3/NYPIRG Request For An Extension of Time IniWhich To Ftle Testimony and For the Licensing Board To Set a Date By N11ich UCS/NYPIBG Bequests for Admission Must Be Answered. Both docutTents are served and filed herewith. Dated: New York, New York June 7, 1982 N1ANDA POITERFIELD, ESQ. Counsel to NYPIRG Box 384 Village Station New York, New York 10014 212-227-0265 On Behalf of UCS, NYPIRG, RCSE, hM, ( PARENIS, WESPAC, FOE and AUDUBON l B206110054 820607 PDR ADOCK 05000247 PDR g
3
~
UNI'IED STATES OF NERICA NUCIIAR REGULNIORY COff1ISSION ,_,p, u..~ BEFORE 'I1E A'IUTIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING BMRD
"?2 JJ! 10 fn:T; In the !btter of )
) , -
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) '502286 SP
)
POWER AUIYiORITY OF 'I1E STA'IE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) )
)
UCS/NYPIIG, RCSE, WBCA, NESPAC, Parents, FOE and AUDUBCN RFIFICA'IE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of:
'IESTIMJNY CN EMERGENCY PIRNING ISSUES PRESENIED ON BEHALF OF 'IYE INIERVENORS:
UCS, NYPIRG, RCSE, WBCA, PARENTS, WESPAC, FOE AND AUDUBCN AND ON BEALF OF 'IYE ATIORNEY GENERAL OF 'ITE STATE OF NEW YORK; UCS/NYPIRG REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TITE IN MIICH 'IO FIIE 'IESTIMJNY AND FOR
'IIIE LICENSING BOARD 'IO SET A DNIE BY MIIG UCS/NYPIIG REQUESTS FOR AITTISSION 11ET BE ANSIERED; and INIERVENORS' SUPPIRENTAL ANSWER 'IO INIERROGA'IORIES have been served on the other parties on the official mininun service list for the above captioned proceeding by depositing in the United States mail, first class, this 7th day of June, 1982. 3 l
Y fk by Holt New ork Public Interest Research Group, Inc. t ' a
o O \ l l l 4 LNI'IED STA*IES OF MERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COBEISSIQJ BOARD CD l BEFORE 'ITE A'IQ4IC SAFETY AND LICENSING y
-X T - s In the >btter of : Docket Nos. 50-286 50-247SPSP --.
S' ,J;W 1 0 1982
- g g secretU1 CCNSOLIDNIED EDISGI CQ4PANY OF NDV YORK -
pga E.d s emte @ (Indian Point Unit 2) f POWER AUI110RITY OF TIE STATE OF NDi YORK g to (Indian Point Unit 3) --X INIEX CF WI'INESSES PRESENTING 'IESTIKNY ON EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES F Qi BDIALF OF 'ITEIX'S, NYPI , IN'IERVENORS: ORK_ hESPAC, FOE, AND AUDUDCN AND CN BEllAIE APPLICABLE O'ITE BO?JO CON'IEN PARI'IES PRESENTING 'IESTIENY 3.3, 3.6, 4.1, 4.6 New York State Attorney ceneral WI'INES_S ' [ UCS, NYPIRG, AUDUBON 1. Brian Palenik, National Audubon Society s Policy Research Department, and Dr. Jan Beyea, Senior Energy Scientist, 3.1, 3.6, 4.6 National Audubon Society UCS, NYPIRG l Foy Albert,M.D., Professor of Environmenta ' 3.1,3 2. 3.4, 4.5, 4.7
- 2. Medicine, NYU ledical School UCS, NYPIBG, ICSE Richard Jay Altschuler, St.atistics for 3.1, 4.7 3.
Business Parents Amy Kriveloff, resident, Yorktown Heights h Atanic 4. l be sutmitted late, with the permission of t e
~~* Testimony of witnesses with asterisks wil Safety and Licensing Board
WI'INESS o . 5. PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTILDTl APPLICABLE BOARD CONTENTICNS Feralyn Woods, parent, Peekskill
- 6. Parents Ebbel Cronk, Peekskill Seniors, Peekskill 3.1, 4.7 7 Parents, hESPIC Barbara flickernell, parent, Ossining 3.1, 4.4, 4.7 1 8 Parents, WESP7C Lynn C. Gunzenhauser, resident, Croton-on-Iludscn 3.1, 3. 7, 4. 7 UG, NYPIIG, WESPAC
- 9. 3.1, 4.7 Karen IIenes, parent, Cortlandt hTSPAC, UCS, NfPIRG
- 10. Arthur B. Zelman, M.D., bbdical Director 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.7 of 'Ihehhite Center for Preventive Psychiatry, Parents Inc., Plains 3.2, 3.7, 4. 3, 4. 3, 4.7
- 11. Agata Craig, parent, Croton-on-Ifudson UCS, NYPIEG, PCSE
- 12. Jamie Gmen, parent, Croton-on-lludson 3.1, 4.2, 4.4 hESPAC, PCSE
- 13. Patsy Chazen, resident, Croton-on-iludson 3.1, 4.2, 4.4 hESPAC
- 14. Gillette, CrugersGertrude and llenry, resicbnts, 3.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2 hESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
*15. 'Ihcrus P. Judd, M.A., Assistant Director of Instituticnal Ibsearch, Rockland ,
WBCA, PCSE Ccrmunity College 3.1, 3.4, 4.5, 4.7
- 16. Luis del Pilar, Affirmatim Action Co-Ordinator, Ibekland County PCSE 3.1, 4.7
- 17. Pobert T. Johnson, resident, Stony Point PGE, WBCA
*18. Lawrence Kaagan, Senior Pescarch Associate, 3.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 3.7 Yankelovich, Skelly and hhite, Inc. UG,NYPIRG, FCSE
, 3. 2, 3.4, 4. 5, '4. 7 {
- 19. Deth Waterfall, Pmss Obserwr, Croton-Cortlandt news hESPlc, ICSE f
3.1, 3.6, 3.4, 4.5 l ( ii-
O O O WITED STATES OF AMCA NLK' LEAR REGUIATORY CIPMISSICN BEFORE 'I1E A'KMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of : Docket Nos. 50-247 SP \U OCMSOLIDNIED EDISON OCNPANY OF NEW YORK (Indian Point thit 2) 50-286 SP
,JilM 1 O1982 #
- secttari POWER AUIHORITY OF TIE STATE OF NEW YORK #
E Semte (Indian Point Unit 3) g act5 /g f X 4 to INIEX OF WI'INESSES PRESENTING 7ESTIKNY W EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES CN BEHALF OF 71E INTERVENORS: UCS, NYPIBG, BCSE, WBCA, PARENIS NESP10, FOE, AND AUDUBON AND W BEHALF OF
'ITE ATIORNEY GENERAL OF 71E STATE OF NEW YORK PARI'IES PRESENI'ING TESTIMNI APPLICABIE BOARD CINIENTICNS WI1 NESS
- 1. Brian Palenik, National Audubon Society's New York State Attorney General 3.3, 3.6, 4 1, 4.6 Policy Research Department, and UCS, NYPIRG, AUDUBW Dr. Jan Beyea, Senior Energy Scientist, National Audubon Society UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.6, 4.6
- 2. Boy Albert,M.D., Professor of Environmental Medicine, NYU Medical School UCS, NYPIBG, BCSE 3.1,3 2, 3.4, 4.5, 4.7
- 3. Richard Jay Altschuler, Statistics for Business
~
Parents 3.1, 4.7
- 4. Amy Kriveloff, resident, Yorktown Heights
- Testimony of witnesses with asterisks will be subnitted late, with the permission of the Atcrnic Safety and Licensing Board
-A- _ _
WI'INESS O O PARI'IES PRESENI'ING 'IESTIKNY O APPLICABIE BOARD CON'IENTICNS
- 5. Feralyn Woods, parent, Peekskill Parents 3.1, 4.7 l
- 6. Mabel Cronk, Peekskill Seniors, Peekskill Parents, WESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7 i f
- 7. Barbara Hickernell, parent, Ossining Parents, WESPAC 3.1, 3.7, 4.7
- 8. Lynn C. Gunzenhauser, resident, Croton-on- UCS, NYPIBG, WESPAC 3.1, 4.7 Hudson
- 9. Karen Henes, parent, Cortlandt WESPAC, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.7
- 10. Arthur B. Zelman, M.D., Medical Director Parents 3.2, 3.7, 4.3, 4.3, 4.7 of 'Ihe Center for Preventive Psychiatry, Inc., White Plains
- 11. Agata Craig, parent, Croton-on-Hudson UCS, NYPIBG, RCSE 3.1, 4.2, 4.4
- 12. Jamie Green, parent, Croton-on-Hudson WESPAC, BCSE 3.1, 4.2, 4.4 I
- 13. Patsy Gamn, resident, Croton-on-Hudson WESPAC 3.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2
- 14. Gillette, Gertrude and Henry, residents, WESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7 Crugers t i
*15. 'Ihcrras P. Judd, M.A., Assistant Director, NBCA, PCSE 3.1, 3.4, 4.5, 4.7 of Institutional Research, Pockland ,
Conmunity College f
- 16. Luis del Pilar, Affirmative Action Co- PCSE 3.1, 4.7 Ordinator, Ibckland County
- 17. Ibbert T. Johnson, resident, Stony Point RGE, WBCA 3.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 3.7 >
*18. Lawrence Kaagan, Senior Research Associate, UCS,NYPIRG, PGE 3.2, 3.4, 4.5,'4.7 Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc.
- 19. Beth Waterfall, Press Observer, Croton- WESPAC, FCSE 3.1, 3.6, 3.4, 4.5 Cortlandt news
-ii-
O O O WI'INESS PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIN APPLICABLE BOARD CChMCNS
- 20. Dr. Donald D. Smith, Profescor of Mass UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 4.4, 4.7 Cmmunication in the School of Journalism, University of Iowa WESPAC, BCSE 3.1, 3.4, 4.7
- 21. Betty Pamey, owner, WRKL Radio, Pmona NBCA, BCSE 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9,
- 22. Kenneth Ingenito, Ibckland County Icgislator, 4.2, 4.3 Stony Point Town Councilperson, teacher, N. Rockland Central School District
- 23. Lucien H. Conklin, Supervisor, Town of Stony WBCA, ICSE 3.1, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.7 Point BCSE, NBCA 3.1, 3.2, 3.6
- 24. Myles Lavelle, Councilperson, Town of Stony Point 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.9,
- 25. Stephen Scurti, Police Chief, Stony Point NBCA 4.2 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2,
- 26. Fred Seeger, Clarkstown Superintendent of WBCA Highways 4.3 NBCA 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2
- 27. George Schnakenberg, Police Chief, Clarkstown
- 28. 'Ihamas F. Rider, Director of Civil Defense, NBCA 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3 Police Cm missioner and Trustee, Village of Haverstraw 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.9,
- 29. Michael Holland, Police Chief, Village of WBCA, RCSE 4.2, 4.5, 4.7 Haverstrau _
WBCA, BCSE 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3
- 30. Gregory A. Carney, Henber, Rockland County Board for Planning ,
WBCA, FOE, AUDUBCN 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3
- 31. William W. Chase, Principal Planner, Rockland County Board for Planning
- 32. Rev. Frederick F. Johnson, Bector of St. Paul's WBCA y,3.2,3.3,3.9,4.2, Episcopal Church, Spring valley, and Menber of Board of Governors of Rockland County Health Canplex _iii_
O O O WI'INESS PARTIES PRESENTING TESTIKEY APPLICABLE BOARD OCETENTIONS
- 33. Richard Wishnie, Supervisor, Town of Ossining WESPAC 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2
- 34. Richard Goldfarb, Police Chief, Village of WESPAC, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.6, 3.7 Ossining
- 35. Ellefson, Earle R., Captain, Ossining Volunteer Parents 3.1, 3.2 Ambulance Corps, Inc., and parent
- 36. Richard F. Herbek, Village Manager, Croton-on- Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2, Hudson 4.4
- 37. Reginald Laimbruschi, Police Chief, Village of WESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2 Croton-on-Hudson
- 38. Nancy R. Elliott, Supervisor, Town of Yorktown NESPAC, RCSE 3.1,3.4, 3.6,4.2, 4.5
- 39. Sonny Hall, Vice-President, Transport Workers UCS,NYPIIG, Parents 3.1, 3.7 Union, Incal 100
- 40. James L. N rphy, MPH, Public Health Specialist, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 4.4 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,
White Plains
- 41. Joan Harding King, registered nurse and parent, UCS, NYPIRG, ESPAC 3.1, 3.6 New City 42.Jannelise Galdone, photographer and parent, UCS, NYPIRG, NESPAC 3.1, 3.6 New City
- 43. Richard H. Bower, CHrdinator, Rockland County WBCA 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, Volunteer Anbulance Corp 4.4
- 44. Robert L. m rris, Consultant in Traffic and U0i, NYPIIG 3.1, 3.3, 3.6 Transportaticn
- 45. Linda Berker, law student, White Plains KESPAC 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.9, 4.2
- 46. Eileen L. Vinci, resident, Mohecan Lake NESPAC 3.3, 3.9, 4.2
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. - - _ - _ _ . . _ . - - - , .________-_-._-.______-_-._-_-________.a
O O. O WI'INESS PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIffNY APPLICABLE BQtWD CChMCNS
- 47. furie H. 'Itxrkins, resident, Tomkins Cove WBCA 3.3, 3.9, 4.2
- 48. Dr. Philip Wolfe, mathematician, Ossining NESPAC 3.1,3.3, 3.9, 4.2
- 49. Charles Awalt,Hestchester Developnental Parents, WESPAC 3.1,3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2,4.4 Disabilities Services Office, Tarrytown
- 50. Richard Lang, Executive Director, Search Parents, WESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7 for Change, Inc., Peekskill
- 51. John ftore, CHrdinator, Jesse J. Kaplan WBCA, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 School, Bockland County BOCES
- 52. Pat Bethge, Besident Supervisor, Putnam Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.4, 4.7 Association for Betarded Citizens, and parent
- 53. Betsy Bergman, Administrative Assistant, WESPAC, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.6,4.2, 4.4, KEOi Center of Ccxmunity Aid for 4.7 Retarded Citizens, Peekskill
- 54. Bonni and Paul Schwartz, teacher and Parents, WESPAC 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9 Director, Canp Rainbow, and parents, 4.2, 4.7 Croton-on-Hudsen
- 55. Ioretta Brundage, parent and grandparent, Parents 3.7, 3.3, 4.9, 4.2, 4.4 Croton-on-Hudscri
- 56. Evan Litty, mobility-inparired parent, Parents 3.1, 3.7, 4.1, 4.4, 4.7 Mahopac
*57. Inez Janger, past-President and Menber, Parents 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 Board of Directors, New York State Parents for Hearing-Inpaired Children ,
- 58. Clifford and Nancy Bowley, President, Parents 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 >
New York City Civic Association of the Deaf and President, Westchester Comnunity Services for the Hearing Inpaired, and ' Parents
-v-
O O o PARI'IES PRESENI'ING TESTIM]NY APPLICABIE BOARD OENIMTICNS WI'INESS Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 58A. Oscar Cohen, Principal Iexington School for the Deaf, Jackson IMights BCSE, NIKA 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
- 59. Barbara Blattstein, Rockland Association for the Hearing Inpaired 3.2, 3.4, 4.4
- 60. Dominic Sbarra, Maintenance Manager, Patricia NESPAC, BCSE Apart 2 Tents, and grandparent, Ossining Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
- 61. Agnes Murphy, Program Co-Ordinator, Senior Action Center, Ossining fiA. 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
- 62. . Seymour Greenbatsu, Menber, Board of Directors, Parents l Shepherd Center, Cortlandt NBCA, BCEE 3.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.7
- 63. Gladys Burger, President, Disabled in Action, and resident, Spring Valley Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
- 64. Hattie Coffey, nstber, Advisory Comnittee for Disabled, Peekskill 3.1, 4.4, 4.7
- 65. Susan Simon, public health nurse, Westchester NESPAC County UCS, NYPIRG, NESPAC 3.1, 3.6, 4.1, 4.4
/ 67. Samuel W. Anderson, PhD, President, New York f State Cbalition of People with Disabilities 3.7, 4.4, 4.7
- 68. Jack Pettersen, Superintendent, Town of Parents Cortlandt Parks, Iecreation and Conservation Department, Crugers l Parents 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 l 69. Stephen L. Elkins, Becreation and Parks '
I Depart 2 tent, City of Peekskill RCSE, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.6, 3.7, 4.4,
- 70. Alex Grunack, Senior Becreation Leader, Town 4.7 of Clarkstown Parks and Becreation Departrent, and menter of Transportaticn Advisory Council of Ibckland County
_vi_
O O O PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIENY APPLICABLE BOARD CCNIDTTICNS 1 WI'INESS hBCA, Parents 3.1, 3.7,4.4, 4.7
- 71. Judy Kesselman, C x rdinator, Suburban Schools, Tiorati Workshop, Harriman State Park Parents, NESPAC, RCSE 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 4.6
- 72. Helen Balgooyen, Health Worker, Croton-on-Hudson
- 73. Kathe Saunders, Croton Becreatim Department Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 After-School Program, and parent
- 74. Joan H. Fine, Girl Scouts of Westchester Parents 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 4.2
- 75. Linda Co, Registered Occupational 'Iherapist Parents, R'.SE and Menber, Board of Directors, Rockland County Girl Scout Council, Inc.
UCS,NYPIRG,RCSE 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.3,3.6,
- 76. Phyllis V. Podriguez, recreational art teacher 3.7, 3.9, 4.2 and parent, Croton-on-Hudscm Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7
- 77. Monya Berg Brown, art teacher, Croton-on-Hudson Parents, NESPAC 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3
- 78. Sylvia G. de Ward, aka Syd Ginsberg, artist, art teacher and parent, Croton-on-Hudson
- 79. Helen Burnham, Director, Croton Free Library Parents 3.1, 3.7, 4.7 Parents, WBCA 3.7, 4.7
- 80. Gerald T. Yapusinsky, Attendance Supervisor, N. Rockland Central School District Parents, BCSE, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 4.5
- 81. David Siegel, Superintendent of Schools, Croton-Harmon School District
- 82. G. Richard Dunne, President, Yorktown Central Parents, BCSE 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7 Schools, Yorktown Heights 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.2, 4.4
- 83. Richard Alexander, Transportation Office, Parents Yorktown Central Schools, Yorktown Heights 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7
- 84. John Roden, President Yorktown Congress of Parents Teachers
-vii-
O O O
.WEINESS PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIl0NY APPLICABLE BOARD CONTENTIONS
- 85. Raymond Bowles, teacher, speech pathologist, Parents 3.1, -3. 3, 3.7, 3. 9, 4.1, 4. 2, Pocantico Hills School, and realtor and' 4.7 _ s
&nt Z
- 86. Viirent J. Rubeo, teacher,- Anne M. Dorner ~ ~ Parents R 3.1, 3.2,'3.7 Middle School, Ossining ,
A~y ~
.n
- 87. John Iurato, Croton-Hanton High School [ Parents, WESPAC 3.1,;3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9,4.7
- 88. Elizabeth Sekelsky, School Nurse, Carrie Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.6, 3.7,4.4, 4.7 E. Ttatpkins Elementary School, and parent, Croton-Ja-Ht@cn .
x
- 89. Anthony J. Napoli, Principal, Port Chester , . Parents f 3.1, 3.7, 4.7 Senior High School, Port Cheste. .
- 90. Toby Gersony, Educational Director, Ramaguois Parents, PCSE '; 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 4.5 _
N. Country Day School, Pamona , j; g i . 91.'hlbonoic Bronzo, Croton Montessori . N 1 Parents . 3.1, 3.7
'" ~
N Dirtectress, Croton-on-Hudsg)
- 92. Arlene Tift, parent, Croton-on-Hudscn Parents, WESPAC 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 9
- 93. Lynn Kauderer, parenti, Croton-on-Htdsca Parents, RCSE 314, 3.7
- 94. Vincent:Savastano, Director, Hudson Parents, WESPAC '
3.1, 3.7, 4.7 Valley Gymastics School, and parent, '; Bidianan ,
~ - s a s 95. Icon Bcck, Superintendent, Lakeland Central
~
Parents) WESPAC 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2 , s
# SchooljDistrict Shrub Oak - x
- 96. Robert W. Hare, Pastor, Scarborough Presbyterian Parents, UCS, NYPIRG ,
3.1, .$.2, 3.7, 4.1, 4.4,* T 01urch,'and parent 4.5 j
- 97. Reverend David B. Wayne, Rector, St. Augustine's Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 _ 1 t.
Episcopal Church, a:4 parent, Croton-on- Y Hudson ,
-viii-l
- = - * - - = wr- gg - ,-- - - ,,__,__,,____,,_m , _ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _,,____,,_,,,,_w,,__+_ _ , .
O O - O~ .. WI'INESS . PARTIES PRESD4 TING 'IESTDDIY ' APPLICABL5 DT3D COT 1tWfId4S
- 98. Cleland S. Conklin, Superintendent of Parents, UCS, NYPIRG ~ _3.1,"3.2,'3.7 Bm1Mogs, Grounds and Transportation, ,
South Orangetown School District
- 99. Phyllis Helbraun, Executive Director of RCSE, Parents 3.1, 3.2,' 3.7, 4.5, 4.7 -
Rockland Comcil for Young Children . 3.1, 3'2, 3.4,3.6, 4.4, 4.7
~
100. Sally Ziegler, Executive Director, Day WESP E , Parents, R 3E ' Care Cotncil of Westchester, Inc. 101. Michael A. Ibbinson, Rabbi, Tenple Israel Parents, ESPE 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 of Northern Westchester, Crottn-on-Hudson Parents, NESPE 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 102.Wi114am Ibdriguez, Director, Recreation Department of Croton, and parent UCS, NYPIRG, Parents 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7
- 103. Jerare Kagan, Ph.D., Professor of Hunan i Development, Harvard University
'
- 104. David Elkind, Ph.D., Professor of Child UCS, NYPIRG, Parents 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 i Developrent, Tufts University ,
105. Fern Narod-Shiek, school bus driver, Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 4.6 . 11ahopac school district, Westchester . Parents,' (X.S, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.7
-106. Seth Corwin, Chappaqua Bus Co., Inc.
Parents, UCS, NYPIrc 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 4.4 107. Tom Turner. Vanguard Bus Co. UCS, NYPIRG, Parents 3.2, 3.7 108. Albert A. Johnson, resident, Stony Point Parents, NESPE 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,,3.7, 4.4 109. Sister Colleen Marray, Principal Holy Nare, of Ma.g School, Croton-on-Hudson , Parents 3.2, 3.7 l 110. Lynn Doughty, President, Croton Hanron Doard of Education Parents 3.1, 3.2, 4.7
~ ll1. .Shapeane Baff, Director Yorktown Gynnastic Center, and parent ix
p 7 V ,) WI'INESS PARI'IES PRESENTING TEbt'IFO1Y APPLICABLE BOARD CONTErffIONS 112. Nancy Sheer, teacher and parent, Croton Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.2,.3.3, 3.7, 3.9,4.2 , 113. Becky Catherall, teacher of gifted students, Parents 3.1, 3.2 Carrie E. 'Iupkins Elementary School, Croton 114. Joan C. Livingston, teacher, Carrie E. Parents, RCSE, LCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 4.3, Tonpkins Elenentary School, Croton-on-Hudson 4.5 115. Barbara Gochnan, teacher, Carrie E. Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7
'Ihpkins Elementary School, and parent, Croton-on-Hudson 116. Barbara Hirschman, teacher of children with Parents, WESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,3.7, 3.9 special needs, Carrie E. Tonpkins Elementary 4.2, 4.3 School, and parent, Croton-on-Hudson 117. Ruth R. Isaacs, teacher, Carrie E. Tcripkins Parents 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 Elementary School, parent and grandparent, Croton-on-Hudson 118. Breda Curran, teacher, Carrie E. Tmpkins Parents 3.2 -
Elementary School, Croton-on-Hudson 119. Maggie North, teacher, Carrie E. Tompkins Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 , Elementary School, and parent, Croton-on-Hudson 120. Eleanor Kahn, special education teacher, Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.1 Robert E. Bell Middle School, and parent, Chappaqua 121. Clare Rosen, School Psychologist, West Orchard Parents 3.2, 3.7 Elenentary School and Robert E. Bell Middle School, Chappaqua, New York 122. Betty Doepken, President of Yorktown Parent- Parents 3.2 Teachers Association, YorktowTi Heights Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 . 123. Susan Scheffel, Co-ordinator, Adult Career Guidance Center, PutnaW Northern Westchester BOCES, and parent _x_
+ --. - - . - . - . _ . . _ . .
O O O WI'INESS PARTIES PBESENTING 'IESTIKNY APPLICABLE BOABD C0fIENTICNS 124. Joan Indusi, teacher, Anne M. Dorner Parents, BCSE 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 4.7 Middle School, Ossining 125. Mary Iou Gohring, teacher N. Ibckland BCSE, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 High School 126. Iois Jessup, retired teacher, E. Bamapo B0iE, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 4.4 School District and President, Bockland County Conservation Association 127. David A. Churchill, teacher, James A. WDCA, Parents, BCSE 3.2, 3.3, 3.7 i Farley MtMla School, Stony Point 128. T. Berry Brazelten, M.D., Professor of UCS, NYPIBG, Parents 3.2, 3.7 ' Pediatrics, Harvard M ical School 129. Daniela Misch, parent, Croton-on-Hudson Parents 3.2, 4.7 130. T.illian F. btore, babysitter and parent, Parents 3.2, '.7, 4.7 Croton-on-Hudson t l 131. Mary P. Bulleit, parent, Croton-on-Hudscn Parents, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 132. Sheilah aechtschaffer, parent, Crotcn-on- Parents, NESPAC 3,.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2 Hudson Parents, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.7 133. Susaa M. Teasdale, parent, Paekskill BCSE, NBCA, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 134. Jane Courtney, parent, Stony Point
. 4.2, 4.3 BCSE, NBCA, Parents, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.7, 135. Helga Ancona, parent, Stony Point ' 3.9, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 UCS, NYPIBG ,
3.2, 3.7 136. Elise Ientz, nurse and parent, Croton-<n-Hudson Parents Parents, UCS, NYPIBG. 3.1, 3.2,3.7, 4.7 137. Myra Spiegelman, parent, Croton-on-Hudson _xi_
O O O WIINESS PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIFONY APPLICABLE BOARD CCNIENTIONS 138. Ellen Burgher, parent, Pleasantville Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 4.7 139. Kathleen Toscani, parent, Crotcn-on-Hudscm Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 140. Karen K. Ebrd, parent, Croton-on-Hudson Parents, WESPAC 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, 4.2 141. Madeleine and Marc Holzer, parents, Croton- Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, on-Hudson 4.3 142. Kathy Pierpont, parent, Croton-on-Hudson Parents, RGE 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 143. Sari Eklund, parent, Croton-on-Hudson Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 144. Eileen McGovern, parent, Tcunkins Cove Parents RCSE, UCS, NYPIRG 3.2, 3.7, 3.4, 4.4, 4.5 145. Ervine Kinmerling, psychotherapist and Parents, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, parent, Croton-on-Hudson 4.2, 4.4, 4.7 146. Sherry Horowitz, _ parent, Crotcm-on-Hudson Parents 3.2, 3.7 147. 'Iheocbra Dyer, parent, Crotcn-on-Hudson Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 148. Kai T. Erikson, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, Parents, UCS, NYPIRG 3 2, 3.7 Editor, Yale Ibview,' Yale University
- 149. Ibbert Jay Lifton, M.D., Ebundaticns Fund UCS, NYPIRG 3.2, 3.7 Ibsearch Professor of Psychiatry, Yale School of bedicine 150. Edward J. Connelly, Emergency Medical Parents, UG, NYPIRG '
3.2, 4.4 Technician and Member, Ossining Volunteer Anbulance Corps, Ossining 151. Stanley G. Brooker, bbnber, Stcny Point WBCA 3.1, 3.2 Anbulance Corps
- 152. Christopher biumll, Director, Ibspiratory UCS, NYPIRG 3.1, 3.2, 4.4
'Iherapy, Ccamunity General Osteopathic Hospital, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
-xii-
I l
- O O O WI')LNESS PARTIES PRESENTING 'IESTIKNY APPLICABLE BOARD CNIENTICNS
, 153. Julie Palmer, M.D., Piermont UCS,NYPIRG, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 154. Albert J. Solnit, M.D., Director, Yale UCS, NYPIRG, Parents 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 University Child Study Center 155. Phyllis Mendelsohn, Teacher-Director, Parents, UCS, NYPIBG, NESPAC 3.1, 3.2,3.3, 3.7, 3.9,4.2 Croton Ccrmunity Nursery School 156. Abby Perl, nursery school teacher, Croton-on- Parents, UCS, NYPI E 3.1, 3.2,3.7, 4.4 Hudson i 157. Judith Glass, teacher, Croton Comunity Parents, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.7, 4.7 Nursery School, and parent 158.Paula Myers, kindergarten teacher, Carrie Parents, UCS, NYPIBG 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 E. Tcrrpkins Elementary School, Croton-on-Hudson 159. Shirley S. Gunn, Director-Teacher, Circle Parents, ESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, 3.9, School, and parent, Croton-on-Hudson 3.6, 4.2 160. Joyce Zern, nursery school teacher and Parents, NESPAC 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 parent, OssminJ 161. Linda Puglisi, Director Mohegan Colony Parents, WESPAC 3.-1, 3.2, 3.7 Nursery School, Cu.mpna 162. Charlyn Appollonio, Teacher's Aide, and Parents 3.2, 3.7 parent, Yorkt;..n ~ 163. Margaret Davis, twher of young children, Parents, NESPAC ' 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 Crotz:n-on-Huds n 164. Jane Capon, Owner-Director, nursery school RCSE, Parents 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.7 and day carp, Ptxtona 165. Sheila Salkin, Director, Tenple Beth El Parents, BCSE 3.1, 3.3, 3.7 Nursery School, Spring Valley
-xiii-
O . O O WI'INESS PAIEIES PRESENPING TESTIKNY APPLICABLE BOARD CINIENTIOE 166. Linda Brown, Tappan Zee Nursery School Parents 3.2, 3.7 167. Katherine Feit, parent and babysitter, Croton- Parents 3.2, 3.7 on-Hur%nri
- 168. Murray Melbin, Ph.D., Profener of Sociology, UCS,NYPIRG 3.2, 4.4 Bostcn University 169. Bela and Ingra Cseh, residents, Croton-on- UCS,NYPIBG, WESPAC 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2 Hudson
- 170. Victor W. Sidel, M.D., Chairman, Department of UCS,NYPIRG 3.6, 4.1, 4.6 Social Medicine,Itntefiore Hospital and M cal Center 171. Daniel M. Pisello, Ph.D., Assistant Professor EDE, Audubon 3.6, 4.1, 4.3, 4.6 of Physics, New York Institute of Technology, Old Westbury, New York, and Richard G. Piccioni, Ph.D., Assistant Professor in the Department of Biological Sciences, Hunter College of the City D1iversity of New York a
I
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()> UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
. Louis J. Carter, Chairman Frederick J. Shon Dr. Oscar H. Paris
______... ____.__________________________.---x In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. CONSOLIDATED EDIS0N COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ) 50-247 SP INC. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) 50-286 SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK June 7, 1982 (Indian Point, Unit No. 3) )
---------------------------------------------x O eaELIMINaar * -
"Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning" Direct Testimony of ~
Brian Palenik and Dr. Jan Beyea On Behalf of New York State Attorney General Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) New York City Audubon Society
- C'ertain Sections,as indicated by as terisks in the Table of Contents, have not been completed as of Jtine 7,1982. In particular, Questions 10, 13, 16, 18-21, and the reference sections are not complete at this time.
i Supplementary written testimony will be submitted by June 17, 1982. q
%)
~L 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Sections and Ouestions h Qualifications . Summary of Testimony
- 1. Please summarize your testimony:
Introductory Questions
- 2. Describe in general terms how radioactive material is released to the environment.
- 3. How does the population receive radiation doses?
- 4. In what units are doses measured?
- 5. What are the potential health consequences of radiation doses?
- 6. How have you modelled the plume movement and dose pathways? .
- 7. In what ways have your calculations taken into account the uncertainties in the current state of consequence modelling?
- 8. What are the characteristics of the release type you have considered and why did you choose to use it?
Consequences of a PWR2 Type Release Beyond Ten Miles and their Implications for Emergency Planning. ,
- 9. For a PWR2 release, what are the health consequences beyond ten miles that are not significantly reduced by the present emergency plans?
l
*10. What are the early death consequences beyond ten miles that are not significantly reduced by the current emergency plans? (not completed)
- 11. What are the land contamination consequences of a PWR2 release?
- 12. Are there any ways to mitigate these consequences?
*13. Is increasing the evacuation zone an effective mitigating strategy?
- 14. What other measures besides evacuation would reduce the health consequences of a PWR2 release for residents beyond ten miles?
O
*Not completed by June 7, 1982.
Consequcnces of a PWR2 Type Release Within Ten Miles and Their Implications for Emergency Planning.
- 15. What are the early death consequences within ten
/]
U miles of a PWR2 release given the current evacuation plans?
*16. lihat special facilities within ten miles are at
- risk uith respect to early death? - (f!ot likely to be completed by June 7.)
- 17. Are the weather conditions you use abnonnal?
*18. How much warning time would be needed to avoid all early deaths? (Not likely to be completed by June 7.)
*19. How many people would require hospitalization for immediate treatment of life-threatening radiation doses? (Not likely to be completed by June 7.)
*20. , What would your results be like for a 350_ ram threshold?.
*21. What are the other health consecuences, besides early deaths, that threaten the population within ten miles? (Not likely to be completed, except for general conments, by June 7.)
- 22. What strategies are available to reduce the health consequences to the population within t'en miles?
- 23. Is sheltering ever a preferred strategy to evacuation?.
24 Should potassium iodide be distributed within the
" ten" mile EPZ?
- 25. Assuming your description of accident consequences is correct, how likely is it what a'PWR2 type -
release will occur in the first place? Methodology and Assumptions
- 26. How were these results calculated?
- 27. Why consider a low plume rise case?
- 28. What does a range max case represent?
- 29. Why is " rain" an especially bad scenario? -
- 30. Describe how the evacuation times were derived and the assumptions behind them?
31 . Why didn't you estimate the number of early deaths from a PWR2 release?
- 32. How accurate are the emergency evacuation (response) time estimates?
A l U l ! * ' Not complete by June 7, 1982.
l
- References Appendix A. Resume of Dr. Beyea. g 1 Appendix B. Supplementary Early Death Tables for Various ERPAS.
l
- i i
. *Not complete by June 7,1982.
l O h O
OUALIFICATIONS~OF DR. JAN BEYEA _ 1 Dr. Beyea received his doctorate in-physics from Columbia University 2 in 1968. Since then he has served as an Assistant Professor of physics at 3 Holy Cross College in Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research 4 staff of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University, 5 and as of May 1980 as the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society. 6 While at Princeton University, Dr. Beyea prepared a critical quantitative 7 analysis of attempts to model reactor accident consequences. The lessons 8 learned from this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes 9 written to model radioactivity releases have been applied by Dr. Beyea to 10 specific problems at the request of governmental and nong'overnmental bodies 11 around the world. Major reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities 12 have been written for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor), for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the 14 state of Lower Saxony in West Germany (Gorleben waste disposal site). He has also 15 examined,in less detail, safety aspects of specific sites for the California. 16 . Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, , 17 and the New York City Council. 18 While at Princeton, Dr. Beyea wrote a computer program useful for 19 reactor emergency planning for the New Jersey Department of Environmental 20 Protection. This program, appropriately modified, has been used for many of 21 the calculations presented in this testimony. 22 After joining the National Audubon Society, Beyea continued to work as 23 an independent cons'ultant on nuclear safety issues. He participated in a 24 study, directed by the Union of Concerned Scientists at the request of the 25 Governor of Pennsylvania, concerning the proposed venting of krypton gas at Three Mile Island. The U.C.S. study, for which Beyea made the radiation dose
I calculatiom, essentially confirmed official dose projections made by the N.R.C. 2 and the State of Pennsylvania. The fact that an organization critical of nuclear g 3 power confirmed official dose calculations was the major reason the Governor 4 gave for approving the venting. , 5 Dr. Beyea participated in the international exercise on consequence 6 modelling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & 7 Development (0.E.C.D.). Scientists and engineers from fourteen countries 8 around the world calculated radiation dasas following hypothetical " benchmark" 9 releases using their own consequence models. Participants from the Unitea 10 States, in addition to Dr. Beyea, included groups frca Sandia Laboratories, 11 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest,and Pickard, Lowe 12 and Garick, Inc. 13 Dr. Beyea also served as a consultant from the environment community 14 to the N.R.C. in connection with their development of " Safety Goals for Nuclear 15 Pcuar Plaats."
-h 16 In addition to reports written about specific nuclear facilities, an 17 article of Beyea's on resolving conflict at the Indian Point reactor site ~
and an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents have appeared in l8 19 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. A joint . paper with Frank von Hippel 20 of Princeton University on the value of improving reactor containment systems 21 is in press. 22 Dr. Beyea has also prepared risk studies covering 'ulfur emissions 23 from coal-burning energy facilities. 24 A complete resume is included in Appendix A. O
QUALIFICATIONS OF BRIAN PALENIK _ g . Brian Palenik received his Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering i{' 2 degree with honors from Princeton University. His area of concentration was 3 operations research and its use in public policy decisions. While an under-4 graduate at Princeton, Mr. Palenik worked with Dr. Beyea on the consequence 5 calculations for "Some Long Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases 6 of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island"--Dr. Beyea's report 7 to the President's Council on Environmental Quality. After graduation, 8 Mr. Palenik joined the staff of National Audubon's Policy Research Department 9 to continue working on nuclear accident consequence modelling, as well as other 10 energy policy issues. N., j 9
() 1. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. 1 The purpose of this testimony is to present the results of our investi-2 gation into the adequacy of the current emergency plar.s for the Indian Point 3 nuclear reactors in the case of a large release of radioactivity. We address 4 the adequacy of the plans for protecting the population within the ten mile 5 Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) from early death. In addition we have set this 6 study in the context of the larger question: What are the consequences around 7 Indian Point--early deaths, latent cancer deaths, thyroid nodules and land 8 contamination--from a specific large release (a PWR2 release in the notation 9 of the NRC's Reactor Safety Study). 10 Using official estimates of evacuation times and standard dispersion 11 models, we show that the present emergency plans are not adequate to protect the population within ten miles from early deaths. We pinpoint those emergency 4" 13 response preparation areas (ERPAs) around the plant where early deaths in the 14 general population would be expected urder frequently occurringweather 15 conditions. We also show that many more ERPAs would be in danger if it were 16 raining during the release, or if a relatively large fraction of the radioactive 17 materials released into the air during the accident were to remain close to I 18 ground level while being blown downwind. 19 We have also looked at the consequences of a PWR2 release beyond ten miles. 20 In addition to the possible occurrence of some early, deaths, we show that, for 21 a wind blowing towards New York City, 6,000 to 50,000 delayed cancer deaths 22 and 400,000 to 2,000,000 delayed cases of thyroid nodules would be expected 23 from doses received relatively soon after the accident. (The range of numbers 24 reflects scientific uncertainty in the quantitative relationship between U radiation dose and human injury.) With the wind blowing toward New York City, 26 a large section of the city would be contaminated with radioactive deposition 27 1 -
1 and would have to be evacuated as soon as possible to reduce subsequent O cancers, injuries and deaths that would occur from prolonged exposure to 3 radiation from contaminated ground. Some areas would have to be 4 abandoned for decades. 5 For a wind blowing towards the north at the time of release, the number 6 of expected health effects from short-term exposure within 10-50 miles would 7 be less than for a wind blowing south towards New York City. However, a large 8 number of health effects and land contamination would be expected beyond 50 miles 9 for this wind direction. (Whereas with a wind towards New York City, only 10 water lies beyond 50 miles.) The inital amount of land in which occupation 11 restrictions would be required would equal 5300 square miles, using a standard 12 threshold for land contamination. 13 These serious consequences, due in part to the heavily populated region 14 around Indian Point, should be considered by policy makers before deciding O unen the future of operations et indian voiat. 16 If the nuclear reactors there are allowed to operate in the future, we 17 have suggested some possible strategie. for mitigating the short-term radiation 18 exposures resulting from a large release. Strategies considered are 1) expanded 19 evacuation; 2) sheltering in buildings; 3) use of potassium iodide as a protective 20 drug; and 4) breathing through makeshift filters. 21 Improvements in the existing emergency plans for resi4 nts within the ten 22 mile EPZ could also be made. For instance, a strategy of beginning preparations 23 for an evacuation or beginning the evacuation itself earlier than under the 24 current policies could ensure greater time for an evacuation. 25 In addition, an apparent defect in the plans that calls for directing 26 evacuees into possibly contaminated ground should be corrected. Emergency plans
] should not be blind to the fact that downwind congregation centers can be 28 contaminated even though they are located outside the ten mile EPZ.
29 L.
_g_ 1 Finally, we have found that use of potassium iodide would be useful within O the ten miie eez. we recommend thet the Boerd require the reector owners to ney 3 for distribution costs if health authorities recommend potassium iodide 4 distribution at any time in the future. This would ensure that the decision 5 to distribute potassium iodide would be made only on the basis of public 6 health considerations. 7 It should be noted that all mitigating strategies only reduce consequences; 8 they do not eliminate them. Furthermore, we are not aware of feasible mitigation 9 strategies that can effectively reduce consequences of long-term contamination. 10 A PWR2 release was chosen for our base calculations because it is 11 considered a physically plausible release category by those analysts at 12 government laboratories who have studied melt-down accident sequences in detail. 13 A PWR2 release is expected, for instance, following certain large pipe 14 break accidents because sufficient amounts of water would not be available A U to scrub the radioactive fission fragments from the escaping gases as occurred 16 in the "small pipe break" accident at Three Mile Island. We do not examine 17 the consequences of the more serious PWR1 release because most analysts 18 have downgraded the possibility of the initiating steam-explosion scenario. 19 Many different accident sequences could lead to a PWR2 release. The 20 total probability for such a release is the sum of the probabilities of 21 all accident sequences that have a PWR2 release as a final state. The total 22 probability of a PWR2 release at the Indian Point site is very uncertain, 23 so uncertain that it is misleading to state a central estimate. There is 24 not sufficient experience with reactors over their life cycle to allow a 25 reliable probability estimate. The fact that new accident sequences are 26 constantly being discovered suggests that additional sequences are yet to f] be found and that current probability estimates must be incomplete. In 28 addition, the probability of sabotage is so uncertain that no one, to our 29 knowledge, has even attempted its calculation.
The true probability of PWR2 release could be orders of magnitude higher J (
't.
or lower than the limited estimate given in the Reactor Safety Study or 3 in the Indian Point Probabilistic Risk Analysis. As a result, there 4 is no way to guarantee the public safety at Indian Point. Nor is it even 5 possible to state that there is reasonable assurance that the public safety 6 can be protected. If the board allows continued operation of Indian Point, 7 with its current emergency plans, it is making the implicit assumption that 8 the probability of a PWR2 release (and its associated consequences) is too low 9 to consider--an assumption for which there is no sound scientific basis. 10 11 12 13 14 1 16 17 18 19 . l 20 i i 21 22 l 23 24 25 26 n 2i_j 28 29 i
- 2. DESCRIBE IN GENERAL TERMS HOW RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL IS RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT. j 1 for a large release of radioactive material to occur following an acci- !
2 dent, a " release p6thway" from the core to thb environment is required. One ( b l set of pathways is generated by failure of the reactor's pressure vessel fol- l 4 lowed by failure of the containment building surrounding the vessel. Re-5 searchers have outlined some, though not all, possible sequences and conditions 6 for these failures. Recent work of importance to these proceedings has par-7 ticularly focussed on failure of the containment building through overpressur-8 ization. Some suggested scenarios for overpressurization, examined by Sandia 9 Labs, Battelle Labs, and others include: steam explosion, hydrogen burning, 10 and rapid (for example, a steam spike) or slow static overpressurization.1 11 A second set of release pathways would lead to releases tnrough an in-12 terface systeu. For. example, excessive pressure differentials between the 13 cooling loops could lead to releases through the secondary system. Similarly, 14 massive steam generator failure due to aging steam generator tubes might lead 15 to a large release through the secondary cooling system.
.(
If a large release of radioactive material to the environment occurs, such as a PWR2 release in the notation of the Reactor Safety Study,3 the 17 18
-material will leave the reactor as a " plume" of gases, aerosols and water 39 droplets. Most of the release will occur over a period of thirty to sixty minutes.
20 21 This plume will rise to a height which is theoretically dependent on such variables as 1) the amount of heat released in the accident, 2) the 22 weather conditions existing at the time, and 3) whether or not the release 23 g takes place at the top or bottom of the structure. As will be shown later, - there is no satisfactory formula that predicts the magnitude of plume rise. 25 The plume will be carried by the prevailing wind. Under the action of 26 wind fluctuations and other weather conditions, the plume will spread in both 27 the horizontal and vertical directions, so that the average concentration of Y radioactive material in the plume will decrease with time as it travels 29 30 away from the reactor. (See Figure I) After a short
O WIND DIRECTION INVISIBLE CLOUD OF MOVING RADIOACTIVITY REGION OF DEPOSITED O RADIOACTIVITY TOP VIEW OF PLUME - FIGURE I O
1 time, the expanding edge of the plume will " touch" ground, and radioactive 2 material will be dispersed along the ground, on vegetation, buildings, cars, 3 etc. The rate at which material is removed from the plume, referred to as the 4 deposition velocity, depends on the " stickiness" of the surfaces. 5 This deposition will also cause the concentration of material in the plume to 6 decrease with time. 7 The plume may disperse radioactive material along the ground for more 8 than a hundred miles if there is no reversal of wind direction. Much of the 9 area where the plume has passed will be contaminated for decades and " permanent" 10 evacuation of the original population will be required there. In addition,as 11 much as 10 percent of the material will be resuspended by the action of wind 12 and blown about in succeeding weeks. The area of contamination will increase, 13 causing residents who live outside the initial plume path to be exposed to 14 radiation. 15 Immediately after the release, the plume will be visible,'due to the 16 escape of large amounts of cloud-forming water droplets. As the plume 17 travels do'wnwind and as the water droplets evaporate, the plume will most 18 likely disappeir from view. O
- 3. HOW DOES THE POPULATION RECEIVE RADIATION DOSES?
(3 v The population in the area under the plume would receive most radiation 2 doses via three dose pathways (See Figure II): 3 1) From external radiation received directly from the
- 4 radioactive plume itself. In these catastrophic accidents, unlike 5 Design Basis Accidents considered in Safety Analysis Reports, the 6 main part of the plume passes by very quickly, within one half 7 hour or so.
8 2) From radiation received following inhalation. The . 9 inhalation pathway would be the most important contributor to 10 the thyroid dose. 11 3) From radiation received from material deposited on the 12 ground or other surfaces. It is this " ground dose" which would 13 usually be the most important contributor to early fatalities l') L/ because it would continue after the plume has passed. Evacuation 15 after the plume goes by is needed to stop the accumulation of ground 16 dose; the faster the evacuation, the lower the total ground dose.
~
17 We have concentrated on these three pathways in our testimony. 18 Other important dose pathways exist for persor.s not under the original 19 plume. These include inhalation ar.d ground doses from resuspended and 20 redeposited radioactive material. (As much as 10 percent of the plume's 21 material may be resuspended within a few weeks.) Doses are also possible 22 through ingestion of contaminated food or water. . 23 The existence of many dose pathways implies that emergency plans, to 24 be effective, must incorporate different dose reduction methods, including 25 evacuation, sheltering, possibly potassium iodide administration, decontam-26 ination, milk and food impoundment, etc. O.. -
,s C'
CLOUD IS INVISIBLE EXCEPT CLOSE TO ^ M~ P' REACTOR EFFECTIVE RELEASE , -, HEIGHT
^
REGION OF CLOUD DOSE , GROUND DOSE , M' v N 4 AND INHALATION i,
~ _.
v Y REGION OF - $ /
/ CLOUD DOS E U n
_: - bc _. _ REACTOR RADIOACTIVITY STICKS TO GROUND BUILDINGS OFFER SOME SHIELDING SIDE VIEW OF RADIOACTIVE PLUME FIGURE H 9 9 9
4'. IN WHAT UNITS'ARE DOSES MEASURED? , () Individual doses are measured in " rems." This unit expresses the 2 accumulated amount of damaging energy deposited by the. radioactive material 3 'per unit mass of absorbing material. " Person-rem" is used in this study ., 4 and elsewhere as a measure of the total population dose, the sum of all 5 individual doses. Long-term health consequences of radiation can be cal-culated, even when the distribution of individual doses is unknown, by using
~
6 l 7 an estimated total population dose. b I i
- 5. WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF RADIATION DOSES?*
1 The health consequences of radiation depend upon the magnitude of the O 2 dose received. Radiation doses on the order of 100 rem or higher--doses that 3 occur relatively close to the plant--lead to immediate sickness (e.g., nausea') 4 and "early death." At a dose of 100 rems for example, 15-25 percent of the 5 exposed persons would suffer from vomiting within 2 days. (WASH-1400, 6 Appendix VI, Figures VI, f-9, f-10.) 7 "Early death," a technical term in the radiological health field, 8 refers to death within sixty days of exposure to a given dose. The threshold 9 for early deaths is between 100-200' rem, while the probability of early death 10 increases with increasing dose and changes with " supportive" medical treatment ** 11 as shown in Table 1 . Large hospitals might each be able to handle 5-10 12 patients requiring supportive treatment; the total capacity in the U. S. for 13 handling such patients would be 2500-5000 people.
, g A4 The quantitative analysis of supportive medical treatment presented in 15 Table 1 was unique to the Reactor Safety Study and has not received widespread 16 acceptance. Although there appears to be agreement that supportive medical .
17 treatment will shift the early death probability curve it3 is not clear that 18 the exact shift projected by the Reactor Safety Study is correct. (Private 19 communication, Edward Radford, University of Pittsburgh.) In this proceeding, we do not testify as expert witnesses on the effects of radiation. Instead, we have surveyed the relevant literature in order - to obtain quantitative information relating dose to injury.
** " Supportive" treatment is defined in Wash-1400, Appendix VI, FI, as such procedures as reverse isolation, sterilization of all objects in patients room, use of laminar-air-flow systems, large doses of antibiotics, and trans-fusions of whole-blood packed cells or platelets.
O
i TABLE 1 EARLY MORTALITY TABLE (BASED ON WASH-1400 FIG. VI 9-1)* PROBABILITY OF EARLY DEATH (WITHIN 60 DAYS) Dose Range Minimal Supportive (Rem) Treatment Treatmen t** 0-50 0 0 50-100 0 0 100-150 .0001 0 150-200 .0065 0 200-250 .11 0 250-200 .26 0 300-350 .54 .0008 350-400 .78 .02 400-450 .93 .16 450-500 .985 .38 500-550 1.0 .7 550-600 1 .85
. 600-650 1 .97 650 1 1 O The definition of supportive , treatment as given in WASH-1400, Appendix VI, F1: " indicates such procedures as reverse _ isolation..., sterilization of all objects in palient's room, use of... laminar-air-flow systems, large "
- doses of antibiotics, and transfusions of whole-blood packed cells or - . .
platelets." (See also VI 9-3.) Minimal treatment is anything less than this. g !
- Our table represents a 25 rem downward shift of the WASH-1400 curve.
Our curve is thus slightly more conservative.
** This quantitative analysis of supportive treatment wa's original to WASH-1400 and has not received widespread acceptance. (See text)
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I Cancer, diseases, and developmental and genetic birth-defects will occur 2 with some probability among all exposed populations; however, the incidence 3 decreases with decreasing dose.0 These consequences of radiation may occur 4 many years af ter exposure. Since experts disagree on the exact magnitude . 5 of the dose /effect relationship for these injuries, we have used a range of 6 coefficients in our calculations broad enough to encompass most expert opinions. 7 For instance, based on our review of the literature, we have used a 8 coefficient range of 50 to 500 cancer deaths (non-thyroid) per million person-rem 9 to the whole body--a range which the Environmental Protection Agency has agreed 10 is reasonable. 11 Table 2 lists the coefficients for calculating health consequences used 12 in this study and in other reports. O
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- We assume as is customary a direct proportionality between doses and the probability of each health effect. This " linear hypothesis", although almost.
standard in applications such as ours, is nevertheless the subject of con-siderable controversy as to its accuracy and as to its validity as an approx-imation to actual dose-effect relationships. We treat it simply as a mathe-matical convenience whose uncertainty can be adequately represented, for our purposes, by the uncertainty assigned to the proportionality constant.
** The number of non-thyroid cancer deaths would be higher if radiation-dose /
cancer-death coefficients were used based on the work of Mancuso, Stewart and Kneale. Assuming one out of three cancers is fatal and that cancer repre-sents 20% of the current death rate and using a linear fit to the 30 rad doubling dose for cancer proposed by Alice Stewart (personal communication)# we obtain a death coefficient of about 2,000 per million person rem. This would be four times the highest coefficient used in this study. h
TABLE 2 RAtlGE OF HEALTH CONSEQUENCES PER MILLION PERSON REM FATAL CAflCER INCIDENCE: Reactor . Safety 1980 1972 Study BEIR BEIR WASH-1400 APSStgy Report) b This Study Reporta ) (1975) (1975) d Whole-body 50-500 67-226 115-621 65 ) 130 Thyroid Child .5-3 5) 8
.5-3 Adult 1.8-11 5) 8 1.8-11 Population Weighted# )
Thyroid 1.9-12f) THYROID N0DULE INCIDENCE: Child h 1309 )-1300 ) g) e 275-1300 8 13o9)-850') 33o ) O^oeit f Weighted ) 200-1500 ) a) National Academy of Sciences, BEIR Report, 1980, Table V-4. The upper number was - lowered by about a factor of two for the final report (1980) as a result of internal criticisms of the use of a pure linear dose effects model. b) From Table V-4 of Ref, a). The 1972 BEIR Report used a pure linear model. c) Revs. Mod. Phys. 47_, S1. d) WASH-1400 mid-range values. (The so-called, " upper-bound" numbers in WASH-1400 were calculated to be about two times higher.) To obtain its mid-range dose / effects coefficients, WASH-1400 used a linear model weighted by dose reduction factors depending on the dose magnitude. The nunber shown represents a weighted average of coefficients ranging from a low 24 to an " upper bound" of 122. , e) The Environmental Protection Agency uses coefficients for thyroid effects which would give a similar number. The number shown is a weighted average of the effects of Iodine 131 and other iodine isotopes. For example, in the case of fatal cancer incidence, the numb g15 in the table is a weighted average of 1.3 deaths per million rem for I and 13 deaths per iodine isotopes. (See y gSH-1400 App. VI, pp. Note, 9-26,because 27)million of the rem for other 3 shorter lifetime of I , the weighted average would drop by a factor of four (d if the hypothetical release occurred many days after fission stopped.
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- 6. HOW HAVE YOU MODELLED THE PLUME MOVEMENT ThD DOSE PATHWAYS?
C',) < G 1 The plume movement and the three me,ior dcse pathways
- discussed 2 previously have beer. modelled by us-in several.ccaputer programs. The g 3 original programs have been cited in other rap' orth while some modifications 4 have beem made for this study.** The dose to the population caught 2i ,
5 directly in the plume in a "PWR2" release was" calculated by these
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6 programs as a function of time after release for a range of weather 7 conditions and for a range of model parameters. Ranges of model 8 parameters were used because the appropriete values of parameters 9 are currently uneartain. 10 The basic modelling used is similar to the approach taken by 11 radiological protection agencies around the world, including the NRC.*** O v
- The major sources of radiation that contribute to early death or delayed cancer considere'd in this testimony are inhaled radioiodine, as well as external radiation (whole-body gamma) from the plume and from contaminated ground. ,
** For this study, we have explored the significance for the urban terrain .
in the vicinity of New York City. We have substituted urban dispers. ion parameters for rural dispersion parameters (with an effective release point adjusted to keep the plume shape continuous) when the plume
, reached the city of Yonkers on its way to New York City. Although doses in New York City increased under some conditions, the increase turned out not to be of major significance.
*** Note that our programs do not include time-varying weather such as changing wind speed and changing turbulence, the major contributor to early deaths in the Reactor Safety Study. However, our programs allow for variations in deposition velocity and plume rise--
variations which the Reactor Safety Stuiy did not consider. 4 V 1 ts _
-23 -
- 7. Ifl WHAT WAYS HAVE YOUR CALCULAT10flS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE UtiCERTAINTIES lil THE CURRErlT STATE OF C04 SEQUENCE MODELLING?
O 1 The treatment of plume rise due to thermal buoyancy illustrates the 2 current uncertainty that exists in dose calculations due to inadequate knowledge 3 of model parameters. Since calculated doses can be very sensitive to whether 4 or not the edge of the plume has " touched" ground, knowledge of the initial 5 rise of the plume can be critical--especially within the EPZ. Yet, lack of 6 understanding, both experimental and theoretical, about plume rise makes prediction 7 of this parameter difficult. 8 Figure III shows the enormous spread in airborne concentration of radio-9 activity (and therefore dose) predicted for the same release of radioactivity 10 by modellers from different countries under one set of weather conditions. 11 Most of this spread arises because of different predictions of plume rise. 12 These results from the international exercise in consequerce modelling10 13 demonstrate that dose predictions from a particular computer c' ode may be highly h 14 uncert9in within about 20 miles from a reactor if based on one set of model 15 parameters. (Output from the computer codes used to develop our testimony were included in this consequence modelTing exercise.) 16 17 As weather conditions are varied, the range of doses predicted by different 18 computer codes shows much less of a spread. It is for this reason that we 19 consider dose ranges in this study rather than rely exclusively on predictions 20 using one set of model parameters. The dose ranges used in o'ur testimony fall 21 well within the full range given in Figure III. Our calculations using , 22 mid-range model parameters fall in the middle. O
j / FIGURE III. RAtlGE OF AIR C0f1CEflTRATIONS OF RADI0 ACTIVITY .i
,e e, PREDICTED BY DIFFEREfiT MODELLERS FOR THE SAME RELEASE SCEfiARIO.
/ (!(CT OF THE VARI ATI0fl IS DUE TO VARIATIOf4 Ifi THE TREATMEllT OF PLUME RISE.)
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- 8. WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELEASE TYPE YOU HAVE CONSTDERED AND WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN TO USE IT?
1 The consequence calculations presented in this testimony have been made 2 using, in WASH-1400 terminology, a "PWR2" type of radioactivity release as 3 an input to the computer codes. There are many accident sequences, all requ,fr-4 ing core uncovery and breach (or bypass) of containment, that could lead to 5 a PWR2 release. The conmon element of these accident sequences is that an 6 expected 70 percent of the iodines and 50 percent of the alkali metals would 7 escape to the atmosphere. This was not the worst possible release type 8 envisioned in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), but close to it. 9 The probability of a PWR2 release is the sum of the probabilities of all 10 accident sequences that have a PWR2 release as a final state. WASH-1400 11 assigned the PWR2 release the highest probability of occurence of any catastrophic 12 accident release. Its estimate of this probability was between one in ten 13 thousand and one in a million per reactor per year [ WASH-1400, Appendix VI, 14 p. 86] This probability is very uncertain at the present time--even more g 15 uncertain than indicated in the Reactor Safety Study. According to the official 16 NRC review (The review that led the NRC to withdraw support from the executive 17 summary): ,
"We are unable to determine whether the absolute probabilities of accident sequences in WASH-1400 are high or low, but we believe that the error bounds on those estimates are, in general, greatly understated. This is true in part because there is in many cases an inadequate data base, in part because of an inability to quantify common cause failures, and in part because of same questionable methodological and : statistical procedu res . " 12 18 Although some improvements have been made in probabilistic risk studies .
19 carried out since the Reactor Safety Study, the same basic inadequacies quoted 20 above remain. O
1 We have picked a PWR2 release for our base calculations because it is considered a physically plausible release category by those analysts at 3 government laboratories who have studied melt-down accident sequences in 4 , detail. A PWR2 release is expected, for instance, following certain large 5 pipe break accidents because sufficient amounts of water would not be available 6 to scrub the radioactive fission fragments from the escaping gases as occurred 7 in the "small pipe break" accident at Three Mile Island. We did not examine 8 the consequences of the more serious PWR1 release because most analysts have 9 downgraded the possibility of the initiating steam-explosion scenario. 10 By choosing to dxamine a PWR2 release, we implicitly reject claims by 11 the nuclear industry that all of the Reactor Safety Study release categories 12 are unphysical. In response to the Three Mile Island accident, the industry 13 mounted a concerted campaign to convince both the public and government that 14 even in case of containment failure, the resulting release of radioactivity to the atmosphere would be much less than has always been tho,ught. In partic-Q ular, the electrical utilities' Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 16 17 published a study which concluded that, even in the event of a core melt-down 18 accident and a containment failure, _ _ . ._ _ , 19 B_7ue to the solubility of the volatile fission product compounds and the aerosol behavior mechanisms, the offsite dispersion of radioactive 20 materials (other than gbges) following a major LWR /Eight Water Reactor 7 accident will be small. O
1 The electric utilities' public relations departments and the nuclear g 2 industry press sprang into action and advertized these claims with great 3 fanfare, noting that:I , 4 If findings like these are verified...it would go far toward 5 deflating the doomsday predictions of anti-nuclear groups. 6 The fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, aside from a few staff 7 comments in the trade press, expressed no public reservations concerning 8 the significance of the claims tended to lend them additional credibility. 9 The NRC did, however, comission an effort to examine the EPRI claims 10 as a collaborative enterprise between NRC staff members and technical ex-11 perts at three major national laboratories. In March 1981 this team re-12 ported back in a draft report that:I 13 The results of this study do not support the contention that the predicted consequences of the risk dominant accidents have 14 been overpredicted by orders of magnitude in past studies. For example, the analysis in this report indicates that..10% g 15 to 50% of the core inventory of iodine could be released to the envi ronmen t. . . 16 Under pressure from the industry, the NRC subsequently rewrote this 17 summary language so that it no longer appeared to be a rebuttal to the EPRI 18 report. Nevertheless, the technical conclusions remained the same.*
- The basic points made in the NRC experts' review had been immediately apparent to knowledgeable readers of the EPRI report. For accidents in which the damage is sufficient to open large pathways from the core to the contain-ment, there will not be sufficient water available to significantly trap the .
radioactive materials of concern, nor will the pathway be so torturous that a significant amount will stick to surfacas before reaching the containment atmosphere. Similarly, if the containment fails early enough, there will be insufficient time for aerosols to settle to the reactor building floor. These three mechanisms are the basis for the claims made in the EPRI report. O
.9. FOR A PWR2 RELEASE, WHAT ARE THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES BEYOND TEN MILES THAT ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED BY THE PRESENT EMERGENCY PLANS?
O () Currently there are no evacuation plans beyond approximately ten miles. 2 Radiation doses will not stop at this distance, however, and persons in the plume 3 path may receive early death doses, or develop fatal latent cancers from dos'es 4 below the early death threshold. In Tables 3 and 4 we have attempted to quantify 5 the number of fatal latent cancer deaths in the area from 10 to 50 miles from 6 the accident site and show how the number of deaths will vary with the 7 amount of time that p' asses between the release and ad, hoc evacuation. The 8 range of deaths shown for each calculation reflects the range in cancer / dose 9 coefficients that appears in the literature. (See Table 2) Similarly, Table 5 10 projects the number of thyroid cancers that might be caused by a PWR2 release. 11 The results here ar,e presented for two uinc' directions (towards the !! orth 12 and South) and for two weather scenarios out to 50 miles from the site. 13 (Details are given in the tables and later in the testimony.) The calculations-are conservative in that the dose for an entire sector is assumed to be the 15 dose at the end of the sector; in fact the dose will be increasingly higher 16 towards the plant. 17 Results for non-thyroid cancer fatalities are presented assuming that 18 evacuation takes the same length of time for everyone. In the case of a_real 19 accident it is unlikely that the three sectors (10-20 miles, 30-35 miles, 35-50 20 miles) would evacuate in the same average time interval. Nevertheless, these 21 tables can be used to calculate a more likely scenario. As an illustrative 22 example, consider an average one day evacuation time for the 10-20 mile sector, . 23 two days for the 20-35 mile sector, and three days for the 35-50 mile sector. _ 24 The range of latent cancer deaths from this limited exposure (excluding thyroid 25 cancer deaths) for average conditions and wind toward New York City would be 26 in the range of 85-850 deaths in the 10-20 mile sector; 950-9500 in the 20-35 mile sector; and 1425-14,250 in the 35-50 mile sector,for 2460-24,600 total deaths. 28 5 m- -.3 . - , - - -< , , _. - - - - , , , - y .-.y, - - -.=, ,
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TABLE 3 DELAYED CANCER OEATHS FROM SHOPT-TERM EXPOSURE IN THE 10-50 MILEsSECTOR WHEN WIND IS BLOWING TOWARD NYC FOLLOWING A PWR2 RELEASE"' Average Conditions ") Precipitation N to ) n vabaton b) P Dose at Deaths g) Dose at Deaths g) Time Outer edge Outer edge (miles) (Rems) (Rems) 1 Day 10-20 31508 54 85-850 97 153-1530 20-35 884021 14 619-6190 27 1193-11930 35-50 1424653 9 641-6410 10 712-7120 1345-13450 2058-20580 2 Days 10-20 ~i508 82 129-1290 163 257-2570 20-35 >34021
.' 21.5 950-9500 50 2210-22100 35-50 1424653 15.5 1104-11040 19.5 1389'13890 l 3856-38560 2183-21830 m
U 3 Days 10-20 31508 102 161-1610' 1193-11930 213 68 336-3360 3006-30060 20-35 984021 27 35-50 1424653 20 1425-14250 27 1923-19230 2779-27790 5265-52650 4 Days 10-20 31508 120 189-1890 256 403-4030 20-35 884021 32 1414-14140 82 3624-36240 - 35-50 1424653 24 1710-17100 33.5 2386-23860_ ' 3313-33130 6413-64130 i a) Delayed cancer deaths not including thyroid cancer deaths. b) Average evacuation time for population, c) Sector is the segment of a 7.5 degree wedge with the boundaries indicated, d) Derived from 1980 population data from the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans by dividing the figures there (for 22.5 degree wedges, by one-third to represent a 7.5 degree wedge, e) Mid-range parameters used are .01 meters /sec deposition velocity; D (Pasquill) stability class; 4m/sec wind speed; Briggs dispersion parameters with a change over to Briggs urban dispersion parameters at 20 miles; Briggs theoretical plume rise; .3 shieldi.ng factor.
.A (Continued)
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O f) Precipitation case parameters are the same as above, but use a washout coefficient of .0001 sec-1 , g) Dose / effects coefficient used was 50-500 per million person rem. This range includes most coefficients found within the literature. It is considered reasonable by the Environmental Protection Agency. (See Appendix E of Ref_). G l - -
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TABLE 4 (') DELAYED CANCER DEATHS FROM SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE IN THE 10-50 MILE SECTOR WHEN WIND 15 BLOWING TOWARDS THE NORTH FOLLOWING A PWR2 RESLEASE"' Average Conditions *) Precipitation b to I Pp n d) Evacuation b)- Time Outer edge Outer edge (*;)*3) (Rems) (Rems) 1 Day 10-20 13,547 54 37-370 97 66-660 20-35 42,700 14 30-300 27 58-580 35-50 25,143 9 11-110 10 13-130 78-780 137-1370 2 Days 10-20 13,547 82 56-560 163 110-1100 20-35 42,700 21.5 46-460 50 107-1070 35-50 25,143 15.5 19-190 19.5 25-250 121-1210 242-2420 3 Days 10-20 13,547 102 69-690 213 144-1440 20-35 42,700 27 58-580 68 145-1450 p 35-50 25,143 20 25-250 27 34-340 Q 152-1520- 323-3230 4 Days 10-20 13,547 120 81-810 256 173-1730 20-35 42,700 32 68-680 82 175-1750 35-50 25,143 . 24 30-300 33.5 42-420 ~ 179-1790 390-3900 a) Delayed cancer deaths not including thyroid cancer deaths and the many deaths beyond 50 miles. b) Average evacuation time for population.
^
c) Sector is the segment of a 7.5 degree wedge with the boundaries incicated. d) Derived from 1980 population data from the New York State Radio 1'ogical Emergency Preparedness Plans by dividing the figures there (for 22.50 wedges) by one-third to represent a 7.5 degree wedge, e) Mid-range parameters used are .01 meters /sec deposition velocity; O (Pasquill) stability class; 4m/sec wind speed; Briggs dispersion parameters with a change over to Briggs urbar 'spersion parameters at 20 miles; Briggs theoretical plume rise case; .3 . melding factor. O V (Continued)
O f) Precipitation case parameprs are the same as above, but use a washout coefficient of .0001.sec~ g) Dose / effects coefficient used was 50-500 per million person rem. This range includes most coefficients found within the literature. It is considered reasonable by the Environmental Protection Agency. (See Appendix E of Ref ). O S 4. O
TABLE 5 THYROID NODULES Ar!D FATAL THYROID CAtlCERS WITHD: 10-50 MILES WHEN WIfl0 IS BLOWIfiG TOWARD NEW YORK CITY OR_ NORTH FOLLOWING A pWR2 RELEASE Wind Blowing Towards NYC Dose at Outer Fatal Thyroid Sector)a Population i ) Edge (Rems)c) Nodules ) d Cancerse ) Sector (NYC) 10-15 13,400 5103 13,400 -- 15-20 18,108 3325 12,042- 18,108 -- 20-35 884,021 937 165,666- 884,021 1575- 9,940 35-50 1,424,653 708 201,731-1,424,653 1915-12,100 l l 393,000-2,300,000 3500-22,000 Wind Blowing Towards the North a Population in Dose at Oute Fatal Thyroid d Sector ) Sector (North)b) Edge (Rems)c Nodules ) Cancerse ) {) 10-15 15-20 1,300 12,247 5103 3325 1,300 8,144-12,247 20-35 42,700 937 8,002-42,700 76 .480 35-50 25,143 708 3,560-25,143 34-214 - 21,000-81,000 110-690 a) Sector is the segment of a 7.5 degree wedge with the boundaries indicated. b) Derived from 1980 population data from the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans by dividing the figures there (22.5 degree wedges)by one third to represent a 7.5 degree wedge. , 1 I c) 24-hour dose calculated using mid-range parameters: .01 deposition velocity; D Stability Class; 4 m/sec wind speed; Briggs dispersion parameters with a changeover to Briggs urban dispersion parameters at 20 miles; Briggs theoretical plume rise case; .3 shielding factor. The dose would not be significantly smaller or larger if a shorter or longer exposure time was used, because most of it is delivered through inhalation of radiciodine during plume passage. d) Dose / effects coefficients used are 200-1500 nodules per million thyroid person rem. (G If thyroid doses exceed 1000 rem ablation would likely occur rather than nodularity. d See Table 2. e) Dose / effects coefficients used are 1.9-12 fatal thyroid cancers per million thyroid person-rem. See TableZ.
-- ~
1 When the 3500-22000 range of thyroid cancer fatalities from Table 5 is added to 2 the previous numbers, a total of approximately 6000 to 50,000 delayed cancer deaths 3 from short term exposures is projected.* (fiote that the range of deaths 4 is based on uncertsnty in the dose / effects coefficients.) 5 Thus 0.2 to 2 percent of the 2.3 million exposed persons are projected 6 to eventually die from short-term exposure in this illustrative example. It 7 should be noted that the fear of developing cancer as a result of a reactor 8 accident could be a serious psychological consequence. Also, a large 9 fraction of the exposed population would eventually develop cancer from 10 other causes and might suspect that they were, in fact, radiation victims. 11 The absolute number of fatalities from 10-50 miles projected in 12 the tables for a wind blowing toward the north is smaller than for the 13 flew York City case. However, when the much greater number of health effects 14 expected beyond 50 miles for this wind direction are taken into account, f 15 (there is no population beyond 50 miles in the flew York City direction), the g 16 total number of delayed cancer deaths from short-term exposure would be much 17 larger then presented in the tables--probably by a factor of ten if our 18 experience with calculations for the Three Mile Island site are a reliable - 19 . 16 guide. 20 21 Although dose calculations beyond ten miles are not affected as much 22 by uncertainties in plume rise, as within ten miles, it must be recognized 23 that an additional uncertainty facf.or of two or three must be assigned to all 24 cancer death totals due to modelling uncertainties. 25 The delayed health effects of the type considered in this section are 26
- assumed to be linear with dose. Consequently, the number of health effects 27 28
- Because th'e thyroid dose is dominated by the inhalation pathway, it does not change significantly with time after the passage of the plume.
h p- _ - n - ,. n .,. y m . ~ 7
-36 .
I for releases scaled down from a PWR2 release can be approximately determired by scaling the entries in the tables by an equivalent factor. 8 Thus, in 3 an accident by which only 10% as much radioactivity was released as in a PWR2 4 release, only one-tenth the number of delayed cancer deaths would be expected-- 5 say, 600 to 5,000 rather than 6,000 to 50,000. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
'3 14 16 17 18 19 20
- Note that we use the linear hypothesis for relating dose to health effects as a mathematical convenience, assuming that possible non-linear effects-are effectively contained in the range of coefficients assigned.
O
- 10. WHAT ARE THE EARLY DEATH CONSEQUENCES BEYOND TEN MILES THAT ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED BY THE CURRENT EMERGENCY PLANS? -
G 1 Table 10 shows that early deaths can occur beyond 10 miles 2 relatively soon after the accident. -Mast of these deaths will occur in the - 3 10-20 mile sector. Prior planning for an evacuation 4 in areas between 10 to 20 miles from the plants would reduce the_ expected 5 number of early deaths in this zone. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
' ' ' ~
16 17 18 19 20 - O
- 11. WHAT ARE THE LAND CONTAMINATION CONSEQUENCES OF A PWR2 RELEASE
() 2 Tables 6 and 7 show the approximate areas where agricultural activities and human occupation might be restricted due to contamination in a PWR2 type 3 release.I7
- 4 In the case of a wind blowing toward the South, most of the area 5
considered to be contaminated would lie over the Atlantic ocean. However, 6 the plume would pass through New York City, greatly increasing the economic 7 and social disruption resulting from the accident. The map in Figure V 8 indicates the size of the long-term ground contamination area (considering 9 only the , dose f om cesium) assuming no decantamination efforts. 10 Effective decontamination of built-up areas has never been demonstrated. 11 With the wind blowing toward the North, the contamination area would be 12 as large as indicated in the tables. Decontamination of some of this area
.3 (the rural areas) would be possible by carting away top soil; even in rural O
v areas, however, the magnitude of the decontamination task is so enormous 15 that only partial decontamination is considered feasible. 16 Note that in the testimony we have not estimated any cancer fatalities 17 that would result from long-term exposure to contaminated ground and buildings, 18 or from ingestion of contaminated food, milk or water. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28
FIGURE V. L0flG-TERM LAtl0 C0tlTAMIflATI0tl C0iiT00RS FOR WIfl0 BLOWIflG TOWARDS flew YORK CITY FOLLOWIflG A PWR2 RELEASE O
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. _ _ _ _ - ~
TABLE 6
, AR d S IN WHICH INITIA! AGRICULTURAL USE AND LONG-TERM HUMAN OCCUPATION V, MIGHT BE RESTRICTED IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCCESSFUL DECONTAt1INATION a)
FOR A PWR2 RELEASE AT INDIAN POINT Initial Area b) Contaminated Areab ) Limited Limited c c ,e) Agriculture d) After 10 Years , e) After 40 Years Occupation c)
----------------------- square miles --------------------------------
5300 f) 18000 9) 550-4300 240-3300 NOTES: a) For typical meteorological conditions. Ground shielding factor = .33. O* b) Approximate area of 7.5 wedge extending from the plant. No decontamination i is assumed. The length of the wedge for various areas is given below: Maximum length Area of of Wedge Wedge . 525 mi 2 18,000 mi 260 4,300 240 3,700 100 650 30 60 c) We assume for illustrative purposes that occupation would be restricted if the resident population would otherwise receive more than a 10 rem whole body radiation dose over 30 years. This is similar to the criterion used in the I Reactor Safety Study and corresponds to about a three-fold increase over the natural background dose in the same period. (A 10 rem whole body dose has l associated with it a risk of a .05 to .5 percent chance of cancer death.) The 10-rem criterion is arbitrary. Should a more stringent threshold be insisted upon by the public, the restricted area would be larger. d) Using criterion for cesium 134 with the infant as critical individual. Feod grown in this area would not be allowed to be fed to infants. Restrictions apply to crops growing at the time of the accident; p we do not attempt to calculate the more difficult problem of detomining V agricultural contamination after the first year. I l 1
e) The land contamination threshold used to calculate the lower number in the table is 10 rem in 30 years. In some sense, the threshold is set to balance the (small) individual risk of cancer against the hard-ships involved in uprooting people. Criteria which would be used to allow re-entry might be stricter. The higher number assumes that a 10-fold stricter criterion (corresponding to a one third increases over
- natural background) is applied in deciding whether vacant land can be re-used.
f) we note that the maximum corresponding figure For comparison in WASH-1400 waspurposes,2 3300 mi (App. VI, Fig. 13-35). g) Some of this area might be water. O e l e O
r TABLE 7 AREAS IN WHICH CATTLE GRAZING MIGHT BE RESTRICTED TO PREVENT MILK CONTAMINATION BY RADI0 ACTIVE IODINE a FOLL'0 WING A PWR2 TYPE RELEASE AT INDIAN POINT ) Time After Release Area b) 1 0 175,000c) 1 month (s) 50,000 c) 2
" 3,400-3
" 170
" 5 4
.10TES:
The affected areas decrease in time because the radiofodines are decaying. O)a The half life for the principal isotope, iodine 131, is 8 days. The areas were calculated using a threshold of 4puci/m2 of Iodine 131 deposition, a - value which lies between those recommended by the Food and Drug Administration for consideration of protective action for infants and adults. These cal-culations have been carried out for typical meteorological conditions.
~
b) Approximately the area of 7.5* Wedge extending from the plant. The length of the wedge is given below for the various cases shown in the table. Wedge Maximum Length of Wedge Area 1600 mi 175,000 mi 2 880 mi 50,000 620 25,000 230 3,400 . . . 200 2,500 50 170 45 130 5 9 c) Much of this area could lie over water. 1
i
~
- 12. ARE THERE AtlY WAYS TO MITIGATE THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES BEYOND THE 10 MILE ZONE 7 g 1 Obviously, if the Indian Point reactors were to be shut down, the 2 consequences mentioned previously could not occur. However if the plants
- 3 are allowed to continue operation, attempts should be made to reduce the 4
number of injuries and deaths from short-term exposure by expanding the 5 emergency planning zone beyond ten miles. The ten mile radius,it should 6 be noted;is a guideline not a rigid distance.18 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 O
- 13. IS INCREASING THE EVACUATION ZONE AN EFFECTIVE MITIGATING STRATEGY?
Not complete at this time. O - 6 O
1
- 14. WHAT OTHER MEASURES BESIDES EVACUATION WOULD REDUCE THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF A PWR2 RELEASE FOR RESIDENTS BEYOND 10 MILES? h 1 In view of the distances at which the 'long-term health consequences of 2 major releases would occur, it is not sufficient to plan only for people 3 living within ten miles of the reactor if the goal is to significantly 4 reduce long-term accident consequences. Dose reduction measures such as 5 thyroid-blocking medication might be needed beyond a hundred miles. Long-6 term population removal at such distances might also be needed in the years 7 following the accident.
8 THYR 0ID-BLOCKING MEDICINE 9 Potassium iodide pills taken before inhalation or ingestion of radio-10 active iodine would reduce thyroid doses by 10 to 100 times due to the block-11 ing of radioactive iodide uptake by the already saturated thyroid.I9 Although 12 not the most serious health consequence of radiation,_ thyroid damage could g 13 effect more people in an accident (in the absence of thyroid-blocking) than 14 any other radiation effect. Hence, development of a potassiua iodide distribution 15 strateay is advisable. _ 16 Putassium iodide is cheap and quite safe at the recomended doses accord-17 ing to the Food and Drug Administration (it is a fonn of iodine added to iodized 18 salt), and could significantly reduce the number of people affected by an 19 accident. 20 The fact that significant thyroid doses can be received out to hundreds 21 of miles for a catastrophic release of, say, 50 percent of the radioiodine in the 22 cnra is not a subiect of debate (see for exople, Ref. 20). However, it is 23 not immediately obvious to what distance protective actions would provide a 24 ,1et health benefit. It seems reasonable to propose that protective actions 25 should be taken out to distance *:here the risks of such actions become comparable 26 to the health risks from projected radiation doses. Making this principle quantit 27 no
ative is difficult but it appears that thyroid-blocking medication would 2 certainly be justified out to a distance of a hundred miles for a PWR 2 re-3 lease, and possibly much farther. This distance extends considerably beybnd 4 the 10 mile EPZ and beyond the 20 mile distance at which evacuation plans 5 might be feasible. 6 Our calculation of 100 miles as the distance within which potassium 7 iodide would provide a net benefit has been made using assumptions based 8 on the position of Rosalyn Yalow, the principal critic of_the use of 9 co'assium iodide in the radiation emergency.* These are more conservative 10 than those of the Food and Drug Administration. Q J
- Dr. Yalow, a physicist with a Nobel prize in medicine, does not believe protective action should be taken to prevent a thyroid dose from iodine 131 below a projected dose of 100 rem. (Private communication,198L) Although -
100 rem is ten times the level considered a reasonable threshold by the FDA, we use 100 rem as a threshold in this paper to avoid irrelevant controversy. For a PWR2 release, adult thyroid doses remain above 100 rem out to about . 100 miles from the point of release for typical weather conditions. Child thyroid doses remain above 100 rem out to several hundred miles.) To compare the benefit of blocking a 100 rem dose with the risk of administer-ing potassium iodide, it is necessary to estimate the number of thyroid nodules that would result from 100 rem thyroid dose. The most conservative nodule risk coefficient in Table 2 is 200 nodules per million person rem. Taking one-tenth of this number, the risk of nodularity to an individual ex-posed to 100 rem would be 0.2%, well above the risk of mild side effects from taking potassium iodide, even as estimated by Dr. Yalow. Dr. Yalow, in disagreement with the Food and Drug Administration, argues that the risk of side effects is 0.002% per potassium iodide dose.(Private communication,1981.) O
47-1 In New York State, a decision to distribute KI around the Indian Point site, either inside or outside the ten mile EPZ, would most likely need to g 3 be confirmed or initiated by the Department of Health, or by local health 4 departments. A ruling by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) would 5 not be sufficient. However, the ASLB could rule that the owner of the Indian 0 Point Reactors should pay for KI distribution, should state or local health 7 departments recommend distribution at some future time. 8 OTHER MITIGATING STRATEGIES 9 Two other strategies offer some important possibilities for protecting 10 people living more than ten miles beyond the reactor and for those within ten 11 miles for whom evacuation is not attempted or is not successful: 12 . sheltering in buildings, and 13 - breathing through makeshift cloth filters or distributed respirators. 14 Complete logistical details for these strategies need to be carefully 15 worked out. None should be rejected prematurely merely because satisfactory g 16 implementation may appear, at first sight, to have some difficulties. A com-17 bination of these two strategies with thyroid blocking would be most effective 18 and most likely to prevent disorganized behavior among those not included in 19 evacuation plans. Successful use of these mitigating measures has three 20 prerequisites, however: 21 . monitoring and forecasting of the position of the radioactive cloudj 22 . communication of detailed instructions to the public; 23 . and, in the case of thyroid blocking medicine and respirators, a sat- . 24 isfactory distribution system. 25 These strategies do rot represent absolute protection against reactor 26 accident consequences. They dc not mitigate at all against long-term exposures, 27 and even with careful planning they only reduce, rather than eliminate short-e
I term doses. In addition, it is unlikely that the necessary instructions or equipment would reach the entire targeted population. flevertheless, if the 3 Indian Point reactors are allowed to continue operating, these measures 4 could significantly reduce the risk of illness and cancer in the case of, a 5 catastrophic accident. 6 7 8 9 10 0 G v
7,
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- 15. WHAT ARE THE EA?LY DEAiH IMPLICATIONS WITHIN TEN MILES OF A PWR2
' RELEASE G: vet THE CURRENT EVACUATION PLANS?
A If a resident is evacuated before the plume passes by, no radiation O 2 dose is accumulated.* If a resident is not evacuated before the plume passes by, then the total dose is the sume of the " cloud" dose, the in-4 halation dose, the external ground dose accumulated during evacuation, and the " internal" ground' dose-I:ccumulated as a result of radiation 6 passing through the building walls while the resident is incoors. Tables have been prepared to indicate, for the weather conditions O and time of day shown, and for mid-range model parameters, whether or S not all of the ~ residents of 19 selected ERPS will be evacuated before D their accumulated radiation dose reaches the 200 rem threshold for I early death. The evacuation time estimates used for these calculations have been derived from the New York State Radiological Emer,ency Response
" Plans. (If evacuation should proceed more slowly than est,imated in the 14 official plans, the consequences would of course be worse.)
15 lo 17 1C
- D \
- For these calculations, we assume residents are not transported to locations subsequently exposed to redi;1 tion.
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. Emergency R esponse Plcn c8 V Source: New York State Radiological Emerpncy
. . '10-Mile EPZ ERPAS
" Preparedness Plans, Figure 6, p. IP-14
1 One sample table, for ERPA2, is included in the text; all 19 are found in Appendix B. It is assumed for each table that the wind is blowing towards O
'v the particular ERPA.
4 Examination of these tables will indicate that, even using official 5 estimates of evacuation times, the present emergency plans are not adequate 6 to protect the population from early death following a PWR2 release. 7 Populations in all 19 ERPAS are vulnerable under the precipitation case. 8 However, even under average weather conditions and for average model parameters, 9 the population of several ERPAs are not always protected. Furthermore, the 10 enormous uncertainty in dose prediction should be recalled before concluding 11 that protection is available under any weather conditions. As mentioned 12 previously, the models used to compute radiation do<. as within 10 miles suffer 13 in their predictive ability because of uncertaintin about how high the plume 14 will rise above the reactor due to its thermal buoyancy. If the actual plume 15 rise during an accident should fall towards the low end of the range of O D theoretical predictions, 200-rem doses would accumulate more quickly. 1 17 Besides the possibility of plume rise lower than the mid-range theoretical 18 prediction, there is-the possibility of an " effectively" lower plume height.21 4 19 Because the Indian Point plants are on relatively low terrain, the plume rise 20 will be effectively lower for areas with elevations higher than the plants.* 21 Although not shown in the tables, calculations made using a low plumerrise 22 (or, for that matter, a high deposition velocity) give results approximately 23 equivalent to the precipitation case. With a low plume rise, a large fraction of ERFAs would receive lethal doses even under typical weather cenditions. 25 26
- For areas with elevations below the initial plume rise height, the plume 27 height will be effectively lowered by approximately one half the elevation of the area above the plant. For areas with elevations above the initial plume 28 rise height, the plume risa at that area will be approximately one half the 5
initial plume rise height.2I O
1 1 Although not considered in our program, a sudden change in wind 2 speed or change in weather condition can also cause extremely high doses. 3 In total, we estimate that extreme doses equivalent to the D-4m/sec. ca'se* 4 would occur with a probability in excess of 30 percent, (See Table 9 ), 5 and doses approximately equivalent to the precipit_ation case would. occur. - 6 with a probability in excess of 20%. 7 Were it possible to provide supportive treatment for all persons ex-8 posed to 200 rem or greater doses and should supportive treatment turn 9 out to be as effective as estimated in the Reactor Safety Study, the early 10 deaths would not occur for doses of 200 rem. 11 Although we believe that hospitals will be overwhelmed by persons 12 exposed to low doses, effectively preventing administration of supportive 13 treatment to those who most need it, we have made calculations for a 350 14 rem threshold similar to those made for a 200 rem threshold. These are $ 15 discussed later in the text. 16 17 18 19 20
- D (Pasquill) stability class with a 4 meters /second wind speed.
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TABLE 8 C0ftDITI0riS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATI0tt IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (itID-RANGE MODEL PARAL 1ETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 2} Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of General Populationd ) c General Populationd ) Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Time ) Low Estimate ) Midday D,4m/sec 10:15 No 6:40 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 7:15 No 4:20 No Early Evening E,.4m/sec 7:15 Yes 4:20 Yes I Late Evening E,4m/sec 5:40 Yes 3:25 Yes Precipitation , Protection of Time of Day ' Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:40 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 9:00 , No
~
Late Evening D,4m/sec 7:00 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise,'and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these - mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.3 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 3, >24 and 1.7 hours for the D-4m/sec, E-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. 4
c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill stability class. s 6 O O O t
I . O is wa^t seccia' ract'iries wiratu io sites nas 41 aisx wira assescr 10 eaaty DEATH 7 Not complete at this time. i i i O - i 1 - i l l l O f 1 I l
- 17. ARE THE WEATHER CONDITI0fl5 YOU USE ABf40RMAL? g 1 According to the Draft Environmental Statement (Oct.1973f,8 the D 2 stability class occurs about 33 percent of the time at Indian Point. -
3 Weather conditions with this class and a wind speed range of 3-5.7m/sec. 4 (which includes and has consequences similar to our 4 meters /sec. case) 5 occur about nine percent of the time. 6 The E stability class occurs about 40 percent of the time, while 7 a 3-5.7 meters /sec. wind speed range in this class occurs 12 percent of 8 the time. 9 More important than the frequency of the specific cases we have 10 used is the frequency with which the early death consequences will be 11 as bad as or worse than the D-4 meters /sec case. In Table 9 we have estimated 12 this frequency by looking at 84 percent of all weather conditions and 13 comparing the early death consequences within five miles to that of the 9 14 D-4 m/sec case. We have assumed for these calculations that a low plume 15 rise an'd a high plume rise each occur 25 percent of the time for any given 16 set'of weather conditions. This calculation suggests that the early death 17 consequences within five miles will be as bad as or worse (sometimes much 18 worse) than the D-4 m/sec case 30 percent of the time. This calculation 19 does not include other technical factors that could make the consequences 20 worse, particularly variations in deposition velocity. It does, for the most 21 part, include the probability of serious consequences within five miles from . 22 a precipitation case, as discussed later. 23 It should also be noted that there are conditions other than 24 the D-4 m/sec case that could lead to early deaths, especially with delays 25 in evacuation. 26 27 28
p - q TABLE 9 COMPARISON OF OTHi.. LEATHER AND PLUME RISE SCENARIOS \ WITH THE D-4m/SEC (SINGLE DEP. 5 SHIELDING FACTOR) CASE FOR EARLY DEATH CONSEQUENCESa) Frequencyb ) Assumed frequencyc ) Seriousness of Early Frequency of Scenarics d2 Weather Scenario - of Weather Plume Rise of Plume Rise Death Consequences Worse or same as 9-4m/s4
.145 Low .25 Worse -
.036 D, 3m/sec. .145 Th. .5 Better -
.145 High .25 Better -
.094 Low .25 Worse .024 D, 3-5./m/sec. .094 Th. .50 Same .047
.094 High .25 Better -
.091 Low .25 Worse .023 D, 5.7m/sec. .091 Th. .50 Worse .046 &
u
.091 High .25 Better -
.212 Low .25 Worse .053 E, 3m/sec. .212 Th. .5 Better -
.212 High .25 Better -
.119 Low .25 Worse .030 E, 3-5.7m/sec. 1119 Th. .50 Better -
.119 High .25 Better -
.071 Low .25 Worse .018-E, 5.7m/sec. .071 Th. .50 Better -
.071 High .25 Better -
4
.105 Low .25 Worse .026 F, 3m/sec. .105 Th. .50 Better -
.105 High .25 Better -
.84 .30 a) A comparison of these weather scenarios for effects other than early deaths would be different.
b) Frequency data from Draft Environmental Statement (Oct.1973) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-286 for a 33 ft. release height. Frequency data may be different for a higher measurement height. c) Assumed distribution for the probability of the plume rise height. d) This does not include consideration of scenarios where the deposition velocity is higher than .01 meters /sec. or other uncertainties that increase the frequency of worse-than-D,4m/sec. cases. 4 9 . G G
l_-_...__.__._..___._..___-_._ _. i 1
- 18. HOW MUCH WARNING TIME WOULD EVACUEES NEED TO AVOID ALL EARLY DEATHS?
Not complete at this time. i i I 1 r r lO .
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- 19. HOW MANY PEOPLE WOULD REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION FOR IMMEDIATE TREATMENT 0F LIFE THREATENING RADIATION DOSES?
O Not complete at this time. , O O G
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, 20. WHAT WOULD YOUR RESULTS BE LIKE FOR A 350 REM THRESH 0LD?
Not complete at this time. L h J I h l l l O - I 9 O
- 21. WHAT ARE THE OTHER HEALTH CONSEQUENCES, BESIDES EARLY DEATHS, THAT THREATEN THE POPULATION WITHIN TEN MILES? (Not complete at this time.) h 1 We have found that under virtually every weather condition, expose,d persons will accumulate some radiation dose--especially to the thyroid.
Residents exposed to doses below the early death threshold will still face 4 the possibility of early radiation illness, marked by vomiting, as well as a significant risk of developing fatal cancer years after the accident. 6 7 8 9 t 's O O O
----- - - - - - - - - 1
- 22. WHAT STRATEGIES ARE AVAILABLE TO REDUCE THE HEALTH CONSEQUEf1CES TO THE POPULATI0ft WITHIf1 TEft MILES?
"' Given a serious release, or impending release, the top priority is to 2
get the population out of the plume path as quickly as possible, if possible, 3 before it arrives. Strategies to achieve this goal include technical fixes 4 that increase the time before a release (core catchers) to give the population 5 more time to evacuate; improved communications to convey an evacuation notice; 6 and pre-prepared evacuation, hospitalization, and other emergency plans to 7 decrease the necessary evacuation time. Most of these strategies are being 8 considered or attempted with varying degrees of success. 9 What has been given less attention are strategies involving consideration 10 of the plume path itself. As currently prepared, the plans seem to assume 11 that once the evacuees reach their school recept. ion and congregate care centers, 12 between 15 and 20 miles away, that they are safe. If any of these centers are within the plume path, a very likely occurrence given the distribution 1 of the centers, the evacuees there will continue to be exposed to radiation, 15 as will emergency personnel staffing the center. A look at Table 10 shows 16 that doses at 15 and 20 miles can be significant, reaching early death levels , 17 even for emergency personnel and others not previously exposed. It would be 18 tragic if centers designed to assist evacuees actually increased the health 19 consequences by detaining evacuees, school children, etc., in the plume path 20 at a relatively close distance to the plant. 21 Several approaches exist for minimizing this danger. A " secondary" 22 evacuation from the initial center is one possibility, but it may be too 23 difficult to achieve both in the time frame required and from a logistics 24 point of view. Also parents and others arriving at the center and finding friends and relatives re-evacuated might act less calmly than otherwise. A
, 26 local traffic tie-up could occur while evacuees attempted to leave the initial center, and the chance of local traffic accidents would increase. Delays 28 in evacuation would inevitably result.
1 A second important mitigating strategy would be to increase the distance 2 at which these centers are located. h 3 Third, efforts should be made to choose centers that are not down wind 4 from prevailing wind directions. Many of the sites are currently directly 5 south of the plant. Wind data suggest that sites west of the plant might be 6 preferrable. 7 Another strategy would be to build wind direction into the emergency 8 plans by having alternate evacuation sites at 180 degrees from each other. 9 Evacuees would be notified to follow either plan "A" or plan "B" at the time , 10 of the accident. 11 All of the above strategies merit consideration if the Indian Point 12 reactors are allowed to continue operating. 13 Finally, it is worth mentioning that a strategy of " preventive evacuation" 14 could serve to gain considerable time. Under such a strategy, evacuation 15 would be ordered even before all control measures had been tried. In this way h 16 many hours could be gained. Of course, in most cases, the evacuation would 17 prove unnecessary, just as evacuations from potential toxic chemical releases 18 folicwing train or truck accidents often prove unnecessary. Had a policy of - 19 preventive evacuation been in force during the Brown's Ferry fire or the Three 20 Mile Island accident, the resulting evacuation would have had little impact. 21 However, should the day arise when a large release occurs, a policy of preventive 22 evacuation could save many lives. 23 24 25 26 27 28 g
- 23. IS SHELTERING EVER A PREFERRED STRATEGY TO EVACUATION?
O U Some incomplete calculations in which dose accumulations have 2 been truncated at an arbitrary time, have been used by those who do not 3 understand the calculations to suggest that sheltering for 24 hours 4 is a better strategy than evacuation in a large release. What is l 5 missing from such calculations is consideration of the necessity for l 6 subsequent evacuations to prevent accumulation of radiation passing l 1 7 through the building walls. Thus, the strategy that some have called 8 " sheltering" is really,in the case of a large release, a strategy of de-9 layed evacuation. . While dose calculations for delayed evacuation 10 have not been published to our, knowledge, it is obvious that delayed 11 evacuation only makes sense, if it makes sense at all, if evacuation 12 after 24 hours can be expected to take place much faster than would 13 be the case for an immediate evacuation.
>~ Of course, at distances from the plant where rapid' evacuation would 15 not be feasible or would interfere with the escaoe of those at hiah risk, 16 sheltering is'the preferred strategy' until delayed evacuation is begun.
17 Finally,'it should be noted'that an " ideal" evacuation for a large 18 release at Indian Point would because of traffic congestion problems, 19 combine shelterina with evacuation. People could shelter themselves until 20 told their escace route was clear. This strategy does not seem logistical,ly 21 feasible, but it miaht be worth further study. 22 23 . 24 25 26 /3 V 28
- 24. SHOULD POTASSIUM IODIDE BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE TEN MILE EPZ?
Yes. We have found many ERPAs for which evacuation might be rapid I O 2 cnough to prevent early death following a PWR2 release, yet not rapid 3 enough to prevent inhalation of radioidine during plume passage. In these 4 situations potassium iodide would be extremely helpful. Without this protective 5 medicine, exposed residents within the ten mile EPZ would have their thyroids des-6 troyed through ablation. 7 In Sweden, Potasium Iodide has been distributed by mail to the ten percent 8 of the population that lives within 6 miles of the nuclear plant.22 The state of 9 Tennessee has distributed KI (paid for by TVA) to residents within 5 miles of the 10 Sequoyah nuclear plant. The Health Commissioner of Tennessee justified his de-11 cision in the following words:23 12 "In 1979 I was asked to serve on a staff panel working with the President's Commission on Three Mile Island. We listened to a 13 great deal of testimony and engaged in discussions with many knowledgeable people in the fields of radiation safety and nuclear 14 medicine. The use of potassium iodide as a thyroid blocking agent in nuclear emergencies was a major topic of discussion. As I 15 heard the formal presentations and talked informally wi.th many people, it became clear to me that the administration of KI has the potential of being a valuable preventive tool in the type of 16 nuclear emergency in which radioactive iodine might be released. 17 As a public health officer, my primary interest is in the pre-ventive aspects of health care, and the use of KI appeared to be 18 one of few preventive technologies available for dealing with . the health effe:ts of exposure to one . type of radiation. In fact 19 I live within a few miles of a plant now under construction. I have frequently been asked .f I would want KI in my medicine 20 cabinet, available to my family. The answer is yes. I have confidence in the safety of the plant. I don't intend to move 21 away, but I will have KI available for the additional bit of safety it will provide. How could I do less for the people of 22 our state whose health and safety are my responsibility?" 23 As stated previously, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has an important 24 role to play in connection with Potassium Iodide. By requiring Indian Point 25 plant owners to pay for KI distribution at any time in the future that health 26 authorities recommended its use, the board would be ensuring that the decision 27 to distribute KI at Indian Point would be based purely on public health 28 considerations. g
- 25. ASSUM:NG YOUR DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES IS CORRECT, HOW LIKELY V) t IS IT THAT A PWR2 TYPE RELEASE WILL OCCUR IN THE FIRST PLACE?
1 The nuclear industry dismisses this grim scenario by stating that the 2 likelihood of such a catastrophic accident is almost zero, or that its risk is 3 within the risks accepted by the public every day. The industry assumesthat the 4 probability of such accident can be determined beforehand by theoretical cal-5 culations. Therefore the debate hinges on the probability of hypothetical 6 events which have never occurred in the past--events for which there is no 7 historical record to estimate risk and settle the dispute. 8 Our attitude on probabilistic risk assessment in this case revolves on two points. First, we believe that no technological claims should be accepted uncritically, but especially not those of avid believers in a. technology.
)
Neither the nuclear industry nor the NRC (or its predecessor)have been noted for 1 their impartiality. Too often these actors have treated the possibility of catastrophic accidents as a public relations problem. Studies have been shaped _- to reassure the puolic not to find and make reactor improvements. 15 Secondly, we believe that the "real" probability of a catastrophic l6 accident is not known with enough certainty to be used in public safety decisions. 17 The possible systems failures, possible defects in design and construction, 18 possible operator errors, and the possible activities of madmen and terrorists , 19 are not known well enough to allow reliable probability estimates. 20 The only probability estimates before the Board are estimates based 21 on probabilistic risk analysis methodology. Yet the official NRC review of 22 this methodology finds it highly uncertain and recommends against it for the O deter i"etio" or ebs i"te or bebiiities-24 25
. 1 "In general, avoid use of the probabilistic risk 2
analysis methodology for the determination of absolute 3 risk probabilities for subsystems unless an adequate h 4 data base exists and it is possible to quantify the un-certainties. However, the methodology can also be 5 used for cases in which the data base will only support
- O a bounding analysis, and for other cases in the absence 7 of any better information if the results are properly qualified.. 24 8
9 This cautious attitude toward probabilistic risk assessment is supported by a 10 look at the historical record of accident prediction. The design goal for the 11 probability of complete failure of reactor safety systems was less than one 12 in a million per reactor per year of operation. This number was not based on 13 any substantial mathematical calculation, but rather on a convenient number 14 that the industry came up with in the 1950s. This goal was assumed to have 15 been achieved until 1974 when the authors of the Reactor Safety Study actually 16 tried to calculate the probability of a meltdown (excluding sabotage) and came h 17 up with one in 20,000 reactor-years. 18 The occurrence of the Three Mile Island accident so early in the nuclear 19 era suggests that the Reactor Safety Study itself was optimistic. According 20 to the report's mid-range probability estimate, an accident as severe as TMI 21 should not have occurred for several more decades. The accident implies that 22 this probability estimate is a factor of 10 or so too low. Furthe wre, it 23 suggests that the Reactor Safety Study probability calculatiens are probably 24 as optimistic for accidents more serious than TMI. , 25 The Brown's Ferry Fire in 1975 was another crucial accident sequence 26 that the NRC and the Reactor Safety Study failed to anticipate. In a 27 " post-facto" analysis, the Reactor Safety Study group downplayed their 28 neglect of fires by calculating that fires of the Brown's 29 Ferry type would only increase the probability of a meltdown g 30
I by 25 percent. This was a self-serving result, since a higher number would have (3 CJ invalidated their $3-million study. Other analyses suggest that the risk from 3 a Browns Ferry type fire was much higher.25 4 Incidents that have occured after the 1975 report cast additional doubt 5 on the ability of the Reactor Safety Study to anticipate important accident 6 sequences. On June 1980, at Browns Ferry Unit 3, water seeped into the hydraulic 7 mechanism which drives the control rods. As a result 40 percent of the control 8 rods failed to scram properly into the core. Though this incident did not 9 escalate into a major accident, engineers had believed previously that a 10 " failure to scram" was virtually impossible.25 The possibility of massive vessel failure due to embrittlement and the
. possibility of massive steam generator failure (either resulting from aging or from g a steam spike following core melt) both serve to increase concern.
g The total probability of a PWR2 release at the Indian Point site is very O wi5 uncertain, so uncertain that it is misleading to state a central estimate. The fact that new accident sequences are constantly being discovered suggests that additional sequences are yet to be found and that current probability es-timates must be in:omplete. In addition, the probability of sabotage is so un- - 18 g certain that no one , to our knowledge, has even attempted its calculation. There is not sufficient experience with reactors over their life cycle to 20 all w realistic probability estimate. The true number could be orders of mag 21 nitude higher or lower than the limited estimate given in the Reactor Safety 22 Study. (The same holds true for the Indian Point Probabilistic Risk Analysis.) 23 , As a result, there is no way to guarantee the public safety at Indian Point. 24 g Nor is it even possible to state that there is reasonable assurance the public 26 27 - 13 t ,8 29 1 _
I safety can be protected. If the board allows continued operation at Indian 2 Point, with the current emergency plans, it is making the implicit assumption 3 that the probability of a PWR2 release is too low to consider--an assumption 4 for which there is no sound scientific basis. 5 6 7 8 9 10 O f O
l
- 26. fl0W THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED THE PRESErlTATI0tl 0F THE RESULTS OF YOUR CALCULATI0ilS', PLEASE COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY BY
/] ANSWERING SOME QUESTI0flS ABOUT THE METHODOLOGIES Afl0 ASSUMPTI0flS FOR INSTAilCE, HOW WERE YOUR EARLY DEATH TABLES DETER.'i!NE.D?
Using a modified version of a computer program developed for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, we modelled--for a given dist-ance, set of weather t parameters, shielding factor, deposition velocity, and plume rise--the dose as a function of time after the release. For illustrative purposes, we have graphed the data for a sample case in Figure VII. From this graph of the program data, the time at which the dose reaches 200 rem (or any desired value) can be found, as also illustrated in Figure VII. By repeating this procedure for a set of distances, the " time after release to reach 200 rem" can be constructed as a function of distance from the plant. J An example of this function can be found in Figure VIII., while a table of
,1 these functions can be found in Table 10.
/ For a given ERPA, the midpoint or " representative distance"is 3 estimated by averaging the distance from the plant to the closest and
> furthest ERPA boundaries. The time at which an individual at this 15 " representative" distance receives a 200 rem dose is assumed for our purpose 16 to be the average time by which the population at all locations in the ERPA has i7 received a 200 rem dose. Of course, the population in the ERPA further from the plant will receive a lower dose and the population closer to the plant will
- ~
18
'9 receive a higher dose. For example ERPA 2 's representative distance is about .0 2.3 miles from the plant. The averace time for the dose in this ERPA to reach .1 200 rem, under the D-4 meters /sec case, is 3 hours. .2 This time estimate can be compared to an estimated evacuation time for 3 that ERPA. When it is shorter than the estimated evacuation time it can be j ,
reasonably assumed that the population is under the risk of early death for that case. In the example above. the estimated (and adjusted) evacuation titre 5 for ERPA2 is 10:15-6:40 in the Midday evacuation (school-in-session) case. The
< population there is thus not protected from early death for a PWR2 accident.
A
go, .,
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TABLE 10 TIME AFTER PUR2 TYPE RELEASE IN WHICH DOSE REACHES 200 REM (IN HOURS)
- For D (Pasquill) stability class 2 and 4.0m/sec. Wind Speed Miles A B C D Range Dep. Single Dep. Low Rel. Hit. Rain
+
2 4 1. 8
- 8.9-20 3.1-6.3 2.8-4.9 6 2.6
- 13-26 7.1-17 4.2-8.2 8 4.3
- 19-58 14-44 6.7-15 10 6.8
- 27-93 19-73 9.8-22 .
- 48
- 16-55
. 15 20
- 51 20 36
- 110
- 110
- 33-120 ,
E
*---greater than 6 days
(.1 to .00lm/sec), Briggs theoretical rel. ht. A--No B--No rain, rain, Range Single of deposition deposition velocity (.0lm/sec), Briggs theoretical release height. velocity C--No rain, Single deposition velocity (.0ly/sec), iaw release height. D--Rain, Washout coefficient of .0001 sec. Brigs 3 theoretical release height. Shielding in all cases is .2 to .5.
+ Table not completed at this time.
l l l e . O e
l
- 27. WHY CONSIDER A LOW PLUME RISE CASE?
As mentioned earlier in this testimony (Question 7.), the 2 doses predicted by various consequence models for a given set of 3 weather conditions can show a wide spread (See Figure III). ; 4 Much of this spread can be accounted for by the modellers different ' 5 predictions of plume rise, a parameter for which theoretical and 6 experimental knowledge is currently limited. Because of the un-4 7 certainty in the plume rise parameter, we have examined both a f
- 8 low plume rise and high plume rise case, though only the results
- 9 of the low plume rise case are reported because of its especially I'J serious consequences.
] I 11 Also, as mentioned previously, the'.topogr phy of the Indian _ 12 Point terrain may result in effectively lower plumes reaching areas i 21 13 with elevations above the reactofs site. 15 j 16 i 17 18 l i J T i 4 A
\m) l
- 28. WHAT DOES A "DAf1GE MAX" CASE REPRESENT?
1 The " range max" case represents the worst case at each distance as 2 deposition velocity is varied over its allowed range. (The worst case cannot 3 occur at every distance at once.) In addition, the range max case assumes 4 the building shielding factor to be the least effective in its assumed range, 5 rather than an average value. 6 7 8 9 10 11 O Between .001 and .1 meters /second for D stability, and between .001 and .003 meters /second for E stability. 0.3 rather than 0.2 in urban buildings, 0.5 in suburban and rural buildings rather than 0.4. O
- 29. WHY IS~THE "RAirl" CASE Att ESPECIALLY BAD SCErlARIO?
Any precipitation occurring during the passage of the plume increases the rate at which radioactive material is removed from the plume and deposited 3 on the ground. This removal occurs withi1 the precipitation cloud when the, 4 radioactive aerosol acts as condensation nuclei or when the aerosol becomes 5 attached to existing cloud droplets. ' Remval of material under the cloud 6 occurs as a result of the falling precipitation impacting on and collecting 7 the aerosol. The increased amount of ' radioactive material'on the ground. 8 increases the resulting ground dose to the population. g The risk to the population in the " rain" case is also increased s due to 19 increased expectea e!acuation times. Precipitation would-be expected to
, (
- 11 decrease visibility, decrease safe road speeds, and increase the' possibility 12 of accidents. It would also probably stress the evacuees further, lowering 13 tneir abilit, to react calmly and safely.
s 9 15 16 17 l s 18 1 s The deposition rate is proportional to the amount of material in the plume. Because we have assumed that the precipitation fans continuously from the time of release, more material will be deposited closer to the plant, while less will be deposited to areas farther from the plant, in comparison with a similar no-rain case. The result is that cases will accumulate more quickly closer to
~
the plant and more s10wly af ter sorte distance from the plant. If the precipitation started after the release, for example when the , plume cloud was at four miles, the dose would follow 'a no-rain case up to four miles and would follow the rain case (or higher doses) after four miles. ! J
+
- 30. DESCRIBE HOW THE EVACUATION TIMES YOU USED WERE DERIVED AND THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THEM.
1 After an " initiating" event at a nuclear reactor, the nuclear facility 2 operator (referred to as the NF0) notifies appropriate state and local officials 3 of an " unusual event", or depending on the seriousness of the event, of a 4 higher emergency level. The emergency level may eventually reach a_ general 5 level emergency in which the NF0 may recommend, in consultation with other 6 officiels and technical support staff, that an evacuation is necessary due 7 to the occurence or high probability of a large release. The appropriate 8 county o'.'icials, who may or may not have received prior warning, are then 9 told that an evacuation is recommended, and the emergency warning system 10 will presumably be activated as soon as possible. The time between an 11 initial notification of an occurrina or .pending large release by the NFO 12 and the time an evacuation is begun i by county officials has been estimated 13 by CONSAD(a consulting firm to FEMA) to take 19-78 minutes, they suggest g 14 40 minutes during the day and 50 minutes at night. Their review of historical 15 date shows these kinds of estimates can range from one to many hours for a 16 range of natural disasters and false alerts. In view of this, our testimony , 17 assumes 60 minutes for this stage. 18 A further assumption made in our study is that the NFO declares a general 19 emergency one hour before the actual release. This was the assumption made 20 in WASH-1400. 29 For this study, then the notification of the public 21 (by sirens, etc) and the release begin simultaneously.* 22 23
- The release may occur many hours after the first sign of trouble at the pl ant. hwever, an evacuation will be recommended, under current policies, not 24 at the first sign of trouble, but when the NF0 decides that there is nothing that can be done to prevent a large release.
25 26 27 3
1 There is current 1/ some uncertainty about how long it would take to () notify all the population within the EPZ. With an effective siren system 3 covering 100 percent of the population, this would presumably be short. 4 The effectiveness of a siren system during a release may be less than 100 5 percent coverage, however, due to malfunctioning, " blank areas, etc. 6 Although the current system of sirens,with tone-alerts in special facilities, 7 itself does not cover all the population, we assume conservatively that all 8 of the population will be notified instantaneously after an order from 9 county officals, 10 We also assume along with Parsons Brinckerhoff that the population will 11 require twenty minutes to prepare, though we believe this is a conservative 12 estimate. 30 13 Our calculations use an estimate of the total evacuation time (time to 14 clear the EPZ from the time of release)found by summing the 20 minutes O PrePeretion time end t8e resPo#se times , erecered bv Persons erinckerhoff, 16 in t.he New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans. 17 For investigating the adequacy of the emergency plans to protect the 18 population from early death, we chose to approximate the average dose to an 19 ERPA's population as the dose at the " representative" distance, the average 20 of the distances from the nuclear plant to the ERPA's closest and farthest 21 boundaries. The time of dose accumulation was approximated as the time an 22 evacuee would spend in the ERPA. We estimated this time for the last 23 evacuees by assuming that the last evacuees would leave their ERPA and. clear 24 the EPZ in the last twenty minutes. We thus subtracted twenty minutes from , 25 the " total evacuation time" (the time to clear the EPZ) estimated above. l l 26 The result is an estimate of the time from release to when the last evacuees 27 leave the ERPA. We used this estimate in our calculations of the early death l 029 te81es. l l r,. . ., , - _ _
- 31. WHY DIDN'T YOU ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EARLY DEATHS FROM A PWR2 ACCIDENT?
Because radiation (ground) doses depend on both the length of time spent in a contaminated area and the ground concentration of that area, it is particularly difficult to calculate the dose to someone who is 4 moving through areas of varying concentration (e.g. during an evacuation). 5 This calculation requires not only plwne dose modelling such as we have done, but also assumptions about the rate and path by which persons evacu-7 ate. Estimates of the rate at which cersons evacuate were not available to us, 8' makino an estimate of early deaths impossible. In addition, we believe that_ 9 the current uncertainty in path and rate assumptions makes any estimate of 10 early deaths highly uncertain.
'
- For making an approximation of the number of early deaths, tne percentage of persons from an ERPA clearing that ERPA as a function of the evacuation 12 time would be the most useful for setting a lower bound on the number of early deaths. The time at which the dose reached the early death threshold 13 at the ERPAs representative distance could be used to find the approximate 14 P.ercentage of persons remaining in the ERPA. This could be used to find an approximate estimate of early deaths in that ERPA by multiplying by.the h
15 appropriate coefficients. The functions mentioned would vary from ERPA to ERPA due to congestion prob-16 lems, the functioning of the notification system, etc. While estimates of these functions can be prepared, especially in dynamic evacuation models, they 17 were not available from Parsons Brinckerhoff. This made a valid estimate of the number of early deaths essentially impossible. 18 Parsons Brinckerhoff makes available graphs of the percentage of tne whole pop-19 ulation clearing the ten mile EPZ as a function of evacuation time, and seems to 90 suggest that this represents a useful guide to the rate at which persons evac-uate?'We believe this type of graph is inappropriate for even roughly estima-21 ting the number of early de6ths. First, the data are too aggregated to be use-ful. As mentioned, the ERPAs close to the plant will experience more congestion and have more difficulty evacuating to beyond ten miles than outer ERPAs.Thus a 22 curve similar to Parsons Brinckerhoff's for a single inner ERPA population would be different, generally with a greater percentage clearing the EPZ during the 23 later hours. The relationship of this curve to the curve desired for our sug-gested approximr tion --the distribution of persons from an ERPA clearing that 24 ERPA--is also unclear, though it might be approximated. 25 26 27 h 28 p t.
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- -81
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1 Secondly, the methodology used to derive the Parsons Brinckerhoff curves may be inadequate. The curves of the cercentage of passenger car equivalents O' clearing the EPZ as a function of time are converted to those reported using 3 an average estimate of passengers per passenger car equivalent. (PCEs) This 4 would be satisfactory if buses and cars evacuated at the same rate, but as ! 4 Parsons Brinckerhoff suggests, the buses will evacuate on average later l than cars. Each of the last PCEs evacuating could represent 20 persons 5 (a bus with 40 persons rated at 2 PCEs) rather than an average number of persons. Thus a larger percentage of the population will be evacuating 6 in the later hours than is suggested by the Parsons Brinckerhoff curves. f J 7 8 . 9 i 10 i 11 1 i I e 4 1
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- 32. HOW ACCURATE ARE THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION (" RESPONSE") TIME ESTIMATES?
1 We first should note that the evacuation time estimates during an actual 2 PWR2 type release would be biased toward the high estimates provided by Parsons 3 Brinckerhoff. Using the criteria from their own reports: " Upper bound 4 evacuation travel times (longer times) are representative of a situation where . . . 5 a low state of operational readiness results from minimal mobilization of the 6 emergency work force." 7 We believe minimal mobilization could easly occur; first because Parsons 8 Brinckerhoff assumes an optimistic notification scenario, especially for some 9 PWR2 accident scenarios. Their notification scenario for the " low estimates" 10 seems to be the following:* 11 1) The public notification system was activated; the public tuned to an Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station; the public was 12 informed of the situation, instructed to read a predistributed emergency public information pamphlet for possible actions to take 13 and to stay tuned to the EBS station for further specific instructions.
.4
- 2) One half hour later. 'he public notification system was activated 15 again. The public, listening to an EBS station, was instructed to evacuate according to the pamphlet instructions. Evacuation 16 zones, routes, and reception centers were reiterated over the EBS -
network. 17 The half hour pre-warning in the scenario allows emergency persoyal to be 18 stationed for the evacuation. Without this warning time personnel will 19 obviously not be in a high state of readiness, at their assigned stations, 20 for the evacuation. In some cases, however, there might not be enough time 21 for this warning. 22 23 24 25
- From p.11 of Methodology to Estimate Roadway Travel Times DLring Evacuation, January 1981.
O
1 Secondly, in the case of a PWR2 release, it would appear that traffic 2 personnel in the plume area would rapidly receive doses above the protective 3 action guidelines. The use of personnel to direct traffic at crucial points in the plume area during a substantial portion of the evacuation seems doubtful, 5 though it is assumed in Parsons Brinckerhoff's low evacuation time estimates. 6 In this case, with low mobilization of personnel, evacuation would be delayed, and 7 according to Parsons Brinckerhoff, the upper range of their evacuation times 8 better predicts the likely evacuation time. 9 In addition, because it is standard procedure in analytical work-to have 10 an understanding of the assumptions and uncertainties on which the results 11 are based, we have scrutinized the evacuation time modelling in order to outline 12 some of their possible uncertainties. __ 13 The first uncertainty in the estimates is the basic assumption of the 14 transportation model that evacuees will follow the plans. In fact deviation 15 from the plans could easily occur'in several ways that would change the estimates: G 1) Some residents will, at least initially, refuse to evacuate.
- 2) Some will follow more familiar routes during an evacua' tion, either 18 because they have forgotten or misplaced the plans, or because these routes
}9 feel " safer." 20 3) Probably the most important is that during a school-in-session evacuation, , 21 many parents will first go to their children's school, causing major traffic 22 tie ups and delays in the area of the school. This natural reaction will 23 delay evacuation of the parents and of many of the children. 24 A second uncertainty is that Parsons Brinckerhoff has modelled, for the 25 most part, an ideal evacuation infrastructure. The model assumes that the 26 necessary agreements for assistance have been made. For example, it is assumed 27 28 29
- O
1 that agreements exist for the use of privately owned buses and drivers, that 2 these drivers will know their assigned routes, that they will make multiple 3 trips, etc. Many of these agreements do not seem to have been made yet. It 4 also assumes these agreements will be followed by bus drivers and other perschnel , 5 who might prefer to evacuate their own families first, or who might be unwilling 6 to receive radiation doses, especially from multiple trips. 7 Similarly, Parsons Brinckerhoff assumes that an extensive " ideal" notification 8 system is in place ~and will operate as planned. The system they assume includes: 9 1) Sirens giving 100 percent coverage of the permanent residents. 10 2) Sirens covering recreational facilities and transient population centers. 11 3) Tone-alerts in all special facilities. 12 If these systems are not in place or don't work (as they didn't in the test 13 of the plans), then actual evacuation times may be longer than the estimates. 14 A third uncertainty is that because of the use of an optimistic scenario that may 15 not be. credible for a PWR2 release. bus travel times may.have been.undere.<timatad O 16 It was assumed that buses have already arrived at the start of their routes 17 when notification occurs. Because buses 'are constraining factors, especially 18 during a school-in-session scenario, 'an additional half-hour might need to 19 be added to some evacuation time estimates. 20 A fourth uncertainty was mentioned by Parsons Brinckerhoff, suggesting 21 that approximately 12 percent of multicar families might utilize their additional 22 vehicles in an evacuation. The effect of these or a larger number of additional 23 vehicles was not quantified by Parsons Brinckerhoff except to say that the 24 increase in time would be proportional to the percent increase in the number 25 of cars used to evacuate along critical evacuation routes.* 26
*From Methodology to Calculate Evacuation Travel Time, p. 32-33, Estimates for the Indian Point Emergency Planning Zone. g i
85-1 A fifth and major uncertainty is that the model neglects the effects of G V a " spontaneous" evacuation beyond ten miles on the evacuation time estimates. From 3 Figures IX and X from " Methodology to Calculate Evacuation Travel Time Estimates 4 for the Indian Point Emergency Planning Zone," it is obvious that many "bottfenecks" 5 occur at the EPZ boundary. The limiting effects of these bottlenecks on evacuees , 6 could be increased if " spontaneous" evacuees made use of them or nearby succeeding l 7 links. 8 The many uncertainties in the evacuation t,ime estimates sugges_t that the 9 evacuation times during an actual PWR2_ release wi.l_1 probably_be as_high or higher 10 than the upper bound estimates provided by Parsons Brinckerhoff. 11 12 13 14 CE) .
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O l APPENDIX A RESUME FOR DR. JAN BEYEA O b O
R2sume for Jan Bryam March 1982 EDUCATION: ( , x Ph D. , Columbia Universi ty,1968 (Nuclear Physics)
- 8. A., Amherst College, 1962 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
1980 to date, Senior Energy Scientist, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022. 1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmeatal Studies, Princeton University. 1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College. 1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Columbia University Physics Department. CONSULTING WORK: Consul tant on nuclear energy to the New Jersey Department of Envi ronmental Protection; the Offices of the Attorney General in New York State and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the state of lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Energy Commission; and various citizens' groups in the United States. PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ENERGY POLICY:
" Comments on Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights of the Committee on Science and Technology, U. S. House of Representatives; Committee ,, Print, June 1, 2, 1981 / No. 14 /.
('~'! "The Audubon Energy Plan Technical Report," Peterson, Beyea, Paulson and Cutler, National Audubon Society, April 1981.
" Locating and Eliminating Obscure but Major Energy Losses in Residential Housing ," Harrje, Dutt and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 85, Part 11 (1979).
Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award. -
" Attic Heat Loss and Conservation Policy," Outt, Beyea, Sinden. ASME Technology and Society Division paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas, 1978.
" Comments on the proposed FTC trade regulation ru!e on labeling and adver-tising of thermal insulation," Jan Beyea and Gautam Dutt, testimony before the Federal Trade Commission, January 1978.
" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of Twi n Ri vers Townhouses ," Beyea, Dut t Voteki, Energy and Buildings, Volume I (1977), Page 261. Also Chapter 3 of Saving Energy in the Home, Ballinger,1978.
"The Two-Resistance Model for Attic Heat Flow: Implications for Conservation Policy," Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Energy--the International Journal, 3, 657,(1978).
" Energy Conservation in an Old 3-Story Apartment Complex," Beyea, Harrje, Sinden, Energy Use Management, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1977, Volume I, Page 373
[; " Load Shif ting Techniques Using Home Appliances," Jan Beyea, Robert Weatherwax, ' '- Energy use Management, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1978, Volume lil/IV, Page 121.
-2' PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY RISKS (PREDOMINANTLY NUCLEAR POWER):
Articles:
"Containing a Nuclear Reactor Melt-Down" (wi th Frank von Hippel), Bulletin O
of the Atomic Scientists, to be published.
"Second Thought's (about Nuclear Safety)," to appear in Nuclear Power: Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (Publication date: October 1982.)
" Indoor Ai r Pollution," Commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, E, Page 63, February 1981.
" Emergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, J6, Page 40, December 1980. (An earlier version of this article appeared in German as Chapter 3 in im Ernstfall hil flos?, E. R. Koch, Fritz Vahrenholt, editors, Kiepenheuer T, Witsch, Cologne, 1980.)
" Dispute at Indian Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36,, Page 63, May 1980.
Published Debates: The Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.B.S. Television. Transcript printed by Southern Educational Communications Association, 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966, Columbia, South Carolina, 1979 Nuclea'r Reactors: How Safe Are They?, panel discussion sponsored by the Academy Forum of The National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C. 20418, May 5, 1980. Reports:
"Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Envi ronmental Quali ty, December 1980. .
" Decontamination of Krypton 85 f rom Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant," (with Kendall, et.al.), Report of the Union of Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.
"Some Comments on Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (wi th Gordon Thompson), National Audubon Society, Environmental Policy Department Report No. 3, April 1980.
" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Containment," (wi th Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Ef fects of Releases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivi ty f rom Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorieben international Review " February 1979
" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectrum,"
presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republ i c of Ge rmany , Bonn , September 1,1978.
3- - Published Debates (Cont'd.): A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at (x_,s) Barseback, report to the Swedish Energy Commission, Stockholm, DS I 1978:5,
' January 1978.
Testimony:_ . _
"In the Matter of Application of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for Conversion to Coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5," testimony and cross-examination on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversion to coal; Department of Environmental Resources, State of New York, November 5,1981.
" Future Prospects for Commercial Nuclear Power in the United States," before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Interior and ~
Insular Af fairs, U. S. House of Representatives, October 23, 1981.
" Stockpiling of Potassium lod de for the General Public as a Condition for Restart of TMl Unit No.1," direct testimony on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York, April 1981.
" Advice and Recommendations Concerning Changes in Reactor Design and Safety Analysis which should be Required in Light of the Accident at Three Mile Island,"
statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning the proposed rulemaking nearing on degraded cores, December 29, 1980. i
" Alternatives to the Indien Point Nuclear Reactors," Statement before the Environmental Protection Committee of the New York City Council, December 14, 1979 .
Also before the Committee, "The impact on New York City of Reactor Accidents at 4 Also " Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," () Indian ihoint," June 11, 1979 statement to the New York City Board of Health, August 12,1976 (with Frank von Hippel).
" Emergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," Testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Commission, Emergency Response and Evacuation Plans Hearings, November 4,1978, Page 171. .
"Short-Term Effects of Catastrophic Accidents on Communities -Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testimony before the California Energy Resources l and Development Commission, December 3,1976.
j
" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jamesport." Testimony before the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment in the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), May 1977 Miscellaneous:
" Comments on WASH-1400," Statement to the Subcommittee on' Energy and the Envi ronment, Oversight Hearings on Reactor Safety, June- 11, 1976, Serial No. 94-61, Page 210.
! " Upper Limit Calculations of Deaths from Nuclear Reactors," Bull. Am. Phys.
Soc. 21, til (1976). O a 4 9 Qr - un , ,m, . - - - ,. - + , w -,- :, - 7 , - --,m,--e- - w a n ,-.
- 0. & y
J O 1 ( APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTARY EARLY DEATH TABLES FOR VARIOUS ERPAS I ( 9
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e V Source: New York State Radiological Emergency 10-M.le i e-.- ERPAS Preparedness Plans, Figure 6, p. 1P-14
TABLE B1 C0f4DITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEA 111 (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) WESTCH STER COUNTY ERPA 2)b Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd )
@ ditions*)
Midday D, 4m/sec 10:15 No 6:40 No Early Evening 0, 4m/sec 7:15 No 4:20 No Early Evening E, 4m/sec 7:15 Yes 4:20 Yes Late Evening E, 4m/sec 5:40 Yes 3:25 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day ~ Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:40 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 9:00 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 7:00 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by. averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.3 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 3, >24 and 1.7 hours for the D-4m/sec,b-Am/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O O .
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) Q c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the es.timates here due to evacuation model uncertainties.
d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected j from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill staoility class. t e Lab I v . 6
TABLE B2 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEAT11 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAf tETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 3 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) Low Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 8:20 No 7:15 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec- 4:45 Yes 3:00 Yes Early Evening E,4m/sec 4:45 Yes 3:00 Yes Late Evening E, 4m/sec 4:05 Yes 2:45 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 9:55 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:45 , No Late Evening D,4m/sec 4:55 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. . b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.7 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 5, >24, ar.d 1.9 hours for the D-4m/sec,b-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O O .
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(,/ .'C-c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher tha.n the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. l e) Pasquill stability class. e e e e e
TABLE B3 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEA 111 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA4 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) Low Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 10:30 No 7:25 No Early Evening D,4m/sec 4:15 No , 2:55#) No Early Evening E,4m/sec 4:15 Yes 2:55 Yes , Late Evening E,4m/sec 4:10 Yes 2:55 Yes 7 Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 12:40 No Early Evening D,4m/sec 5:10 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 5:05 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.3 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 3, >24, andl.7 hours for the D-4m/sec,6-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. 9 G
O . O c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the. o New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties, d) Protection from a dose-at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses.
- e) Pasquill stability class.
f) Given the uncertainties of both the transportation and dispersion /close models, we do not consider all the population protected under this low evacuation time estimate. N 8 9 O e
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TABLE B4 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTFCTED FROM EARLY DEA 111 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAf tETERS)a) b) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 5 Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day e Conditions ) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd) Midday D, 4m/sec 10:40 Yes 7:40 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 4:45 Yes 3:10 Yes Early Evening E,4m/sec 4:45 Yes 3:10 Yes Late Evening E, 4m/sec 4:30 Yes 3:05 Yes { Precipitation Protection of . Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:55 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:45 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 5:30 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.4 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 11.7,> 24, and 3.7 hours for the D-4m/sec F O O-4m/secandD-raincases,respectively. O
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p V c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at' or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill stability class. O e. I s 99 4
TABLE B5 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (i1ID-RANGE MODEL PARAftETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 6 Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Tine of Day Conditions
- Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Papulationd )
Midday D, 4m/sec 8:15 Yes 7:15 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 3:20 Yes 2:55 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 3:20 Yes 2:55 Yes . Late Evening E,4m/sec 3:15 Yes 2:50 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 9:55 No Early Evening D,4m/sec 4:00 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 4:00 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these . mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and' farthest ERPA bcundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.3 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 11.4,724, O and 3.6 hours for 'the D-4m/sec. b-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O
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! c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation tice estimates based on those given in the ! New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments .
i see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. i ' d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected j l from-latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses, e) Pasquill stability class. . 1 1 I i I-e i 4 9 I I e 4 ! t' i t ) l ? I i ' i i 6
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TABLE B6 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEAT11 (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf tETERS)a)
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WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 7 Typical Weather Weather High Estimated Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Timec ) General Populationd ) Low EstimateC } General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 1:45 Yes 0:40 Yes Early Evening 0, 4m/sec 0:35 Yes 0:30 Yes Early Evening E,4m/sec 0:35 Yes 0:30 Yes , Late Evening E,4m/sec 0:35 Yes 0:30 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 2:10 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 0:40 , Yes Late Evening D, 4m/sec 0:40 Yes a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from t.arly death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.8 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 5.5, >24, F-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O and 2 hours for the D-4m/sec,O O
o O O c) High an'd low evacuation time estirtates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given'in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model'uncartainties.
.d) Protect' ion from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early. death. The population is.not protected
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s ~ TABLE B7 - CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE' GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEA'Ill (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a} WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 8 Typical Weather Weather High Estimated Protection of c Protection of Time of Day Conditions *} Evacuation Timec ) General Populationd ) Low Estimate ) Gereral Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 10:10 No 6:30 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 7:20 Yes 4:25 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 7:20 Yes 4:25 Yes i Late Evening E, 4m/sec N 5:45 Yes 3:30 Yes , Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 12:35 No Early Evening 0, 4m/sec 9:05 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 7:05 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 4.5 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 9.8, >24 F-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O and 3.1 hours for the D-4m/sec,O O
O O O . c) High and low evacuation time estimates-are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans;'for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties.
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d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill stability class. U1' i o e 4 l i i
TABLE B8 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (f1ID-RANGE MODEL PARA!!FTERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 9 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 9:55 No 6:40 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 4:40 - Yes 2:55 Yes Early Evening E,4m/sec 4:40 Yes 2:55 Yes , Late Evening E, 4m/sec 4:25 Yes 2:45 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 11:55 No Early Evening D, 4m/ rec 5:40 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 5:25 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theore ical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possit'e value of oarameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 4.0 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 8.9,> 24, O and 2.8 hours for the D-4m/sec,b-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O
i
- c). High and low evacuation time estimates'are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given-in the.
New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose' at or exceeding 200 -rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected 4 g from latent cancer deaths, thyroid' cancers, birth defects etc., that would be caused by lower doses.
- e) Pasquill stability class.
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TABLE 89 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTYERPAlY) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day e Conditions ) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 10:15 Yes 6:05 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 6:55 Yes 4:10 Yes Early Evening E,4m/sec 6:55 Yes 4:10 Yes . Late Evening E, 4m/sec 5:20 Yes 3:15 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:40 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 8:35 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 6:30 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 6.8 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches F-4m/sec and D-rain cases, resoectively.
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200 rem in 15, >24, and 5 O hoursfortheD-4m/sec,O O
O OL O. c) High.and low evacuation time estimates are.the' adjusted; evacuation time estimates based on those 'given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the ~ assumptions and adjustments see text. _The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the-threshold for early death. The-population is not protected
.from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. -e) Pasquill stability class.
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TABLE B10 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATH (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) WESTCHESTER COUNTY ERPA 12 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 10:00 Yes 6:50 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 4:40 Yes 3:55 Yes 3 Early Evening E, 4m/sec 4:40 Yes 3:55 Yes . Late Evening E, 4m/sec 2:50 Yes 2:30 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:05 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:40 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 4:45 Yes a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance f.or this ERPA is 6.9 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in ' EE, >24, and 5.2 hours for the D-4m/sec, b-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. G O .
o o o c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evucuation time estimates based on those.given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold -for early death. The population is not protected ~ g from latent cancer deaths, thyroid. cancers, birth defects, etc.,'that would be caused by lower doses, e) Pasquill stability class. I W A 0 t . i
TABLE Bil CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEAT11 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAftETERS)a) PUTNUM COUNTY ERPA16 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *I Evacuation Time ) General Population dsj Low Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 7:35 Yes 5:10 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 2:50 Yes 1:50 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 2:50 Yes 1:50 Yes , Late Evening E, 4m/sec 2:50 Yes 1:50 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) Ge'neral Populationd ) Midday D. 4m/sec 9:05 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 3:20 , Yes Late Evening D,4m/sec 3:20 Yes a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protec. tion from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise, b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.5 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 11.8, > 24, c-4m/sec and D-rain cases, resoectively. e and 3.8 hours for the D 4m/sec'O O
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c)~.High and low evacuation time estimates-are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the
. New York State Radiological . Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions:and adjustments ,
see text. The "real" evacuation times may be' higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. ; t , t d) . Protection from a ~ dose 'at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is'not protected f lI from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused.by lower doses. l
.. t e) Pasquill stability cla.ss.
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TABLE B12 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEA 111 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAMETERS)d) b PUTNUM COUNTY ERPA 18 ) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *} Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) Low Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 9:15 Yes 6:20 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 7:10 Yes 4:15 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 7:10 Yes 4:15 Yes , Late Evening E, 4m/sec 5:35 Yes 3:30 Yes Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 11:00 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 8:55 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 6:55 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population mignt not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.3 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 11.4, >24, O and 3.6 hours for the D-4m/sec, bAm/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. G
_ . . . . . . . - . . - - - - - . . . - - - - - . - - - . . . . . ~ . . - - . . . - . . _ - ~ . - . . . - . . . n O O U i c) Highland low' evacuation time estimates are the adjusted' evacuation time estimates based on those given.in the ; i New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments-see text. The "real* evacuation times may be higher.than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. .t d) ' Protection fr m a dose at or exceeding-200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that'would be caused by lower doses, t i e) Pasquill stability class. l t l I i .
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TABLE B13 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (f1ID-RANGE MODEL PARAftETERS)a) b ORANGE COUNTY ERPA 26 ) Typical Weather , Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 9:25 Yes 5:40 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 4:35 Yes 2:40 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 4:35 Yes 2:40 Yes . Late Evening E,4m/sec 4:30 Yes 2:45 Yes f Precipitation
?
Protection of Time of Day ~ Conditions High Estimatec ) Gener51 Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 11:40 iso Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:35 No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 5:30 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.5 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 11.8, >24, F-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O and3.8hoursfortheD-4m/sec,O O . I
O o . O c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evoc:Jat:on time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties, d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding:200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population'is not protected from latent' cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses, e) Pasquill stabilit'y class. k e r .
TABLE B14 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE' GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEAT11 (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) b ROCKLAND COUNTY ERPA 29 ) Typical Weather ! I Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Evacuation Yime ) General Populationd ) Low Estimate ) c General Populationd ) Time of Day Conditions") ! Midday D, 4m/sec 11:45 No 7:00 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:50 No 3:30 No l i Early Evening E, 4m/sec 5:50 Yes 3:30 Yes , Late Evening E, 4m/sec 5:45 Yes 3:30 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 14:30 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 7:05 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 7:05 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 1.8 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 1.9, >24, F-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. O and 1.4 hours for the D-4m/sec,O O
O .O O. c) .High and low evacuation time estimates 'are = the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the-New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for.an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation -times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection- from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population'is not protected
' from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers,' birth defects,'etc., that' would be caused by lower ~ doses.
e) Pasquill stability class. f T S
TABLE B15 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATli (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAMETERS)a) ROCKLAND COUNTY ERPA 30 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of c Protection of Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4n/sec 12:00 No 7:15 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 6:05 Yes 3;50 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 6:05 Yes 3:50 Yes Late Evening E,4m/sec 6:05 Yes 3:50 Yes , 8 Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 14:50 No Early Evening 0,4m/sec 7:20 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 7:20 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 4.1 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 9.1, >24, E-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. and 2.8 hours for the D-4m/sec, O O O .
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i j O o - 0-c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in-the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may.be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties, d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the. threshold for early death. The population is not. protected
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from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill stability class. '1 i )
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TABLE B16 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (f1ID-RANGE MODEL PARAfiETERS)a) ROCKLAND COUNTY ERPA 31 Typical Weather i Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *) Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Population d' Midday D 4m/sec 11:40 No 6:55 Yes Early Evening D, 4m/sec 5:45 Yes 3:30 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 5:45 Yes 3:30 Yes i Late Evening E, 4m/sec 5:45 Yes 3:30 Yes P_recipitation Protectica of Time of Day " Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 14:30 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 7:00 . No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 7:00 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by a/eraging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 5.5 miles At this distance, the dose reaches rem in 11.8, > 24, and 3.8 hours for the D-4m/se -4m/sec and D-rain cases, resDectively.
ur~ o o c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the , New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses, e) Pasquill stability class. f) Given the uncertainties of both the transportation and dispersion / dose models, we do not consider all the population protected under this evacuation time estimate. , s o e O e h 6
TABLE B17 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEATil (filD-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) ROCKLAND COUNTY ERPA36 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions )e Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D,4m/sec 7:40 Yes 5:25 Yes Early Evening D,4m/sec 3:45 Yes 2:10 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 3:45 Yes 2:10 Yes , Late Evening E,4m/sec 3:45 Yes 2:10 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day ' Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 8:15 No Early Evening D,4m/sec 4:35 , Yes Late Evening D,4m/sec 4:35 Yes a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 6.8 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 15, >24, F Am/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. e and 5- hoursfortheD-4m/sec,O O
o
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o - o c) .High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation thes may be higher than the estimates here due _to evacuation model uncertainties. d)' Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200_ rem, the threshold for early death. The population.is not protected from latent cancer deaths,- thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses, e) Pasquill stability class. 9 U1 .h M.
TABLE B18 CONDITIONS UNDEP, WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEAW (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAMETERS)3) b ROCKLAND COUNTY ERPA 38 ) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions *} Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 9:50 No 6:05 No Early Evening 0, 4m/sec 4:55 No 3:10 No Early Evening E,4m/sec 4:55 Yes 3:10 Yes , Late Evening E, 4m/sec 4:55 Yes 3:10 Yes f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day ' Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec 12:05 No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 6:00 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec 5:55 No a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaging the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 1.4, >24, and 1.5 hours for the D-4m/sec, E-4m/sec and D-rain cases, respectively. 9 9 G .
c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted eve uation time estimates based on those given in the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; tor an explanation of the assumptions and adjustments see text. The "real" evacuation times may be higher than.the estimates here due to evacuation model uncertainties. d) _ Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem,_ the threshold for early death. The population is not protected from latent cancer deaths, thyroid cancers, birth defects, etc., that would be caused by lower doses. e) Pasquill stability class. 4
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TABLE B19 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GENERAL POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM EARLY DEA 111 (MID-RANGE MODEL PARAf1ETERS)a) ORANGE AflD ROCKLAND COUN1Y ERPA 39 b) Typical Weather Weather High Estimated c Protection of Protection of Time of Day Conditions") Evacuation Time ) General Populationd ) c Low Estimate ) General Populationd3, Midday D, 4m/sec 9:55I) No 5:45 ) No Early Evening D, 4m/sec 4:30 Yes 2:45 Yes Early Evening E, 4m/sec 4:30 Yes 2:45 Yes . Late Evening E, 4m/sec g) g) f Precipitation Protection of Time of Day Conditions High Estimatec ) General Populationd ) Midday D, 4m/sec ll:50I) No Early Evening D. 4m/sec 5:35 , No Late Evening D, 4m/sec g) g) - a) Mid-range parameters assume a .01 meter /sec. deposition velocity, a Briggs theoretical plume rise, and a 0.5 ground shielding factor. " Protection" implies protection from early death (a 200 rem dose) only assuming these mid-range parameters. The population might not be protected assuming other possible values of parameters such as a low plume rise. b) The " representative" distance is calculated by averaaing the distances from the plant to the closest and farthest ERPA boundaries. The representative distance for this ERPA is 2.8 miles. At this distance, the dose reaches 200 rem in 5.5 E G and 2.0 hours for the D-4m/sec#-4c/sec and D-rain cases, rescectively. 9
j o o l 0 d on those given in the ptions and adjustments l c) High and low evacuation time estimates are the adjusted evacuation h timedestimates base l uncertainties. l ) New sec text. York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans; for an explanatio f The population is not protected 1cwer doses. d) Protection from a dose at or exceeding 200 rem, the threshold for early deat f e) Pasquili stability class. For example the midday evacuation f f) The evacuation time estimates for this ERPA are highly time and season dependent.The estimated adverse evacu is not in session is 12:30-7:25. he s o s in l g) The time estimates are incomplete for these cases. i t l
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STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS June 4, 1982 TESTIMONY OF RIGIARD ALTSQiULER I am Richard Jay Altschuler, a sociologist, statistician, heher, writer aid editor. I am 39 years of age, born August 5,1942. As a statistician, data analyst and sociologist, I have provided statistical services to individuals and organizations since 1968. From 1968 to 1973, I taught Statistics to both undergraduate and graduate i 1 students at Tetple University (where I also taught Research Methods), ) i New York University and Queens College (where I also taught Introductory I Sociology, Marriage and the Family and Crime and Deviance) . In 1970, while at New York University,1 was chief data analyst and coauthor (with Prof-essor S. M. Miller) of the U. S. Department of Ilealth, Education and Wel-fare study, The Prospects For The Social Services. Since 1974, under the business names " Statistics Made Sinplest!" and " Statistics For Business", I have provided research, tutoring and consulting services to hundreds of students, professionals, businesspeople and organizations, including, for example, the Life Skills Project at Columbia University, McGraw-Ifill, the Ford Motor Ompany and Prentice-Hall, atong many other publishers. As an author, I am currently under contract to Ilarcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., for whczn I am writing Sociology, an Introductory college textbook, to be publisned in the Fall of 1983 or Spring of 1984 (with Professor David Sudnow) . I am also the author of Open Reality 3 (V Y unSP2 Gj2 @74-4995
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(G. P. Putnam's Sons,1974) and IC: An Introductory Exposition of Infinite Capitalism (Little-Brown and Ocznpany,1972; both with Nicholas M. Pegush). As a contributing author and editor, I have workcx1 on many college textbooks for a variety of the country's Irwiing educational publishers, including McGraw-filll, Macmillan, S$. Martin's Press, t Van Nostrand, Prenti -Hall and Randcm House. I have received a Master's degree and Bachelor's degree, both in Sociology, frcm ibnple University, and at New York University I have cxmpleted all course work, oral and written examinations for the Ph, D. in Sociology (a status designated "ABD" in many schools, meaning "All But Dissertation" for the Ph. D.) . In the Spring of 1982 I was contacted by NYPIRC, the New York Public Interest Research Center, to conduct a study of Westchester residets in the 10 mile area around the Indian Point nuclear reactor power plants, to deternune if people knew what they were supposed to do in case of an cuergency, as well as to determine how they believed they might behave in the face of an cmergency. s The study has been crrnpleted and shtted in evidence .for the - Hearing in White Plains, New York. Very briefly, the study showed that, despits a booklet- explaining what residents in the area are supposed to do, and despite dissenunation 0
4 e o9 ' of much of thf s is: formation by the mass tredia, the level of understanding
- arrong Westchest:er redidents of the EPZ is very poor.
. , i.
tere than a third of the respondents said that they had not received copies of the booklet, " Indian Point, Dnergency Planning, and You," and of
' those who thotght they had got it, about a third said they had not read it and another 22% said they had read only "some of it." Further, among those who had the booklet, over haif did not know where it was at the time.
Sirens have been installed and tested, which are to alert oecole if there is a nuclear accident, but 64% of the respondents said they have never heard the siren, and only 21% of them said with certainty that they w uld be able to distinguish the Indian P int siren-from thers if they did O hear it. If they heard a siren, about. 8 of every 10 people in the sanple did not know that their first act should be to seek nore information; instead, most indicated that they didn't know what they would do, or that they would flee the area. 11esidents in the Indian Point area of Westchester are also ill informed , about the use of telephones. Only 8% of them knew that the plan advises residents not to use phones, plus another 3% who thought that use would be 4 somewhat restricted. Since, in addition, nore than half said that they would have a problem in refraining frun telephoning when informed that the plan asks thcun not to in an emergencv, it seems highlv likely that lines and switch-j boards would be quickly jamned in case of an accident at Indian Point.
, Only 42% of the respondents who have children in school knew that they are
. h,n supposed to meet their children outside the EPZ in case of an accident during school hours, and--even nore ominously-70% of these parents did not know where i.
"'( _ the reception center is where they are supposed to neet their children. Further,
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O. over half of the parents said they would have trouble following the official O emergency plan when it cmes to necting their children outside the cLmger zone; mny indicated that they would make every effort to get their children directly from school. The survey results give an idea of the size of the problem of
" latch-key children": among parents of children under 16, about a quarter admitted that the child is smetimes not in the care of an adult, and only a i i
little nore than half of them believed that their children would be able to get 1 out all right if there were an accident at Indian Point.
'Ibe great majority of Westchesterites in the EPZ (alnost 70%) don't know where they would go in a radiological mergency; they have mde no plans. Further-nore, very large numbers would be not only confused and uncertain if there were an Indian Point accident today, but would not know whom to trust for accurate
- information and sound advice. Ibst trusted would be Alfred DalDello and the NFC g (by 57% cach--the only ones of the six sources mentioned to have the faith of even a najority), and least trusted would be con Edison and Governor Carey.
The evidence of the survey conducted by my firm, Statistics for Business, is that the people of Westchester county would be ill-prepared to follow the energency plans in the event of a serious accident at Indian Point, because \ of the ineffectiveness of the public education effort made so far. 1 a) Y - V aichard m schuler O
, *. Feb. 198'O O 546 LaGuardia Place New York, N. Y. 10012 (212)674-4995 RESUME RICHARD ALTSCHULER Writing and Editing Experience 1978--Present: Freelance contract writing, rewriting and editorial work on college-level (C) and high-school (HS) textbooks for: Publisher Name of Text Author ( s) McGraw-Hill (HS) The Free Enterprise System Managed St. Martin's (C) Sociology: an Introduction Smith, Preston St. Martin's (C) Psychology of Adjustment Barocas,
'~') Reichman ~
Prentice-Hall (C) Sociology Popence Prentice-Hall (C) Introductory Psychology Darley, Gluckman, Kamin, Kinchla Random House (HS) Understanding Psychology Bringle, Kremer Van Nostrand (C) Social Psychology Rychman Macmillan (C) Introduction to Sociology Wallace 10/79--2/80: Freelance writing and editing, Landau Assoc iates. New York, N. Y. Wrote and edited a manual for the Ford Motor Company explaining the sociology of the changing channels of oil distribution in the U. S. and the world. 3/77--9/78: Editor-in-Chief, Diseoworld magazine, New York, N. Y. One-hundred thousand circulation, four-color 7s (-) glossy, national newsstand distribution.
Q. RESUME $ Richard Altschuler
- p. 2 1/75--3/77: Freelance script and promotional writing for individual and commercial clients, including "SPIMBI" (Semaine du Prestige International de la Mode et des Bijoux), Ellipsoid Music and Entermedia, Inc.
4/73--12/75: Editor and chief writer for Columbia University's Life-Skills Program (an innovative educational method combining mass media and traditional classroom techniques designed to teach adults how to cope with the novel, rapidly changing conditions of modern life) . 5/72--9/72: Script writer for the weekly, prime-time, nationally-aired TV show " Marketplace," produced by CBC. ggg Published Books Open Reality (New York: G . P . Putnam 's S ons , 1974), with Nicholas M. Regush. JC: An Introductory Exposition of Infinite Capitalism (or) The Great Nipple Plot (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1972: Tokyo: Yomiouri Shin Bun Sha Ltd. , 1973), with Nicholas M. Regush. The Prospects For The Social Services (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970) , with S . M. Miller. Related Skills Statistician 1976--Present: Private consultant to students and businesspeople who need assistance computing, inter- ggg preting and reporting statistical data.
e, h RESUME Richard Altschuler P3 9/65--9/72: Instructor of undergraduate and graduate Statistics at three major universities (see below). Teaching Experience 2/70--9/72: Queens College, Department of Sociology. Statistics, Crime and Deviance, Marriage and the Family, Introduction to Sociology. 9/67--6/69: New York University, Department of Sociology. Statistics. 9/65--9/67: Temple University, Department of Sociology. Statistics and Research Methodology.
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Degrees and Education 1972: A.B.D. (Ph.D. less dissertation) . New York University. Sociology. 1967: M. A. Temple University. Sociology. 1265: B. A . Temple University. Liberal Arts. Personal Born t.ugust 5, 1942, Philadelphia, Pa. Married twelve years. Health perfect. Resident of Manhattan since 1967 r p a
e O, Preliminary Poport SURVEY OF DiERGENN PIANNDG ARDUND TIE INDIAN POINT POWER PIRTTS O Prepared For: NYPIFC (New York Public Interest Research Center) Prepared By: Richard Altschuler President, Statistics for Business June 4, 1982 O
Q* h Men m m m mis report is based on a telephone suvey of 105 residents 18 years of age or older in 105 different households within the 10-mile radius of the Indian Point nuclear power plants. The interviewing firm Social Area Research, Inc., located at 44 Carman Road, Scarsdale, New York, was subaantracted to select the sample and conduct the inter-views. W e telephone numbers cuployed in the study were selected through randcm digit dialing techniques to ensure the representativeness of the sample, which included the following telephone exchanges and areas: 21echone Exchange Area 245 Yorktown Heights, Jefferson Valley, Amawalk 271 Croton-on-Hudson, Croton Heights 526 Putnam Valley, Oscawana 528 Mohegan Lake, Putnam Valley 737 Crugers, Buchanan, Pc h ll, Verplank, Montrose, Cortland 739 Peekskill 762 Ossining, Teatown 962 Shrub Oak, Yorktown O
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%e -rdt instnment used to collect the data was a questionnaire, which is appended to this report. %e questionnaire was pretested and re-i vised during the week of mnday, May 17 and adrainistered to the respondents a
j in this study on Wednesday evening, May 26, Thursday evening, May 27 and i ! Friday afternoon and evening, May 28. i !O h 5 i 1 i I i O I j i i
9-h DESCRIPPION OF TIE SAMPTE For each of tie 105 respondents 18 years of age or older in the study, details on their sex, age, mployment status, educational status and the number of cars in their households were obtained. These data are presented in the following tables, 1 through 5: O Table 1 Sex of Sample N % Male 36 34 Fm nle 69 66 O
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l A. !O Table 2 Age of Sanple I N % under 30 years 20 19 30 to under 40 years 31 30 40 to under 50 years 13 12 ! 50 to under 60 years 17 16 60 to uni r 70 years 8 8 over 70 years 16 15 Table 3 Biployment Status of Sanole N % Biployed 55 52 Not atployed or 50 48 not in labor force
e. O Table 4 Blucational Status (Last Grade Octnpleted) Of Sample N % Grade School 13 13 Iligh School 44 42 Smc College 22 21 College 10 10 Postgraduate 15 14 Table 5 Nurh:r Of Cars Per Household of sample j i l mean=1.8 (total number of cars =188) l l 9l
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'I1E QUESTIONS NJD PESPOtEES QUESTION 1. 1101 WIIL 'I1E NJI110RITIES 'GIU PEOPIE IF '11EIE IS A SERIOUS 10CIDEtTP AT INDIAN POINT?
N % Siren 60 57 3
'Iv / Padio 3 Other 2 2
!,,,l Don' t knw 39 38 The correct answer, " Siren," is presented on page 4 of the official emergency planning tooklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You" (prepared and distributed by the Indian Point utilities) , and has been disratinated by the mass media. Nevertheless, alnest 4 out of each 10 people (38%) did not know how they would be warned, and another 5% gave tuong answers. ,\
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9-h ) QUESTICN 2. TIE DERGENCY PIRi SAYS TIRT TIE FIRST WAINING WIIL BE GIVEN BY A SIREN. BY TIE NAY, IRVE YOU IEARD 'HE SIREN THEY'RE USING? N % Yes 21 20 No 66 64 Don't Know, 17 16 ( Not Sure l l l l As can be seen, about two-thirds of the respondents have not O heard the warning siren and another 16% weren't sure, leaving only 20% who could answer "yes" to this question. I QUESTION 2a. IF YOU IEARD A SIREN RIGff NOW, DO YOU THINK YOU 00UID TELL TIRT IT WAS BEI%USE OF AN AOCIDENT AT INDIAN POINP, RATIER TIIAN, SAY, A FIRE ENGINE, AMBUIANCE, OR SOtETHING ELSE? l N % No, couldn't tell 64 61 Yes, could tell 22 21 Maybe, probably could tell 12 11 Don't Know, not sure 7 7 O
O QUESTICN 2a (cont'd) Only about 20% of the respordents-the same percentage who said they had heard the siren-said they would be able to distinguish it fran another type of siren or other noise. The great majority, 61%, said they would not be able to recognize the energency warning siren. CUESTICN 2b. HOW WOUID YOU RECONIZE '1 HAT A SIREN MEANT A NUCLEAR ACCIDENr? Q. High pitch 5 11 Steady Tone 11 23 Very Ioud 12 26 Other 8 17 Don't Know 11 23 Note: Percentages are based on the 41 respondents who were asked this cuestion. Only a fifth of the total samle gave evidence that they would be able to recognize the siren.
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1Q. O QUESTION 3. IN CASE YOU IEAR TIE WARNING SIIEN, WHAT IS TIE VERY FIRSI THING YOU ARE SUPPOSED 'IO DO? N .% Turn on the radio or TV 13 12 , Tune to channel 7/WABC 4 4 Read the instruction booklet 3 3 Get the family together 3 3 Make phone calls 1 1 Start packing 2 2 Other . 31 30 O Don't know 48 46 Page 4 of the mnrgency planning booklet descrites " Tune to channel 7, WABC or another anergency Broadcast station," yet only 4% of the respondents gave this answer. Ombining the first three answer categories, only 20% of the sample said they would seek information as their first act. Many responses in the "Other" category included evacuating the area. O
QUESTION 4. 1000RDING TO TIE PIAN, IKM AIE YOU SUPPOSED TO GET SPECIFIC INFOIMTTICN ON WIIAT TO DO? N % Turn on radio /'1V 35 34 l l Tune to channel 7/WABC/EBS 9 9 Pcad the instruction booklet 11 11 Other 7 7 1 Don't know 42 40 l As can be seen, though page 4 of the booklet describes what to do, 40% said they don't know how to get specific information. OUESTION 5. DOES 71E PIAN SAY ANTI 11ING ADOUP USI?E OR NC7f USING 71E TELEPIDE? N % No/OK to use phone 32 31 Only if vital /Only 3 3 special people No one is to use phone 8 8 Other 1 1 Don't know 61 58 l /\ l L)
4 . O QUESTIQ15 (cont'd) Pages 5 and 6 of the energency planning booklet say not .to use the phone, yet only 8% of the respondents gave this as the correct answer. Ninety-one percent of the respondents gave the wrong answer or didn't know. QUESTIOT 6. BY 'I1E 1&Y, DO YOU HAVE ANY OIIIDREN MD (D 'IO SODOL IN THIS AREA? N % No 67 64 Yes 38 36 As can be seen, about 1/3 of the respondents had children in school and about 2/3rds didn't. The total number of children anong the sanple group was 68, with a mean age of 10.5 years. The range was 16 years (19-3=16) . The mean number of children per respondent with children was 1.8. O
6 00ESTICH 6a. IF TIERE IS AN AOCIDDTP AT INDIAN POINT N SCEL HOURS, MIAT ARE YOU SUPIOSED 'IO DO ADOUT YOUR OIIIDREN? N % Get children frcm school 0 0 2 5 Wait for them to cm e hcme Meet them outside the danger zone 16 42 14 37 Don't kmW 6 16 Other fm, Page 7 of the cmergency planning booklet instructs parents with children V in school to meet than outside the danger zone in a specially designated area, depending upon where the respondent and school are located. However, 58% of the respondents with ch2.ldren didn't answer this questicn correctly. Once again, as in many of the previous questions, " Don't know" was the modal category anong the incorrect responses. QUESTION 6b. WELL, NIDRDING 'IO THE PIAN, YOU ARE SUPIOSED 'IO MEEP THEM OUTSIDE l 'ITE DANGER ZONE AT A SPECIAL QNTER. MERE IS '11E CENTER MERE r J YOU WOUID FIND YOUR OIIID(REN)? l N % 1 ! 30 11 t Named a placo l l 26 70 Don't Know l l 1
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O QUESPIOi 6b (cont'd) Page 12 of the omrgency planning booklet describes where parents are supposed to moet their children, yet only 30% of respondents with children in school could name a place, and several of these responses were vague. As can be seen frun the data, 70% of the respondents did not know where they were swsod to neet their children. QUESTION 7. HAVd YCU RECEIVED A CDPY OF TIIE BOOKLE7f, " INDIAN . POINT, DERGDCY PIRNING AND YOU," MIICI EXPIAINS MIAT TO DO IF THERE IS A NUCLEAR IOCIDENr? N O No 36 34 Yes 61 58 Not sure, maybe 6 6 Don't know 2 2 As can be seen, about a third of the respondents have rot received - the booklet, and another 8% aren't sure if they have. O
e, CUESTION 7a. DO YOU 100W MEIE IT (DE BOOKLET) IS RIGTP NOW7 N % Yes 30 43 lb 31 44 Don't } mow 8 12 Among those who have received the booklet, nearly six out of ten did not krm its present location. <~ U QUESTION 7b. IIAVE YOU READ IT? N % Yes 28 41 tb 22 32 Don't know 3 4 Scne of it 15 22 Anong those who have received the booklet, nore have read it than rot, especially when "Scne of it" is included, but about a third have not read it. O b
Q-h OUESTION 7c. IIAVE YOU DISCUSSE DIE INNINATION IN IT WITII OTIER PEOPTE IN YOUR IOUSF2OID? N % Yes 35 51 tb 34 49 Don't kncw 0 0 Page 15 of the mergency planning W: 3t instructs residents to discuss the contents with their families, yet only about half who have received the booklet have done so. QUESTION 8. IIAVE YOU AND YOUR FAMILY DECIDED WilERE YOU NOUID GO IF YOU IIN)
'IO IEAVE VIE AREA BDCAUSE OF AN INDIAN POINP AOCIDD7f?
N % Yes 34 33 tb 62 60 Don't know 7 7 O
e. 9 QUESTION 8 (cont'd) Page 15 of the booklet instructs rnMors to know where they would go in case of a nuclear accident, yet only a third of the respondents said they knew where they would go, while two-thirds indicated they didn't know where they would go. QUESTION 9.1000RDING 'IO TIE PIANS, YOU ARE tM SUPIOSED 'IO USE TIE PIDE, SO TIE LINES CAN RDMIN FREE FOR OFFICIAIS 'IO USE. DO YOU THINK YOU NOUID BE ABLE TO FOLION THIS INSTRUCTION, OR ARE THERE ANY CAILS ' YOU FEEL YOU NOUID 1RVE 'IO MAKE? e~s Iv) N % Would follow 48 46 Would have to make calls 23 22 Depends, might have to use phone 20 19 Don't know 14 13
!bre people indicated that they would follow the plan than fell in any other response category, but 41% of the respondents indicated that they would or might make calls, and when the " Don't know" responses are added to them, the data indicate that nore than half of the resoondents might not follow the plan.
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GJESTION 10. IF YOU IEARD TIE WARNING SIREN, TURNED ON TIE TV. OR RADIO A?O NERE 'IDID TIIAT YOU NOUID BE SAFE IF YOU JUST STAY INDOORS, NOUID YOU llAVE ANY PROBIB4 WITH THAT, OR NT'? l 1 N % l l l tb prob 1m, would do it 86 82 Would assm ble fanily, 4 4 start packing to leave Would leave at once 5 5 Other 6 6 Don't know 4 4 The great majority of respondents, as can be seen, indicated they would have no probim following the order to rmain indoors. QUESTICN 11. ACCORDING 'IO THE PLAN, YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO GO TO A REOPTION QNTER, A SPECIAL PIACE OUTSIDE 'IEE DANGER ZONE WHEPE YOUR GIIID(REN) NOUID BE BUSSED. WOUID YOU HAVE ANY PROBIR4 EOLIOWING
'IIIIS INSTRUCTION, OR NOLYD IT NORK OK?
N % No prob 1m 16 42 Probim 20 53 Don't know, uncertain 2 5 O
e O~ QUESTION 11 (cont'd) As can be seen, nore than half the respondents would have a problan following the plan to neet their child (ren) outside the danger zone. From answers written in by the interviewers, it is clear that many parents would want to pick their children up fran school. QUESTION 12. (Ebr respondents with a child under 16) ARE TIERE ANY TIMES AETER SQDOL IOURS WHEN YOUR CHIID(REN) IS (ARE) ?Dr IN 'DE CARE OF SOME ADULT? , N 1 Q lb 25 74 Yes/ occasionally 9 26 QUESTION 12a. (for those who answered "yes/ occasionally" to the above) IF TIERE WAS AN ACCIDENT AT INDIAN POINT AND PEDPLE HAD 'IO LEAVE, NOUID YOUR CHIID TT OUT ALL RIGff? N % Yes 5 56 Problen 3 33 Don't know 1 11 s i U
Q-QUESTION 13. YOU MIGE IEAR STATH4EtES G4 'I1E RADIO OR 'IV BY QUITE A NtNBER OF DIFFEIEE PIDPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS. I'M G)D4G 'IO MDEIQ1 SOME OF
'I1EM, AND AS I DO, PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH QE WIEITER YOU M)DID TRUST TIEM 'IO TELL YOU 'I1E TRUI11 AND GIVE YOU CDOD ADVTCE, OR h1EI1ER YOU MIGE THD 'IO DISTRUST 'I191.
Person / Organization Trust Distrust Don't Know N % N % N % Alfred DelDello 57 54 24 23 24 23 IIugh Carey 40 38 44 42 21 20 Con Riison 32 30 53 50 20 19 pran 36 34 29 28 40 38 Nuclear Regulatory Cannission 57 54 25 24 23 22 h Independent scientist 46 44 14 13 45 43 . or organization As can be seen frun the above data, the nest trusted individual or organization was Alfred Delbello, the County Executive, and the NBC, which tied at 54%. The least trusted was Con Edison, at 30%. PIS;N appears to have an " identity problan," with the second highest tally (38%) in the
" Don't know" category. 'Ihe respondents were least distrustful of an in-dependent scientist or organization, but this category received the highest " Don't know" count at 43%.
O
6 G ECLUSIOJS
'Ihe survey shows that the residents 18 years or age or older in the Westchester portion of the 10-mile EPZ around the Indian Point plants have a very poor idea of what they are supposed to do in case there is a nuclear accident in their area.
tere than one third of the respondents said that they had not received the energency planning booklet published by the two Indian Point electric utilities, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning and You," and of those who thought they had received it, about a third said they had not read it and another 22% said they had read only " sane of it." Further, anong those who had received the booklet, over half did not know where it was at the time m ,! they were interviewed. A special siren is supposed to alert people in the area if there has been a nuclear accident, but 64% of the respondents said that they had never heard the siren, and only 21% of the respondents said with certainty that they would be able to distinguish the siren from other sirens or noises if they heard it. If they did hear a siren, about 80% of the people in the sanple did not know & hat seeking information should be their first act; rather, most indicatet they didn't know what they would do or that they would flee the area.
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4 COtK10SIONS (cont'd) Not only is the public in the Indian Point area of WestcInster ill inforned about infonnation-getting, the residents are also ill informed about the use of telephones. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents didn't krxu whether or not the plan said anything about using telephones, and another 32% gave incorrect answers. In fact, only 8% of the respondents knew that the plan says that residents should not use their telephones. About a third of the resoondents have children in school, but only 42% of these parents knew they are supposed to nuet their children outside the danger zone in case of an accident, and 70% of them did not know where (O O the reception center is where they are suppos_a to moet their children. Further, 53% of these respondents said they would have trouble following the emergency plan when it comes to neeting their children outside the danger zone; nony indicated they would want to get their children before then. Among those with children under 16, about a quarter admitted that the child is sometimes not in the care of an adult, and only a little over half of these (56%) believed their children would get out, all right if there were an accident at Indian Point. In case of an accident, the survey reveals that the great majority (almost 70%) don't know where they would go; they have not vet made any plan. Further, in the face of an energency, 54% said they would definitely or nest likely have a problem in refraining frca using the phone, despite instructions in the planning booklet to the contrary. G
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l O. O i COtCLUSIONS (cont'd) Finally, the survey data indicate that at a time of[ cnergency at Indian ' Point, only two of the six possible sources of information and advice named would be trusted and believed by even small nujorities of tle Westchesterites sampled. !bst trusted would be County Executive Alfred D31 Bello and the Nuclear Ibgulatory Conmission, and least trusted would be Con Edison and Governor Ilugh Carey.
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INDIAN POINT SURVEY llello, my name is ; I'in with Social Area Research, Inc. We're conducting a survey about emergency plans for the area around Indian Point. May I ask you a few quections, ple ase? (IF IN DOUBT ABOUT AGE) First, are you over 18 years old? (IF NO) Is there an adult there I might speak to? .- As you may have heard, an emergency plan has been written for Westchester county in case of a serious accident at the Indian Point nuclear power plants. I'd like to ask you a few-questions about that. <
- 1. How will the authorities warn people if there is a serious accident at Indian Point?
( ) Siren (, ) TV/ radio (,) Other ( ,) DK
- 2. Right, /or:/ Wel cy plan says that, the first warning will be given by a siren. By the way, have you heard the siren they're using?
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK, not sure 2a. If you heard a siren right now, do you think you could tell that it was because. of an accident at Indian Point, rather than, say, a fire engine, ambulance, or some-thing else? ( ) No, couldn' t tell (SKIP TO Q. 3)
) ( ) Yes, could tell ( ) Maybe, probably could ( ) OK, not sure 2b. How would you recognize that a sirpn meant a nuclear accident? (CHECK AS MANY AS APPLY) ,
( ) High pitch ( ) Steady tone ( ) Very loud ( ) Other ( ) DK
-3. In case you hear the warning siren, what is the very first thing you are supposed to do?
( ) turn on radio or TV ( ) tune to channel 7 or WABC (SKIP TO Q. 5) ( ) read the instruction booklet . ( )get family together ( ) make phone calls ( ) start packing ( ) Other: ( ) DK
- 4. According to the plan, how are you supposed to get specific instructions on what to do?
( ) turn on radio or TV ( ) tune to channel 7, WABC, other EBS station ( ) read the instruction booklet ( ) other ( ) DK LJ
- 2. -
- 5. Does the plan say anything about using or not using the telephone?
( ) No/ OK to use phone ( ) use phone only if vital /only special people can useh ( ) no one is to use phone ( ) Other ( ) DK
- 6. By the way, do you have any children who go to school in this area?
( ) No (SKIP TO Q. 7) ( ) Yes: What are their ages? , 6a.' If there 1 san accident at Indian Point Aering school hoors, what are you supposed to do about your children? " l
) Get children from school
( ( ) Wait for them to come home ( ) Meet them outside danger zone ( ) DK ( ) Other: 6b. Well, according to the plan, you are supposed to meet them outside the danger zone at a special center. Where is the centers where you would find your child (ren)? ( ) DK
--.7. Have you received a copy of the booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning,'and Y which explains what to do if there is a nuclear accident? -
( ) No (SKIP TO Q. 8) , , ( ) Yes' ( ) Not sure, maybe ( ) DK . u 7a. Do you know where it is right now? .
'( ) Yes ( i No ( ) DK 7b. Have you read it?
( ) Yes (,) No ( )DK.( ) Some of it - - i
-Why not?
7c. Have you discussed the information in it with other people in your household? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK
- 8. Have you and your family decided where you would go if you had to leave the area because of an Indian Point accident?
I ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) DK
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3.
- 9. According to the plans, you are not supposed to use the phone, so the lines can remain free for officials to use. Do you think you would be able to e follow this instruction, or are there any calls you feel you would have to make?
O. ( ) Would follow ( ,) Depends, might have to use phone ( ) Would have to make calls ( ) DK
- 10. If you heard the warning siren, turned on the TV or radio and were told that you would be safe if you just stay indoors, would you have any problem with that, or not?
(. ) No problem, would do it ( ) Would assemble family, start packing to leave ( ) Would leave at once ( ) Other ( ) OK IF R DOES NOT HAVE A CHILD IN SCHOOL: SKIP TO Q.13 (Next Page)
- 11. According to the plan, you are supposed to go to a . reception center, a special place outside the danger zone where your child (ren) would be bussed. Would you have any problem following this instruction, or would it work OK?
O ( ) No problem; OK ( ) Problem: ( ) DK, uncertain
- 12. (IF R HAS ANY CHILD UNDER 16) Are there any times after school hours when your child (ren) is (are) not in the care of some adult?
( ) No (SKIP TO Q.13, next page) ( ) Yes/ occasionally 12a. If there was an accident at Indian Point and people-had to leave, would your child get out all right? ( ) Yes ( ) Problem ( ) DK O .
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- 13. You might hear statements on the radio or TV by quite a number of different people and organizations. I'm going to mention some of them, and as I do, e' please tell me for each one whether you would trust them to tell you the truth and give you good advice, or whether you might tend to distrust them.
h Would trust Would distrust DK Alfred DelBello, County Executive Hugh Carey, Governor Con Edison PASNY (the Power Authority) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Independent scientist or organization OK, Thanks -- now I just need to get some background information from you, like your SEX ( ) Male ( ) Female AGE ( ) under 30 ( ) in your 30s ( ) in your 40s ( ) in your 50s ( ) 60s ( ) 70 or over ( ) refused Are you employed? ( ) No ( ) Yes 9 IF YES: What is your occupation? . In what town or city do you work? What is the highest grade in school you completed? ( ) Grade school ( ) High school ( ) Some college ( ) College graduate ( ) Postgraduate work And finally, how many cars are there in your household? Tharks very much for your time. O
&bl <sst The reading level of the pamphlet, Indian Point, emergency planning and you, was found to be on a college level. This fact was determined by applying the Fry readability formula to three sections of the pamphlet and interpreting the results. This formula is widely used by text book publishers and others in the field of education in order to determine suitability of reading material for a particular grade level. The formula is simple to use. For each of three 100 word sections chosen, one counts the number of sentences and syllables contained within each sample.
These are plotted on a graph and a grade level is found based on normative research. The average of the three indicates the grade level of the material analyzed. Based on the above analysis, I would conclude that the pamphlet in question is appropriate reading for those who read on a college level. 2 C7 ( Amy Kriveloff 1665 Maxwell Drive Yorktown Hts. N.Y. member- Yorktown Parents Concerned About Indian Point
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G l Mabel Cronk 801 South Main St. Peekskill, NY I am president of Peekskill Seniors with a membership of 400. We are people throughout the i Peekskill area that people don't seem to worry about. We are older people that would like to be considered for mass evacuation in case of a nuclear accident at Indian Point. Many of us did not get a leaflet or any notification as to shere to 60 or what to do in an emer6ency. I know that we may not pay electric bills directly, but they are included in our rent, so we con-sider ourselves just as important as any other person () to /have officials consider us worthwhile to save. Many of us did ;not hear the sirens on March 3, and we The city has a few do not know what they wound like. buses but they aren't always workin6 and wouldn't be enou6 h to evacuate everyone who needs transportation. We would like to Rnow what we are supposed to do. Sincerely, ( o
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' Barbara K. Hickernell
' 12 Terrich Court Ossining, New York 10562 My name is Barbara Hickernell . I live in Ossining, New York. Since 1973 we have lived in a house which is just behind the Independent Hose Fire Company and consequently we are well aware of the fire siren. As with so many nuisances, one learns to live with the stren and ignore it to the greatest extent possible. However, when we received our Indian Point Evacuation Plan Booklet, we again have become very aware of that siren. Whenever the siren sounds, I wait expectantly for the short blast so that I can continue my life. Several times when the siren has wailed for over 1 - 2 minutes, I have called the police department to see if there truly was a fire, a siren malfunction, or an accident at Indian Point.My [~')
, children have had the same reaction - if a siren continues blaring, both of them will ask me if I think that something has happened at Indian Point and, if so, what are we going to do. When I leave the house, my nine year old daughter asks what she and her twelve year old brother should so if
! the Indian Point siren comes on while I am gone. I don't know what to say. i
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Lynn C. Gunzenhauser Quaker Ridge Road f'N Oroton-on-Hudson,
'# New York 10520 June 1, 1982 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
On receit of the booklet, Indian Point Emergency Planning And You, my husband discovered that ours was inappropriate for our particular area. Immed-intely, my husband, explaining the error and re-questing the proper booklet, mailed the attached Bus-iness reply card to Four County Nuclear Safety Committee. (Do telephone number was included.) After a three week wait, I wrote a letter myself, making the same request. Failing in a month's time to get any response, I sent a mailgram. One month later we received the correct booklet, not that we felt any better; I believe we were making a point. The above reminds me that the only reason we heard the f') siren during the test was that our bedroom window was open; even then it was so faint we could've missed it. Not that it matters, really. As any even slightly informed person such as myself knows, the " evacuation plan" - am evacuation plan -- is a hoax on the public, pap and a sop. Indeed, were it not so terribly dangerous by its mere existance, it would be a farce, utterly absurd and quite laughable, meat for more Jack Lemmon or Ray Bradbury. Just one. example: are we to all set out to the designated " host" area even though weather conditions dictate otherwise? I know that no one could safely or effectively set out anywhere and so do you. The only answer is for the Indian Point plants to be shut down. Then we could do a little booklet burning and dance around the bonfire. Sincerely y {}
& - . fr' nn C. Gunzenha ser m+
June 2, 1982 , () wJ To whom It vay Concern :
"y name is vEren 13enes and live in the woods of the ""own of Cortlandt approximately 13 miles from the closest emergency evacua-tion pick-up point. I am writing as a very concerned parent of two school-age children; 5 and 13 When I received the Tndian Point %ergency Booklet, I read it thoroughly and with great care as T had been very concerned about a possible emergency occuring and what to do at such a time. After reading the booklet, I am as concerned and as confused. I do not know what is the best advice to give my children in the event that an emergency should occur when I am not at home and they are. Do I want them to walk 1} miles to the emergency bus and risk exposure to nuclear radiation'. Do T instruct them to wait at home for me to come and get them (what if I cannot get home due to the chaos and crowding on Route 9)? '!l hat do T do if I am out of the restricted area and my children are in it (I certainly would risk any exposure etc. to get to my children!)". What if my children are in school and are put into G
ig buses headed towards "lhite Plains and if the buses make it to '/!hite plains, (whichT doubt very much after living here for 10 years and seein5 the congestionthatdevelopson9undernormalcircumstances,)howwillI ever get to ?!hite Plains on the same coute 9 to pick my children up'. How can I be assured that bus drivers from outside the restricted area will enter it and drive my children to White Plains and safety? What l happens to us all if the sirens do not sound, as they did not sound when t e s t e d'. l There are so many problems with the emergency e mcuation plan as it stands now, and so many fears in my mind that i find that T try to ignore the possibility that a nuclear emergency can occur. But my children ask questions and are very frightened. Therefore I need to have a working plan to discuss with them. I need to have the assurance that it is possible for us to live through a nuclear emergency; to get out of the area safely and in time to spare ourselves of future medical l problems due to exposure to nuclear fall-out.
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l l bh w l varen Henes 7ramblebush 9FD #1 Croton-on-Hudson, N .Y. 10520
. THE CENTER
- A non-profit community cgency for tha prevention of mnntclillness FOR PREVENTIVE PSYC HI ATRY
,, MAIN OFFICE:19 GAEENAIOGE AVE.
/ 4 W H I T E P L A I N S , N. Y.10 8 0 5 D '~ PHONE [ 914 l 9 4 9 - 7 8 O O CFFCEAS ANO MEMBERS ST. JOHN'S CHURCH OF THE DOAAO OF TAUSTEES G Y SQUAAE Gemard A. Feuerstevi (9141 985-1109 Charmen wmam rn ucn June 2,1982 1 vc. cn.-n G'"*"""" My name is Arthur B. Zelman, I am a child and adult psychiatrist, living and working in Westchester County. I am the Medicai Director of
,CC, S-The Center for Preventive Psychiatry, Inc. in White Plains. I am also Henry F.eide psychiatric consultant to the Rye Country Day School in Rye and have a T- private practice of child and adult psychiatry in Mamaroneck. I am a s ,en ouroses Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the fields Stepwd D'Agostancof child and adult psychiatry.
Mewne Fnedman M*"o*** "'" At the Center for Preventive Psychiatry I have been specializing, for
$a Tno. the past ten years in helping children, adults and communities to cope with CWd A. Karam a variety of externally imposed stresses and have had a chance to observe Done K- their efforts at close range.
Joan Kennedy
"" "" Given the real dangers presented by the existence of a nuclear power U$.*C""ne, plant in a highly populated area, an evacuation plan is a necessity. Yet Eleanor Steng. the very existence of an evacuation plan underscores some major problems suninne we ent=co from the point of view of a child psychiatrist.
m U In order for an evacuation plan to have a chance to be effective, chil-dren must be told about the plan and the reasons for it. If not told, their anxiety level at the time of a crisis would most likely be sufficiently high as to make quick evacuation difficult. Of perhaps greater concern is the fact that without preparation beforehand the accident and evacuation could constitute, to many children, a terrifying event (i.e. trauma) which would have predictable short and long term consequences. Short term consequences would include increased behaviorism disorders, depression, learning difficulties, phobias and anxiety reactions among others. Long term effects could include the later development or predisposition to development of traumatic neuroses or chronic symptoms of anxiety and depres-sion. In addition, some children may develop a tendency to repeat the ori-ginal trauma; for example, by unconsciously looking fde or even attempting to recreate life threatening situations. This phenomena, known as the
" repetition compulsion" has been observed over and over again in clinical psychiatry and underlies phenomena such as the fact that abused children tend to become abusing parents or that the children of parents who have suicided are at high risk to comit suicide themselves.
If the children are told of the evacuation plans and reasons for it (as they should be for reasons given above) a more fundamental psychological problem arises. ~ v E AAL Y LIFE TRE A1 MENT FOR PRESCHOOL AGE CHILOALN. PAEVENTTVE TREATMENT IN CF4 SIS SITUATIONS. TRANsNG AND RESEARCH
D June 2,1982 Page 2 continued:- If the potential problem posed by the nearby nuclear plant is sufficiently great to require a massive evacuation of the comunity, their inevitable response will be to question why the plant is there in the first place. The bottom line answer they will get (whether it is correct or not) is that it is the cheapest way to get necessary energy and that the risk to them and the community is not great enough to warrant spending more money for alternate sources. This answer must be considered in the light of what we know about how children think. Young children ten'd to think on all or nothing, black and white terms. It is very difficult for them to conceptualize relative dangers or " cost-benefit" analyses. What they will know (and already know) is that a distinct possibility exists that they and their families will have to flee their homes, their schools, and their communities in order to escape the possibility of death, serious injury or serious illness. Further, that this scenario is not made possible by " natural" phenomena but by something that their parents themselves have wrought. This latter observation probably poses the most potentially psychologically damaging aspect of the situation for young children. The well known child psychologist and researcher, Sybil Escolona, has pointed out that elementary school age children depend to a very great extent on identifica-tions with the available adults in their lives, in order to form their own characters. A prerequisite for adequate character foundation is that the adults in their lives provide them with a secure, consistent environment. Where problems and dangers exist, h as of course they must, the children only require that the adult comunity present them with the message and example that they are actively doing something to correct the problem or reduce the danger. What are the children to think, however, when confronted with the fact that their parents have not only not reduced the danger but have creted it. What are they to think when the " solutions" the adults seek are to minimize the damage the nuclear monster they created can inflict instead of attempting to get rid of it. My contention is that far from being abstract and remote possibilities, there is ample evidence from children's dreams and even conscious responses when anyone bothers to ask, that living next door to a nuclear reactor, is a profoundly meaningfu'i experi-ence to young children and one which is very likely to influence their views of them-selves and their future. It is my contention and other observers, that as a group, they will become less trusting, more cynical, less likely to make meaningful commitments, more apathetic and more self-involved. Most disturbing, they will be even more likely than their parents to accept and even seek out solutions to future problems which further devalue human life and well being as a priority. O
ir June 2, J982 Page 3 g continued:- J Much of what has been said above can also be seen to apply to nuclear arms and children. Indeed Escalona and more recently Beardsley and Mack have presented evidence for similar consequences to children due to the nuclear arms race. How much more devastating, however, might this phenomenon be when the danger is experienced by the children as coming from their own back yard. e t k V ^,b'n Arthui' B. Zelmdn, M.D. O NJ G i
O My name ic Agata Craig. I reside at 25 Mountain Traili in Croton-on-Hudson. I am the mother of two small children ages 4 and 22 months. Often, I am without a car as my husband must commute by car to his job. I have had to rely on other mothers for getting my four year old son to and from his nursery school. In the event that I could not use the telephone O b I would have a difficult time seeking out transportation from the evacuation zone. My familys home is situated in a rather secluded area, which is a long walk to the nearest bus stop. Most of my neighbors are not at home during the day. Those who are do not have cars. I never heard the sirens during the March 3rd evacuation drill. I barely glanced at the pamphlet I l received in the mail. My home has no basement nor do most i O of the homes in my ne1 9 hdorhood if we hed to retreet to shelter quickly. I don't know what we would do. f
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I am a housewife, residing at 7 Truesdale Drive in ('T On March 3rd, I was aware that the new . Croton. sirens for Indian Foint were to be tested. I heard nothin7. On May 5th, I was at home on the sunporch when a friend on Lexington Ave, called to ask if the siren she was hearing was the Indian Point siren. I had heard nothinc. She was upset since she didn't know if it were the Indian Point siren, or if it were, whether it was a test or the real thing. I do not intend to run if there should be a mishap. I have a car but doubt if I would be able to get . out of 3enedict Boulevard on to South diverside. It's hard enough to do when a commuter train.comes in, so with everyone running- ! But I feel that should anyone so desire to go, it would be a matter of great anxiety to decend on a friend's calling one up in what would be a time of great turmoil and confusion. Anyway, I called Consolidated Edison. The woman answering the phone knew nothing and gave me an Albany number to call--department of safety I think. 'Che man answering knew nothihg but called others and reported finally that Consolidated Edison had been r-)s (_ civen permission to test a new siren on Croton Point for three days. I hear fire whistles (even some of those in Ossining) smbulence and police sirens but have never heard the sirens for Indian Point though it is only 6 short blocks from our house- d as the sound waves could travel. ,
," m - fd Fatsy Chazen O
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l We, the undersignedy Gertrude and Henry Gillette, reside at 33 Battery Place, Crugers, N . Y . 10 520. The house itself is 7ituated about two miles south of the Con Ed Nuclear Plant at Indian Point and next to the V A Psychia-tric Hospital in Montrose. Access to our house--and our neigh-bors' houses--is by an old iron and wooden bridge over the railraod tracks--already designated unsafe by our Highway Superintendent-- and particularly precarious in the winter snows due to the steep-ness of the inclined approach. We, ourselves, are well into our Senior Citizenship and Con Ed's plans for evacuation from our area are beyond comprehen-sion. In the last evacuation test, for example, we heard no siren (and I wear two hearing aids), we received the wrong evacua-(
~
tion directions booklet and even on the second test we heard only what could have been interpreted as any distant and faint siren. In conclusion we want to add that among the people living in the twelve houses on our road there are small children, one very ill old lady with an excitable daughter, and two elderly ladies. So any evacuation from this spot presents us with the prospect of all our neighbors struggling to cross one narrow and antiquated bridge--perhaps in the snow and ice--after maneuvoring over a pot-holed and constrained an4 dead-end road only to reach the main two-lane highway (Albany Post Road) already crowded with the con-fusion not only of fleeing residents but with all the inmates and personnel of the V A Hospital. 1 L
s g.ik j : .e : O i i J i n: l ly , n: t h e ;r. r m .'o r fully opernble pl: n to, beenuce o- t the well publicized defects.have proven totally inacequate to 1 { their original purpose or providing: cheap power--on the con trary, they are oven the most expensive in the s tate--end as they precent l a constant hazard to the residents not only from steady emmisions and frequent breakdowns bu t from a possible catastrophe, there is only one solution. Close them. I m _,\ sWI # 4 4,
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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD - 0 In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) )- ..
) 50-247 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) 50-286 SP (Indian Point Unit 3) )
TESTIMONY OF: Luis del Pilar. Rockland resident ON BEHALF OF: RCSE RELATING TO CONTENTIONS: 3.1. 4.7 My name is Luis A. del Pilar. I am now and have been since January 5,1981 Affirmative Action Coordinator for the County of Rockland. I am a member and past chair of the Haverstraw Ecumenical Project. I am a member and past chair of the Hispanic Caucus of Rockland County. O First, let me state that I did not receive a copy of the brochure explaining the emergency evacuation plan. I have my residence at 3 Tanneyann's Lane, West Haverstraw, New York for thepast seven (7) years. During that period of time I have been a customer of Orange and Rockland Utilities and my bills have always been mailed there. I pick-up the mail daily and realized that I had not received the brochure when someone else showed me a copy. A major concern of mine is that the plan did not adequately address the needs and concerns of non-English speaking residents and visitors in the area. In the villages of Haverstraw and West Haverstraw where approximately six thousand (6,000) Hispanics live, to the best of my knowledge,
I l RCSE witness Luis del Pilar - 2 O no literature in Spanish was provided.- Two people whom I spoke to, having received the brochure in English, did not O understand what it was about and one literally thought that a nuclear blast was going to take place. In addition, Rina White, a community iarker for the Rockland Community Action Council, in the village of Haverstraw, informed me that many of her clients were panicking and some literally left the village out of fear until the test was over. The problem of language becomes even more acute du ring the summer months when thousands of non-English-speaking residents of New York City and northern New Jersey utilize public recreation areas that fall well within the evacuation area. The language problem is not only with Spanish, but also with French Creole, Chinese, Korean, etc. Further, the number of Emergency Response Personnel that speak Spanish or other languages is nil under normal circumstances. Under an emergency of the magnitude that the plan addresses, this problem would create chaos. The foregoing are my observations as an individual not necessarily as an employee of Rockland County. O
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-2 O Ada a few hundred moro cara fron thera and 2 rom other parts of tha park. It a.:ould b; cbvious that tralfic will quickly 'oa at a stand-atill.
What about us? We who liva hara. Our Junday suaats have rendared our roads i a,aacaable, trap;ing ua as wall. Consolidated Edison says tha ten-aile circle can be evacuatdd in 7 to 10 hours. .:y conc;rn ic with what could happen in just one hour. I think of the property dana 3e, personal injury ~and the potential for violence. I think, too, of the possible reaction of some of our local tai truly native Rocklanders. Those who have been here for many 3enerations ara the same tough and independent breed that has inhabited our eastern hills and mountains for three hundred years. I submit that, while the prospact of a nuclear accident at Indian Point is upsetting, the prospect of an accident on a weekend in the summer is appalling! As I montioned in a recent convorsatien, we feel that the Indian Point evacuation plan, as it applies to school childrog might not have been prepared in sufficient detail. a W We sent a letter, with a brief questionnaire to be returned, to each of the school districts in Ber6en County, New Jersey, responsible for the five schools designated in the Plan an reception areas for our dtudents. The replies we have rooelved so far indicate that the
" receiving" schools. were asked to ( or told to) parti-01pate in the Plan but that xs further information or suggestions were not received as to housing, feeding or ro61stering evacuated children or for providin6 commun-ication botueen those ch11dron and their families.
Furthermore, there has been no financial provision for tho achoolcontars. roception diatricts to meet the costs of oueratin6 these Wo wish to chow that the Utilities, while proponing the meanc to Get the children out, havo dono only a small part of the total job. As we compile our data, wo find that this part of the Plan, like so many others, will prove to be incomplete and, therefore, inoffective. Robert T. Johnson O
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Watedan 1MelhHen - O commoTecxntcas ca A COMPLETE EDITORIAL AND GRAPHIC SERVICE June h, 1982 W name is Beth Waterfall and I was a press obsener for the Croton-Cortle dt News, one of the local newspapers in the Indian Point area, during the March 3 drill testing the warning and coimainications systems which would be used in case of a general emergency at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station. W colleagues arul I at the pmss center did not hear the sirens. We were given press badges which were valid only in the fire station / press center. We wem not allowed / encouraged to observe the operations of the drill, but wem expected to stay at the press center waiting for officials and spokespersons to show up atxi address us on the progmss of the drill. There was no press pool allowed to represent the press corps in actual observation of any of the developments of the day. An effort by anyself and our photographer to question the guard at Indian Point headquarters gate brought c2Gy curt and incomplete mswers. m This is evidence that the licensees and the responsible government agencies do not have a serious comitment to giving the public as intch infomation as they need to carry out a successful evacuation. Comp 3e te and accurate gess coverage of an event such as tho drill would be helpful to publicizing the roles and asponsibilities of all participants, and would help improve the functionint; of everyone in case of an actual evacuation. I have been involved in the courainications field for 30 years. W background spans radio, television, magazine and newspaper experience l with such firms as CBS, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, and Cande-Nast Publishing. I I am currently affiliated with the North Ontnty News as a free-lance reporter and am president of Waterfall.Menillen Comunications Co. l At the time of the March 3 drill, I was a communications consultant to the Croton-Cortlandt' News and as such c red issue-oriented events. l ,
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President I cc: Parents Concer d About Indian Point lO New York 28 West 39th Street. New trk. N Y 10018 ' l (212) 840 3612 e Westchester , 176 Clevetand Dnve. Croton-on-Hucson. N.Y 10520 t m -.
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O I TESTIMONY OF DR. DON D. SMITH My name is Donald D. Smith. I am a Professor of Mass Commun-ication in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Univer-sity of Iowa. Prior to my current appointment, I was on the facul- ! ties of Florida State University (1965-1980) and The College of Wooster (1960-1965) . I received my B.A. from Syracuse University in 1955, with a major in Russian, my M.A. from the University of Nebras'ka in 1957, majoring in Sociology. In 1964 I received my Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with my major emphases on Social Psychology, Cultural Anthro- > O pology and Mass Communications. At that time, my major profess-- ional focus was, and still is, the effects of mass media in society. In 1975, I was a member of an interdisciplinary research team which investigated the public evacuation response (and the mass medin role in that response) to Hurricane Eloise efter it hit Funn a City, Florida. Since that time, I have continued my re-search and study on (1) the role of the mass media in emergency (3) pub-evacuations, (2) the content of emergency warning messages, lic response to mass media emergency warning messages, and (4) the 4 prenaration and training of mass media personnel for their role ! in disaster preparedness. O .
N 2. O In the interest of contributing to the most effective evac-uation planning that current research knowledge allows, I have prepared reports and papers on my research, and I have given lectures and seminars, the. latest being in March,1982, when 'I participated in a state-wide Disaster Management Seminar for Dis . aster Preparedness Officials,'given under the auspices of the Iowa Office of Disaster Preparedness. The materials I have examined in preparing this testimony a re s (a) Sections E and G from NUREG 0654, Revision 1, containing the criteria and guidelines for " Notification Methods and Proced-ures" and "Public Education and Information," (b) Appendix 3 of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, "Means for Providing Prompt Alerting and Natifi~ cation of Response Organizations and the Population," (c) g Appendix E ("Westchester County Emergency Communications Network") of the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, (d) Appendix F ("Westchester County Public Notification Plan") of the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, (e) The State of New York Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) Oper-ational Plan and the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) Procedures for the Hudson Valley and Catskill New York EBS Operational Area, (f) The R.E. Ginna i Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Information pamphlet, (g) 'he T booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You," dis-tributed to the public in the Indian Point area, (h) The sample O
3 O V public warning announcements contained in Appendix B, Rev. 1, of the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, (i) the script of the EBS General Emergency broadcast message, written during the March 3rd exercise of the Indian Point Emer-gency Plans, and (j) the media kit. prepared by New York State, . for mass media personnel in covering emergency situatiens. The main thrust of my testimony is that the contents pre-sented in these plans, procedures, brochures, and suggested ' scripts are in' adequate to reasonably assure an effective evacuation of the I public in the event of a major emergency requiring large-s'cale evacuation. (An " effective" evacuation is defined here as one ([) which ~ achieves the maximum possible protection of the public.) In the materials that I have examined, the mass media are ex-pected to be the main link with the public in eliciting the pub-lic's participation in the pre-disaster evacuation. (The " mass media" are defined here to include radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, pamphlets, booklets or any other signals intended to convey information to the public.) These media are expected to
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serve as the principal device for informing and preparing the public, and for bringing the population into the requirements and l activities of the evacuation. However, despite the important and I crucial role assigned to the mass media in these materials, in l , [s^s) . l l
4. my opinion, the contents, procedures and approaches outlined in lll these materials rely, in some instances, on what are actually erroneous notions about the mass communication process and the way people are likely to respond to mass media messages and, in other instances, rely on what are as yet untested assertions about mass media effects. To begin, embodied throughout these materials is the idea that achieving the intended evacuation response from the public is a result of getting the warning message to the public. Fritz (1961) has characterized this notion in saying:
"Many of the difficulties in obtaining the de-sired response to warnings stem from an over-simplified conception held by persons issuing warning information. They often conceive of warnings as a direct, stimulus-response type of communication, in which people issuing the warning give the signal ' danger' and people lll automatically respond as though danger were imminent."
Mass media effcets research of the past 15 years has found l repeatedly that a major factor in an individual's response to a l media message is the individual's interpretation of the message (Rice and Paisley, 1981: Roloff and Miller, 1980; Blumler and Katz,
- 1974) . To be sure, the public does not respond unless it receives the message , but reaching the public with the message is merely the first step in the complicated process of conveying information t o the public.
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In recognition of these research findings, it has- becone ;
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axiomatic that the communication of information, conducted with , ,u the intent of affecting the public in some way, should: (a) be- , gin with a very detailed examination and assessment of the intend- '
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ed audiences its sociological and psychological charaderistics, the already existing' beliefs, ' opinions, ideas, knbwhedge (and _ micconceptions) that might be brought to bear ~by' the public in
. s interpreting, understanding, and acting on, the information reach-ing theme (b) based on these now-known chaincteristics of the 4' nudience, the next step consists of the deliberate design of commun ':, -
ica tion strategie.u - ascertainment of the most effective media and media mixes, the sruction of mj'ssage content an4 specific word-(]) ing, with messages tailored for ' specific groups witiin the pqpu-t. s ' lations (c) given the complexities and possible variations l'n'- nossage interpretation of individuals and groups within the public, the proposed media messages should be extensively pre-tested on snmples of the intended pcpulation, (d) the messages, once dis-
' tributed to the population, should be followed by an evaluation
.;tep to ascertain if the intended effect has been achieved (Schramm and Roberts, 1971).
Obviously, in disaster ' preparedness, the steps outlined above nre to be done long before the advent of an actual emergency. The materials which I have examined.for this testimony do not reflect this current " state-of-the-art'.' Consequently, in my 1
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'1 1 lk opinion, the plans, procedures, brochures and suggested scripts:
first, ascribe an unwarranted effectiveness to the mass media in
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achieving the intended evacuation results. More is being expected of, and required, from the mast; media than is warranted by current media effects research. Further, these materials insufficiently take into account, and inadequately incorporate into their content, the realities of what we actually do know about how people are likely to respond to mass media warning messages. Secordly, these materials reflect inadequate attention to the necessity for pains' takingly constructed, already pre-tested emergency information and warning messages--messages which have been developed on a foundation of already measured audience characteristics and which contain alternative message forms and phraseology designed to fit 9 particular audience characteristics. This is particularly crucial in the case of nuclear emergency, for nuclear threat represents a relatively new and unexperienced emergency for most of the Amer-/ ican public, and we know very little as yet about the public's ,be-l liefs, ideas, knowledge and misconceptions about it. 1 The content of the preparedness and warning messages is th'e primary link the public has with the evacuation plans. Yet, this is perhaps the most untested area in disaster evacuation plannih6 l Most trial tests of emergency response procedures stop just short l of testing thiscruc'ial and " bottom-line" step--determining what I the public actually would have grasped of the warning messages, i O
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7 O what interpretations the public would have made of the infor-mation and what actions the public would likely have taken. Thir:1, these materials place too heavy a burden on mass media personnel who, at this time, are generally unprepared and untrain-ed for, and, in many instances, unaware of, the crucial role in which they would~ be thrust in the event of a major nuclear emergency. In support of these points, I would make the following obser . vations. First, these materials presume a previously informed and prepared public motivated to carry out the emergency responses planned for them by evacuation officials. However, mere distri-bution of the information brochure is not in itself evidence of an informed, prepared and motivated public. It is not uncommon [} for public information campaigns to fail, to only partially succeed, or to have resulte quite different from those intended. In one of the few assessments that hawe been done of the public's dis-aster preparedness, conducted in a geographical region in which the Dublic has good reason to be prepared (the Texas coast), and after a deliberate and heavy multi-met-la disaster preparedness
, campaign, it was found that, even of those people who did recall hearing or , receiving the preparedness information (many did not),
between 1/4 to 1/3 of them missed or misunderstood important points in the information (Christensen and Ruch,1979). Based on the contents of the material I have exmnined, in my opinion, one can anticipate large gaps in the emergency know- 4 l') l \_/
8. 9 ledge, preparation and motivation of the Indian Point public. Secondly, the expectations in this material require that the mass media messages will be quite effective in inducing the population to evacuate. Few other options or alternatives 1 are prepared for in these materials. Yet, a review of public responses to mass media messages in previous disasters indicates that, in many instances, as many as 20 to 50 per cent in the f; potentially affected populations did not evacuate, even when they were aware of the threat and had been requested to evacuate Bakerf, et al., 1976: Baker, 1979: Windham et al., 1977). So far, the appropriately worded messages, or mix of m'essages, have not been utilized that would induce these large numbers of remaining individuals to evacuate. In Hurricane Eloise, for g dxample, only 6 per cent of the public indicated that mass media messages were an important factor in their decision to evacuate (Baker et al., 1976). Clearly, in previous disasters, large ! segments of the public have been marching to a different drummer than the mass media. This leads directly to a third observation. The materials I have examined do not include, and build upon, a factor that, time and again, has demonstrated itself to be one of the most important factors in the public's response to warning messages: interpersonal relati'onships (Mack and Baker, 1961: Drabek and Stephenson, 1971: Baker et al., 1976). Family and friendship h
9 G groups have been shown to be important in how and what individuals learn of an impending threat, what interpretations they make of the messages, the decisions they make about it, and what actions they take. These interpersonal relationships can play - both a positive and negative role in the evacuation responses of the public. Hence, awareness of these interpersonal patterns can,- and should, be deliberately used in emergency warning procedures (Steale, Lyons and Smith,1980) . However, other than making the ciraple 9dmoni tion, "Do not drive to schools to pick up your children," (p. ?- in " Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You")--which it-scif will require an already well-informed and well-prepared public--or, advising the public to go to the homes of friends and reintives which, tojudge. fron past evacuation behavior, is what mcct of them will do, regardless of what they are told, the contents of these materials proceed as if effective evacuation response i; n problem of moving individunis, whereas, more frequently it roonn o r individuals who do or do not respond in the planned-for n r.m nr. e r . Fourth, these materin1s place an unwarranted reliance on the mass media to elicit approcriate evacuation behavior from those l nenple who u, chocso to evacuate. Although the materials recognize thn t not all necole will respond as directed, there is little allow-l n r.ce for, or preparation for, the large numbers of individualswho, while evne Juting, are doing so in a manner unintended by emergency l l l
10. O officials. In some previous evacuations, despite media pro-nouncements of public shelter locations and the routes to them, it has been found that approximately 3/4 of the evacuating pop-ulation has chosen a self-selected destination and self-selected routes to these destinations. Compounding this potential con-fusion, it is not uncommon for individuals not intended by officials to be included in the evacuation to include themselves (Zeigler, Lrunn and Johnson,1981: Baker et al., 1976). A fifth abservation looms large in my assessment of these materials. The specific information and directions in the distri-buted brochure, and the examples of warning messages in the suggest-ed broadcast scripts, represent, in my opinion, a weak link in the pre parations . These materials reflect (a) insufficient attention llI to the many interpretations and diverse meanings that could likely be assigned to the content of the messages by the receiving public and insufficient sensitivity to the confusion that can easily be created by seemingly straight forward messages when not constructdd on the basis of extensive pre-testing. To take but one example of this from these materials, the booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You," directs people to the home of a friend or relative (p. 7). The simulated broadcast message, in the trial test of the Indian Point system on fearch 3,1982, directed people to "go to your designated reception center." (b) The message content of these materials is characterized O
l 11. G kl by bare descriptive facts. Yet, studies of actual public in-terpretations of disaster warning messages suggests that a threat-ened population wants (and needs) more than these descriptive facts (Smith, 1981). The public asks for interpretation, ex-danation and the presentation.of options to fit their particular circumstances. Completeness of information e as well as accuracy, is needed by the public in responding to the requirements of the evacuation. In Hurricane Eloise, for example, on hearing which public shelters were full, without a corresponding announcement of which shelters remained open (and how to get to them), some listeners interpreted that to mean that they should stay homes others took that same infonr.ation to mean that they should leave town (Smith, 1981). O (c) The information for the public in these materials exhib-its little attention to the large differences in public response that can be created by seemingly small differences in message word-ing. This is crucial in mass nedia warnings in which the public l has little opportunity to ask for clarification. Loftus (1979) ' has documented the tremendous difference in public response that can be achieved by alterations in message wording. Again, to take but onr: ex,nple from the Indinn Point booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning.. and You," (p. 7), the admonition , "Please do not drive to schools to pick up your children," can be taken to mean that one should not go to the schools at all or it can \
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be taken to mean that one can go to the schools if one does not drive (possibly to avoid traffic congestion). Or the phrase (p. 7) that children will be at the school reception centers "until they are picked up by their parents" without any designation of when parents are to do this. (d) The contents of the brochure and suggested broadcast scripts do not reflect the different message content and phraseol-ogy necessary to achieve a common response from diverse sociolog-ical and psychologien1 segments of the population. Seemingly, it is the expectation of these materials that "one message does all." This is not supported by current mass media research in which it is frequently found that differing segments of the population (such as the higher / lower educated, the aged, male / females) re-In disaster O quire differing messages to achieve a common result. response, for example, the elderly have been found to learn of . the impending threat later than others, to follow the information less closely, to bring different facters to bear in making their decisions, nnd to evacuate later than others (Bnker et al., 1976). Other points could be made in this connection: the reliance in these messages on map-reading ability, or the questionable com-bination of background radiation education material with emergency nrocedures. A final observn. tion. These ma terials inadequately recognize the linited training and preparation of news media personnel to e
13 O achieve the results exp.ected of them in these emergency prepa-rations. It should be noted that the news media are being asked here to carry out a very unfamiliar role--to bring forth from the public an immediate, behavioral response--evacuation. The . traditional practises of the news media in the United States, the values and attitudes, and 'the procedures of news collection, evaluation, selection and distribution have not been pointed in this direction. News media personnel have not been trained for this role, either formally or informally. Journalism schools provide no training for this and, although I know of no systema-tic study on the subject, informal inquiry suggests that in-depth, "on-the-job" training for disaster response is quite' rare in
,r3 broadcast stations and media agencies. It has been my experience kJ that news media personnel themselves are often quite surprised to learn what is being expected of them. Although there is no reaaon to challenge the courage and sense of responsibility of news media p?rsonnel any more than any other occupation, it should to noted that, unlike the other occupations intimately involved in dinaster response (such as fire, police, rescue services), the performance of one's task in the face of approaching nuclear danger is not included usually in the officially-stated job descriptions for news r c: iia personnel.
A jus t completed study of journalism majors at three uni-l i /~N NsY
14. versities has found that these future news media personnel are !!h very poorly informed about emergency behavior and harbor many erroneous ideas about human behavior in disaster response (Smith and Zima, 1982), Yet, during actual emergencies, the public's demand for news frequently outstrips the news available from designated officials and the. information that has actually gone out to the public has increasingly been a product of news media personnel (Waxman,1973), resulting in confusion, contradiction and even error, These materials, in establishing the formal responsibilities of the Public Information Officer, recognize the importance of providing the public with information that is internally consist-ent. Just how this coordination is to take place, however, is
!I not snelled out in these materials.
In sum, in my opinion the materials I have examined are in-Needed adequate to assure the maximum protection of the public. ares (1) a detailed study of the Indian Point public to determine its audience characteristics, (2) on the basis of that audience a nalysis , the development of communication strategies, with the construction of information and warning messages for diverse groups within the population, and (3) cxtensive pre-testing of the proposed public information. After all, in an actual emer-in many gency, these messages will be the public's main link and, cases, its only link, with the require. -nts of the evacuation. Thank you. O
REFERENCES Baker, Earl J. , " Predicting Response to Hurricane Warnings: A Reanlysis of Data from Four Studies," Mass Emergencies, Vol. 4, 1979, pp. 9-24. Baker, Earl J., Anth'ony Paredes, John Brigham and Don D. Smith. Social Response to Hurricane Eloise. Florida Resources and Environmental Analysis Center, Florida State Univer-sity, 1976. Blumle_r, Jay G. and Elihu Katz (eds. ) . The Uses of Mass Communi-cations. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974. Christensen, Larry and Carlton E. Ruch, " Assessment 'of Brochures and Radio and Television Presentations on Hurricane Aware-O ness," Mass Emergencies, Vol. 3,1979, pp. 209-216. Drabek, Thomas E. and John S. Stephenson, III, "When Disaster Strikes," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol.1, 1971, pp. 187-203 Fritz, E. C. , " Disaster," in Nisbet, R. (ed.) . Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961. , Loftus, Elizabeth F. , "Words That Could Save Your Life," Psychology f r . Today, November, 1979, pp. 102-137. f
!. lack, Raymond W. and George W. Baker. The Occa'sion Instant. Nation-i l al Academy of Sciences / National Research Council Disaster I Study //15 Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1961.
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O Rice, Ronald and William J. Paisley (eds.). Public Communication Campaigns. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981. Roloff, Michael E. and Gerald R. Miller (eds.). Persuasion: New f Directions M Theory and Research. Beverly Hills: Sage , Publications, 1980. Schramm, Wilbur and Donald F. Roberts (eds.). The Process and Effects g Mass Communication, Rev. Ed. Urbana: Univer-sity of Illinois Press,1972. Smith, Don D., "Public Perceptions and Interpretations of Mass
~ t.ledia fdessages in a Natural Disaster," paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Buck Hill Falls, New York,1981.
Smith, Don D. and William Zima, " Disaster Knowledge of Journalism g Students," (manuscript in preparation) 1982. Steele, G. Alec, Morgan Lyons and Don D. Smith, " Area Agency on Agency Disaster Contingency Planning: The' Pre-Disaster Phase," in Earl J. Baker, (ed. ), Hurricane and Coastal Storms. Florida Sea Grant, Report No. 33, 1980, pp. 50-55 Waxman, J. J., " Local Broadcast Gatekeeping During Natural Disasters," Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 50, 1973, pp. 751-758.
*clindhnn, Gerald 0. , Ellen I . Posey, Peggy J. Ross, and Barbara G.
S pencer. Renetions M Storm Threat During Hurricane Eloise. Mississippi State University: Social Science Research Center, Report 51, 1977 O
O Zeigler, Donald J. , Stanley D. Brunn, and James H. Johnson, Jr. , ,
" Evacuation From a Nuclear Technological Disaster,"- l Geographical Review, Vol. 71, No.1,1981, pp.1-16. '!
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VITA Identification Name: Don D. Smith Birth Date: November 5, 1930 Marital Status: Married, two children Education and Training l l Four years active duty with U. S. Air Force (1951-1955) Soviet Air Communica-tions Intelligence Hastings College, Rastings, Nebraska (1948-1951) English and Speech majors
----- U. S. Air Force Russian Language School, San Antonio, Texas (1951)
U. S. Air Force Institute of Technology (1951-1952) Military Law; Russian B. A. Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York (1955) Russian major M. A. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska (1957) Sociology major; Polit-ical Science minor Ph.D. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (1964) Sociology-Social Psychol-ogy major; Cultural Anthropology, Mass Communications minors (1955-1957) Graduate Teaching Fellow in Sociology at the University of Nebraska (1957-1958) Graduate Teaching Fellow in Cultural Anthropology at the Universit of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (1958-1959) Graduate Research Assistant in Social Psychology, Institute for R - search in Social Science, University of North Carolina (1959-1960) Graduate Teaching Fellow in Sociology, University of North Carolina Positions Held (1960-1963) Instructor in Sociology and Anthropology, College of Wooster (Ohio) (1963-1964) Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, College of Wooster (1964-1965) Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, College of Wooster (1965-1967) Assistant Professor of Sociology, Florida State University (1967-1971) Associate Professor of Sociology, Florida State University (1971-1980) Professor of Sociology, Florida State University (1980- ) Professor of Mass Communication, University of Iowa Teaching and Research Interests Social Psychology of Mass Communications, International Political Communications, Sociology of Mass Communications, Public Opinion, Socialization, Collective Be-havior, Comparative Social Organization (Soviet Social Systems), Political Soc-iology, Social Psychological Theory, Sociology of Language, Communications Theory, Information Delivery Systems, Social Psychology of International Conflict, Cross-Cultural Social Psychology, Content Analysis Methodologies, Introductory Sociology, Introductory Social Psychology 9
O Professional Associations American Sociological Association; American Association for Public Opinion Research; World Association for Public Opinion Research; Society for the Study of Social Problems; International Consnunications Association; Southern Association for Public Opinion Research; Southern Sociological Society Awards-Honors National Endowment for the Humanities Sunumer Research Fellowship,1976. Alternate Designate, Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow, 1971-1972. RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS Articles Don D. Smith, " Primary Group Interaction and Emergent Norms in Panic Be- , havior," (forthcoming). Don D. Smith, "The Stereotype of Rape in American Pornography,* (forth-coming). Don D. Smith, " Teaching Undergraduate Sociology Through Feature Films," in Approaches I;o_ Undergraduate Teaching _ni_n Sociology, New Rochelle, New York: Education Change, Inc., 1977. Don D. Smith, " Sexual Aggression in American Pornography: A Content Anal-ysis," Psychiatric Spectator, Vol. 10, No. 11 (May, 1977), pp. 18-21. Don D. Smith, "The Social Content of Pornography," Journal o_f_ Communication, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 1975-1976), pp. 16-24. (a) A description of an earlier stage of this research is available as " Sociological Themes in American Mass Porn-l ography," Public opinion Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 ! (Fall, 1975), p. 407. (b) This research is reviewed in Human Behavior, Vol. 5, i No. 9 (September, 1976), pp. 53-54. i
' (c) This research is reviewed in New Look, Vol. 2, No. 6 i -(December,1976), pp.12-14.
\ Don D. Smith, " Teaching Introductory Sociology by Film," Teaching Sociology, l Vol. 1, No. 1 (October, 1973), pp. 48-61. O .-
O Don D. Smith, " Mass Communications and International Image Change," Journal of_ Conflict Resolution, Vol.17, No.1 (March, 1973), pp. 115-129. (a) This article was distributed by the United States Information Agency in pamphlet form under the same title (1974). Don D. Smith, " Sex, Reference Others, and the Affective-Cognitive Con-sistency of Opinions about Social Issues," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 53, No.1 (June, 1972),.pp. 145-154. Don D. Smith, "An American Elite's Knowledge about the Soviet Union," World Affairs, Vol. 134, No. 4 (Spring, 1972), pp. 344-351.
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Don.D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter,1970), pp. 539-551. (a) This article is reprinted in Psychological Operations Casebook. American Institute for Research, Kensington, Maryland, 1972. (b) An earlier version of this article is available under the same title as Special Paper FAR #9013,1969 For-eign Affairs Research Center, U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C. Don D. Smith, "' Dark Areas of Ignorance' Revisited: Public Knowledge About Asian Affairs," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 3 (December, 1970), pp. 668-673. (a) This article is reprinted in Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M. Bonjean (eds.) Political Attitudes and Public 02 - inion. New York: David McKay Co. ,1972. Don D. Smith, " Student Audiences for International Broadcasts: An Inter-national Comparison," Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 65-72. Don D. Smith, "The U. S. Audience for International Broadcasts," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer,1970), pp. 364-366. O
O Don D. Smith, " America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty Five Years Later," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 1969), pp. 537-545. (a) A description of an earlier stage of this research is available as " International Broadcast Audiences: The U. S. Audience and Some Broadcast Effects," Pub-lic Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Fall,1967), pp. 466-467. Don D. Smith, " Reply to Jordan," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring,1969), pp.130-132. Don D. Smith, " Dogmatism, Cognitive Consistency and Knowledge of Conflict-ing Facts," Sociometry, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September, 1968), pp. 259-277. Don- D. Smith, " Cognitive Consistency and Perception of Others' Opinions," Public Opinion Quartertg, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1968), (a) This article is reprinted in Robert O. Carlson (ed.), Communications and Public Opinion. New York: Fred-erick Praeger Publishers, 1975. Don D. Smith, '9 Modal Attitude Clusters: A Supplement for the Study of Nat-ional Character," Social Forces, Vol. 44, No. 4 (June,1966),
- pp. 526-533.
I l Don D. Smith, " Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts: An Exploratory Study," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn,1965), pp. 643-645.
- Don D. Smith, "Is There a U. S. Audience for International Broadcasts?"
Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 86-87. Don D. Smith, " Political Opinions and News of International Events," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn,1962), pp. 525- ' . 526. - - - - l ! O
Chapters G. Alec Steele, Morgan Lyons and Don D. Smith, "AoA Disaster Contingency Planning: The Pre-Disaster Phase," in Earl J. Baker (ed.), IIurricanes and Coastal Storms, Gainesville, Florida: Florida Sea Grant, 1980, pp. 50-55. Don D. Smith, " Changing Public Opinion: Problems and Prossacts," in Warren Viessman, Jr. (ed. ) Water Resources Planning and Public Opinion. Lincoln, Nebraska: Water Resources Research Institute, 1971, pp. 45-59. Don D. Smith and Richard L. Simpson, " Goals and Values of Voluntary Associations: A Content Analysis," in Richard L. Simpson, Donald Freeman, William Gulley and Don D. Smith, Voluntary Associations ,in America. Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, 1960. O O
Funded Research, Grants and Technical Reports Don D. Smith, " Application of Computer Managed Instruction to Mass Communication Courses," Council on Teaching and Weeg Computing Center, University of Iowa, 1981-1982. Don D. Smith, " Application.of TIPS-Assisted Instruction to Introductory Sociology," Euon Education Foundation, New York, 1978-1979. Don D. Smith, "Information Processing Systems in Undergraduate Education," Exxon Education Foundation, New York, 1977. Don D. Smith, " Final Report: The Poli!.ical Competency of the American Publics A National Assessment," National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington, D.C., 1976. Anthony Paredes (Anthropology), Jack Brigham (Psychology), Jay Baker (Geography), and Don D. Smith (Sociology). "The Impact of Hurricane Eloise." Florida Sea Grant, Gainesville, Florida, 1975-1976. (a) The technical report of the research, by the same authors, is available as The Social Impact of Hurricane Eloise. Tallahassee, Florida: Florida Resources and Environment-73 al Analysis Center, 1976. C1 (b) A technical report on another dimension of this research is available as, G. Alec Steele and Don D. Smith, Threat Responses of the Aged in a Gulf-Coast Hurricane. Tallahassee, Florida: Florida Research Center, 1978. (c) A technical report on another dimension of this research is available as, G. Alec Steele and Don D. Smith, Area Agency on Aying Disaster Contingency Planning: The Pre-Disaster Phase. Tallahansce, Florida: Florida Research Center, 1979. Don D. Smith, " International Audiences for Deutsche Welle: Final Report," Foreign Office: Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, FRG, 1975. Anna Ochod, et. al. (Education) and Don D. Smith (Sociology), Summer Institute for the Teaching of Social Psychology in the Secondary Schools. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1972. 1 # N
O Don D. Smith, " Political Awareness of the American Public: A National Assess- , ment," Contract DDSM (34-936), Graduate Research Council, l Florida State University, 1970. l l Don D. Smith, " Basic Sociology on Film," Contract SMIT (15-132) Council for Instruction, Florida State University, 1968. (a) The report of this research, by the same investigator, is available in Sociology o_n Film, New York: Selected Academic Readings, 1969. Don D. Smith, " Audiences to Political Communications," Contract SMIT (0-34-32) Graduate Research Council, Florida State University, 1967. Don D. Smith, " National Audiences to International Political Communications," Graduate Research Council, Florida State University, 1966. Don D. Smith, " International Political Communications," Faculty Research Grant, College of Wooster, 1961. Richard L. Simpson, Donald Freeman, William Gulley and Don D. Smith, Volun-tary Associations ,i_nn America. Chapel Hill: Institute for Re-search in Social Science, 1960. O I l
PAPERS PRESENTED O(~h Don D. Smith, " Assumptions About Mass Media Effectiveness in Pre-Disaster Evacuation Plans," presented at the annual meetings of the Amcrican Association for Public Opinion Research, Hunt Valley, Maryland, 1982. Don D. Smith, " Primary Group Interaction and Emergent Norms in Panic Behavior," presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Toronto, Canada, August, 1981. Don D. Smith, " Disaster Policy Assumptions About Mass Media Effectiveness in Pre-Disaster Evacuations," presented at the dnnual meet-ings of the Association for Education in Journalism, East Lansing, Michigan, Auguct, 1981. Don D. Smith, "Public Perceptions and Interpretations of, Mass Media Messages in A Natural Disaster," presented at the annual meetings of
- the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Buck Hill Falls, New York, June, 1981.
Don D. Smith, "The Portrayal of Rape in American Pornography," presented at the annual meetings of the American Culture Association and the Popular Culture Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, () March, 1981. Don D. Smith and G. Alec Steele, "Public Evacuation Responses to Mass Media Messages in a Natural Disaster," presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Re-search, Chicago, Ill., December 1980 Mary Tokheim, Don D. Smith and Jenene Gerrdes Karamon, "A Role for Public Opinion," presented at the annual meetings of the American Association for Public Opinion, Kings Island, Ohio, June, 1980. Don D. Smith, " International Political Communications and International Tensions," presented at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York City, 1980. Don D. Smith, " Innovative Uses of Media in Sociology Instruction," pre-sented at the American Sociological Association's National Series on Teaching, Gainesville, Florida, 1980. l Don D. Smith, " Computer Assisted Instruction in Sociology," presented at the American Sociological Association's National Series on Teaching, Gainesville, Florida, 1980. m
O Don D. Smith, " Stereotypes of IIctero , Ilomo- and Bi-Sexuality in American Pornography," presented at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Sccial Problems, Boston, Mass , 1979. G. Alec Steele and Don D. Smith, " Area Agency on Aging Disaster Contingency Planning: The Pre-Disaster Phase," presented at the National Conference on Hurricanes and Coastal Storms, Orlando, Florida, 1979. G. Alec Steele and Don D. Smith, " Threat Responses of the Aged in a Gulf Coast 11urricane, " presented at the annual meetings of the Gerontological Society, Dallas, Texas, 1978. Don D. Smith, " Mass Media Performance and the Public's 'Right-to-Know'" presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Association for Public Opinion Research, Chapel IIlll, North Carolina, 1978. Don D. Smith, " Application of ' TIPS' to Introductory Sociology," presented at the American Sociological Association's Project on Under-graduate Teaching, Southeast Regional Workshop, Tallahassee, Florida, 1978. Don D. Smith and G. Alec Steele, " Mass Media Performance and Public Evacuation O Responses in Gulf Coast llurricanes," presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1978. Don D. Smith, "The Portrayal of Sexual Aggressiveness in American Porno-graphy: The Stereotype of Rape," presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, New York City, 1976. Don D. Smith, -" Primary Group Interaction in Panic Behavior: A Test of Theories," presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, Miami Beach, Florida, 1976. Don D. Smith, " Sociological Themes in American Mass Pornography," presented at the annual meetings of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Itasca, Illinois, 1975. Don D. Smith, " Psychological Warfare Reconsidered," presented at the meetings of the Psychological Warfare Society, Imperial War Museum, London, England, 1974. O
O Don D. Smith, "Rusu Ndla in Public Administrat lon," procented at the nat-ional meetings of Univernity Union Administrators, Talla-hassee, Florida, 1968. Don 11 Smit h, "Dogmatium, Cognitive Conniutency azul Kriowledge of Coriflicting Facts," prcuented at the .uinual mirotings of the Airorican Sociological Auuociation, San l'ran<:ll:co, California, 1967. tun D. Smit h, " International Political Broadcants: the U.S. Audience and Sosiu Broadeant liffects," girosented at tho annual mootiriqu of thu Anurican Aunociation for Pulalic opinion knearch, Dolton I.anding, New York, 1967. Don D. Smith, " Knowledge, Opinion and Perception of Othors' Opinions," prenented at the annual meetinga of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, Louluiana, 1966. lion D. Smi t h, "Trendu in International Mann Conununications," procented at the annual meetinga of Livs Ohio Valicy Sociological Society, Lexington, Kentucky, 1964. () f% Ibn D. Smith, "Some ' Cold War' Opinions Boforo-and-After Soviet Man-in-Space," presented at the annual meetings of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society,1;aut Lanulng, Michigan,1%2. O
O Don D. Smith, "The Effectivenesu of the Masu Media and the Public's 'Right to Know'" presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, 1973. Don D. Smith, "The Uses of Theory in Current Social Psychological Research," presented at the annual meetings of the Southwestern Socio-logical Association, San Antonio, Texas, 1972. Don D. Smith, " Teaching Undergraduate Sociology: A Reflection of Graduate Sociology?" presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1972. Don D. Smith, " Teaching Introductory Sociology by Film," presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Denver, Colorado, 1971. Don D.- Smith, " International Short-Wave Broadcasts and Change in Internat-ional Images," presented at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Denver, Colorado, 1971. Don D. Smith, " Social Constraints on International Research," presented at the Annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Washington, D.C., 1970. Don D. Smith, " Sex, Reference Group Congruity, and Cognitive Consistency," presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, 1970. Don D. Smith, "Public Opinion in Modern Society," presented at the annual meetings of the Council for Social Studies, Winter Park, Florida, 1969. Don D. Smith, "Some Effects of International Broadcasts on International Images," presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California, 1969. Don D. Smith, "Internati)nal Affairs: What do Americans Know?" presented at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Soc-ial Problems, San Francisco, California, 1969. Don D. Smith, "American Audiences for International Political Communications," presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 1968. Don D. Smith, "Lovels o:? Political Knowledge in the American Public," pre-sented ac the annual meetings of the Southern Sociological Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1968. O
O TEACHING Courses Taught Undergraduate: Introductory Sociology, Introductory Social Psychology, Introductory Cultural Anthropology, Social Problems, Collective Behavior, Race Relations, Political Sociology, Sociology of Language, Mass Communications, Public Opinion, Sociological Theory, Comparative Social Organization (Sov-ist Society, Chinese Area Studies), Theories of Personality, Social Stratification, Criminology, Social Structure-Person-ity, Sociology of War, Research Methods. Graduate: Theories of Social Psychology, Sociology of Mass Communi-cations, Advanced Social Psychology, Social Psychology of Mass Communications, Mass Media and Society, Small Groups,
- Socialization, Sociology of Politics, Public Opinion Anal-ysis, Collective Behavior, Research Methods.
Other Teaching Related Activities Rated " excellent" teacher in Florida State University Students' Faculty O Evaluation Handbook, 1967-1969 (on both undergraduate and graduate levels). Eight-time Nominee for Teaching Excellence Awards (Standard Oil, Amoco, Pro-vost's, President's) at Florida State University. Teaching Innovations Developed / Introduced: (1) Introductory Sociology Through Films (1968) (2) Introductory Social Psychology Through Films (1972) (3) Social Psychological Theories in Behavioral Vignettes (1973) (4) Application of TIPS-Assisted Instruction to Introductory Sociology, (1978-1979) (5) Introductory Sociology Through Behavioral Vignettes (in preparation). Participating Teaching Faculty, Interdivisional Doctoral Program in Marriage and Family, Florida State University, 1969-1975. Participating Teaching , Faculty, Interdepartmental Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies, Florida State University, 1979-O
O Book Reviews Shadow in the Cave: The Proadcaster and His Audience (by Anthony Smith), Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer,1976), pp. 277-278. The United Nations and the News Media (by Alexander Szalai with Margaret Croke and Associates). Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring, 1974), pp. 361-362. Current Perspectives in Mass Communication Research (edited by F. Gerald Kline and Phillip Tichenor). Social Forces, Vol. 53, No. 2 (December, 1974), pp. 361-362. Attitude Change: A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Approaches (by Charles A. Kiesler, Barry E. Collins, and Norman Miller) . Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 35 (Spring, 1971), pp. 148-149. Psychology and Politics (edited by LeRoy Rieselbach and George I. Balch). American Sociological Review, Vol. 35 (April, 1970), pp. 389-390. lll Politics and Television (by Kurt and Gladys Lang). Social Forces, Vo. 47 (June, 1969), pp. 509-510. Dimensions oj( Authoritarianism (by John P. Kirscht and Ronald Dillehay). American Sociological Review, Vol. 33 (June, 1968), pp. 483-484. Theories of[ Mass Communication (by Melvin L. DeFleur). Social Forces, Vol. 45 (March,1967), pp. 450-451. The Effects of, Mass Communications (by J. D. Halloran). Social Forces, Vol. 44 (September, 1965), pp. 139. Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States l ' , (by Claire Selltiz, June Christ, Joan Havel and Stuart Cook), Social Forces, Vol. 42 (March,1964), pp. 385-386. Social Class 131 American Sociology (by Milton M. Gordon). Social Forces, Vol. 37 (May,1959), pp. 371-372. l O
SERVICE-ADMINISTRATION Departmental Level Acting Chairman, Department of Sociology, College of Wooster, 1963-1964. Chairman, Graduate Program Committee, FSU, 1971-1972; 1972-1973; 1976-1977; 1979-1980. Chairman, Undergraduate Program Committee, FSU, 1969-1970; 1970-1971. Chairman, Graduate Assistance and Financial Aid Committee, FSU, 1971-1972; 1972-1973. Chairman, Social Psychology Program Committee, FSU, 1969-1975. Chairman, By-Laws Committee, FSU, 1978-1979. Member, Departmental Policy Committee, FSU, 1968-1974; 1975-1976: 1977-1978. Member, Graduate Program Committee (2 terms); Undergraduate Program Committee ( (4 terms); Graduate Assistance and Financial Aid Committee (1 term). College Level Member, Academic Program Committee, College of Wooster, 1964-1965. Member, Faculty Promotion and Tenure Committee, FSU, 1971-1972. () Member, Curriculum Development Committee, FSU, 1969-1970. Member, Uaiversity Fellowships and Stipends Committee, FSU,1973. Member, Faculty Research Awards Committee, FSU, 1977-1978. Member, Policy Committee, Interdepartmental Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies, 1979-19 . University Level Member, Faculty Promotion and Tenure Committee, FSU, 1972-1974. Member, Faculty Development Committee, FSU, 1971-1974. Member, Faculty Senate, FSU, 1969-1973. 7 Member, Committee on Use of Human Subjects in Research, FSU, 1972-1973. Member, Instructional Media Advisory Committee, FSU, 1973-1974. Member, Executive Committee, University Humanities, FSU, 1976-1977. Member, NEH Stipend Awards Committee, FSU, 1978-1979; 1979-1980. Chairman, Graduate Program Review Committee (Humanities), Graduate Policy Council, 1975-1976. O
O Staff Member, American Sociological Association Project on Teaching Under-graduate Sociology, Southeast Regional Workshop, 1978. Staf f Member, American Sociological Association's National Series on Teach-ing, 1980. Honors Program Tutorials and Seminars, Florida State University and College of Wooster. 9 l O l l l t
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i Chairman, Graduate Program Review Cosmiittee (Social Work), Graduate Policy Council, 1978-1979. Meaber, Belgian-Americen Fellowship Committee, 1979-1980. s State University System Level Evaluator, Program for the M. A. in Mass Communications, University of South Florida, 1978. Discipline Level 4 Elected: Member, Executive Council, Southern Association for Public Opinion Re-search, 1978-1979. i l Co,nference Vice-Chairman, Southern Association for Public Opinion Research, { 1978-1979. Chairman, Division of International Tensions, Society for the Study of i Social Problems, 1970-1971; 1971-1972. ( Appointed: -, Member, National Committee on Research Development, American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1977-1978. Member, National Committee on Undergraduate Training in Public Opinion Re-i search, American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1970-1971. Member, National Council, Consortium for Peace Research, Education and Development (Representative of the Society for the Study of Social Problems), 1970-1974. Member, Program Committee, Southern Sociological Society, 1969-1970. Member, Membership Committee, American Association for Public Opinion Re-search, 1978-1979; 1979-1980. Associate Editorial Board, Social Forces, 1971-1974. Chairman and Organizer of sessions on Public Opir. ion, Social Psychology, Mass Communications, Political Sociology, International Tensions at annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Soc-iety for the Study of Social Problems, Southern Sociological Soc- - iety, American Association for Public Opinion Research, Sou'th-western Sociological Association. Manuscript /Research Proposal Review for: American Sociological Review,
, () National Science Foundation, Social Forces, Social Science Quarter-ly, Public Opinion Quarterly, Johp Wiley & Sons, McGraw-Hill, Prentice-Hall, Random House.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2/ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) )
) 50-247 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) 50-286 SP (Indian Point Unit 3) )
June 7, 1982
)
TESTIMONY OP: Betty Ramey, WRKL Radio ON BEHALF OF: RCSE RELATING TO CONTENTIONS: 3.4, 3.1 My name is Betty Ramey and I have been the sole owner of WRKL radio, Pomona, N.Y. for the past 14 years, prior to which I was the co-owner for 4 years. I am a member of the Governing Board of the New York State Associated Press Broadcasters and was 1981 President of that organization. (~) For the past 14 years I have been responsible for and v conducted much of the WRKL " Hotline" which I see as a" Town Hall" of Rockland County. Issues of vital concern to Rockland-ers are aired six days per week and political, social and econ-omic problems of the community are discussed by the people in-volved. WRKL functions as a provider of emergency information and public information regarding, for example, problems due to power outages, road and adverse weather conditions, etc. Rockland County schools use us for school-closing announcements, snow-related or otherwise. We are interested in performing wnatever public service is appropriate in connection with keeping the community informed of any and all emergencies. ([ ) We presume that our listeners are English-speaking and we broadcast only in English.
- 1. .
RCSE witness Betty Ramey, g Regarding the Emergency Broadcast, System (EBS), we feel that the Federal Warning program should be examined so that O local notification and activation can be similarly pre-planned regarding provision of authentication by return phone call or pre-arranged code (see attachment 4, para 6raph 3 reference to suggested improvement, top right corner of attachment 1. ) A system with the safeguards and immediacy of current EBS should be developed for all emergencies, including nuclear ones. Infor-mation regarding a local emergency should come from the source of the emergency through a local dispatch center such as the Fire Training Center and be directed to the radio station by a source we know to be authorized. Our records show that our role as provider of prompt local news may be somewhat compromised regarding notification of leaks at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 WRKL maintains records, by date, of every newscast. According to a file-check by our News Director, Robert LeMoullec, the following delays are noted: leak date news report Unit 2 fan cooler 6 a.m. leaks plant manager 10-22-80 told 10-17-80 Unit 3 malfunction 6 a.m. and leak 2-2-81 1-31-81 Unit 2 malfunction 5: 00 p.m. and leak: 10-6-81 10-5-81 Unit 2 malfunction 9:00 a.m. and leak, small re- 3-25-82 lease of radiation: 3-24-82, evening It should be noted that our license permits broadcasting during llg daylight hours only, though we can operate after sunset in a
. . I
RCSE witness Batty Ramey declared state of emergency for information dissemination only. Our newsroom is covered approximately 21 hours of most days with the morning hours of 2:00 to 5:oa receiving least or no coverage. Although we do not maintain records of when news items are received, it is not our practice to delay broadcast of newsworthy items once we have the necessary information. C') v i (J
27 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , S
- j ,BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY CF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Kenneth Ingenito ON BEHALF OF RCSE/WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1,3.2,3.3,3.6,3.7,3.9,4.2,4.3 JUNE 1982 My name is Kenneth Ingenito, and I am a resident of Stony Point, New York. I have been a resident of the Town of Stony Point since 1965, and a schoolteacher in the North Rockland Central School District since 1964. In November 1979 ,7 x_' I was elected to the Town Council for the Town of Stony Point, which office I still hold. This past year I was also elected by the Town people of Stony Point to serve as their representative to the County Legislature. I come before this Boiard as a resident of the community, as a teacher in the local schools, and as an elected official. My purpose is to state some observations which I have made concerning a possible emergency response by Stony Point to a radiological accident at Indian Point. As a Resident Because of my long residence in Stony Point, there are certain facts about this town which are apparent to all residents and which indicate impossibility, or at least the unlikelihood, that Stony Point could adequately react to an emergency at Indian Point r~N \ .yl [ __m
Y
- e First is our proximity to Indian Point. The entire town is within the
(). 10 mile EPZ, and at its nearest point, the nuclear reactors are just acrdss the liudson River. Obviously any release of radioactive material from Indian Point would reach Stony Point almost immediately if the wind were blowing our way. With just a 10 mph wind, Indian Point air would reach the center of our town in less than 1/2 hour. Second, many people of Stony Point would not become aware of an emergency if one were called. Stony Point is a mountainous, semi-rural town. The people are not all located in any one place and many people have homes "out in the woods", away from other residences and in sheltered areas, where neither their neighbors nor any sirens would reach them. There are also many recreational areas in the town so that hikers, hunters, people on the liudson River or its shore may not be notified of an emergency. Third, sheltering is not adequately available in the town. Many homes here do not have basements, and there are few air raid shelters and even less with supplies. Finally, because of the topography of Stony Point, and its system of roads, it would be very difficult to evacuate the town if this were deemed necessary. Route 9W, the main artery through the town, is a narrow and twisting 2-lane road with many intersecting roads. There is already congestion on it during a normal day. If there were an emergency people would be trying to travel in both directions on this, because many peop?e would demand to return to their family or demand the fastest way out of the area. A single accident could tie things up for hours on a congested Route 9W. This is especially so since our town's volunteer services would have difficulty responding to an accident on a congested and narrow road. The Palisades Parkway would seem a better means of evacuation for most of the town. Ilowever, there are big difficulties in getting people to the Parkway,
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and then knowing whether the Parkway can handle the traffic. Already the l l i
. l Palisades Parkway gets congested during rush hour, and at times is bumper to e bumper during summer weekends around the recreation areas of flarriman Stdte
\_s) Park. Evacuation via the Parkway during one of these congested times may prove impossible over any reasonable length of time. As a Teacher My experience as a teacher in the North Rockland Central School District tells me that there would be many significant problems associated with evacuating schoolchildren from the area in the event of a radiological emergency. First, the reactions of teachers, children and parents cannot be predicted, and could produce hysteria, or at least mass confusion. Second, it is uncertain whether adequate means of transportation can be found to evacuate the schoolchildren. Note well that we must maintain staggered hours throughout school district in order to use our limited amount of school buses. North Rockland buses over 70% of its 8,000 students. 7- Third, there would be extreme distress in both children and parents by NJ their separation in an emergency. tiany homes have two parents working, and therefore no one may be at home to care for a child during an emergency if returned home. If the child was bused away,.I think the emotional distress would be obvious. As an Elected Officer Since I have been elected to office in January 1979 as a representative of the township of Stony Point many, many individuals have approached me relating to their concern regarding Indian Point - its threat to the community, its people and the environment. I have voted to suspend the operating license of Indian Point on the Town Board. This action had to be taken out of desperation, not irresponsibility. We took that step out of desperation, when the legislature passed a resolution sponsored by Legislators Reisman, Gdanski, Gorman and myself, (~)
%./
to withdraw from the evacuation plan and prohibit any counties moneys or
. I personnel from participating in this non-existent plan. We included to
, this resolution the immediate suspension of the operating license of Indian Point. The opponents of this resolution are screaming about the extreme cost l k to the county - $5 million dollars. They are leaving the taxpayer with the impression this resolution has caused Rockland County to lose 5 million dollars that was guaranteed to the county. Not true! Ilow much money will the county be receiving now - S30,00 for what was allocated for the plan that did not work and we did not evacuate one resident. A large part of the so called aid is in sophisticated communications equipment, which I believe is probably highly inflated since it is common to inflate requests in case cut backs are made. liighly sophisticated communications equipment needed to direct the people. To direct them where? To tell them what? To direct them to the nearest traffic jam, to lead them to the nearest bottleneck, to tell them you are now in the middle of a traffic jam. I believe the opponents to this move on the part of the county is pullout I h of the evacuation plan and shut down of Indian Point is attempting to cloud the issue by quoting exaggerated figures. When they take a member of their family to the doctor and the doctor informs them you have an incurable disease and the doctor states your alternative is two-fold - it can be corrected by surgically removing the disease or we can attempt to treat it to prolong life not guaranteeing anything and not knowing when it will instantly spread. Will they ask the doctor which is cheaper. No, they will ask which will save my family member. There is not much of a difference with our present situation - we have an incursble disease across the river - we winh to surgically cut it out not use a bandaid approach to prolonging its life not knowing when this disease is going to spread and cause an epidemic. l h _4_
Rockland County has shown leadership and will not bend under pressure by blackmail threats of rescinding funding. State and Federal officials are C) - - ] aware of our sincerity and determination. We have accepted the responsibility xs of developing our own plan to handle emergencies of all types (not Indian Point) and we will still insist we are entitled to Federal and State funding and will continue to apply for it. Do we want our cake and eat it too - you bet we do because it is our lives we are talking about not some bureaucrat in Washington D.C. r ix_ ,. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA L3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I O Administrative Judges: l Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon
.In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. ~50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK '
(Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF HONORABLE LUCIEN H. CONCKLIN SUPERVISOR, TOWN OF STONY POINT Herewith one page of testimony of Hon. Lucien H. Concklin, Supervisor of the Town of Stony Point, N.Y.
\O J
His testimony comes under NRC ASLB Contentions 3.1, 3.3, 3.9 and 4.3 for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. 443 Buena Vista Road New City, N.Y. 10956 kNWE W 914/634-2327 f' 'Zipporah S. Fleisher Secretary a - ,e, - - - , - , . - , - ,_ - - o n--,s- n - --
- l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
COMMENTS OF LUCIEN H. CONKLIN, SUPERVISOR TOWN OF STONY POINT My name is Lucien H. Conklin and I am the Supervisor of the Town of Stony Point. I feel it is my responsibility to voice my concern in relation to an extreme problem that ceuld occur at the Nuclear Plant at Indian Point. I have faith in the Technology used in building a plant of this nature; however accidents can and do happen. In case of an extreme emergency I would like to stress come of the problems that may exist and perhaps add a few suggestions. Evacuation would be a last resort. Therefore, I feel extensive and regular maintenance of the Indian Point facility be intensified and kept at high priority at all tires. I emphasize this not only because the area is quite congested by Stony Point rasidents, but because in the sununer months there are thousands of people from other arsas visiting Bear Mountain Park very close to the Indian Point facility. There is little need to remind the commission if an evacuation was called the result would be utter confusion and extremely dangerous. Our road systems are very poor. Route 9 W is quite narrow and winding, Wayne Avenue a County road leading to the Parkway, is extremely narrow. I believe the siren system and the local radio station may be the best way for an initial alert, however I feel along with this there should be a wind indicator, whsreas people could be made aware of the importance of knowing wind direction. Reports of prevailing wind would be given periodically and of course immediately, if a problem should occur. Those in the face of a breece would have less time than those on the opposite side. Therefore I repeat the wind or prevailing breeze is a main factor and must be known immediately. I believe local input should be usec, as with Rockland County, Stony Point and Haverstraw are those who would be affected first. O
24 D . / 1 V TESTIMONY OF Myles Lavelle, Councilman, Town of Stony Point, N.Y. ON BEHALF OF RCSE/WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.2, 3.6 May 1982 Q. My name is Myles Lavelle and have been a resident of Stony Point, N.Y. \_- for 18 years, and am a Councilman in the town of Stony Point. I have many concerns regarding the proposed evacuation plan in the event of a nuclear accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant. My firce concern is the brochure which was sent to all residents in the town. I have doubts about the' number of people who actually read the brochure. Of those who did read it, I question their recall if it became necessary to implement the plan. Finally, I would question the number of people, having read it or not, have placed it in a prominent place so that it would be available if needed. Unless the residents-are familiar with the plan as spelled out in the brochure, the best we could expect is a chaotic situation in the event of an emergency. Even if we experienced a religious dedication to understanding the contents of the brochure and the plan, how many people accept the plan and how many would display a religious adherence to the plan. How many parents would follow the prescribed plan and leave for a remote location without seeking.
\,.K. F* , 'e 4 first, to reach their children at school. I believe you can see how this would defeat the purpose of the plan. Also we must consider the human factor.
What assurances do we have that those actually involved in the plan will completely follow their assignments, e.g. will a school bus driver actually return to the location to make additional pickuns. The brochure, unfortunately, is filled with assumptions as to the timing of an accident. Inordinate references are made to the situation occurring during school time. What if it were to happen at another time. Suppose the accident took place during a winter storm. What allowances are nade for stalled vehicles clogging the roadways; this happens frequently without a sense of emergency. Suppose it were to occur on a weekend during the summer when our roads are overburdened with weekend travellers to recreational areas. Being familiar with highway conditions during different periods of the year, g I am very concerned that there seems to be no contingency plan for these coaditions. Another inadequacy in the plan is the lack of reference to the length of time the area will be evacuated. Allowances are only made for a short duration. What if a lengthy period is required. What type of protection will our homes and property receive? What I perceive is a plan based upon doubts and specuations - generalizations without concrete specifics. My final concern is with the safety of the Indian Point facility. Does it present a definite potential danger to the residents of the town of Stony Point? If it does, then consideration must be given to closing it down completely or reconstrucEng it so that it does not even present a negilible threat to our town.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD G
Administrative Judges: Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK June 4, 1982 (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN SCURTI, POLICE CHIEF, STONY POINT, N.Y. Concerning contentions 3.1, 3.2,3.3,3.7,3.9 & 4.3. My name is Stephen Scurti, I am Chief of Police of Stony Point, New York. I have held the position since October 1967 and was a New York State Trooper from 1962 to 1967 ('v') I have an AAS, BS and MA in Criminal Justice. My concerns over the prospect of evacuating the Town of Stony Point are many. Based in part upon these con-cerns I made a decision earlier this year not to partici-pate in the County evacuation drill of March 3. I did not make this decision lightly but made it only after de-ciding that the drill was potentially misleading. Regard-less of what drills and plans are made, the evacuation of Stony Point, as well as i.he notification to its residents of an emergency at Indian Point, will be difficult, if for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. , T i Ct lb ' W g 914/634-2327 bhZipporahS. Fleisher V Secretary
l not an impossible task. The following are my reasons: j () lack of manpower, lack of information and no protective clothing for the officers. The widening of Route 9W and repairs to the Stony Point bridge on it will further complicate traffic and add to the confusion for the evacuation plan therefore ) some contingency plan must be drawn up. We have 21 officers on the force with 1 or 2 patrol officers on a shift. In relation to the evacuation plan l they lack training, equipment, especially radio equipment which is totally inadequate to meet any major emergency involving communication among several agencies. It would be advantageous to have a teletype system linking all ; the agencies involved. With it there would be a minimum () of misunderstood messages because they would be written. We have 9 vehicles including some very old cars plus three portable radios. The cars have radios. A man needs a car if he's directing traffic and wants to have radio contact but most of the time his car is parked too far away for the radio to be of use to him.. Each man does not have a portable radio, he should have one if he's di-recting traffic. In a wide scale emergency he can't talk to the State troopers because the radios are on different bands. Which means that if there is any problem in the Palisades Park or on the Palisades Parkway we wont know it by direct radio contact. Rockland County is the last on
i the list of New York State's money grants for radio im-provement. There are also some uncertainties in the plan about overlapping of services, the role of the Ambulance Corps and Fire Departments. j A lot of people wont hear the sirens, or will think they are fire sirens. We would have to go from hcuse to house to tell them to go. A lot of them wont want to leave. We would probably have to call out the National Guard to get them to leave their homes. There has been a lack of local participation in draw-ing the Plan. I believe we will see a lot of parents going directly to schools to pick up their children. And spouses returning home via the roadways will pose serious congestion of the [} roads. People wont obey orders, they will be panicked. We always have the possibility of looters in the evacuated areas. Would the National Guard be mobilized to patrol the evacuated areas? The amount of manpower needed does not seem to be available. j . - . - . - - . - _ . .. - - . - . - __ _ ._ _ . - - . . - . . . _ - - - - . - . . . . . -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Admitaistrative Judges: Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of i CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF FRED SEEGER SUPERINTENDANT OF HIGHWAYS CLARKSTOWN, NEW YORK Herewith testimony of Fred Seeger consisting of 3 pages, concerning Contentions 3.2, 3.3, 3.9 and 4.3 in above cap-O tioned case. l l for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. Te's C 10 5 M' O 914/534-2322 - 3y z1,,,,,,s. ,1,1,,,, Sectstary
,w.- -# - -,----w , w,
i
- 1. My name is Fred Seeger, I am Superintendant of
- 2. Highways of Clarkstown, New York, a town of 80,000
- 3. population and 260 miles of roads. I have worked in O 4. the Department for 28 years, 20 of them as Superinten-
- 5. dant. I am elected to office and have been the candi .
- 6. date of all political parties in the last election. I
- 7. was born in New City, N.Y.
- 8. I have seen Clarkstown grow from a rural hamlet
- 9. to a suburban Town. My budget was $150,000 and has
- 10. grown to $2 million. My department employs 63 men.
- 11. We have enough equipment to handle a snow emergency.
- 12. It takes an hour to mobilize the men and equipment du-
- 13. a snow emergency. We have to contact our employees by
- 14. telephone. Even under regular circumstances, without
(]) 15. an evacuation, with a lot of people trying to move in
- 16. the snow you find people can't drive. Traffic jams
- 17. keep maintenance vehicles from their jobs and if we
- 18. had panic conditions the whole thing would break down.
- 19. I don't believe the Plan would work.
- 20. Our departt int's manpower would be unsure. We
- 21. don't know how mar.y men would report to work and how
- 22. many would take care of their families and leave. I
- 23. haven't any power to force them to work.
- 24. We have traffic jams during rush hour every day.
- 25. We recently paved south Main Street in New City and
- 25. in detouring the traffic we were astonished at how O
- 1. much there was. So if you had an emergency during a
- 2. snow storm you could forget it. Where would you send
- 3. them all? You've got route 9W, 303, 304 and Little Tor
- 4. Roads going south. There are terrible bottlenecks on
- 5. each one of them. The contractor widening Middletown
- 6. Road went bankrupt and left it all torn up. There's no
- 7. saying when that will get straightened out. We're
- 8. going to have a lot of detoured traffic coming through
- 9. next summer when the work on route 9W starts. Most of
- 10. it will probably come on over the mour.tain on Central
- 11. Highway and then down Little Tor and Middletown Road.
- 12. In addition, where the Thruway crosses Middletown Road
- 13. the overpass is only two lanes wide. Most of our roads
- 14. have stretches that are only two lanes total. We have
- 15. panic now when there's a snow storm. If the people
- 16. were evacuating from some emergency it wouldn't work.
l 17 Route 59 is the only decent East-West Road we
- 18. have. Several other plans have been abandoned. The
- 20. people fought straightening of Congers Road from the
- 21. causeway west, the Maple Avenue extension went by the
- 22. boards when the nearby residents objected. When a de-
- 23. veloper. bought the land where East Phillips Hill Road
- 24. was planned, he and the neighbors fought that east-
- 25. west road. Improvements on route 59 such as the i
- 26. bypass have been dropped, for lack of money and by l
O l s
- 1. community objection. Buena Vista Road was supposed
- 2. to cut through to South Mountain Road and the neighbors
- 3. fought that. The last attempts to plan for east-west
)
- 4. roads ended when Phillips Hill was removed from the
- 5. the Town and County maps in 1974 and 1976.
- 6. Then there's always the example at Main and New
- 7. Hempstead Roads where the east-west roads don't meet.
- 8. That corner's a mess and nothing gets done about it.
- 9. So if they're planning to send traffic south
- 10. across route 59 it will take a lot of intersection ,
- 11. control to do it. I don't believe you can move all
- 12. the traffic an emergemcy would create, r
O A U . . . . . . )
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ' 27
, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Administrative Judges:
Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shen In the Matter of CONSOI.IDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF CHIEF GEORGE SCHNAKENBERG CHIEF OF POLICE, TOWN OF CLARKSTOWh ,N.Y. Herewith testimony of Cheif George Schnakenberg con-sisting of 5 pages. Subjects herein discussed cover contentions in above captioned case numbers 3.1, 3.2,3.3, 3.6, 3.9 and 4.3. l for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. li iC 10 N - 914/63412327 y'ZipporahS. Fleisher O secre*a=v
TESTIMONY OF e GEORGE SCHNAKENBERG O
- 1. My name is George Schnakenberg, I am Chief of Po-
- 2. lice of the Clarkstown Police Department a position which
- 3. I have held for the last five years and have been a member
- 4. of the Department for the past 28 years. I am currently
- 5. President of the Chief's Association of Rockland County
- 6. serving a second term. I'm a member of the Crime Control
- 7. Planning Board of Rockland County and many other committees
- 8. throughout the State.
- 9. There are 106 members of the Clarkstown Patrol and
- 10. we have a total of 31 vehicles. It is strictly speculation
- 11. for me to say how many we would have on duty in an emergen-
- 12. cy. Normally there is a complement of 15-16 including de-() 13. tectives on at any one time. In order to notify people to
- 14. report in emergency situations it would require phone
- 15. calls. To mobilize the major part of the department would
- 16. be a very dif.ficult task. We have people on vacation e-l 17. qually throughout the year. The summer is a harder time
- 18. to find the men at home. From January to December we have
- 19. almost a full complement of men on vacation at one time.
- 20. I think the peak period would be Easter, Christmas, summer,
- 21. the times when children would be out of school would be tbe
- 22. most difficult to mobilize the extra men.
- 23. That is one of the fallacies the Chiefs Association
- 24. falt was wrong with the plan, the whole communications sys-
- 25. tem and the fact that there are no beepers available
("N V
- 1. for this type of mobilization.
() 2. Regarding traffic signals, all of our men are
- 3. issued keys and can change them to blinkers. We would
- 4. have to try to man avery intersection of the exit routes
- 5. if they had lights or not.
- 6. If route 9W is under construction all the way to
- 7. Stony Point we would probably find the traffic detoured
- 8. over Central Highway and down Little Tor Road. Only po-
- 9. lice may direct traffic, by state law, even in an emer-
- 10. gency. We would have to see what results we got from
- 11. our mobilization efforts and then if needed, call to the
- 12. EOC for help. Some of our men live up in Orange County
- 13. and are spread over a fairly wide area. We might have to
- 14. excuse an officer who was on duty to make arrangements
() 15. for his own family and then expect him to return.
- 16. We have no protective clothing, monitoring badges 17 or dosimeters. Barriers might help us in certain loca'
- 18. tions but it might be too time consuming to get the bar-
- 19. riers out.
- 20. How do we know the people will hear the sirens? It
- 21. might be the middle of the night when most people are
- 22. asleep. Also, we have no way to force peopl6 to leave.
- 23. Any time you have volunteer participation you don't leave,
- 24. know how many you will have /you might have 65% or you
- 25. might have 15%. People are afraid of their home being O .
- 1. burglarized. And if it happens during the day, knowing
- 2. the public, I am sure people aren't going to get in their
- 3. cars and go to a designated location not knowing where
- 4. their children are. The system has been worked out where I
- 5. the children are going to be taken to location X, I am
- 6. sure that most parenta are not going to accept that.
- 7. They're going to be flocking to the schools.
- 8. Regarding the major arteries and their crossings
- 9. such as at route 59 and Middletown Road one officer is
- 10. not enough to direct traffic under normal conditions.
- 11. An officer cannot control traffic as well as a traffic
- 12. light.
- 13. We do not count traffic, that's done by the County.
- 14. But as regards flow, right now Middletwon Road is O 15. all torn up. The contractor has gone bankrupt and the
- 15. traffic would move slower than usual. The repairs are
- 17. at a standstill.
- 18. I think we need a plan and so does the Chiefs
- 19. Association.
20. 21. i l 22. Probably the single most l
- 23. important factor is communications, and or a lack of
- 24. communications on a high band frequency where we would
- 25. be able to speak with surrounding communities. We're i
- 1. on a low band frequency here' in Rockland County. We've
() 2. been fighting for years to get State or Federal funds
- 3. to upgrade our communications but that's not been forth-
- 4. coming. Let's say we were diverting traffic to the Pali-
- 5. sades Parkway and something happened, or they had a
- 6. serious incident there we could not talk directly to 7 those police agencies there. We would have to go through
- 8. telephones, land lines, before the men out in the cars
- 9. could be notified.
- 10. With the volume, a heavier flow of traffic, during
- 11. an evacuation, we could certainly anticipate a greater
- 12. number of accidents. People might be utilizing the
- 13. the shoulders so that coming up against a disabled vehicle
- 14. that had been pulled off would create other conditions.
,) 15. People, in general, react very foolishly at times.
- 16. Under stress people tend to come apart. There's anger,
- 17. there's emotion whether it be a fairly minor accident or
- 18. incident where they get carried away sometimes. So cer-
- 19. tainly if emotions were running high to start with.and
- 20. something happened, certainly I think it would have an
- 21. adverse effect.because people have a tendency to panic.
- 22. One or two accidents certainly have a tendency to jam
- 23. things up pretty well.
- 24. I telieve we need a Plan but I think Rockland
- 25. County officials should have input in a Rockland n U
..y _.,,.,nm. ,-. _- , . - - . m , , ._ ,:-.,-.m,.. ,- . - - -
I i . i
- 1. county Plan. Certainly they would be the most obvious
- O 2. to kmow eneir comme =1tv detter, e=a waet tue ceg 8111 ties
- 3. were in any situation. To my knowledge none of the police j 4. agencies were contacted to make the Plan.
i
- a a
i, 'l lO 1 1 O
b UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t_,f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Thomas F. Rider W CA ON BEHALF OF RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3 JUNE 1982 My name is Thomas F. Rider, Jr. and I live in, and have been a lifelong s resident of , the Village of Haverstraw. I am also a Trustee of the Village of Haverstraw (11 years), the Police Commissioner (4 years), and the Director of Civil Defense (lycar). The Village of Haverstraw is within the 10 mile EPZ. I have perviously prepared a report, which is attached, dealing with how the Village would face a radiological emergency which might arise at Indian Point. I ancorporate and adopt this report as my testimony before this Board. As a n u pda t e t o my r epo r t , the Village Board has not yet made any decisons with respect to is contingency plan. Also, we are still seeking state Department at Transport at ion help concerning the railroad crossings. Thomas F. Rider, Jr. Y 1
d VILLAGE OF HAVERSTRAW INDIAN POINT... NUCLEAR ACCIDENT EVACUATION PLAN G. Thomas F. Ryder, Jr. 9 November, l'J81 Direct or of Civil Defense 9 O
O TABLE E CONTENTS I. Background Information II. Facts III. Conclusions IV. Recommendations V. Attachments : l A. Map ... " Evacuation Routes"... Village of Haverstraw, 1981: Thomas F. Ryder.Jr. Civil Defense Director C B. Newspaper Articles:
- 1. "Haverstrav Village Residents Vent Anger Over Rail Crossings"' THE JOURNAL-NEWS, Thursday, October 27, 1981. -
- 2. " Indian Point Unsafe, Ex-Project Chief Says":
THE JOURNAL-NEWS, October 29, 1981. ,
- 3. "Haverstraw Formalizes Request for 9-W Improvements": THE JOURNAL-NEWS, Tuesday, Noventer 3, 1981.
,' 4. " Village Makes Appeal'.'s THE ROCKLAND COUNTY TIMES, Thursday, November 5, 1981. C. Official Correspondence... ( COPY ) State of New York Public Sorvice Commission to Village Mayor, Havers
- raw, N.Y., dated December 8, 1945.
i 1 4
I l
" BACKGROUND"
" Indian Point is UNSAFE" and is " operated by people who at best could be called below average. I wouldn't have them come in and repair my toilet," said Robert Pollard, former Nuclear Regulatory Commission project manager of Buchanan's Unit a 3 s nuclear reactor. These comments were made on October 27th,1981, in the Briarclif f Middle School before 300 residents.
Comments such as those made by. Hr. Robert Pollard recently have prompted Haverstraw Village Civil Defense Director. Thomas F. Ryder, Jr., to survey Haverstraw for the most feasible evacuation routes if a nuclear accident should occur at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. The following is the text of his report submitted to the Haverstraw Village Board on Honday evening. 9 November , 1981.
" FACTS" It should be noted that a "ROCKLAND COUNTY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN" was published on December 10, 1980. This plan established a prdmary ( EZP ) " Emergency Planning Zone" to be a ( 10 ) mile radius of the Indian Point Nuclear Power ~ Plant.
The Village of Haverstraw is ONLY.'.. ( 5 ) miles from the nuclear plant. This emergency plan was never officially adopted by the Rockland County legislature. In reviewing the avenues of departure from the Village of Haverstraw, the following facts must be taken into considerations
- 1. The Village of Haverstraw is landlocked by the n.ountains on the west and the waters of the Hudson River on the east.
- 2. The Village of Haverstraw is only a SHORT...( 5 ) miles f rom the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant.
- 3. The village of Haverstraw is in the primary ( EZP )
"Emeroency Planning Zone" as noted in the "RUCKLAND COUNTY RADIO-LOGICAL EttERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN" published on December 10, 1981.
- 4. The Village of Haverstraw has only ( 1 ) major exit corridor and that is by means of Route 9-W.
t
- 5. The Village of Haverstraw has ( 4 ) exit roads that lead into Route 9-W numbered 1-4 respectfully (Please refer to attached map).
4 k
Villcge cf Hrverotry> Thomal F. Ryd r, Jr. Evaeustion Pltn Directcr of Civil Def nse 9 Novembar, 1981
. 6. The Village of Haverstraw's ( 4 ) exit roads leading to s- Route 9-W are Short Clove Road, New Main Street, Westside Avenue, and Gurnee Avenue.
- 7. The V111hge of Haverstraw has ( 3 ) exi.t roads leading to l Route 9-N tha. must pass over dangerous CONRAIL railroad crossings that ar'e in deplorable physical condition.
8 The Village of Haverstraw has at least ( 2 ) railroad grade l crossings at New Nain Street and Westside Avenue that... DO NOT ; comoly with the " GRADE CROGSING ELIMIMATION ACT OF 1939".
- 9. Tie Village of Haverstraw's ( 4 ) exit roads have dangerous intersectians with Route 9-Wei.e., Short Clove Road, New Main Street, Westsida Avenue and Gurnee Avenue. " Village police Chief Michael
. Holland has said that ( 33 ) percent of the community's 930 traf fic accidents in the last 2 years have occurred along Route 9-W between Short Clove and Gurnee Avenue."
10 The Village of Haverstraw's Gurnee Avenue exit road passes through a TUNNEL that was built in ... 1904. This " horse and buggy" size tunnel is so narrow that only ( 1 ) car can pass through it at
) a time. /n the event of a mass evacuation, a very dangerous " bottleneck" of vehicular traffic could occur at this tunnel.
- 11. The narrow tunnel on Gurnee Avenue has ... No SIDEWALKS for pedestrians. This creates a serious hazard for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
- 12. The Village of Haverstraw would be effectively " sealed-off" from Route 9-W if an accident occurs in the single lane TUNNEL on Gurnee Avenue combined with a stalled freight ttimin covering the ( 3) other exit roads, namely Short Clove Road, x~w Main Street and ,
Westside Avenue. /
"C ONCLUSIONS" Tho safe evacuation of Haverstraw Village residents in the event of a nuclear mishap at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant is ... NUT PoiS T Hir. . . . a t this time. The dangerous conditions existing at the Routa 9-w intersections and railroad crossings in the Village of Haverstraw plus the hazardous tunnel on Gurnee would prevent adequate and safe tra'fic flow.
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?! THE JO1JttNAl NEW5.11E50AY. NOVEMBER 3.1981
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Haverstraw formali7_es rectuests for 9W improvements also asked lnal the state determme why work scheduf ed Short Clove and Carnee Avenue By J A\t!5 W A1. Sit prove traf fic flow. in other bow-ess. the board is plannirs to instatt a' The board also aslied that similar improvements be in 1939 to improve the Sew Stain Street crossing was bus stop she'ter on the east side of the Gurrce Avertue Staff witer made at the New Main Street and Short C!ove intersw- never Jone The Haserstraw Village Nrd Waday night format. tions, requesttrig that they be miJened, that grades be Residents and busmessmen have complained that entran(e to the new Warren Knot!s semor utizen apart; ment compics taed its requent that the stae improve Route 9W and leveled and that radroad crossings there be made their vehittrs have been damaged at the New Main Street. Westuu ad ht be Wst he Lne rah t.a t eek. residents and of ficials met with represen- I *he t* ' ' in to tut n p s u mous.y. the board C N""" Latises of the state Department of Transportativa and The village is to mstall two fire call bones at the com-ewed ,the state Departmes:wf i en>portation to re- state Sen landa Winikuw. D Sprmg Vahey, asking that Vittage pohce Chsef %chaellloltand has said that 33 eamp tSe mte mestions of itete 9% nd ucit hte Ave ples today. one at the Curnee Ase tue side of the apart-percent of the community's 930 traffic accidents m the **"I' ind ow at the Route 9% cnd nuc and HJute 32 and Garnce Avenue to increase the improvements be maJe. Stonday's resolutions formatized the requests, and last 2's years have occurred along Route 9W between wiubi'dy for motorists and edestrt ns, as melt as am. _ k
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I~ Haverstraw village residents . - e , , .: .~ ... vent anger over rail crossings T.&w.v:.1;k. .6.; - By JAMF.5 % 413H Staff %rtier that people unfamshar with the antersections sau. Gary the troumgs can easdy Zeh. president of llagers-traw Tranut, w ho also l, e
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Forty years vf frustra. loose rontrolof their cars ,.
- g tion poured f rom Havers- Defund a table mhere the asked for safety improve- . **
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traw vallage residents offnials sat w ere photo- means *
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e jg . stribed how their nerves Some shomal the uneven so severe st sume trossings l have been frayed and their pavement and loose track that it's not unuwalIw line [ auto mufflers rapped off at that esists today. and oth. estmguisherslo f atiuh.and _ three benpy railruJ cross. ers shohed mhat could be if Iof apparatus duurs to tee ,,. ings the state installed rubber forced open on fue trut hs b n.* M**Qp.Wayuelf..a,.ufW g They got a chance to tell mattmg and leveled the crossmg the trat ks , 4%,41' 4 #.7 the,r complaints to a repre- griding The internettions may sentaine of the state (4 Next to the photographs also be keepirit shoppers partmeat e I was a chait intmg arts. out 01 the sill.sge. Sant I.av p Tr an*por t ation who Uked dents at the crouangs be Goldband. pre sideni of the , 8 due md the inevimg it.at he t uern January .979 and llaserstraw Mes a bant
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hoped to make it out of the Se pt e mber tv8 4 T h er e soi s.nion l room ahve .g u p , A c ; were 16 a.*cidents at New .. Stater, aswslant to DtJT -o' _;
While no such threats Mam.'38 at short Clove and "H e gionna Director Al'1 mere made, the residents 40at Westside Dinun. told the audience g
mastcJ no time in tellmg Those actidents repre. that he couldn t make any 'gp ag g .g Ted Matcr. awntJnt to the sent 33 perrent of all auto promises that the slate .d . .d ...-gdgg
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regionalINIT hree tur that accidenis in the village dur. would help but that he
, they moul<l no I..rger be a ing that Emie. said puhte would relay the ir i um i rns N@,f.W ' '
stepe h lJ to stoic highway ( hief Mechaelliolland lle said af ter the mnt- .7T m a p r-princi t s "We probably a cold ing that the state is not per-i -
- They pointed out that the have had mure." he added, mHted to notk on Contall state mill t,e in the area
- if we hada t had so little property and cannot amyn *
- anyway in IMI. whi n a lj 5 snuw in the last few years crees to Projetts oli slate rmthon ro.aJ imprmement They re particularly has. roads project is to twgin.in ltoute ardous m bad meather - Slater added. humever. *
- 9W W hy nut take the pl.an a lie also said that rain. that tuo mtersections -
httle f urther and include storms add to danger at New Mam 5tiect and hrt their three miersec tions. Piew Mam and Shorl Ouve Clov e. Could quahl) for r esident s and of f stals Tractmn is pwr then, he fundmg under the f uteral I. 7
- asked said. makmg it dithcult for Aid to Urban 5) stems pio-llaverstras village offs- drivers attemptmg to get gram rials alw emphawe-d that over the sleep grades, anJ Money from that pro- /*.
the state had plans to m)- for passmg motorists on gram u alturaled by the v ,_ , . . \ prove one ul the troumgs Houte 9W who are trymg to county, and it Hot bland ., ma** funds the impros ement s. "u 't ' -
-New Main 5ti n ct. but stop abanitonnf them 40 years = The intersections com. the state could plan the ago %hy meren t the plans prise the ce of the four murk and then turn the pre h.Q, , *.,,,,.j. ,M, *
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3 carried out, a>kt3] %llage routes m and out of the vil. jects over for pubhc bid, he , . % .; ,, , , , . e lage They all front on sa J Hoard members , About 50 peug le gathered Houte 9W $ for the meetmg at Hescue A representat6.e of flook anJ ladder Co No I Hoi kland Coathe said the f (?4' 3 bghteen people spoke. in company s buses hase sus-cl6J6n g residents, mer- tamed damage tu their RAJAf- b 5 c 0 a n t s a nd bu sine s s tires undercarriages and legJets suspension systems at 2r MOI t . ..
.H ega rdie as of w ho Westside and New Main A spLhe, homever, the ma's- woman complamed that her g'/ or d,,. .dy' sage mas the same They car lost its euhaust system . ' ' " , .
said the West Wre lane al one cronmg ' r ***=w*
- crossmg s at New Main Witham 1.co. represent-5t reet. Westude Asenue ing Ward l'avements Inc .
daJ Short Clme are danger- said grade inpros ements (7* ous to motornts and pniev are necenary to improve *. trians The greh s at the safety at wrt Close. par. rronmas are 30 sharp that larularly for w hool buses the undercairiages of buws Although it s avoided af . and cars are eif ten d.am- consible sumeloaded aged. they coseplamni, and school tsuws have to cross l ,,- ..,,,. ____._e,,.
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The Rockland County Times. Thursday, November 5,1981 Village makes appeal BY ANDREW KOPPELMAN 'not forgotten again' as it was forty A month and a ha!f of informallob- 3 cars ago; bying by ifaserstraw village officials e And in send the $2 page rep ,t on for the state to impove the three en- the problem of the crossings, prepared trances to the sill. ige from floute 9W dormg the past eight weeks by Trustees that cross Conrail tracks was followed Ilyder,,fohn Del uca, and Bernard I,uc-up by formal requests for action at chese, to Winikow, Morahan, Gilman, Monday night's mettmg of the village and DUT Ilegional Director A.E:. leard of trustees. Dickson. O (/ IN SIX separate, unanirnously pass- VILLAGE OFFICIALS contend that ed resolutions, the teard decided: the crossings are dangerous because of e To request the New Wrk State their steep grades, p,or visibihty, and Department of Transportation (DOT) roughtnc>s as they go across the and/or Conrail to wicen and improve radroad tracks. According to Village the intersections of floute 9W with Short l'olice Cinef Michael llolland, a third of Close fload, New Lin Street, and the traffic accident.s in the sillage have Westside Avenue, iruluding the adja- occurred at those intersections with cent railroad crossings; Itoute 9W. e To request State Senator I.inda Since the state plans to widen parts of Winikow and Asi.cmblyman Timrnas Itnute 9W in the spring of !!an anyway, Moraha n, the village's state legislators, the vdlage fathers reason, why can't - to investigate the reason why 1941 they send a crew over a little while to Public Scrs ice Commission plan to ma- tenovate the crossings? jur improvements in the New Main In a scperate statement, issued Mon-Street and Westside Avenue entrances day, Senator Winikow stated that, while . w as nes er carried out; the crossings are not on state roads and e To request the tuo state legislators cannot t.e repaired with DOT funds, , also to send the village a copy of the "their proximity to a major highway on state law governing railroad crossmg which extensive work is to be done of-prades, which Trustee Thomas Ilyder fers an opportunity for the state to reelieves may be violated by the condi- cooperate with the villag and its lion of some of Itaverstraw's en- residents to sohe the tiroblems."
. trances; In a meeting with DOT Commiwioner e To request Winikow, Morahan and Wdliarn llennessey last w cek, she Congressman llenjamin A. Gilman. to repirted, she told him that, "even provide fundmg to iirtrove the cross- though the rail crnssmes were not a mgs: DUT re>ponsitnhty, I felt that the state e To hase the village clerk insert m should t>e able to be of help to the escry future board meetmgs minutes a Village of Itaverstraw and that I note as to whether the crossings have wanted es cry avenuc of assistance fully been fixed yet, so that the problem is e x plored."
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k' B14 THE JOURNAL NEWS. THURSDAY. OCTOBER 29.1981 i
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#'),Vi*"* .N"' " By JON CRAIG of Croton. the evemng's moderator. If the .
Staff Writer NRC refuses to do anything about the '
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Indian Point is " operated by people problems at Indian Point. Pollard said. it y,M.
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~.' " who at best could be called ',elow aver- clearly will not do anything at any other
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age. I wouldn't have them come in and re, nuclear p wer plants around the nation
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- pair my todet," said Robert Pollard, until an accident happens.
phJ;dQ'- Q* W j'I..i.'I * : . . , former Nuclear Regulatory Commission "If you don't care how many safety project manager of Buchanan's Unit 3 nu- problems there are at Indian Point. Con d ** . . . . a 1:d will continue to operate the plant a
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*I. '. 1 clear reactor Pollard resigned from the NRC in 1976 aUnit 21 and assure all is well." he said I v.
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.' in protest over w hat he believed were haz-The Power Authority of the State of New W . e
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ardous conditions at the power plant and Y rk runs Unit 3. Umt 1 is being dis- - has smce become one of the nation's fore- intantled "The probabihty that the NRC
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most critics of nuclear energy. lie spoke . wiH close Indian Point is m direct propor- } before more than 300 residents at the Bri. tion to public response." Pollard added. .-9"**^ .MW 4,' .T d ' archf f Middle School Tuesday night. "They athe power plants) are a hazard to .. *
.re,*s- . *, The session was sponsored by the Kit. your health , h.
chawan branch of the Sound lludson "Many problems have grown in their
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Against Atomic Development, or SilAD seriousness and other safety problems i4 D ~ s[4. ,
- Alhance, and endorsed by more than a have been discovered.' Pollard said lie
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dozen local orgamzations cited the alleged lack of protection from
" Indian Point is unsafe," said Pollard. fire. inadequate electrical equipment po-N..$g-Wra-)h'. .q N ' 4 ,
'**# now nuclear safety engineer 'with the tential for an eruption of reactor vessels.
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-i Union of Concerned ScienLsts. "It is the cracks and resulting " turbine miniles."
worst site The consequences are far corroding steam generators. ensuing
- worse than any other site " leaks of radioactive water and thus inop-f4 Pollard could be called a Paul Revere crable emergency cochng sptems as ,.
d'*?*. t,.s W %d f p' 'e 't of the 20th Century because he "has some of the hazards at today's power ' ,1".* * ]* . ; "
- - - - - -- sounded the warning." said Alan Latman plJnts Ailing Buchanan 3 may reopen By ED TII APASSO A PASNY spokesman said the repair Staff Writer program would not . affect the safe. opera-tion of the plant A repair program proposed by the PASNTs plant has been out of service
- state Power Authority for its Indian Point since Sept 4 when at was closed for rou-d'.,y'g'Q f,'=# Q*g.,'j 3 nuclear power plant could mean the all- tme maintenance and the replacement of , , , , . ,
M. ,% M .5* . ,, ,, ing plant will be ready to open by mid No- an electrical transformer.
- q* J vember The plant was scheduled to begin oper- ~~~
But that depends on the Nuclear Regu- ation cather this month liut the resump-latory Commission. which must approve tion of service was stalled when a small PASNY's plan for long and short. term re- leair was discovered in one of 13 000 steam i pairs for f aulty heat transfer tubing inside generator tubes duting tests routinely l
- r- . the plant's steam generators. cunducted w hen the1ilant is restarted 8
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I State of New York l O' h Public Service' Commission Albany WILO R. W ALTSit. Ceessnesan
- NEAL GR$wettR '
- M A L'R f C E C. S U R R iff .
otomat A. .R wRiour December 8, 1945 SPENCER S.EDOY consessessoses % i . d Village. Mayor Haverstraw, 11. Y.
, Horowith is a certified copy of an order of this Commission, o
cdopted t!ovember 28, 1945, in Case 6622 f In the matter of the Proceeding, under the Grade Crossing Elimination Act, for the elimination of the existing highway-railrond crossings at grade of the railroad operated by The
!!ew York Central Railroad Company and New Main street and ' dest Side avenue , located respectively about 0.1 mile Ttnd 0.4 clic d north of Haveratraw station in the village of Haverstraw, Rockland county.
REVISED ESTIMATE OF COST APPROVED. also a form of notification to this Commission, under Section 23 of the Public Sorvice Law, of receipt i by you of said oortified copy of said order. Please sign sudtr*w_@ this notification and mail
! forthwith to this Commission.
By the Commission. M Secretary. C ,,s g , . . ro w . ~ .. u .. . ..i. .. .
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4vuwiv omw ivo vunru oo wn At a Session of the Public Service Commission held in the City of New York on November 28, 1945. ggg COMMISSIO!!ERS PRESE!!T:
!!eal Srewster
- Maurico - Burritt George A. orkwright Spencer B. Eddy CASE 6622 - In the matter of the Proceeding, under the Grade Croseing l Elimination Act, for the elimination of the existing highway-railroad I croosir.gc at grade of the railroad operated by The liew York Central Railroad Company and Ifew Main street and West Side avenue, located respectively about 0.1 mile and 0.4 mile north of Haverstraw station in the village of Haverstraw, Rockland county. .
AS SUPFLE".E!!TED BY THE GRADE CROSSIt!G ELIMINATION ACT OF 11INETE3: HUlIDRED AMD THIRTY-!1I!!E. The St ate Departmpnt of Public Worke having submitted a revioed estimat e o f cost in amount $512,550., exclusive f land ar.d damar,e s , in conr.ect ion with the elimination of the grade crossings of the !!ew Ycrk Ce:'.r91 railroad and !!ew Main street and West Side avenue in the villa, e of Haveratraw, Rockland county; and said reviced estimate having teer. aperoved by The !!ew York Central Railroaa Ocm; a-v and appearir.c renconable ; it is 0 R D E R E D: 0 That the above mentioned revised e stimate of cc at in accurit 3f12,f,50., exclusive of land and damages, be and it nereby is approved. By the Commiecion (SEAL) (SIGNED) HAROLD !!. WEBER Acting Secretary JAO'C ' BMH (HMS)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Q ATOMIC SAFETY ,%ND LICENSING BOARD Administrative Judges: Louis 3. Carter, Chairman , Dr. Oscar H. Paris ! Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ' (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF CHIEF MICHAEL HOLLAND VILLAGE OF HAVERSTRAW, NEW YORK Herewith seven pages of testimony of Chief of Police Michael Holland of the Village of Haverstraw, N.Y. 10927. His testimony is concerned with contentions in the above captioned case 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 3.9, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7. l for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. 443 Buena Vista Road - New City, N.Y. 10956 D66/2hyttb(' f vlt /r n 914/634-2327 b'h#'ipporahS. Z Fleisher
\d Secretary
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL HOLLAND ( My name is Michael Holland, I am Chief of Police of the village of Haverstraw and Chief of the Mid-Hudson Associa-tion of Chiefs of Police comprising some 60 departments. A major problem in Haverstraw is the fact that three of the four exits from the town traverse railroad tracks. If they were to be blocked, evacuation would be a near impos-sibility. A few years ago we had an attempted evacuation in the sec-tion of town known as Dutch Town, due to a large barge fire, where there was danger of explosion. Although there were only () twenty-six families in the area, it took us four hours to get them out. A few families refused to leave at all, fearing i theft. Security is a major problem this plan makes no at-tempt to address, yet we.all know there will be some indi-viduals who will steal property if houses are left unguarded. Without a viable plan, we'd never be able to evacuate the whole town. We desparately need upgraded police communication networks. Under President Johnson's Omnibus Crime Control Act,there was communications training for most police officers. Twenty-six million dollars worth of high-frequency radio equipment was funded by the state. The plan was for a state-wide Civil De-() fense Emergency Network - we'd have been able to communicate
l with Buffalo! However the funds dried up and the state is () now trying to install equipment on a budget of two million per year. The program was only half completed - Westchester for instance, has Mobile Radio Districts, but with differ-ent types of systems, some better than others. Rockland Coun-ty is not scheduled for equipment until 1986-87, although we have appealed for reprioritization. We have the lowest pri-ority, which is inappropriate given our vulnerability to an accident at Indian Point. We do have licences for six lo-band frequencies. We're hoping to upgrade them. With all the iron in the hills surrounding Haverstraw, we need repeaters and sat-ellite boosters. We have no contact with nearby towns. I don't have enough cars (5) to handle an evacuation. I don't () have a paging system. Of my force of eighteen, I might be able dT- dufV to call in chree,offiders if an emergency struck- fewer if any were in school or on vacation. Indian Point sirens would not successfully them in, in North Rockland, sirens are used to designate all emergencies- fires for instance. I can't count on an informed public- the brochures are written in English only, but this is a multi-language town. Thirty-five per cent of our people are hispanic, we have prople who speak / read only French, Russian, Chinese. I I have not even been kept informed. When I finally learned,by accident, that there is a radiological plan, I asked for a copy. l () It took them two and a half months to send it to me. I had to I l - . - - - , -- ---
7- ask several times. I didn't get a copy until the middle of April. (_./ I asked them to coordinate an information session for our emergency services people, but they refused. I can't recommend this plan to my town. I was asked to send two officers the day of the drill. I didn't send them because I wanted to make it clear I do not endorse the plan. The plants are there, and we have to know what we're going to do if there is an emergency. I don't know how to instruct my own family. My children go to Thiers school, and my wife teaches kindergarten. They would be sent to different centers - we'd have separation of family. O I'm not willing to go along with that, and I don't think the public is either. Trying to enforce the road blocks would be a major problem-it would take fifty-two people in Rockland, and we don't have them. The police would be unwilling to force families to sep-arate. If a father told me he was going to join his kids, I wouldn't stop him. There is no law that says the police can force people to evacuate. Traffic would supposedly be directed to go one-way- north on the north side of town, and south on the south side. If there were an accident, no ambulance could get through. I _ - . . ._~ . . . . _ . - _ . . . _ . _
J . I In my own family, my wife works. Although she's a kindergarten teacher, if there's an emergency, she'll try to get to our kids. I will stay on the job, because I'm in an emergency ser-vices profession, but I will try to find out where our kids are and make sure they're safe. I would make sure someone was taking care of my kids. I'm not going to sit here and take care of someone else's kids and not take care of my own. That's the problem with emergency services, the vast majority of emergency services in Rockland are volunteers. I'm not knocking volunteers, but I'm certain they're going to make sure their families are a safe. Even the police- if they are at home, the first thing they 4 will do will be to take care of their own family before they go to their job- at least until they're sure their families are safe-ly underway. Then too, there 's no verification system- even if they sent their - l families off, people couldn't call to verify their safe arrival. , i The plan doesn't allow for road construction / repair activities, l but there are major repairs projected right here in Haverstraw for 9W which is one of the major routes out of the North Rock-land area. Our biggest problem is communication, and half of Rockland's population is in the ten-mile zone. We feel there has to be a plan and we have to be a part of it, but it has to be one in which we can level with the people. If it's true we 'd have four hours before any major fallout would
I arrive, we would need to plan what we could and couldn't do (~T in those four hours. One situation is not the same as another. V We'd have one set of problems if the accidents occurred at night, and everyone was home togebier as a family, and an entirely different one if it were noon o6 a weekday, and seventy-five per cent of Rockland's working adults were in New York,on the job. They would all try to come out to get their kids. Talk of bringing in the National Guard to prevent that is a joke. They'll all be on the job as well. Even during simulation it took them between six and eight hours to get them together at Westchester Councy Airport, and then they caravanned across the Tappan Zee bridge to get to their posts. A viable plan would really need to go back to the old Civil Defense concept. We would need to mobilize private citizens on the spot, like shop-keepers, trained to cover specific posts- Joe the haberdasher- his post is New Main Street and 9W traffic light. He'd change that light over, and stand there and make sure traffic flowed through- he'd have his hat on- he'd be an official just during the emergency But they'd have to be equipped with radiation detection equipment, and trained so they'd know how much radiation they could ab-sorb safely- or they wouldn't stay on their post. But if we had a Civil Defense set-up in the community, I really be-lieve most people would stay and would help as much as they could. If the N.R.C. won't face up to these needs, are we going to have Os a major disaster where thousands of people will die as a result
. of our inability to mobilize and get the people out? I look 7- at the plant every morning when I go to work, because I can s
see it from my house. I doesn't bother me that it's there. It bothere me greatly that we haven't been able to develop a viable emergency plan that would work. We h' ave very peculiar problems in Rockland County. Our roadways are old, ma were constructed thirty-five/ forty years ago, for two-lane traffic. The population has grewn substantially, and our road system just hasn't kept up. Recently, at a sports show at R.C.C., traffic backed up for seven miles in both directions. In the summer thousands of people pour into the county to go to Rockland Lake for the day, Bear Mountain. We'd have thousands of cars coming in when we're trying to get thousands out. I think the public is generally apathetic about the problem, partly be .use they know the plan won't work. The brochure was considered to be a joke here in the village. If there were I i a viable plan, I think the people would have more confidence } and that would help. I l ! The Police Academy for instance, has general training sessions. l l But to my knowledge, there is no specific _ raining program to address a nuclear accident at Indian Point. The first inkling we had of a plan was the notification of drill.They didn't talk to us. I'm concerned about evacuation of Helen Hayes Hospital- is the O shelter really adequate? I' m concerned about Green Hills- how i
[ i will they get those people out? I know they only have two or () three emergency vehicles. I'm concerned that there is at best loose organization- they're just hoping people will cooperate effectively. I think they should have a realistic drill- planned and sched-uled in advance, with the public fully informed. Sit. seven years ago we drilled for a simulated air crash. It worked very well. We didn't move the people, but we did have all of the 4 emergency services involved. That's what is needed, simulated evacuation, carefully planned. For instance you could have a patrol car go through informing the people to evacuate. That way at least you'd know how long it would take to tell people to (G~) leave. We could test the mobilization of the ambulance corps. If we had realistic sumulation, carefully planned and documented, we'd be in a better posiiton to anticipate further problems. They spent something like ten million dollars throughout the State on sirens. We could have used that money to upgrtde our communications system and used our fire sirens. In my opinion there's no way you'd get a mass evacuation unless you had a viable plan.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indiant Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Gregory A. Carney ON BEHALF OF WBCA/RCSE RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.3, 3.9, 4.2, 4.3 JUNE 1982 My name is Gregory A. Carney and I have been a resident of 3 Adams Drive, Stony Point, New York for 16 years. I am a Member of the Rockland County
,,a (j Board for Planning. I speak here au a citizen.
,R,oa_d,s__and Tra f fic As a resident of Stony Point and living one block off 9W, I witness on any given weekend or summer day the amount of traffic coming into or exiting this area from Bear Mountain State Park is extremely heavy. Traffic consists of family autos, buses, vans, and small and large trucks. I have in the past 16 years seen a constant buildup of traffic. And if the trend continues, I see moreand more people entering this area. This traffic causes traffic to be backed up from Haverstraw thru Stony Point and up to the Bear Mountain Circle. The same can be said for the Palisades Interstate Parkway. With these transient people evacuating the area at one time and add the town residents this would cause 100 times the amount of traffic prolems.
Furthermore, this traffic that would normally use the Tappan Zee Bridge t
/8 l
' Y would not be able to use it because of the location of the Indian Point Plant. __1
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People irom Westchester would evacuate West . l Q, Another major problem, is the type of roads; in this area. Route 9W it a one lane road and winding. To change the topography which the town's road follow could cause water problems and have an advorse affect on the environment in t h i:5 rural area. Sheltering
' The basic construction of the homes in Rockland County have basements either fully above ground or 1/2 above ground. This type of structure is not constructed to seal out the type of materials that the Indian Point Plant would give off. I feel people would not be safe in their homes in Rockland County.
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ROCKLAND COUNTY PLANNING BOARD occxet am, 18 NEW HEMPSTEAD ROAD 50-247-SP 50-286-SP NEW CITY, NEW YORK 10956 1914) 425-M80
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y g g ggg SALVA1DRE COR A1.!D JAMES W. nADLEY BERNARD WEINER GREGORY A. CARNEY Mr. Martus Granirer- June 4, 1982 sosErn w.noRNix 164 S. Mountain Road New City, N.Y. 10956 7d
Dear Mr. Granirer:
As you requested, here is a list of events associated with aborted highway projects involving the County. Resolution numbers
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reter to resolutions of the Rockland County Legislature and were found in the proceedings. Maple Avenue Extension Recommended in Clarkstown Town Development Plan -- Aug. 1966 Res. 714 -- 12/17/68 -- Authorization to engage engineer for feasibility study. Res. 200A -- 3/20/72 -- Denial of placement on County Official Map G C PhiilIps Hili Road Connection Recommended in Clarkstown Town Development Plan -- Aug. 1966 Proposed by Legislative Res. 143 -- 3/5/68 Res.454 -- 7/2/68 -- Placed on County Official Map Res. 271 -- 3/18/74 -- Deleted from County Official Map portion from Stark's Corner to New Rte. 304.
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Route 45/59 Bypass Appeared in Ramapo Town Development Plan -- July 1966 and in Clarkstown Town Development Plan -- Aug. 1966 Res. 371 -- 6/21/67 -- County called for change in design Gilbert Avenue Extension Appeared in Orangetown Town Development Plan Res. 778 -- 10/21/74 -- Deleated f rom County Of f icial iviap. Very truly yours, 4, g . William M. Chase d Principal Planner WMC:ro
The Diocese Of New York Of The Protestant Episcopal Church ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCil TESTIMONY OF The Rev. Frederick F. Johnson Rector 2G South Madison Avenue Spring rolley, New York 10977 ON BEHALF OF WBCA The Rev. Frededck F. Johnson RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, 4.2,4.3 Rector MAY 1982 My name is The Rev. Frederick F. Johnson, I live in the town of Ramapo, I am Rector of St. Paul's Episcopal Church in Spring Valley, and have been for the last 22 years. 'I have also served on the Rockland County Board of Covernors of the Rockland County Health Complex for the last eight years, and for the last three years as Chairman of the Board. I have been quite active in the public life of the County for many years. My concernsrelating to the evacuation plan in the event of a nuclear eaergency are the following: First of all I am quite concerned about the adequacy of our road system for any kind of mass evacuation. I remember many years ago, over 15 I think, a particular incident that stays vividly in my mind. There was a funeral in New Square for one of the leading rabbis of the World Hasidic Community. Liter-ally thousands of people came from all over the world to the village of New Square, just north of Spring Valley. The traffic congestion was unbelievable. The entire Spring Valley area, which is the mcst popubxm area in the County, was tied up for many hours well into the night, as I remember. The police were all out in force doing the best they could with the thousands of people, who were quite orderly r- under the circumstances, and yet the road system, simply a two-lane highway (Route ()i 45), could not cope. I remember cars being parked on the side of the road for miles and miles and people simply walking toward New Square because there was no other way to get there in the congestion. I mentioned this incident because we have exactly the same road system today we had over 15 years ago and yet the population of the County has more than doubled. Also, since this particular occasion was a solemn and dignified one, it was not an emergency and there was no panic, I shudder to think what might occur in an emergency situation in which there is the possibi-lity of panic. I have also observed traffic on virtually any week-end when the weather is moderately good, coming out and going in to New York City, on our major traffic art-eries, the Palisades Parkway, the New York Thruway, and the Garden State Parkway. Anyone can testify it is not at all unusual to see traffic backed up bumper to bum-per for miles and miles, sometimes the entire length of the road in Rockland-County. Since the Palisades Parkway and the New York Thruway would have to be the major arteries used for an emergency evacuation, I believe the summer week-end congestion is a highly significant example of what an emergency evacuation could be like, only much worse, with a couple of hundred-thousand people involved. My second area of concern has to do with the ability of county residents to respond in an orderly manner without panic. As a spiritual leader of the community, I am quite concerned about this. Naturally everyone would like to believe in times of emergency the best that is in people will be brought to the surface and all'.ould share a mutual concern for the good of all. I seriously question whether this would be the case at the present time. Over the years I have watched the peaceful and (,,) somewhat tranquil atmosphere in the County change as our road systems and television v Ctd.
Page 2 has made us more and more a part of the larger New York City area. Also, the recent social calamities of severe economic recession, astronomical local taxes, ( as per-ceived by the residenta), increasing number of robberies, to private residences, e and the increase of crimes of violence, have made people frightened, bitter, mistrust g ful, and often very suspicious of their neighbours. I recall a very acrimonious w school board meeting of several years ago, in which Irate tax payers were expressing great hostility toward the local teachers union; so much so that they insisted on being called a Parent's Association in contra-distinction to a Parent-Teachers Asso-ciation. I remember well when the PTA movement was such a positive force years ago. Economic pressure has been a divisive force here and I believe, sadly, it is getting worse. At a local school graduation just this last year, I witnessed an incident which illustrates just how close many people's tempers are to the boiling point. After the graduation excercise, a motorist was not permitted to make a left turn by a local auxillary police officer, and he berated and abused the officer indefensibly. Had there not been hundreds of honking cars behind the man, I am sure he would have been stopped, ticketed, and possibly even arrested, but there was no time. The pres-
. sure of the cars behind was too great. Private alarm systems are in houses all over the area as a defense against robbery and in my neighbourhood, rarely more than two or three days pass before I hear one go off accidentally. Added to all this the recent Brink's robbery in the Nanuet Mall in which two Nyack policemen were killed, has frightened people even more. I mention all these things not because I believe they are unique to Rockland County or to say only negative things about my fellow citizens. Under normal circumstances I believe citizens of Rockland County do quite well in very difficult times, but the spiritual mood of the people is extremely rele- . vant, it seems to me, to how they would respond to all the unknowns of a nucl-ear emergency situation. No one understands radiation very well but everyone is afraid of it. Unlike fire and flood, radiation cannot be seen and therefore people's fears that they might be receiving dangerous and even lethal doses invisibly would add to a panic-stricken determination to escape at all costs.
My final concern is with our experience with the recent test of an evacuation O plan. Sirens either did not go off or were not heard, public information about how to participate was not communicated effectively and there was and is widespread belief the plan was not and could no.t be taken seriously. What troubles me the most is views I have heard expressed by responsible public health officials, that given the density of our population and the inadequacy of our road system, a workable evacuation plan is simply not feasible in the forseeable future. Now of course, this is in the realm of conjecture and surely given time and a much improved road system, an evacuation plan could be made feasible, sometime in the future, on paper at least; but whether there are public funds available for the radical improvement. of our roads and for the necessary education of our citizens, about how to follow such a plan, I cannot help but question. Also, whether people could be counted on to follow even an adequate evacuation plan in a nuclear emergency, given as I have suggested, the present fearful mood of people, in such a densely populated area, I question even more. I urge, therefore, the suspending of the licence of the nuclear energy plants at Indian Point. O 1
73 My name is Richard Wishnic and I am the Supervisor of the Town of j Ossining. The Town of Ossining has been and will continue to be coop-erative in planning for an emergency at Indian Point. But we are concerned about our ability to respond adequately even in the case of a partial evacuation. We have a small police department in the Town and lack equipment for communicating with other respon-sibic officials in the event of multi-community activity. Our police force has received a two hour crash course in which they learned the definition of radiation and how to read a dosimeter. The dosimeters which we were given for the March 3 drill do not properly register low level exposure to radiation. We do not have any protective gear for our police officers and emergency workers. We have requested more training and equipment, but we do not know how money for such training and equipment will be provided. If the proper equipment exists, we do not know where it is or how it will be acquired in an emergency. Our police force will do a good job with what they have, but the point is that it is above and beyond the capacity of our department to respond to the kind of emergency contemplated by the radiological emergency response plan. Our entire on duty police staff gets tied up when a one-car accident occurs. Cars frequently break down on route 9A, which is very hilly and has no pull-off lane. If the roads are crowded with evacuation traffic, emergency equipment will have difficulty reaching a stalled vehicle. The 7~s complete back-up which would be caused by one stalled vehicle '() heading out of the 10 mile area on 9A will hamper evacuation efforts, causing severe concern by motorists and a breakdown in l the system. The March 3 drill was taken seriously by my office and by the Town police. Lt. Lloyd Tompkins did an excellent job preparing the local officers for their roles in the drill. We were notified by the County hot line to set up a rondblock at the intersection of Pinesbridge Rd. and Brookside Lane. When Chief Joynes called to verify this directive, he was told by County personnel that they were' unfamiliar with this order, but it should be carried out. Two policemen were dispatched to the location, but there was confusion as to which way to direct traffic. According to the emergency plan, this location was to be staffed in case of an evacuation of Ossining. According to the NRC scenario, the Yorktown ERPA should have been evacuated. We were using a radio communication system which had been loaned to us for the drill and which has since been returned. I would like to make two points about our participation in the drill: (1) Even with the most favorable conditions for communication, the men on the line were inadequately informed as to their duty. The front line workers will be subject to severe stress and must be very well informed on what they are supposed to be doing. We do not at present have a communication system adequate to the (~'T task. (2) We were not requested to make a report on our participation kl in the drill, therefore our experience will not be evaluated and considered in plans for the next drill, if any.
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e n. (o . In addition to m responsibilities as Town Supervisor, I khh am also Chairman of t e Ossining Red Cross Disaster Team. My experience indicates that the Red Cross in Westchester cannot staff and supply the reception centers without aid from outside New York. At present there are no supplies such as food, water, blankets, or medicines at the reception centers. The civil defense supplies which were stocked in emergency shalters during the 1950's and '60'.s have been removed and destroyed as outdated. There are not enough disaster workers within the 10 mile area to handle the job in question; therefore people would have to be brought in from outside the area. The question arises:
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Who is going to protect the areas from which the emergency workers come as th6se areas will be receiving thousands of evacuees? The emergency workers will require relief; where will this manpower be supplied fran? Although the Ossining Town Board has not taken an official position on the emergency plan, some members have expressed concern and reservation about the plan. The issue of the availa-bility of busses and drivers to evacuate those that cannot provide their own transportation, including the possibility of school children, is amongst this concern. We have heard experts on both sides of this issue. Many express their opinion about the problems with Indian Point and the imminent danger the plant poses to the surrounding counties. lll On the other hand those who built and operate the plant assure us of its safety. Quite frankly we don't know who to believe. If there is a possibility of an accident at Indian Point, and if it ever came to the point of an evacuation, our community would be severly put to the test, as we are not properly trained or equipped to do the job required. l f . l kW - Richard G. Wishnie Supervisor June 2, 1982 k l
~g, TEdTIn0NY OF RONALJ GOLDFAhB -
s { ) , :* CliIhF OF POLICE ,. , 1 : . . . .. .- . . - - r ..; .
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, 1973 --ePr.omo'Resi'gned~to tsd 'take toi sits [pos~i~ti.on.?ip41ndianapolis, 'Ind'iana as ' Chief
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of Airport. Authori-ty _ Police 1977 - Returned to Village of Ossining and promoted ~to Provisional Chief 1978 - Promoted to Chief of Police If we had to evacuate our area as the result of a major accident at the Indian Point Power Stations, we would have many problems. Mass evacuation is a 21st Century problem -- we nave the means of tne 19th Century to handle such an emergency. The evacuation plan only " presupposes" that local governments have the manpower and backup (i.e., buses, Con Rail, etc.) (; We have radio communication with Croton, North Tarrytown, Briarcliff and Ossining Town on low band radio frequency. This it-self is ineffective in emergency conditions since it is affected by atmosphere conditions, i.e., lightning. Also, patrol car radios have a short communication range on low band. If the sirens fail, as was the case in the March 3 drill, the officers must use loud speakers on cars to notify the public. This is ineffective since, on a normal day, only 5 to 6 officers are employed (the night shift a few more). Not nearly enough to handle the entire village. , Telephone lines would be completeiy jammed. (Experience has proved that to be the case just on " snow dajs".) Durind the . March 3 drill were were given a portable radio on the County fre-
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'_) quency. The County hotline was used to monitor operations by tue 1
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., . ser.vicFon tnat ,* day,: wo had no 2swhy communiqation-with7heCCountf>-..'.
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,a . d.4rinE.an actual emergency.. . - If a mass eva'cuation is needed., the plan "presdpposes"
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12 to 14 hours available to us. 'The reaction to this type of - emergency by the officers and their families is unknown. There is no mention in the plan of feedin6 and housing the officers involved. There are 41 people on the force. (The' County said they could go to a hotel. Where?) If our headquarters is aban-doned, there is no provision for any other type of command post. ( There is no provision for decontaminating department vehicles, otner than Valhalla, which is too far removed from the lO-mile radius. The March 3 drill went very poorly. An imaginnry wind direction was used during the drill. It woulu have been better to use tne actual wind direction for that given day. There was very little coordination between police, fire and emergency departments. The fire department took no part in the drill. Since Ossining nas a purely volunteer fire department, it
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was difficult to get people in the daytime. We had a few extra ' officers during the drill; but, we were "on our own". Not too many officers were called in for the drill, since overtime pay was required. P"ior to the March 3 drill, there were training sessions for tr.e officers. They were taught to read docimeters, which were of World War II vintage. These docimeters only measure hign degrees or radiation; consequently, oy the time they register, it is too ggg late. Over-exposure is the result. We were given 2 Geiger counters,
to e, but no instruct 1one on how to use them. The, of ficers ye,re- ^ - ' Given the '*..'.,
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saser booklet;-Indian Poi nt wgrke fs.gdt .f'egdreing what- 3o' 'do,' ih' case ' . , ,~ .
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e ha t,s .and docime t$ts."in," thb cont'aminated. ar.ea. Thic lea 9es them
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totally unprotected, since you can't see radiation. , Indian Point was built in the wrong area -- a too densely c populated area. It also stands on the Ramapo Fault. We need extra-ordinary means to evacuate -- an extra 60 people to implement the plan who could direct traffic and notify the public. We are dealing with the unknown, and people fear the unknown. A mass evacuation would cause mass panic for the schools and nursing homes using private buses. There are also some new day-care centers not mentioned in the plan. 7 There would definitely be big problems of the possibility
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01 anow (and even heavy rains on the Saw Mill and Bronx River Park-ways). The magnitude of a mass evacuation is far beyond local control and calls for tremendous coordination. The chain of command is also confusing in such an emer6ency. Who will make the final determination to evacuate? There is always the possibility of persons suffering heart attacks, etc., during such an emergency. . To date, there are no evacuation plans for the Ossining Correctional Facility, which holds 2,200 inmates. There are no instructions concerning tne deaf. We don't know tae locations of people who sent in the cards from the 'orochure. . There is no extra funding for a mass evacuation. The (~~ . a equipment available is outdatcd. We have been waiting for a high 1 _ - _ . ._ ___
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- m. band radio frequency system since 1973 (i.e., F.o b i le District 3.dio Program). This would help, but we don't have it now. lll C A major evacuation route woula be Rts. () and 9A. Since R t. 9 in Ossining is under construc' tion and will be for some time, traffic control would be virtually impossible under emergency con-An alternative would be to see the U.S.~ military get ditions.
involved with helicopters, etc. In the extreme, the military might work. The evacuation plan, as it stands now, is very technical; and, it assumes that the job can be done. Preparations for the March 3 drill were rushed by everyone concerned to meet federal licencing guidelines. We only had a month's notice and very little preparation. In no way did it reassure us. I feel less prepared now because the drill went so badly. O QN P Ronald Goldfarb Chief of Police Village of Ossining
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35 l 104 Cedar Lane l 1 Ossining, New York 10562 (J June 4, 1982 l l l l Pat Posner 22 Park Trail ; Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520
Dear Pat:
As a parent and as Captain of the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps, I am very concerned about the grave inadequacies of the Nuclear Disaster Evacuation Plan. The plan, as currently formulated, in no way provides for the traffic jammed exit routes and chaotic condi-tions that will invariably result from such a massive evacuation. Moreover. the plan assumes the availability of busses and emergency vehicles with trained personnel to operate them. Unfortunately, I am of the opinion that in such a situation virtually all such personnel faced with the personal decision to remain behind /
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; to handle the plan's assignments or to gather up their families and
> run like hell will opt for the latter. I am confiden* however.
that this likelihood is reversible and stems from the ract that such emergency service organizations as 0.V. A.C. , although eminently qualified to handle almost any disaster situation, have never been trained, equipped or even apprised of our responsibilities in the event of a nuclear disaster. I sincerely hope that a new, more realistic and responsible plan will be generated as soon as possible. Its formulation should reflect input from the various area emergency service organizations and provide for equipping and training them to properly implement the plan if necessary. Very truly yours, Earle R. Ellefsen Captain OSSINING VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE CORPS, INC. z, ERE:be
Y Vilage 02 Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. PO BOX 249, () V MUNICIPAL BUILDING, CROTON-ON-HUDSON, N.Y.10520 Mayor %Ilage Manager-Clerk
',, o , ' + RICHARD F. HERBEK ROBERT R. PRICE g
- %Itage Treasurer Trustees , _
RICHARD J. CAMPBELL JANET E BUESSEM w THOMAS K. BURNISTON N8 MIIage Attorney V ACENT MATAL JR. SE(MOUR M. WALDMAN WILLIAM J POHLMANN p PHILIP A. TULLY CONCERNS OF THE VILLAGE OF CROTGN ON HUDSON WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT WESTCHESTER COUNTY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
- 1. Bottlenecks which might develop on two of the evacuation routes listed for Croton (Rt. 9 and 129) invite a chaotic situation to occur in the event of a mass evacuation.
- 2. Adequate evacuation of Croton's 1,622 school children would require existing school buses and Chappaqua buses to make three
(_; separate trips.
- 3. Adequate evacuation of the 160 residents of Sky View Haven Nursing Home would require two buses and 25 ambulances.
- 4. The Village has not been given the necessary protective gear to equip our emergency personnel.
- 5. The Village Police Department has no radio communications with neighboring police departments such as Buchanan, Peekskill and Yorktown, as well as state and county police. No funding has been made available for the purchase of radio equipment which would facilitate interdepartmental communications.
- 6. Consolidated Edison and the Power Authority of the State of New York drafted the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Plan with limited input from the Village.
Richard F. Herbek VILLAGE MANAGER 6/4/82 n.
3> May 25, 1982 Parents Concerned About Indian Point (]) P. O. Box 125 Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. Mrs. Kathy Toscani Police Chief Reginald Lambruschi, Jr. Croton-on "udson Police Derartment Van Nyck St. Croton-on-Hudsony N.Y.10520 Police Chief Lambruschi has been with the Croton Police Denartment twenty years. This information answers cuertions asked of Chief Lambrunchi on May 24, 1982. The r9dio frecuency at the Police Stntion only reaches Briarcliff, Onnining, nnd Croton. It should also reach Buchanan, the State Pol.i c e , Feeknkill and Yorktown. There is no b ck-un to the " hot line" nhona in cane nhone lines nent out. She faren in conr.osed of 17, including the Police Chief. There are 10 pntrolmen; 3 nolicemen per shift. They ahve to show un during emargencies according to their contracts. ( Rondn are a big nroblem. No nrotective clothing for the nol i c ron,. in onother problem. Donimetern are not very good since they mostly register high leval a of rndintion. The denartment has 6 dosimeters. P,ur nolicemen went to a training day snonsored by the county iy v, w w , bout ko* to rend dosimeters. H ~" do you turn neonle bsck (South) at Croton Point Avenue 9 Je enn' t n="ent ell the peopl e 1"nnting to come North because we h9ve ronhorn to cut then. The county feels that generally the masses will c orni v. Otherwise the nolice were informed to v'arn them they n"n goin- into n contonineted area and it is un to the neonle l
"S. ether they enter the aren or not.
People will act irrationally, Chief Lambruschi et9ted. They alway:- do during energencier. ! All villare trorkerq with r7dio ecuirned vehiclen will be 1 mobili'en , ring a rn.diologien1 evacu" tion -- fire department, gs ambu 19nce driver:, street department. 7e elco have e list of tow l l
%] trucks 1.inod un to move vehiclen out of the 7ny so traffic could t
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( -, p?ge 2 Police Chief Reginald Lambruschi, Jr. Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. be directed. There are 4 sirena in Croton inctalled by Con Ed /PASNY. Patrolmen were stationed at each airen to nee if they rotated and were loud enough attring the ciren testing in March. Three out of the four " tere working, but were not loud enough. This may be entered as written testimony at the NRC relicensing henrings in June, 1982.
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STATEMENT Of SUPER /ISOR NANCY R. ELLIOTT TOWN Of YORKT0WN June 4, 1982 . O, (, ) The Town of Yorktown lies within a ten mile radius of the Indian Point Nuclear Comples. It is, therefore, directly impacted by both the positive and negative influences of our enormous nuclear neighbor. As Americans we are all aware of the savings in oil and resulting OPEC independence that systems such as Indian Point represent. However, such inde-
~y: s pendence cannot be purchased at the cost of the safety of the residents of the -
people of Yorktown and the surrounding areas. In January of 1982 the Town of Yorktown presented a statement concerning Indian Point. In that statement we asked several questions that are considered vital to the question of Indian Point remaining open. As of June 1982, the following questior.s have not been answered:
- 1. The Emergency Evacuation Plan, as it has been re-vamped, addresses 7
i
/ some of the questions previously raised. However, the sheer magnitude of the plan requires that a great deal of education and training is needed before it could operate. What are the provisions for this training?
At the present time a viable educational and training program has not been put into place. No evacuation plan can possibly succeed without an intensive program for everyone from government officials to the ordinary citizen.
- 2. Further consideration should be given to sufficient nuclear sheltering for all those who would be affected by a possible accident. This should be em-phasized and expanded.
There is still no information of any real substance on sheltering.
- 3. The proposed " drill" should be conducted using " worst possible cases" M .-
and least passable roads in order to give a complete picture. We are not really g~, interested in what can happen if everything goes right. We are, af ter all, deal-
- i. )
ing with a situation which has its genesis in everything going wrong. The shortcomings of the drill in March aie on the public record. t
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O. Statement - Supervisor fiancy R. Elliott
- 4. The history of Indian Point and its open lines of communication with towns, such as Yorktown, has at best been questionable in the past. The efforts to improve such communication are commended and should continue to be open to all responsible community leaders. Similarly, any review board should
[ be prepared to answer all citizens questions clearly and promptly. The quali-fications and background of such review boards are also of interest to us all. Both PASilY and Con Ed representatives have been willing to meet with the public, but as of this date no review board has been established. s The Town of Yorktown still demands that this facility must be made safe. If this is not possible, Indian Point should be closed. O I O
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of Industrial Organisations PEANK McCANN June 2, 1982 vi.. e.. 4 Ms. Pat Posner 22 Park Trail Croton, New York 10520
Dear Ms. Posner:
Your letter of May 24, 1982 was forwarded to me by President John E. Lawe. I am the Vice President in charge of all the private bus lines within Local 100 and this includes Liberty Bus. The easiest way for me to answer all of your questions is to say "no". No one has contacted this Union concerning our members participating in any emergency evacuation of the area around or near Indian Point. This Union will not allow any member of our Union to be in-volved unless each and every detail has been discussed with us and then, of course, with our members. Therefore, it is our position that as of this date there is no evacuation plan that our members are involved with. < Yours truly, 1
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l Sonny Hall, VJi e Presideht Transport WorRers Union, Local 100 SH/nm opeiu-153 O V The Union of All Passenger Transportation Workers in Greater New York
F9 o- 4 . D-Testinony of James L. filzphy, MPH d Public Health Specialist, New York Public Interest Besearch Group, Int.. White Plains, NY My name is James L. Murphy. I live in New City, New York, in Rockland County. I am a public health specialist working with the Indian Point Project of the New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG). I started working with NYPIRG in February, 1982. I received my B.S. in Community Health from the State University () College at Brockport, New York and my Master of Public Health (MPH) degree in Environmental Health from the University of Michigan School i of Public Health. When hired by NYPIRG, it became my responsibility to assess, by means of surveys, the public health response capability of the four counties (Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Westchester) which lie within l the 10-mile EPZ around the Indian Point nuclear power plants. To 1 design and implement the surveys, I enlisted the help of three other health professionals: Joan E. Harriss, MPH; James Plews-Ogan, RN, FNP; and Margaret Plews-Ogan, RN, FNP. Our team of four health professionals undertook the following plan: ; 1
- 1. set " adequate capability" criteria for each type of
~ organization to be surveyed,
( s) 2. decide which questions need most to be asked,
page 2
- 3. design a survey that effectively asks the questions,
- 4. mail surveys to potential respanknts
- 5. follow up with phone calls to address any problems and to encourage response,
- 6. receive and tabulate results..
It was decided to survey the following areas:
- 1. Hospital emergency departments in the counties of Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester, to assess their ability to treat victims of a radiological emergency. A sample survey was done on a Westchester hospital before the final draft was sent out.
- 2. Ambulance services in the 4-county area, to see if they are aware of their roles within the proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plan and to assess their ability and willingness to respond to a radiological emergency. A sample survey was done on a Westchester volunteer ambulance corps.
- 3. Residential health-care facilities within the 10-mile EPZ, to see if they have workable evacuation plans for their clients. Time constraints precluded pre-testing of this survey.
- 4. Decontamination facilities identified by the Departments of Health of Rockland and Westchester Counties. The survey for this specific purpose was served as an inter-rogatory to Rockland and Westchester Counties. In the event of a poor response to this survey, the facts may be ascertained during cross-examination of County witnesses lll l during the evidentiary hearings.
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page 3 c Summaries of each survey response follow: Hospital Emergency Departments 26 surveys mailed 11 responses Saint Agnes Hospital, White Plains - approximately 15 miles from Ind!.an Point, can handle 4 major trauma victims at one time. One physician staffs the department at all times with 4 nurses during the day, 3 on evenings and 1 at night. None have had in-service training on the management of ionizing radiation injury; the Director reports that 4 physicians and 2 nurses are competent in managing ionizing radiation injury and decontamination procedures. There is a written protocol for decontamination procedures but it~has never been practiced. There is also a written protocol for the management of major radiological disaster but it has not been practiced. () The Director has no knowledge of the department's role in response to an emergency at Indian Point. There are no decontamination showers or supplies necessary for radiation treatment and decontamination. The Director does not know if there are any radiation survey instruments. On a scale of 0 to 10, with "0" meaning " totally inadequate" e and "10" meaning " totally prepared" (hereafter referred to as the "0-10 scale"), the Director rated facility preparedness as 1. I am in agreement with this assessment. Yonkers General Hospital, Yonkers - approximately 20 miles from Indian Point,'can treat 2 major trauma victims at one time and has a total capacity of 5 patients. Two physicians staff the department s during the day with 1 physician in the evening and night shifts. There are 4 nurses in the day, 2 in the evening and 1 at night. The in-service training for staf f on the management of
page 4 radiation injury and patient decontamination consists of one 2-hour lecture held September 2, 1981 and attended by 2 physicians, 6 nurses and 8 support staff. Three physicians and 6 nurses are reported competent in treating radiation injury and decontamination procedures. Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster plans were practiced once on September 4, 1981. Three physicians, 6 nurses and 10 support staff participated. The Director does not know the department's role during a radiological emergency and reports that contaminated patients , would probably need to be transferred to another hospital if they had contaminated wounds. The departr.ent has showers for decontamination procedures but it has no protective clothing for workers nor any personnel dosimeters. The department has one gamma / beta detector. Facility preparedness is rated 7 on the 0-10 scale. However, due to the lack of equipment this is a generous assessment, in my opinion. Doctor's Sunnyside Hospital, Port Jervis - approximately 40 miles from Indian Point, has a total patient capacity of one. It was stated that 15 patients have been treated during disaster drills. One physician and 1 nurse staff the department at all times. The staff has had no in-service training on the management of radiation injury and patient decontamination. One physician, 2 nurses and 2 support staff have each had 12 hours of Civil Defense training. on-going Nuclear Medicine training. One x-ray technician has One physician and 1 x-ray e technician are considered competent in radiation treatment i
page 5 0 -and decontamination. Neither decontamination procedures nor radiologica? disaster plans have been practiced. The , department's role in a response to a radiological emergency [is unknown to the Director. ' It is_ stated that patients with radiation injury would need to be transferred to another. hospital.' There are no di, decontamination showers but hosing facilities -exist -immediately outside the hospital. The department does have protective clothing and personnel-dosimeters for the workers. There are 4 gamma /bethsurveyinstruments. On the 0-10 scale, facility preparedness is given a 3 by , the Director. I concur with this assessment. Horton Memoriah Hospital, Middletown - Approximately 30 miles from ( Indian Point, has 1 physician on staff of the Emergency department 5t all times with 2 between 6:00 and 10:00 pm. -There are 4 nurses on days and evenings and during the night. Radiation treatment and decontamination procedures were practiced in May 1979, September 1980, and March 1982. In addition, S Emergency Mediccl Technicians have had 15 hours of training in i radiological monitoring. All physicians, nurses and EMT's are considered competent in
- radiation treatment and decontamination. Decontamination l
procedures and radiological disaster management were practiced ., in June 1981 and March 1982. l The department has decontamination showers with a holding tank and protective clothing for workers. There are no personnel. I ? l dosimeters. Radiation survey instruments areiavail'able.from the . Nuclear Medicine Department-(2) and from t5 laboratorh (1) . i r
page 6 The Director reports that the department could adequately care for 10 victims or radiological emergencies and on the 0-10 scale rates the facility preparedness as an 8. I would not dispute this rating if no more than 15 patients require treatment. Greater numbers than this would tax the facility beyond its capacity. Phelps Memorial Hospital, Tarrytown- approximately 18 miles from Indian Point, has a capacity of 8 patients and can treat 3 major trauma patients at one time. There is one physician on staff of the Emergency Department at all times with 5 nurses during the day, 4 'in the evening and 2 at night. The staff has received no in-service training on the management of radiation injury and decontamination. No staff memeber is con-sidered competent in managing radiation injury and decontamination. O Decontamination procedures and radiological disaster plans have never been practiced. The department has decontamination showers which drain into the Hudson River. There is no protective clothing or personnel dosimeters for the workers. There are 2 radiation survey instruments in the Radiology Department. On the 0-10 scale, the Director assesses facility preparedness at O. I would concur with this evaluation. Please note that this hospital appears on a New York State Department of Health list of facilities able to provide treatment for radiolgicallyicontaminated individuals. New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, New Rochelle - approximately 20 miles from Indian Point, has 8 treatment rooms in its Emergency ggg Department, and 3 holding beds. It can treat 3 patients at one time under standard operating procedures and 10 patients during
page 7 f%
\l disaster drills.
One physician staffs the department all the time with 2 house staff as back-up. There are 4 nurses during the day and
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evening and 2 during the night. The Director did not know if the staff had had in-service - training on the management of radiation injury and decontamination. The Director stated during a phone call on June 2, 1982 that there was no one on staff who was an %xpere on radiecion in3ury and decontamination. Decontamin ation procedures and radiological disaster plans have never been practiced. The department's role in a response to a radiological disaster at Indian Point is unknowlto the Director. There is one decontamination shower with no holding tank.
'M The Director did not know of any protective clothing for workers.
There are 4 personnel dosimeters and 2 Geiger /Mueller counters available. The Director assesses the facility preparedness as 4 on the 0-10 scale. Because of the lack of training and because procedures have not been practiced and because no staff members are considered ae,xpert" in treating and decontaminatin9 radiation victims I consider this hospital inadequate to the task of responding to a major radiological disaster at Indian Point. It is important to note that this hospital is listed in the Westchester Radiological Emergency Response Plan as being a facility that is able to treat victims of a radiological emergency.
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page 8 O Cornwall Hospital, Corrrell This'atergency rocm,approxinutely 18 miles from Indian Point, has a total cnpacity of 10 patients. Three nnjor trauna victrns can to treated at one time. One physician staffs the dept at all tires, with 3 nurms during the day, 2 in the evening and 1 at night. There is annual in-servi training for radiation treatment and injury v.:ich involves all staff. The Director states that the dept. is totally prepared to treat 1-3 contaminated patients. He adds that "...our cocpetence with a larger annunt of patients is unknown ," There have been 3 separate drills for radiological disaster response and decontamination of victins. No dates for these drills were given. Facilities for mshing down contaminated patients and tolding the water for later disposal do exist. Proteccive clothing and dosincters are available for workers. 'Ikre are 5 radiation curvey instruments. The Director ended with the stateaent that they can adequately treat 1 to 3 patients efficiently and beyond that number, it is uncertain. It is clear that this dept. is well eqaip;xf3 and trained to deal with victims of a nnjor radiological disaster if only 3 victims appear at th3 hospital. I nust accept the Director's report that abave this number, this facility could prove to be inadequate to the task. Saint Joseph's Hospital, Yonkers This facility, approximately 20 miles from Indian Point, has a total capacity of 8 patients and can treat 4 major trauma patients at one time. Three physicians etaff the dept. in the day, 2 in the evening and 1 g at night. There are 3 nurses during the day and evening and 2 at night. The Director doesn't know if the staff has had in-service training on
page 9 - radiation injury and decontamination, and also doesn't know any staff O that are cm petent in treating radiation injury and decontaminating patients. We Director doesn't know if decontammation procedures and radiological disaster plans have ever been practiced.
%ere are no decontamination showers available and all protective clothing and personnel dosimeters are in the Radiology Dept. Bere is one Geiger /Mueller counter in Radiology.
The Director rates the facility's preparedness as 2 on the 0-10 scale. In light of the absence of training and lack of facilities,I feel that this evaluation of 2 is smewhat generous. Saint John's Riverside Hospital, Yonkers ,'
-This facility, approximately 20 miles from Indian Point, has a total capacity of 4 patients. Three nnjor trauma patients can be treated at one tine. Wo physicians staff the dept. during the day and evening; there is 1 1 during the night. %ere are 3 nurses during the day, 2 in the evening, and one at night.
Three physicians and 2 nurses received 2 hours of training in-Radiation Safety Procedures in 1979. Three physicians, 15 nurses, and 5 support staff received I hour of training for energency nanagement of radiation accidents in 1981. One nurse received 7 hours of training on Mass Evac-i uation Procedures with Related Public Health Problems in 1979. Five physicians,10 nurses, and 5 support staff are considered cmpetent in nanaging radiation injury and decontamination. Decontamination procedures have never been practiced; there is no written protocol for responding to a nnjor radiological disaster. There are two decontammation showers but the lulding tank system is under construction with conpletion date unknown. There is protective clothing and 10 personnel dosimeters for workers; there are 2 radiation
M@ l0 survey instruments. The Director rates facility preparedness as a 6 on the 0-10 scale, g Decause decmtamination procedures have never been practiced, I have serious reservations about rating this dept. as high as 6. United Hospital, Port Chester
'Ihis facility, approxinntely 25 miles from Indian Point, can treat 8 najor trauna patients at one tine. One physicim is on duty at all tines , with 4 nurses during the day and evening and 3 at night.
The staff has had no in-service training in the managenent of raMation injury or decontamination, while the Director reports that 3 phpicians and 4 nurses are conpetent in this area. Decontaminatim procedures and a radiological disaster response plan have never been practiced although the Director is awire of the hospital's role in the proposed Indian Point response plan. There are no decontamination shamrs, protective clothing,or persmnel g dosincters for workers and the-Director does not know if they have any radiation survey instruments. Facility preparedness is rated 4 on the 0-10 scale.
'Ihe lack of equiptent and training causes ne to object to a rating as high as 4. Most importantly, this hospital is listed in the Westchester Radiological Diergency Response Plan as a facility for treatment of radiologi- disaster victims.
Pmkskill (%xmunity Hospital, Peekskill This facility, approxinately 2 miles from Indian Point, is the best equipped facility in the area to deal with a radiological emergency because of its agreenent with the Indian Point utilities to treat radiation victims from onsite at the plants. 'Ihe utilities have provided personnel O
page 11 and training to assist in preparedness over a period of several years. O % e staff hee treinine end grece1cet exeerieece in the treetnene of radiation injury and decontamination. I had difficulty,hcmever, in ascertaining this infornation. We Emergency Dept. Director refused to conplete the survey. In fact he told me that he threw the survey out upon receipt. %ree weeks of per-sistent phone calls gave me a partially-ompleted survey from the administration, and a telephone conversation with an administrator inforned ne on the hospital's preparedness. %e survey gave the facility a 10 on the 0-10 scale for facility preparedness. I will not question this evaluation. I will only point out that this facility is within the 10-mile EPZ and would be evacuated in the event of a unjor radiological disaster. SIMARf OF AMBUIANCE SURVEYS 96 surveys mailed 5 responses O ur-- ena rirst ua S-~ el. rire ass n. ,1nc. Tnis service , has 60 active members of which 16 are Energency dedical Technicians (EMP). They have two ambulances. Wey have had no training in the emergency response to ionizing radiation injury and/or decontamination procedures. S e ambulance service Chief stated that none of the members are cmpetent in the evaluation of radiation exposure levels or decontamination and treatment of individuals exposed to and contaminated by ionizing radiation. On the 0-10 scale he rated the Service nembers' preparedness to respond to a najor radiological disaster (more tlun 5 persons injured) as a 0. They have no written protocols for responding to a radiological energency and are not aware of their role 'in the Indian Point anergency Responso Plan. They have no radiation survey instruments and little of the v
page 12 essential equipent needed to provide energency care to radiatial victims. None of tM Ambulance Service naabers would respond to an energency @ resultingI fran a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors until theyareftb$ytrainedbythecounty,stateorfederalgoverngentand necessary equiptent is given to tMm.
'i
. The Ambulance Service states that it would transport victims to Peckskill'Conmunity Ibspital. Ibwever, in the event of a nujor radio-logical release, this hospital is to be evacuated.
#2 Unidentified survey. Return envelope postmarked " Mount Vernon" Tnis service has 45 active numbers of which 37 are afrs. They have two ambulances. TMy have had no training in tM energency response I to ionizing radiation injury and/or decontanunation procedures. The respondcat stated that none of the nonbers are conpetent in the evaluation of radiation exposure levels or decontamination and treatnr.nt of individuals exposed to radiation. On the 0-10 scale, he rated the nembers' preparedness h to respond to a radiological dim ster as a 1.
Th2y Md no written protocols for responding to a radiological energency, and are not aware of their role in the Indian Point Emergency Response Plan. They have no radiation survey instrunents and ncne of the essential equipTent needed to provide emergency care to radiation victims. The responcent stated that, as needed,10-15 nembers would respond to an energency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors. This response is surprising as the Service is totally unprepared to respond to such an energency based on their other responses. O
page 13
#3 Horton Menorial Hospital Ambulance Service, MiM1eton, NY.
'Ihis service has 16 active nembers, all of whom are des. They G have 3 ambulances. All 16 have had some training relemnt to the emer-(,)
gency response to ionizing radiation injury and/or decontamination pro-cedures, for two hours in DE/ADE courses and for 1-hour in an in-service training in 1981. 'No radiologica1 monitoring courses were attended by 1 person each and a radiological monitoring and instructor training course was. attended by 1 person. The respondent stated that 3 of the members are conpetent in the evaluation of radiation exposure levels and decontamination and treatment of individuals exposed to ionizing radiation. On the 0-10 scale members preparedness is rated as 5. They have no written protocols for responding to a radiological energency but they have practiced decontamination procedures, with 20 people participating in 1981 and 3 participating in 1982. The respon'cnt believed this plan to be feasible at this time. 'Ihey have been notified by the Civil Defense in Orange County they they are to aid in the treatment, transport and evacuation as directed by the Civil Defense. They are not aware of their role in the Indian Point Response Plan. They have from 20 to 50 of the essential items needed to provide emergency care to radiatiin victims (protective gloves, gowns, masks, shoe coverings and head covering, and blankets) but no perscnnel dosimeters or bags narked as radiological waste containers. They also have no radiation survey instruments. All 16 nembers would respond to an energency resulting from a radiological release at Indian Point because, according to the respondent they ar'. a paid Ambulance Service, subject to mandatory recall. Although this is the only Ambulance Service returning the survey from which anyiof the members have had any relevant training arxl had s practiced any pro dures, only 3 nembers are cmpetent,in tls evaluation and treatment of radiation injury. In general
P ge l4 they are not prepared to respond to an emergency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors. They do not have the necessary $ training or equiprent to respond.
#4 !!wimn Valley Ambulance Service, Paverstraw. NL Wis service has 45 active nembers of which 17 are arts. They have 12 ambulances. Wey have had no training in the energency response to radiation injury and/or decontamination procedures. %e respmdent stated tint none of the nembers are cxxrpetent in the evaluation of radiation exposure levels or decontamination and treatnent of individuals exposed to radiation.
On the 0-10 scale, preparedness is rated as 0. They have no written protocols for responding to a radiological energency and are not aware of th2ir role in the Indian Point Brergency Response Plan. They have no radiation survey instruments and few of the necessary items needed to provide energency care to radiation victims. h According to the president, 24 of the nembers would respond to a radiological ster,as they muld, respcod with at least 2 people per ambulance. s response is surprising,as the Service is totally unprepared to respond to such an energency based on their responses.
#5 Irvington Volunteer Ambulance (brps Irvincton. NY Wis service has 24 active nembers of which 11 are afrs. Wey have 2 ambulances. %ey have had no in-service training in the emergency response to radiation injury and/or demntamination procedures. The captain of the Service didn't know if the nembers have had any other relevant training.
They have no written protocols for responding to a radiological energency and are not aware of their role in the Indian Point Emergency Response Plan. They have m radiation survey instrunents and none of 9 the essential equipment needed to provide emergency care to radiation victims. I
page 15 The respcmdent stated that, as needed,10-15 members would respond to an energency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors. 'Ihis response is surprising,as the Service is totally unprepared to respond to such an energency, based on their survey responses. SONARY OF SURVEY OF RESIDENTIAL HEALTH-CARE FAcTLTTIES WITYIIN TIIE 10-MILE EPZ 37 Surveys mailed 9 responses
#1 Marrs Extended Care Facility, Ibhegan Lake,NY Facility #1 has a total of 120 patients; 5 are ambulatory, 85 require wheel-chairs and 30 require stretchers. The respondent states that the facility does have a plan for the relocation of the patients in the event of an emer-gency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors.
According to this plan, all patients will be taken to the Inving Hills Care Center in Pauling, NY with whom the facility has a written agreement. All staff members on duty at the time are designated to rennin and direct the relocation. If an insufficient number of staft members remain, the facility has no alternate staffing plan. No arrangements have been made for the trans- - portation of the patients to the Loving Hills Care Center. The facility owns no vehicles. It is the respondent's understanding that the state will provide the vehicles. On the 0-10 scale, the respondent rates the adequacy of this plan for the rolocation of patients as 0. Clearly 'tnisis inadequate. H Laurel Manor Adult Ibme, Spring Valley, NY Facility #2 has a total of 35 patients, all of whom are ambulatory. The responchnt states that the facility does have a plan for the relocation of tha patients in the event of a radiological disaster. According to this plan, the patients will be taken to Nyack Hospital, Good Samaritan Ibspital in i l pJ Suffern, NY and Rockland State Cbnter, with whom the facility has an oral agreenent.
s page 16 Fiw Staff members are designated to remain and direct the relocation. Ifan insufficient number of staff rennin, the facility has no alternate g staffing plan. Arrangements have been made for transportaticn of patients to the rem iving facilities. In addition to the 3 vehicles owned by the facility, which have a total patient capacity of 16, four other vehicles will be utillzed. TMse additional vehicles are a bus provided by Harran, a mini-bus provided by Rxrona, a paranedics vehicle provided by bbhawk and an ambulanw provided by Spring Valley. The facility does not have written 19reenents with the providers and doesn't know who will pay for the transportation. On tM 0-10 scale, the respondent rates the adequacy of this plan as a.9. Based cn the other responses in the survey, the plan is inadegtnte and doesn't merit this high rating. Also, the responses contradict what is stated in the Radiological Drcrgency Response Plan (RERP) for Rockland County. According to the RERP, the patients from this facility are g to le taken to the Elmwood Park Memorial School in New Jersey. Clarkstown Minibus has been designated in the RERP to provide one minibus to transport the patients to the school. The obvious lack of cmmunication which caused this discrepancy is a serious problem. p Briar Crest Nursing Hme Ossining, IN Facility #3 has a total of 86 patients; 5 are ambulatory ard 76 require wMelcMirs. The respondent states that the facility does have a plan for . the relocation of the patients in tM event of an emergency resulting frm a radiological release at Indian Point. According to this plan, the patients will be taken to PMlps bbmorial Ibspital in Tarrytown and Tarry Hall Nursing Ibme, with whczn the facility has a . written agreement. Fifteen staff nerbers are designated to rennin and direct the relocation. If an insufficient number of staff members renin, there is a list of employee to call in the Adnunistrative Secretary's office. Arrangenents have been
. PW 17 made for transportation of patients to the receiving facilities. In addition O to the 1 vehic1e e ned hv the fec111tv which has e tota 1 eetient cevecity of s, an unknown number of amhilances will be provided by the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps. '1he facility does not have a written agreement and states that the Corps will provide the transportation at no cost.
On the 0-10 scale the respondant rates'the adequacy of this plan as a 0. I concur with this assessrrent. H Tolstoy Ebundation Nursing Home Cbnpany, Inc. Valley Cottaqe, NY Facility #4 has a total of 96 patients; 22 are ambulatory, 68 require wheel-chairs, and 6 require stretchers. The respondant states that the facility does have a plan for the relocation of the patients in the event of a , radiological endrgency. According to this p3an, the patients will be taken to Nyack Hospital and Elmwood Manor Nursing Hcune in Nanuet, NY, with whom the facility has written agreements. O Eieht etaff memhers ere desieneted te rerein end direct the re1ocetion. If an insufficient number of staff members remain, the facility has no alternate staffing plan. The respondent didn't know if arrangements have been mp for the transportation of patients to the receiving facility. The facility owns I only 1 vehicle which can transport 4 patients. t The respondant did not rate the adequacy of this plan but it is obviously inadequate to the task. Also, this plan contradicts the RERP for Rockland County. According to the RERP, the patients fran this facility are to be taken to the Elmwood Park Memorial School. The obvious lack of com-munication which caused this discrepancy is of nejor concern. p M2stledge Extended Care Center, Peekskill, NY 4 Facility #5 has a total of 100 patients; 16' are ambulatory, 66 require wirelchairs, and 18 require stretchers. The respondent states that the O facility does have a plan for the relocation of the patients in the event of a radiological energency. According to this plan, tha patients will be taken
page 18 to brtMrn Westchester Ibspital, Salem Hills Health-related Facility in o Pordys and Kent Nursing Ibme in Luddingtonville with whom the facility has h written agreements. As alternate arrangements, 58 patients would be taken to tolding center for a slurt tinu. The respondeat doesn't know how many staff menbers are designated to rennin and direct the relocation. Ib arrangenents have beenmade. for the transportation of patients to the receiving facility. Tre respondaat stated tMt tir facility owns no whicles and that they would need an auto or minihis, arbulettes, and 9 ambulances to transport their patients. On tic 0-10 scale, the respordant rates the adequacy of this plaa for the relocation patients as 0. I concur with this assessmnt. _#6 Garnerville Hone, Garnerville, NY Facility #6 has a total of 37 patients, all of wirm are arrbulatory. The facility owns three vehicles with a total capacity of 22. The respondent states that the fagility has no plan for the relocation of patients in the event of an energency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian reint reactors.
#7 Coltr Manor Extended Nursing Care Center, Ossining, NY Facilit/ #7 ras a total of 153 patients; 30 are ambulatory, 42 require wheel-chairs, ard 26 require stretchers. The respondant states that the facility has no plan for the relocation of patients in the event of an energency resulting from a radiological release at the Indian Point reactors. Contra-dicting this response, it is stated-that patients muld be taken to Phelps Bbmorial Ibspital, Tarrytown Hall and Tibetts in White Plains with whom the facility has a written p.greciert.
No staff members are designated to rennin and direct the relocation. The responc'eTt didn't kncs. if arrangerents have been nude for t%3 transportatior9 of patients to t recei3 ring facilities. The faci'.ity owns one vehicle with q. a capacity of 4 patientN.#
page 19 The resporxbat stated that " transportation and other arrangenents were by directive of New York State Department of Health arranged by another agency." The adequacy of this plan was nct rated.
#8 Julia Butterfield Menorial Hnanii-al . chla Apring; w Facility 48 has a total of 36 patients. The retumed sarvey stated that there was no plan for the relocaticn of these patients in the event of a major radiological release frcan the Indian Point reactors. #9 Intchwrth Village Develognental Center, Thiells NY Pacility #9 was evaluated by a site visit on 6/1/82. The administrator stated that there es a relocation plan in the edent of a' radiological energency. Patients will go to locations in New York C .ty, New Jersey, Rockland, and Orange counties. 'Ihe administrator stated that he could not order the staff to aid in the process, should the area be evacuated.
TM facility has vehicles for the inmediate evacuation of 816, patients G or 43% of its patients. Therenninderaretobeevacathionsubmquent V
^
wams of facility vehicles and by Rockland Jounty Transit / (Red and Tan) busses.
. . s' v There is no written agreement with th2 bus empany. Sheif.erang capability
. s. .
m s stated to be inadequate due to lack of stored food and the logistical ! nightnnre of governing the pcpulation of this fac1.lity under such conditilons. In my opinion, the unique features of this institution: ,
-large residential population of 1900. "' d.2 the ~1argest facility of its kind in the country
-nnny re'sidential buildings covering an e qnnsive area -
--severely physically ard nuntally. handicappea clientele
.~.
render it impossible to evacuate in any reasonable length of time in the - event of a radiological energency. O
.-3
O i: page 20 a i SLMRIN OF TESTIFOtW O After review of these surveys, it is my professional opinion that the pdblic health capibility of the 4-county area surrounding Indian Point is f inadequate to the task of responding effectively to a major radiological anergency involving the Irrhan Ibint reactors. I base my opinion on the following:
- 1. IIospital anergency departments (inadequately addressed in the proposed IERP), do not have the equignent, personnel, and training to provide for e'en the nost basic care and treatment for any substantial number of victims of a radiological anergency. I cbn't believe that fault lies with the hospitals.
All possess a written protocol for radiological decontaminaticn of a patient as requireil for American llospital Assiciation accreditation, but most are ill-prepared to respond adequately to a radiological anergency.
- 2. Ambulance services, crucial to the IERP, lack the equipnent and training necessary for an adequate response to a radiological energency.
- 3. Itsidential health-care facilities within the 10-nole EPZ cb not have the personnel or vehicles to relocate their climts safely outside the 10-mile EPZ during a radiological anergency.
The inability to respond to a major radiological anergency is a problen inherent in the operation of a nuclear power reactor in an area as densely populated as that which surrounds Indian Point. O
l 1 I 1 O l i f 1 . 4 i i i NEW YCRK PUBLIC IN1ERESP RESEARCH CENIER j
- "N RADIOIOGICAL DERGENCY RESPCNSE SURVEY .
\
l 4 s ~ m, <-n- . j SPRING, 1982 i i . -0. ! 4 4 O i 1 i i 4 1 i d i Return carpleted survey to: 1 .
- NYPIRC
! 238 Central Avenue l White Plains, NY 10606 1
i l l , . i
!O .
t 1
1. O PIEASE ANSWER 'HE POLIONING QUESTTCNS 'IO 'HE BEErr CF YOUR ABILITY. IF M IRVE ANY ADDITICNAL CD9ENES, PIEASS HIEE 'IEEM IN 'HE HMGINS OR IN THE-SPACE PlVNIDED CN 'HE IASP PAGE. TOUR CDCPETJEIGN IS GREMIX APPRECIATED. GENERAL QUESTICNS ABOUP 'IEE ENERGENCY DEPARIMENT
- 1. Wat is your Bnergency Department's total patient mP ty?i
.1 w . 's; a ,n _
- 2. Ihf many major trauna patients can your Bnergency Department handle if a mmber of them arrive at the same time?
- 3. Ibw many physicians staff the Dnergency Department at one time during thes dag g.
evening? night?
- 4. Ibw many nurses sMf the Brau.pcy Department at one time during that day?
evening? night? O
f 2. O l SUFF PREPAREDESS FOR A RADTrvtcrN EMERGENCY l l 1 i Jh
- 5. Have yot or your Bnergency Trtznent staff had in-service trainim *
- on the r.arwy=narst of ionizing radiation and/or patient.Wantirm i in the past five years?
YES NO DON'T 100f S If IES, plane fill out the list below: nnsvription of 9 of staff Lii.3Ja of Dates c trained training training Phys. NL1rses Other (in hours) 9 J } I, i i J i. 3
. I, '
I ;'! 4
, 3. ff
"{,
- ( , ,
1 s x'
- 6. Have you or your staff had any other training pertinent to the managment of ionizing radinticn and/or decontamination?
o YES m IG'T IOKW 4 If YES, please fill out the list below: Description of # of staff Iength of Dates' - training trained training F Phys. Nurses Other (in hours) ,p . 9 l b t / O
I i 4. O
- 7. 'Ib the best of your knowi@, how many of your anergency Department
. staff are -pii=st in the =W of ionizing radiation injury
' and decontamination s. wtwes?
4 4 @it
. Physicians Nurses Other
.<~
O i
- 8. 'Ib the best of your knowledge, how prepared is your staff to manage a major radiolorfi cal diaaater? (more than 5 persons with radiation injury)
CIDCIE GE!: NLBEER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all 'Ibtally Prepared prepared O
5.
~
+>
}b $g %
O DEGNDMDATIQi PFOCEIXJRES
- 9. Does your departnent have a written protocol for N -ibaulnaticn Procedures?
YES NO DON'T KHOW If YES, please include a spy of the putocol with this survey. If YES, 9a. Have. the Avvwitamination sucedures ever been pracHM? YES 10 DO4'T IOM If YES, please fill out the table belcw: Dates # of parHnir,nts Physicians W.es Others 9b. In your dstination, is this plan feasible at this time with your present facility? YES ID DO4'T ION O
~
.' i. 6.
O 1 1
- 10. Do you have a written prot:ocol for the marwymmt of a major r=Malagiemi dimanter?
YES NO DON'T EtON If YES, plamaa include a copy of the protoM with this survey. IfYES.4 10a. Has this diaaatar plan ever been practiM?
- YES T DON'T ENON If YES, please fill out Me table below:
O Dates 9 of W iei % Physicians Nurses Others a 10b. In your, estimation, is this plan feasible at this time with your present facility? YES NO DON'T ENON O
7. O
- u. n - = rgency w e - contaceed % f m .
the county or from the Bnergency Response Planning therittee about the Indian Point Response Plan? e YES NO DCN'T ENOW If YES, please indicate winat was involved with this contact in the
. space below:
- 12. Are you aware of your role as a hospital energency h-ility in the currently pW Indian Point Response Plan? g
?n., -
YES NO DCM'T NOW i
- 13. Is your hospital designated as a receiving hospital or as an l evacuation hospital in that plan? (du!ck one)
Evacuation W ving Don't know O
8. O
- 14. Are deocntamination procedures clearly posted in your Bnergency Deputment?
YES NO DON'T ENOW If YES, please include a copy with this survey.
- 15. Who is/are considered the inost skilled person (s) in dealing with ;
ionizing radiation injury in your hospital? I Name Tit'a3 . Name Title O %./ Name Title
\
16., ,hbuld patients need to be transferred from your hosp tal to another facility if they were suffering frca an ionizing radiation injury? YE NO DON'T ENOW 16a. If YES, to what hospital would your patients be tranferred if they were suffering from an ionizing radiation injury? Name Don't know O
9. O F7CILITIES
- 17. Do you have the facilities to provide an auxillinry entrance i to the Enw.p cy DepartTnt for use by contaminated patients? -
YES _ 10 DCN'T 100W
- 18. Do you have an icolat. inn rocxn in the Ducrgency Department?
'.'ES 10 DON'T KNOW
- 19. Do you have the capacity to isolate one section of your Drm.pcy Department to be used as a contaminated and buffer arca?
t YES NO DON'T Kt0W ,ht. Do you have a < lev,nntamination table in the Dtcrgency Depart 2~mt on which patients can be washed and frcan v411ch contaminated water can drain into a lawlevi recepticle? YES to DON'T KNOW - 20a. If YES, Ibw nuny decontamination tables are there in your D Trgency Department? 20b. Approximately how many feet is it frcxn the emergemy room door which m uld be used in a radiological Ecm. p cy to the decontamination table? b
=
0 0
e t 10. O -
- 21. Do you have decontanination shmers in the Emenpncy M YES NO DON'T KNOW IfYES,4 21a. How anny Decontamination shwers are in your Brewpcy Department?
21b. Does the water fran the showers drain into a laadad holding tank? YES NO DON'T 100f 21c. If YES, what is the ca P ity of the hol3IKg tank? (in <Jallmus) O Don't know
- 22. Do you have landad containers for the diamaal of contaednated arHelaa?
l YES NO DCN'T 100i IfYES:h 22a. How nany landad containers do you have? 22b. W at is the total holding capacity of the containers? (in gallons) Don't know O l l
11. O
- 23. Do you have a dinanter cabinet containing the supplies renaary for treat 2nent and amnntamination in the event of a radiological energency?
YES NO DCN'T IMM
.r of
~ '
_ , . . =u:. . N. Plbase indicate the nunber (if any) of the following. protective-
". equipnent that you have available in the Euw.wcy Department for use by your staff in the event of a radinlogical energency.
(Please enter' 0 for none and D.K. for don't know). Number thanber Protective gloves inadM glass shield Protective gowns TaaMM forceps Protective masks Respirators Protective boots Warning Markers Absorbent floor covering Personal Ibsimeters I 9
- O
~k:.
12.
, s. ,
t
~
O .i 4
- 25. Do you have any radiation survey instruments?
YES 10 IXXi'T IQO W If YES, please canplete the following table: TYPE # of staff Latest # of Date last ('alibratice with know- CALIBRATIC2V instrunents tested date ledge to RANGE (mo./yr. ) (mo./yr.) operate a S O i I l l l 1 0 i
13.
- 26. 'Ib the best of your knowledge, how prepared is your facility to manage a major radiological uncwcy?
CIFCLE Q E O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all Totally Prepared Prepared Please make any additional ocmnents in the space provided below: O l l I have cmpleted this survey voluntarily and to the best on my knowledge. Signature Title / Position Date l l THANK YOU VERY MUCH EUR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATIQi. PIEASE MAIL THIS ! (D4PIRIED SURVEY 'IO TIE ADDRESS LISTED 04 THE COVER PAGE. 100 WILL BE POTIFIED OF ALL RESULTS SIORILY AFTER FINAL OCMPIIATION. l s O l
1
~
G- \ l NEW YORK PUBLIC DEEREST RESEARCH ORIER RADICEOGICAL ENERGENCY RESPCNSE SURVEY HEAI!IH CARE FACILITIES EVAIIATICH SPRING 1982 O Return otmplete survey to: NYPIBC 238 Central Avenue 4 M ite Plains, New York 10606 i I { O \ -
Page 1 PIEASd ANS1ER TIE ETLIIMING CUESTIQ4S 'IO 'I1E IEST OF YOUR ARTT. TTY. IF YOU IRVE o, ANY ADDITICNAL CONENIS, PLEASE FRKE TIDi IN 'ITE MABGINS OR IN TIE SPACE PIOVIDED g CN 'ITE IAST PAGE. YOUR COOPERATICH IS GREATIX Am<tL.1ATED. W GENERAL QUESTICNS ABJUr YOUR FN'TT TTY
- 1. What is the inpatient merity of your facility?
Ntzrber
- 2. What is the average ntaber of inpqtients receiving care in your facility at one time?
~
Ntznber
- 3. Please list the type and number of vehicles owned by ya,tr facility.
3 Type of Vehicle Ntznber O
- 4. What is the total patient capacity of your facility's vehicles?
Ntznber Please catagorize this number into the following: Ambulatory patients Number Wheeletnir patients Ntznber Stretcher patients Number O
Pap 2 EVACUATICN PROCEDURES *
- 5. Do you have a plan for the relocation of the patients in your facility in the event of a mjor radiningical ralaaw fmn the Indian Point nuclear power plants?
Yes No Don't Know 4 + (If you answemi _NO or DON'T KNOW, please sign the last page and return the questionnaire in the envelope provided.)
- 6. How m ny staff e mbers have been designated to r e ain and direct the relocation? .
Ntznber Don't Know
- 7. Should an insufficient ntsnber of staff r- Mrs rmain, does your facility have an alternate staffing plan?
Don't Know Q Ys No If YES, please explain the plan below. l i
- 8. 'Ib what facility (s) will your patients be taken in the event of a mjor radiological release requiring patient relocation at the Indian Point nuclear power plants?
Don't Know (If yx1 answered DCN'T KNOW, proceed to Question 13.) Nam (s) / Iocation
Page 3
- 9. Is there an agrement between you facility and the above named facility (s)?
Yes No Don't Know
+
If YES, please answer the following question. 9a. Is it an oral or written agreenent? Oral Written O l i O L
Page 4
,m 10. Have arrangments been made for the transportaticn of ycur patients V' to the abcre named facility (s)? .
I Yes No Don't Know I
+
If YES, please answer the following question.: 10a. Will vehicles in addition to those owned by your facility be W? Yes No Don't Know
+
If YES, plaata answer the following questicLui. 10b. Please list the nuber, type and provider of the vehicles i W. Type of Vehicle Nmber Provider 10c. Does your facility have a written agrement dith the pro-
. vider(s) of the vehicles?
i Don't Know Yes No f 10d. Who will pay for this. transportation? Name Don't Know 10e. Does your facility have a written agrement with the payee p v (if it is not your facility)? Yes No Don't Know
Page 5 o,
- 11. What is the average number of trips each vehicle will be required -
to unke in order to cmplete the relocation? hWr Don't Krn
- 12. Will all patients be taken to the above naned facility?
Yes No Don't Know h If _NO, please answer the following questions. 12a. Please explain alternate arrangenents. O 12b. Ibw many patients (approximately) will be involved in these alternate arrangenents? Number Don't Know
- 13. In your estimation, how adequate is this plan for the relocation of the patients of your facility in the event of a major radio-logical release at the Indian Point nuclear power plants?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Totally (Excellent) Inadequate) I have answered this survey voluntarily and to the best of my ability. O Signature Date
NEW YORK prmr.TC INitutST RESEAICI CENTER RADInfIY:ICAL DERGENCY RESPCNSE SLEVEY AMBUIANCE MEDICAL SERVICES SPRH G, 1982 Return cmplete survey to: NYPIRC 238 Central Avenue White Plains, NY 10606 O
Page 1 e, GENERAL QUESTICNS ABOUT AMBUIA6 CORPS
- 1. How many people are active menters of your Antulance Corps at this time?
O Nunber
- 2. Ibw nany of these people are Era.pcy Miml Technicians?
Nunber
- 3. Ikw many amhilares does your Anbulance Corps operate?
Ntaber
- 4. Is your Ambulance Corps part of the Police or Fire Department in your area?
or - Yes M WORKER PREPAIEINESS FOR A RADIC[DGICAL DERGE2Cf
- 5. Have you or your Ambulance Corps italers had in-service training on the mergency response to ionizing radiation injury and/or decontamination procedures in the past five years?
l Yes No Don't Know l 4 ' If YES, please emplete the chart below. l l Description of f of Ambulance length of Dates ' Training Fu iers Trained Training In Hours I i l O l , l 1
Page 2 A 6. Have you or your Antulance Corps menbers had any other training fd pertinent to an energency response to ionizing radiation injury and/or decontamination? Yes No Don't Know If YES, please atmplete the chart below. Description , [# of ,%daroe length of Dates Of Training ' iCorps Members Training Traintd In Hours O 7. To the best of your knowledge, how many of your Ambulance Corps members are conpetent in the evaluation of exposure levels? Ntzuber
- 8. To the best of your knowledge, tow many of your Aml=darm Corps members are ocmpetent in the evaluation of decontamination and treatsnent of individuals e_W to ionizing radiation?
i NLunber
- 9. To the best of yxir knowledge, how prepared are your Ambulance Corps m nbers to respond to a major radiological disaster?
(Mare than five persons with radiation injury?) CIBCLE CNE NtNBER l 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l (Not at all (Totally prepared) Prepared) l
Page 3 e. O DERGENCY RESKNSE Piu_tuJRES
- 10. To what hospital would you take patients who have been injured in a radiological energency?
Nane of Hospital location
- 11. ht is the distance fran the farthest point in your area to this hospital?
Miles
- 12. ht is the raaxinun nuuber of major trauna or Wical patients that your Anbulance Corps can transport at one time?
Nuober
- 13. What is the maxinun nunber of non-amhilatory people that your hubulance Corps can transport at one time?
Nunber O
Page 4 e,
- 14. Does your Artix11ance Corps have a written protocol for radiological mergency g.vceidres?
Yes No Don't Know If YES, please include a copy of the protocol with this survey. If YES, please answer the folicwirg questions. 14a. Have the decontamination goceiures ever been practiced? Yes No Don't Kncw 4 If YES, please ecmplete this table. Dates Ntznbar of Participants O 14b. In your estimation, is this plan feasible at this time, given your present resources? Yes No Don't Know t'h U
I Page 5 , i 1
*. 15. In the event of a radiological emergency, do you have a written I gOiccol for an arcrgency response to accidents ir. wiving other injuries as well as radiation exposure? -
$) l 1
l Yes Ib Don't Know
+
If YES, please include a copy of the p Otacol with this survey. If YES, please answer the following queations. 15a. Ihs this omergency response procudure ever been practiced? Yes No Don't Know
+
If y_ES, please cmplete this table. Dates Num rs of Participants. O b b _.J 15b. In your estimation, is this plan feasible at this' tine, given ymr present resources? i
~
. Yes No Don't Know
. O
'N
Rvje 6
~.. ,
- 16. Do you have a written ju.ctocol for the trani.p tion of patients contaminated in a radiological eru p cy? -
Yes No Don't Know 4 If YES, please include a copy of the protocol with this survey. If YES, please answer the following questions. - 16a. Have the transportation procchires ever been practiced? Yes No Don't Know If YES, please ocmplete the following table. Dates Number of Paricipants O 16b. In yottr estimation, is this plan feasible at this time, given your present rems? Yes No Don't Ya]W s l 1 l
Page 7
,' 17. Do you have a written protoml for the evacuaticn of people dependent on others for nobility during a raMnlevJ cal i cmergency?
gi Yes No Don't Kn:M 4 If YES, please include a copy of the protocol with this survey. If YES, please answer the follcwirg questions. 17a. Have the evacuation tu.vceiures ever been practiced? Yes No Don't Know 4 If YES, please emplete the following table. Dates Ntznber of Participants . O l l l 17b. .In your estinntion, is this plan feasible at this time, l given your present resources? l l Yes No Don't Know l l l O I l
Page 8
- 18. Has your Antulance Cbrps ever been contacted by anyone frun the county or frun the Bergency Planning Mttee about tha Indian Point Response Plan?
Yes No Don't Khow 4 If YES, p1mw describe what was involved in this contact in the space below. O I ( l l iO l
Page 9 Q. 19. Are you amre of your role as an Ambulance Mv14m1 Service in the - currently 3u.v3;crmd Indian Point Response Plah? Yes !b Don't Kncw
+
If YES, please ans er the following questions. 19a. Please explain you role in the space provided below. (Include Evacuation promrhtms as well as Bnergency treatment and transport.) Please be specific. 1
]
l 19b. Ihve you ever had a formal discussion of this role,with your Ambulance Corps manbers? > Yes No Don't Know 19c. To the best of your knowledge, given your present mambarship and resourms, how cuwtent is your Ambulance Corps to ful-fill this role in the event of a radiological wr.u.yecy re-sulting fran a breach of containment at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants? i CIRCLE CNE NIEBER 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Not at all (Totally Prepared) Prepared) O
Page 10
- 20. 'Ib the best of you knowledge, how many of your Antulance Corps -
mmbers would respond to an eTepcy resulting fran a radio-logical release at the Indian Point reactor? (estimate) Nmber 20a. Please exp' lain the basis for your answer. ICUIPMENT ,
- 21. Do you have any disaster cabinets containing the supplies necessary for treatment and %tamination in the event of a radiological energency?
Yes No O
- 22. Please indicate tin nunber (if any) of the followirg protective -
cquipnent that you have available in your amhilances for use by your Ambulance Corps iwsims in the event of a radiological emer-- gency. (Please enter 0, for none and D.K. for Don't Know.) Protective Gloves Pr0Lective Gowns _ Protective Misks Protective Shoe Coverings Protective Head Coverings Permnal Ehdeters Plastic Bags Marked As Padiological hhste containers Blankets O
Page 11
~
Q- 23. Does your Ambulance Corps have any radiation survey instrunents? , l l I Yes No Don't Know '
+
If YES, please ccnplete the following table. Type # of
- rs Calibration / # of In- Date last w/ knowledge Range strunents Tested to operate (mo./yr. )
O o
- 24. Mxtid you be willing to provide us with a list of the names and phone nunbers of your Ambulance Corps ers so that we may ask a ran&m sanple of thcm a few questions? (Their names would renain anonymous if they so desire.)
Yes No I have answered this survey voluntarily and to the best of my ability. Signature Date O
f TESTIMONY OF JOAN HARDING KING
- 1. My name is Joan Harding King, I reside at 80 Saw
- 2. Mill Road, New City, N.Y., 10956. I have lived in
- 3. Rockland County for 30 years, I have a BA, R.N. degree
- 4. and am the mother of five children.
- 5. On March 3, as part of the drill exercise of the
- 6. Rockland County Radiological Emergency Response Plan
- 7. (RERP) and acting as an officer of West Branch Con-
- 8. servation Association I visited Good Samaritan Hospi-
- 9. tal arriving there at 10:05 A.M.
- 10. I found that no personnel in the Emergency Room
- 11. were aware of the drill or any part in it for the hos-
- 12. pital. I met Security Director Patrick Woods and the
() 13. Assistant Director of Nursing, Theresa Schwartz who
- 14. showed me the decontamination unit of the Emergency
- 15. Dept. and explained some procedures on receiving and
- 16. handling patients exposed to. radiation. Ms. Schwartz 17 said that the Emergency Council had informed them that
- 18. Good Samaritan Hospital would be having no part in the
- 19. drill. They had received no official notification that
- 20. the drill would take place. They knew about it only
- 21. from newspaper and radio accounts.
- 22. Mr. Woods said that the hospital's radiation decontami-
- 23. nation area and plans were set up because of the proxi-
- 24. mity of Route 17 and the danger of spills of radioactive
- 25. materials being trucked over it. Also because of the 0 -
i
- 1. presence of the Union Carbide company's nuclear reac-p)
(~ 2. tor in Sterling Forest, N.Y., not because of any warning
- 3. from Indian Point. He had only received the Four County
- 4. Nuclear Safety Committee emergency planning booklet two
- 5. days before this drill and said be received the orange
- 6. book (State of New York Emergency Worker Training Course)
- 7. the day before the drill.
- 8. Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Woods described an emergency
- 9. drill held on a Memorial Day weekend within the last
- 10. two years. After a simulated explosion in a New City
- 11. office building ambulances were unable to get to the
- 12. Good Samaritan Hospital on any major highwaf because
- 13. traffic was backed up for miles and they had to use the
- 14. County's back roads.
On
\/ 15. On May 26, 1982, at 9:30 A.M. I spoke to James Dawson,
- 16. President of Nyack Hospital, Nyack, New York. (We have
- 17. two hospitals in Rockland County.) When I asked if the
- 18. hospital had been notified officially of the March 3
- 19. drill he said, "Not officially, we only knew about it
- 20. through the media." When asked if they were equipped to
- 21. handle radioactive contamination he said they had some
- 22. provision as part of the hospital's regular disaster
- 23. plan which includes a bath tub large enough for only one 24 person at a time and their other preparations were simi-
- 25. lar to those at Good Sam. A separate entrance area, it
- 26. can be expanded to about 40 beds maximum. He has no cpoy 27 of the RERP. It has never been sent to them. They have
- 28. " received no official communication frcm anyone."
,.9,,,c-
i , J.H. King Exhibit 1 GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPIT A L SU F F E R N. N E W YO R K 10901 914-357-3300 March 16, l'982 West Branch Conservation Accociation 443 Buena Vista Road New City, New York 10956 Att Ms. Zipporah Fleisher
Dear Ms. Fleisher:
On March 3,1982 I met with Mrs. Joan King from your organization and together with Mrs. Theresa Schwarz, Assistant Director of Nursing and Mrs. Joan Fenton, Emergency Department Nursing Care Coordinator reviewed Good Samaritan Hospital's Internal Radiation Emergency Plan. As Mrs. King (]) has advised you, other than your organization there was no attempt to incorporate Good Samaritan Hospital into the overall plan and we felt that written confirmation of that fact might be useful in preparing your critique. Sincerely, .
& . f./A Patrick F. Woods Director of Safety & Security ec/ J. Fitzpatrick K. Yusko T. Schwarz pfw/dc
e JANNELISE GALDONE
\-)
My name is Jannelise Galdone, I reside at 234 Phillips Hill Road, New City, N.Y. and have lived in New City for 60 years. I am married and the mother of two children now grown. I am a housewife and phdographer. On March 3, 1982, I, as a member of West Branch Conservation Association, observed a drill exercise con-ducted by the County of Rockland for its Radiological Emergency Response Plan at Rockland Psychiatric Hospital, a New York State owned facility at Orangeburg, New York. I arrived at the Safety Station at 9:45 AM and found on duty personnel setting up a tank, hoses, screens and other parsphernalia well in advance of what might in reality have taken place as an emergency. They said they () _ were working overtime and that they had been setting up the decontamination materiel since 8 AM. It is my impres-sion that their prepared advance notice gave us no way of knowing how long it might take to set up in the event of an emergency. The equipment consisted of one brown canvas pool approximately 12 feet square and 3 feet high with no water in it, and an outlet to the outside of the buil-ding from inside the safety station. The persons parti-cipating in the practise were lined up outside the buil-dina waiting to enter were let in one at a time at first. They were inspected with a geiger counter. After about ( ,j h
. six people were processed a second tester arrived and r')%
(_ then two people were allowed in at a time. Next they went to a Red Cross table to identify themselves and then left. No one was washed because they all tested " clean" therefore there was no washing practise. No privacy was provided or segregation as to sex. There were screens along one side of the pool for un-dressing and a pile of paper clothes available but not enough to provide for any large number of people. The Red Cross mobile units which were a part of the practise were a block away, or too far to walk to in paper clothing. The mobile unit was supposed to have clothing but I did not visit it. The processers took two minutes per person to go
) over them with the counters.
Buses arriving were tested outside the building for radioactivity. The man from Stone and Webster, Ken Mattera, I am not sure of his last name, said when the exercise was over that it had been speeded up and the two hours he was there would have taken four hours. My impression was that it was incomplete even for a practise and proved very little excepting that it took too long to process people and had there been a real e-mergency the people outside would have been standing there possible needing to be trashed and f ailing to have timely treatment.
"a 09, '_902 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BO?.RD in the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK , Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) 50-286SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point Unit 3)
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD H. BOWER VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE DISASTER COORDINATOR, ROCKLAND COUNTY ON BEHALF OF WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1,3.2,3.3,3.6,3.9,4.4,4.6. I. My name is Richard H. Bower. I am 55 years old and live at 38 Maple-wood Blvd., Suffern, N.Y. 10901. II. Background and Experience A. I was born and raised in Haverstraw and , with the exception of time in the U.S. Coast Guard and college, have always lived and worked in Rockland County. B. I hold a B.S. and M.S. Degrees in Industrial Arts Education and have been a state certified Driver Education teacher since 1954. I have taught driver education at the high school and adult education levels since 1954 in the following Rockland County schools: South Orangetown, Ramapo, East Ramapo, North Rockland, Pearl River, . Rockland CounQy Day, Clarkstown, Nanuet, and V.E.E.B. (Now B.O.C.E.S.). C. I am a 14 year riding member of the Ramapo Valley Volunteer Ambulance Corps,with 3,300-plus duty calls to my credit. I have served as a certified Red Cross First Aid Instructor in the past. At present, I am a New York State Certified Emergency Medical Technician (12 years). I have served in the following elected offices of the Ramapo Valley Corps: Second Lieutenant (2 years), First Lieutenant ( l year), .Co-Captain (2 years), Captain ( 2 years), and I am presently 1-
m Co-Captain elect and a member of the Board of Directors. U<-s D. It has been my pleasure to serve as 1st District NYSVAFAA Volunteer Ambulance Disaster Coordinator in Rockland County since 1974. During this time I have been responsible for directing 23 major multi-corp and other agency drills such as:
- 1. Touchdown 75 Air Crash
- 2. Lederle's Industrial Fire
- 3. Rockland Lake Bus Crash
- 4. Rockland State Bus / Car Crash
- 5. Piermont Boatfire Drill.
In addition to these drilisthere have been 10 actual disaster situations where our plan has been activated. Examples are:
- 1. Mt. Ivy Apartment Fire (10 families)
- 2. Suffern Flooding - Squire's Gate (40 families)
- 3. Lost Man on Mountain - One 89 year old man
- 4. Stony Point Battle Re-enactment - Heat ex'eaustion of participants.
- 5. Rear deck collapse in Tallman (40 people)
-( ) Also, I spent 2 years in service with a U.S. Coast Guard Air / Sea Rescue Unit and its experiences.
E. Evacuation plan involvement by me has been continuous since its inception, except for 1 year. I have attended most meetings, and submitted suggestions and changes to all phases of the plan's revision. III. OVERALL PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE INDIAN POINT EVACUATION DRILL OF MARCH 1982. A. CO;9!UNICATION -- Telephone and radio
- 1. Most of the success of the Plan depends on the present phone system's ability to function. Since much of the ambulance dispatch is dependent on fast available phone use, I am greatly concerned about its ability to handle the obvious overload that is bound to occur during a disaster. I also am at a loss at this time to suggest a positive solution to the telephone problem.
- 2. Lack of radio equipment for my disaster committee members , so they can communicate from their field assignments to the command post and stay r-e d
mobile, severely restricts their effectiveness.
- 3. A quick glance at a map will immediately confirm that the most obvious source of outside volunteer ambulance help must come from New Jersey. This presents several areas of concern. First, how will notification of our needs be carried out once it'is established . Second, it has not yet been confirmed that New Jersey's system is compatible with Rockland County's, and therefore this interstate communication may not even be possible. Third, and a rather important point, is the resolution of the question of financial obligation.
To the best of my knowledge, to date there has been no acknowledgement, let alone discussion about, this topic of out-of-state expenses. B. TRAFFIC CONDITIONS ON ROADS.
- 1. Most of the roads in the 10 mile zone are narrow and winding with a fair share of curves and hills, and all this would be quite restrictive for evacuation purposes.
- 2. Over-loading and traffic jams would be the order of the day, most likely, for all those moving out in the event of an evacuation.(I can recall what happens after a modest parade in most of our communities.)
- 3. Further compounding the situation would be the questionable accessibility of the roads for entering and exiting emergency vehicles.
C. MEDICAL SELECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUAL NEEDS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION (Ambulances).
- 1. Unless alot of pre-situation assessment is done ahead of time'for known patients, a large amount of trust in the phone--caller requesting aid will be a necessity. To quote a familiar American expression, everyone will feel he/she is #1 and should go first.
- 2. This kind cf selection can only be done by the ambulance corps at the-time of an evacuation under 'the guidance and direction of qualified medical
() supervision, if fairness and actual needs are to be met. 3-
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- 3. Therefore,a requested list of transportation priority must be establ-ished so that chaos can be avoided.
- 4. Another top medical decision priority is an explanation in layman's terms of wl.at limits of radiation,1f any, can be established for crewmen and ambulance rigs.
D. HUMAN RESPONSE OF VOLUNTEERS.
- 1. At this moment there is no way of knowing what the response to ambulance needs there would be by individual volunteers. Unless and until all aspects and ramifications of the problem have been specified in detail, it is unthink-able to ask for this decision by ambulance crewmen. One has to know what and who they are being asked to trust before the individual can make an answer.
- 2. Anything short of having all the equipment required and expected to do the job as safely as possible should be unthinkable bythe-authorities.
f% A lack of faith and trust will make it impossible for most volunteers to partic-b ipate. Don't try to fool them too often.
- 3. We know that some training has been provided by the authoritiec and this is good and'necessary. But there does exist in many minds the question that must be ad4tessed -- Does it really matter? --Will it do any good? This is so important before a volunteer says "yes".
- 4. Major changes in both the time and distance of moving patients is an absolute necessity if the plan is to have a chance of working. This is especially true unless massive outside aid is made available in numbers not yet verified by any source.
- 5. A form of identification for personnel says-"they know we count" to the volunteer, and that makes it important and gratifying to volunteer
-Likewise,a patient I.D. system like the international I.D. tag is essential
,, to the organization of thelarge numbers of patients being relocated and
-s accounted for. So far this request has fallen on deaf ears.
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- 6. Remember, any doubts built up in the minds of volunteers will only fuel the fires of conflicting loyalties in their minds and sway them towards looking out for their families and selves, rather than participating in the plan.
E. LIMITED RESOURCES
- 1. There is little doubt in Rockland County circles that we cannot carry this evacuation off without outside resources -- will will need help.
What outside resources and how they will be divided up between requesting counties has not been established. Will we all be asking for the same equip-ment? How much state or federal aid / equipment is available? How is it obtained and by whom? These are just a limited few of the most significant ques tions left unanswered so far in our recent evaluation drill. But answered they must be if the plan is to have a chance. 3 2. Once these resources have been identified the questions asked through-G out this presentation re-appear: Training, equipment, financial support, organ-ization, authority, etc. -- again and again. I IV. EVACUATION RISKS AND UNKNOWNS.
- 1. The potential for increased accidents related to evacuation should be obvious, especially as the tempo of excitemalt and danger climbs, and tempers flair.
- 2. It should be fair to expect a decided increase in stress type health-related problems such as cardiac and hypertension problems.
- 3. The interruption of medication and daily medical routines should manifest additional problems.
- 4. The mental health areawould be expected to be more of a problem as
- - familiar situations become unfamiliar due to evacuation.
! 5. All ambulance volunteers know and understand the. trauma experienced by family and loved ones at being separated in times of need. Many times this hysteria is harder to deal with than physical injury. - -. - - - , -- -. . . -- . .. -- , - .
TESTIMONY OF LINDA BERKER_ 7 Lj' My name is Linda Berker. I and members of the Pece Environmental Law Society spent th& summer of 1981 analyzing compliance of Indian Point Licensees with 10 CFR Part 50. That is a requirement for workable evacuation plans. I would like to mention some problems with the transportation aspects of the utilities' evacuation plan, including ambulance, bus and car evacuation, as well as road capacity in the Indian Point area. First, there are insufficient numbers af specially equipped ambulances to evacuate the three hospitals within the ten-mile zone. The average number of ambulatory patients in these hospitals is 939; wheelchair and stretcher patients-average 323 and 72 respectively. These roughly 400 non-ambulatory patients will need to be evacuated by specially equipped vehicles. Out of the six agency ambulances, which are the only ambulances available, only two (3 are fully equipped. The hospitals routinely use ambulances, from private < U' ambulance companies in the area. They have no agreements with these companies to evacuate the hospitals in case of an emergency. Second, under the heading of bus evacuation, there are 59 bus routes listed in the evacuation plans which have no buses assigned to them. There are no letters of agreement with bus companies, with the unions or with the drivers. Furthermore, a large number of the buses which are assigned to to some areas are diesel buses. Diesel buses require specially trained drivers, which have not been provided for according to the plans. We contend that automobile evacuation, as called for in the plans, is impossible because of insufficient road capacity. To illustrate this point, I would like to go through a scenario, involving a family living within a half mile of the plant. They live along either Third St., Court St., or (^') near Tate Avenue, a few blocks south of the Indian Point plants. v' Henry St.,
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- Our family will evacuate along their assigned evacuation route. They are instructed to travel North along Tate Avenue, to Route 9. This is roughly. northeast, parallel to the border of Indian Point. Following the plan, they then turn South on Route 9, virtually retracing the ground they covered going north.
Interestingly, as our family heads South on Route 9, they pass the point at which they could have entered Route 9 by driving South on Tate Avenue, instead ' of Ncrth, in the first place. Travelling South on Route 9, our family, and the group of cars they are travelling with, enter Evacuation Route Planning Area 4 (ERPA 4). At ERPA 4
- our fami13 's group and the two other.s groups of cars travelling south with them are joined by three groups of cars from Furnacedock Road, two more groups from Albany Post Road and one group from Furnacedock Road West. This makes 9 groups of cars coming together at this point. Depending upon exactly how many cars are in each group and whether or not there is an accident, a stalled vehicles or inclement weather, traffic may keep moving past 1.his point.
near The point at which traf fic will probably' stop moving is/the intersection of Route 9 and Route 9A, in ERPA 22. Here, the ten evacuation groups proceeding south on Route 9 come to a place where their two-lane highway curves sharply, goes under a bridge and merges with Route 9A where three more groups of cars join them. ).
.8, But at,the underpass, the road has a " volume / capacity ratio" of as determined by the New York State Highway Sufficiency Rating of 1978. This ratio compares the average volume of traffic at a certain point to the capacity the road was designed to handle. A " volume / capacity ratio" of 1 would denote a breakdown of traffic flow, or a standstill. Thus at this point, depending upon the number of cars travelling in each group -a figure mot given in the plans - it is likely that two to four evacuation groups added to the average traffic e
flow at the underpass could bring traffic to a halt; ten groups will be coming down Rt.9. In conclusion, our family will be stuck. Perhaps they would have safer in their basemen 3
Eileen L. Vinci 3818 Chesterfield Drive Mohegan Lake, NY 10547 I lived in Peekskill for 1 years during which I traveled the roads, specifically RT 202, everyday to work. During this time, I received the* Indian Point, emergency planning, and you" phamphlet. This was designed to show people how to get out of the area should there be a radiation leakage at Indian Point. I feel, the plans for my area were quite ridiculous. The main routes of escape are RT 6 and RT 202. I gather that none of the people who planned this live in the area. RT 202 on any weekday between the hours of 5 and 6 is as bad as driving in New York City. It has taken half an hour to travel 2 miles. RT 6 on a Saturday afternoon is worse. These are only speufic times when only a relatively small portion of the area population is on the roads. Both these roads are small two lane roads, in places there is no shoulder to drive on either. Should everyone in the area leave, it could take hours to evacuate the city and surrounding area. Submitted by, bSit-nGk ')( CN. Eileen L. Vinci O oa 2e a sea
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- a. Mario R. 'onkin.-
lll Rocotoun ' cad Tonkinn Cove, 'I. Y. I live in Tomkins Cove where I have a very good view of the malignancy structured directly across the river at Indian Point. Our crea is almost a nuseum of American lievolu-tionary history, by the way, and I wonder: -- How would the colonial patriots who lived here and went to war against a kingdom threatening their rights view today's residents who mockly tolerate a utility " kingdom" uhich threatens their lives, and furthermore makes them pay for this outrage? With 7s pity and contempt, I should imagine. (
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It is proposterous to intelligently consider the possibility of a successful exodus of the menanced areas of Rockland County if an accident occurs at Indian Point. If it should happen during a blizzard such as last January's, or even during an ordinary winter snowstorm, evacuation from most of Tomkins Cove, for examnle, would bc literally inpos-cibic. Rosetown Road, where I live, in a narrou, tuisting hilly country road, and at its widest point of 17 ft. two cars cannot pass around a curve unlocs one backs into a driveway to allow room for the other. Buckberg Mountain Roadj f also steen and curving, has an olevation of 1000 ft., and Lavender Lane is even higher and nuch narrouer. My own drivoway is 500 ft, long and almost straight up, and there are other places along Rosetoun Road with even more unmanage-able approaches. THESE ROAD 3 AFD DRIVEc/AYS IWST B3 PLOWED AUD SANDED before any automobile could begin to :ovo. If
^ peopic nanicked and attempted futilcly to cacapc, it is not difficult to project the resulting chaos and icy wreckages.
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O. If no "en banbno-led into acco, tin ~ the "su s 20ssful ovacuntion" decontion, tro thereby holn cornetuito the h r.uoloar d nn<*cr. This cynically nromulgated and fatly financed ovecuation schone in norol:r Voodoo planning -- it cannot work and ciill not work, and those uho foster the illusion of its utility nuct be aware of this. Incidentally, even if we could n11 be removed by ' sono nagic carpot, could 90 over. rotur 7 to our homos? dhat uould wo have when we roturnod? ' dill our wells be contaminated? Our uninsurablo housos? The vogotation? Our Innd? Abraham Lincoln is quoted es saying that all of the people can't be foolod all of the tino, and thoroin lies our hopo ... that reality will prevail anong those entrusted with and renconsible for our connon safety. O e
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James E. Introne STATE OF NEW YORK
- Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Commissioner V WESTCHEsTER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES SERVICES OFFICE Wilbur Rouse Zygmond Steiak Dep. Dir. Treatment 580 White Plains Road First Deputy Commissioner Tarrytown, N.Y.10591 (914) 631-8188 Ivo J. Coraria Elin Howe Acting Director Associate Commissioner June 1,1982 My name is Charles Awalt. I am Community Residence Specialist for the Westchester Developmental Disabilities Services Office of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. My office is located at 580 White Plains Road, Tarrytown, NY.
WDDSO has 12 group residences in the towns of Cortlandt, Ossining, and Yorktown, including the Villages of Croton, Ossining, and Briarcliff Manor, which are within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone. Each of our residences services 8 to 10 severely and profoundly retarded persons, including some with ambulation handicaps. The ages of our clients range from 8 to 70. Some of our residents take medication for seizures, and some have other medical problems which require medication. Every home has a nurse and a locked medicine cabinet. Dispensation of medicine is superyised by an M.D. All prescriptions and administration of medication are recorded. If evacuation were required, staff and medication would have to go with residents. We provide 24 hour care. Each residence has a supervisor and a total staff of about 12. At night when the residents are sleeping we have 1 person awake on duty, and sometimes another staff person sleeps at the residence. We have a back up system of staff on call to come in in case of an emergency at night. Each of our residential staff is required to take E00 hours of formal classroom training during his or her 1st year, in addition to on the job training. This education does not include any training in recognizing or treating the effects of radiation. Each residence owns at least one van. The residences which house wheelchair patients also have a wheelchair van. Our residences have a system of drills for internal emergencies such as fire. We conduct 3 drills per month; one early morning, one daytime, and one early evening. It is a requirement for admission and continued residence that our clients be able to evacuate the building within 2h minutes. Q
a 1 Our homes have sophisticated fire and smoke detectors. g' We also have an internal emergency plan for snow days: staff people who live near a WDD50 residence know that they may be called on to staff that residence, even though it is not their regular assignment. This system depends on telephone comunications. I am not aware of any involvement on the part of WDDSO or individual residences in emergency planning for an accident at Indian Point. No supervisors have reported receiving informational brochures and none have reported participation in the March 3 drill. Our ordinary emergency procedures call for evacuating the residents of one home to another. It is safer to keep our clients in an environment where all are familiar with them and their special needs. The logical places to evacuate in a nuclear emergency would be our 10 new fire proof and barrier free buildings outside the 10 mile EPZ. As for transporation, we would be dependent on staff vehicles. If a nuclear emergency occured during office hours, an evacuation could probably be effected with staff vehicles from headquarters. We would have a greater problem if the emergency occured during the night. Speaking personally, I question the wisdom of evacuating south into a bottleneck. As a service to the staff, I monitor and report on traffic on I-87 during evening rush hour. On Thursday, May 27, traffic was stopped a on I-87 at 4pm. I also question the 10 mile limit, and would like to know W how far away nne would have to go to be really safe from a release of radiation. O
50 SEARCH 0 for Change Illcorporitted llielinnl lanig Executive 1)irector June 2, 1982 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board c/o Ms. Pat Posner 22 Park Trail Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 To whom it may concern: The lack of comprehensive evacuation plan in the event of a disaster at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant has become a major concern to Search For Change, Inc. As the operator of community residences for emotionally disabled adults in Westchester County, we feel the current plan has failed to address the special needs of our residents. To our knowledge, the majority of our residents do not own or drive cars. There has been no provision made for evacuation f';'
'v by public transportation. The necessity of insuring adequate supplys of stabilizing medication when traditional sources (i.e.,
pharmacies, day treatment centers, etc.) become unavailable, has not been teken into consideration. Both of these issues impact on many of the handicapped in Westchester and should be given attention. We provide service for ninety two residents and employ thirty five staff. Search For Change considers its residents and employees at great risk. We request consideration in future development of evacuation plans in the event of a nuclear emergency. Sincerely, Richard Lang Executive Director. RL:da lO V l'O lbx 272 1001 thrk .kenne Ibekskili N Y 10Mi(i 914 7:19 R14:1
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q , June 3, 1982 e My nano is John Moore. , I am employed by Rockland BOCES. I am the coordinator of the Jesse J. Kaplan School, a special education center, located at 61 Parrot Road, W. Nyack, N.Y. 10994. I had no knowledge that the Jesse J. Kaplan School had been designated as a School Reception Center during a radiological emergency until I inadvertently received this information on the morning of June 3, 1982. I then called Mr. Scharff, assistant superintendent for business of Rockland BOCES, and found out that 21 physically handicapped children from Camp Jawonio will evacuate to the Kaplan School. I do not know if any other children have been scheduled to evacuate here. I have never been informed as to. my role and responsibilities during an evacuation of the area around Indian Point. No one has contacted me to determine whether this facility is a viable site. I have no knowledge of what a congregate care center is or where any congregate care center is located. I have () no special equipment or instructions pertaining to a radiological emergency. Our school population is 187 handicapped children. There are children who are severely retarded and emotionally handicapped. Many are k Mn'a a n d M.Lael,vu.Wd i n im$ ave health problems such as diabetes and seizures, are not toilet trained, and some cannot speak. Every child in this school comes by vehicle. Before I can send any of our children home, I am required by state law to have a person available who can meet the child at the door. This system depends on telephone communication with parents and others responsible for the care of the children. If this , system breaks down, I would have to keep our children for an indefinite period of time. We do have a full time nurse on duty, but the health problems that keeping these children for an extended period of time i creates could cause a very serious situation. Many need medication. In addition, the nurse and many of our teachers are also mothers who will be concerned about their own children.
John Moorce p.2 Parents of children in this school are particularly worried about their children during any emergency because of the severe handicaps of the children here. We have had situations where parents have had auto accidents while driving to the school, because of the stress of not krowing how their child is. Many parents would panic, especially if they could not have telephone communication with the school. This school would not be a good site for evacuation or for a reception conter because we are so close to the boarder of the 10 mile evacuation zone. We would be boxed int the roads surrounding us would become quicly congested. We need 27 buses to transport our childron. Our buses are parked at a Hudson River garage in Stoney Pointo within the EPZ. I do not know if they have been designated to be used to evacuate schools within the EPZ. In any case r it seems likely that they will have difficulty getting here. hlh Respectfully ubal e l 1
6 Q, Pat Bethge P.O. box 62
- Putnam Valley, New York 10579 As a qualified mental retardation professional and a residential supervisor for Putnam Association for Retarded Citizens, the current evacuation plan for Indian Point presented by Con Edison is distressing to me. I have worked in transitional housing programs for the emotionally gandicapped in Westchester t
ounty (Peekskill), community residences for the retarded in Westchester and j Putnam Counties, and intermediate care facilities in Westchester and Putnam Counties. As a program coordinator for P.A.R.C., supervising a group home in Putnam Valley, I have never received any information or notice of ) evacuation plans or procedures for persons with special needs in the event of a nuclear accident at Indial Point. The materials I have received second hand have made no mention of persons with special needs. If an evacuation were necessary of the seventeen people I am directly responsable for, or of other disabled' persons resideing currently in Westchester group homes, I fear that most of them would not survive. Even though we are located in Putnam County, were are approximately 18 miles from the reactor and would should be involved in some way in a truly realistic plan. At the very least we coul4 be utilized as a reception center for those closer to the reactor who would need to evacualte. / The ten mile radius determined by Con Ed as the crucial area to evacuate is purely
" arbitrary, as there is no determining how winds or weather conditions would af feet the spread of radioactive contaminations.
As difficult as it is to maintain these people in a residential setting, the probles' routinely encountered in our group homes would escalate to major emergencies in the event of an evacuation, without intensive. training of both staff and residents. Many of the staff are residents of Westchester (Peekskill) and would not be available to supervise residents as they would be themselves involved in evacuating the area. The current staff /clint ratio is three to one, and this is under " normal" conditions. In an emergency situation any group home with a special needs population would need even more staff to deal with the fear, tension, behavioral problems, and mental handicaps of these residents. If these special needs people are without transportation,'they are, according to the evacuation plan, supposed to wait on corners for public busses. I do not feel very confident that these "undesireable" persons would be picked up. It has been my experience that handicapped-people are not readily accepted by the community at large, and are stared at,
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teased, or ignored in public situation.This is based on my own experiences in
l l () community prograiming tor the retarded and emotionally disturbed. Many of the residents of these group homes, community residences, or intermedia
._ care-facilities have complex medical needs (seizure disorders, hyperactivity, psychoses, diabetes) and we have on hand in our homes only a one week supply of their medicatioas. Without their prescribed medications, their conditions would be unmanageabic.
Wherever special needs people are directed to congregate, if they are integrated with normal people without adequate sdpervision, this would be disastrous. This statement is based on my own experiences with the handicapped'in community situations. Any center intending to service special needs persons wcuid have tb be somewhet separated fcr racilities for normal persui.s to' avoid undup tensions'on both parties parts. s t There are many group homes, supervised apart. men".s; and boarding homes withina < ten mile radius of Indian Point. These special ierds people must be made p?rt of a realistic evacuation plan if that plan is to be non-discriminatory. Many of the agencies and all of the staff working.oi running these homes have not been notified of any special procedures which would affect them if they had to evacuate their homes ' and apartment:3. I a,m a resident of. Putnam Valley livlag within a ten mile radius of Indian f Point. I have not received any information conceraing evacuation plans, and I have lived there fbr two. years. My son attends' an elementary school which would be evacuated in the event of.an emergency. The school has not informed me of any plans. As a resident needing to evacuate, a parent, and a group home supervisor directly responsable for the welfare of se'vtnteen retarded adults, I would feel very
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unsure as to my first loyalties. I do not want to be separated from my son, and s would still want to, insure the safety ot the residents. No evacuation plan can adequately address the needs of such a diverse.3nd intensively populated area withput intensive training, drills, and more adequate communication uith the pecple involved. People panic in an emergency, and the worst qualitiet; of bcth handicapped and normal people are exhibited in these circemstances. Thia plan cannot vork for me or the persons with wh'om I work. Yours truly, , Pat Bethge program coordinator 6,*5/82 [ %
7 s Detsy Bergraan Keon Center V 831 Washington Street Peekskill, NY My name is Betsy Bergman an1'I am the Administrative Assistant at the reon Center of Co:munity Aid for Retarded Citizens ("C.A.R.C.") Inc. It has been mf responsiblity to work cn the emergency plans for;our facility, which is a sheltered wrkshop for 72 nederate te mildly retarded n citizens, aged 18 to 76. 'Our clients have a mental age of 8+ years. Na do not. owniny buses or whicles for, client transport. We have to camercial vehicles for shipment only. The Vanguard Elmsford bm cocpany has been' assigned to the area of Peekskill wnere our facility
~ is located, and our clients are expected to ride the bus provided for the ordinary transportation dependent population. We have had no contact .
with tnat bus cmpany. We are depending on them, and we have no way of evacuating our facility if the buses do not cme. The IOJN Center received an emergency planning brochure and
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sent the post card which was.attaciwd to the back cover of the brochure. The emergency planning office called ne and asked abaut our special needs. I raIuested a special bus to this facility, as if w were a school or a day care center, sinm we have 72 dependent pecple and would fill up 1 a bus by ourselves. l'also requested a special receptien center prepared to deal with the special needs of the retardeo'. I have~not heard fran the emergency planning office about these requestse To date our energency plans call for the clients to wait at the Fairlawn bus stop to be taken by bus to h _ school in White Plains. Our ciionts arriva at the Center by public transportation, ' taxi, vans fran gr6up homes, parental cars, and by walking, , O In case of an evacuation due to an accident at Indict Point, I ) would c p a client panic with a childlike level of response and understanding. We have a staff to client ratio of about 1 to 5. I would expect about 10 staff members to be available to put clients on tM bus, but they would not necessarily stay with the clients througbut the evacuation. Our staff is very dedicated, but they have families who muld need care in such an energency. One or tw staff l persons on the bus muld probably be adequate to reassure cur clients, . 1 who are independend ~ani nobile but wha require a familiar staff person 3 for guidance and reassurance. t
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~o The energency planning booklet did not address the problem of evacuating 70 nentally retarded persons. In order to be effective, energency and evacuation planns nust be widely publicized, and in our society this means T.V. Extremely detailed preparation is required for an effective evacuation. Plans which require families to be
] separated at times of great stress are inhuman. 4 e l 4 .
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Camp Rainbow Croton, New Y.ork CS June 4,1982 \.~ ' TESTIMONY: I am testifying on behalf of my husband and myself. My husband, Paul Schwartz, is the director of Camp Rainbow, Croton, N.Y. The camp is a non-profit, residential, therapeutic community for 75 emotionally handicapped children from 6-12 years old. The 22 acre site is only a few miles from Indian Point. The camp season runs from June 27-August 22. The counselor-camper ratio is 1:2. The evacuation of the camp would be a very difficult process. The camp lies between Route 9 and the Taconic Parkway, both roadways which would be jammed with hundreds of panicky residents fleeing the area. The camp does not have sufficient vehicles in order to evacuate the population of 125 people. Given the nature of the campers (i.e. emotionally handicapped) an evacuation would be terribly traumatic. All campers are in some type of counseling or psychotherapy throughout the year. They need a secure and stable environment in (N which to function. Some of the campers are in need of daily medication. Thus, b' an emergency evacuation would cause serious problems with our particular group. It is possible that many of our campers would not be able to deal with the trauma of an evacuation. At present we are not aware of any evacuation plan that is
, feasibic for the camp.
Additionally, as a local schoolteacher, I believe that the evacuation plan of the local schools is seriously flawed. I would have great difficulty staying with my students during an evacuation effort, while leaving my four year old son's welfare to his nursery school teacher in Yorktown lleights. My instincts would be to rush to my son's school and personally assure his safety during a life-threatening situation. Ilow can any parent be asked to abandon his/her child in an emergency? It is our feeling that the power plant jeopardizes the lives of us all. Sin erely, ,
' wtA / &
, Ronni Witkin Schwartz
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Mrs. Loretta Brundage Van Wyck Apts.
,e Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.
Q) I am concerned about my family. I have a grandson living with me and in C.E.T. I am not assigned to his bus. Then I have a daughter (his mother) who has an illness that has not been corrected as yet. When she is ill, as a result of this, .she is living with me. She also maintains an apartment in Buchanan...near the con Ed facility.... Do we leave her stranded up there....My husband is a postal worker out of the Croton Post Office....Another daughter works in Montrose and has the family car...can she get to her sister amidst all the confusion....are we all completely separated...If my daughter is ill and in my apartment, I must leave her...this is absolutely insane. The entire plan frightens me because I was born in Croton and have lived here all my life...I have commuted to Pleasantville for 20 years and the slightest accident can tie up transportation to a standstill....the buses coming from another town after a siren is sounded and all the confusion that will surround it absolutely frightens me silly. I can see everyone perhaps getting to mass transportation, like the railroad and perhaps families being together but this one separates the entire famity...because of this separation...I know there will [~) be chaos... chaos so great that it will be total disaster.... v When and if say my daughter gets to a designated spot...what is going to be there....is medication going to be there .... if my grandson gets to where he is going without family...is food and clothing and bathing facilities going to be there....nothing is clear to me and because it is not I am terrified. ()(( YW i l Loretta Brundage Secretary (C.E.T)
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My name is Evan Litty. I live at 272 Orchard R oad, Lake Secor, /^N (,) Mahopac, N.Y. 10541. 1 I live with my husband, Thamas, and my two 3 daughters aged 9 months and 5 years. I am confined to a wheelchair due I ~ "1 to a condition callad Spinal Muscle Atrophy, a form of muscular n' a dystrophy. l I did not get a 1 3.norgency planning booklet in the mail. I knew , that some people in my development received one. I borrowed one from a frinna and discovered that I was a few blocksooutside of the EPZ. ! In fact, in my developinent, there is one side of the street that is supposed to evacuste ani one side that is supposed to stay home. I don't understand why the entire neighborhood is not included in the evacuation. If the line is based on scientific reasons, I would like r3 to be informed ao to how radiation will stop on one side of the street. 3 (_! l Many 92 my neighbors will self evacuate. I will not want to stay in l ray housa aa.i watch my neighbors evacuate. I certainly would want to evacuate, but I face two problems. I do not drive and would have to get the bus at Socor Road and George's Deli (about 1/2 mile from my i In nice woither, I could get to the bus stop with my electric ! hause) . wheelchair and my children (oi course, I could not take many supplies). In winter oc bad wuather I could not get to the bus stop on my owa. And if I did, the bus would have to be accessible to a wheelchair. In oEfact, I will be diacriminated against because of my disability. ,, 6 My neighbors w Lll h a rate to get the bus out whether they are over the 10 mile boarder or not. I have no way of notlfying you the'- I I,) (J e t i.a t . I plan to get a booklet and cen1 tha card back, but I do not know what your erge : bili.ty to na is. 2
(- . ,. Even Litty, p.2 My husband work 9 in White Plains. He would try to get home in an emergency, but I understand that no one will be allowed back in the EPZ. I am dependent 0:t him foe lik suqtaining assistance. I have two additional problems. My 5 yaTr old daughter, Shannon, i attends Our Montessori School in Yorktown, WW11.n the EPZ. I hTire never been informed by the school about any emergency plans. I do not know what the school evacuation route is or where she would be taken. [ calla 3 t*iv Scho:>l an May 26 and the seccot-icy had no immediate answars far me. The school is supposed to get back to me with further in fo rv. it i. ,n . A second serious problem is that my 9 month old daugh6=r h o mid he *nfant death syndrome and must be monitored during sleep with
. g an APNIM monitor. If electricity were cut of f and we were a f fachel, I would have no way o? monitocing her. k cently, during a power b l u k<r.:t , I hel t 1 stay up until 4:30 A.M. to monitor her. I kept f
I dozing oE?. I vvild not do thwh h e ire ty 1 >.1,; . I a.ast ' vere I elnetricity so I can plug in the monitor. Respectfully nabmittp!, Evan Litty N l June 2, 1982 , l l 4 O l t
r EDUCATION cOMMUNTTY o VAV HUMAN 8ERVICES WESTCHESTER COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR THE HEARING IMPAIRED 1496 Washington Street, Peekskill, N.Y.10566 June 3, 1982. This is the statement of Clifford Rowley and Nancy Rowley of Peekskill, N.Y. We are both deaf. Mrs. Rowley is President of Westchester Community Services for the Hearing Impaired, and Mr. Rowley is President of the New York City Civic Association of the Deaf, a branch of the Empire State Association of the Deaf. Because we are both active as advocates on' behalf of' the deaf and the hearing impaired, we are frequently asked to address planners and policy makers. We would like to inform the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that present plans for an emergency response in case of'an accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station' do not' adequately address the needs of the deaf and (q
,/ hearing-impaired population' .
According to a report by the NYU Deafness Research and Training Center based on figures from the 1970 census,-there are 58,000 people with hear'ing problems in Westchester County. Of these, 6000 are deaf. The towns of Yorktown, Ossining, Cortlandt, and the City of' Peekskill comprise about 13% of the total population of Westchester. Our experience indicates that deaf people are not proportionately represented in the population of NorthernWespchester-thecostof'livingishighandjobsforthedeafare scarcej and "- - c we might expect to find 600 deaf people according to statistics living within the 10 mile emergency planning zone in Westchester. Some of these individuals are parents of young children. We ourselves have two children who attend schools in Peekskill and Ossining. Our sociky has not done much to eliminate the formidable barriers which prevent communication between the hearing and the deaf. Obviously we would not be able to hear any siren warnings or radio broadcasts concerning an emergency at Indian Point. The TTY system is a breakthrough, but very few deaf people have this sophisticated equipment. Continued...
1 O %w fq . , ' u ~a 0 It is our understanding that Con Ed has a TTY terminal in Brooklyn. We would like some assurance that-we and others in-the 10 mile planning area would be called in case of' an emergency at Indian Point (TV, open caption news etc.) According to FCC ruling, open captions are required on emergency warnings. T.V. stations in the N.Y. City Metropolitan area do not usually broadcast these warnings. The ruling is mandated but our experience has been that this requirement is sometimes ignored. Lipreading while watching T.V. is an insurmountable task. An expert lip reader can only understand about 30% of'what is said in a face-to-face conversation, and much less of what transpires on T.V. It depends on the individual, but in most cases, lipreading produces gross misunderstanding. All our communication systems, the T.V., the TTY, and our doorbell, depend on flashing electric lights. We are very concerned about what will happen to our power supply in case of an accident at Indian Point. Even the siren warning system for the hearing population may be vulnerable on this point. Our involvement with the deaf community has taught us that the deaf are reticent about themselves. In general, deaf people do not come forward demanding benefits, but must be sought out in order to be advised of available services. It will take a determined search to notify all the gi deaf and hearing-impaired people of the emergency plans and of any special help which might be provided. Our family received an emergency planning brochure and we sent in the post card advising of our special needs. To date we have not had a reply. Deaf children frequently have emotional problems due to the frustrations of communication. They may become more easily frightened than a hearing child who can comprehend to some degree the nature of the emergency. We are a very unusual family. Since we are both highly expert in the field of deafness and our home is equipped with a TTY, we are in the best position of any of the deaf population to respond quickly in an emergency. Yet we are concerned about getting accurate information and warnings to protect ourselves and our children. O
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD . I O ^d= tatr*'t'* 3"ds - Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP
' (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3)
TESTIMONY OF OSCAR COHEN 20 BURD STREET, NYACK, NEW YORK RELATING TO CONTENTION 4.4 My name is Oscar Cohen. I resi,de at 20 Burd Street, Nyack, N.Y. 10960. I have an MA degree from Teachers College of Columbia University in Education. I am Prin-cipal of the Lexington School For The Deaf in Jackson Heights, New York. I have grown up in a family where my parents have been profoundly deaf from birth. Deafness is an invisible handicap. Deaf persons cannot be identi-fled as disabled, or needing special help, by sight. As a result they are often treated as though they comprehend what is going on - around them when they do not. For example, a deaf person in an - ' f airport cannot hear a special announcement concerning a delay or for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. 443 Buena Vista Road 7 ',, ( j , $gh[ I New City, N.Y. 10956 ,,- I
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914/634-2327 Q'ZipporahS. Fleisher O
, Sec=etary
change in schedule, or to report to a desk. It would not be possible . for an airline employee to identify $eaf person to lend assistance. $ There are about 13 million hearing impaired persons in the United States. Their hearing losses range from profound to moderate. These persons experience difficulty in being kept informed of surrounding events, especially in emergencies, due to their lack of access to information communicated through mass media, including radio, t.v. , public address systems and telephones. Also, frequently a breakdown in comunication occurs when a deaf person talks to a hearing person who is not aware of a hearing impairment. The unusual sounding voice of the deaf person often surprises the hearing person, resulting in increased anxiety and a desire for withdrawal. While this behavior is understandable, it is problematic,especially in times of emergency. O Prelingually seversly and profoundly deaf persons experience language acquisition difficulties. Syntactic and semantic difficulties often present obstacles to comunication between deaf and hearing per- '. sons. American ' Sign Language is tne most common forrn of manual com-munication for hearing impaired persons who use manual communication. It is not English and is very difficult to learn by non-hearing impaired persons wishing to learn it. This background is presented to describe the implications to the hear-ing impaired community of an emergency evacuation plan. G 1 l
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In the case of an emergency evacuation due to radioactive leakage from a nuclear power plant, notification of tfie emergency would be , primary. T.V., radio and loudspeaker announcements would be made ~as well as sirens sounded. Deaf persons would not respond to any of these. In the case of t.v. .where captionshuld be flashed on the screen, it must be understood that deaf persons do not find t.v. a popular form of entertainment. This restricts 'the number of deaf persons watching it at any given time. Watching t.v. for a deaf j person is like a hearing person watching it sithout the sound turned on. Telephones are ineffective for notifying deaf persons of an emergency. The sender must have telecomunication equipment, as well wb h .
- as the deaf person grec 64ving the message. Telecommunication equipment is expensive, ranging in price from $500 to $1500. Many deaf persons do not have these systecs. Telecomunication devices require about three times the amount of time to transmit a phone call as does a regular phone. The time delay, together with the language diffi-culties of prelingually deafened persons, would create formidable I
problems in an emergency for this population. Therefore, notifi-cation of an emergency to deaf persons through mass comunication would be difficult, if not impossible. Should an evacuation plan be implemented, the deaf person would be at a loss concerning events, receiving directions and in having basic 4 needs met. While.many deaf persons drive cars, their cars generally !O ' " *"' ""d ' "c" *** r*d' " "'d h*"" " '""ct' "- " I ;
instructions could be received by a deaf person while driving in a car: O Living accomodations would present another problem in an evacuation. Deaf persons need light, since comunication is visual. Routine pro-visions for mass housing would not likely take into account the special lighting needs of the deaf. Lack of lighing would also contribute to safety problems, since many instructions concerning where to step, when to duck, and how to proceed in a dark place are done through auditory means. Hearing impaired persons are dependent on their homes for communication, security and safety. In fact, a deaf person's home, with special devices, is analagous to an emergency shelter. Removal from this special place would result in extensive problems. g It is my opinion that, due to the exceptional comunication problems faced by hearing impaired persons, the unpreparedness and lack of training of those likely to come into contact with deaf persons in an emergency situation, the importance of mass media to communicate with the deaf and the unique facility-related needs of this population, I evacuation as a means of meeting the needs of hearing impaired persons in a nuclear radiation leakage emergency is inadequate, unworkable and potentially harmful. l I t - O l l
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C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - Q NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Administrative Judges: Louis .:. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick J. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-286-SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF BARBARA M. BLATTSTEIN P. O. BOX 4, NEW CITY, NEW YORK Herewith 1 page testimony of Barbara M. Blattstein, O President, Rockland County Association for the Hearing Impaired. Mrs. Blattstein is an audiologist and her office is at the Rockland Center For The Physically Handi-capped, 260 North Littl'e Tor Road, New City, N.Y. 10956. Her testimony falls under contentions 3.1, 3.3,4.4 and 4.7 . for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. p/ \m
.g 443 Buena Vista Road - - r 7
g'CM New City, N.Y. 10956 ['/' 616 U -{ h {' 914/634-2327 b"y Zipporah S. Fleisher Secretary
r-3 ('a N'C O(' ' (I/ll 0 Officers DII/ //// HARBARA M BL ATTSTEIN n,s w a NLSSOC[U/[O/I NORMA POST ut . nt sa m i /, eitt voMvoRis O/, (/IP rnusuui n 1 MICHELLE CAMPOLI CG/*[/ l(J P.O. Box 4
- New City, New York 10956
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Testimony for Hearing on Indian Point Emergency Plan i As President of the Rockland County Association for the Hearing Impaired, an organization consisting of parents of deaf children, deaf adults, professionals involved with the hearing handicapped and interested persons , I submit the following information.to
- help insure a more effective and appropriate evacuation plan.
- 1. There are approximately 600 hearing impaired people (including children and adults) living at home in Rockland County who sustain a deficit ranging from moderate to profound in deg ree.
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- 2. There are approximately 300 senior citizens with significant hearing impairment who reside in nursing homes and are under the care of a nursing staff.
- 3. There are approximately l00 hearing impaired residents in Letchworth Village Developmental Center in Thiells. These residents are under supervisory care.
- 4. 'There are approximately 75 hearing impaired adults. residing in community residences. )
- 5. There are approximately 500 senior citizens who sustain substantial hearing loss who reside in senior citizen complexes.
During an evacuation any signal which is presented auditorally would be useless in alerting the hearing impaired population. Such devices as sirens, telephone signals, radio broadcasts and police car loudspeakers are totally inappropriate. Any disaster plan must consider the fact that the deaf must be alerted via personal contact or by visual devices such as in-home signarr-lights. O Barbara M. Blattstein Atrated min THE INTERNATIONAL PARENTS' ORCAtitlITION . ., wction of T HE At E XANDhik GIAHAM BELL AdoblATION OR TdD A . Ibb
e , a hl$k Dominic Sbarra 14 Fershing Ave.. Cssining, New York June 6,1982 Fy wife Caroline and I have been deaf since birth. She is 6h and retired. She had operated a luncheonette business for 23 years. I had been an employee of Hudson Wire Co. for 46 years. After seven months' retirement, I was employed by Patricia Apartments as maintenance manager. People of all walks of life live in these 100 apartments--the sick and elderly, young couples with robust chil'ren and business people--all overlookins the Indian Point station. r^x ' We are grandparents genuinely concerned about Indian Point. two We have/heautiful grandchildren living M ' 'Fatricia Apartments. They do not understand the harsh reality of life-- the possibility of being maimed permanen:ly in case of a nuclear mishap. Working as maintenance manager, I can from high ground see the inposing dcmes of the nuclear plant--a mere stone's throw away. Every time I look at the domes, I think of Three F.ile Island. It is a scary thought. It is rbported that Con Ed is requested to come up with a workable plan within 120 days and also that Westchester has received 100d cooperation from officials in several noi6hboring counties. 100$!?--when these officials are at a complete loss to know what to de in case of an emergency. There is little or no cooperation from the concerned parents and grandparents of beautiful, innocent I
children, from the sick and elderly, from the deaf and other handi-
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capped peo e living comfortably in their own homes. They have no desire to/uprcoted and evacuated even if a real emergency exists and severe logistical problems have been resolved. No official is able to foresee all the possible consequences of an evacuation--housing and feeding problems, looting, security, traffic jams, panic, and other real insurmountable problems. The Con Ed plan,or any other plan for that matter, is no plan because destruction by radiation is qualitatively different from destruction by flood, earthquake, or fire. The best feasible plan is to shut down this atomic monster and keep it shut until it is made 99fs safe. This is possible only under public control. It is only the federal and state governments that have the necessary financial O resources to tastitute verv exre=eive but vitat rety me sures. Frivate profit and public safety do not mix. The evacuation plan, if carried out, would be a needless; terrible good waste of taxpayers'/ money--money that originally built Indian Point. This scod money could be put : tetter use running Indian Point nors safely, Several serious nuclear mishaps have occurred at Indian Point in the space of several years. A number of times Con Ed officials, who operate under the aegis of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have failed to report a nuclear accident for many days. This is unconscionable--and all the more reason for public ownership. O jbia S2Lta .
P I (bv NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION EVACUATION IF NEEDED BY INDIAN POINT PROBLEM Agnes Murphy, Program Coordinator, Ossining Senior Action Center 95 Broadway Ossining, New York 10562 We serve people over the age of 60 in the Town of Ossining including the villages of Briarcliff Manor and Ossining. According to the 1980 census, 5,025 are over 60. Of these, 1,717 people are over 75; 819 live in a rural area. Many
\ ! '"'- of these people have not received any notice of evacuation plan.
We tried to cooperate with the consulting firm in the winter of 1980. We prepared the list of people who would need assistance. The consultants informed us that identification would be delayed because of time limit constraints. We have not yet been asked for the vitally-needed information in the event of a need for evacuation. Matters of serious concern to us are identification and arrangements for home-bound blind, handicapped people with Life Support systems, people with respiratory problems, frail elderly and people in wheel chairs so they can be n'
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3 \ No nowledge of plans for people in Nutrition Program $ L llealth Related Facilities, Long term care facilities, Adult, homes and Rooming houses. No knowledge of priorities for moving segments of population, e.g. during school hours, during night, bad weather. What delay time on pick-up is anticipated? Emergency medical attention for people waiting at designated places for busf idio b c r E. (ti r ed - 1 fs& f 4 /It 8=sz
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( \l Testimony of Seymour Greenbaum in his capacity as Member of the Board of Directors of The Shepherd Center of Cortlandt My name is Seymour Greenbaum. My mailing address is P.O. Box 34, Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520. My phone number is 271-9507. I am a senior citizen, and I live in the Amberlands Apartments overlooking the nuclear reactors at Indian Point. I am also a member of the Board of Directors of The Shepherd Center of Cortlandt. This is a voluntary organization to maintain
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( ,) and enrich the lives of our senior citizens. The national organization is known as the Mid-America Resource and Training Center on Aging, 5218 Oak Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64112, and the local organization is ministered to the aging in the Town of Cortlandt and Peekskill. A., I have received two certificatep of comple-tion in the prescribed course entitled, " Developing Ministries with the Aging" on May 7, 1982 from the Mid-America Resource and Training Center on Aging. (o". l l 1
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Greenbaum 2 I have been authorized by the Board of Directors of The Shepherd Center to speak on behalf of - the senior citizens of Cortlandt.
- 1. According to the 1980 census figures there are 4,124 senior citizens in the Town of Cortlandt.
There are also 1,283 frail elderly senior citizens over i the age of 75. However, we have learned from numerous l l surveys conducted by the Senior. Citizens of Peekskill I that 30 percent of the total population of Peekskill is 65 years or older, and according to our own preliminary ggg survey that 20 percent of the total population of Cortlandt are senior citizens. From the initial surveys and working wit! 28 synagogue and church groups within Cortlandt, we can estimate that there are between 1200-1500 senior citizens who are homebound either due to frailty, handicapping conditions or no accessible means of transportation. The population we are address-ing frequently live alone (especially the women),and men tend to live with their elderly spouses. They depend on 0
1 O. Greenbaum 3 relatives or homemakers to bring in their daily food and medicine. Relatives and homemakers are not on call 24 hours a day and have their own families as well as other responsi-bilities to attend to.
- 2. I have seen the emergency evacuation plan from Con Edison and we know of no special provisions for our senior citizen population.
- 3. The majority of this group could not walk to public transportation in the event of an emergency,as they
(') are not even able to leave the house under normal condi-tions.
- 4. This survey has been compiled to set up a life-enrichment program for the elderly. Our initial investigation was to determine whether the senior citizen i
population of Cortlandt-Peekskill could arrange transporta-tion to a senior citizen center. It was through our initial efforts that we became aware of the problems of transportation of our elderly population even for a local recreation program. l l l l L
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) . s L ? , J1must.'be'picke,dJup.Jat~their homes ~and m'oved to a pre-determined point'.or institution. From our' experience we l can anticipate that they will become disoriented and ) ( l cannot be expected to be prepared to bring adequate medi-l cation which is often vital to their living. This parti-l cular group would require special personnel whom they know and trust to give them institutional care in the event of an evacuation. 1
- 6. There are no special provisions that we are aware of for the senior citizens. To assume that senior
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citizens could be prepared for such an evacuation would ( require at a minimum individual planning and communication ( with this population. The brochure is inadequate because i
- I I
it assumes a higher level of comprehension than a large ' ) ! number of the population have (especially those who are / senile.) It requires independent planning on the part of the individual,which is unrealistic, and it assumes that we are dealing with a mobile population who either O
L O. l {} Greenbaum 5 l have their own means of transportation or are capable of ) using public transportation. This is not the case.
. Basically my conversations with several of the elderly living within Cortlandt have revealed that they would take the hands of their loved ones and sit it out. In effect, the plan or lack of plan for our senior citizens is condemning many of them to death.
Submitted by
& wev /w 7 Seymour Greenbaum, in his capacity as Member of the Board of Directors-of The Shepherd Center of Cortlandt i
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' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD O Administrative Judges:
Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP June 4, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF GLADYS BURGER PRESIDENT, DISABLED IN ACTION Herewith 5 pages of testimony of Gladys Burger, 51 Sneden Place West, Spring Valley, New York, 10977.
< r Her testimony is concerned with contentions 4.4 & 4.7 for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc.
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- 914/634-2327 g8Zipporah S. Fleisher Secretary
l s l eh Testimony of Gladys Burger. Contentions 4.4 and 4.7. O My na.me is Gladys Burger of 51 Sneden Place W, Spring Valley, l N.Y. 10977. I am President of Disabled In Action of Rockland and D.I.A.'S representative to Disabled in Action National and the New York State Coalition of Persons with Disabilities. I am also in frequent contact with organizations and agencies for the disabled in the county. I have spent a great deal of time going through the Rockland Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP).and find that the disabled population has been given short shrift. I realize that the disabled in institutions have been acknowledged in the plan, but the many who live in their own homes or apartments have very little chance unless they have able-bodied people to help, k and/or their own transportation. The following are among the problems found:
- 1. The brochure that was sent out to homes was printed in such a fashion that many of the disabled did"not realize that the card was supposed to be sent in. It has been suggested that if the address had been printed on the inside of.the fold, the questionJ would have been more obvious and more people would have answered. I have letters from disabled people saying that a.) they did not get the brochure, b.) they did not understand the use of.the card, or c.).they did not feel that the plan would work and therefore did not make out the card.
- 2. There are about 32,500 disabled persons in Rockland
( County according to the U.S. Census Bureau. I do not have a k
r breakdown by towns, but would approximate 14 to 16 thousand '() in the E.P.Z. Of these, 1,119 are wheelchair and stretcher cases in institutions, 1005 are transient camp residents (wheel chair and stretcher), and the remainder live in their own homes or apartments and the arrangements for them are less than satis-factory.
- 3. The disabled who use wheelchairs, crutches, who have difficulty in walking, use canes or are blind are not likely to be able to bring the clothes, medication.and other items request-ed in the brochure. I would like to know what arrangements are being made for such people. There is nothing in the plan about it.
- 4. There are ISS wheelchair tie-downs in Rockland County.
I have made this assessment by calling all the bus companies, school districts, voluntary agencies, etc. that appear in the s plan, and others about which I have some personal knowledge. A wheelchair tie-down is an area where a wheelchair can be im-mobilized in an accessible vehicle. Some vehicles can take only one wheelchair, most can take more, but the total number of wheelchairs that can be moved at one time in Rockland is 158. This does not include vehicles that are privately owned. I do not know how many of these or hand operated vehicles there are because that information can come only from the Motor Vehicle Bureau. I asked the people at TRIPS (Transportation Intra-county for the Physically Handicapped and Seniors) how many l 1 wheelchair clients they transport and they said approximately 150. The Department of Social Services gave me a figure of 385 (() wheelchair trips in April. They transport Medicaid patients
l l l l l and this is not a hard figure since people are rehabilitated and leave Medicaid. I was informed that some of these are dup- llk licate rides. The TRIPS passengers frequently are going to work or to Helen Hayes Hospital or Jawonio for Rehabilitation. If any of the privately owned vehicles are in having work done on them, have flat tires, or if the owners are not at their best,these people will also need transportation in the event of an evacuation. Of the 15E wheelchair tie-downs 41 belong to Letchworth Village which will take several trips to evacuate their people, 12' belong to Camp Jawonio which has an average of 70 people in wheelchairs and 35 using crutches and braces during the day, the Associa-tion for Retarded Children (ARC) workshop has 6.and contracts out for more which might not be available to them, the. TRIPS buses have 12 and are assigned to Summit Park which has 245 patients . llg
- in wheelchairs and many who use canes and walkers, Helen' Hayes Hospital has 2 but I intend to talk about Helen Hayes later, the remainder (85) belong to or contract out to school districts 1
and will be used for school children in the EPZ. I assume that if schools are closed these might be accessible for the disabled l who are not institutionalized, but there are .ru) chair arrange-ments.
- 5. I understand that the plan for Helen Hayes Hospital is to shelter in the basements. As an ex-patient, and an out-patient a', Helen Hayes I have been in those areas, and do not consider
, them safe. Because of the hilly terrain one side of a-basement l l can be at ground level with a wooden door to a parking lot and I g do not think that would be much protection. The pharmacy is in llh l . j , x L,
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' ~ such an area. In addition, there are many out-patients 'there ' {- during the day who come from areas outside the EPZ and will not x (( know what to do. As an out-patient, I would not wan': to ~ spend three days or' Tore wicbout a change of clothing in'an unsafe area in the facility closesc7to Indian Point in Rocklan ' County. Helen Hayes Hospital is very'important to New York
- State because it is the.only state-owned rehabilitation hosp- i ital and they bring many . people back into the nai'istream of g n
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- 6. There are also people using canes or crutche's who live near or on a bus line and under normal circumstances can use these buses with the help of the drivers. In a panic situation
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$hese-people will be left behind because they can not move fast enough. , .
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- 7. 'I .ere. are uany disabled in Ehe county, who are blind,use
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,t' wheelchairs, canea, crutches, and/or braces e.ho ,use hand operated s
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s cars or TRIPS and are hodiemakers, business, owners, employees,and i i professionals.,TNesaarenot"consideredintheplan. s
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- 8. The disabled who live outside the EPZ but work within it
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m L' have not received brochures and have not been informed by their
, employers about the Emergency Plan. As I understand it, this also r;
i i applies to the ab.1.Mthdied. I have no way'of estimating the numbers
! N in this situation) ,
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- 9. There ,are at'any time a number of people who have had accidents,stroken,aad surgely, who have been sent home from
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1 the hospital to rent hospital beda and the care of visiting nurses and aides. Many of these, particularly those in body k i casts or who are partially paralyzed will need ambulances to remove them from their homes. They can not be sheltered because it will take a stretcher to move them. 1 s l It is obvious to'me that it will take far more equipment and sensible communications to_ deal with the dir.1 bled community. I realize that we are a minority but we are not useless nor should we be ignored. I have done this at the request of West Branch Conservation Association. They wished to be able to call fewer witnesses by using my expertise and contacts. llh 4 ( ifat tie Coffee 901 Main street Peekskill, New York k U My nane is IIattie Coffey and I am 71 years old. I had polio when I was 4, which left ne lane. Three years ago I fell and crushed my lane hip. I was doing well in rehabilitation therapy with a walker until I got rinumatoid arthritis. Now I cannot put any weight on my swollen hand joints. I am confined to a wheelchair and I cannot take one step. I luve not received any infornation about emergency planning in case of an accident at Indian Point. I did not receive a brochure in the mail. I do not know what I would do if an evacuation were called. I am a nember of the Advisory Comnittee on the Disabled in Peekskill.
< My term expires February 9, 1984. I live at 901 Main Street, Peekskill.
I have a police band radio in my apartnent, so I would learn of an acci-dent at Indian Point, but I could not do anything about it. The senior citizens have a mini-bus which can take ne in my wheelchair to special events such as the Elmsford dinner theater and family picnics. I do not rely on this bus for shopping. I can get into a private car by swivelling into place. I can leave my apartnent by Q myself, and go down the elevator by myself, which I do on nice days to visit people on the terrace of our apartment building. I cannot go off the apartment grounds by myself because I am afraid of the traffic. Drivers do not etch out for ne. I could not get into a regular bus 4 or a scirol bus. ' Tiere are at least two other people in these apartments known to ne who are wheelchair dependent, altlough they can walk a little. They are a narried couple. As far as I know, ro provision has been made to evacuate us. Sone of my family lives nearby, but my closest daughter lus a job and just sold,her car. I could not rely on her for transportation if an evacuation were called when she could not borrow a car from her. son.- There are other people in this building win walk with a walker, or a cane, or two canes. They could not leave the apartnent carrying any emergency i supplies. "O l
N=l.. e's j nattle Co1 Ice ; 1 Seniors around Peekskill do very wll getting around on buses for nutrition programs, but that is a routine ard very wil understood procedure, with no upset or panic involved. I do not think there are enough buses to evacuate all the seniors in Peekskill who do not have cars. I do not know whether the seniors' wheelchair van would be dispatched to pick me up. I don't know where I would try to get on the bus. I don't know who m uld drive it. I would feel better if I wre confident that I could get out in case an evacuation were called because of an accident at Indian Point. M e 4
Susan Simon - 70 Croton Avenue Ossining, NY 10562 My name is Susan Simon. I have lived in Ossining for one and one half years and have been working as a public health nurse in Westchester County. The experience I have had as a public health nurse has made me become acutely aware of the problems of senior citizens. When I read the booklet, " Indian Point, Emergency Planning and You," I became concerned about the plan for the evacuation of homebound senior citizens. Many senior citizens who are physically homebound are not in touch with current issues and many are sight and hearing impaired . I question how many people from this age group who would need to send in the card indicating special transportation needs would O be ebie to read and understand the booklet well enough to do so. I also wonder how many would hear the siren and know what it's for. Without knowing just how many people need transportation assistance, there is no accurate method to know if there are enough special transport vehicles to accomodate these people. Under non-emergency circumstances, homebound senior citizens often need ambulette services just to go to their doctor and rely on family, friends and homemakers for their shopping and housekeeping needs. As a resident in an apartment building with a predominantly elderly population, I have had the opportunity to observe the problems non-home-bound senior citizens have evacuating the building. Many are completely dependent on the elevators and need assistance to go down the stairs
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e be Susan Simon <g 70 Croton Avenue , Ossining, NY 10562 1 l Page 2 when the elevators are broken. As the population of senior citizens in the Ossining area is approximately 10% and growing, I believe this problem is a significant one to consider. yr) W$
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47 W-e CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING THE EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION-IIANDICAPPED PERSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY IN Tile EVENT OF A LIFE TilREATENING NUCLEAR HAZARD Samuel W. Anderson, PhD
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w , BRIEF RESUME: ( ) Dr. Samuel W. Anderson, President of the New York State Coalition of e People with Disabilities, is a professional research scientist at the Columbia College of Physicians & Surgeons, Dept. of Psychiatry, and Now York State Psychiatric Institute. Currently, his research projects include studies of anxiety and panic, depression, and learning disa-bility. IIis past experience includes survey design and evaluation for the Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce. g e 1
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING THE EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION-HANDICAPPED PERSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY IN THE EVENT OF A LIFE THREATENING NUCLEAR HAZARD., Samuel W. Anderson, PhD New York State Coalition of People with Disabilites.
. June 5, 1982 s
Transportation-Handicapped (TH) individuals are defined as those persons who: Experienced general problems in past 12 months such as visual, hearing, mechanical aids, wheelchair or other problems (i.e., walking / going more than one block; waiting /standin'g; going up ("') and down stairs, etc.) U and g perceive they have more difficulty in using public transporta-tion than persons without their general problems and are not homebound (go/can go outside home at least once a week with or without the help' of another person; 1, p. 13). It is estimated by the City that there are at least 380,000 residents who actisfy this definition (2, p.1). It is clear by definition that any gen-arel plan to evacuate and re' locate the entire population of New York City ccnnot expect more than a smal.1 part o f ,the TH population to be moved quickly or safely by conventional public transportation. Suggestions have been made that TH people might be provided with a special ovccuation plan, perhaps involving priv' ate cars, special buses, vans, and thor vehicles that would offer es.ay entry and exit and accommodate wheel-llh choirs, possibly aided by professional attendants.
- It is the Police Department in New York City that is charged with the respon- '
l cibility for planning all emergency population evacuations, but a recent
]
( h inquiry revealed that the Police Department had no plan for evacuation at this time, and was avaiting advice (which had already been requested) from the Mayor's Office for the Handicapped as to the needs of the disa-bled population. But, to date, no such advice has been released by the Mayor's office. The following considerations summarize the realities of the problem, based on statistics either collected by the City or known to be accepted by them, with respect to several hypothetical solutions. In the absence of any more explicitly appropriate models of the crisis problem, the rush-hour j am will be used as the best available model for which statistics exist. This optimistic assumption is highly questionable
,- s but while it is admittedly a "best case" model, it is the only one availa- !)
ble for a city fortunate enough never to suffer a blitz, general fire or acrthquake. But it should be easily granted that the population almost curely cannot be relocated any faster than the rate achieved during a typi-col weekday afternoon rush hour. PROPOSAL I. EVACUATION BY PRIVATE CAR. Now York City's best statistic for the number of TH people able to move Space precludes consideration here of the multifarious difficulties facing the planning of emergency evacuations in general. We do not consider the nondisabled as a group, nor the homebound and institutionalized immobile populations, for whom ;all ambulances. and emergency. vehicles not needed to scive casualties oiltkeu disaster itself must be reserved. Similarly, we cnit consideration of all air, rail and marine passenger vehicles used by ccmmuters, since the disaster may occur during the working day, when the number of persons in the city is larger by several million. llh x,
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g themselves by private car is the numbe r who are issued Special Vehicle Identification (SVI) parking permits. The permit has been issued only to car owners who demonstrate that they are in fact TH by a city-mandated codical examination. According to t f.e Mayor's Office for the Handicapped, there are 3800 SVI permits in circulation, 800 of which are in the posses-cion of nonresident commuters, leaving 3000, or just under one percent of the TH population able to evacuate in their own vehicles. PROPOSAL II. EVACUATION BY PARATRANSIT VEHICLE. Now York City has collected volumf aus statistics on use and estimated , potential use of paratransit services, which have been proposed as a sub-(\->a ctitute for mass transit accessibility. An analysis by the NYC Department of Transportation (3) identifies a "paratransit eligible" (PTE) popula-tion by its own criteria of 107,800, clearly a subset of the TH as defined by Grey Advertising Study's National Survey cited above (1), including an estimated number of 22,800 wheelchair users. Currently, the paratransit industry is estimated to serve the PTE popula-tion with 6800 trips per day, i.e., providing even just the PTE subgroup with only 6% coverage in any one day. Thus, if all available paratransit vehicles constituted just the ones now operated privately for profit, or Gvon just economically at cost, their total recruitment for evacuation ? would require 15 days to totally relocate just the PTE subgroup, and a total of 55.9 days to evacuate the entire TH population. G Q
PROPOSAL III. EVACUATION BY EXISTING OR PROJECTED PUBLIC MASS TRANSIT. Existing. Although the Metropolitan Transit Authority has been, until recently, un-dor. continuous pressure from the Federal Government to provide evidence that they have made "special efforts" to improve transit accessibility by the TH population, the present system is still nearly totally unusable to more than a minority of TH people. As for the subways, stairways at ingress and egress of stations, only 14% of which are at grade, are pro-hibitive. The inflexibility of subway lines raises serious questions as to how useful the system might be to evacuate the city during the danger of power failure, etc. anyway. gg) (x (s)Ao for buses, several hundred new buses with rear-door, wheelchair lifts are just now beginning to appear occasionally on certain routes in several boroughs. But slow. deliveries , design defects, and haphazard driver prepar-ation still prevent reliable and dependable service availability to TH people. As it is now constituted, the bus system is virtually unusable by nore than a handful of additional TH passengers. Projected. Evacuation by project 2d use of public mass transit again must exclude con-cideration of the subways. Although the U.S. Department of Transportation had mandated the MTA to adopt a 30-year transition plan for gradually ma-king key subway stations (about half the total of 487) accessible to the TH over the next 30 years, recent changes in Federal regulations have c') eli-lll
'-cinated any requirement to even begin the process.
But the MTA has announced plans to continue purchasing new buses that are accessible until one-half of its fleet of 4,000 are equipped with lifts.
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Based on projections from the Grey study, this is judged to be adequate to transport one wheelchair user for every 1800 passengers at peak load. Since a bus that is wheelch' air-accessible is also accessible to nearly all other TH people, of which the wheelchair users constitute 5%, it is projected that every cluster of seven buses will carry 20 TH passen-gars, including one wheelchair. This works out to an average of 2.86 TH passengers per bus: a desegregated TH percentage markedly below the 6.2% of TH in the United States (4) . Of course, a minority of TH people will remain unable to use these new buses, and it might be hoped that the recruitment of the entire paratransit fleet for door-to-door evacua- ,_ tion might be sufficient to relocate thira minority. If it is small enough,
- there might be additional paratransit capacity to set up a feeder service lI bringing TH persons from their homes to accessible mass transit rallying points. Unfortunately, estimates of the size of this minority are;not ea-oily made,: as it depends upon the adequacy of accessible mass transit along with accompanying feeder services. We must reserve judgment on how adequate Proposal III, even in conjunction with Propos~al II, might be.
CONCLUSION. In fact, many of the figures used by the City and cited above, are now being challenged. Recently, the Consumer Health Information an.d Resource Conter has reviewed the available literature, and has concluded that they all may well undercount the actual number of TH people in New York City (5). The Center has called for a new survey to correct th ese in a c cu ra c re s , after hich we may obtain accurate, detailed projections so that disabled New Yorkers will have an equal chance to survive what may be the City's final ruch hour.
F References.
- 1. Grey Advertising (Prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Summary Report of Data from National Survey of Transportation. Handicapped People. Washington, DC, US Govt. Printing Office, 1978, p.5) as cited in ref. no. 5.
- 2. Gregory Mansfield, " Historical & legal perspective on public transpor-tation for the disabled in New York City (Xeroxed) p. 1, as cited in ref. 5, p.7.
- 3. Walter Thabit, The demand for paratransit services in New York City:
Revision gnd detailing of earlier estimates._ NYC Dept. of Transpor-tation, Division of Transportation for Elderly and Handicapped Persons, 1980.
- 4. National Research. Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems. NRC Transbus Study, p. 44, as cited in ref. 5, p.11.
- 5. Jody Carlson, Critique of three national studies of transportation
(^ needs of the transportation handicapped. Community Technical Assistanceg ( Project, Consumer Health Information and Resource Center, New York, NY, 1982. -- - See also: Zita Fearon, Mo.bility Disabled Residents of New York City and the quest for accessible public transportation: an overview. Consumer Health Information and Resource Center, New York, NY, 1982. o o e
Curriculum Vitae Samuel Wentworth Anha April 1981 Personal Information: . Born 9/11/29 - Norwood, Massachusetts; Married, one child (male) - age 20. Education: B.A. 1958 - George Washington University, Washington, D.C. PhD 1965 - Harvard University. Research Appoint:ments: 1976 - Present Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University. 1969 - Present Research Scientist (V), New York State Psychiatric Institute Specialty: Bicmetrics. 1962 - 1963 Research Assistant, Laboratory of h in1 Relations, Harvard University. U 1960 - 1962 Research Assistant, Center for Cognitive ShvWs, Harvard Uni- a versity. W 1960 - (sum.) .Research Psychologist, U.S. Depart 2 tent of Cumm.w, Dureau of the Census, s 1959 - (sum.) Research Assistant, Social Relations, Harvard. 1958 - (sum.) Statistician, U.S. Department of cr=mrce, Bureau of the Census. Research Grants (Principal Investigator): 1979 - Present Bicmedical Research Support Grant Allocation RR05650-13 "High Volume Processing of Speech & Physiological Signals." Research Foundation for Mental Hygiene, Inc. 1973: General Research Support Allocation RR05650-06 " Speech Evoked Potent ini n. " (with J. Jaffe) Research Ebundation for Mental Hy-giene, Inc.
, 1969 - 1970 National Institutes of Health Grant #MH-17240 " Evoked Potential Ccrrelates of Speech Perception." Wesleyan University (Conn.)
Research Interests:
'Ihe neuropsychology of human ccumunication, with emphasis on the acoustic analysis of speech in the study of phasic and tonic motor control of voice and related psy-chophysiological systems; cognitive, emotional and expressive activities as factors pd in normal and abnormal patterns of ccumunication; the mathemat ical analysis of perception and notor control fran the viewpoint of brain function. g i
(nore)
O V _2-Teaching Apoointments: 1967 - 1968 and 1970 - 1971: Acting DifevLu of the Linguistics Program, Wesleyan Uni-versity (Conn.) 1968 - 1970: Visiting Professor, Institute for Contenporary Latin Anurican Shdim , Cuernavaca Mexico. 1966 - (sun.): Head of Tahvatory Psychology, Liberal Shdim Program, Mount Hernon School, Mount Hernon, Mass. 1965 - 1971: Assistant Professor of Psycholocyf, Wesleyan University.
,1964 - 1965: Instructor in Psychology, Wesleyan University. ,
1962 - 1963: Tutor, Harvard University. 1960 - 1963: Teaching Fellow, Harvard University. Honorary Societies: Ihi Beta Kappa; Sigrra Xi. , Professional Societies: International Neuropsychological Society; Acousi-ical Society of Americ.a; American Asscciation for the ,Mvancecent of Science; Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease; New York Acadeny of Sciences;. Aphasia Study Group of New York; Council of Research Scientists of New York State; New York Neuropsychology Group. Boards and Ctmnittees: Member, Board of Editorial Ct:mentators, Behavioral & Brain Sciences; Editorial Board, Journal of Psycholinguistic Research; Steering Ccmnittee, Aphasia Study Group of New York; . 3 Mvisory Ccmnittee on Linguistics, New York Academy of Sciences; Conference Ccmnittee, New York Academy of Sciences; National Science Foundation Mvisory Ocmnittee on Careers in Science for Haniicarped Perscru; Mvisory Ccmnittee, New York University Mariical Rehabilitation Research and Training Center;
. Technical Merit Review Panel, National Institute of Neurological & Comuni-cation Disorders and' Stroke.
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Q e l Boards and Ccmnittees (continued): l l President, The New York State Coalition of People with Disabilities; ' Public Felations Coordinator, Disabled in Action of. Metropolitan New York; ; Member, Mvisory Ccmnittee, New York Metropolitan Museum of Art; ' Consumer Panelist, Very Special Arts Festival, New York State Departnent of Education; Member, American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities. Ccnsumer Panelist, Conference on the PsycholocJi cal Inpact of Disability, New York University. , Member, . Equal Brploynent Opportunity Mvisory Board, Cornell University. Chairman, New York City Council..for the International Year of Disabled Persons. O e 9 O e
.,...% .. g .
l Publications: e: I Anderson, S. W., & Beh, W. (1968).. 'Ihe reorganization of verbal mmary in child-hood. Journal cf Verbal I. earning & Verbal Behavior, 7, 1049-1053. j Anderson, S. W. (1970). N intecer concept anong. school children in New England. Cuernavaca, Mexico: CIDOC Cuaderno #1006, 69 pp. Anderron, S. W.,& Jaffe, J. (1971). Projections between noncry codes.and sme speech events not derivable fran stinulus-response theory. Mathematical Bio-sciences, 12, 303-320. Anderson, S. W.,& Jaffe, J. (1972).. h. definition, detection.and timing of vo-calic syllable = in speech signals. , Sci. Rept. No.12, Dept. Comn. Scis. , New York State Psychiatric Institute. Anderson, S. W.,& Jaffe, J. (1973). Eye novementibias and ear preference as in . dices of speech lateralization in brain. Sci. Rept. No._15, Dept. Ctrrm. Scis. , New York State Psychiatric Institute. Jaffe, J., Anderson, S. W., & Rieber, R..W. (1973).~ Research and clinical ap . . proaches to disorders of speech rate. Journal of Camunication Disorders, 6_, 225-246. Zeldenberg, P. , Jaffe, J. , Clark, W. C. , Anderson, S. W. , Chin, S. , & Malitz, S. (1973). Effects of oral administration.of tetrahydrocannabinol on mencry, speech 'and perception of thermal stinulation. Omprehensive Psychiatry,1,4,, g <g No. 6, 549-556. W U Anderson, S. W. (1974). A note on Wittgenstein*s inductive nethod. In: A. Fre-mantle (Ed.), A primer of linquistics. New York: St. Martins, pp. 225-226. Anderson, S. W. (1975). Ballistic control of rhythmic articulatory novements in natural speech. In: D. R. Aaronson & R. W. Piahar (Eds.), Develomental psy-cholincuistics and comunication disorders. Annals of the New York AcMamy of Sciences, 263, 236-243. Anderson, S. W., & Jaffe, J. (1976).. Speech timing characteristics of normal native speakers of English in New York City. Sci. Rept.. No.16, Dept. Ccmn. Scis., New York State Psychiatric Institute. Anderson, S. W. (1977). Language related asynmetries of eye novement'and evokal l potenH ni s. In: S. R. Harnad, R. W. Doty, L. Goldstein, J.'Jaynes & G. Kraut-hamer (Eds.), Lateralization in the nervous system. New York: kndamic Press, pp. 403-428. l .,' Anderson, S. W. , & Ibdwall, F. N. (1977). &nlar timing control in spontaneous l speech. Journal of the AcousHeal Society of America, 62, Suppl. No.1, 564. Anderson, S. W., Podwall, F. N., & Jaffe, J. (1978) ., Speech timing deficits in dyslexia. Sci. Rept. No.17, Dept. Cann. Scis., New York State Psychiatric Institute. I Jaffe, J., Anderson, S. W., &JStern,.D. N. (1979)'. Conversational. rhythms.. In: D.' R.'.Aaronson & R. W. Rieber (Eds.), Psycholinguisuc research:'inplications & applications. Hillsdale, N.J. : Erlbaum, Ch. 13. g ln V Jaffe, J., & Anderson, S. W. (1979). Camunication rhythms and the evolution of i language. In: A. W. Siegman & S. Feldstein (Eds.) , Of speech and tine. Hills-
- dale, N.J.
- Erlbaum, pp. 17-22.
- Anderson, S. W. (1981). Vowel timing and organization of articulatory sequences in l jargon aphasia. In: J. Brown (Ed.), Jarconaphasia. New York, MMamk Press, l pp. 295-304. ,
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PARKS, RECREATION & CONSERVATION DEPT. CRUGERS, NEW YORK 10521 CHARLES G. DiGIACOMO Telephone: (914) 739 4301 ns: Supervisor JACK PETTERSEN Supenntendent June 3, 1982 I have been the Superintendent of the Parks, Recreation and Conservation Department for the Town of Cortlandt for over eight years. Previously I was the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation for the Village of Ossining for three years and Supervisor of Recreation for the Oceanside School District for three years. Currently I reside at 1518 Washington Street, Peekskill, New York and have no other family in the immediate area.
The Town of Cortlandt runs a number of campa, playgrounds and day play centers from July 6th through August 13th. These recreation activities take place between the hcurs of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. on a five day a week basis. These activities will range from general camp activities to specific sports activities to teen trips, covering a wide range of events. The Town operates a camp and programs for mentally and physically handicapped clients during this same summer period. ,] How many working parents who are among our camp population is unknown to us. Our activities take place throughout the entire Town at numerous locations.
All of our staff have been tested and meet all New York State laws concerning the operation of such activities. Our ratios range from 1 to 1 to as high as 20 to 1 for our older groups. The New York State Health Code requires that all of our camps have a person trained in first aid and at some of our camps we have a registered nurse on staff. Currently the Town has first aid supplies at all of its camp locations as prescribed by law. The Town also has available to it the use of eleven buses for transportation [ in case of an emergency. In such an emergency, our Department would be involved with the Town's own emergency plans. l Last year we filled out a questionnaire sent to us by a firm hired by PASNY or i Con Edison concerning our camps. In return we have received some instructions in
- case of a nuclear emergency.
l There have been no meetings between the Recreation Department and parents of the children who attend our camps. I might add that this would be of great difficulty to do. In case of an emergency we would receive orders from the Town's Disaster Control Center. It is believed that we would take the campers to a reception center outside of the ten mile radius. Our response would be to do whatever is ordered by the Control Center. We have some communication between this Department and the Center by radio. We do not know how parents and campers would be reconciled. t I
ange 2 We do not have food and shelter per se for all of our campers for any prolonged period of time. I do not know if the reception centers are aware that the procedure we are to follow in the event of a nuclear emergency is to transport our campers to their site.
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/ Jack Pettersen Suparintendent JP/al
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CITY OF PEEKSKILL CITY HALL PEEKSKII.L. N. Y.10566 The City of Peekskill Recreation and Parks Department administers l leisure service programs for children and adults throughout the year. ! For example, during the summer of 1982, we expect threehundred elemen-tary school age children in the Woodside Day Camp and eighty 4 , 5 , and 6-year olds in our Kiddie Kamp. These programs have a staff-to-camper ratio of 8 to 1. We also conduct supervised play at four City playgrounds during the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Typically, three recreation leaders will be in charge of forty children per site each day the program runs. The Veterans Memorial Pool hosts about one hundred children each day in swim instruction programs and five hundred children during afternoon fue swim. Although we try to discourage the practice, the fact is that m children and young teenagers are frequently left to swim unsuparvised (g except by the Recreation Department lifeguards. For teenagers during the sumer we sponsor tennis lessons, roller-skating parties, ball leagues, Teen Adventure Camp and Recreation Cen-ters. The recreation leaders in our sumer programs are skilled and hard-working, but they are basically teenagers who have not been trained to react in the kind of emergency with which we would be faced if an acci-dent occurred at Indian Point. During the school year the Recreation and Parks Department has after- ' school programs for children, such as drama, dancing, gymnastics, guitar, basketball, rollerskating, and much more. These programs are taught by adults and are located at schools and other public buildings. On a busy Saturday, depending on the season such as during baseball or basketball times, we might have six hundred children involved in our activities. Most parents are not present, but they drop their children off at the site. As in every cross-section of the population, some of the children involved in these activities have allergies and take medication. It is a very serious responsibility to supervise this number of young people, and our department is not equipped to evacuate the children in our care. The Recreation and Parks Department owns four buses and three vans, two station wagons and some park maintenance vehicles. These vehicles would be used in any emergency evacuation, but which population will need
() 2 O them most is a decision which will have to be made en the spot. The City of Peekskill has made extensive efforts to develop a disaster emergency res,90nse plan and has assigned the Recreation and Parks Department a role. That plan involves the sheltering concept and only lim ,trans-portation. [ wI e Stephen L. Elkhts, Superirttendent Recreation and Parks DepaMmertt s a
e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND_LIGENSING BOARD t-(n) Docket Nos. In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) 50-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286 SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) June 7, 1982 TESTIMONY OF: ALEX GROMACK ON BEHALF OP: RCSE / PARENTS / HESPAC RELATING TO CONTENTIONS:3.1, 3.2, 3.6, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 I am Senior Recreation Leader with the Town of Clarkstown, Parks and Recreation Department, as well as a member of the Transportation Advisory Council of Rockland County (appointed by the Rockland County Legislature). Inbothcapacitiesmydutiesincludeservice[khepublic, (~') responding to their needs, concerns and welfare. v The Clarkstown Parks Board and Recreation Commission sponsors and conducts a year-round program of activities, events and services for the children and adults of the comm-unity under full-time professional supervision. The majority of these programs are conducted at Recreation and School facilities located within the ten-mile EPZ. These programs and activities are attended by pre-school-age children, elementary-age youth, teens, young adults, right up to Senior Citizens. And the vast majority of these participants must provide their own transportation to and from our programs. Many are often dropped off and then picked up at the con-
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clusion of the program. Meanwhile,the driver either goes to work,
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- is off shopping (possibly out of the County), or countless ggg other reasons for not being around. Under no circumstance is any emergency transportation provided or anticipated for these people in case an emergency were to occur.
Purthermore, as amember of T.A.C. (Transportation Advisory Council) we have no plans for taking care of these needs via public or private transportation. It is impossible to have thousands of buses on stand-by, waiting to evacuate these people during an emergency. Information concerning the above mentioned problems and concerns does not exist in the public sector. There is no information on a Town or " program" basis which deals with how parents, next of kin, etc. will be in-structed in what to do or what would be done in the type of lll emergency we are talking about. There is no information or instruction to staff explain-ing their role in such an emergency. Do we really believe staff will stay around waiting for transportation that is not going to come, rather than rush to their own families? In short, there is a definite breakdown of communication, of public information, of staff instructions and there is no provision for transportation for the many citizens who par-ticipate in the many recreational programs and activities pro-vided in the Town. Programs and activities are scheduled on a daily basis. O
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_.A1.92_D.rgaitch. - 3 of ten starting before 9: 00 a.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m. - Should a serious accident requiring evacuation occur.during these hours, when many residents--ranging in age from pre-school to Senior Citizens--are away from their homes, I don't see how total confusion could not be avoided. Supporting data, attendance figures, etc. to follow promptly. A V I l l l l l O l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) )
) 50-247 SP Fo#ER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) 50-286 SP (Indian Point Unit 3) )
June 7, 1982 TESTIMONY OP: Judy Kesselman, Coordinator of Suburban Schools. Tiorati Workshop ON BEHALF OF Resp / PARENTS RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.7, 4.4, 4.7 We are an educational center with a large building near Lake Tiorati in Harriman State Park. Each day groups of up to sixty children come by bus for 7_ the day for educational activities planned by one of our staff and the children's teachers. Our staff feels capable of handling normal emergencies that can occur when you take children hiking in the park. We have taken Red Cross first aid courses ar.d can handle accidents which fortunately seldom occur. However, the enormity of the situation in the event of an accident at Indian Point seems bey 6nd coping. Sometimes the bus remains parked outside the building at other-times it goes back to school and returns later in the day to pick up the children. But what would I do in the> event of such an accident. If the bus is there, send them home? To Manhattan or the Bronx or Westchester (across which bridge?) or Orange or Rockland County? , to an evacuation center? -s Keep them in the building? What pratection would it be? Iv)
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RCSE witness Judith Kesselman - 2 O If there is no bus, what do I do then?" How long would it be g before someone would come? What about food? What if groups are scattered in the woods? Should they return to the build-ing or seek shelter? I have no training to deal with the hazards of radiation. What would be the safest way to deal with the children who are my responsibility? I have never received any information as to what I am supposed to do. Our phone rings with the first thunder clap. What would harpen in a real emergency? I would also have concerns about my own family: my mother, who lives in Peekskill and has no car and needs a wheelchair, and the rest of my family in Rockland.- Would I go home?, or to Spring Valley High School (my "home" evacua-tion center)?, or my house? h Judy Kesselman O
, Holon Bnigooy:n Journoy'o End Rocd f Croton, N.Y. 10520 (914) 271-6513
( I am a registered tiarse, a certified Lamaze (or natural child-birthteacher,awifeandthemotherofa10yearoldboyanda12 year old girl. I have lived within 10 miles of Indian Point for 13 years. During my college years I studied the growth and development of biological cells, the basic building blocks of each of our bodies. I learned how fragile and delicate life is, and how conditions must be right for normal cellular growth to take place. I learned that the quickly growing cells of infants and children are much more susceptible to environmental factors than the more slowly changing cells of an adult. As a nurse, I frequently see the devestation of parents who are unable to produed a viable collection of cells and I have grieved with them over their miscarriages. I also care for O and grieve with families afflicted with the horrors of cancer - the o ultimate cellular aberation. Most of us are casual about radiation, having yearly dental x-rays, multiple x-rays of backs or limbs, and deliberate exposure to the harsh rays of the sun. As a professional nurse, I know that radiation from any source is nothing to be casual about. Like most health workers I am vehemently opposed to any " routine" x-ray, whether it be for admission to a hospital, back x-rays for a job, or un annual dental chec3-up. The public is no longer encouraged to have a chest film at a mobile x-ray unit . Professionals concerned about the cumulative effects of medical radiation technology order such tests only after conservative evaluation. Although I have long been aware of the dan 6ers of radiation, (} I assumed I felt relatively comfortable living near Indian Point. that it was being responsibly operated and carefully monitored and
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- 3 lon B 1gosycn , 2, that there were no heath hazards to my family from the plant. I no longer feel comfortable. I have become increasingly disturbed by what I've read in the local papera about the frequency of releases of radioactivity into our air and water. The reassurances of the Health Commissioner that "there were no health effects" from a so-called minor release of radioactivity, don't reassure me. As a health professional I know that the calculation of dose levels of medication, as well as radiation,must take into account many factors and must be determined individually. How much radiation is too much - for a 70 year old man who has spent his life working on a tractor out in l
the blazing sun all day, for a dental hygientist who doesn't always bother to step all the way out of the room when x-raying a patient, for , the 6 year old who's already been x-rayed for a possible broken bone and now has a compound fracture requiring tho series of films, or for the unborn baby in a mother's womb? How much is too much?? Nobody O P knows for sure. Nor 'isa: ever revealed to us in a meaningful way exactly how much radiation is involved in the regularly scheduled releases or in the increasing number of accidental releases from Indian Point. If we get too much radiation, when will the results show up - after it has accumulated in the body for 10 50 years? The medical community recognizes that there is no safe level for radiation. It is my responsibility as a nurse, a mother, and as a Lamaze Childbirth Educator to be concerned about the developing child. Much time in class is spent on the effects of diet, drugs, smoking, alcohol, and radiation on the unborn child. As parents we make every effort to eliminate harmful environmental factors; we can eliminate harmful drugs from our lives and increase the nutritional quality of the foods we eat, but we have no control over the amount of radiation the unborn child receives from the regularly seneduled releases from Indian Point. People have expressed concern about
{' 1 Hulon Balgooycn i 3 the safeguards for the gene' tic engineering tbat goes\ on' in a labor-O atoreiwhetebouttheseneticensineerin,thet1eseg,enin,rish, here in the shadov' of Indian Point? How is our' basic cellular mnterial being changed by Arradiation? What' kind of mutations are we producind? What, kind of effects will these. mutations have on future generations? t4hhearthat10%ofthepohalationoftheU.S. lives within.60 miles'of Indian Point; logic tells us that At is also 10% of the future population. That's a lot of unborn babies! Have c,n w you laeen in a grocery store at 10 o' clock 4 Thursday morning and looked around at the numbers of pregnant women?! After more than 8 years of working professionally with expectant p w nts ,
, oI know that pregnancy is at best an extremely stressful time. Every pardnt wants a healthy child, and every parent worries about having an unhealthy child. Whenacouplebiksmadethedecisiontohavea O child - a difficult decision for many in today's economically, politi-callyandenvironmentanyuncerteaworld-phey..doallwithintheir power to ensure that their offsp' ring will be healthy?and safe. I find that most expectant couples do not want to think about the' s genetic anomalies or future cellular damage - auchi as cancers - caused by radiation. Psychologists, tell us that when soraething is over-whelming, frightening or out 31 controll, the common tendency is to ignore it.
Living within 10 - or 25 s- or even 70 miles of Indian Point we must face the reality of regularly scheduled radiation releases and the very real probat131ty of an increase in number and severity 3 of incidents. 'As a gurse and ris a mother, I'm scared. Each morning when I send my children off to school, I wonder if it's the last time I'll kiss them good-bye. When they go3aff<to a Little League game, to a music lesson, or to play at a frien'd's house, I wonder if that's the last time I'll see them. Of course I know that we are
Halen B?lgooy;n 4 , finite beings and will die some day. Let's just hope'not all of us die one day! I take reasonable precautions to insure that dc6th will not come to my family before it must: we look before crossing streets, we Wear seat belts in the car, we have a smoke detector in the house -( a non-ionizing type rather than the more usual kind which releases small amounts of radiation). I feel I MUST do something about the insidious and everpresent danger of Indian Point. I, like thousands of others, have too long been overwhelmed by the threat and I've been unable to face it and speak out. The lives of my children have been seriously affected by their proximity to Indian Point. At ages 10 and 12 they are well aware of what is going on. Indian Point is often the topic of dinner table conversations, and as often as not, they initiate the subject. They are anxious to move from this area even though it would mean leaving their life-long friends, because they feel so insecure and frightened. O Their fear colors their perceptions of their whole daily existance. It is my responsibility as a parent to deal with their fear, to let them express it; it serves them no good to be passive and to try to deny their fears. In order to get all the children to the Croton schools, some buses have to make two trips. My children easily recognize the folly of claiming to be able tu ivacuate all of Croton's students to White Plains in the event s ' 1 'jor accident at Indian Point. Our son is su upset that ne is ainsidering an evacuation plan of hia l own, and it frightens me as much as the officially proposed plan. l l ff his teacher won't let him run from the room, he plans to throw a l desk through the classroom window and run home (4 miles) as fast as ggg l he can! "his fight-flight response is a normal reaction to stress, l and of course a 10 year old wants to go home, where he feels safe and secure. But the response frightens me. I feel the results of
, Halen Balgooyen 5 his 10 year old reasoning could have disasterous effects if the sirene blow - or if he mistakes a regular fire siren for an Indish Point alarm.
1 I wonder what provisions have been made.for children who are away from school on class trips? Are the authors of proposedievacuation plans aware of the large numbers of children who are away from school grounds on many days? Are they aware of the huge variety of places i the children go on trips - from our local nature center to a New York City museum? What plans are there for them in the event of a radio-logical emergency? Will they be taken from New York city, for instance,
- back to their designated evacuation school in White Plaine , or to a j safer, less radioactive but unknown and undesignated place in New
! Jersev" I worry that I would never see my family again if there were an emergency. The proposed evacuation plan calls for members of my i family to go to four different sites in 3 different areas based on our work and school locations. Why would my children be evacuated south-east to White Plains? The prevailing wind often blows in the direction of White Plains, and, thus, the radiation plume would likely go toward White Plains. White Plains is a heavily populated area. What sort of conditions will be found there? Will it be a place of turm'il? o Will the citizens of southern Westchester be reassured by official pronouncements that only those within the 10 mile radius need to evacuate, or will reason prevail as they realize that radioactive fallout would not be confined within a magical and arbitrary 10 mile
- limit. If my family could be safely evacuated, I wonder how we
; (]) could ever be reunited. I avoid driving to White Plains even under normal conditions because I can't handle the crowds, the traffic, the confusion. How would I ever manage to pick up my children from
I , Holon Balgooysn 6e a school whose location I don't know and probably couldn't find. Who would pump the gasoline to keep my car running, if, indeed, O I could move the car against the tide of people exiting from southern Westchester and New York City. I am frightened by the Peekskill Evening Star's report of a Yorktown School Board - PASNY - Con Ed informational meeting that was held May 12. After reading the article 1 have no trust that officials will sound the alarm if there is a major accident at Indian Point. According to a FASNY spokesman, our county Executive would have to make a decision to evacuate if it is judged that there is a big enough release to be a threat, and if there is thought to be enough time to evacuate an area as densely populated as ours. PASNY tells us that a more likely selection of the County Executive would be to " shelter" us in our home communities. I thought fall-out shelters went out with the 60's; they couldn't work then and they can't work now. No mention is made in the Evening Star's brief article that we would have to forage > for radioactive food, breath in radioactive air and d rink radioactive water. The sheltering plan at least has the advantage of keeping our family unit intact - til death do us part. It's ironic to me that all the negative thoughts and feelings we and our children have about Indian Point are so very similar to those feelings most people reserve for thinking about nuclear war. What we're talking about here is supposed to be the peaceful atom! , Since evacuation, or " shelter" are hollow dreams, I believe that the physical and psychological health of the community - within 10, 25 70 or more miles of Indian Point - would be dramatically improved with the closing of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Plant. Through (gg my study and work as a registered nurse I am convinced that the health of the unborn child would improve. As a mother I know the future of
Helen B 1gooyen 7 O =7 on11 area o=1a de drisa ter ithout **e thre
- or oe11u1er a ese duetoplannefrunplannedradiationleaksandwithouttheconstant stress and worry of a possible evacuation. And as c. human being I
! know that the psychological stress of all of us in the Indian Point neighborhood would be lessened if the plants were closed, so we could get about the business of pursuing life, liberty, and happiness. i l n 6+ =r e . 2 at (- i
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73; 1 My name is Kathe Saunders. I live at [] v 6 Palmer Avenue, Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520. I am ! a single parents my children are aged 11 and 15. I have been employed by the Croton Recreation Department for two years. I run an after-school program, from 3:00 to 5:00 P.M., four or five afternoons per week during the regular school year. I have approximately 45 children enrolled in groups of up to 15. The children are in grades preschool to five. I am also Director of the Croton Recreation Department Day Camp for 4-6 year olds. Last summer there were approximately 55 children enrolled. The camp runs for 6 weeks. Children attend from 9:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. O Parents are responsible for providing transporta-tion, both for the after-school program and the camp. Many parents work outside of the EP2 and make arrangements for their children to be dropped off and picked up. I am the only responsible adult on the premises for both programs. Camp counselors are high school students. They are basically counselors in training. .They have had no emergency or disaster training, and I do not think that they i
. 6 Saunders 2 O have the maturity or experience to handle a nuclear crisis. I have no assurance, verbal or in writing, that they would even stay with the children. I do not know what instruc-tions they have been given by their parents. I have no communication system at my disposal at all times. I have no equipment or supplies for shelter-ing, if that becomes necessary. I have no transportation available. I do not know if there is a designated recep-tien center for the summer program. I have had no disaster training or instructions about what to do in a radiological emergency. I have never been approached by the utilities or the consulting firm about my programs and evacuation needs, nor has my supervisor. I do not know whether I should or would wait for all the parents to converge. I have not discussed emergency planning at all with parents. In the past I have had children in my programs who have handicaps, asthma, and behavioral problems. I do not know how I would be able to handle a situation where a child might have a severe asthma attack; the rest of the children need to be taken care of, and my usual procedures O
o a s 1 ( Saunders 3 l 1 (phone, doctors, back-up personnel) would be unavailable because of a radiological emergency. At this point, it seems entirely unrealistic to assume that I could successfully evacuate 55 4-6 year olds. While I feel a strong moral responsibility towards the children in my care, I also feel the tenable dichotomy of wanting to protect my own children. I have told my own children to leave wherever they are and find me (no matter what other people tell them). I have heard the sirens go off so frequently that I wouldn't know which was a real signal. I attended a meet-ing in Croton-Harmon High School in May 1981 sponsored by the PTSA. A representative of PASNY, Bowen Lindgren, spoke about the evacuation plan. Instead of being reassured by the information, I became more convinced that evacuation was impossible. O
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> \ ! l My name is Kathe Saunders.
{} I live at 6 Palmer Avenue, Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520. I am a single parents my children are aged 11 and 15. I have been employed by the Croton Recreation Department for two years. I run an after-school program, from 3:00 to 5:00 P.M., four or five afternoons per week during the regular school year. I have approximately 45 children enrolled in groups of up to 15. The children are in grades preschool to five. I am also Director of the Croton Recreation Department Day Camp for 4-6 year olds. Last summer there were approximately 55 children enrolled. The camp runs for 6 weeks. Children attend from 9:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. O Parents are responsible for providing transporta-tion, both for the after-school program and the camp. Many parents work outside of the EP2 and make arrangements for i their children to he dropped off and picked up. I am the only responsible adult on the premises for both programs. Camp counselors are high school students. They are basically counselors in training. .They have had no emergency or disaster training, and I do not think that they O
k Saunders 2 O have the maturity or experience to handle a nuclear crisis. I have no assurance, verbal or in writing, that they would even stay with the children. I do not know what instruc-tions they have been given by their parents. I have no communication system at my disposal at all times. I have no equipment or supplies for shelter-ing, if that becomes necessary. I have no transportation available. I do not know if there is a designated recep-tion center for the summer program. I have had no disaster training or instructions about what to do in a radiological emergency. I have never been app oached by the utilities or the consulting firm about my programs and evacuation needs, nor has my supervisor. I do not know whether I should or would wait for all the parents to converge. I have not discussed emergency planning at all with parents. In the past I have had children in my programs who have handicaps, asthma, and behavioral problems. I do not know how I would be able to handle a situation where a child might have a severe asthma attacks the rest of the children need to be taken care of, and my usual procedures O
o a / O Seunders 3 (phone, doctors, back-up personnel) would be unavailable because of a radiological emergency. At this point, it seems entirely unrealistic to assume tbat I could successfully evacuate 55 4-6 year olds. While I feel a strong moral responsibility towards the children in my care, I also feel the tenable dichotomy of wanting to protect my own children. I have told my own children to leave wherever they are and find me (no matter what other people tell them). I have heard the sirens go off so frequently that I wouldn't know which was a real signal. I attended a meet-ing in Croton-Harmon High School in May 1981 sponsored by the PTSA. A representative of PASNY, Bowen Lindgren, spoke about the evacuation plan. Instead of being reassured by the information, I became more convinced that evacuation was impossible, fkYh b O
() Joan H. Fine 150 Harwood Ave. No. Tarrytown, N.Y. 10591 June 3, 1982 Ms. Fhyllis Rodriguez 64 Elmore St. Croton, N.Y. Dear Ms. Rodriguez In response to your request to the Girl Scouts of destchester*Putnam about our concerns over a nuclear accident at Indian Point I would like to submit the following information. Approximately 2,000 Girl Scoutu between the ages of 6 an 4 17 rauide and hold meetings within 10 miles of Con adison Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. Girl Scout croups or troops range from 10-to 24 girls and generally meet with 2 adults. Most groups meet after school in ucho;13, churches or community buildings for approximately 2 ncurs per week. \ s' so outa neither Con Edison or any other agency has ad,ined the dirl Jcout council regarding the preferred utepa to be taken, the responsiblity that the leader will have to assume and what legal ramifications both the leader and the council are undertaking in trying to protect the children in our care in a time of poten;tal danger. ut e atac very concerned for the many unsupervised late..-key chlidren in that part of destchester. An cr.orrency at the power plant could leave these children totally helpleus. Sincerly yours,
%I0 $ r-7 k.)b'f 't
, 'Joan H. Fine, President dirl Scouts of Westchester*
Putnam ,7
A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ! In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) 50-247 SP 50-286 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) )
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) June 7, 1982 (Indian Point Unit'3) ) TESTIMONY OF: LINDA CO MD4BER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ROCKLAND COUNTY GIRL SCOUT COUNCIL, INC. ON BDIALF OF: RCSE RELATING TO CONTENTIONS: 3.1. 3.2. 3.4. 3.7. 4.2 My name is Linda Co. I reside in New City, New York and am a Registered Occupational Therapist. I currently have O outdoor leadership responsibilities in three Girl Scout Troops at three different age levels, (Jr. Cadette and Senior ages ranging from grade 4 through grade 12) have worked on our campsite as a summer staff member, and have spent a good deal of time " troop camping" over the past ten years. Rockland County Girl Scout Council's office is located at 211 Red Hill Road, New City, N.Y. (zone 35F). Our campsite, Camp Addison f Boyce, is located on Mott Farm Road in Tompkins Cove (zone 30A). Communic'ation is by public telephone. Our campsite is used in four very different ways:
- 1. Hiking and pichicking occurs weekdays and weekends year round. Individual troops and their leaders spend f
part or all of a day in camp or use camp as a base bV point for hikes into the park cystem. Leaders are r l responsible for advising our Ranger of their projected l
c l k RCSE witn^ss Linda Co - 2 whereabouts, but troops can and do get temporarily lost. There is no system of communication with groups out on the trails. The average number in such groups is from ten to thirty. There could conc} O ably be np_ cars for them in camp.
- 2. Troop Camping begins in late August and runs through May. Individual troops and their leaders spend two to three days and nights, usually weekends (some-times mid-week holidays) in rustic cabins and/or tents. The maximum number of people in camp is
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about one hundred. There would be about ten cars. 3 Use of camp by outside groups (schools) occurs on a contract basis week-days during the school year. The maximum number of children and adults present O at one time is approximately two hundred. They are transported by their local school buses, which nor-mally do not remain in camp.
- h. Day Camp is in session in July and August. One I
hundred-fifty to one hundred seventy-five girls and adults are bused in and out daily. They may remain 4
, in camp or hike into the Park system or te points of interest in the surrounding area. An average of four l
to six cars is in camp. Girl Scouting's Health and Safety Standards are publishe/. in " Safety Wise", from which I quote, a " positive attitude toward accident prevention. . . . involves a logical, natural way g l
r RCSE witness Linda Co - 3 O of anticipating risks and responding appropriately. " With this in mind, we have reviewed the Rockland County Radiological Energency Response Plan (RCRERP) Procedure for our "Special Facility", and the booklet, " Indian Point. Emergency Planning, and You," and wish to advise you that we have the following difficulties: Re The RCRERP:
- 1. (2.0) we have no confidence in the Nuclear Facility Operators' ability or willingness to comply.
- 2. (4.1, 5 1, 6.1,) Our council office is regularly staffed only during business hours, and the telephone at camp is not always covered. Communication between office and camp in an emergency of this nature by
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public phone lines is precarious at best. . 3 (4.1.1.2, 5 1.1.2, 6.1.1.2) Groups out on the trails are frequently out of communication for six to eight hours. Even a runner who knew where to look might have difficulty finding them in half that time.
- 4. (4.1.2.1, 5 1.2.1, 6.1.2.1) Depending on the timing,
, Troop Campers and School groups might have as much l as two days' worth of food.
Hikers and day campers routinely have a sandwich and drink.only. ! (5 2.1.1, 6.2.1.1) 5 Our cabins and lodge building are very rustic. There are fireplaces with huge chimneys, knot holes, doors and windows that do not l () I
RCSE witness Linda Co 4 O fit closely. The lodge has only plastic sheeting and shutters over screening for winter protection. In short, " indoors" for these purposes is little better than outdoors. Sanitary facilities are all outdoors.
- 6. (5 2.1.2, 6.2.1.2, 6.3 1 3) "ad hoc respiratory protection"! Six year olds! For how long? How consistently? While they' sleep?!
7 (5 2.1 3, 5 3 1.2, 6.2.1 3, 6.3 1.2) We have no base-ment, large room without windows, hallways or indiv-idual rooms.
- 8. (6.3 2.1) As previously stated, groups for which we are responsible are frequently unreachable. Further-more, our standard evacuation procedure involves qgg gathering outside. Also, as previously stated, none of our buildings provide much protection.
With regard to the General Evacuation Procedure ( Attachment 1 SF 1 - 1)
- 1. We do not have, nor have we been educated about " Tone alert radio receivers"
- 2. (C.1 a.) If the park trails are to be cleared indep-endently, it will be impossible for the Ranger, Camp
- Administrator or School Coordinator to determine that everyone for whom he or she is responsible is accounted for, before leaving the site. If the park trails are not cleared (fully, successfully and reliably--including persons lost and not on trails) then I point a- gain to O
RCSE witness Linda Co - 5 O v the problem of communicating with these people. It takes jiiEe to walk out--even if they hear and recognize the sirens--(not guaranteed in the mountains). Will the evacuation of the entire camp wait for them? Will the buses assigned sit idle waiting? Or come back--maybe? 3 (C.1.c.) (egress) We believe that here a major break-down occurs. First it is legitimate to speculate on whether bus drivers (and other emergency workers) will actually enter and reenter the ERPA. Second, no provision has been made for hikers and picnUckers. School groups are presumably to be () fetched by their own buses, but nowhere do we see this in print. Haverstraw Transit which regularly serves the Day Camp, and the Clarkstown School Buses, which are assigned to evacuate troop campers, make multiple runs daily. We are dubious about the buses' ability to return from a reception center "against the tide", particularly when we are so far north of our designated center and so close to Indian Point.
'It is also possible that buses might be contracted out of the locality during the day, and not be available*when needed.
i Furthermore, as a National Girl Scout standard, to which we are conmitted by charter, and for insurance purposes, we t
RCSE witness Linda Co - 6 ll) Maintain certain adult-to-girl ratios: 1 adult to 6 Brownies (grades 1-3) 8 Juniors (grades 4-6) 12 Cadottes (grades 7-9) 24 Seniors (grades 10-12) Therefore, if the average auto can transport five girls, we would have left over, dependent upon buses, one Brownie, three Juniors, seven Cadettes and nineteen Seniors, for every adult driver. In addition, our standards require that
- 1. an adult be with girls at all times
- 2. an adult be in charge of the group (in addition to O
the bus driver) on buses. Effectively then, our adults would have to accompany on the buses the children for whom they are responsible, render-ing their cars useless and the plan's figure of ten cars in camp, meaningless. Finally, Camp Addison Boyce is populated by children from all over the county--and occaggionally groups from out-of-state and even from Canada. Unless some of these children are to be deliver.ed to their homes outside the ERPA, their parents, who are not affected by this plan and presumably have not received mailings, would not know where to find them.
- 6. (III) On the first day of our recent Clarkstown School strike I happened to be, to my greater edification and dismay, lll outside Festa Junior High School - C wing, at 10:00, having heard via the parental grapevine that things were out of control.
RCSE witness Linda Co - 7 O Things were unpleasant there that day, but _the children thought it was a lark. They did not comprehend the gravity of the situation, the potential for tragedyr nor were they particularly cooperative. Living as I do, adross the street from North High School, I will testify that the situation there was even more out of control. The notion of gathering large numbers of people.--many of them youngsters, into an obviously short-term, anonymous situation, with unenforceable limits, in the care of adults, not necessarily our own people, whose minds may be elsewhere, and wl.o may have had little sleep for some days, does not seem sensible. Little children will be fr_ightened, lost, and possibly abused. ** () 5 (Alert list) There is no listed telephone number for us. R_e " Indian Point. Emergency Planning and You" (1) The eirens have never been heard in the office and only very faintly in camp. Noise of children's activity or interference from i mountains would render this mode of warning unreliable.
.( 2 ) (pg. 5) As stated before, our buildings cannot be made airtight.
(3)(pg. 5). In winter, fireplaces are our only source of heat. (4) (pg. 5) By camp policy radios are not brought () to camp. Leaders in some types of emergencies use car radios, but that requires going outside.
RCSE witness Linda Co - 8 h (5) (pg. 5) Some of our kids come from inside the ERPA, some from outside. (6) (pg. 6) Troop campers and School groups would be well prepared vis-a-vis: " Leaving Home" with the exception of medicines and radio as noted above. Hikers, Picnickers, and Day Campers would be totally unprepared. A most serious problem would be lack of medication. (7) (pg. 7) Not within our area of difficulty but noted in passing: the question of teachers who have children staying until other teachers who have children can pick them up is a circular one, ggg (8) (pg. 15) Nowhere is potassium iodide mentioned. Girl Scout adults would not be allowed to administer it to girls in any event. In conclusion, we hope that our efforts are producing the kinds of girls and adults who would respond generously and quickly to an emergency of this nature. Please understand that from the very beginning Girl Scouting has endorsed the principle of preparation and planning. (We affirm that a work-able plan is needed. We recognize, however, that the time-frame imposed by our proximity to Indian Point may make attempt-ing to plan for a' worst-case accident an exercise in futility. ) With the best will in the world and unlimited resources, we would find this plan very difficult to implement. As it stands Ih the plan is sufficiently unrealistic as to be almost as great a peril as the one it attempts to address.
i 7(o : l Testimony of Phyllis V. Rodrigues l 6h hnee Aveme. '
, Croton, N.Y. 10520 June 2,1982 I have been a resident of Croton-on-Hudson for 8 years, a parent for Ib) years, and a recreational teacher of art to children for the past 2 years.
In June 177h when my family moved here, we were not aware of the existence of the Indian Point power station, or for that matter, of the dangers inherent in melear power generation. I always felt that any kind of man-eade radiation was to be avoided unless absolutely necessary, but I also had the notion left over from the 1950's that somehow the " peaceful atom" had a hture. For the past 5 years e blissml ignorance of melear power issues has been eroded by g reading, thinking, and reflection on the experiences of the nuclear power industry. I now feel very strongly that the continued ope-i ration of Indian Point II and III poses too many dangers to the sorrounding G population. Although I, like many of agr neighbors, are aware of the very likely risks to health posed by our melear plants, I address here only the , insurmountable tasks that emergency planning, i.e., mass evacuation, present
- for gaelf as a mother and teacher.
nbr daughter attends Croton Harmon High School and agr son attends Pierre Van Cortlandt Middle School. In the event of an evacuation call, each could be taken by bus to a different reception center in White Plains, according the plan drawn up by the utilities. Although this may sound simple, in practice it is not. First of all, the Croton Hannon schools have not been given any assurance that the Chappaqua Bus Company (which is outside the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) ) will actually have drivers to send into the EPZ to pick up our children. Second, if the buses do perform as expected by the planners, traffic back-ups may slow down the usual 30 mimte drive to 12 hours. Since O buses are not constructed of lead or double brick, many hours on the bus may lead to my children's absorbing a high dose of radioactivity. Just as I teach ngr children to avoid dangerous situations while swimming, bike riding, etc., s /
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Testimony of Phyllis V. Rodriguez - page 2 just as I question doctors or dentists very carefully before they take X-rays, and just as I give carefill thought to my children's health in preparing and I buying food, I question very strongly whether my children would be safe undae i the evacuation procedures that have been planned for them. Consequently, I would do agthing necessary to prevent their being placed on those buses. This presents another problem fe me. We are a one-car family, and Mondays to Fridays g lusband uses the car to coaute to work in the Bronx. If I couldn't get a ride with a neighbor or friend (and the tied up phone lines would probably prevent this), my children ard I would be dependent on public transportation to evacuate us. I' fear that if wo follow instructions we would be dramat4a=117 endangering our health because it could conceivably take a day for a bus to get to our corner (where we would be expected to wait while absorbing the air). of Traffic in and out /Croton is often slowed down to a crawl due to construction, g' icy conditions, heavy rains, fog, etc. We are not t= m na here about such "umsual" circumstances - just situations where every car and bus on the road, from Croton and from communities south and north of us are bogged down. The prospect of a major accident at Indian Point scares me, but it also worries y children. My children are worried about their future and live f with fear in their minds. A power failure in our neighborhood last year y caused y son to worry that Indian Point had " blown up", and the testing of sirens in thy of this year caused my daughter to rush her walk home to call the police and ask if there had been an accident at the plant. I was able to roassure y son because I know that we rarely receive power from Indian Point in Croton. ly daughter's case was different because all I could tell her was, " Don' t worry. If anything happens I'll gat you and keep you safe". I am very anxious to play down their fears and protect them, but I as stalling g for time. Evacuation for my family (and most others) would be virtually N
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Testimory of Phyllis V. Rodriguez - page 3 O. impossible from this village. I think that it is immoral to allow any community anywhere to live under such dangerous circumstances. . This past Spring I taught a Saturday morning class to 10 children at the Bennett Conservatory of thsic. ~ In September 1982 I will also have 2 sessions on Friday afternoons. I have not received any instmetions as to my responsibility if such an event were to occur, nor did I discuss it with the parents of children in the class before the session ended. However, my instinct would be to unite with agr own family. Some of the art class children come from outside Croton. I do not know if their parents would be able to get back to fetch them in the event of an emergency. I do not know if g conscimee would allow me to leave them there. But if I were to choose to take. them to y house or outside the EPZ, do I have the legal right to force a possibly unwilling child to go, even to try to keep him or her safe? The current energency plan and the brochure recently distributed to residents make such unrealistic assumptions about,where menbers of families are located at any given time, about what people are expected to reasonably do under mergency conditions, and about what public agencies in the county are capable of doing in an emergency, that the only feasible alternative is to close indlan Point until such time as the County and the utilities can produce a realistic, workable energency plan. I urge the ASLB and the NitC to pmtect our comrminities by closing down Indian Point until such a plan has been produced. [ M Pigr1fis V. Rodriguez o .
e 33 Lexington Driva 7~7 Croton-on-Hudson,14 June 3,1982 Nuclear Regulatory Commission " Hearings regarding Indian Point Evacuation Plan- 10 Mile area
Dear Sirs,
I am a f ree-lance artist and art teacher living in Croton-on-Hudson,lE. Most of the time I am home alone working in the studio. If the siren rings when I am in the showe I will not hear it. If I am asleep, I will probably hear nothing. W hurioand missed a clap of thunder the other night, so he'll hear nothing. Lhen an electric kiln is on cr I am using chemicals, I must use a very strong fan which blots out all noise. Our atfic fan does the same in warm weather People working at the plant may be felled by the sit, uation and not be able to trigger the alarm. The energy required for its operation may be electric and if the plant shuts down so will the sirens. When I have classes in my basement most of the studente sre children. I do not drive and cannot take them anywhere except by bus. The bus stop .iesignated for me to use is cn the corner, two blocks away, exposing us on the way. The driver has to take care of her own children probably, before she gets the bus, then she has to get to this area, going against traffic. The cars trying to get away may not let her in. Thus we may be waiting for a non-existent driver, risking further. exposure as we wait. Neighbors will pass us with fully loaded cars, if there is some space I will not know where the child I give them will end up. I will not be able to tell their parents where they are. Some of the parents will be in NYC at siren time, as my husband will probably be. Trains will use the tracks to get away from the area, not go to it. They will not be able to come home, the same situation will prevail on tho highways. Telephone service from the city is bad when times are normal, in an emergency it will be non-existent. If the weather is bad, a snow or rain stom or a heat wave, all processes will be more difficult. If there is no electricity, trains may not go at all. We own only our home, if we lose it we lose all. This entire area, where I have lived off and on since I was two years old, will be worthless. No one will buy our house, we may not be able to live in it. The entire area water supply will go bad, the Croton Dam a cesspool of radiation. We do not believe in incurring debts, do not buy on time, have no credit cards, I do not keep ext,ra money in the house. I will be cashless in an evacuation emergency. The l action banking box vill not operate, anyway I will not be able to get to it. The longer l one stays in the polluted area the more radiation one gets. i I will end up with no money, no home, a husband who is somewhere else or with me, rg ba with children who are bound to get panicy as they realize that their parents do not know where they are, a probably dead cat, and a situation which nay never actually get back to normal. Three days is a mere guess as to how long people would stay away. There is no guarantee that life could ever rnsume here. The emotional effect on the adults ani even more so the children will be pomanent. I do not believe that is possible to actually evacuate an area this congested without v any things goind wrong. The children no not bring extra clothing with them when they come to art class, food will run out .4n the shelters, uater may not be safe to drink. Doctors will net be where they are needo*l. Q. l l Moqva Berg Brnwn.
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Fc June 2, 1982 TESTIMONY OF SYLVIA G. deWARD As an artist and art teacher I am known as Syd Ginsberg. Legally, and as a parent, I am Sylvia G. deWard. I live in Croton. I have taken the time to write this because I am very concerned about nuclear power, and especially about Indian Point.
- I am here because I have had to deal with my child's fears that her life might be shortened or cut off by an accident at that plant and because we do not know what effect these fears will have on the lives of our children in the future. I have difficulty dealing with these fears because I believe they are legitimate.
As a mother I would, in a nuclear emergency, want to be
, with my child; and, she attends the PAG Program at the Fox Meadow Campus in Yorktown. -
.cnow of no. plans to return the children at the BOCES Tech Center to Croton or to get the parents to the Tech Center. 1 do know that during the " test" run earlier this year, the desi6 nated receiving centers in the plan in White Plains knew nothing about Croton school children being directed to them. I learned about this at a school board meeting.
I woult like to interject here: As I put this together l 1 have ,.sions of what the' roads here in Northern Westchester would l j be like in an emergency. It's an incredible picture. The roads can - not even now handle normal rush hour traffic without large backups. You can imagine what they would be like with everyone on the road. I often teach in an after-school program in District #3. I wonder what plans have been made for the children in my class and l in all the other after-school classes. Will we, students and teachers, be able to get back to our families? I doubt it. Our roads are just wide enou6h for two vehicles. How will we be able to move when all the people come out of their homes in a panic? ,
-2 In Desining I teach a Senior Citizens art class at the Community Center. Some of my students come with ,their spouses and some without. At'least one student has a husband almost completely j One student has a. wife in Croton, etc. How :
incapacitated at home. , will the planners get these people together? These people will not leave for so-called safety without one another. I am sare this is not an isolated case, so we will be left with pockets of people unable'or unwilling to leave without those closest to them. I have been talking, very briefly, about the people I come into contact with as a teacher and parent; but, in many of our families there are non-human members. Can we abandon them to the death and sickness from which we are running? I couldn't. Are there plans to accomodate those animals to whom we have made commit-
, ment? I doubt it. It may seem a trivial point, but I believe that carin6 for all living things is an indication of our humanity.
In conclusion, I really must say that I do not believe that there can be a plan to save anyone if there is a major accident at Indian Point. I am afraid that we who live in the vicinity of the plant have already lost years of our lives to it. The only reasonable s'olution, it seems to me, is to shut it down. N Sy via G. keWard
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79 ,, Helen Burnham
- Croton Free Library 171 Cleveland Drive Croton-on-Hudson, NY 10520 I am the Director of the Crotan Free Library,.a position I have held since 1968. My experience includes being a children's librarian in the Brooklyn and Seattle Public Libraries. My husband and I live in Croton.
There could be anywhere from one to fifty children under my super-vision on a given day. Children attend the library during school hours and after school as well as two evenings a week and on Sat-urdays. They come for class visits, story hour, reading, reference work, study, the selection of books, movies and special programs. We don't know how many have special problems, learning disabilities and physical and mental handicaps. We don't know how many use the library as a place to come after school while their parents are 7._x working, though we do know that some of the parents work as far away U as White Plains and New York City. Senior citizens from Springvale visit our library on Friday after-noons every other week. Other older people in the community come to the library at various times during the week. Besides myself, our staff consists of Nancy Rolnick, librarians Elizabeth Clarke, librarians Eleanor Cooper, senior clerks and Mary St. Leger, clerk. The staff is experienced and responsible, but there is no guarantee that under duress any one of us would not fall apart. We do not have disaster training nor are we privy to the special needs of the children and seniors who visit the library randomly in the way that the schools, for example, are cognizant of the particular needs of their pupils. We have received no instructions from Con Ed, PASNY, the NRC or the firm hired to develope the evacuation plan as to how to handle whatever V dependent persons might be in the library when a nuclear emergency struck. Were an alert condition called, we have no larder from which to feed people nor any provision for bedding people down. Should
1 e s.. the disaster be of such proportions that evacuation were demanded, no provision has been made for transporting the indeterminate number of children and seniors in the library at the time, nor has a reception center been designated as their destination. 7/aw &u/Ls>w O l i l l , 1
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h l ' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , d BEI' ORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l in the Matter of , l' CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK )s Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) g )t ,50-286SP
) l' POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ' )
(Indian Point Unit 3) ) ; TESTIMONY OF Gerald T. Kapusinsky ON BEHALF OF ' PARENTS s RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.7 s JUNE 1982
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I, Gerald T. Kapusinsky, Attendance Supervisor for the North Rockland Cent ral School District, have been in this capacity since 1974.
,-~, { hat during my service with the school districh I make home visits nearly
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every school day and have, found many situations yhere studentE are home in their apartment / house with or without the knowledge of their parents. That in the North Rockland Central School District the mean attendance , e is approximatel" 93%. This indicates that on any given day 7% of our student population are absent. The present statistics in the North Rockland area are such that 7225 (At-6 Report dated 5/21'/82) students are enrolled in school. t This figure does not include students attending Day Care centers, Private .:
,C and Parochial students within the area.
5 My concerns are such, that on any given day a probable figure of several i hundred children being home or in- the immediate area could cause a problem i f an I evacuation was necessary. f 1 1 x
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( ? Cerrld T. Kapusinsky ll s t
Hy name is David Siegel. I have served as the Superintendent of Schools
- In the Croton-llarmon School district since 1976. The Crotn-Harmon School district is within a ten (10) mile radius of the Indian Point Nuclear i facility. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the Hendrick Hudson School district, we are the closest school distr.ict to Indian Point. {
We have been aware of the concerns with regard to the safety of our student population in the event of a nuclear accident at Indian Point for several years. About two (2) years ago we lucame more aware of the planning that was being undertaken by the Parsons Drinckerhof f Consulting firm on behalf of Con Edison and the New York Power Authority related to " Evacuation of the Ten Mile Zone." I will not dwell on all of the concerns we have expressed as the planning has occurred. Certainly.some efforts were made to gain input and inform 3 tion , from those school districts 8 1 the immediate region. g i 1 would, however, like to go on record in expressing some very speci fic concerns that I have with regard to the nature of the plan, its development, and its adequacy or lack of adequacy. I do not believe that it is taking a defeatist's point of view to suggest that,under any circumstances,a mass evacuation, as suggested by the plan, can result in anything short of chaotic conditions. As we saw the plan being developed and those people responsible for its organization, we saw more and more and more evidence of .
" lack of fellow-through and communication". In essence, what I am saying is that people have roles to perform but the people who have important roles to perform have not all been advised of their responsibility nor are j there, to my knowledge, any laws which require these people to perform the
acts which the plan calls on them to perform. There is no enforcement.
In simple terms, the Croton Schools would be advised of a nuclear emergency by a telephone call fr ~om an official in a near by district. There is no back-up to the telephone communication system. If any back-up has been suggested, there are no monies to provide such back-up. We believe the phone lines would be very strained should an emergency occur and in our case (our phone systems are antiquated) we believe our phones would be unreliable. Sirens are sometimes heard and sometimes not heard. Radios may not be reliable i as a means of communication if the electrical system goes out. Portable radios may be owned by the local schools but are certainly not provided by the emergency planners. If communications become a problem, it will be ' difficult for the person in Croton, who is fi rst advised of the emergency, to pass that message along to each of the building principals as well as to the other schools on the phone chain. In summary, the comunication system is a weak one. If we are told to evacuate,Croton can provide enough buses, and hope that our drivers will be responsible enough to use them to evacuate all of our elementary school childrer.. The location for the evacuation is White Plains. There are many in Croton who have suggested that sending our children into a highly populated area is unwise. There are others in Croton Eho feel that the route our buses are asked to take would result in very lengthy delays.
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Page 2 I I 4 An outside bus company (the Chappaqua Bus Company) has been designated as the bus company who will evacuate our high school and middle school hl children. To the best of my knowledge there has been no contract between i ' the agency that the_Chappaqua.. Bus Company would be responsible to which would assure us that the company could be relied upon to provide emergency evacuation fdr our secondary children. We have communicated with the administrators of the host schools in White Plains who, presumably, would take care of our children once they were delivered to them. We have been advised by those administrators that they have received little or no direction concerning how long they would take care of our youngsters, who would supervise our youngsters and for how long, how our youngsters would be turned over to their parents or guardians and other concerns related to the safety of our children. Members of our professional staff, as well as parents, feel very uncomfortable with the many, many unanswered questions related to safe and efficient evacuation. We are unable to answer all of the questions that have been raised. Many of these questions have been forwarded to the consulting agency and the county officials and have continued to remain unanswered. While we would make every reasonable effort should there be a real emergency to cooperative in the evacuation plan as it currently exists, I must say that I have little confidence in its reality and will continue to have little confidence in its reality until those who are responsible for its development have provided more assurances in terms of the unanswered questions raised by parents, teachers and others regarding the safety of our children before, during and after the evacuation procedure. g
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- David S/SJetfci '
Superintendent of Schools DSS:hhr O
YORKTOWN CENTILLL SCHOOLS 2723 CHOMPOND HOAD YORKTOWN 11EIOllTH, NEW YORK 10598 V (914) 245 6028 BOARD OF EDUCATION
- Passioemt ,
CLsan Tausfess C. RICHARD OUNNE PAUL N. LEE LOUISE ELLIS Wca.Possioen? TasAsuman EDMUND J. LAVOIE BARGARA Of EHL ELIZABETH ZUSES DAVID LOMET SurensMTsNoGMT TERRY Sr. VINCENT o2. RICH ARD S. GREENE STEVEN WILLS BOARD OF EDUCATION STATEMENT ON THE INDIAN POINT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN Af ter carefully reviewing the Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and af ter sponsoring a district-wide meeting with representatives of the Power Authority of the State of New York, the Yorktown Central School District Board of Edula-tion believes that the present evacuation plan is neither feasible nor does it represent a workable option which would be considered viable for the protection and safety of the students, staff and residents in our district. Our conclu-sion, therefore, is that the proposed plan be, eliminated. In view of its many errors, the evacuation plan further serves at this time p only to undermine the credibility of the utilities with regard to the safe V operation of Indian Point. This document which has been proposed without consultation with local school districts is both unacceptable and functionally non-operable. Due to the nature of the highly populated communities surround-ing Indian Point and the inadequate roads, the Board of Education has serious doubts whether any workable evacuation plan can actually be developed for this area. Since one of our prime responsibilities is to protect the health and safety of our students, the following ten points represent some of the more glaring prob-lems which as yet remain unresolved by PASNY:
- 1. What authority does a superintendent have in mandating that staff go on buses that are evacuating students? We believe that legally we cannot mandate this action if staff decided to be with their own children.
- 2. What arrangements have been made for food, blankets, medical supplies, public health facilities and radiological detection equipment for per-sonnel at the reception centers?
- 3. If parents come to school tr. get their children during an evacuation, do we refuse them that right? As parents, we wouldn't want to be refused, but who will take care of the major traffic jams on major roads and on school sites when parents and buses arrive at the same time? New York City uses the word " gridlock" to describe stalled traffic, and we believe a
\j that word would apply here. The plan does not deal with a realistic con-cern: what are the radiological exposure dangers to our children stranded in traf fic jams? Are they really safer on buses attempting to leave the area?
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- 4. We have children in 14 schools located within the Emergency Planning Zone.
They will be transported to ten different reception centers. Many families
- have students in two or more of the schools. Since they will wind up in the triangle of White Plains, Hopewell Junction and the Connecticut border, how are parents exp9cted to retrieve their children? Are we again encour-aging " gridlock" on our narrow roadways? How long would students be at the triangle, and what happens to them after they arrive there?
- 5. Over a year ago we notified those in-authority that the French Hill School was deleted from the plan. That school which houses BOCES students and a number of ours is still deleted.
- 6. We see no arrangements for severely handicapped (wheelchair) students.
BOCES has approximately 25 and we have 9.
- 7. On Table 1 Page SCl-7, Item #5, PASNY has 45 students scheduled for two 15-passenger vans. On Page SCl-15, Item #13, PASNY has 28 students scheduled for one 15-passenger van.
- 8. PASNY has taken our bus fleet and sent it into ten different unfamiliar areas and replaced the vehicles taken from us with 26 vehicles from Liberty Bus Company who are totally unfamiliar with our school locations. If we have our buses, why must we give them aw'ay and then hope that someone will replace them?
- 9. The plan indicates the use of 75 buses from the Vanguard Yorktown fleet.
Since only 45 exist, this means that approximately 1600 students will be stranded. How will they be evacuated?
- 10. Most of our drivers are parents of children in our schools. Is is reason-able to assume that they would leave the area in lieu of transporting their children out of the area?
These deficiencies and the continual malfunctioning problems occurring at Indian Point, coupled with the inability to safely and effectively evacuate residents should an accident occur, create a constant threat to the welfare i of the community. Until the operational and functional problems are satis-factorily rectified, the Board of Education requests that the Nuclear Regula- ! tory Commission close Indian Point. In reviewing whether a workable plan can be developed, we request that input by school, town and community representatives be mandated. We further suggest that on-site visits be made to both receiving and sending districts to ensure that the number of students slated to go to those particular receiving stations can indeed be accommodated without the necessity of saparating the family uni t. We, the Yorktown Heights Central Schools Board of Education, charge the Nuclear ! Regulatory Commission with the responsibility to take appropriate action that l is consistent with the concerns voiced by the af fected communities. O 6/7/82 l l
YORKTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOLS s 2729 Ch0mpCNO ROAD { g YORKrOWN MKWTS, NEW VORK 10098 [ (914) 245.4036 1914) 245 4036 f vamposuriow omes I May 27, 1982 , Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Washington, D. C. Attn: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the interest of brevity, I will address my connents to page numbers and sections. Since many of the procedures or instructions are repetitive through different stages, I uill only con:,ent on them once. Inasmuch as I did not receive attachment 2-6 with the revision, and attachments 2-6 on the original plan, December 1980 are blank,1 cannot comment on them. P. SC-6 Attachment 1, Table 1, lists telephone numbers at our schools Sec. 3.0 for llendrick fludson School District to call. If we have a power failure our phone system does not operate. I suggest these numbers be replaced by the private line numbers at each school. The Superintendent's number should also be listed. P. SC-9 Our buildings are not designed, nor do they have the room Sec. 4.4.1 where designed, to have personnel in substructures or hall-ways not exposed to windows. SC-10 It's wishful thinking that staff will stay on campus in Sec. 4.5 lieu of being with their families. SC-14 Reception Centers are to have manpower to augment the l Sec. 5.4.3.1 reception and care of staff from DDS, Red Cross, Food ! Service and Department of Ilealth. Where will this manpower come from? l Questions: What arrangements have been made for food, blankets, and medical supplies? If the answer is Civil Defense stores, they don't exist. What arrangements have been made for l l medical personnel? ! l Observation: 1. Attachment 1, Table 1 indicates the use of 74 buses ; from the Vanguard, Yorktown fleet, Only 45 exist. 4 This means approximately 1600 students will be stranded. ! O l < l b
b Con Ed Emergency Plan - page 2 g j 2. We have children in 14 schools located within the EPZ. They will be transported to 10 dif ferent reception centers. Ibny families have students in 2 or more of the schools. Since they will wind up in the triangle of White Plains, !!opewell Junction and the Connecticut border, how are parents expected to retrieve their children? Not to mention the traffic congestion at these centers or roads leading to/from them.
- 3. Over a year ago I notified them that they had deleted French Hill School. It still is deleted on the revision.
- 4. I see no arrangements for severely handicapped (wheel chair) students. BOCES has approximately 25; we have 9.
- 5. Table 1, P. SC 1-7, Item #5 - they have 45 students scheduled for two (2) 15 passenger vans. P. SC 1-15, item #13 - they have 28 students scheduled for one (1) 15 pass <nger van.
- 6. The plan assumes that we will have a full compliment of drivers, and worse yet, drivers who don't exist, to g operate the spare vehicles which are part of the count. W
- 7. They have taken our fleet and sent it into 10 different unf amiliar areas, and replace the vehicles taken from us with 26 vehicles from Liberty, who are totally unfamiliar with our school locations and the reception center locations. We have our buses; why must we give them away and then hope that someone will replace them?
Why isn't Bedford Bus used? They are only 15 minutes away.
- 8. Since our buses will now be involved in the latter,
. what happens to our students who are in numerous schools outside the EPZ?
- 9. Our fleet is radio controlled. Assuming we had drivers, why send them out of range and loose control?
- 10. } ost of our drivers are parents of our students. Is it reasonable to assume that they would leave the area in lieu of transporting their children out of the area?
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e den Ed Emergency Plcn - pass 3
- 11. What arrangements have been made with law enforcement I O agencies to control traffic, remove broken down vehicles, etc.?
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. t-In conclusion, this plan is unworkable, irresponsible, lacking forsight ;
and an insult to the reader's intelligence. , j t Ver 4eul ours, Richard Alexande RA:ss , t
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YorldOWn bongrPLS Of Teachers 2051 Baldwin Road Yorktown Heights, N. Y.10598 June 1,1982 TO Wi!OM IT MAY CONCERN: 9 In addition to the concerns stated in the resolution adopted by the YCT on 3/8/82, we must be concerned about the lack of planning and concern shown in the selection of receiving school districts. Children removed from "affected" school districts are to be " serviced" by untrained staff in receiving schools. No information has been provided to these receiving schools. No check haa been made of their facilities; no food, clothing or equipment has been made , available to these schools de' spite the fact that the plan calls for their part in feeding and clothing children. I use this as further evidence of the inadequacy of this plan, which is nothing more than a clever subterfuge to lull the public into thinking there is a plan, there is an escape and there is a genuine possibility of public safety in the event of a severe nuclear accident. I do not believe there can be a workable plan, nor do I believe there is adequate possibility of planned. escape or avoidance of serious injuries to a large portion of the f West ester, o ulation. (c I Sch 73 %
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John F. Roden President, YCT L ~
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i . t ( [. , e.* l 1 I I g , f Motion: Opposition to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan - 4 Whereas the procedures for evacuation of school district persqnnel and, ., , students in the event of a nuclear accident at Indi'an' Point were developed with minimal consideration for those people most af fected by it, and Whereas these procedures require students and personnel to be dispersed to widely diverse areas far from their homes and families, and Whereas these procedures can result in separation of children and parents in the same f amily to widely varying locations at a time of potential crisis, stress and cor 'usion, and Whereas these procedures assume that workers from areas outside the nuclear danger zone will enter the danger zone to transport personnel and students at some hazard to their health and life, and , Whereas there is serious doubt as to the possible success of these procedures, be it p-Resolved that the NYSLTP locals in Westchester/Putnam oppose approval of [ ) these procedures and oppose local participation in such procedures, and be it further Resolved that the NYStfr local members carefully consider the negative consequences of the plan before subjecting their children to it, and be it further Resolved that the NYSUT local presidents convey this motion'to the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education and request their support of similar resolutions, and be it further Resolved that the NYSUT director notify government authorities clyarged with approval of this plan that it is considered unrealistic, unworkable and unacceptable to the membership of the.Westchester/ Putnam NYSITF locals. I I
I Mot. ion : .
#- Q) position to Nuclear Dnergency Procedures ? l Whereas the procedures for evacuation of school district personnel and students in the event of a nuclear accident at Indian Point were developed with no teacher union input, and Whereas these procedures require students and personnel to be despursed to widely diverse areas far from their Etomes and vehicles, and Whereas these procedures can result in separation of children and parents in the' same family to widely varying locations at a time of potential crisis, and Whereas " these procedures require workers from areas outside the nuclear danger zone to enter the danger zone to transport personnel and students at some hazard to their health and life, and whereas there is serious doubt as to the possible success of these procedures, be it
- Resolved that the YCT oppose implementation of these procedures and YCT participa-tion in such procedures, and be it further
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Hesolved that the YCT enlist support for this motion from other district employee unions, and'be it further Resolved that the YCT convey this motion to the S,uperintendent of schools and the Board of Education and request their support of similar resolutions, and be it further kesolved that the YCT urge the Westchester and Putnam County Executives to convene a committee consisting of employee union, parent, student and administrative representatives to discuss and recomunend alternatives to the present program D0
- 4 MY NAME IS RAYMOND BOWLES AND l RESIDE IN POCANTICO HILLS AT 8 STILLMAN LANE. MY TELEPHONE NUMBER IS 769-3307 l AM MARRIED AND THE FATHER OF TWO GRADE SCHOOL CHILDREN.
l AM LICENSED BY THE STATE Or NEW YORK AS A TEACHER AND AS A SPEECH PATHOLOGIST AND AM EMPLOYED BY THE POCANTICO HILLS SCHOOL. IN ADDITION, 1 AM A LICENSEo REALTOR OF NEW YORK STATE AND OWN AND OPERATE A REALTY FIRM IN THE VILLAGE OF PLEASANTVILLE. l HAVE SEVERAL DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE CON EDISON NUCLEAR PLANT AT lNDIAN POINT AND ABOUT THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE PLANT. LIV I NG JUST ONE-ElGHTH OF A k MILE FROM THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE, 1 FEEL EXTREMELY VUL-NERABLE IN THE EVENT OF A MELT DOWN AND l FEEL THAT THE COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER HAS COMPLETELY IGNORED THOSE OF US OUTSIDE BUT YET SO CLOSE TO THE EPZ. WITH NO ASSURANCES THAT MY FAMILY WILL BE SPARED THE AWESOME CONBEQUENCES OF THOSE CLOSER TO INDIAN POINT, l QUESTION THE ARBITRARY CUT OFF POONT OF A TEN MILE MADIUS WHEN SO MANY FACTORS WOULD INFLUENCE THE EFFECTS OF RADIATION RESULTING FROM AN ACCIDENT AT INDIAN POINT. I HAVE NEVER MECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR INFORPATION FROM WEST-CHESTER COUNTY OR ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY W ITH REGARD TO PROTECTING MY FAMILY FROM A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. ASSUMATION OF THE PLAN SEEMS TO BE THAT FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES WE DO NOT EXIST AND WILL NOT O
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INFLUENCE THE EVACUATION. AS SOMEONE SO CLOSE TO THE TEN MILE CUT OFF, 1 ASSURE YOU MANY OF US PLAN TO EVACUATE. MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ROADS NEAR THE BORDER OF THE EPZ LEAoS ME TO BELIEVE THAT MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAMS WOULD RESULT AT THE FbdNGES OF THE EPZ. FURTHERMORE, 1 AM OUTRAGED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE FIFTY-FOUR STUDENTS FROM POCANTICO HILLS WHO ATTEND THE BRIARCLIFF HIGH SCHOOL, WHICH FALLS WITHIN THE EPZ, NONE OF THE PARENTS OF THESE YOUNGSTERS HAVE EVER BEEN INFORMED OF AN EVACUATION PLAN. THEY HAVE NO IDEA AS TO WHERE THEIR CHILDREN WOULD B E HOW
*i TO CONTACT THEM AFTERWARDS. IN ADDITION, SOME POCANTICO FAMILIES LIVE WITHIN THE EPZ BUT- NO PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ACCOMMDATE THESE CHILDREN IF THEIR FAMILIES g WERE EVACUATED. LASTLY, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CHILDREN WHO LIVE WITHIN THE EPZ WHO ATTEND POCANTICO HILLS SCHOOL THROUGH THE BOCES GIFTED AND TALENTED PROGRAM. AGAIN NO ACCOUNTING HAS BEEN MADE OF THESE CHILDREN. THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL HAS NEVER BEEN INFROMED AS TO WHAT PROCEDURES HE SHOULO FOLLOW IN THE EVENT OF AN EVACUATION NOR HAS ANY OTHER SCHOOL PERSDNNEL.
1 WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD THAT AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER, 1 OFTEN ENCOVNTER CUSTOMERS SEEKING HOMES IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN WESTCHESTER. OFTEN SITUATIONS ARISE WHEN I REFER PEOPLE TO OTHER AREAS IN SEARCH OF A HOME. BECAUSE OF
r A CERTAIN SIMILARITIES TO MY AREA, ESPECIALLY A HIGHLY MATED SCHOOL 01 STRICT WITH FAIRLY LOW TAXES, 1 FIND MYSELF SUGGEST-ING THAT CUSTOMERS LOOK IN THE MONTROSE VICINITY. CONSERVA-flVELY, THIRTY TO FORTY PERCENT OF THE CUSTOMERS EXPRESS UNWILLINGNESS TO EVEN CONSIDER THE AREA BECAUSE OF THE NUCLEAR PLANT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, FOUR CUSTOMERS HAVE COMC INTO MY OFFICE THIS YEAR CARRYlNG A MAP WITH A CIRCLE MARKING THE EPZ AND REQUESTING THAT THEY ONLY BE SHOWN HOUSES OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE. ALTHOUGH l HAVE NO DOCUMENTATION OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY VALUES, 1 STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THE PROXIMITY OF THE NUCLEAR PLANT AT INDIAN POINT IS A KEY FACTOR DEPRESSING REAL ESTATE VALUES IN THOSE COMMUNITIES. Cl BECAUSE OF THE DEMONSTRATED INACCURACIES AND OMISSIONS v OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR INDIAN POINT AS WELL AS NUMEROUS UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES OF THE EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE NElCHBORING POPULATION, l URGE THAT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CLOSE THE NUCLEAR PLANT /. T INDIAN POINT UNTil SUCH TIME ASIA TOTALLY FEASIBLE EVACUATION PLAN IS DEVELOPED OR CONSIDER THE PERMANENT CLOSING OF INDIAN POINT IF SUCH A PLAN CANNOT BE ACHIEVED.
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. b dritten Testimony submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Q Commission on June 4, 1982 v vincent teacheratAnneM.DornerMg8:lleSchoof. Hub,oOssinIng, New York.
An accident, by definition, is an event which cannot be anticipated. Some accidents may result in consequences which have far reaching effects on large numbers of people so the prudent person or institution tries to anticipate these consequences in order to ameliorate the seriousness of these unanti-cipated events. We all recognize the value of the procedures established to deal with the evacuation of our school building if a fire should occur. We do not rely on the fact that our building may be constructed of fire retarding building materials which meet the standards of the fire code. We go beyond that and f i
- develop plans to remove people from the possible danger f areas as orderly as possible.
We endeavor to improve on these plans by practicing, evaluating, and coordinating them in a very systematic I l way. Our goal is to eliminate the factors that would l increase the possibility of injury during all stages of our evacuation plans. Our students and staff I members are made fully aware of the step by step procedure to be followed. Both students and staff members are madb cognizant of their particular roles. l We live with the danger of fire with the hope that we will never have to experience the reality of l Ih ~ one but we do find some comfort in the knowledge
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i;k 'N , that we do have a procedure to follow should one occur. (,/ It would be difficult to fai? to recognize the wisdom of this approach to such a serious problem. How much more valid is this approach in dealing with the possibility of an accident at the nuclear energy plant at Indian Point which may necessitate the evacuation of our schools? Our close neighbor to the north ( 6 miles) has come up with an evacuation plan for all residents within a ten-mile radius of its facility at Indian Point. That plan is one of the subjects of these hearings. The booklet, Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You, specifies that in the event of an evacuation g students in school would be bused directly to school reception centers outside of the emergency area. It goes on to name these reception centers: Webb School, 200 H. Central Park Ave..at Harvard Drive, Hartsdale, Juniper Hill School, Saratoga Rd., White Plains, White Plains Child Day Care Assoc. (Church St. School), 295 Church St., White Plains, Ardsley High School, 300 Farm Rd. , Ardsley, and the Dobbs Ferry Middle / Senior High Schoo'1, Broadway, Dobbs Ferry. Our presumption was that at the least, these schools were aware that they were selected to be ! reception centers for our children and that they were informed as to the special needs of the age group that l, would be coming to them. We further assumed that they
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,, were equipped to keep these children for an extended
() period of time and that they were ready to provide whatever care they might need resulting from the nature of the emergency that precipitated the evacuation, such as decontamination facilities and equipment. Our first inquiry by phone to the Church St. School in White Plains, revealed that not only were they not aware of the age and number of the students that might be coming to them, but they had no knowledge of the fact that they had been designated as a recep-tion center. We made the same inquiry of each of the. designated centers and got the same responses. Our disbelief soon changed to outright rage when the full realization of the deception that was being perpetrated on the parents, children, and teachers of our community became apparent. The deception occurred when the booklet was sent to the residents within a ten mile radius of the plant leading them to believe that the plan was in place and that the facilities to carry it l out had been organized to some reasonable extent. ! In the absence of any information to the contrary, a reasonable person reading the booklet had to conclude that the facilities necessary to carry out the plan
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l were in place and ready to go into operation at a moments notice. If an accident necessitating an evacuation should occur, I and my colleagues would be faced with a real dilemma since we now know how ill-prepared the k facilities are to reesive our children. This knowledge raises a series of other questions about the plan and
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1 1 this plan and reach the conclusion that we have come L to. The plan is ill-conceived, unrealistic, and unworkable and amounts to a potentially disastrous j attempt to comply with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's mandate to come up with a plan to evacuate all residents within a ten mile radius of Indian Point. Vincent J. Rubeo M or the Ossining Teachers Association h O i l l
" OSSINING TFAC'iERS ASSOCIATION Ossining, New York 10562 .
Mo:lon: Opposition to the Radiological Emergencv Respon.ee Plan - c Whereas the procedures for evacuation of school dirtrict oer. onnel' and
.. students in the event of a nuclear accident at Indian Point were developed with minimal concideration for thoce people mo.e t
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affected by it, and Whereas these procedures reouire student.e and oereonnel to be dicoerred to widely diverse areas far from their homee and familier. a7d Whereas these procedures can result in separation of children and parente In the same family to widely varying location.c at a time of - potential crisis, stress and confusion, and . Whereas these procedures assume that wor'kers~from areas outside the
. nuclear danger zone will enter the danger zone to transport personnel and . students at some hazard to their health and life, and Whereas there is serious doubt as to the possible success of these procedures, N
be it Resolved that the Ossining Teachers Association (OTA) oppose approval of these procedures and oppose OTA pwticipation in such procedures, and be it further
- Resolved that t'he OTA members carefully consider the negative consequences
- of the plan before subjecting.their children to it. 'and be it further
. Resolved that the' OTA convey this motion to the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education and request their support of similar resolutions, and be it further Resolved that the OTA notify, government authorities charged with approval of this plan that it is considered unrealietic. unworkable and unacceptable to the OTA membershio.
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Resolution approved by the OTA membership April 27. 1982.
John Iurato
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Crutcn-Ilarnon fligh School Old Post Road, S. Croton-on-liudson, ?N The Croton-Harmon School District has been involved in planning for an emergency at Indian Point since November 13, 1980, when I represented the district at the meeting held at B0CES, Yorktown. N.Y. We were one of seven districts.who y responded out of 19 invited. We were informed that other review meetings would be held as the plan was developed, but no further meetings were held. We expected to receive a copy of the completed plan and were surprised l to learn in late April, .1981, that the plan was complete. We managed to borrow a l copy for 2 hours on May 1 in order to copy the pages pertaining to schools. As a result, of an informational meeting sponsored by our own PTO on May 6, a Croton parent who is a PASNY employee provided us with our own copy of the plan. Our school district has taken its responsibilities in emergency planning very seriously and has taken steps beyond those called for in the official plan. Even so, many problems remain. We have raised several cocnerns which have not, as yet, been adequately addressed. (1) We pointed out the need for a back up communication system to a the phone relay and suggested crystal radio sets. We have heard nothing further about a back up communication system. (2) We requested that all children from Croton schools be assigned ) to one reception center, to minimize panic, confusion, and traffic problems in reuniting families. To date, children from (,J CET elementary school are assigned to the Ridgeway School, , while students in our middle and high schools will be taken to the SolomonSchecter School. (3) We have not been reassured that the County and State are prepared with personneland equipment if the school districts cannot muster needed volunteers in case of evacuation.
~ (4) .TbChappaqu'a Bus C' #
o _. ,- is ass'igned :tc cur. district, but was not' ~ 4'! - -
' cMtacted by the planners.10ur Distrii:t ' Superintendent contacted -
the.co'mpany in May;and alerted the President of the bus line that- g f
- , his -firm waslo'mmitted 'to transport our secon.dary schoo.1 age 3
m ttudents. - We also made recommendation, at a meeting sponsored by the Town . of Cortlandt Supervisor, that the Chaqqaqua Bus Co. be encouraged to send a few buses to our middle school and high school'as'a. , drill to become familiar with our access roads. This recommendation. . g .
, was never acted ,.upon. .
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'(5) The po' lice r~es~ources 'of the Village'of Croton'.-will no doubt Ibe taxed to the limit"during an evacuation, henc'e. we are not confident that th'ere will' be. adequate traffic control at and l'eading away .
from~th'e schools. - 5
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Q e (2) , (6) Schools have been designated as reception centers, but.none have . not been given any direction as to their responsibilities .during , , , , an emergency. We.noted the following problems when we visited .~ our designated reception centers:
- 1. No training of staff to handle problems connected with panic.
- 2. No emergency supplies on hand to care for our children who may not be quickly reunited with their families. ,
(7) It should be'noted that as part of our planning responsibilities we contacted the school reception centers in August of 1931. We were frustrated to learn that the reception centers knew little or nothing about the evacuation plans and their specific roles. Furthermore, the "Rosedale School" designated as a reception center for our middle and high school students was no longer owned by the
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4" White Plains School District. We made contact with the new owners, which is the Solomon Schecter Religious Schools. , We visited and designated holding areas for our students .in case of an evacuation. This experience illustrated the difficulty of keeping emergency lists accurate and up to date as well as indicating that the planners of the evacuation plan did not plan as well as they could and should have. (8) We are very concerned about the possibility of massive traffic. Jams during an evacuation. Tow trucks have a major role in keeping the flow of traffic heading away from the emergency area, therefore I contacted the. local gas stations that. operate tow trucks and was - astounded to find that they have never been contacted about their participation in the emergency evacuation plans. . We were very disappointed in the quality of the drill conducted on
- March 3, 1982. Wa had.one substitute. driver on stand by and t.h,at_
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. Triver was use.d f.or. an h'our to. simufate- la: us .'run.
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.' ~ ' Allow ine to,'epho 'my'. plea ' for 'the ;offici.als', who' are. responsible for..
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'.. formulating: an.' evacuation plan to: recognize the fact.that th6. present .
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" plan is . inadequate. We need an evacuation. plan'th'at is developed'by .,
people who will stay in close contact with Village, Town, School and 4 Countyofficials.. so that they will follow up suggestions made to improve initial . plans :and .to...c.orrect mistakes. as is evidenced in the ns Adininistrators'f se- are responsible for
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. . . . . present evacuation =pla'n.
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J g'.};. ,.,. f,'.. 'p.f " 2, the safety,ind welfaYe ~ of our s.tudelnts and care @ligaed to draw' your .. atte,ntt,on . to the lack.of so. many finishing touches,).in?the. proposed c . ..;. ,
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( rry Q. . ; evacua. tion . plan,' . anti: to the. fact 'that they,haVe ye~t to be .addrdssed. ,' . 77 s
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** Elizabath Sekelsky 316 Grand Stract Croton-on-Hudson, Now York, 10520 (914) 271-3834 I have residad in Croton-on-Hudson for the past 26 years, within 10 miles of the Indian Point nuclear reactors.
For the past 10 years I have held the position of school nurso in the Carrie E. Tompkins elementary schools Croton, N.Y. I have a son who is presently n Junior in the Croton Harmon ~ High. School. ' c '- ..
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- Ais'c hool' nurse. my; responsibili. ties includit the heal.th r
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- and safSty~'of 4hs school liodulatiorr'r. ' students and staft'.. '2 -
f 7Dur.fngI the 'courni of -a school- dayi Ic administere fiFst' aTde to. ipjiired students 'and ' assess ill students, referring app'ropriate
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.s:tu' dents to their n'arents or;Wuar'd.in6s for future midicd13,.... *
.trea ttnent( .'I cd1so give m,<s dication .to. s.tudent.s,.during.,t'he- '.'- J-?.
.'s'chool' day Onde.r written.. o'rders' fi'om. their personaf physician. -
. .c In .my cape . ;during 'a regular. school tlay, .'thers Jare -
students'who receive.. medication.at.home;prio'r to' coming to - school-eg. 1.diabe' tic ort -inaintenance ihsulin r 2. students. :' , y,ith ' seizure . di'shrders a l l.% ast.hmaties t .4 students . on ' cerebra'l '- -
. .. stimulants :: as:sel1 'as 1 who. are~und3rgoing.or wh'o havesr~
e cently . completed ch'emotheTapy.. . d After evacuation from school by bus in the event-of .
. a general'. emergency.-at Indian Point..these students will be- '
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--. 'iE my. care;with no'me.di' cation.or communicatifon with parents ' ' 6 '
br family.- To add' t6 'physiciansJfor' %n : undetermined this ', . the re .is'no'aimilar ' ~ex' tended clicum's'tance . period. for comp- -
-ari' s'on, to' estimatehthe ' result of :aniiety' . separation ~ from -
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) parents) and7eT$rfriEstas..who'./wll'1 lie. released' prior'tobus * ' ~ ~
. boarding.' ,.' . .~
While'I' realize th'at an evacuation. plan is necessary,
-: . much han to be .done. to make this a . workable plan. As I travel
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'by bus 'to jhite Plainsiwith 'thn .staf f and students from" the.1.
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," ' elementary .s chool . . as. a. m.other', ,I will :be fgreatl'y' concerne..d 4: .-
about the safe ty~ of' m.9 son yht'r'wi-ll' 'bs 1eavirig -Croton much ~
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As a' health. professional, I"haven n'ot;been informed'nor
. . - have. I takdn 'bart,in. any. o'f thd planning, and..no ~ seminars. have.
been of fered - t'o -gui;de me 'in 'this .diflf.icult task..
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. S chooli. children.'by.. law p ' ractice: -fire drills .. No-
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suc'h' drills'/have bee'n . c'onsidered. for-evacuatio'ni. le. ' . . .jrepara.Ai,on," for exam'pl'e 'us.ing 'ba'throom fa61litiesiS iinp'e b fire. c /~.- boarding may make ' the- bus' ride 'less of an ordeal. ThetAmerican 7 Re'd Cross advises th'e,public to bring blankets but school systems do not have-blankets for each child. I know of no such provisions on arriv'al'in-White Plains ahd knov ofno' q - V provisions.for feeding and clothing change, if necessary. ' As a school nurse whose contact with parents is impe ra tive in the case of a medical emergency. I am concerned about this communication break. Has a medical pool been -
Elizabeth Sekelsky Page two h organized and given authority to treat students,without paren-tal consent? If so, school nurses in the ten mile radius should be informed of this. While insurance coverage will not be given for nuclear accidents, will school insurance be extended to cover accidents after school hours, or on the bus in transit? I believe that much work has to be done and many questions have to be answered.before I.can consider the present evacuation plan workable. C Thank you. Sincerely. fg ($<'
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. (Mrs. ): Elizabeth Sekelsky
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PORT ClilSII R SliNIOR }{lGil M'.llOOI. 14 l' j[ TAMARACK ROAD l't)R'l ( lil3TLR, NLW YORK 10573 18 Ll.Pil(DNE: (')l 4 ) ')39-73(N) AP(IHONY J. NAPOf f PRINGPAL Rtwo A. CAarmt A55tSTANT FitINOPAL June 2, 1982 Parents Conce rned About Indian Point P. O. Box 125 Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 Ge ntlemen: Recently I completed a survey conducted by your organization. There are several points to be stressed. First, my notification as to Port Chester High School being an evacuation site was made by telephone on the day of the drill. Secondly, at (y no time have I been directed as to the plans to be made in pre-paring for such a possibility. Thirdly, we have no idea as to the number of people who would be scheduled to report to Port Chester High School. Port Chester High School is always willing to be of aid to the community. However, more planning must take place as to a possible evacuation. Since rely, 9 Ii Om . 7 u Anthony J. Nbpoli Principal AJN:dr t'T N,)
fo W R ceived 3////tz. COUNTR'/ DAY SCHOOL MOUNTAIN ROAD, POMONA, N.Y.10970 MARCH 10, 1932 DEAR PHYLLIS, I Afi RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER REGARDING THE If,OTAN POINT EMERGENCY PLAtlNING PROCEDURE. I, PERSOfALLY, DO NOT FEFL THIS PLAN IS VORKAF.LE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST, TO EVACUATE OUR BU LDING AND MOVE OUR CHILDREN TO DON BOSCO HIGH SCHOOL IN NEW JERSEY WOULD CAUSE SUCH MASSIVE CONFUSION AND HYSTERIA THAT ONE SHUTTEPS AT THE THOUGHT. WOtJLD NOT TEACHERS AND RtJS DRIVFRS BE CONCERf>ED ABOUT THEIR Oki' CHILDREN AND ACT ON THEIR PERSOf!AL BEHALF? WOULD PARENTS COfiiNG F R Of ' f!PW YORK CITY AND OTHER POINTS PE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY RFACH THEIR CHILDRFr! WHEf! YOU CONSIDER THE STACCEniNC TRAFFIC PPOPLEMS (T THAT WOULO Efl';UE? POULD i. AS I'IRECTOR. PFLIEVE TttE OFFICIALS WHFM. Itl MY O P iili ON , THEY HAVF IOST THElo C R f D i l' l L I T Y FY CALLif'r l V THIS RFCFNT D9fLL A StJCCESS VHEN WC DION'T EVFN PEAR THE STPFN? l IF THrY CALLED IT A MINOR IFAV t tOU WOtJL7 i PESPOND? IT .I'JS T COF 9 FN AND ON ANI) STACGFRS THF MfMO. l l I EFlIEVE THAT THE fi'lC LF AO S I TtlAT IO' (r!'rogy At!D ARMS "U f L')-UP S IS THE NU'1PFR O!!E PUMLIC HEALTH PROBLE*d FACINC 'JS Tn9AY AND T1AT IT*9 TiMc FOR THF C I T I ' tins OF 000 C O'"t' p; I T Y T (' TCT COR THE f?ENF F i T OF 0:JP CHILI)REN SPECicICALLY AND OUP S('C I F T Y AS A WHOLE. SINCF9 FLY. t^-h-r TOBY G FR SOP'Y EDtJCATIONAL DIRECTOR O ARTHUR KESSLER: Owner /Directo:-
{roinn Ennic558ti $thnol POST OFFICE BOX 84 7 CROTON ON. HUDSON, NEW YORK 10520
)
m 271-4283 June 3, 1982 To Whom It May Corcern: According to your latest records, this nursery school has not been included in the emergency evacuation plan for local nursery and other schools. We have never been contacted by anyone to work out an evacuation plan for our school even though we were listed with other local schools in the public hearing which was held in January, 1982. The name of our school is: The Croton Montessori School We are located in the Unitarian Church on Route 9A North, about a quarter-mile north of the Amberland (V Apartments. There are 30 children registered at the school and the hours are from 9: 00am-12:00 five days a week and Monday-Thursday, twelve students attend school until 2: 30pm. The staff consists of three teachers, myself included. I have been teaching at this school for 14 years, the last 8 years as the Directress. I am a certified Montessori teacher with a New Yerk State Teacher Certification. Thank you very much for your attention. . Sin 6erel' e cy3N MON cSR1$CHW jk@ owe @ " o .
ARLENE TIPT g 153 Cortlandt Str ot p Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 As a resident of Croton, I would consider myself a close (]} neighbor of the Indian Point Power Plant. 1.wish to report that on the day of March 3,1982, though I was at my residence all day I did not hear any sirens or any drill whatsoever. I received your pamphlet on Indian Point and evacuation plans but to my consternation my daughter's nursery school, the Croton Montessori School is not included in your evacuation plans. This omittance is not acceptable, nor is the faulty system for warning local residents. Personally, I feel that in such a highly populated region as this the risks are far too great to justify the benefits of nuclear power. This plant should be permanently cicesed until your technology is vastly improved. O Sincerely, Arlene Tift 153 Cortlandt Street Croton- on-Hudson, New York
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p Lynn Kaut'erer ( 222 Cleveland firive Croton-on-lludnon, N.Y. 10520 My name is Lynn Kauderer. I live at 222 Cleveland Drive, Croton-on-lludson, New York. I am the parent of Laura Jane Kauderer, a five-year old, who attends the Croton Montessori School which is located in the Croton Unitarian Church, Route 9A, less than five miles from the Indian Point facility. This school, attended by more than thirty children daily, has been repeatedly overlooked in the planning for evacuation in the case of an emergency at Indian Point. On January 21, 1982, I attended the N.R.C. Public licaring at the Cortlandt Civic Center and submitted a petition signed by a majority of the parents from the school complaining about this oversight. To the best of my knowledge, nothing has been done to correct this situation. The printed pamphlet which we later received lists, on page 12, all the schools in the area with their corresponding school reception centers except the Croton Montessori School. The school has not been contacted in any way to inform them of instructions for the evacuation of our children. We parents have not been notified. As far as I know, in the event of an emergency at Indian Point, my child and her fellow classmates would be left at the school completely unprotected. Five months have passed since this extremely serious oversight was brought to the attention of the evacuation planners and to date no response has been made. If these planners can overlook an entire school and then, even after the error has been pointed out, continue to overlook it, how can I as a parent and as a citizen have any confidence i in their ability to evacuate an entire area? I fear for the safety of my child, Ifear for the safety of my community, and I fear for my own safety. *) N
HUDSON VALLEY GYMNASTICS SCHOOL 341 BLE AKLEY AVE.
- BUCHAN AN, N.Y.10511
- PHONE: (914) 737-0334 4
Juna 1, 1982 To: The fluclear Regulatory Commission Re: Evacuation Plan Dear Sirs As the director of the Hudson Valley Gymnastic School; and as a parent. I would like to state officially that we are totally against the evacuation plan proposed by Con Ed. We were concerned about the plan because as a private school,' i j at any given time we have between 30-40 children attending our program. We sent in the post card that was attached to the pamphlet. As of this date we have not been contacted as to any kind of emergency bus transportation for our. O echoo1. ediately. We ree1 that we shou 1d have beeu contacted imm-It seems as though no intelligent type of plan coul'd possibly work when there are so many thousar.ds of people involved. I myself have 3 children and am a resident in the Lakeland School District. Our children are in 3 diff-erent schools, starting from Ben Franklin Elementary School, i Copper Beech Middle School, and Lakeland High School. As I understand your plar., this would mean my children would be bused to 3 different places. I'm sure there are many people who are in'our same situation; who can't sleep nights with the thought of separation of whole families at a most traumatic time. .
'lle ask you now, before making any decisions to please think of what your actions may mean to all the residents of *Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland Counties.
Sincerely, 4ArJ \ Vincent Savastano Director VS/as l j 'N
l LAKELAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
~, SHRUB OAK NEW YORK /"'s i ? 'O TO: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM: Leon Bock, Superintendent, Lakeland Central School District DATE: June 4,.1982 RE: Radiological Emergency Response Procedure i
This is to submit, on behalf of the Lakeland School District, information coacerning the current position of the District on the proposed Radiological Emergency Evacuation Plan. Attached is a draft of the proposed Resolution on the matter and an accounting of scue of the current inquiries into serious difficulties arising from the plan in its present state. s j ('% ( s' LB:Vi Atts. i e
' I Serious Difficulties Arising From the Radiological Emergency Response Procedure in its Present State $
It is important to note that at this date, the attached proposed resolution is in draft fom, and it has not been presented to the Board of Education for action, ne district is in the process of examining the' weaknesses and com-plications that are referred to in the resolution, and it is the detemination of the extent and anticipated impact of these complications that will detemine the final action on the proposed resolution. For exampic, a district cmmittee chaired by the Assistant Superintendent of the district and the Director of Transportation is examining a number of the serious problems that arise in an examination of the feasibility of the plan. Among the problems being considered are: a) R e possible rearrangement of the assignment of district schools to the various reception centers. D e baeis for this concem is that a number of our schools are linked by the promotion of the student body with one elementary school feeding into a middle school, which then feeds into the high school. On this basis, siblings are likely to be located along this three school alignment. Assignment to reception centers did not take this into consideration; therefore, siblings are more likely to be scattered to different reception centers creating greater problems for families seeking reunification. We are examining the possibility of a W recomending changes in the alignment without changing the number of students assigned to the reception center. b) Another very serious concern relates to the ability of the Liberty Bus Company, located in southern Westchester, to provide the busing needed to complement the district's , own bus flect to move all of our children. c) Anotherveryseriousproblemrelatestothiedistrict'sability to obtain the voluntary force for driving and supervision that is considered in our resolution. Under the circumstances of our obligation, we will make every effort to obtain voluntary services, but there still remains to be detemined whether this will be successful or not and, until such provision for voluntary service is detemined, Lakeland District cannot state a feasible plan is in place for the safeguarding of the interests of our children. d) Other problems relate to the Lakeland terrain. Bis is a large district with many winding, narrow roads with steep ascents and descents. In winter weather, with snow or icy conditions, our traffic is often tied up with long hourly delays. If such conditions were to prevail in the event of an emergency, the already difficult traffic problem would be enomously complicated. We respect the efforts to provide an emergency evacuation. We believe that a W the roster of difficulties imposed in these circumstances are famic'abic, and require solution before it can be stated a feasible plan is in place.
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LAKELAND CINTRAL SQOOL DISTRICT SHRUB OAK NEW YORK DRAFT O PROPOSED RESOLUTION REGARDING LAKELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT'S ?ARTICIPATION IN '111E WESTCHESTER COUNIY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE MIEREAS, it is the ethical and legal responsibility of the district to provide for the safety of its students, to the extent possible, in all instances of hazard, and MIEREAS, it is the judgment of the administration that an effective, reasonable means of obtaining staff participation in the execution of responsi-bility under the plan is to seek voluntary participation in the plan. For example, the district would invite voluntary participation by qualified drivers in the phase of the plan calling for the driving of busses to designated recep-tion centers, and seek voluntary participation by staff members in the phase of the plan calling for the assignment of teachers to busses travelling to desig-nated reception centers, and MIERFAS, it is the judgment of the administration that aarental decision in these key matters not be superseded and that parental authority over their own children be respected and acknowledged up to the point of governmental ' identification of the necessity to evacuate student personnel. When and if the district is required to evacuate student personnel by governmental declaration, emergency evacuation procedures will then be exercised by decision of the C school district, and MIEREAS, it is recognized that the plan as currently set forth contains a number of weaknesses and complications that will require. the district to detennine those aspects of the present plan that are feasible and those aspects of the plan that need revision. NOW, 'IIIEREFORE, BE kT RESOLVED, that 1) the Lakeland Board of Education authorizes participation in the Westchester County Radiological Emergency Response Procedure according to the planned specifications cited above;
- 2) that staff involvement take place on a voluntary basis; and 3) that the district seek to detennine the strengths and weaknesses of the current plan with a view to seeking improvements where possible or identifying weaknesses and difficulties where manifest in comunication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Appreciation is extended to the various units of the Lakeland School comunity that have participated in the consideration of the plan: the Lakeland Federation of Teachers, the Association of Lakeland Administrators and Chairpersons, the Civil Service Employees Association, and the District Parents Council. O LB:bg 5/12/82
TESTIMONY FOR SUBMISSION TO THE Robert W. Hare, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN s n ITS HEARINGS, SUMMER 1982, terian Church U RESPECTING ' HIE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR PLANT. I testify as a seven year resident of Briarcliff Manor, Revolutionary Road in the Scarborough neighborhood of this village; as a parent of three children in separate schools within the Ossining Union Free School District; as the Pastor of the Scarborough Presbyterian Church, operating a nursery school of 50 pre-schoolers; as a trustee of the Clearview School for the emotionally distutted, located in the Scarborough neighborhood. I happen to be serving currently as the President of the Ministerial Association encompassing clergy from all of Briarcliff Manor and all-of Ossining. We current evacuation plan has no provision for the Clearview School or three rm V, nursery schools of which I am aware, the one which our church operates and two located in the Village of Ossining. At the Clearview School there are 83 emotionally disturbed students and at 1 cast fifty other personnel involved in that institution's operations. Among the three nursery schools there are over a hundred pre-school children enrolled. Our cwn school is expanding, beginning with the 1982-1983 academic year. We will have more than sixty students and a half dozen regular staff. Of the various populations least able to endure a crisis serenely, those for l l whom such occasions are bound to be most difficult are the emotionally disturbed, the l l very young, the elderly and the handicapped. Next to these possibly would be parents, separated from their children. I personally could not endure having my three children i removed to three different locations under conditions of extreme anxiety with no provisions (the plan shows none) for their feeding and sleeping accommodations, ne (] teachers of the Ossining Union Free School District have declared publicly that they l will not cooperate with the present evacuation plan. I applaud them. They have my interests at heart.
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C As Pastor of this church I would not support our nursery school's cooperation with the plan had we been included. As a trustee of the Clearview School I would not support cooperation with the plan, had the School been included. Rat the N.R.C. would continue to allow a plant to operate from which could como an accident of such nature as to risk the need of evacuation is, in my opinion, e judgment of questionable prudence. Rat such a plan would encompass only a ten cile radius seems incongruous with the conception that an accident requiring ov:cuation could occur. I'm aware of no scientific evidence suggesting that radiation from such an accident could be limited to ten miles. Furthermore, there has been too little education and planning. Upon receiving ths booklet from the Four County Nuclear Safety Committee I called our local police l d partment to ascertain certain things. He police department knew nothing of the arrangements to which I was referring. I called the Westchester County Govemment Offices only to be switched from office to office which knew nothing of what I was O sp:;aking. Sirens have been installed for alerting us to the crisis. No siren has yet been hsard in our neighborhood. My professional colleague at the First Presbyterian Church of Peckskill tells me that on the day the sirens were tested it was necessary to open the church doors and to quiet all intemal noise in order to hear the closest siren. Rat uiren is located one block from the church. in Peekskill. In another nearby community, the siren was activated erroneously one day. He people of the neighborhead panicked. They sought frantically to see if it were "for real". Were I to hear a siren, in the course of a day, I would (as calmly as possible) contribute to the re-uniting of our nursery school children with their parents, of the Clearview students with their parents,and of myself and my wife with our children. I would not follow any such plan as has so far been given us. Robert W. Hare
97 From the Reverend David B. Wayne, Rector of ST, Augustine's ' (~')
Episcopal Church, Old post Road North and. Grand Street, Croton-on-Hudson I have been Rector of St. Augustine's for the past six years and over the previous fifteen years I have served as Rector of I two churches in the Bronx, part-time Chaplain at Calvary Hospital '
in the Bronx, and part-time Regional Officer for the Bronx for the Episcopal Diocese of New York. I live at 44 Van Wyck Street,. Croton, and my two high school age children live at home. As pastor of St. Augustine's I am concerned about two groups of children that meet regularly. The First group is the Sunday Church School. 15-40 youn g people, ages 4-16, take part in the Family Eucharist, starting at 10 AM cvery Sunday morning. At about 10:40 they leave the service
/D i, ) with half a dozen adult Church School teachers, divide into four groups, and work together in classes until 11:30, when they rejoin the rest of the congregation in the parish hall at coffee hour, The Second group of young people is the Carol Bierman Dance School that operates in the padsh hall, Monday through Thursday.
There are probably a dozen classes of an hour to an hour and a half, with 8 to 15 youngsters in each class. Some of these children are brought to the classes by babysitters; some walk by themselves . The teacher, Carol Bierman, is a highly qualified professional, who sometimes has one or two helpers working with her. Of course I am also concerned with my own family. q 1.J
page 2 The Reverend David B. Wayne Our Church School children come from mid-Ossining in the g South, to Hunterbrook Road on the East, to Verplanck on the North. I believe the geography of the dance classes would be similar. All the persons who teach in our church school are responsible, intelligent adults, but there has not been any discussion of an evacuation plan, so I have no way of knowing what they might do in case of an alarm. There are no radio or TV facilities at any of the church buildings, so that they would Lave no way of receiving any additional directions or information after an alarm over the emergency broadcast network. There are no reserve supplies, first aid supplies, or any other fdisaster equipment. Given the lack of preparation and plan, it is possible that the adults in charge of the Church School might panic and not take proper care to see that all the young people in the lll Church School were in some way provided for. During the last two years, no one in our parish or Church Sobool has been approached about the evacuation plan by anyone at all, either from public agencies, the utilities, or the churches. As teacher of the dance classes, I'm confident thaIt Carol Bierman would stay with the students at the school until they were picked up or got home in some way. As far as I know there is no evacuation plan, and there is no radio or TV for information. There has been no meeting of Church School parents or Dance Class parents to deal with any of these issues. Let me add, that to my knowledge, no one in any of the i Croton houses of worship, or in any of the Episcopal Churches in Westchester, has been contacted about evacuation plans. There have certainly been no instructions or suggestions relative to churches and Sunday Schools that I know of.
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Page 3 The Reverend David B. Wayne () The Four County Nuclear Safety Committee Booklet seems to assume that all persons are either at home or at shool, and gives no guidance to church groups such as ours. l I found the booklet itself to be ambiguous and confusing. It seems to me to playdown the possibility of any nuclear accident to such a degree that planning for evacuation seems a waste of time; and on the other hand it lays out such an elaborate course of action for a family to take to be' properly pepared that one
! would have to be motivated'by a great sense of peril to follow 1
all the precautions. Since St. Augustine's is across the street from the Croton l Municipal building, I assume we could hear the alarm siren--though , there has not been a test of that during ch3xh functions. But the
'O instruction booklet leaves me confused as to what my response j should be--to keep everyone inside and close the windows, or to send everybody home ( some to Verplanck), or to send everyone off to their relocation locatin. As mentioned above, there is no radio or TV available in any of the church buildings, so that we would.
have no radio interpretation of the alarm with instructions of l what to do. With no definite instructions for our situation, I'm I afraid there would be contradictory directions and confusion, with l people charging off in all directions. I do recall the incident when there was some sort of an electrical fire at Indian Point, or l a power transformer near by, that caused some fireworMs visible in the area, and one of the umbers of my parish put all his family in the car and drove off to New Jersey. Many people do have tense feelings about the nuclear power plant, and may not wait around for information or instructions. l _ _ __ _ _ _ _ , _ _, _ . , _ _ , _
a- . page 4 The Reverend David B. Wayne No group in the parih has discussed the evacuation plan lll booklet or any plan for the parish in relation to an emergency. Rpart from receiving the Evacuation plan booklet in the mail, there has been no external or internal initiative to cause the parish to prepare or discuss an evacuation plan. Through no formal poll, but through casual conversations, I have the tpression that for most of the people in the congregation the evacuation plan is perceived as a futile exercise, not well enough organized and presented to be taken seriously, and no one really feels that it is worth discussing. All in all, the pesent evacuation plan--and the process of pre-paring it--gives very little help to those responsible for the safety of childen and families in our parish, or in the other local homes of worship, in case of emergency. l ( oc
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O _BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING 130AR_D In t he Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SP
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Cleland S. Conklin ON BEHALF OF RCSE/WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.2 JUNE 1982 My name is Cleland S. Conklin and I am Superintendent of Buildings, Grounds, and Transportation of South Orangetown School District.
- 1. The first thing to come to my mind is the warning. I know the warning s sirentf and they cannot be heard over a lawnmower, or effectively herad when a person is in his or her home. Many people do not know what the sirens may mean.
- 2. I do not know what authorities would or could order South Orangetown School District personel to attend and assist in an evacuation to the school district (which is outside of the 10 n.ile EPZ). The employees, including busdrivers, certainly cannot be ordered into the 10 mile EPZ. I would possibly not go there myself; maybe for a handicapped or injured person.
- 3. I think it is very uncertain as to whether South Orgetown employees would go even to the school. I note that some of the people coming in form the EPA may be contaminated and so may then contaminate South Orangetown personnel.
4 As a former volunteer fireman, I can say that if I were an active fireman I might go to my family first in the event of a radiological accident at Indian Po i sit , especially since firemen are not trained or equipped to deal with a problem of this sort. The problem here is Indian Point; correct this! I have studied the plan as it regards schools and it leaves a great many questions unanswered.
o-. UNITED STNfES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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) BEFORE Ti!E ATOMIC S AFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket nos .
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEN YORK (Indian point unit 2) 50-247 SP 50-286 SP PONER AUTilORITY OF TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian point Unit 3) June 7, ]982 TESTIMONY OF PilYLLIS HELBRAUN EXECLTTIVE DIRECTOR OF TIIE ROCKLAND COUNCIL FOR YOUNG CHILDREN ON del {ALF OF RCSE/ PARENTS RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1.3.2.3.7.4.5 4.7 I am Phyllis Ifelbraun, Executive Director of the Rockland n Council for Young Children, a non-profit agency supported by V the County of Rockland, Rockland Community College and private contributions. Ne are a coordinating body for day care centers which serve the low income working poor; we respond to the child care needs of working f amilies through our network of nursery schools, family day care mothers , and group facilities. The Indian Point Evacuation Plan omitted the following preschools: abc Nursery group, Brick Church Road, Spring Valley, NY (37C), 190 children. Sonshine Day Care Center, New IIenpstead Road, NewCity ( 35D) , 25+ children. It does not take into account the private homes in which women babysit for the children of working families. Some of A \ l
' ' ' thes6 wonen accomodate as many as ten children. These homes are not part of our system, but, we are f amilipar with a few of them
4 q[], enyliss Heloraun (2) o i and know that more exist within the Plan Area. . 4- . In response to phone calls requesting information, we received the following respones from some of the preschools listed in the Plan , ()) Playgarten and Hudson Hill School - Warning sirens not heard; against the law to use staf f cars without child restraint seats to transport children; phone service in 268 exchange unreliable for warning; parents, especially those outside the evacuation area, would come to the school to gather their children despite advice to the contrary. (2) Ramaquois County Day School - Warning sirens not heard; bus driver not always at school; bus drivers and teachers would put their own children's needs first and act accordingly (gg rather than move Ramaquois children; traf fic problems compounded by parents from New York City and other points trying to reach their enildren; credibility of of ficials impaked by their calling the recent drill a success. ( 3) Woodlands Playgroup, Inc. - Warning sirens not heard; buses and drivers not always on prenises; drivers may not hear the sirens, nor could they be relied upon to return. (Nuclear Safety Of ficials called this school to offer a speaker for the parents; nothing has been heard since then). (4) Rockland Learning Center - Never received the Plan ( a parent brought one in) ; warning sirens not heard; never allotted trans-portation or contacted. O (5) Tappan Zee Cooperative Nursery - Allocated two vans for
a o Phyllis Helbraun ( 3)
-y evacuating children; essential to have teachers in both vans a
with children to comfort and reassure them under such critical circumstances; more information is needed about the effects of administering potassium iodine tablets to children. (6) Temple Beth El Nursery School - School has no vehicles; enrollment is 70 children, not 30 as plan indicates; parents transport the children. (7) Cricket Town - Never heard siren. Parents unwilling to allow children to be transported to New Jersey without them. Attached are answers in response to request for in formation from nursery schools listed in the Plan. Our involtament with the child-care situation generally in Rockland County points O out these concerns Aside from the known public and private preschools , there are countless homes , legal and illegal, where young children are placed because their parents work. The caregivers do not have the means to transport out of the Plan Area; they may not even know about the Plan. Attached are answers in response to my request for in-formation from nursery schools listed in the Plan. l i d Attachments (4)
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DAY CARE COUNCIL OF WESTCHESTER, INC. 100 470 Mamaroneck Avenue, White Plains, New York 10605 . June, 1982 Testimony for Wespac Concerning Emergency Evacuation Plan as it Relates to Children in Day Care My name is Sally Ziegler and I am the executive director of the Day Care Council of Westchester, Inc. The Day Care Council of Westchester, Inc. is an umbrella agency providing technical assistance, advocacy and coordi-nated services to the approximately 30 licensed group day care centers spread throughout Westchester County. We are appearing today becausa of our strong feeling that the present emergency evacuation plan for the Indian Point area cannot possibly work. It probably cannot work generally, but we are sure that it is not a workable plan for the day care population. There are thirteen public and parochial schools in the Ossining area affected by this plan. There are three day-care centers, one of which was not listed in the plans. There are six nursery schools -- three of which were not listed. G There is a school for emotionally ill children which was not listed. This means V that in this one area, out of twenty-three facilities, five do not appear in the plans. These overlooked agencies care for children as young as eight weeks and for some children with serious problems. The ' forgotten' children attend: Quakerbridge Nursery, Albany Post Rd. Ossining First Presbyterian Nursery, South Highland Ave. Ossining Small Miracles Day Care, Campwoods Rd. Ossining Sleepy Hollow Nursery, Scarborough Rd. Ossining Clearview School, Albany Post Rd. Scarborough Rd. l The plan, as written, states that " schools" -- a category that includes day care centers -- will provide teachers and other school staff to accompany children to reception centers. Most day care staff are themselves parents of children and we feel certain that they will feel their first obligation is to their own: children. At one Ossining center, I spoke to; classroom staff who stated clearly that they felt their first obligation was to their own children. Staff.said they did not want their children moved to reception j centers and would go find their children. . As there has been such limited community input into the plan, few day care. centers have known what arrangements they are expected to make. This means that we have day care staff unprepared for an awesome responsibility and generally eaaer to reach their own children. The director at one center said that parents had instructed her not to send their children to the reception centers, but to hold them at the day care center until the parents were able to pick them up. Directors (] I spoke with at several shcools expressed to me a sense of vagueness and uncertainty about procedures. The arrival of vans was promised, but there had been no follow-up. Staff members said they were very unclear about procedures.
Parents of children in day care work all over the county. Those outside~ the evacuation area will clog the highways trying to reach their children, either at reception areas or at their centers. Parents within .the area will add to local confusion by trying to reach their children at the day care ce nte rs . Day care centers care for children from eight weeks of age on up. We can guarantee that the parents of infants and toddlers will head for their babies - not for some barely-known reception center. The drill which was held in March only served to heighten the distrust with which the pbin is generally viewed. Only a very few people heard the sirens. For the rare school or center that had enough information to prepare child-ren for the drill, it has been found that the failure of the drill caused quite a lot of anxiety among the children. Generally there was no preparation in the centers because there was no information made available to them. The question of information is a vital one. The pamphlet is a very handsome example of graphics but other than that it fails to satisfy the most basic re a quirements for such a publication. Considering the population of Westchester and the high number of employed people, there is not enough attention paid to notifying or transporting such groups. Where are sufficient numbers of buses coming from to do the massive job outlined? School districts have staggered sessions in order to make do with their buses yet the plan g adds day care centers and nursery schools to the load. This attractive W booklet seems to have as its main goal the playing down of the potential danger of a nuclear accident. Among omissions in the pamphlet for the Ossining area were one day care center (Small Miracles), at least two nur sery schools (1st Presbyterian and Sleepy Hollow), and a school for emotionally distrubed children. All this information is readily available, but apparently efforts at gathering information were sporadic at best. The Council which has all the informa-tion on day care was contacted only once and that was a casually-phrased phone call. I have no memory of the name of the man who called about the plan. His whole manner was off-handed and almost "by the way." I did recomend to him the Westchester Association for the Education of Young l Children as a source for all nursery school names2 l Infants and children are obviously the most vulnerable part of our population. and the most valuable for our country's future. The evacuation plan as presented in the pamphlet does not take this group into serious consideration and we believe it is doomed to failure. Sally Ziegler e
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A Y Y emple T Israel ~n. w A of Northern Westchester/Glengary Road,Croton-On-Hudson, N.Y.10520 914-2n-ueo6 WITNESS TESTIMONY TO THE N.R.C. My name is Rabbi Michael Aaron Robinson. I have been Rabbi of Temple Israel of Northern Westchester located on Glengary Road in Croton-on-Hudson for twenty-one yea rs. I came here from Pomona, California, where I served as Rabbi at Temple Beth Israel. I live on West Mt. Airy Road in Croton. At Temple Israel we run a Religious School program for children that meets on Saturday mornings, Sunday mornings and Monday nights. On Saturday and Sunday mornings we have approximately over 125 children in the building and on Monday nights around eighty children. Some of these children are involved in a hands-on and intellectual learning program. Some of these children have special problems, one has severe cerebral palsy and walks with two canes, some are on special medication for diabetes, etc. The members of our congregation and their families live in the village of Croton and the towns of Cortlandt, Yorktown, Ossining, with a few scattered members who live as far as Mt. Kisco, Garrison and into Putnam County. We also have older children, high school youngsters, who cone here for Temple Youth O Group on Sunday nights, about thirty youngsters take part in the Youth Group program. v Sheila Phillips is the Education Director and in charge of our education program. We have a number of teachers who are responsible for our classes. Our classes average in size around sixteen. No one has an evacuation plan in case there is an accident at Indian Point. No one has ever approached us and asked us to form such a plan or to inform us of any plan that exists. Most of our teachers are also parents. They would be, of course, concerned about their own children if there were a disaster and they would be concerned about locating their own families. There is no guarantee that any of these adults would remain with the children. It is true that there is a special responsibility that the teachers of the little children, kindergarten through fourth grade, who come on Saturday, have. Our teachers do not have emergency first-aid or disaster training. We have a small first-aid kit in the office and that is all. In case of emergency Mrs. Phillips would be directly in charge of coordinating and implementing evacuation. We have regular fire drills at our school. There has never been a meeting with us -- Mrs. Phillips, myself or our teachers -- concerning any kind of. disaster information. Neither have we ever received any specific information on any kind of responses that we should make in case of an emergency. We do not have a radio or television set on when school is in session.
!!c are not equipped with water, food or medical supplies in case of a disaster. Nor do we have transportation available. Our children are usually dropped. off by their parents who leave them here. There would not be sufficient cars and no busses to take care of the children. The parents frequently go of f in dif ferent directions while their children are here for school. They use this as an opportunity for their own O
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\ ht Witness Testimony to the N.R.C. (Continued) recreational or household activities and are not always available. We know this when we have to call parents in case of the illness of a child. Frequently no g parent is available unti1 they pick up at the end of school. We have no evacuation plans at Temple Israel. We have no reception areas for our children. We know of no way to mobilize our children in case something should happen and there are no available shelters. It is frightening to me to give this testimony and make me realize how the children under our care have no protection in case of a disaster at Indian Point which is epproximately three miles as the crow flies from our building. Sinc ely, y
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Michael A. Robinson Rabbi of Temple Israel of Northern Westchester O O
tilliam Rodriguez Director, Recrestion Denartment Croton-on-Hudson, H . Y . 105 20 This answers cuestions asked by Medlinda Krasting, Parents Concerned () About Indian Point, P. O. Box 125, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. Mr. Rodriguez has held his nresent nosition for 5b years, and has previous experience as Supervisor'of Recreation for the Village of Scarsdale. He lives in Brewster and has one child at home. There are from zero to 500 children involved in recreation activities and under my supervision on any given day. These activities are Sunday through Saturday, S am - 10 pm and involve swimming, dap camps, sports, and after school programs. None of the children involved in these activities have special nroblems, (i.e., handicanned, sncial-medication needed, etc.). I do not know how many, if any, live outsid e the 10 mile EP3. I am unaware of how many children in these activities have working narents who are not home vddle the children are in my care. The activities are held at Croton Harmon Schools and fields, P.V.C. tennis courts, Senascua Park and Silver Lake Park. (~T The number of adults in direct responsibility for these children nnd their activities varies. The average number of children
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each adult is responsible for is 12. None of these adults has a specific evacus. tion nlan. There is no guarantee that these cdults would.stsy nith the children during a radiological evacuation. Some of these adults have some first aid training. Of the facilities mrntioned by Mrs. Krasting (first aid, trnnsportation, communication) that would be available to these adults now the only one would be first aid. If an emergency should occur, it would denend on the time and dev as to who would be directly resnonsible for coordinnting and imnlementing an evacuation. During the last two years, no one to mv knowledge in this organization has 'been anpronched by Con Ed, PASNY, the NRC or the firm hired to develop the nresent evacuation nlan. I have received no specific instructions or evacuation- nlans that annly to my snecial needs. There has never been a meeting between my groun and narents to deal with these specific issues. O / 1
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-6 w j Page 2 7/illiam Rodriguez Director, Recrention Dent.
Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. g With regard to the booklet sent out by the Pour County Nuclear Safety Committee, I have not discussed the n1nn nrovided in this booklet with the other adults who will be resnonsible for child"en in my organization. I have not discussed it (the booklet ) with the parents of the children in my care. There is no way to determine how I would react if an emergency should occur. I am not sure that the sirens are audible to myself and the children in my cnre during all of the activities and in all locations of such activities. I do not have a radio or television at my disposal at all times. There are no lines of communications with the other adults who are resnonsible for the children. - In case of a sheltering order, I am not couipped with water, food, supplies, or special medical supplies. I am not eouinped with a three day supply of any medications, etc. if children with such special needs are in my care. I use department vehicles which consist of one car and one bus. I have no contract with any bus comnany and its drivers which would insure their full cooneration in lh case of an emergency evacuation. It has not been determined if any narents are planning to pick un their children if an ovncuntion order is given. No, I do not nor do the ndults who would be trnna-norting children know where we would go and what routes we "tould take to get there. Parents do not know where we would be tnking their children. I ouestion that these "recention centers" are n"inro of our possible arrival and that they would be adeountely sunnlied to l receive and board the numbers of children we may be bringing, i There are no defined nlans to my knowledge that would nddress children under my supervision in outside recreation (i.e., narks, camping, etc.) so 'as to mobilize them or shelter them. l l This may be entered as w ' t en testimony at the NRC relicensing hearings regarding Ind'e. int nuclear power plant in June 1982. lll JAhv , a m l
/b5 My name is Fern Narod-Shiek, my address and phone number is,
=276 Rd 5 Mahopac, 914-246-5607 I drive a school bus for the
() Mahopac school district. During April 1982 I attended a meeting of the League of Women Voters, in the Carmel Library. At that time I spoke out because the proposed evacuation plans for Indian Point stated that the bus drivers from the surrounding towns and also the contract carriers would drive the buses during an emergency evacuation: when Indian Point Nuclear Plant has an accident and releases radioactivity into the air contaminating a ten mile radius. What I said) was that I am a bus driver and that I have not been in-formed by my supervisor that we have become part of the emergency evacuation plan. My understanding is that the bus drivers of the Mahopac and other schoci districts have been drafted by a private industry to drive evacuation vshkles, owned and operated by the Boards of Education and private companies during a public emergency when radioactivity occurs as a result of another accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant. Some of my co-workers heard "something" about this on the radio. A day or two later my immediate supervisor having heard something from someone stated to me "that he heard we () would probably have to bus another town's children'.' I have been driving a bus for five years and am familiar with the daily situtations that arise within a transportation garage. Every bus driver has an assigned route and bus. I am the type of bus driver who is used to fill in whenever there is an absentee or if l another run needs to be added. Since I am a backup driver I am aware of the absentee rate, as well as the number of broken down buses that a transportation garage may have to deal with in one day's l CLme. I would first like to talk about the operating conditions at the bus garage. Everyday there are buses that either break down or are , taken out for DOT ins ection. Everyday sees some drivers absent.. O v5 There is no equipmenta oogrepairs if there should be a breakdown on the road. Each morning the dispatcher has to assess how many buses and drivers are available for the regular runs. Since I am a backup driver I drive a different bus on a daily basis possibly covering two different runs. One observation that I have made is o
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Q S\ (2i m that just about none of the buses have radios. This is not only true of the town of Mahopac but also of the surrounding towns and lll the contract carriers. Since most of the buses do not have radios most of the drivers cannot be contacted during regular driving hours which are approximately from seven to ten and one to four Monday through Friday. As the drivers cannot be contacted during regular driving hours, if there were an emergency only drivers with radios would know to double up on runs. The garage would just have to wait for the unaware drivers to come in with the buses. The waiting time between the call and the ability to be on the road to the emergency site would be at least an hour. There a're sixty-two bus drivers at the Mahopac garage. Twenty-two work full time for the school system. Forty are only part time employees and go home between the runs. Therefore there is a likely possibility that two-thirds of the drivers would be unavailable should the emergency occur during in-between hours. This immediately takes me to another problem about using the school buses for the evacuation plan. This problem is that it is the lawful responsibility of the driver to transport the children llh from one location to another, never allowing them off the vehicle unless it is their designated location, whether going to school or going home again. So, what is the driver to do if recalled for emergency proceedings? , This conflict is further complicated because most of the bus drivers are women with either children in school or f amilies living in the area of contamination. I realize that the NRC states that the ten mile radius is the only area of contamination to be concerned about but, nevertheless, Mahopac goes in and out of the ten miles na the crow flies and many of us in the area would most probably be inclined to instinctively protect and respond to our families and neighbors first. I have no contract stating that I would be driving for a private industry and therefore I will not guarentee that I will be available for any emergency evacuation. Furthermore, my responsibility is to the chlidren of the Mahopac school system. It is my understand-ing that the evacuation buses will not only be picking up children llk from other school systems but will also be picking up members of tho sonoral public from the contaminated towns.
(3) . Before ending I thought it would be a good idea if I enumerated l some of the technical problems involved with rerouting buses dur-
) ing an emergency of any type. To start off with we have had no . ,,
training pertaining to emergencies of any type. Secondly. with no radios drivers cannot be contacted. Third, if there are children on these buses exactly what are we supposed to do with these children? Fourth, if the evacuation needs to take place oicher on weekends, holidays, during the summer or any workday between nine a.m. and one p.m., or after five there would not be many drivers at work to be sent out on these runs. Fifth, since the people who have to know what.to do (drivers, supervisors and dispatchers) have not been .. . informed of these plans, none of us will Raow where to pick up people, where to drop them off, which schools to go to and which routes to take. The sixth problem I think about as a bus driver is the reality that the roads will be used by many other people trying to get out of the areas of contamination. The seventh , problem is the amount of exposure the buses and of course the driv-ers would be exposed to. Another thought i had pertaining to the routes and buses is taking l l contaminated buses out of the contaminated zone. I would certainly i like to know the number of times I would be required to enter the . ! contaminated area and how much exposurethe NRC is willing to allow on'the people driving these buses. I would like to know if there will be any compensation especially af ter we have reactions to this exposure which might not show up immediately. I am wondering if we will- be equipped with protective clothing or any emergency equipment for these accidents. Since there is no repair equipment on these buses I would be concerned about breaking down in the contaminated, area. , , 1 s o
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May 17, 1982 Parents Concerned About Indian Point {S P. O. Box 125 s/ Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 The comnany is a family concern which Mr. Seth Corwin Mr. Corwin has been working for at Chappaqua Bus Co., Inc. least 20 years. He is the nresident. 130 Hunts Lane Chanpaqua, N.Y. questions asked of Mr. Seth This information Corwin May 13 on isthe answers to my(Kathy Toscani, Parants Concerned telephone. About Indian Point). There is one school in Chappaqua within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone; 10 buses used there daily. Total fleet is 50 lagge buses; 21 small buses. 47-54 frequenyy wavellength on bus radios; they work pretty well. Buses are fueled every night. Fifteen (15) of the large buses are diesel which hold 60 gallons. Mr. Corwin felt that if sor some reason they would need more fuel during an evacuation that they could get fuel at Vanguard Bus Co., Ossining, or from the Croton School District. Some drivers have voluntarily signed up to drive during an evacuation. No contract to do so. The bus drivers are pretty easy to get in touch with; have good phone contast numbers. Most live relatively close by. (]) l They are currently p&id double time pay for late hour driving 1during railroad emergencies. - Mr. Corwin's " gut reaction" is that most drivers will show un even I though they could evacuate with their own families. They willl I show un for humanistic reasons. l The drivers have not been assigned to go to certain schools within the 10 mile EPZ and then transport children to certain reception centers. These specifics have not been worked out nor have the economics of this plan been settled. Norone from the state has approached Chappaqua Bus Company in matters relative to training the drivers and convincing them that it is a workable plan. l In February, 1982, two sessions were held regarding an evacuation l emergency -- one at the County Office Building and one at Vanguard Tours. l 1 l v
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1 May 17, 1982 j Mr..Seth dorwin' ChkyMaua Bus, Co. , 'Inc. h , Page 2 1 l 8 _ My opinion of th the present time s that evpcuationplansa empn _ d i f i k W E h )c h L }:. TG h
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I This can be submitted as written testimony during the NRC hearings i in June, 1982, regarding possible~re-licensing of Indian Point nuclear power plant.- , , I will e ysi ' yritness at' the hearings, if necessary M v 5 ,
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,(1 $$ l +7,'c d,1 L Kathy Toscani Parents Concerned About Indie.n Point O
1 May 20, 1982 IC)"7 j Parents Concerned About Indian Point P. O. Box 125 w Croton-on-Hudson, NLY. ~ Mr. Tom Turner Mrs. Kathy Toscani Assistant General Manager Vanguard Tours Inc. 1 Westerly Rd. Ossining, N.Y. 10562 This information was in answer to my questions asked of Mr. Turner on May 18, 1982. Mr. Turner has been in the transportntion field 10 years; with New York Bus Service, with Liberty Lines, and with Venguard. There nre apnroximately 400 buses in the fleet; 300 large; 100 small. Apnroximately 200 nre stated to be used according to the eve.cuation plan. The number of children to be evacuated is unknown. Vanguard would receive a en11 during a first alert: they would then he 4.nstructed to nrenaro their voluntary list of drivers. During n cecond al ert, they would contact drivers on the connany nronerty nnd stort refueling. During a third alert, Venguard would call all their driverr. Fourth alert would be time to evacuate. Dosimeters will be "r 'ind for encP driver: at the nresent time one dosimeter is nn Vnnenord nronerty. Bun tnnks are filled every evening. There are no spare tires on the buses. Drivere rre not contracted to drive during an evacuation. Thern ic no ner"1.ty if they don't show un. if n" t drivarn 1. i ve i". th e even : they nro part time end mostly f-"il y nean) c which will rose n nroblem at evacuntion time becoune ti ey vill ho -rimarily concerned with their own families. V"nrunrd has 3 garages -- Ossining, Yorktocin, Bedford. Also 6 dinrntc& facilition -- Ardsley, Greenburgh, Portchester, Peekskill, 1hi t e U1 m nr , and Ue~ Rochelle. Thc dri.vern hnve hed no emergency trnininc for r-diological exercencier. Bueo , per the vlan, are inatructed to drive on narkwnys with bridgen thnt the bonea enn't fit under. The different agencies involved are very resnonsive to our cri tique, md I am sure, some'xhora in the future, a viable ulan enn O he wor *ed eue. This moy b entered as written testimony at the NRC relicensing ho" rings in Ju 1982. r - *m W dW . mwd
e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fO
, ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Administrative Judges:
Louis 3. Carter, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Frederick 3. Shon In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Docket Nos. 50-247-SP (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-236-SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF ALBERT A. JOHNSON PRINCIPAL, FARLEY MIDDLE SCHOOL Contentions 3.2,3.3,
- 3. 7,3. 9,4. 3 and 4. 4. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, STONY POINT AMBULANCE CORPS.
My name is Albert A. Johnson, residing at Thiells Road in the Town of Stony Point, New York. The thoughts and opinions stated are my personal beliefs. I am not speaking as a representative of the North Rockland School District or the O Stony Point ambutance Corps. I have many reservations about the proposed evacuation of the North Rockland Area as the result of an accident at Indian Point.
- 1. Mcving Farley Middle. School students from the least populated area in Rockland County to Northern New Jersey (Riverdell High School, Oradell, N. J.) is ridiculous.
- 2. In any emergency traffic will be far above noma 1. Moving south into a heavily populated area will produce massive traffic jams.
Any nuclear accident at Indian Point will have people throughout l Rockland County, Northern New Jersey and even New York City heading for the west and north. l 3. The brochure mailed to residents tells parents not to come to school to pick up their children. This is impossible to prevent. On days of rain, snow or early dismissal the school parking lot is jammed, making it difficult for buses to move. for West Branch Conservation Association, Inc. iCt . Y 10 bb # 914/634-2327 bd Zipporah S. Fleisher O ~ sec= eta =Y -
- 4. Expecting drivers from Red 4 Tan and Ramapo Valley Rapid Transit O to drive north into stonx eoint is wishfut thinkins.
- 5. Requiring middle school and high school students to remain in school and take a bus to northern New Jersey would be impossible to enforce. ('Ihe brochure also tells us that students with cars will be allowed to drive home or wherever the student decides to travel.)
- 6. The Ambulance Corps has a difficult problem staffing, especially during working hours. I have not seen any plans for evacuating the infim and hospitalized but if it is similar to the school plans, I'm worried.
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l(k Sictcr Collocn Murray Principal Holy Name of Mary School Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 : June 2, 1982 - (]) This answers questions asked me by Mrs. Kathy Toscani, Parents Concerned About Indian Point. The population of the school I administ'er is 190. No, l according to the evacuation plan there are not enough buses; only I for 140. Yes, we have to depend on outside bus companies. No, we do not have contracts with them. I do not believe that I can rely on those buses to show up during an evacuation. I don't know what I will do if they don't show up. Yes, in case of a sheltering order I an prepared with water, but not with food or sunplies. No one has contacted me to nrenare for such an order. l I have taken no steps to see that children are nronerly sunervimed during an evacuation. The ratio of children to teachers is 20+ to 1. l Yes, I think this adeaunte. I can't force teachers to stay with the children. I will have to 3et the children go if narents attempt to pick un their children when an evacuation order in given. I don't know how manv narents are planning to do this. Our school has no () peonle aveilnble to direct traffic. If someone other than the parent comen to pick up a child I will not allcw them to go. No rndio systems have been installed as a back-up to telephone warning. No, children on snecial medication do not have a three day 9unnly nveilnble to trke with them nor anyone to administer it. - Te,chers have had no radiological emergency training. I want con Ed to nrovide such training. Other commenta: , Thie may be entered as written testimony at the NRC relicensing l regarding Indian Point nucleer nlant starting June 1982. henrgpr
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l O ~ wil'1 be a physical witness I to this testimony if necessary: ( g 1 4 i L\
4 i ' IlD My name is Lynn Doughty. I live at East Mt. Airy Road, Croton on Hudson. I as
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the president of the Croton Harmon Board of Education which is responsible for the operation of the school district. I think that the primary defect in the evacuation pinn gpyyyyntly stands is that bus drivers from Chappaqua are expected to come inw nauwactive zone and take Croton students to White Plains. I think it is totally unrealistic to believe that these bus drivers will risk being exposed to radiation, or leave their own community which is not far outside of the 10 mile evacuation zone. Our middi3 school comprises grades 6-8. The plan currently calls for our own Croton buses to evacuate grades K-6. Imagine the scene when our buses pull up to the Middle School, take out only the 6th grade and tell the 7th and 8th grades to wait! I feel that it is even more unrealistic and unnatural for parents to permit their children to be evacuated under such circumstances when they have no idea what the outcome might be. Many school district residents have expressed the same concern to me and have stated unconditionally that their first action upon hearing of an emergency would be to go to the echool and get their child. I share these feelings and would do the same. I envision mass chaos rendering an evacuation impossible when residents in their cars converge upon oar elementary and middle schools which are located on narrow streets with limited access and turning area especially for buses. - The Croton-Harmon Board of Education has taken the position that the evacuacion plan is unworkable and cannot possibly meet its objectives. Lynn Doughty, President P }% < Y 3 O
i g. y My name is Shareane Baff. I live at 108 Timberlane Ct. , Yorktown Hts. , N.Y. I F ve two children aged 4 and 7 living at home. I have been the director of the Yorktown Gynnastics Center for the past four years. There are 250 children aged 2-13 involved in the program which runs between the hours of 9 a 6:15 pm. The children are involved in gymnastics activities with 12 pupils and 2 adults in the room . Tne children reside in Yorktown, Croton, Garrison, Mahopac, the Bronx, Connecticutand Hawthorne. These areas are both within and cutside the epz. The parents may or may not be in the area during class and are not always at home because many parents carpool to the school and then leave, so I cannot always contact the parents. I do not always have more than one car available at the school so I cannot always transport the children myself. I have never recieved any instructions from Con- Ed, Pasny, or the NRC regarding an evacuation of the center. I have no water, food or special (' )
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meneal supplies in the school in case of a sheltering situation, nor do I or my staff have any emergency training. Therefore, I feel that the emergency brochure does not adequately adress my situation. I also have a conflict regarding an evacuation. I would never allow my own children to evacuate anywhere without me. I would go to their respective schools or any other place to get them. Thus, I cannot guarantee that I nor any member of my staff would remain with the gymnastics students and not attend to their own families. Shareane Baff LI (
lib To: Nuclear Regulatory Commission . , O My name is Nancy Sheer and I live with my husband and two children l on Mt. Airy Road in Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. Both my children attend Croton Public Schools. I teach handicapped children in Eastchester, N.Y. , a distance of 25 miles from my residence. My home is located within 6 miles of the Indian Point Power Plar. . I must register my dissatisfaction with the evacuation plan proposed for residents of our area. My objections are the following: I 1.- In September, 1982, my daughter will be attending Croton i Harmon High School and my son will attend Pierre Van Cortlandt Middle School. According to the plan, students in these schools would be i evacuated by buses coming from outside the area to collect the children.
- l How feasible is this? What driver, especially one with no personal Q commitment to Croton children, will risk nuclear contamination by entering a danger zone? This is a fundamental flaw in the plan.
- 2. Our local roads, especially in winter, are winding, narrow, and slippery--hardly adapted to the orderly funneling of large numbers of panic stricken drivers.
- 3. My children often engage in extra curricular after school activities.
- 4. Generally I arrive home as they are concluding such activities .
It is impossible to arrange " evacuation contingency" plans with each dance, music, or athletic instructor; what of the % hours time my l children sometimes spend alone waiting for me after school? Who could be "in charge" and evacuate them to safety? My return would doubtless be prevented by clogged roads.
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- 5. I find the notion of reuniting with my children in White Plains unrealistic. Have you not considered the crowds, chaos, traffic, and panic which would ensue in the event of a nuclear accident? The plan for parents to pick up Croton children in White Plains is wishful thinking, at best.
- 6. The warning sirens have been tested in our community and found to be barely audible. My children make jokes about the efficacy of these sirens. Croton children continually express a lack of faith in the sirens, the evacuation plans, and the safety of the Indian Point Plant. You can't fool kids.
- 7. It has been very distressing to observe the deep fear which the presence of Indian Point has cast upon Croton children. My 10 year old son has twice cried himself to sleep during the testing of the llh failed sirens. His comments included "We can't hear the sirens. We could never get out. How fast will we die? How can you and Dad get home?" My reassurances and consolation were useless because a pervasive climate of fear exists among our children. They are afraid because they know they cannot be effectively evacuated. Home is not such a safe place.
- 8. The absence of evacuation possibilities points to the obvious--
Indian Point Power Plant, an unsafe, unreliable, expensive plant in a densely populated area, should be closed. Respectfully submi ed, NANCY SHEE e
Becky Catherall k i 193 Sixth St. Q Verplanck, N.Y. 1H - 739-2496 l I am Becky Catherall and I live in Verplanck, N.Y. i I am the teacher of the gifted students at the Carrie E. Tompkins Elementary School in Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. I am also the mother of a one-year-old daughter. In the event of an accident at Indian Point that woud on a, bas require evacuation, I am supposed to gogto the Ridgeway School in White Plains along with a number of children and a few other teachers. However, my husband and daughter
! are at home without their own transportation. It is imposs-ible to state with any degree of certainty whether or not I will chaperone the school children. I do know, however, that I will be in an extreme state of conflict, uncertain about the safety of my family to whom I have a major tie
! and obligation. The Match 3'r'd drill only served to intensify my worst fears. My husband never heard the siren. At this point I don't believe I would be able to distinguish an Indian Point siren from the many other sirens in my life. Furthermore, I have no confidence in the plan as it stands and can't understand why the community wasn't consulted before the plan was conceived. The response of my student's to Indian Point's i evacuation plan has been most illdminating. When asked on l l Thursday, May 27th to state the most personally relevant and important items in the newspaper they mentioned nuclear l power plants and nuclear weaponry as their number one
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BeNkyCatherall Page Two O concern. They do not distinguish between nuclear power use ; I for energy and nuclear power use for war. For them, it is i all part of the same destructive force impinging on their lives each day. Thank you. Sincerely yours, (Mrs.) Becky Catherall O O, f
Statenant by: Joan C. Livingston 06/01/82 llY 115 Old Post Road So. F'i Croton-on-Hudson, NY 10520 V I am a fifth grade teacher at the Carrie E. Tompkins School in Croton. To date, I have not had an opportunity to give input into the nvacuation plan that affects me and those for whom I am responsible. In early spring at a faculty meeting, ue usre given instruc-tions for the evacuation of our school. The unanimous reac-tion hy the faculty uas that the plan was, at best, "unuork-able." Thus far, we have not been informed of a single al-toration in that plan! It 19 difficult tc knou uhat one uill do in an emergency. I hnvc given much thought to uhat my reaction uould be, if the nnhnol'a evacuation plan uere to be implemented in a real
=3tuatinn. I hnpo that I uotild accompany my class and others on a bus. Houever, after careful deliberation, I am thor-nunhly convinced th>t there is no uay that the bus, if it ebnold nucn got to leave CET, vould EVER reach its destina- & inn in Uhite p1nina, nu- ni*n police chi.cf Lambrunchi uas quoted by the Neu York Timon (March 13,1987), "Ue're in big trouble!" He suggestod G W iniking uould be fastor than driving! Our police have O ce+ h e e=einee in evecuetien oreced"ree-Un tn'rborn haun had no training - f'or en routo supervision or rk!1.dr"n in a adiningien1 disaster, nor for coping uith rc-In} and citoryd,y need- of our children should ve success-fully vench Ubite Plains.
T 'e nau ne nn provistorfor emernency packets of medication, fond, or other supplins to be taken aboard buses. Since that initis1, r,ther pathetic procentation of the evacuation plan at the ,fa*cmontioned meeting, NOTHING has been forthcoming "an the administration or other sources. On M,-rb '2 , no ci.rnnn could be heard in my classroom. No
-irnn- h e i,e bnen nudihin since that date!
i ,w -- ~ ,.:m- ,e th- ,riainn) and only evacuation plan unre c $ r t h., * -d to be t ,t< e n Snrr to parents, thore uns little re-
,-& inn, u n enve , noe etudnnt anid, " Mise L., if un havn to sn &n itsita n 1, i n . , i311 ynu 59 uith can?" Af'ter ny positive ----mn- , ., , n n ., nadad, " Thor T avie-s 7 do 't havn tn untry."
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+. Such innocence - and ue unuld betray it!
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II15i Barbara Gochman 19 Piney Pt. Ave. Croton-on-Hudson, NY 10520 271-4626 (]) I am a third grade teacher at Carrie E. Tompkins Elementary School in Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. I am aware of the school evacuation nlan which was nresented at a teachers meeting early this Spring. To my knowledge teachers were not involved in.the planning; at least I was not. As a residentiof Croton, parent of one child in Croton-Harmon High School who also has a-husband working in the Village, I am of course concerned with how the plan affects me personally. Most probably my husband would be able to nick up my daughter at school leaving me free (but with conflicts and concern) to stay with my class. As a famil, we shall certainly have to make our plan--honefully when and where a. aet--in advance. An n teacher I am concerned about the workability of the nlan. Bocnure we did not hear. (or heard very faintly) the sirens on March 3rd, I cannot renort an" snecini signs of anxiety or emotional distress in my clonr. ' Jill we henr the sirens with windows closed? Is there () n back un for the phone notificetion plan? Wo did dincunn the reasons for the siren test, but I felt at the time thut the children had virtually no understanding of ?! hat was involvcd at Indian, Point or what'would be involved in an evacun. tion. I have taught young children for twenty five years. I feel I kno- hr cpi'ar en would react in most situations and I'm ouite sure that ir a rea) emergency children are going to want to be with rarents (and vice versa). Our nlan made no urovision for narents picking un children nt school vthich they will certainly do if they can. And how will troce who nee friends leave with n'. rents, but are not nicked un themeelves re'et? 1 hila T might be able to deP1 with this situation, T certr. inly have no training as to how to handle a radiologien1 dicenter regarding eleven children in my clnsa. As in overy cinen, thove nre also children who have medics 1 nroblenn (thin year one child ~ith cyntic fibrosis who takes medication dFily in school, o"n child with nsthma., and a number with nllergier). 'I do not have (
,) any mediention in my clnseroom nnd I am certninly not nrenared to 1
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I %)g~ (, , \. - pace 2 Barbara Gochman 19 Piney Pt. Ave. Croton-on 271-4626 Hudson, NY 10520 g ' give shotn or medication. I do have a list of children with medical problems, but no instructions for their care. The other nroblems which particularly concern me are the inodenuncy of the busing plan (which way will we go if the wind is blowing South? Can our roads handle the traffic which will jam them?) 7111 our buses have bathroomn for anxious children? Will the nchool which receives un be nrenared for 500 + children and adults? And at this noint for how long am I responsible for the children in my class? This tontimony may be entered at the NRC relicensing hearings concerning Indian Point nuclear power plant this June, 1982.
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l ( I "ill be a physical witness to this testimony CY ~ A V O
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Barbara Hirschman , , 294 Weaver Street i e Larchmont, New York 10538 ! (914) 834-6711 ! l I am a second grade teacher at C.E.T. in Croton. I teach a class of special needs children who require extra time and individualization to accomplish . and understand learning experiences. I am thus, very concerned and dismayed by the present evacuation plan. Teachers and administra-tors -- responsible for hundreds of children -- were given no opportunity to help develop a workable plan best suited to the needs of their area and conditions of 4 children. l As a parent and teacher, I am concerned i about how I will help my own child (25 miles from Croton) as well as the children in class. I certainly do not feel the evacuation plan ! is workable. I travel to and from Croton on Route 9A. l O l
a;, Hirschman 2 . i I know how congested this road is during rush hours. It i l
.'I is the only route we can use, and yet it will be impass- F able. Children will be stuck in buses for miles while ,
the hazards increase. During the day of the drill we could not even hear the signal. My children did come to school the next day very concerned and anxious after hearing their parents' concerns. Many of them r'eported that their parents wanted them to leave school at the time of the evacuation -- anyway they could. Hysteria and accidents are bound to occur as children run out of school, parents drive up to grab their children to safety and school staff attempt to get others on board buses that will never reach safety in time. This entire plan is an impossible scheme resounding disaster. Thank you. Sincerely,
._ e Barbara Hirschman 0
/~T V Ruth R. Isaacs i 97 Old Post Road South Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 (914) 271-8752 I am a third grade teacher at Carrie E. Tompkins School in Croton. I am familiar with the evacuation plan. Although I have no dependents in a ten-mile radius, I am torn regarding staying with my class. I say this because I feel the plan is unworkable. Parents will rush to our school to pick up their children on the one hand, while buses (if available and function-U ing) will be trapped in a massive traffic jam to White Plains on the other hand. I have lived here for twenty-six years and know the road conditions very well. I also have no training to care for children in such a radiological disaster. I do not have the ordinary medication used by children who I know have special medical conditions, O (>
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h 1.e. asthma, et cetern, nor am I confident that I could i , m deal with treating the children if so charged. l , As a teacher, a mother and a grandmother, i I feel this " evacuation" is inadequate and unworkable. I strongly urge that teachers be consulted in the forma-tion of a plan which is feasible. I also feel that until an adequate plan can be developed, the anxiety which I see in my classroom will not abate,
, Thank you.
Sincerely, i. h
.A M
- Ruth R. Isaacs I
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Breda Curran . 2 Taft Lane Ardsley, N.Y. (914) 693-3461 My name is Breda Curran and I live in Ardsley, N.Y. I am a teacher of 2nd and 3rd grade children at the Carrie E. Tompkins Elementary School in Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. I have been informed that should a serious accident occur at Indian Point, I am supposed to travel on a bus with my students to the Ridgeway School in White Plains, N.Y. I must clearly state that in all probability, I will be unable to fulfill my responsibility because of my asthma condition. Any accident at Indian Point sufficiently serious p to require evacuation, undoubtedly will be accompanied by a G high degree of panic - above and beyond the usual problems I must deal with on a daily basis, or even on a rare basis. My condition seriously worsens under extreme stress and I cannot be counted upon to care for the physical or emotional i needs'of my children during a nuclear accident evacuation. In fact, I hope that someone will be available to attend to my needs. In my opinion the evacuation plan is unworkable because there are too many flaws. If I had been consulted during the planning process, I would surely have made known my particular predicament. Indedd, I represent only one of the ways the plan relins on too many untested assumptions. Thank you. Sincerely,
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Breda Curran
i Maggie North' ga y { 114 North Highland Place Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 i S I (s_~/ (914) 271-8864 i i My name is Maggie North and I live in Croton, N.Y. I have two children aged 17 and 18 I teach 4th and 5th grade children at the Carrie E. Tompkins Elementary School in Croton. I have been notified that it is my responsibility to accompany my class on a bus to the Ridgeway School in White Plains, N.Y. in the event of a serious accident at Indian Point. My input was never solicited in preparing this terribly flawed scheme. Simply st&ted, I do not want this responsibility because I don't believe the evacuation plan is workable in any way. I knos for sure that I will not want to leave this town without my child, who has 'to wait for a bus from Chappaqua, N.Y. O' to evacuate his school. It is a fact that many of the parents of children in this community have a similar lack of faith in this plan. For example, I happen to know that there are children who have been instructed to meet their siblings and mothers at some i distance from the school. Other mothers will undoubtedly be deluging the schools, mostly in cars - demanding their children. No one seems to believe that the buses will be able to travel on the prescribed roads. To date, I have had no radiation disaster training, but I can't imagine what purpose it would serve if I am too I sick to administer treatment to others. I believe the children would be better served in the schools with access to toilets j , l and water, rather than finding themselves stuck in traffic 7-) 1 %-) i
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- '} Maggie North Page two on impassable roads, with danger rapidly approaching.
The March 3rd drill was a fiasco. All day long the children were asking when the sirens would blow. In fact, none of us heard anything. My stud'ents expressed great concern - feeling uncertain as to what a real emergency would sound like. And the children have been influenced by their parent's continuing anxiety vis a vis the evacuation plan. Our shared anxiety is not likely to cease until Indian Point closes. Thank you. Sincerely, ha e Maggie North, t ( l l l l k
June 2, 1982 TESTIMONY OF ELEANOR KAHN BITTENSWEET LANE MT. KISCO, NEW YORK 10549 I am a special education teacher at the Robert E. Bell Middle School, Chappaqua, New York. I am also a resident and parent of*a student in the Chappaqua School District. This district is partly within the Indian Point evacuation area. Chappaqua's situation, straddling the evacuation and non-evacuation areas, creates difficulties which have not been recognized by Con Edison's plan. In Chappaqua, only one of its five schools, West' Orchard Elementary School, is in the evacuation area. The middle school, at which I teach, and the high school both contain students from the entire school district, but are not them-O ee1 vee witnin the evecuation eree. In the event of an emergency during school hours, younger siblings of families in the West Orchard area would be evacuated, as
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would famihewho are at home. Older siblings attending the middle and high schools would not be evacuated. i As a teacher in the middle school, I do not know which of my students live in tne evacuation area. There are no plans for them left at school, with their homes evacuated. If their parents happen to be at home at the time of the evacuation, and happen to have cars, they would probably try to get to school to pick up their children. This would create chaotic conditions on the roads and in the schools. And then, what about the children whose parents are 7 not home at the time of the evacuation. Where would they go after i school? Their homes would be evacuated and so would their younger brothers and sisters. There are no plans for taking care of this situation.
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0 Speaking as a resident, I live about two miles beyond the evacuation area. I would wish to evacuate, since I am not convinced that radiation would be contained within a ten-mile radius. I have received no communication from Con Edison about the best way to evacuate, routes, procedures, etc. As a parent, it would be difficult for me to choose between my responsibilities to my job and my responsibility to my daughter, who attends high school in Chappaqua, a few miles outside the ten-mile radius, a location I consider to be hazzardous. Other considerations which cause me anxiety are the need at the time of an emergency, for a full gas tank, a full wallet,and the opportunity to obtain food. Con Edison has made no plans to protect property in evacuated areas. Insurance aoes e not cover any losses or injuries resulting from a nuclear accident. I fear for the health, safety and material well being of myself and my family should there be an accident at Indian Point. j l From my point of view, the Con Edison evacuation plan is inadequate, b A x 64/ Eleanor Kahn l e
June 2, 1982 TESTIMONY OF CLARn ROSBN . My name is Clare Rosen, and I am school psychologist at West Orchard Elementary School and Robert E. Bell Middle School, Chappaqua, New York. It is my experience that elementary school children believe that they will return home from school each and every day. The knowledge that their teacher will not take them away from their school and will send them home at a regular dismissal time daily is needed to enable them to meet the basic needs of security and trust. Interruption of this routine will erode this trust basis and prevent them from establishing separation and individuation from their familiee. The relocation exercise or evacuation plan currently (~N contemplated will remove the children from their safe "other" home
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and take them to a place unfamiliar to them and their teacher. This unfamiliarity and stress experienced by the teacher will be communicated to the children, thereby heightening their insecurity. Since such an exercise is completely unlike a scheduled class trip, no amount of preparatory explanation can alleviate the insecurity. This can be extremely damagirg to the children. I, therefore, believe that the perceived benefits of continued operation of the Indian Point nuclear power stations are overwhelmingly negated by the certain damage to our children. Clare Rosen O
I2-v w n s&yssw 27s3 CROMPOND ROAD YORKTOWN HEIGHTS, NEW YORE 10598 I am Betsy Doepken. President of the Yorktown PTA. Each of our 722 members has been issued a card signifying membership. On the back of this card there is a statement setting forth the ob-jectives of the PTA. I would like to share just two of these ob-jectives with you. The first is that the PTA will " promote the welfare of children and youth in home, school. community, and place of worship." One other states that the PTA will work "to secure adequate laws for the care and protection of children and youth." It is for these two reasons that we feel the evacuation plan is inadequate. O ^ccordins to the P 1 an as Presented to the communsty in the booklet " Indian Point, emergency planning and you" we are to assume that enough bus drivers will come into this area to transport over 4000 school children to safe areas. What is to become of the children for whom no bus comes? Our teachers have families that they will be concerned about. Who is going to demand that these teachers wait with their classes.rather than go home to tend to their own Will the schools have to forbid parents from coming famil % needs? to the schools and getting their own children? Let's suppose for a minute that 1,he children are bussed to the
" safe areas". Will the teachers be forced to go with their classes?
Who will be at the reception areas to insure the safety and well l l being of the children there? Do we have any assurance of the lO l
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proper supervision necessary with such large numbers of children? You are asking too much of responsible parents and school personnel. How can we put trust into such a plan? Was this plan made with any input from the schools, police, fire department, or ambulance corps? Did anyone speak to the Director of Transportation of the Yorktown Schools, who has the responsibility of these children 180 days a year? We feel that the plan was made with little or no attempt to guarantee the safety and welfare of the children in our schools. We have too many questions and no answers. In your booklet you state that the plan will " enable officials to cope with emergency situations that may arise." We feel that the plan as it now stands will create many more emergency situations than we already have. 3bLj Qptc.Q
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Su::cn Schaffel 133 Adult Carcar Guidance Center, Bldg. A Putnam/ Northern Westchester BOCES Pinesbridge Road , j Yorktown lleights, NY 10598 l O As coordinator of the Adult Career Guidance Center at the Putnam/ l 1 Northern Westchester BOCES, I work full time at the Yorktown Hei6 hts campus. I am the mother of two daughters -- ages 6 and 7 who attend school in Ossinin6 about 14 miles from where I work. Since the Three Mile Island incident I have followed the local papers with interest on the subject of the safety of Indian Point I and II. And have become increasin61y more anxious about the possibility of an accident at the site of the reactor. I was pleased to be asked to attend a citizen action Group orEanized to address itself to the safety issues of Indian Point. I was eaEer for the opportunity to move from a feeling of helplessness to one of action. I attended the meeting and quickly realized that if I were Eoing to motivate others to understand
] the issues I had to first clarify my own thoughts and feelings on the issue.
I began by reflecting back to the Evacuation Booklet that arrived at my home last Wbruary. I had looked at the booklet with a combination of relief and horror. Thinking that finally somebody had done some- - thin 6 about this monster in Buchanan that had begun to invade my dre ams . However, I took one look at the booklet and with a sick I feelin6 in my stomach, stuffed it into a drawer as if it were contamin-l ated. It has remained there ever since. On the morning of Parch 3 j l the day of the practive evacuation, I made a mental note to listen to the sirens and do my own mental practice drill. On the drive home from O work. I reme=dered tue mid-dar " evacuation" and tae fact tuat 1 and ! never heard the sirens.
k i l' l Since then I have becomo more and more anxious about the practicalities j involved in safely evacuatinE my children from the radiated area. If Il I was separated from them at the time of the accident I know my instincts would be to find them at any cost. I am concerned how my 6 year old ; daughter would manage without her bronchial dilator. She suffers from osmatha and at cortain times of the year is very dependent on the medicine. ; 9 I also know that I would face certain conflicto. Trained as a counselor end sensitive to human needs, I would no doubt feel the ur6ency to assist ny clients and coworkers at the BOCES campus. Frankly I don't know what I would do. I find that I am simply not able to resolve what's been referred to as l c # disaster waiting to happen". I want desperately to be responsible -- & es I usually am -- and work out my own evacuation plan for my family. In some sense I want to come to terms with this but infact have become more and more angry as I realize that I shouldn't have to come to terms with a nuclear reactor for a neighbor. A reactor that because of the surrounding population density would not be permitted to be built today. A reactor that is supposedly located on the Ramapo fault and has experienced more and more frequent breakdowns and near accidents. Usually a good compromiser I can't be in this situation.
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- - ,$r A 1 $ 9 Susan Scheffel 45 Orchard Drive Ossining, New York 10562 g
I1M l My name is Joan Indusi and I am a teacher at the , Anne M. Dorner Middle School in Ossining, New York which is within the 10-mile radius of Indian Point. I understand I am required to participate in the evacuation procedures should a radiological emergency evacuation take place during the school day. I have informed myself of radiological releases by nuclear power plants and have found that area residents are in' formed after the release. Even at Indian Point Unit 3 the release of radioactive gases in late March was not reported to the County Executive's Office until 12:05 - more than 2 hours after it was discovered and after the release was stopped. These facts lead me to the conclusion that in O the event we must evacuate, radioactive gases and/or particles will have already been released and they cannot be stopped. Several months ago, I received a booklet entitled 1 Indian Point. Emergency Planning. and You. This booklet was supposed to have been sent to all residents within the 10-mile radius of Indian Point to inform us of the procedure in the event we must evacuate the area. The booklet states "Close the windows and air vents of your car, and do not operate the air condi-tioner until you have left the emergency O area." d
'I After reading this statement, and concluding that there g
are already radioactive releaner in theatmosphere, I cannot in good conscience take children out of doors to board buses. The facility that my school will be evacuating to is listed in the Emergency Response Plans as the Church Street School, 295 Church St., White Plains, New York. The phone number listed is (914) 948-2220. In fact, the Church Street School no longer operates as a school. The building is under a five-year lease to the White Plains Child Day Care Association. The phone number is (914) 761-1448. No one at the facility was aware that over eight-hundred middle school students and approximately eighty staff members may be required h to use this facility. The plan states that the reception center should dismiss its own population, should it have to receive evacuees. It is reasonable to expect that the children at the day care center must remain at the center because there is no adequate supervision for them at home. I question the wisdom behind a plan which would bus nearly 900 people (possibly contaminated) to an operating day care center. Upon further investigation, I have found that two school reception centers in White Plains are not even operating facilities. They are the North St. School, 50 Partridge Rd., White Plains, New York and O
o s the Rosedale School, 30 Dellwood Rd. White Plains, V, tiew York. Since the buses are required to reenter the EPZ to evacuate the general public, what would happen to the children who were supposed to go to these facilities and how would they reunite with their parents? For these reasons, I cannot simply "not cooperate" with the evacua tion plan but conscience will move me to prevent children and adults alike from leaving the building. However, I am also aware that remaining in the area poses a grave threat to the health and cafety of those in the area. This entire issue then turns into a moral dilemma. I must therefor () urge the Nuclear Regulatory Commiasion to reject the evacuation plan as proposed by the owners / operators of Indian Point, hh Joan Indusi June 1, 1982 l l Indian Point, Emergency Planning, and You, page 6. i ("3 t NJ
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[G Hl.1% P E Till- ATt'MIC r. A!'t.1 Y AND 1.1 F I;N S I f JG fu )Alili in i t'e- Matter of )
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CONSCl.IDATED EDISON COMPANY ul' NEW YoltK ) Docket Nos. Su- 2 4 T;P (irid ian Point Unit /) ) 50-286SP
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PoWElf AUTHOHITY Ol' Tile STATE OF NEW YOl4K ) (Intilan Point Unit 1) ) TESTIMONY Oy 'cary Lou Gohring, 3.3. , t.1. A. i.iember of the Faculty, North Rockland H.S. oN 13EllALF oF RCSE/ PARENTS RELATING To CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 MAY 1982 ,o V I am concerned about the evacuation of Noron Rockland High School in the event of a nuclear accident at the Indian Point site for the following reasons:
- 1. since the students have no experience with a similiar situ-ation, I fear pandemonium which would be uncontrollable by the faculty by sheer virtue of the size of the student body in comIlbison with the size of the faculty.
- 2. routine drills for fire, air raids, bombs have questionable value as preparation for a nuclear drill 3 as an experienced teacher, I feel competent to ceal with emergencies as illness, localized fires et al., situations that one routinely deals withs however, due to my own 1 6norance about every aspect of nuclear power plants, and the problems therein, my own reactions are of questionable value.
Finally, my observations about the outside adult community's perception of a school is that people fail to remember that students, despite their physical size and often superficial sophistication, are, to a great extent children, whose behavior and reaction under stress, are, at best, unpredictable, o i
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UNITED STATEU OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ft. MISSION , BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD . [f n In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) )
) 50-247 SP POWER, AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) 50-286 GP (Indian Point Unit 3) s
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TESTIMONY OP: Lois Jessuo. Rockland resident f ON BEHALF OF R. C. S. E. / PARENTS RELATING TO CONTENTIONS: 3.1.3.2.3.3.3.7.4.4 _
, My name is Lois Jessup. I reside at 178 Saddle River
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Road, Monsey, New York. I am a retired educator. Most of my_ teaching career has been in the Eaat Ramapo School District whose administrative offices are in Spring Valley, New York. Sinc.e my retirement I participate in a riety of ways in many civic and enviornmental activities. At present, I am President of the Rockland County Coriservation Association, i Inc. an organization which has been incorpcrated since 1930. In discharging the various duties associa'ted"with these activities, a considerable amount of my_ daytime an'd ' evening' hours are spent within the ten mile zone of the Indian Foint Nuclear plants. Since my actual residence is outside the
, zone, I have received no instruction as to the'7'rocedures p I sh'ould follow if an emer6ency should develop whil'e I am with-in this arbitrary evacuation area. I might well be driving through without my car radio turned on, and with car windows closed, I quite likely would not hear any sirens. How would l
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Lois Jessur/- 2 , I know what to do, what rcutes to follow? Should here not O ' be instructions for people like me in phone books, regularly , h publiNhed in newspapers, and broadcast on Jocal radio stations? Should not route tr.arkers he placed along roadways? ~ I am cure there are hundreds of people, both Hockland County residents and outsiders passing through, who might find themselves in similar circumstances in case evacuation should become necessary. - In relatipn to , evacuation of school'ohildren to reception centers, may, I cite my! experiences as a teacher in Rockland County for twenty-three years. On rainy or snowy days, parents invariably drove to +5e school to pick up their children, who would ordinarily walk home, in order to ' avoid their getting wet or cold, blore times than not, the traffic jam which ensued prevented school buses from entering the school driveways this in spite of repeated requests that parents delay this practice until the buses had collected the children who used thi s means of trans-portation. Since the majority of the pupils were bused, this proves that only a small percentage of concerned parents were able to cause an intolerable trgffic situation. Try to relate this kind of experience with circumstances where children would have to be evacuated because of danger from radiation, and you can see how completely' unworkable the plans for evacuating school children are. Remember, many school districts do not own their own buses, run bus routes on staggered schedules, and'many of the O
lo_L_Legsus bus driv er 3 s have their bus routes . It isother impo kinds of employment when th ren in a timely manner ssible to move thousa dey complete n The using school buses for t s of child-
; relevance ransport.
area was brought out i of my own personal exp Police at erience in another Mountain when spoke rstate wethe Palisades Park Headquartwith Inten the Chief o tors. This involve about plans for ev ers at Bear participated. s Hudson Riv er Day Line trips inacuation of park - On which I have passenger a peak day of park use , as s disembark many as Mountain dock. from the Hudson Riv one thousand The Day Liner er Day Line Poughkeepsie Bridge b continues at the Bear efore up the Bear Mountain preturning Ci ty. later in thup the Hudson to the For e day to pick means of several hours,assengers for their occurred transportation c ba kthese passengers l have wilreturn to New no during this time int to their homesanif ready and departure from the erval emergency sheltering them park. between their at Has the park would e be thThis o mean that would appear t ar uation of riv a plan been developed for only alternative er traffic? Would for i ts notification and ev to notification ac-and control? the Coast Guard be responsible return to New York City? Would the Day Line be These are allowed that an some of the areas Point is evacuation plan for th which lead to unworkable, e four-county area a conclusion around , Indian
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- - Lois Jessup - 3 bus drivers have other kinds of employment when they complete It is impossible t& move thousands of child-
' their bus routes. ren in a timely manner using school buses for transport. The relevance of my own personal experience in another area was brought out in a recent interview with the Chief of Police at the Palisades Interstate Park Headquarters at Bear Mountain when we spoke about plans for evacuation of park visi-tors. This involves Hudson River Day Line trips in which I have participated. On a peak day of park use, as many as one thousand passengers disembark from the Hudson River Day Line at the Bear Mountain dock. The Day Liner continues up the Hudson to the Poughkeepsie Bridge before returning later in the day to pick up the Bear Mountain passengers for their return to New York City. For several hours, these passengers will have no ready means of transportation back to their homes if an emergency occurred during this time interval between their arrival at This would appear to mean that and departure from the park. sheltering them at the park would be the only alternative. Has a plan been developed for notification and evac-Would the Coast Guard be responsible untion of river traffic? Would the Day Line be allowed for its notification and control? to return to New York City? These are some of the areas which lead to a conclusion that an evacuation plan for the four-county area around Indian Point is unworkable. f
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/17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos: . 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SB
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF David A. Churchill ON BEHALF OF WBCA/ PARENTS RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.2,3.7 JUNE 1982 q)My name is David A. Churchill. I'm a public school teacher in James A. (3 Farley Middle School in Stony Point, New York. As an individual employed in an industry where my daily responsibility focuses on the personal safety of adolescent children, I am aware of some problems that would likely occur if a mass evacuation of our schcol was' needed due to a nuclear accident emergency. These problems would likely include: a) delay in busing children from school due to the lack of availe.bility of buses- cur school's buses are also used for our elementary and our high school; b) traffic congestion of parents driving to school to pick-up their children; c) and if we did load our buses, where would we take the children in order to evacuate the danger area of our town? Teaching personnel would be at a loss to take meaningful action to facilitate l
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June 2, 1982 Daniela Misch East bbunt Airy Ibad Croton-on-Hudson, NY 10520 My nane is Daniela Misch. Hv husband, our two children and I reside in Croton-on-Hudson within a three and a half mile radius of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. We have in our possession the " Indian Point, Dnergency Planning and You" booklet but we do not feel safe or reassured by its content. Reading the booklet is liking seeing a movie script which does
, not take into account the very real problems people might ' face in regard to leaving the area, or for that matter the very real reactions pecole might have in the event of an accident at Indian Point.
I would like to share three separate experiences of the not-too-distant-past with you which show why the proposed evacuation plan would not work for O e ^#a v re i1v-On a lata afternoon in Decenber,1981 mv twelve-year-old son and I were leaving the movie theater at the Westchester Mall on Ibute 6 in Peekskill, NY. It was snowing very lightly and a thin film of ice was accanulating on the road. 'Ihis condition made driving very hazardous and slow. Mv son nointed to one of the warning sirens which had recently been installed and mentioned casually "what if they were to go off now?" I realized that no matter what kind of evacuation plan existed, we would be trapoed. 'Ihe drive hcme, which normally takes about 30 minutes at most, took us two and one quarter hours on that afternoon, two and one quarter hours which seemed endless to mv;voenger' son who had stayed honn by himself. Another incident was on a midnorning in March wben I was getting ready to leave for college class in Valhalla. All of a sudden I heard the loud sound of the sirens. I did not know at the time that it was just a tivout, but I also was not ready to think of it as the real thing. Icaving the house, I figured that once on the road I would find out what was haopening. In retro-spect my reaction scares me and also shows me how unpredictable one's behavior can be. The third incident occurred about two weeks ago. My husband was at his job in New York City, I was on jury duty in White Plains, my older son was in school, and my younger son was at hone in bed with the flu. I keot in touch with him by phone, and it was then that he asked me what he should do if there should be an accident at Indian Point. I told him that there would be a bus l on Mt. Airy 111., but not what tine, or if there would be nore than one bus. My son replied that in case of energency he would want .to wait at home until I could get him and that his older brother would run away from school to come
' home and save our dog. These are just three incidents, involving only the mem-bers of one family and their different reactions. On any of the thnm occasions th( evacuation plan would have proved to be either unfeasible or insufficient, a very scary thought.
Daniella Misch
Lillian F. Moore 56 Irving ave. s,
,7 K-J Croton on Hudson N.Y. 10520 l
914 271 8293 3 I care for a two year old child every Tuesday and Thursday. I have had no instructions from his parents as to their wishen in case of an emergency at Indian Point. The father works in New York City, and travels out of the state and the country occassionaly. , The mother works in White Plains and there are times when she cannot be reached. I am dropped off and picked up. 9etween 8am and 5:30pm there is no car available to me. I have two school age children at home, one mile away. s-G k_) If an emergency occurred after school, there is no way I con get home to supervise my children. i l O s_J l l { 1 l l l
Mary P Eulleit l Briggs Iame l Creten on nudson, N.Y. ; i f ,s I hav( an eight yeatr old ebild in the third grade in the Frank (_) G lindsey school, which is located about one mile from the Indian i Point Nuclear Meactor. While .I have heard several sirons in the area on several occassions, I did not know what any of them were for, nor could I tell you which specific ane was from Indian Point. I strongly doubt that
.many people de unless they would happen to be lict6nin; to their radic at the time. If I heard . siret. in tae future, I w m.d Lav
. ..; r. ' ; a , .i.a listen to ute if tae airen was av.ethin.
t L <. r L. .. c cr; , . out, -r t, . L. Li :. J av a.d .ut, I.. c u n e .- r..c d t~ t 't i_ t b: t 1 L. t nwt ,, v a i n A i t. .a e n u .. e e l -uiu
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i receivwu au ==.r....cy pianulus voor, uuu uni e r c u...t e ly , it did n;t i.;cluje ny child,'u Jiutrict in it. We were given only the iactructivas f.,r the Croton scheal district, not Mistrict three. In e..y case, I am maet doubtful about havin; my child bussed in a direction that is down wind of the y revailind wind in this area, .nd am also dubicus that the drivers would show up to bus any children fore a school that.is within plain view ef a malfuntian- . in; nuclear reactor. I am afraid my child and hundreds of children in district three ieuld siaply be stranded unless they have a par-ent to este and ;et then. Since my husband works in the sity, and I work in th; city at itast three oays a week, I taink there is very little kope of anyone rescuing uy little girl. Everytime I drive inta the city, I tniak tout this possibility and wonder why I sm forced to live with it. In addition, I have received me additional information fram my child's school as to their particular (~} plsas fac cealin, with an escr;ency; as far as I can tell, tasy have ecne. I alsa worry about where my child ai.ht be if an emergen-cs acevred after school haurs. Frequently, sne is with L Laby sit-ter, who may ar sky not be capajble of cealing with such an eder;cn-cy, ,ad certaicis is tao elderly to drive long haars in heavy traffic to esca,e fro this area. II my child is in ballet school, I have btea taid by the teacher herself, that she would not have the slightest idea wh,t to tie with >il the children leeft in her care. Nor de l I believ ,t it tu the respencibility of either a sitter er a ballet teacher to havu to deal with how to evacuate children from a nuclear disaster area. It is the respencibility of Com 7dison, and they have not delt with it successfully. I strongly questian their right to jepoordize es many lives in the first place, let alone be so cavalier < taut what they will de if seme-l thin,moes wreng. A,t any rate, if at 11 possible, I would try to
,_et cy child myself, hivin; no confiance that anyone else will.
Given C en Edison 's past performance,- I alsa doubt that they would infor2 the proper authorities until the very last minute anywyv. By the tiae they conclude there is no way to fix the error and - then pretend'it neve; hap,ened, time will be very short indeed, especilly for hundreds of children in schools where the reacter itself can be seen from the play,round. If an order to stay indoors were given, I am sure I wauld i;aere it; I would tryto et my child fron shcool and ;et out af the area. O m 7 Y . a / & I G sl v ) tl l l l l
!.,T"*t I still question why, in a country that prides itself.en its reppeet for the rights of the individual, I have te live daily with the llh threat of a muelear disaster hanging over my head, and ~werry about what to de if it happens. Iwas given absolutely me choice in the .
matter of the location of ta' is reaetor less than three miles form ! my home in a densly populated area, and new it appears that they i will be allowed ta continue to operate in my area regardless of whether there is aray way te evacute us in case of emergency or met. Apparently, the rights of the individual are mothine when coup,ared
. with these of Con Ed.
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\W N )s I, Sheilah Rechtschaffer, residing at 71 Old Post Road ,
l North, Croton-On-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 wish to state my opposition to the continued use of the Con Ed Atomic Energy Plant at Indian Point. I am specifically opposed to the so-called evacuation plan because ... (1) It is impossible to move large numbers of people in a short period of time -- and it is impossible to know in advance whether evacuation can be made within a specific time (' (_j) schedule with safety. One car breaking down on any of the toads leading from the disaster areas would cause a traffic tie-up of epic proportions. If you have ever experienced traffic on an icy day in this area when people are not fleeing for their lives it isn't too hard to imagine the chaos which would occur during an emergency situation. Simply stated, exit routes from a disaster in this area are totally inadequate. (2) I work in Ossining and in the case of any emergency there is no way I feel I could be assured that I will be able to travel north in order to reunite with my family. (3) There is no guarantee that the drivers of the buses that are to bring the children to White Plains will come into a hazard area to pick up the children -- and if people are fleeing O) k- how will the buses come to this area to pick up children and what happens if they can't make it. 1
g n,?-8o 3 1
. o O (4) What happens to my children, when my husband and I are at work and my children are out at a variety of after school activities and cannot be transported to White Plains or contacted as to what to do. My daughter goes to the Hudson Valley Gymnastics School down the road from the Con Ed plant. How could I reach her and reunite her with the rest of the family.
(5) Why should I think that any evacuation plan that would not work in any case bring a greater feeling of security to my family. We have young children and from what they have expressed they have no confidence in any such plan and the whole idea only brings more anxiety to their lives in an already overburdened generation. Very truly yours,
.' s at . . . . f- G .: e L Sheilah Rechtschaffpr gyg 9
SUSAN M. TEASDALE 7 KINGSTON AVENUE R. D. # 2, SOX 78 PEEKSKILL, NY 10566 I have lived with my six year-old son at Camp Rainbow in Croton-on-Hudson, within the ten mile zone of the Indian Point plants, for the past 3 years. I recently moved to Peekskill, which is still within the evacuation zone. I travel to Harrison daily, to I work at IBM, outside o f the zone. I never received the Con Edison booklet entitled, Indian Point. EmerRency Plannine. and You. A friend lent me her copy, and after having read it, I must say that I never have in the past, nor do I now, af ter reading about the evacuation procedures, plan to follow those directions. Should I hear of an accident or the possibility of one, I intend to find my child, either at school or at his sitter's house, and drive him out of the area myself. My biggest concern is in finding my child 7-) should an accident occur. I am sure that in an emergency of this scale, my sitter, or my son's school teachers may well leave the area before I could get back in. Before we lived in New York, we lived in Pennsylvania. Though we were not within the ten mile radius of the Three Mile Island plants, I took my son out of school and left the area two days before Harrisburg was evacuated, having anticipated Metropolitan Edison's non-communication of the real problems. I intend to do the same thing again, if I ever hear-of a problem at Indian Point.
/
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" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
() . BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING ROARD f% Y In the Matter of -
)
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Jane Courtney ON BEHALF OF RCSE/WBCA/ PARENTS RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1,3. 2,3. 3,3. 7 ,3. 9,4. 2,4. 3 JUNE 1982 My name is Jane Courtney. I live in Stony Point, three miles from Indian Point, and I am a wife, mother of three girls, and a homemaker. I don't have any particular specialized knowledge or background regarding Indian Point, rg other than what I have read in the last few months since I received the evacuation
*d plan booklet in the mail.
I ignored the booklet for a long time, and I know many people who have done the same thing. And when I finally read it carefully, I really had no confidence in it whatsoever. I was turned off by the format, tone and vocabulary a which all seemed designed to minimize any danger, to not arouse any anxiety, and to distract the people's~ attention from the cause of the problem in the . first place - Indian Point. 1 I and many of my friends have no faith in this paper plan, and will not cooperate in a plan that separates f amilies between dif ferent points in New Jersey and Pearl River. We will not allow our children to be bused to New Jersey. The school reception centers there have had no preparation for such an event. We do not know if school bus drivers and teachers will fulfill their roles, since they have their own families to take care of. Police, Fire,
/~']\ \_
and Ambulance Personnel do not have the proper communications equipment,
protective clothing, and monitoring equipment to fulfill the requirements of the O. plan. And even if they did, the population density, panic, congested rohd systems, and hilly, winding terrain all make implementation of an evacuation plan totally unworkable. It has been estimated in the newspaper that Rockland County alone would need 5 million dollars just for proper equipment of all sorts, not including the additional costs of road widening, realignments and leveling, etc. The plan is totally unacceptable to the populace, the emergency personnel and to the Legislature. The consequences of an accident at Indian Point are too devastating to life, health, safety, air, water and food supplies, home and property to justify Indian Point's continued operation. The sirens are simply going to contribute to the general panic, if we can hear them. You assume that people will quietly listen to their radios, and
-almly follow directions. This is totally unrealistic. There will be utter hysteria; the roads will be clogged with people trying to get from one school to the other to get their children. There will be accidents, and once the roads get clogged (as they frequently do now at rush hours), there will be people perhapu killing other people in order to get ahead of them and drive out of the area. I hope everyone has a full tank of gas, because otherwise there will be murder and mayhem at the gas pumps.
As to the bus routes for evacuating the general populace, the Red and Tan 1.ines are talking of only supplying the buses that normally service Rockland County (which are too few to meet the needs of an evacuation), and they are not guaranteeing that there will be bus drivers. Anyone who foolishly waits at a' bus stop carrying three days' worth of clothing, food, water, medicine, important papers, money and credit cards, will just be irradiated while waiting for this imaginary bus. Multiple trips are supposed to be made. We'll be lucky if there is one. And if there is one, people will trample one another to get on it. I'm sure robbery and vandalism will rampant. j l m There will be no reimbursement for the loss of home, property and liveli-hood. The Price-Anderson Act will only pay a few pennies for each dollar,'s
. g> . /~'\ worth of damage. I notice that Con Ed and PASNY are not offering to pick up U
the tab for this damage, but they have the nerve to ask us all to " cooperate" in a plan that will cause almost as much death and destruction as the radiation will. It is simply unworkable. If the plants are so old and deteriorating and dangerous as to need an evacuation pl'an; and if the plan is unworkable (which it is); then the only logical conclusion is that the plants are too dangerous' and should be shut down and decommissioned. I really don't know what we will do, but my_ family and I will do it together. O l i l I l I g-
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} s i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - NUCLEAR REGULATORY DOMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
'In the Matter of )
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Dockets Nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) l 50-247SP
)
50-286SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point Unit 3) l TESTIMONY OF Helga Ancona ON BEHALF 0F RCSE/WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1,3.2,3.3,3.4.,3.7,3.9,4.1,4.2,4.3 MAY 1982 My name is Helga Ancona. I am a resident of Stony Point, and have resided here since 1968. I am a journalist and housewife.
- 1. Personal concerns My three children, aged 12,10 and 5 years old, attend -
the Green Meadow School in Spring Valley, outside of the 10 mile EPZ. In case of an emergency at Indian Point, I know realistically that no bus driver would take my children back into a contaminated area and I know too that there would be no possibility for me to pick up my children. Once the alarm would be given (and I'm still very confused as to when it will be the real alarm and when the test), people would go into a state of panic, our country roads would be imediately clogged O with care. My choice wou1d de to etay heme. in tete 1
Pi ti _2_
~
o . O despair as to how and when I would see my children again. No emergency plan has been conceived for children outside the 10 mile EPZ: I don't know where my children would end up: the phone lines to the school would be jammed with phone calls, I wouldn,'t even be able to call and tell the children what to do. This to me is a war scenario not warranted by a source of electricity!
- 2. Stony Point roads The roads in the area where I live are narrow and windings when there is snow, ice or strong rain they can only be travelled on at very low speed.
The Palisades Parkway which is our main thoroughfare to other areas of the county and state is packed with cars during summer week-ends and holidays. It has taken me hours to reach New York on such days. In an emergency when many more cars would hit the road it would be impossible to reach any destination.
- 3. Previous incidents at Indian _ Point I am aware that a major release of radio activity could occur within an hour after an accident took place at Indian Point. That means that we, the people within the 10 mile radius (and most likely the people beyound the radius according to how the wind is O
a
~
e . 9 blowing that day) would have no chance whatsoever to escape. On Oct. 17th, 1980, 100,000 gallons of water leaked into the container of Indian Point 2. The NRC was notified about the accident 3 days later. What assurance do we have, that something similar will not occur in case of a serious accident? Indian Point 2 has been rated "below average" in its overall performance (N.Y. Times, Sept. 13th, 1981) and I know of continuous shut-downs of Indian Point 2 and 3 for recurring problems at the plants. How can we feel reassured? We are not covered for nuclear accidents by insurance companies. Even if b d we could evacuate from our towns it would be many years if ever, until we could return to our homes and property. What would we live off in the meantime, how would we replace our losses? The government would ! have to spend millions to shelter, feed and clothe l all the displaced people , it would have to provide l homes and jobs for us. It seems to me that Indian Point symbolizes too many l unnecessary dangers, expenses, unresolved questions j which have been growing and not decreasing along the years. We should turn to other sources of energy and close down Indian Point. Q f l . y [, D fb(&Q %
\
<di Elise Lantz 1 31 Cleveland Drive Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520 (914) 271-6349 I am Eliso Lontz and I live in Croton-on-Hudson, N.".
I am the mother of two dauchters ages 7 and 9 I am also a nurse at Northern Westchester Hospital, Mount Kisco. N.Y. I am very concerned about the evacuation plan because during school hours I an outside of the 10 mile radius of Indian Point and an reliant upon the community to evacuato my children. I happen to know that teachers with children of thair own will be in an enornous state of conflict about stayinc with their students. Furthormora, there is a short I) pariod of time befora and af ter school when my childron arn laft to their own resourcos without adult supervision. Whila they are responsiblo onouch to caro for their needs in usual or even slichtly unusual circunstances, in no way are they capable of fendine for thnmselves in the event of a serious accident at Indian Point. I also face a serious othical and enotional dilamma because as a nurse chargnd with paoplo who are already sick and dependent upon .io. I am torn between my responsibility to them and to my children. What makes this even more d i f ficult is that my youncor daughter displays unusual fears which have been of serious concern to her father and me. Nandless to say I worry as to the possibin consequences wern
/\
i har imaginary fears replaced by roal ones. Finally, I foni the plan is unworkable end the anxiety we live with on a daily basis is unhealthy , . i
----------________--________W_m__
W___ _ _j __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ _ _______
a. live at 10J it .dner ;venc e. Croton, a.i. g hy n ne u n;r Ci ; , o.1e . I i ve never he ni tua emeryncy
! .. ve t.o c..ilaren . d .: ..v ! ? . .o Live t cic ac r.u I a.a not confident ,t. t Con - Ed or Pf.SJY ould notify th ,ublic c.d very httle tia.e to
,romptly in c:.se of an e.1ergency. I aoul be sure unt;e leave. I ..ould be p .niced nd im..ediately get my child fra.a sci. col. I think that tue utilities bive not correctly estimated the response of ,urents on several issues. I uould never allow the school to evacu:.te my child because I am not confident that I would ever see him again. I also do not trust th:>t teachers or bus drivers would leave their own families behind to go with t:.e school.clildren.
I forsee several problems ir. that there will be hundreds of parents converging on the schools at the same time producing a parxing problem and mass chaos. I would then proceed to evacuate in the direction tnat I felt was the safest regardless of instructions. My child attends aftr school activities and I know that there
-x
- re no evacuaticn plans for this progra:;t. This would be anotner chaotic situation.
I also ao not feel confiaent that a babysitter could safely evacuate ny children by public or f riv te transportaticn. I would certainly come to get them myself reg:,rdless o. ro dblocks or instructions to do otherwise. I have not even instructed tues. on the issue because I do not want them to take ny children anywnere. I feel that the maps in the evacuation booklet were confbsing 1.ad it ..as difficult to find my zone. Myra Spiegelman _/c/ , ' UJ t[)Tuls h l
1 (*) U June 2, 1982 TO: THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Hy name is Ellen Burgher. My husband, Eric, daughter, Karin and I live at 307 Old Sleepy Hollow Road in Pleasantville, New York. In the event of a nuclear accident or emergency at Indian Point, my daughter, along with 470 other Briar-cliff High School students, is due to be evacuated to the Park Avenue School-in Port Chester, New York. I, on the other hand, will be " safe" in that I live just beyond the 10 mile radius determined to be the critical zone. And, therefore, .I am not expected to be evacuated. l .
- 4. ,
It may be of interest to you that:
- 1. We have received NO information from Con Ed regarding evacuation plans.
l
- 2. We have received NO information from the Briarcliff
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\
[ Manor School system regarding evacuation plans. l
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{ i ) 2.
- 3. The route - PLEASANTVILLE ROAD - which the evacuation is to take out of Briarcliff - is currently under construction and has been for several months.
- 4. All three Briarcliff public schools are either on or adjacent to Pleasantville Road.
- 5. The 10 school buses which are to evacuate our children are to be driven North from Greenburgh -
a " safe" area - into the Briarcliff " danger" area, in order to take our children across the county. The presumptions inherent in this plan are incredible.
- 1. That a radioactive plume will stay within a j specified, artificially determined 10 mile limit..
- 2. That those people beyond that hydthetical limit are " safe".
l 3. 'That parents have been informed by any private, public or governmental agency of evacuation plans,
- 4. That the home school is prepared. Briarcliff liigh School received NO phone call when the practice drill was conducted.
t L
o 3. () 5. That the receiving school is prepared.
- 6. That the buses or bus drivers will enter a
" hot zone" in order to evacuate our children.
- 7. That the loss of time in evacuating our children, since the buses must come into the area and the narrow roads could well be chaotic, is inconse-quential.
- 8. That parents, in our situation, will sit idly by, supposing themselves to be " safe", as their children are bused to a receiving school miles away.
In addition - it is of enormous interest to me that a small company in Elmsford (Self-Powered Lighting, Ltd.) that is spewing radioactive waste into the air has indicated in their Draft Environmental Impact Statement that an accident I l i at .THEIR facility would affect people within a 50 kilometer, range. During the D.E.C./S.P.L. hearings last year, Dr. Leonard j Sohlon, Chief Radiation Officer of the New York City Department of Ile a l t h , indicated that the area of contamina-i tion in the event of a " credible accident" would be far , O . 4 7 .- - - , . - .
b, t 4. greater, encompassing New York City and portions of Long Island, New Jersey and Connecticut. YET ...an accident at Indian Point would affect only those within a 10 mile ) { radius? Picase review the evacuation plan. It appears at the very least to be unworkabic. Furthermore a county plan must be disseminated throughout the area of impact. It must not be up to the citizenry to discover from occasional newspaper and magazine articles bits and pieces of information. Respectfully yours, g
%/
Ellen Burgher O
krs. kathleen T:ccani 15 Piney Pt. Ave.
)
Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.10520 - 271-4626 Parents Concerned About () Testimony for the NRC Hearings Concerning Relicensing of Indian Indian Point Point Nuclear Power Plant May 31, 1982 - June 1982 I am a resident of Croton for 8 n the mother of a years a'd 6h yr. old daughter. I feel you have to account for fear and panic in the evacuation nlan. These aspects of human behavior are now being upheld in court regarding Three Mile Island aftermath. You (Con Ed/PASNY) mention its direct opposite first, however, in the Emergency Planning Booklet section " Leaving Home" by stating " Remain Calm". You certninly admit to fear and nanic as a possibility by doing so. You n1so should mentian in that section that people should have a full tank of gas at all times. Another error in this section is not mentioning th9t neonle should have duplicates of important papers-- one cet of conies possibly in many peoples' safe deposit boxes and n () one net of copies at home. The latter may be the only cony in the end, beenuse if an area is contaminated it cannot be reentered for decades. I thought the sirens were not loud enough when I heard them during testing of them in April. In April, I called the Con Edison telenhone numbe" listed at the end of the Anril 1982 Westchester Mngazine nrticle about Indian Point. Mr. Bowin Lindgren then told me ~ ~ the sirens are sunnosed to be 125 decibels loud, but further out, yards unknown to him, the level only has to be 60 decibels. This is i according to federal guidelines so as not to cause ear damage. I feel ee.r dnmnge is a much less severe medical nroblem than the nossible medical nroblems that could result from not hearing the sirens, in other words, staying in a radiated area too long before attempting to evacuate. If my 6A year old daughter was at a friend's house after school ; nnd .n meltdo'vn occured , I greatly fear the means of evacuating at that time, esnecially if I nere out of the village. I would then G 1 i L
(') ae , !, i f Page 2 Mrs. Kathy Toscani % Testimony for NRC E Hearings, June 1982 g[ have no way of evacuating her with surety. I don't know if my j., friend would evacuate my daughter and her own children to a reception center, or whether I should try to reenter Croton to do so. . Mr. Harvey Harth, of the Four County Nuclear Safety Committee, 3 told me on the telephone in April that it is the state's res-ponsibility to recruit and train bus drivers to be ready in case of a radiological evacuation. I feel that even if the state somehow gets the money, bus drivers will not sign con, tracts to drive into and out of contaminated areas. Maybe a few altruistic souls will show un whose children are grown and l'iving away from home, and whose husbands can self-evacuate, but the many drivers with young children in different schools will be caring primarily for their evacuation f needs. They cannot presume other drivers will show un to evacuate their school districts. Honefully you can see the lunacy of evacuation for those without cars and with pe ts. This could include wives / husbands home once in a while earless while their spouse has the car that day, mothers llh home with pre-schoolers, older peonle, and some of each group with nets. In the " Leaving Home" section of the Emergency Planning Booklet, people are instructed to take " food for any pet you take I with you", so obviously pets are not excluded from being evacuated. Can you nicture these people standing on a street corner waiting for the bus during evacuation of the general public--with their pats? Cats and dogs going at each other, small children screaming, someone with a bird in a cage going frantic, and older people ; getting extremely agitated by all this rucus on top of the fact that the evacuation itself is looming foremost in their minds,'as they wait (how long?) for transport South. In the May 16, 1982 edition of Catholic New York newspaper, Mr. Lindgren certainly puts his intelligence in jeonardy by stating that "the earthauake fault argument has been beaten to death with respect to Indian Point's safety". How can he say it has been beaten to death? The fault isn't dead; it is still there. Even a dormant fault can have periods of activity and one of the original uroblems O.j vas the siting of the plant on the fault. The plant has not been I b
page 3 . Mrs, Kathy Togeani 15 pincy Pt. Avo. Croton-on-Hudson, NY c-Testimony for NRC (~/T x- ' Hearings June 1982 moved to a less densely populated area and the fault has not gone away. I am also tired hearing how much radiation I can get, for example, by walking into Grand Central Terminal, largely granite. The Terminal will never have the possibility of a meltdown and will never need an evacuation plan. Plus I have the option of walking in it or never setting foot in it. I do not have the surety of thinking Indian Point will never have a meltdown or will never necessitate an evacuation. Its potentini radiation dangers far outweigh other natural and many times avoidable radiation sources. In a news magazine five or six months ago, I read a cost analysis of power produced by nuclear plants and by. coal plants. The cost was only about a penny difference. With all the problems of plutonium disposal, the out-of-this-world price of evacuation cirens and plans plus the real, tengible cost if it was ever implimented, make a conversion to coal plants a most logical con-(]) clusion at this time. Coal gasification would make this power source cleaner than decades ago and the lack of radiation leaks, I human error problems in nuclear plant maintainence, plutonium disposal, and evacuation worries would clearly be advantagious to this densely populated New York area. The financial future of Westchester depends on its existence free of evacuation nlans on country roads or even on telephone-poll l bordered freeways. The social and psychological future of its residents for decades to come depends on knowing they live in an area safe for them and for their children, and not feeling that they are merely experimental pawns in an impossible evacuation plan, obviously exnendable to the board members of power companies. Con Edison /PASNY must realize the gravity of the evacuation issue and that the possibility of accidents with no solutions would leave the area devastated for decades. I will be a physical witness to this written testimony.
%L. & CA
V/Y/12__
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140 () Karen K. Ford 90 Maple Street, Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 As a parent of two children in Croton schools, I am especially concerned about the evacuation plan. On the day of the siren test, I made a call to the Croton Police Department to get some idea of what information regarding evacuation would be forthcoming in the event of a real emergency. I identified myself to the officer and stated nty reason for
,] calling. I asked him if, were this a real emergency, he would be able to tell me whether buses from CET and PVC had left. The officer told me that he would have no idea, that no procedure had been set up to gather and transmit thic information to parents.
I believe that this is a serious defect in the plan. I have children at two different schools in the Village. The younger ane is at CET, which does have buses at its disposal to take the children to White Plains. But my older one is at PVC which would be alledgedly covered under the Chappaqua bus with all of its rayriad problems. I work in North Tarrytown.
) Assuaing I learned of an emergency at work and the children at school, I would have these options:
lLuf -
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- h. Head south to White Plains, to one of the schools my children would be bused to. $
- b. Return to Croton to personally get rqy children.
\s Unless I h_ad information indicating that yes, both claildren were in transit to Wlaite Plains, I would probably be more inclined to return to Croton to see to their safety.
In the event of a real emergency, I believe that there would be ~ v thousands of parents, like myself, who would attempt to drive back into the Plume Zone in order to get their children. This , would, of course, be a f action. Roadways would all be jammed. At best, chiloi ., would be_ evacuated to safety while At worst, their paren(s would be trapped trying to reach them. all would be trapped. Further, consider these snags regarding the evacuation of s children from Croton.
- 1. Field Trips. I am concerned that[it would be especially difficult to evacuate ' children from what often are extremely remote locations. I am concerned that buses may not be available to them because bus drivers will not have waited for the children to return, or that children might be off in separate groups, or even worse, may become isolated in a panic situation. I believe that these are realistic O
& pws ~5J
I ( O coaceras sivea that uader aor ' circu st aces buses are
~4 not always waiting in parking lots for the duration of the ,,
~ outing, and that these outings frequently involve breaking -
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the larger group up into smaller groups. ,
- 2. After school hours. As a working mother, I have babysitters at home with iny children before I return from work. This is rather a typical situation. I am concerned that these babysitters may not be informed of the evacuation plan, and that even with adequate information they might join their own families or friends and sqy children would be left to fend for themselves. If this were to occur and I was unable to communicate with iny children, their choice would be to wait home for me or to seek transportation out of the area. This would be extremely confusing to them, adding to their fright during a nuclear emergency and thus ont increasing the liklihood of panic,4non-constructive ,
behavior.
- 3. Inclement weather. Snow, heavy rains, icy roads, would exacerbate an already unwieldy evacuation plan. As evidenced by the area's historic tie ups during storms which are due, to a large extent, to State and local government highway departments' slow response time in clearing roadways of ice and snow, the road system is hazardous and inadequate during poor weather conditions. Moreover, there are a O number of specific stretches along the area's highways that a
seem especially vulnerable to this problem. The steep hill along Route 9A just South of Croton is one example. Route h 129 between Croton and Yorktown is another. Both of these routes are mjor, and both are affected by rather unique climactic factors which cause resistant icing up. Another glaring example of a major egress route which becomes a virtual accident trap even in the most normal of inclement weather situations is the Taconic Parkway. Not only does it ice up easily, but it is extremely hilly and curvy in the Plume Zone and its immediate vicinity. Accident statistics clearly document these major roadways' vulnerability of inclement weather. I am convinced that the evacuation plan is completely unworkable. Even under the best of conditions the road system O in and out of the Plume Zone would be jammed. It would take only a few breakdowns, empty gas tanks, and accidents to accomplish this. I, for one, usually have less than a half a tank of gas for several days each week. Often the gauge registers nearly empty. I am sure I am typical of the average driver in this regard. Compounding this, under a real nuclear emergency there is no doubt that there would be massive panic behavior. And this would not be limited to inhabitants of the Plume Zone. Were I visiting relatives in Port Chester or Harrison dJring a nuclear emergency at Indian Point, I would surely head as far away from the area as possible. O 5'q'sW pt
Because of these and a multitude of other concerns I have r regarding the safety of g children and gself in the event of a nuclear emergency at Indian Point, and because I believe that the Evacuation Plan does not begin to address these concerns, I < feel it my responsibility as a parent and as a citizen to bring rny misgivings before you in hope that the safety and health of my children, my neighbors and ngyself can be secured. Thank ou.
/o w, [.
% M2-Karen K. Ford O
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/W Our names are Madeleine and Vard Holzer. We live at 36 Lounsbury Road, Croton, New York. We are writing as the parents of two children, Matthew and Benjamin, ages eight and four. Matthew attends the Carrie E. Tompkins Elementary School in Croton: Benjamin attends the Crotonn Community Nursery School. We both work in Manhattan approximately one-half hour from Grand Central Station. In the event of a nuclear accident at Indian Point we greatly fear for our children for many reasons:
- 1. The roads exiting from Croton are of inadequate width to permit complete evacuation of the area in the event of an ememgency. These roads are quite windy, and under stress of nn- emergency it is likely that accidents would occur,
, blocking these roads.
- 2. We have never heard the nuclear emergency sirons.
They have always been tested while we were out of the area. Our babysitter did not hear them when they were tested. It is likely that we would not know what they were if we heard them in a real emergency. 3 There are not enough buses to evacuate all the children in the Croton schools. It is naive to assume that i bus drivers from neighboring communities would voluntarily drive toward a nuclear accident in order to evacuate someone else's children.
- 4. The " evacuation plan" has our children going to two different schools in White Plains, and our sitter's child 1o l
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iE . to a third. We are not familiar with the locations of any ll) of these schools and do not know how we would reach them ! I in an emergency. Our sitter is torn between wanting to be with ; her child and caring for our children. It is likely that phone connections to Croton would be snarled, and we would not know where our children would be.
- 5. The plan forces us to evacuate to the south, whereas we have accommodations available to the north.
- 6. Because the booklet on the evacuation plan is at our home , if we were at work we would have absolutely nothing to remind us of what we were supposed to do.
For these reasons we feel the evacuation plan is totally unworkable. A true emergency at Indian Point would mean disaster for us and our children. lll
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j My name is Kathy Pierpont. I live at Finney Farm Road, Croton on Hudson. I am a single working mother of four children, ages 12, 17, 19 and 20. I work in O Haw tho rne . My daughters go to the middle school and the high school in Croton, my son works in Croton and my other son works in both Garrison and Poughkeepsie. All four children reside with me. My working sons do not have their own trans-portation and rely on my car. My experience with the evacuation booklet planted the idea that this evacuation plan was not workable for my family because I was issued a bookle: with the wrong map. I felt that if the utilities could not send out the correct map for my area, then I could not trust them to provide an adequate evacuation plan or notify us in adequate time for an evacuation. I have instructed my children not to leave the area in the event of an emergency, because I will be coming to get them. I feel that it would be too psychologically traumatic for my family to be seperated and am not all certain that we would be reunited, even though the booklet states that we would be in White Plains at the reception center. Instead, I will drive from Hawthorne to Croton, pick up my three children and continue on to either Garrison or Poughkeepsie to pick up my fourth child. I feel certain that my children would not get on any bus, but would wait for me because in the past I have left similar instructions and been held up due to traffic. I have found my daughter in the cold, waiting for over an hour at the designated spot, certain that I would come. I have no faith that my children would be able to evacuate themselves as instruct-O ed in the booklet. They have not been able to correctly remember the directions we have established for a fire emergency unless they are constantly reviewed. However, I know that constant talk of a nuclear emergency makes them apprehensive and worried, affecting schoold work, etc. My children are without adult supervision from approximately 3:00 pm until 9:00 pm as I work two jobs in order to support us. I am quite sure that in an emergency, they would wait for me and not take the public transportation because they would be paniced and because they would not leave without our five cats and a bird. In summary, I intend to reunite my family, myself, and go north instead of following the plans in the booklet. s ... i O
SARI EKLUND 109 Grand Street f e Croton, New York 10520 My name is Sari Eklund. I have two children in Carrie E. Tomkins Elementary School in Croton. According to the present evacuation plans, buses should pick them up and take them to White Plains. Who are they kidding? First of all it is extremely doubtful that any driver would want to come or stay in the area. Second, most of the teachers and aides have families of their own. Would you hang around waiting whil~ your children are elsewhere? I wouldn't. My children already know to meet me away from the school and not take a bus should it possibly arrive. Most everyone else has the same idea and that's one of the many reasons the plan cannot work. In the event of an accident at Indian Point .there will be panic - people all over the place trying to get their families together - (} .a mass exodus out of the area, if you are lucky enough to get out. There will also be violence because poeple will be scared and they will be stuck in traffic - who's going to wait for a green light or a stop sign? What happens to children who are out playing around away from home. What about kids on ball teams? Can the coach fit 20 kids in his car? Where will he go - where will you find your children? I am a volunteer for the elderly. I visit them at their homes. Most of them live alone. Most of them don't get around-very well. They' don't hear much and many don't see very well. What about all these people? Even if they heard the sirens - and chancen are they wouldn' t - they wouldn't know what to do. They probably would refuse to leave their homes. I could go on (]) and on. I think the most important thing to say is that the chances of an accident at Indian Point are not remote. There are too
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mtny people at stake here. Let us get on with our lives, g Jau enkoL 1 1 O l l l l e O
o IW UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR -REGULATORY CO) MISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK (Indian Point Unit 2) Docket Nos. 50-247 SP 50-286 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) (Indian Point Unit 3) TESTIMONY OF EILEEN McGOVERN ON BDIALF OF P e sts RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.2, 3.7, 4.4, 4.5. O MAY, 1982 My name is Eileen McGovern and I live in Tomkins Cove, New York. I believe the evacuation plan is totally unrealistic and un-workable. Being a mother of four children who attend different schools, I am far more comfortable relying upon my own ability to react to emergency situations, as I feel most do. I agree this will cause mass chaos, but will be a reality if ever >= are O alerted to these emergency situations that already exist at _ . . - . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . . . _ . _ . . _ . ~.
2 1 ', Indian Point. We are all aware that the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant is in a deteriorating stage. This is easily recognizable by the continuous closing down of one nuclear generator after another. Our efforts would be better concentrated in another direct:fon, namely the CLOSING OF INDIAN POINT. I will not be pacified or sidetracked by an evacuation plan, or more realistically, by a fruitless attempt at developing an evacuation plan. If the people who are imposing this critical stuation upon us are truly concerned about the well-being of my family then they h will eliminate the need for ever having to evacuate. I will not participate in this farce. CLOSE INDIAN POINT!
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Eileen McGovern . O
o My name is Ervine Kimerling. I live at 37 Piney Point Avenue, Croton-on-Hudson,.New York 10520. I am a parent of three children, ages 16, 12 and 8. I have a dog and two cats. I am a psychotherapist in private practice in lower Manhattan, and I teach college courses for the College of New Rochelle, both at the New Rochelle campus and the Co-Op City, Bronx, campus (all outside the EP2). I am away from Croton at least three mornings and afternoons per week and some evenings. I have various child care arrangements. There are days when my 8 year d is h me f r \ hour to 1 hour by her-O self until one of her brothers gets home. During normal times, when this is the case, I am in telephone contact with her. Sometimes my 12 year old babysits, sometimes my 16 year old babysics, and sometimes I have an 18-year-old babysitter. There have been many incidents in the past where due to in-experience and lack of maturity my'babysitters made decisions which resulted in my 8 year old being left alone. Telephone contact saved the situation. In a radiological emergency, my children have been instructed to try the telephone first to contact myself or their father. I know that in the past when I have been b . ! 9 _
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. Kimerling 2 working in New York City and my children'were not reachable by telephone I have been extremely worried.
If there were an emergency, and my children were separated due to various after-school activities they are 4 in, it would be traumatic for them. They have been instructed to stick together during an emergency. One would never leave Croton without the other two. When I think about a situation in which my children are in.Croton, perhaps separated and looking for each other, and I am in New York City unable to even have telephone contact, I feel great anxiety. I would g certainly come back to get them -- I would do anything I had to, to get to my children. The emergency planning booklet is totally un-realistic and does not address the needs of my children home alone. I have not even read it to them. I have not told them about the bus stop because I do not believe any buses will come, or if they do they will just sit in a traffic jam on Route 9A. I also do not want them standing outside, in case of a radiation release. I have given my 16 year old, who has no permit or license, permission to drive the family car east on Route 129. At least they will have some chance
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{} that way. If I am home I will pick my children up at their respective schools. Each one is in a different school I will try to go north or east to evacuate -- never south. My 8 year old is in organized activitie5 2 afternoons per week. Neither~one informed me of Luy evacua-tion plans: when I asked, neither had one. If they are in school and I am not home, they 1 will go with the school evacuation plan. I have no confi-dence in it; but no other choice. I do not know how to get i to the three different reception centers my children will be in, assuming the bus drivers show up to drive and traffic () is not at a standstill. I It gives me a terrible feeling of frustration and impotence not to be able to provide for the safety of i my children and to have no confidence in the evacuation plan I provided. 1 i
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/E l SHERRY HOR 0*lTZ 42 Sunset Drive O Croton, N.Y. 10520 Fy name is Sherry Horowitz. I live at 42 Sunset Drive.
Croton. New York, within the 10 mile emergency planning zone. I have two children aged 11 and 13 who attend school in the Croton Harmon School District. They both go to Pierre Van Cortlandt Middle School which is 5 75 miles from Indian Point. The evacuation plan calls for the children in the Pierre Van Cortlandt school to be evacuated by buses from the Chappaqua Bus Company. I understand that there are no commitments on the part of either the Chappaqua Bus Company or its drivers to drive into the emergency planning aone to evacuate our school children, and I have no confidence that they will do so. I do not know what to tell my children to do in case of a nuclear emergency at Indian Point. I would advise them to leave school immediately and run home so that we could evacuate togethers however, I fear that if there is a radiation release they would be in great danger on the street. The other alternative is for me to pick them up at school. I assume that many other mothers and fathers who are fortunate enough to be in Croton would do the same and sheer bedlam would ensue on the streets and in the school. This much is clear. I would never leave the area without my child-ren. I understand that this is counter to the instructions in the emergency planning brochure but these are my intentions.
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My name is'Theodora Dyer and I live in Croton-on-Hudson, ( at 5 Memory Lane. I have read the emergency evacuation plans in their various draft forms as they were prepared by the Indian Point nuclear generating facilities and have before me the booklet " Indian Point, emergency planning and you", as I draft these remarks. First, my family in Croton-on-Hudson did not receive the PASNY-Con Ed booklet through the mail. I sought out a copy from my local government because of my concern about the poss-ibility of a nuclear accident and my need to discover the de-tails of any plan to deal with such an event. How many families did not receive the booklet? How many of those tried to get one in another way? p Turning to the booklet, let us deal with the question of I i the maps. My profession requires me to read maps on a regular basis. Living, as I do, in the hills back of the commercial center of Croton, even I had real trouble finding the " plan-ing area" assigned to my neighborhood. Careful review of the map on page 9 now informs me that I live in area 6D rather than 6C. I now know to travel cast on the Cross Westchester Express-way, should I get that far. How many residents bring professional map reading skills to this crutial exercise? I am the mother of three school age children. In one more year they will be located in three different Groton school buildings, representing two differnt School Reception Centers in White Plains. I work as well as live in Croton. Starting with my youngest, I g V
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l e O. 4 will remove them from their schools, if I can get there before the schools' buses leave for White Plains. Will someone try to deny rae the right to pick up my children? Don't. What will this do to the academic traffic flow planning of the emergency plan? I don't care if I live in area 6D when an emergency alert is sounded and my children are not with me. And there are thousands like me. Theodora Mitchell Dyer Y [ 5 Memory Lane Croton-on-lludson New York 10520 0 i l l t i l O
() TESTIMONY OF KAI T. ERIKSON v 4 My name is Kai T. Erikson. I have been a Professor of Sociology and American Studies at Yale University since 1966, and Editor of the Yale Review since 1979. I received a B.A. in sociology from Reed College in 1953 and both an M.A. in 1955 and Ph.D. in 1963 from the University of Chicago. I held a joint appointment in the Departments of Psychiatry and Sciology at the University of Pittsburgh from 1959 to 1963, and a similar appointment at Emory University from 1963 to 1966. I am a Fellow of the American Sociological Association and served as an elected member of its governing Council from 1974 to 1977. I am the immediate past President of the Eastern Sociological Socity, and I was President of the ([]) Society for the Study of Social Problems in 1970-1971. In recent years my professional work has focused increasingly on human responses to emergencies. Between 1973 and 1976 I did an intensive study of the Bafjblo Creek flood of 1972, and I wrote a book on the topic which in 1977 won the Sorokin Award of the American Sociological Association for the best book written in sociology during the preceding year as well as a Nomination for the National Book Award. Since that time I have done a briefer study of the effects of mercury contamination on an Ojibwa Indian Band in Northwest Ontario, and I have written on general problems of toxic waste disposal with particular reference to the situation at Love q's / Canal in upstate New York and on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In the past two years I have kept abreast L
ERIKSON -2 of research dealing with human reactions to the incident hI at Three Mile Island, and I testified on related matters before the Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission considering a restart of T!!I-1. Since that time, I've been invited to participate in a workshop on psychological stress at Three Mile Island by the Mitre Corporation on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I have lectured widely on the general subject of human emergencies, including the principal address to the Red Cross National Convention in Miami, Florida, in 1977. In the course of the various activities described above, I have read a substantial part of the available literature on responses to disaster from both a sociological and psychiatric standpoint. I have recently reviewed the Radiological Emergency 4 Response Plans for the State of New York and the four counties in the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. These plans are quite vague in detail. It is elecr, nonetheless, that they include a number or assump-tions about the way residents of the area are likely to respond in the event of a radiological emergency. These assumptions are without foundation, in my opinion; and until such 1ime as we have more information about the social and psychological dispositions of the people who are expected to play a role in carrying out local emergency plans, we can have no confidence in the feasibility of those plans. Unfounded assumptions in the Indian Point emergency plans O
ERIKSON -3 fall under two general headings:
- 1) An assumption that residents within and outside the EPZ will follow directions in the event of an emergency regardless of where they are at the time; and
- 2) An assumption that emergency workers will report to the posts assigned them regardless of their other responsibilities as members of families.
Let me begin by noting thatany accident serious enough to require evacuation of the area surrounding the power plant is likely to be traumatic for a number of local residents, and final emergency plans should take into account what has been learned in other crisis situations about the way people typically respond to moments of severe stress. I cannot deal r~T U now with the full range of social and psychological reactions described in the available studies, but I would like to note three that may be of particular relevance here. Crisis situations involving the risk'of radiation or some other form'of contamination are different from the typical run of natural disasters and human accidents. Most emergencies, whether they result from acts of God (such as floods, storms, earthquakes) or acts of men (such as accidental explosions or deliberate bombings), have a clear beginning and a clear ending. Sooner or lager the flood waters recede, the winds abate, the smoke clears, the bombers leave; an"all cleard is sounded both literally and figuratively to indicate that the incident is over and the source of danger is gone. But when an invisible threat hangs in the air or is lodged in the tissues of the body for an indeterminate amount of
ERIKSON - 4 time, and the survivors have no sure way of knowing how much damage has been done or is yet to be done, the event is lll never quite over. The cause for alarm never quite disappears. This has been the situation, for example, in such diverse places as Hiroshima and *igasaki, Seveso, Minamata, the Love Canal and Three Mile Island -- all of them places where residents have reason to fear that they and their children yet unborn have been contaminated in one way or another. Events of this kind often provoke a deeper and more lasting form of anxiety than ordinary disasters. It is probable that a substantial number of people who are exposed to an immediate peril will over-react. They will evacuate before being advised to, will move longer distances than advised, and in general, will respond to their own feelings of alarm by doing more than is required and doing llI it earlier than required. This tendency has been noted in many different emergencies and has been called " hyper-vigilance," "the counter-disaster syndrome," "the evacuation l shadow phenomenon," and so on. At the same time, however, it is clso likely that another substantial number of people exposed to an immediate peril will under-react, for one very common reaction to moments of crisis is to become immobilized, to go numb, to freeze. This tendency has also been noted in many different emergencies and has been called "the disaster syndrome," " psychic numbing," and so on. It is my opinion that each of these tendencies, but 1 especially the tendency to over-react, becomes more intense l when radiation or some other contaminant is involved
ERIKSON - 5 O because people do not know what the dangerous substance looks like or feels like, how far it can reach out into the country-side, or how long its effects can last. Many more people evacuated the regions around Three Mile Island than were advised to, for example, and those who did so drove many more miles on the average than was necessary. Both the tendency to cWorreact and the tendency to underreact have been ignored in the Indian Point emergency plans. Those people expected to play helping roles in an evacuation who also are members of families will be in a situation of very marked conflict if an emergency is declared. To say that there will be conflict is not to say that we know in advance how everyone will resolve it, but (]}) it is my very strong expectation that a number of emergency workers will first go home to tend their children in the event of a crisis no matter what commitments they have elsewhere, and they will do so because they feel, as is the t case with parents everywhere, that their major responsibility is to attend the needs of their own offspring. A sociologist has no professional warrant to call such behavior instinctual (although the great majority of biologists and psychiatrists would probably do so), but he is certainly in a posiition to point out that many research studies have found people reluctant to turn to emergency duties until such time as they have been reassured about the safety of their families. This general finding was phrased well by James Cornell:
First, the basic unit of human life -- the family
--emerges as the single most important force in-fluencing behavior. Survivors rapidly turn their own anxiety into concern for their kin. A per-son's first regard is for saving family members, of ten at the expense of other victims or lll oneself. Even officials charged with the safety of an entire community find their first allegiance is to their family. As Ralph Linton has written, "In GBtterd'mmerung...the d last man will spend his last hours searching for his wife and child."
An evacuation plan that takes for granted the readiness of local emergency workers to report for duty, regardless of family obligations, runs a high-- and in my opinion unacceptable-- risk of failure. Those are among the general findings from the social and behavioral sciences against which the particular plans drawn for the areas around Indian Point must be measured. It is one thing to estimate how rapidly human traffic could drain out of a danger zone, or how many emergency workers would be required to carry out essential activities of one . kind or h another; but it is another thing to take for granted that people will in fact behave in the way the planners assume. The plans assume, for example, that emergency workers who reside within the danger zone can be counted on to report for duty whether or not their own families have assembled and evacuated, and this assumption is problematic for all the reasons noted above. It may be reasonable to take for granted that police officers as well as physicians, nurses, and other medical personnel will report as expected. But a very large number of other people figure in the plan as well -- people to drive school buses and to accompany the children who ride them, people to staff the communications O
ERIKSON -7 O centers and to register evacuees, people to monitor the spread of radiation and set up check points of one kind or another and work with decontamination teams, people to drive ambulances and tow trucks and whatever other vehicles are brought into
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play 'to transport the disabled and people without working vehicles, people to repair roads and establish traffic control checkpoints and maintain reception centers and handle necessary food and water supplies and, in general, carry out the hundreds of other tasks that might, in a real emergency, be required. As things presently stand, we have do way of knowing what all of those people are likely to do in the event of a serious crisis (although it may be instructive to note that many of the emergency workers O who are expected to aid evacuation if yet another accident should strike Three Mile Island -- fire fighters among them -- have let it be known that their families would come first) . We need to know what proportion of the emergency work force has family obligations that might prove to be a source of conflict, and how members of that force are likely to resolve that conflict. The emergency plans for Indian Point also assume that the emergency workers who reside outside the danger zone will move into it if asked to do so, and that assumption, too, is problematic. Police could presumably be relied upon, but it is not certain that others who make up the emergency {]) work force-- truck drivers, heavy equipment operators, laborers, volunteer firemen -- will be willin~g to leave
ERIKSON - 8
- 4 places of relative safety and expose themselves to hazard, h
especially if they are expected to arrive equipped with dosimeters, exposure records, protective gear, and other reminders that the work they are about to perform may prove very dangerous indeed. Additionally, emergency workers who live a few miles outside the perimeter of the danger zone may not feel confident that their families are safe and may themselves try to evacuate. The plans for Indian Point further assume that parents of 1 school-age children will be willing to evacuate without first-hand reassurances that their offspring are being safely conveyed out of the area. It may turn out that the residents of the area will feel comfortable with an arrangement by which children are removed by bus to O reception centers but given what social scientists have learned about the closeness of family ties and the anxieties of most parents concerning the safety of their children, it would seem foolhardy to take that view for grmited. If a fair number of parents insist,upon questioning, as I would expect them to, that they might drive to the school them-selves, then there would be substantially more traffic on the roads than the present estimates seem to allow for. O
l ERIKSON - 9 f 1 The plans assume, finally, that vehicular traffic will drain out of the danger zone along assigned evacuation routes. Forbene thing, the plans seem to call for some traffic to move toward the power plant for at least a short time l even though it is not at all unlikely that people will balk at being ordered to take what may seem at first to be an j illogical and perhaps even dangerous route. Moreover, the plans assume that drivers will all vacate the' danger zone along the given evacuation routes, but it is likely that some of them will have particular destinations in mind -- the l ! ~home of a relative or friend, say. If, for either of those reasons, vehicles enter the road network moving in the" wrong" direction or cause congestion at intersections in an effort to
\/ do so, the evacuation of the area might very'well be adversely affected.
In short, the emergency plans for Indian Point are full of vague directives, but whether or not they can be implemented depends to a very large extent on the attitudes, intentions and emotional reflexes of the people charged with carrying them out. Surveys gathering information on these attitudes have been begun in Suffolk County,where.the Shoreham nuclear plant is located, and in WestchesteroCounty. Atlarge scale l f study will soon be underway in the Three Mile Island area as well. Until we know a great deal more than we do now about these f i matters, we dare not assume that the present emergency
- evacuation plans provide any protection to the public.
l O Kai T. Erikson Department of Sociology Born in Vienna, Austria, 1931 Yale University U.S. citizen (derivative,1937) New Haven, Connecticut Married, two children EDUCATION I 1949-1950 University of California, Berkeley l 1950-1953 Reed College (B.A.) 1953-1955 University of Chicago (M.A.) 1955-1963 University of Chicago (Ph.D.) POSITIONS 1954-1955 Research Fellow, Family Study Center, University of Chicago , 1955-1957 Social Science Technician, Walter Reed Army Institute of 3esearch, Walter Reed Army Medical Center (while on active duty, U.S. Army) 1959-1963 Instructor to Assistant Professor, Departments of Psychiatry and Sociology, University of Pittsburgh 1963-1966 Associate Professor, Departments of Psychiatry and Sociology, Emory University 1966- Associate Professor to Professor, Department of Sociology and American Studies Program, Yale University 1968-1969 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California 1969-1973 Master, Trumbull College, Yale University (Chair, Council of Masters, 1970-1973) 1974-1977 Chair, American Studies Program, Yale University 1979- Editor, The Yale Review O
O SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
! Books a
Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: John Wiley, 1966) Everythine in Its Path Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976) Articles "The Confirmation of the Delinquent," Chicago Review, Winter, 1957 (with Erik H. Erikson) j " Patient Rolet and Social Uncertainty: A Dilemma of the Mentally Ill," Psychiatry, 20:263-274, 1957 "The Functions of Deviance in Groups," Social Problems, 7398-107, 1959 (with Robert A. Dentler) . i " Impressions of Soviet Psychiatry:' Some Travel Notes," Psychiatric Communications, 5:1-12, 1962 i O " Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," Social Problems, 9:307-314, 1962 "A Return to Zero," American Scholar, 36:134-146, 1966 "A Comment on Disguised Observation in Sociology," Social Problems, 14:366-373, 1967
" Sociology and the Historical Perspective," American Sociologist, 5:331-338, 1970
" Introduction," In Search of Coneon Ground: Conversations with Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton (New York: Norton, 1973)
" Loss of Communality en Buf falo Creek," American Journal of Psychiatry, 133:302-306, 1976 "On Teaching Sociology," New England Sociologist, 1:35-40, 1979 i "A Report to the People of Grassy Narrows," in Christopher Vecsey and Robert W. Venables, editors, American Indian !
Envi ronments: Ecological Issues in Native American History (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1980) (with Christopher Vecsey)
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS (continued) Bock Reviews American Journal of Sociology American Scholar American Sociological Review Contemporary Sociology New York Times Book Review Transaction Yale Law Journal HONORS McIver Award, American Sociological Association,'1967 Sorokin Award, American
- Sociological Association,1977 Nominee, National Book Awards, 1977 PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS -
O American Sociological Association (Chair, Committee on Professional Ethics, 1971-1973; Council, 1974-19773 Conunittee on Executive Office and Budget, 1978-1981) Society for the Study of Social Problems (President, ' 1970-1971) Eastern Sociological Society (President, 1980-1981) l e January 1982 O
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STATEMENT TO THE LICENSING & SAFETY BOARD OF THE NRC My - name is Edward.J. Connelly. I live at 11 Cortlandt Place, Ossining, V~N I am an Emergency Medical. Technician certified by the State of New York. hm) an active member and. Treasurer of the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps I am very concerned with the plans developed to implement an evacuation of the, area around Indian Point in the event of a nuclear accident and the reliance upon the great number of support personnel required for the successful implementation of the plan. '
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<p The altruism of the people intended- to support the evacuation is assumed to be boundless. Assumptions are made in the plan calling for a wide range of people to give up their pursonal safety as well as endangering the safety, , security and future of their family. The list of these support
, people is long. It includes bus drivers, teachers, doctors, nurses, police officers, fire fighters, correctional officers, public officials, disaster management specialists, and ambulance personnel. As a member of the last aroup I resent the implication: that I will give up all personal considerations to assist in an evacuation attempt. When I joined the Ossining Volunteer Ambulance Corps I did it with the thought that I'could use my skills to help the people of my community, that I was going to be involved and take an active part in the activities of Ossining that make it the great place that it is. I took advanced training and achieved' certification as an Emergency Medical Technician to help keep the corps at the highest level of New York State standards, an ambulance s*3vice the people of Ossining could be proud of. I, like most of our (,ji ve < members, am required to be on duty 72 hours per month, nights and weekends. I am required to attend business meetings, training meetings and s commi ttee meetings. There is a lot of Corps related work to do out' side of the above mentioned time. I am subject to being exposed to any disease imaginable from the routine flu to hepatitis, meningitis and worse. I know these requirements and risks but I do it anyway. -When it comes to willingly going into a area of radioactive contamination, however, the considerations of survival and family have to come first. I will not respond to a nuclear emergency ambulance call. I will pack up what I can in a short time and take my family as far away as possible very quickly. In discussing this with other Corps members I. find that at least 95% of them will do the same. It is very unlikely that there will be an ambulance crew to do anything worthwhile in the event of an evacuation. In conjunction with this one must realize that there is strong liklihood that no emergency vehicle smaller than a tiretruck will be used for its planned purpose. If the rightful users don't desert with them I am sure that a mobs of people will commandeer them and drive, with lights flashing and sirens blaring, all the way to safety. (signed)
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/l O Conn 6Ily L Edward J.
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~ ~ l TI Q3 I~ '; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
's > NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Dockets nos. (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-247SP
) 50-286SP POAER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK )
(Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF Stanley G. Brooker ON BEHALF OF WBCA RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 2, . ,3.9, May 1982 O,s My name is Stanley G. Brooker of 10 denzel Lane, Stony Point, N.Y. 10980. I moved to Stony Point on Dec.13th, 1952, from Astoria, L.I., N.Y. My wife and I are the A3 parents of five children. I joined the dayne Hose Company # 1, Inc. , the Stony Point Fire Dept. on March 1953, was elected Vice-President . from April 1954 to April 1956. Elected to the Stony Point School Board May 1954 to late 1957 Elected President of Wayne Hose Co. April 1957 to April 1959 Joined Rockland County Volunteer Firemen's Association .. O (,,) September 1960.
y% (t - - O Elected Fire Commissioner December 1962 to present time. Chairman for 10 years. Elected Treasurer of Jayne Hose Co. from 1964 to 1974. Elected Vice-President of Stony Point Volunteer & Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Assoc. in 1963 to present time. Elected President of the Rockland County Volunteer Firemen's Assoc. from 1966 to 1967 Helped organize the Association of Fire Districts of Rockland County in 1966 and was elected its first President to January of 1969 Appointed to the Rock]and County Fir'e Advisory Board January 1965 and elected Chairman in January of 1982. Elected Treasurer of the Rockland County Volunteer P Firemen's Assoc. in September of 1969 and still Treasurer. Elected President of the Mid-Hudson Legislative Clearing House from 1976 to 1981. This group represented six C ountie s: Rockland, Orange, Ulster, Sullivan, Putnam, i l Dutchess. Its purpose is to propose legislation to better the fire service and the public. Became a Notary Public from March 30th, 1965 to present time. Became an active member of the Stony Point Ambulance Corp in 1962 to present. Advanced First Aid and CPR. I l
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e. g-) V Referring to the Evacuation Plan, it leaves much to be ! 1 l desired. The Volunteer Firemen and the Volunteer Ambulance Corps, two services of very highly trained members would be called upon to help, I am sure, but being human their ! first thoughts would be for the safety of their families. Next would be a meeting of all the Fire Companys and Ambulance Corps involved, asking for their participation to help them understand what they would be involved in and how to cope with it. Would they get extensive training and the proper. tools and equipment plus the proper turn-out gear assigned to them for protection? ( It is the unknown that bothens the public and therefore hearings should be held to enlighten them and to let them know what they can do to help themselves and all , concerned. It is my belief that this would.be a big aid-in helping to stop mass confusion. Sirens were placed throughout the area but are very inadequate. They have not proven effective as you have . to be right on top of them to hear them. There are just too many obstacles to overcomes you have the dense woods, hills, dales and mountains that restrict the sound, then you have the households with their television and radios on and just normal household appliances going. The public will not be able to hear the sirens in the factories, () stores and shopping malls. It will still take great thought to come up with an alerting system.
O. On the evacuation routes 94, 202, 210 and the Palisades Interstate Parkway: the first three routes are two lane highways, 9W could not be used as the nuclear leak would be with you going north or south: Rt. 202 is a very heavily traveled road at all times: Rt. 210 not heavily traveled, but a very winding road that could be used by the residents of Stony Point with properly policed roads. The road winds through the mountains which should act as a buffer. Both 202 and 210 go in a westerly directions the Palisades Interstate Parkway going north and south is the biggest highway, being two lanes north and two south and winding between the mountains in this O ares. It is to be remembered though, that an accident on any of these roads ties them up. To me, the P.I.P. by blocking the complete highway at the New Jersey end and Route 32 end, would be the best road to expedite the evacuation plus the fact that all roads East, West, South and North should be blocked off. There will be a great number of people trying to get home to their families and will be very irrational and explosive upon finding their way closed. I would dare say that it would take from six to eight hours or more, to evacuate the North Rockland area. Our area roads have not changed much since General Washington marched his' troops over them, the only g difference is that they are paved.
GL There would be massive communication problems. There are at least three radio stations in the 10 mile radius and possibly four, 'vhat would they do, would they continue to operate or would they be part of the human factor. In this day and age, the television is used more than the radio. The telephone would be jammed, causing more confusion, therefore television would possibly be the only outlet of communication. Planning has to be very complex and expansive, the public has to be trained on just what they are up against to allay their fears and to let them know what to expect. () What can they do to help themselves before and during the evacuation. how much time do they have and in all fairness we need a sound education on nuclear leaks. A consultation should be helu with all officials of TodNS, VILLAGES , FIRE DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS and AMBULANCE CORPS DIRECTORS along with and very important the POLICE CHIEFS, FIRE CHIEFS and AMBULANCE CORPS CAPTAINS. This is a must if you want to plan an evacuation with their help. As the evacuation plan stands now, it is absolutely far fetched and the money being spent is being thrown down the drain, a complete waste. This complete statement reflects my opinions and mine only. () Respectfully Submitted STANLEY G. BROOKER
e , cm UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247SP (Indian Point Unit 2) 50-286SP
)
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point Unit 3) ) TESTIMONY OF JULIE PALMER,MD ON BELALF OF UCS/NYPIRG RELATING TO CONTENTIONS 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, 4.4 June 6, 1982 My name is Julie Palmer. I am a medical doctor with my residence and family medicine practice in Piermont, N.Y. I am Board Certified in family practice
,_s and in psychiatry.
( I would like to address two issues. 1) The psychological implications of an evacuation resalting from an accident at Indian Point. 2) The capacity of local hospitals to handle a major evacuation. I. Psychological Stresses Related to Evacuation. A. Children -- reactions of anxiety, panic. nightmares, withdrawal, lasting weeks or months depending on the degree of trauma, pre-existing adjustment, and handling of the situation. 3)
~
H. Parents -- panic, and attempts to locate children in situations in which they are evacuated f rom school . C. Elderly -- The elderly, whether at home or in a nursinq home may be faced with the following difficultie;:
- a. May not be ambulatory,
- b. Some may be confused, disorietned, which invariably becomes worse
[ with stress and with lack ot structure and familiar people, places, etc.,. . . may precipitate psychosis. D. Mentally retarded Letchworth Village population -- s<une problems as abover people in need
1 O of structure and familiar personnel, etc. Psychological decompensation may result. E. Medically ill.
- 1. Ifospitalized: Problem of transporting seriously ill, post-surgical patients, orthopedic patients, patients on respirators to other hospitals outside drea, risk, anxiety, pain related to transfers to strange hospital, new doctors and nurses, etc.
- 2. Non-hospitalized:
- a. Heart disease and emotional trauma --heart attacks and fatal rhythm disturbances may result,
- b. Other illnesses worsened by stress: diabetes, asthma,
- c. Invalids at home -- in need of visiting nurses, home health aids for ongoing care.
- 3. Outpatients requiring frequent treatment
- a. Cancer chemotherapy ( Must find treatment elsewhere in new area).
- b. Physical therapy (must find treatment elsewhere in new area).
- c. Psychiatric Day Treatment --common for acute decompensation in this population if routine disrupted.
F. Stresses within families.
- 1. Fear of long-term effects on health and well-being of childern.
2. New environment -- The environmental change may precipitate anxiety or depression.
- 3. Loss ot income -- leave area of employment.
- 4. Loss of home.
h
- 5. Stresses family relationships.
. . . __ .. _ _ _ _ _ L
II. Capacity of Hospitals to Handle Evacuations. A. Hospitals have specific plans, required by state, for nuclear accident
-- includes decontamination, assessment and management. Periodic meetings and practice drills are conducted.
B. However, it is a fairly consistent opinion of personnel with whom I discussed these plans that they " appear adequate on paper" but that an actual accident would result in chaos, for the following reasons:
- 1. Medical personnel have no experience in this area (fortunately).
- 2. It is unlikely that hospitals are prepared to receive large numbers of people who might require treatment in such a situation. In addition to victims from direct site, there= would be transfers from hospitals in immediate vicinity of 1he accident, transfers from nursing homes (of patients who would require hospitalization). Hospitals do not state the maximum number of people they could handle because attempt is made to treat everyone who needs treatment; but obviously the quality of care would deteriorete with increasing numbers of patients, particu-larly in a situation outside of the experience of the personnel treating them.
- 3. General chaos and panic. This is compounded by the fact that this type of disaster is different from most others in that the personnel treating the patients would themselves be at risk of contamination.
Julie Palmer, MD I
.YaleUniversity mwu_,,,c_u,a,e6ye /'N CHILD STUDY CENTER
() ALBERT J. SOLNIT, M.D., Director Mailing Address: 333 CedarStreet June 3, 1982 (23o S. Frontage Rd.) Testimony of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. My name is Albert J. Solnit. I am the Sterling Profes-sor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry and Director of the Child Study Center at Yale University and have been a $ ember of the full-time faculty since 1952. I am the Past President of the International Association for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Allied Professions, the American Academy of Child Psychi-atry, the Association for Child Psychoanalysis, and the Ameri-can Psychoanalytic Association. I teach child development, O ch11d nevchietry, femi1v 1e- and ch11d eevchoen 1vsis. - fully trained in pediatrics, psychiatry, child psychiatry and psychoanalysis. In 1968, with Dr. Milton J. E. Senn, I pub-lished a textbook, Problems in Child Behavior and Development. Ir. 1973, with Professor Joseph Goldstein and Dr. Anna Freud, I published a book entitled Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1979, New Edition), and in 1979 another book entitled Before the Best Interests of the Child. I have authored and co-authored numerous other publications and articles on children, their development and health. I wish to comment on the planning for the emergency evacuation of children in the 10-mile Emergency Planning L?ne should there be a breakdown of the Indian Point Nuclear Energy 'u) Plants of New York. Our best knowledge in regard to children's _ _ _ _ _ ______.____..___.__.-____A- - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - .
5 ~ . Testimony of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. -2 needs and reactions to an emergency in the community that lll requires evacuation has been learned from a number of studies and from our understanding of how children cope with a threatening or actual catastrophe, given the tolerances and needs of children of differing ages and developmental levels of functioning in a variety of cultural settings. The Studies
- reported by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham are particularly appropriate, as are a number reported in this country.** Also,,
newspaper accounts and observations of the populations fleeing from Mount St. Helen's volcano eruption are recent confirma-tions of what our clinical experiences and theoretical assump-tions indicate. The child should be evacuated with his parent or parents. Especially the younger child and school-age child needs the O presence of his parents to help him cope with such evacuations in the face of threatening disasters. Trying to evacuate children and parents separately confronts children with an overwhelming sense of loss. Until they are with their parents children up to early adolescence will feel caught up in a sense of panic, fear of permanent loss and disappointment that their parents have let them down at such a crucial time. Such a
- Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham. Young Children in War-Time.
London: Allen & Unwin, 1942. (This book also appeared, under various different titles, in several English and American edi-tions and was translated into German, Spanish, and Japanese.) Also, What Children Say about War and Death, New Era, 23:185-189; l l and Young Children in War-Time, New Era, 23:57-85, 1943. t Everything in Its Path. Destruction of Community
** Kai Erikson.
in the Buffalo Creek Flood. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976. lll l
^
l
Testimony of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. -3 O' trauma often leads to the child's loss of a sense of trust and an anxiety about the protective security of their rela-tionship to the adults they count on the most, their parents. Conversely, parents out of their love and concern for their children are very likely to not cooperate with any other plan, but will try to reach their child as quickly as they can in whatever way they can. Thus, a plan that does not incorporate the need for children and their parents to be evacuated together is unrealistic, psychologically unsound and carries with it the great potential for damaging the child and his relationship to his parents and other important persons (teacher, grandparents, and siblings). The above recommendations, already adequately based on past studies and experiences, are even more crucial given the specific nature of the threat to health and life by a break-CC[ down of a nuclear energy plant. There may be an audible steam explosion at the pDmts-or none--but the real danger and threat to the civilian population living in the Emergency Planning Zone cannot be immediately experienced in a concrete physical way. The threat, the danger, and the damage will be experi-enced concretely only at a later date. Given the invisible, inaudible quality of the noxious environment of damaging, life threatening irradiation when there is a breakdown of a nuclear energy plant, it is all the more likely that children will feel bewildered and imagine the worst that could happen to them and their families; and that parents will insist on () l l t _
\
Testimony of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. -4 going to get their children at school, at home, or wherever they are regardless of any plan that is based on evacuating children and parents separately. I urge that the standards of early warning regarding the breakdown of the Indian Point Nuclear Energj Plants of Ziew York be so formulated as to make it feasible for children and their parents to be evacuated together and to be lodged together. Without this basic requirement fulfilled, any plan for emergency evacuation will be more damaging to young children than is justifiable and is at great risk of break-ing down from a plan to a pandemonium. Alberb/ J. Solnit, M.D. t
Enclosure:
Curriculum vitae l O
33 046-26-4125 CURRICULUM VITAE Albert J.'Solnit, M.D. 107 Cottaae Street Apt. 4C New Haven, Con'necticut 06511 Director, Yale University Child Study Center. July 1966 . Sterling Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine and child Study Center; and Professor,. Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University. Dat e and Place of Birth: Los Angeles, California August 26, 1919 Married: Martha Denedict. 1949. Children: . David, b. in 1951 p) \_ Ruth, n. in 1955 Benj amin, b. in 1957 Aaron, b. in 1961 Academic
Background:
University of California B.A. in Medical Sciences. May, 1940. Teaching Assistant in Anatomy. July, 1940-June, 1941. M.A. in Anatomy. May, 1942 (from research work performed in 1940-41 and a thesis on the influence of sex hormones on the skeletal metabolism of rats.) M.D. October, 1943 (University of California, Berkeley and San Francisco; Yale University Master of Arts. November, 1964. Honorary Degree. Postgraduate Training: Long Island College hospital. New York: Rotating Internship. January, 1944-October, 1944. October,1944-June, 1945. Assistant Resident in Pediatrics. Resident in Pediatrics and Communicable Diseases: I'N University of California Division, San Francisco Hospital, d July, 1947-June, 1948.
l Department of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene, Yale University School of Medicine: Assistant Resident. July, 1948-June, 1949. Senior Resident and Instructor in Psychiatry. July, 1949-June, 1950. . Child Study Center. Fellow in Child Psychiatry. - July, 1950-June, 1952. New York, Psychoanalytic Institute. Graduated in June, 1955. Military Experience: , Ward Psychiatrist, Schick General Hospital, Clinton, Iowa. August, 1945-October, 1945. Student. School of Military Neuropsychiatry, Mason General Hospital, Bren twood, N. Y. Octobe r , 194 5-Janua ry , 19 46. Psychiatrist. Schick General Hospital. January, 1946-March, 1946. Neuropsychiatrist. Fort Logan, Colorado. March, 1946-May, 1946. Psychiatrist. Fort Warren, Cheyenne, Wyoming. May, 1946-July, 1946. Instructor in Psychiatry. School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas. July, 1946-November, 1946.
- Consulting Psychiatrist, Plicht Surgeon and Pediatrician l . (to dependents of Air Force Personnel) , Eschborn Air Base, Rhine-Main Air Base, Wiesbaden Air Force Hospital, Germany.
November, 1946-June 1947. Licensure : California - 1943. Connecticut - 1949. Certification : American Board of Psychiatrv and Neuroloov, in Psychiatrv. 1951. American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, in Child Psychiatry. 1960. Certified as a Qualified Child Analyst by the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. 1962.
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J l . i Academic Anoointments: - O Yale University School of Medicine and Yale Child Study Center: Instructor in Pediatrics and P,sychiatry. July 1952-53. Assistant Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry. July 1953-June 1960. Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry. July 1960-64. Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry. July 1964-October 1970. Chief Psychiatrist. Yale Child Study Center. July -1964 . Director, Yale Child Study Center. 1966 . Sterling Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry. 1970 . Yale University: Pellow. Branford College. 1967 . Chairman. Center for the Study of Education, Institute for Social and Policy Studies. May, 1971-73. World Health Organization Visiting Professor of Psychiatry and Human Development. The University of the t;egev, Beer-Sheva, Israel. 1973-74. Smith Colleges-School for Social Work. Clinical Assistant Professor, 1976 . Honors: Honorary Degree, Master of the Arts, Yale University, 1964. Awarded the Fifth Annual Mount Airy Gold Medal for Distinction and Excellence in Psychiatry. Mount Airy Foundation, Denver, Colorado. March 1, 1975. Attending Physician in Pediatrics and Psychiatry, Yale-New Haven Hospital, New Haven, Connecticut. The William C. Menninger Award for distinguished contributions to the science of mental health. Menninger Foundation. March 1979. The Agnes Purcell McGavin Award of the American Psychiatric - Association. May 1980. Alumni-Faculty Association Distinguished Faculty Teaching Award 1980. University of California (San Francisco & Berkeley). May 1980. Washington Council of Child Psychiatry Award for Outstanding Leadership and Contributions to the Mental Health of Children. May 1980. O e
a . 3a ' Honors - Special Lectures O Beata Rank Memorial Lecture. Symposium on "The Contributions of Child Psychoanalysis to Basic Psychoanalytic Education. Boston, MA. 1972 Fifth Annual Mount Airy Foundation Lecture: "The Adolescent and His Family," Denver, Colorado. March 1, 1975. Hilda Lewis Memorial Lecture: " Least Harmful to Children," Association of British Adoption Agencies, London, England. December 10, 1975. Second Mary Susan Brubaker Memorial Lecture: "The Challenge of Deficit in Early Childhood," University of Connecticut School ~of Social Work, West Hartford, Connecticut. April 22, 1976. Alvah Newcomb Memorial Lecture: " Children's Rights in the Changing Family," Evanston Hospital, Department of Psych'._ y, Section of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Evanston, Illinois. March 17, 1977. Annual Taboroff Memorial Lecture: "The Challenge and Conflicts of Child Placement," University of Utah College of Medicine, Salt Lake City, Utah. April 26, 1977. O Twelfth Annual Freud Lecture of the Psychoanalytic Association of New Yorx: "The Role of Aggression in the Formation of Object Relations," New York Academy of Medicine, New York, New York. May 16, 1977. 6th Annual Gustav Bychowski Lecture: "The Meaning of Parenthrsod" Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, June 12, 1978. 9th International Congress - Int rnational Association for child Psychiatry and Allied Professioni: " Change and Continuity for Children and Their Parents" in Melbourne, Australia, August 1978. 9th International Congress - International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions: " Ego Development in Disturbed Children" in Melbourne, Australia, August 1978.
" Problems of Development First Annual Andrew Rackow Memorial Lecture:
in Adolescence." Abington Hospital Mental Health Center, Phila. PA. September 1980. New York University, April 1, 1982. Paul Schilder Memorial Lecture. O e v-m.w - , m -ms- y m--- ,e - ,, e--- + --- - -w-,v. m ,o-w -o--e zw -,--e, - -
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O Committees: Yale University School of Medicine Medical Library Committee. 1958-1961. Student Af fairs committee. 1961-1968. Committee to Recommend Improvements in Method of Instruction in History Taking. 1963 . Curriculum Committee for the First Pre-Clinical Year. 1963-1965. Chairman. 1965-66. . Board of~ Permanent Officers. 1964 . Executive Committee. 1964 . Yale-New Haven Medical Center, Committee for the Improvement of the Care of Children. 1964 . Committee of Department of Psychiatry to Evaluate the Undergraduate Curriculum Program in Psychiatry. 1965 . Faculty Advisor. The Community Health Visitor Program. 1966 . Committee on Community Health Services. 1967-1969; Chairman. 1970-1973. University Council on Medical Services. 1968 . Chairman. Medical School Governance Committee. 1969-1970. Chairman. Medical School Council. 1970-1973. Chairman. Curriculum Committee. 1970-1973. Appointments and Promotions Committee, Department of 1971 Psychiatry. . Council Member. Joint Committee on Planning and Pricrities. 1972 . Trustee. Associates of Yale Medical Library. 1971-1975. Member. Advisory Committee. Behavioral Sciences Study Center. 1972 . Member. Admissions Committee. 1973 .
L L 5 Committees: g Yale University Yale Upward Bound Program's Faculty Advisory Coamittee. 1969 . (Chairman, 1971). . President's University-Wide Advisory Committee. 1969. University-Nide Governance Commission. 1970- . Institution for Social and Policy Studies: 2 Member. Advisory Committee on Education. 1969-71; !! ember. Interim Governing Board. 1970; Governing Board. 1971-1973; Chairman. Center for the Study of Education. 1971-1973; Faculty Member. Seminar: " Teacher Development on the Job." Center for the Study of Education. 1970-1971. Committee'on-Publications. Yale University Press. 1971 . Yale College Committee for the Teacher Preparation Program. 1971 . Member. The :Tational Ilumanities Institute Advisory Council. g 1975 . W Chairman. Clinical Advisory Committee, Yale Psychiatric Institute. 1976- . Member. Priorities Committee of the Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School. 1977 . ( Chairnan. Board of Directors. Yale Psychiatric Institute. 1977 . Member, Advisory Committee, Yale School of Medicine Faculty Practice l Plan. 1980 . l Member, Advisory Committee, Faculty Practice Pl'n. a Yale School of Medicine, 1980 . Member, Pre-Medical Advisory Committee, Branford College. June 1980 . l Member. Ad Hoc Planning Committee for the Yale Psychiatric Institute; School of Medicine. February 1981. O
)
Professional and Scientific Activities (and Outside Committees) The Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis. 1958- ; Training and Supervising Analyst and Member of the Education Committee . 1962 . . New York Psychoanalytic Institute. 1962- ; Training and Supervising Analyst. 1966 . Advisory Council. Erikson Institute for Early Childhood Education. 1966 . The Center for Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies, Princeton, New Jersey. 1963 . Conference on Psychiatry and Medical Education and Secretary of the Preparatory Commission I on Philosophy and Goals. 1966- . Organizing Committee and Secretary, Group II, Pre-Congress () Conference on Psychoanalytic Training. International Psycho-Analytic Association , Copenhagen. July , 1967. Task Force V. Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children. 1967 . ' Consulting Editor, Report of Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children. The American Psychoanalytic Association: Board on Professional Standards. 1967; Chairman, Committee on Child Analysis. April, 1964-68; Member, Coordinating Committee Executive Committee. 1969- ; Member, Editorial Board, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 1972-74; Member, Committee on Liaison wita Proressional Organizaticns. 1971- ; Member, Committee on Psychoanalytic Education. 1971 . Patient Management Problems Committee of the American Psychiatric Association and National Board of Medical Examiners. 1968 . Chairman. Organizing Committee, Pre-Congress Conference on Psycho-analytic Training. International Psycho-Analytic Association, Rome. July, 1969. Joint Committee to Study Problems Relatinc to the Moral, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Clinical Investication Involving Children (~N and to Formulate Recommendations and Guidelines . (The Society ' for Pediatrics Research, The American Pediatric Society, The American Academy of Pediatrics, The Association of Medical Scho61 Pediatric Department Chairmen, and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.)
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7 l l l Study Commission on criteria for Selection of Applicants for Psychoanalytic Training. International Psycho-Analytical Associa-tion. 1969. Scientific Advisor. The Center for Preventive Psychiatry, White Plains, New York. 1970 . Heinz Hartmann Award Committee. 1970 . Member. Sponsoring Committee for Corresponding Members. Israel Psychoanalytic Society. 1971 . Member. American Professional Advisory Committee of the Jerusalem Mental Health Center. 1971 . Member. Nominating Committee. Association for Child Psycho-cnalysis. 1971 . . Member. Advisory Committee on Community Mental Health. 1972 . Member. Advisory Board. Action for Children's Television, Newtonville, Mas s achuse tts . 1973- . Member. Board of Directors. Human Services Institute for Children and Families, Inc., Washington, D. C. 1973 . llh Membership Chairman. Association for Child Psychoanalysis. 1974 . Member. American Psychiatric Association's Committee I, Clinical Experiential Evaluation. 1974- . Member. Task Force on Pediatric Education. American Academy of Pediatrics. 1976 . Membe r. Program Committee for the Jerusalem Congress, 1977. International Psycho-Analytic Association. 1976. Member. Program Monitoring Team, Connecticut Valley Hospital, Department of Children and Youth Services. 1976 . Member. Exploratory Subcommittee of the Nominating Committee. The American Psychoanalytic Association. 1976-78. Member. Prcfessional Advisory Committee. The Research Center for Human Sciences. Hebrew University. 1976 . Member. State of Connecticut Advisory Council on Children and Youth Se rvices . 8.13.76 . Member. Endowment Committee. AmericanAcademyofChildPsychiatry.lll 1977 .
7a () Chairman. Association. Program Committee. International Psycho-Analytical 31st Congress. July, 1979. New York, N. Y. Member. New England Academic Advitory Committee for Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. 1977 . Member - National Advisory Committee; The Center for the Study of
- Families and Children, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn. 1978-Member - Board on Maternal, Ch'ild, and~ Family Health Research of the Assembly of Life Sciences. Washington, D.C. 1976 .
Liaison Representative. American Academy of Child Psychiatry. 3 1978-1980. Member. "anel of Child Welfare Resource Information Exchange. National Center for Child Advocacy, Children's Bureau, Administration for Children Youth, and Families. 1978-Member - Medical Advisory Council. Tourette Syndrome Association,
- Bayside, New York. 1978-Member - Advisory Board, Children's Literature An Interesting Journal, l()
l l 1979-Member - Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Standards, Connecticut Justice Commission, 1979. Member - Board of Directors of American Associates, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Inc. 1979-Member - Professional Advisory Committee of the Margaret S. Mahler Psychiatric Research Foundation. 1979 . Member, International Psycho-Analytic Association. Vice-Pres. 1979 . Fellow, Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Science, Washington, D.C., 1979-Member, Committee on Endowment. American Academy of Child Psychiatry. Aug. 1979-Oct. 1981. Member, Task Force for Foster Children, Connecticut Child Welfare Association, Aug. 1979. Member, Education Committee, Western New England Psychoanalytic Society. 1979 . , (]} m
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7b , .. Member. Multidisciplinary Committee, " Health and Behavior: A Research Agenda." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences. Washington, D.C., 1979 . Member. Board of Directors, National Center for Clinical Infant BI Programs. Wasyington, D.C., 1978 . Member. Committee for the Freud Center at the Hebrew University, American Friends of The Hebrew University. New York, 1980 . Member. Physicians for Social Responsibility. Cambridge, MA. 1980 . Member. Essay Prize Judging Committee. The Gerald H. Pearson Prize. The Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis. June 1980 . Member. Consultant Task Force on Academic Psychiatry. American Academy of Child Psychiatry. June 1980 . Member. Board of the Organizing Committee of the World Association for Infant Psychiatry. Seotember 1980.. Member. Advisory Board. National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection. American Bar Association. October 1980. Member. Advisory Board. Resource Center, American Bar Association. November 1980 . Member. Statewide Advisory Board. Department of Human Resources, State of Connecticut. May 1981-June 1982. Member. Board on Mental Health and Behavioral Medicine. Institute of Medicine. National Academy of Science. July 1981- February 1983. Member. Nominating Committee. International Association for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Allied Professions. 1981 . Member. World Association for Infant Psychiatry (WAIP). Oct. 1981 . Member. National Advisory Committee. "The Ounce of Prevention Fund." State of Illinois, Dept. of Children & Family Services & Pittway Corporation. April 1982 . M3mber. Study Panel on the Future of Services to Children and Their Families. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. May 1982.
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Editorial Activities 8a l Committee on Knowledge Sources (Literature Reviewl American l () Member. Jeurnal of Orthopsychiatry. 1981 . M;mber. Editorial Staff. Public'ation of the Association for Child Pcychoanalysis. 1981-Member. Editorial Board. Monograph Series, Volume of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. June 1981 . - O 6 O , e i
l 8 , 1 Editorial Activities lll Member. Editorial Board. CHILDREN TODAY. Office of Child Developmen t. 1965 . Member. Editorial Board. Hampstead Psychoanalytic Publications. Member. Editorial Board. PSYCHIATRY IN MEDICIME. Inte rnational' Journal of Medical Psychology and Psychiatry in the General Hospital. 1969- . Araerican Editorial Committee Member. The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciolines. 1969- , Managing Editor. The Psychoanalytic Study o# the Child. 1971 . Member. Advisory Editorial Board. International Encyc1cnedia of ~~ Psychiatry , Psychoanalysis and Psychology. 1972-t/. Member. Editorial Board. Journal of the American Academy of lh Child Psychiatry. 1975- 79. Member. Editorial Board. The Hillside Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. Journal of the Hillside Hospital, Glen Oaks, N. Y. 1977- . Member. Editorial Board. The American Journal of Ps'chiatry. Journal of the American Psychiatric Association. 1974-Member. Editorial Board. Journal of the American Orthonsychiatric Association. March 1978-1982. Member. Editorial Board. GENERAL HOSPITAL 'esYCHIATRY, Psychiatry, Medicine and Primary Care. November 1978. Member. Advisory Board. Children's Literature. 1979 . Member, Editorial Advisory Board, ACT (Action for Children's Television), Book on Young Adolescents and Broadcasting. 1980 . Member, Editorial Board. Jrurnal of Preventive Psychiatry. June 1980 . Member, Editorial Board. Psychiatric Journal of the University of Ottg'a. July 1980. W
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r 9 Committees (Local) Member. Advisory Medical Committee. Poster School, New Haven. 1964 . - Member. Advisory Committee. Visiting Nurses ' Association,. New Haven. 1965 . Member. Board of Managers. Dixwell Community House, New Haven. 1965 . Member. New Haven Community Health Research Advisory Council of Community Progress , Inc., and the South Central Connecticut Regional Men *;al Health Planning Council. 1965 . Chairman. Subcommittee on Health for State of Connecticut, White House Conference on Children and Youth Planning Committee. 1970 . Member. Advisory Council for Children and Mental Health. Connecticut State Department of Montal Health. 1969- . Member. National Advisory Council of HOSPICE. 1974-75. O k> Member. Subcommittee 2 " Identification of Service Needs," Department of Children and Youth Services, State of' Connecticut. 1974-75. Member. Professional Advisory Board, BenHaven School, New Haven. 1976- . Member. Committee on Safety Programs , South Central Connecticut Chap ter. American National .a.ed Cross. 1976 . Chairman. Advisory Council. Department of Children and Youth Services, State of Connecticut. July, 1977 . e
10 Memberships $ American Psychiatric Association. Member, 1950; Fellow, 1966 . New York Psychoanalytic Society. Associate Member,1955; Member, 1956 . American Psychoanalytic Association. Member, 1957- ; President-elect, 1968-70; President, 1970-71. American Orthopsychiatric Association. Member, 1957 . Western New England Psychoanalytic Society. Member, 1957- ; Secre tary , 1959-61; Vice-President, 1961-63; President, 1967-68. Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis. " Member, 19 5 8- ; Member, Boatd of Trustees, 1958-64; Vice-President, 1960-61; President, 1963-64. American Academy of Child Psychiatry. Member, 1960- ; President-elect, 1969-71; President, 1971-73. The Association for Child Psychoanalysis. Member, 1965 .; President, 1968-70. American Pediatric Society. Member,, 1965 . The Connecticut Council of Child Psychiatrists. Member, 1967 . American Academy of Pediatrics. Fellow, 1968 . I American Association for the Advancement of Science. Fellow, 1968 . Society of Professors of Child Psychiatry. Member, 1969 . International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions. Secre tary-General, 1970-74; President, 1974-78. l The International Society on Family Law. Member,- 1975 . l Israel Psychoanalytic Society. Corresponding Member. 1977 . l T
11 rN Consultant - l ,G Children's Bureau, Dopartment of Health & Huma'n Services, Washington, D.C. Connecticut Child Study.and Treatment Home (residential treatment center ' for disturbed children) , Hamden, Connecticut. 1957 . North Haven Public School System. 1957 . The Greenwich Center for Child and Family Service, Inc. 1960- . New Haven Public School System. 1962 . Highland Heights (residential care center for children), Nei Haven, Connecticut. 1962-63. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital. Torrington, Connecticut. 1963 . Clifford Beers Child Guidance Clinic. 1963- . New Haven Pre-Kindergarten School Program. 1964 .
~
National Research Council, Assembly of Life Sciences , Division of Medical Sciences, Board on Maternal, Child, and Family Health Research. 1974- . Consultant. Pre-Congress Conference on Training. International Psycho-Analytical Association. NIMH, Mental Health Study Center, Division of Mental Health Service Program. 1974- . Advisory Committee on National Issues. The. American Psychoanalytic Association. 1979 . Consultant. John Merck Fund (John Merck Program, Western Psychiatric Institute, University of Pittsburgh. July 1980. Advisor. Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc. Hadassah Medical Organization. 1981-Consultant. Project - "Toward Preventing the Development of Hostility () in Children." Medical College of Pennsylvania and Hospital. June 1981 .
;e w .
11 a Member, Ethics Committee. American Academy of Child Psychiatry. 1981-84. Member. Advisory Board. Department of Human Resources. State of Conn. h 1981 . Member. Advisory Board. Opportunity House, Inc. 1981-Building Fund Raising Committee. American Academy of Child Member. Psychiatry. ,ay 1982 . 6 0 0 [ O
i i 1 n - . . 3 5 . . 1' = 11 b 1 Interviews (Television, Radio, etc.) lO (with Judi Marks) Teen, Mor.thly Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 8. 1980 A { t } - . i t t i I l l i i O . i I r ( l 9 I I l e b O ,
-y
I 12 . . Principal Publications BOOKS Modern Persoectives in Child Develooment. In Honor of Milton J. E. Senn, M7D. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and S. A. Provence, M.D., Co-editors . International Universities Press, October,1963. The Pediatric Management of the Dying Child. Part II: A Study of the Child's Reaction to the Fear of Dying. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and Morris Green, M.D. The Adolescent in a Suicidal Crisis: Collaborative Care on a Pediatric Ward. Melvin Lewis, M.D. and A. J. Solnit, M.D., in Modern Persoectives . . . (see above) . . Some Relations of Constitution, Environment and Personality as Observed in a Longitudinal Study of Child Development. Case Report. Samuel Ritvo, M.D. , Eveline Omwake , .M. A. , Audrey T. McCollum, M.S., A. J. So3 nit, M.D. and S . A. Provence, M.D., in Modern Perspectives ... (see above) . Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann. Editors: R. Loewenstein, L. Newman, M. Schur and A. J. Solnit. Psvchoanalysis - a General Psychology. :lew York: International Universities Press, 1966. Problems in Child Behavior and Develonment. Milton J. E. Senn, M.D. and A7 J. Solnit, M.D. Philadeipnia: Lr.a & Febiger, 1968. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. J. Solnit, M.D7 :iew York: The Free Press, November 1973. Jarnets rdtt-eller ratten till barnet? J. Goldstein, A Freud, Svensk upplaga Bokforlaget Natur och A.J. Solnit, M.D. Stockholm: Kultur. (Swedish translation of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child) Thesis , The Influence of Progesterone on the Skeletal Metabolism of Young Female Rats. M. A. Thesis. University of California Library, Berkeley , California. Before the Best Interests of the Child. J..Goldstein, A. Freud and A.J. Solnit. New York: The Free Press. November 1979.
- l h
,4
13 () Articles , Chapters , etc. I 1. Teaching Comprehensive Pediatrics in an .Out-Patient Clinic. j A. J. Solnit, M.D., and M.J.E. Senn, M.D. Pediatrics.
- Vol. 14. No. 5. .
1
- 2. The Psychological Approach to the Interview and the Physical Examination. A. J. Solnit, M.D. In the Twenty-first Ross Pediatric Research Conference. Psycholoaical
! Aspects in the Care of Infants and Children. March, 1956.
i 3. Influence of Early Mother-Child Interaction on Identification Processes. S. Ritvo, M.D. and A. J. Solnit, M.D. The Psychoanalytic Study of, the Child. Vol. XIII. 1958. (also published in German in Psyche) J
- 4. Psychological Considerations in the Management of Deaths on Pediatric Hospital Services. Part I. The Doctor and the '
Child's Family. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and M. A. Green, M.D. Pediatrics. Vol. 24. No. 1. July, 1959. rS 5. The Vicissitudes'of Ego., Development in Adolescence. (_/ Panel Reporter, A. J. Solnit, M.D. Journal of the American l Psychoanalytic Association. Vol. VII. No. 3. July, 1959. ! 6. Pediatric Management of School Learning Problems of 4 Under-Achievement. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and M. H. Stark, M.S.S. I New England Journal of Medicine. November 12, 1959.
- 7. Hospitalization: An Aid to Physical and Psychological Health in Childhood. A. J. Solnit, M.D. A.M. A. Journal of l Diseases of Children. February, 1960.
l 8. Discussant: Symposium on Adolescence, Pediatric Clinics of North America. Indiana University. Sp ring , 1960.
- 9. The Relationship of Early Ego Identifications to Super Ego Formation. S. Ritvo , M. D. and A. J. Solnit, M.D.
i International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. Parts IV and V. ! Vol. XLI. 1960. (also published in French in Revue Francaise de Psycho-analyse , Tome XXI, Ju111et - Dec., 1901. Nos. 4-5-6)
- 10. Some Clinical views of the Physician-Patient Relationship, Panel Moderator. Report of the Second Institute on Clinical Teaching, Association of American Medical Colleges, 1961.
() The Journal of Medical Education. Vol. 36. No. 4. Part 2. April, 1961. \ _
14 J 1 l
- 11. Mourning and the Birth of a Defective Child. A. J. Solnit, O M. D. and Mary Stark, M.S .S. The Psychoanalytic Study of --
l the Child. Vol. XVI. 1961.
- 12. It Isn' t Fair - Treatment of a Blind Child. E. Omwake, M.A.
and A. J. Solnit, M.D. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.
~~
Vol. XVI. 1961
- 13. Use of Hospitalization for the Diagnosis of Family-Child Disturbances. Panel Chairman and Discussant. American Orthopsychiatric Association Annual :teeting, February, 1960. The American Journal of Orthoosychiatrv. Vol. XXXII.
No. 3. April, 1962.
- 14. Trauma and Fixation in Early Childhood. Presented at Panel dn Classical Forms of Neurosis in Infancy and Early Childhood. American Psychoanalytic Association. Fall, 1961 Meeting. Panel reported by E. B. Kaplan, M.D. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. September, 1962.
- 15. Publication resulting from uork on Committee: Booklet -
Montal Disorde rs .T Guide to Control '"ethods. September, 1962. 132 pages. American Public Health Association, Inc. Prepared by the Program Area Comnittee on Mental Health, New York. llh 4 16. Treatment of Children with Brain Damage and Associated School Problems. J. Doris, Ph.D. and A. J. Solnit, M.D. Journal of American Academv of Child Psychiatrv. Vol. II. No. 4. October, 1963.
- 17. Reactions to the Threatened Loss of a Child - A Vulnerable Child Syndrome. Morris Green, M.D. and Albert J. Solnit, M. D. Pediatrics. Vol. 34. No. 1. pages 58-66. July, 1964.
- 18. A Tribute to Heinz Hartmann. The Psychoanalvtic Quarterly.
Vol. XXXIII: pages 475-484. Octobe r , 196 4. l I 19. You Can' t Raise a Child by the Book. Film.
- 20. The Dying Child. Annotations. Albert J. Solnit, M.D.
Developmental "edicine and Child Meurology. 7. i pages 693-704. 1965.
- 21. Who Deserves Child Psychiatry? A Study in Priorities.
Albert J . Solnit, M.D. . Journal of The American Academy of Child Psychiatry. Vol. V. No. 1. pages 1-16. January, 1966. O
r 15 () 22. An Exploratory Study of Accidental Ingestion of Poison in Young Children. A. J. Solnit, M.D., Melvin Lewis, M. D., Mary H. Stark, M.S.S., Ira W. Gabrielson, M.D. and Ethelyn H. Klatskin, Ph.D. Journal of The American Academy of Chil.d Psychiatry. Vol. V . No . 2. pages 255-271. April, 1966.
- 23. Failure to Thrive in Inf ants - A Family Problem.
A. J. Solnit, M.D. and Julina Rhymes , R. N. Ame rican Journal of Diseases of Children. Vol. III. pages 600-612. J une , 1966;
- 24. Child Psychiatry Consultation in a General Hosoital Emergency Room. A.J. Solnit, M. D. and John E.
Schowalter, M. D. Journal of The American Acadenv of Child Psychiatry. Vol. 5. No. 3. pages 534-551. July, 1966.
- 25. Some Adaptive Functions of Aggressive Behavior.
In Psychoanalysis - A General Psycholoov. pages 169-189. 1966.
- 26. Psychoanalysts View Conjoint Therapy. P ane l, Apple Valley Symposium. The Psychoanalvtic Forum.
() Vol. 1. No. 2. 1966. Who Owns the School in Our Changing Society? Presented 27. at the Annual Institute for Teachers, February 26, 1966, in Los Angeles , California. Published in the Bulletin of the Reiss-Davis Child Study Center. January, 1967.
- 28. Learning with Teachers. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and Mary H.
Stark, M.S.S. Published in Children. Vol. 14. No. 1. pages 19-24. January-February , 1967.
- 29. The Psychiatric Council: Applied Psychiatry in an Anti-Poverty Program. In the American Journal of l Orthonsychiatrv. Vol. XXXVII. No. 3. pages 495-506.
April, 1967. Trauma and Infantile Experiences: A Longitudinal Perspective l 30. With Marianne Xris, M. D. In Psychic Traura. New York: Basic Books, Inc. pages 176-220. May, 1967.
- 31. Discussion of Druc Use by Adolescents: Some Valuative and Technical Implications by Aaron H. Esman, M.D. In Psychoanalvtic Forum. Vol. 2. No. 4. paces 348-350.
1967. O . L
16
- 32. Post Infectious Diarrhea in Fospitalized Infants:
A Study of Object Loss. Psyche. Vol. 9. No. 21. 1967.
- 33. Child Analysis and Pediatrics: Collaborative Interests.
In Symposium on Pediatrics and Child' Analysis. Copenhagen Congress. In the Journal of International Psycho-Analysis. 49. 280-85. 1968.
- 34. Study of Human Behavior. A. J. Solnit, M.D. and Sally Provence, M.D. In Man, Mind & "edicine "he Doctor's Education. Oliver Cooe, M.D., A Chairman's View of the Swamoscott Studv on Behavior Science in Medicine, October 23-November 4, 1966. Philadelnhia and Toronto: J. P. Lippincott Coreany. 1968.
- 35. Psychotheraceutic Role of the Pediatrician. In Ambulatorv Pediatrics, ed. Vorris Green and Robert J. Haagerty. Philadelchia, London, Toronto:
W. B. Saunders Co. pages 159-167. 1968. .
- 36. Eight Pediatricians and a Child Psychiatrist: A study in Collaboration. In The Teachinn of Ovnanic Psychiatrv ed. Grete L. Bibrina,31. Y. International Universities Press. pages 158-174. 1968.
- 37. In the Best Interests of the Child and His Parents.
O (Presented at Panel at Annual Meetina of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, San Francisco, Cali#ornia, April 14, 1966.) Orthonsvchiatrv and the Law hv the American Orthopsychiatric Association. *!avne State University Press, Detroit. caces 139-155. 1968.
- 38. The Concentual Basis of the Child Study Center, Yale University. In Connecticut "edicine (a two-cart series) a Symposium on the Clinical Asoects of the Psycholocical Development of the Child: cuest ed., Melvin Lewis, M.D.
(Part II) . Vol. 32. No. 6. 1968.
- 39. Child Develoonent and Scientific Values. In Connecticut Medicine (a two-nart series) a Syrnosium on the Clinical Aspects of the Psycholocical Develonnent of the Child.
Guest Ed., "elvin Lewis, M.D. (Part II) . Vol. 32. No. 8. 1968.
- 40. Emotional Management of "anilv Stressed in Care of Dying Child. In Pediatric Currents. Vol. 17. No. 8.
September, 1968. O
7 ~ () 41. Commentary on: A Psychotherapeutic Aide in a Headstart Program. Vol. 16. No. 1. 20-21. Children. Januarv-February , 19 69.
- 42. The Relationsh o of Child Psychiatrv to Medical Education.
Academic Child D9vchiatrv. A Collection of Pacers Compiled by P. L. ; dams, H. H. Work and J. B. Cramer. The Society of Professors of Child Dsychiatrv. February, 1969.
- 43. Youth Unrest: A Synoosium. Albert J. Solnit, M.D.,
Calvin F. Settlace, M.D., Stanley Goodman, M.9. and Peter'Blos, Ph.D. In American Journal of Dsychiatrv. 125:9:39-53. March, 1969.
- 44. The Emotional Setting of the Classroom. Chapter III.
Ed. C. C. Wilson, M.D. and E. A. Milson, Ph.n. In Healthful School Environment. National Tducation Association, Mashincton, D. C. 29-42. 1969.
- 45. A Persocctive for Students. Also, Surmarv pecort of the Precaratorv Commission on Philosoohy and Goals (with Lawrence C. Kolb , it.D. ) In Teachinn osvchiatrv in Medical School. The Workinn Pacers-of the Conference oE Psychiatry and Medical Education, 1967. American
! - Psychiatric Association. Baltimore, Mashington: Garamond American Pridemark Press, Inc. 34-36; 37-46. l May, 1969.
- 46. Bisexuality Gone Awry - The Child is Father to the Man.
Commenta ry . Pediatrics. June, 1969.
- 47. Life and Death in Adolescence. Commentary. Pediatrics.
I 44:5:635-36. November, 1969.
- 48. Early , Childhood-Pushina and Pullina. Nhat Me Can Learn from Infants. Proceedinas of a Conference Jointly Sponsored by the Yale Child Studv Center and the National Association for the Education of~Youna Children.
49-67. 1970.
- 49. Learning from Psychoanalvtic Suoervision. International Journal of Psycho-Analvsis. 51:1-4. 1970. '
l l C:) -
= -
mw w-,,,-ye yw-,+w, w+--m+-
18 O
- 50. Who owns the School in our Chanoine Society. Contri-bution in Learninc for Love to Love of Learnina, by Rudolph Ekstein, Ph.D. and Rocco L. Motto , M.D.
New York, N. Y.: Brunner/ Mazel. 1970.
- 51. Letter to the Editor. Growth Failure from Maternal Deprivation or Undereating. Journal of the .American Medical Association. Mith Martha Leonard , M.D. 212:5:
882. May 4, 1970.
- 52. The Generation Gan: Continuitv and Chance.
New Haven Jewish Center Annual Magazine. Septembe r , 1970.
- 53. A Study of Obiect Loss in Infancv. Chaoter: The Psychoanalvtic Studv of the Child. Ruth S. Eissler, Anna Freud, Heinz HarFann , !!arianne Kris , Feymour L.
Lustman (eds . ) New York, M. Y.: International Universities Press. XXV:257-272. December, 1970.
- 54. Commentary. A Need for Pediatric Guidance. Pediatrics.
l 47:2:325-326. February , 1971. 1 i
- 55. Inner Tasks of Today's Teen-Ager conolicated by External Forces. Frontiers of Psvchiatrv. 2:2. January 15, 1973.
g
- 56. Adolescence and the Changing Reality. Currents in Psychoanalvsis. International Universities Press .
April, 1972.
- 57. Youth and the Camous. The Search for Social Conscience.
The Psychoanalytic Studv o#; the Child. 27. 1972.
- 58. Aggression: A View of Theory Buildina in Psychoanalvsis.
Journal of the American Psychoanalvtic Association. International Universities Press. 20:3 .Tulv, 1972.
- 59. Depressive Reactions in Childhood. Child Psychiatrv.
Western New Encland Society for Psychoanalysis. September 30, 1972.
- 60. Commentary: To Their Mutual Advantaae. Pediatrics.
50:837-838. December, 1972.
- 61. Chapter: The Hospital and Its Children: A Raoidiv Changing Community. The Fffects o# Fo9eitalization on Children. Evelvn K. Oremland , r.i . F .t .' . and .Terome D.
Oremland, M.D. (eds.) Springfield, Illinois: Chas. C. Thomas. 1973. ggg M
19 , I O .
- 62. Chapter:.Who Mourns Nhen a Child Dies. The Child in -
His Family. E. James Anthony, M.D. and 5Tfille Roupernik, M.D. (eds.) Yearbook of the International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions. New York, N. Y. and London, England: J. Miley. 2:245-254. 1973.
- 63. Failure to Socialize in Early Childhood. Issues in Human Develoorent. An Inventory of Problems, Un-finished Business and Directions for Research.
. Victor C. Vaunhan III, M.D. (sci. ed. ) . Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printina Office. 84-91.
1973.
- 64. The Child's Riaht to Fantasy. Who is Talkine to Our Children? Third National Synoosium on Children and Television. Peggy Charren and Evelyn Sarson (eds . )
Published by Action for Children's Televisi'on, Newtonville , Massachusetts , and the ERIC Clearinehouse on Media and Technoloav, Stanford University, Stanford, California. 1973.
- 65. Child Placement-on Whose Time? The Journal of the American Acaderv of Child Psychiatry. 12:3. July, 1973.
(])
- 66. Conunenterv on Movement Theraov as a Psychothernoeutic feel. Journal of the Meriean Peveheanalvtie Aarseia=
tion. 21:2. 1973.
- 47. Some Aspects of Children's Aceressive Behavior During States of Illness and Recovery. Psycholoeical Rases of war. Jerusalem, Israel Academic Presst Guadranale/
tee New York Times Book Comoany. 1973. Sea susunary Tho Infant at Risk-Early Detection and Preventive htervention. M Infant 31 _8t(s_h_,, 90esel Bergsma , 11.D. Miami, Flori.das Symposia Specialists. 2:167-176. Ju2y, 1974.
- 69. Mental Health Setvices. Issues in the classi*ication of Children. Nicholac Hobbs (generaI editor) . Donald J."~
Cohen, Richard H. Grencer, Sally A. Provence , Albert J. Solnit. San Francisco, California and London, England Jossey-Pass. 18:II:88-122. 1974.
- 70. Care for Your Children as You Wish Then to Care for Your Grandchildren. The Child in His camilv: Children at Psychiatric Risk. C.J. Anthony and C. Kounernik Teds.).
() Yearbook of the International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions. New York, N. v. and London, England: J. Wiley. 3:405-412. 1974.
~
20 0
- 71. Developments in Child Psychoanalysis in the Last Twenty Years, Pure and Applied: A Vital Balance.
Monograoh Series of the Psychoanal'stic Study of the Child. Studies in Child Psychoanalysis : Pure and Applied. New Haven, Connecticut and London, England: Yale University Press. 5. 1975.
- 72. Psycholoaical Reactions to Facial and H'nd Burns in Young Men. Can I See Myself Through Your Eyes? A. J . Solnit and B. Priel. The Psychoanalvtic Study of the Child. R. Eissler, A. Freud, M. Kris and A. J. Solnit (eds.). New Haven, Connecticut and London, England: Yale University Press. 30:549-566.
1975.
- 73. Promising Directions in Psychoanalysis. A. J. Solnit and M. Lewis. American Handbook of o sychiatrv.
S. Arieti, D. A. Harbura and H. K. H. Brodic teds.). New York, N. Y.: Basic Books. VI: 692-701. 1975.
- 74. The Risks of Screenina. A. J. Solnit. Pediatrics.
57:5:G46-647. 1976. llh
- 75. Changing Psycholoaical Persoectives About Children and Their Families. A. J. Solnit. Children Today.
Washington, D. C. Children's Bureau, Office of Child Developrent. 5:35-9,43. 1976.
- 76. Marriage: Changing Structure and Functions of the Family. A.J. Solnit. Reorinted from: ';he "amilv-Can It Be Saved? V. C. Vauchan and T. B. B iazelton
~
(eds .T. Chicaco , Illinois: Yearbook "edical Publishers, Inc. 21:231-238. 1976 Letter to the Editor. A. J. Solnit. The New Ennland l 77.
- Journal of Medicine. 1347. June 10, 1976.
- 78. Scared and Scarred-Psycholonical Asnects in the Treatment of Soldiers with Burns. A.J. Solnit and B. Priel. The Israel Annal of Dsvchiatrv and Pelated Disciolines. 1976.
- 79. Child-Rearina and Child Advocacy. A. J. Solnit.
Brighar.i Youne University Law ce view. 3:723-733. 1976.
- 80. Special Feature : I. Pesearch in Child Psychiatrv -
The' History of an Attitude. A. J. Solnit. Deiss-Davis g Child Study Center Silver Anniversarv Scienti#ic Procram, Journal o# the Association for "svchoanalvsis (Recorted by Elaine Caruth, Ph.D.). 111:1&2:62-64. 1976. , e
I 21 (]) 81. Inner and Outer Changes in Adolescence. A. J. Solnit. Journal of the Philadelphia Association for Psycho- I analysis. III:3:43-46. 1976. l 1
- 82. Obstacles to Providing Psychologic Services to Disabled Children and Their Families. A. J. Solnit.
In Developmental Disabilities: Psychologic and Social Implications. Daniel Bergsma, M.D. and Ann E. Pulver, M.H.S. (eds.) Birth Defects: Original Article Series. The National Foundation - March of Dimes. New York: Alan R. Liss, Inc. XII:4:85-90. i 1976. (conference sponsored by The Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, School of Hygiene and Public Health, March 1-2, 1976, Baltimore, Maryland.)
- i
- 83. Panel Discussion on the Oppositional Syndrome. Chapter 4. -
E. James Anthony, M.D., Chairman; Albert J. Solnit, M.D., Fritz Redl, Ph.D., James P. Comer, M.D. In Three Clinical i Faces of Childhood, E. James Anthony and Doris C. Gilpin (eds.) Holliswood, N. Y.: Spectrum Publications. pages 29-40. 1976.
- 84. Editerial Commentary. Connecticut Medicine. 41:1:53-54.
1977. () 85; Least Harmful to Children. A. J. Solnit. Adoption & Fostering. The Journal of the Association of British Adoption & Fostering Agancies. London. 87:1:30-34. 1977. , 86. Parents as Advocates (Response to " Changes in the Parent-Chilo Legal Relationship--What They Mean to the Clinician and Researcher" by Henry A. Beyer, same issue). Journal or Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia. Plenum Press. VIIsl:94-96. March, 1977.
- 87. Recognizing the Psychological Parent in a Custodial Dispute. Review of: Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A. J. Soinit. Roche Report: Frontiers of Psychiatry. 7:7:2-10. April 1, 1977.
- 88. Day Treatment. Chapter 40.5. A. J. Solnit and M. Lewis'.
In comorehensive Textbook of Psychiatrv/IT, _ g
'A. M. Freedman, H. I. Kaplan and B. J. Sadock (eds. ) .
Baltimore, Md.: Williams & Wilkins Co. II:2250-2251.' 1975 ..(updated edition 1980) see page 22b, #119.
- 89. Residential Treatment. Chapter 40.4. M. Lewis and O A. J. Solnit. In Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry /II, A. M. Freedman, H. I. Kaplan and B. J. Sadock (eds.)
Baltimore, Md.: Williams & Wilkens Co. II:2246-2250. 1975
,[
22 O
- 90. Mourning and the Birth of a Defective Child (1961) . Chapter 8.
A. J. Solnit and M. H. Stark. In An Anthology of the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child: Physical Illness and Handicap in Childhood. R. S. Eissler, A. Freud, M. Kris, A. J. SolnIt (eds.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 181-194. 1977. ,
- 91. Mental Health and Voluntary Services for Children: An Issue in Child Advocacy. Proceedings of the Third Annual Children's Advocacy Conference. New England Children's Mental Health Task Force. April, 1977.
- 92. Overcoming Early School Difficulties: Three Aspects of Learning Inhibition. Joan Costello, Marjorie Graham Janis and Albert J. Solnit. In The Elementa ry School Journal, University of Chicago Press, November 1977.
- 93. Changes in the Meaning of Handicap: Children's Rights in a changing World. Proceedings of the Annual Meetina and Conference of the National Society for Autistic Children. July 1977.
- 94. Algunas Consideraciones Sobre las Neurosis Infantiles. In Practicas Psicoanaliticas Comoaradas En Ninos Y Adolescentes.
Editorial Paidos, Vol. 55, Brazil, 1977. pp. 177-190. Some Considerations About Infantile Neuroses. In Psycho-analytic Studies of Children and Adolescents. Editorial Paidos, Vol. 55, Brazil, 1977. pp. 177-190.
- 95. Children and the Law: A Report of a Multidisciplinary Seminar (AJS Special Speaker) . Jan. 24-25, 1976. Vancouver, B.C.:
Legal Publications, The Continuina Lagal rducation Society of British Columbia Centre for Continutnc Iducation, University of B.C., Vancouver, June 1977, pp. 58-77; Group Discussion, 78-89.
- 96. A survey of the Child Study Center. Yale Alumni Magazine, February, 1978, pp. 21-28.
- 97. Introduction in Crisis: Psychological First Aid for Recoverv and Growth by Ann S. Kliman, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. xi-xiii. 1977.
- 98. Editorial Commentary. Infants Who Become Enuretics: A Longitudinal Study of 161 Kibbutz Children. In Monograohs of the Society for Research in Child Develooment, Serial g No. 170, Vol. 42, No. 2. 1977. W 98a. Introductory Remarks. Presented at "A Scientific Program in Honour of Frederich C. Redlich, M.D. In The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Inc. 51: 101, 1978 .
22 A
- 99. Infantile Neurosis and the Unconscious In Early O cat 1<= oed. In= rod ction in 2 mares in Mont i He ith-Athens, 1978, pp. 13-22.
18G. counseling Parents of Mentally Rotarded and Learning
/ Disordered children, Albert J. Solnit, M.D. & JuliamL Fosholt, M.D. in Meloine Parents Helo Their Children, edited by L. Eugene Arnold, Brun3er/Masel, Inc.,
New Tost, 1978. 101. The Meaning of change in Child Development in The child in His Family: Children and Thnir Parents in a Chanoine world. Ed. E. James Anthony, M.D. and Colette Chiland. M.D. j Yearbook of the International A:ssociation ~ for Child psychiatry and A{ lied Professions. Vol. 5, 1970 102. Psychotherapeutic Role of the Pediatrician in .Wlatory pediatrics, Ed. Morris Green, M.D. & Robert Haggerty, M.D. W.S. Saunders Co., Phila., London, Ontario, 1977. - 1 103. The Rights of the child in a changing Society. In child Abuse and Neglect, vol. 2, pp. 193-201. Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1978. l f 104. Workshop on Family and Social Environment, Beatri Namburg, M.O.
- O and Albert 3. solnit. M.D. In mael scene n *=vior =nd Health, Publication of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1978 -
! 105. Patients' Reactions to the Death of the Psychoanalyst, Ruth Lord, M.A., Samuel Ritvo, M.D. and Albert J. Solait, M.D. i In International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 59, 1978. f 106. The Unconscious and Acute Neurosis in a Young Child. In The Unconscious Nature. Function, Methods of Study, l ) Vol. 2, pp. 382-388 Metsniereba Publishing House,
! Tbilisi, Russia, 1978.
107. Reflexions d'un psychanalyste d' enfants. In l'identite"de psychanalyste, Presses Unnversitaires de France, pp. 100-106, 1976. 100, vulnerability and Risk in Early Childhood. In
===dhaak of Infant Develop;sent. Ed. Joy D. Oso s ,
1979. wilev s, sons, Inc. Publisher. New York I Sall? Provence, M.D. (co-author).
]
! 109. Contributor to Psychoanalytic Case Studies, Ed. Victor Calef i and Firoos Sholevar, M.D., 1979 a-
!O l
.. rod tio. to Fem.1e Adotescent gew Tosk Brunner/Masel, 1979.
oeveloosent, . n. ar, n. I h 110a. Introduction in Proceedinefs, Report of the International Year of the Child'- Child Advocacy,(ed.)S. Katz, June 1979. J
e 22 B 111. . Associate FestschriftEditor - Special
- to honor Edition American F. Braceland, Journal M.D., July 1979.of Psychiatry -lll 112. Psychosexual Development: Three to Five Years. In: Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry, ed. J. Noshpitz, Vol. I, pp.
178-184, New York: Basic Books, Inc., July 1979. 113. Psychosexual Development: Five to Ten Years. In Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry, ed. J. Noshpitz, Vol. I, pp. 104-190, 1979. (with Justin D. Call and Carl B. Feinstein), Aug. 1979 114. Mental Health Services in Head Start. Proiect Head Start: A Legacy of the War on Povertv. Ed. Edward Zigler and Jeanette Valentine, pp. 259-282. New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. (with Donald J. Cohen & Paul Wohlford). 1979, 115. The Adolescent's search for Competence. In Children Today, pp. 13-l' November-December 1979 & The Education Digest, April 1960.pp. 42-45. 116. The Appraisal of the Individual in the Family: Criteria for Healthy Psychological Development in Childhood. In The Family': Evaluation and Treatment, ed. C.K. Hofling & J.M. Lewis. New York: Brunner/ Mazel, 1980. pp. 71-85. 117. Child Abuse: Least Harmful, Most Protective Intervention. Pediatrics, Vol. 65, No. 1, January 1980. pp. 170-171. h 118. Eulogy. Ralph R. Greenson, 1911-1979. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XLXI, 1980, pp. 512-516. 119. Day Treatment. Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry III. cds., H. Kaplan, A. Freedman, B. Sadock. Baltimore / London: Williams & Wilkins. 1980. (with Melvin Lewis, M.D.)s pp. 2692-26E 120. Too Much Reporting, Too Little Service: Roots and Prevention of Child Abuse. Child Abuse, An Agenda for Action, eds. G. Gerbner, C. Ross & E. Zigler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. , pp. 135-146. I 121. Sexual and Gender Development in the Context of the Family, School j and Society. In: The Sexual and Gender Development of Young Child:- eds. El Oremland & J. Oremland, Cambricge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., Subsidiary of Lippincott. (1977) , pp. 3-9. l 122. Lessons from Normative Development: A Response. In: The Sexual and Gender Development of Young Children, eds. E. Oremland & J. Oremland, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., Subsidiary of Lippincott. (1977).e pp. 35-37. 123. Three Homes in Two Years. Case Reports in Zero to Three, Bulletin O of the National Center for Clinical Infant Programs, Vol. 1, No.2, December 1980. pp. 4-5, 9
l e ,. - 22 C ( l 124. Participation in Connecticut Conference sponsored by the Dept. of Mental Health and Dept. of Children and Youth Services.
" Prevention: An Idea Whose Time Has Come." Proceedings. Apr. 1979.
Ov 125. Child Abuse: The Problem. Family Violence, An International and Interdisciplinary Study, ed. J. Eekelaar & S. Katz, Toronto: Butterworths, pp. 243-252. 1981. 126. Infant sexuality. SIECUS REPORT (Sex Information and Education Council of the U.S.), Vol. IX, Number 14, March 1981. (with Alice Colonna, M.A.). 1981. pp. 1-2, 6. 127. Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Children One-Three Years of Age. The Course of Life: Psychoanalytic Contributions Toward Understandi Personality Development. Vol. I: Infancy and Early Childhood, S.I. Greenspan and G.H. Pollock (eds). National Institute of Menta. Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, pp. 501-522. 1981. 128. Participation in the " Scientific Forum on the Superego: Its Early Roots and the Road from Outer to Inner Conflict as Seen in Psychoanalysis. The Bulletin of the Hampstead Clinic, London, England, pp. 77-98. 1981. 129. Change and continuity in an Age of Transitions. The Child in His Family: Preventive Child Psychiatry in an Ace of Transition, (eds' E. J. Anthony & C. Chiland, Vol. 6, pp. 1-22. 1980. Yearbook of th; International Association for Child & Adolescent Psychiatry and () Allied Professions. Change and Continuity in an Age of Trans 130. Obstacles to Early Assessment and Treatment of Infants. Children Today_, July-August 1981, pp. 38-41. (with Sally Provence, M.D.) 131. Research on Repetitive Behaviors in Childhood. American Journal of Psychiatry, 138:12, December 1981. pp. 1598-1600. 132. In Memoriam: Marianne Kris 1900-1980. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. Vol. 36, 1981. i 133. Selma Fraiberg: 1918-1981. Zero to Three: Bulletin of the National Center for Clinical Infant Procrams, Vol. II., No. 3, March 1982. 134. The Vulnerable Child-in Retrospect. In: The Child J' Hs Family, Thle Family - Evaluation and Treatment, (eds.. C.K. Hofling and J.M. Lewis. New York: Brunner/ Mazel, 1982. Vol. 4, pp. 643-654. 135. Early Psychic Development As Reflected in the Psychoanalytic Proces-International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 63, pp. 23-37. (1982. O .
23=* O Reviews Attaining Manhood. George W. Corner, M.D. Attaining Womanhood. George M. Corner, M.D. Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. Harper and Brother's, 1952. Review in Pediatrics. 10:3. September, 1952. Childhood Exoerience and Personal Destiny. William V. Silverberg, M.D. Springer Publishing Co., 1952. Review in Pediatrics. 12:4. 1953. Child Psychiatric Technicues. Lauretta Bender, M.D., Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1952. Review in Pediatrics. 12:4. October, 1953. Treatment of the Child in Emotional Conflict. Hvman S. Lippman , M.D. , The Blakiston Division , 'AcGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1956. Review in The Yale .Tournal of Biolonv and Medicine. September , 1958. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. XIV. 1959. International Universities Press. Review in Basic Book Mews. 1960. ,, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. XV. 1960. Inter- . national Universities Press. Review in Basic Book News. XVII:5. 1961. Child Develoament and Child Psychiatrv. In tribute to
- Dr. Arnold Gesell in his Eichtieth Year. Charles Shaaass, M. D. and Benjamin Pasamanick, M.D. (eds.). Psychiatric Research Reports. No. 13 (December, 1960) of the American Psychiatric Association. Review in The Psychoanalvtic Quarteriv.
Positive'Asoccts of Child Psychiatrv. Behavioral Science Book Service. Book by Frederick Allen. March, 1964. Child Develooment Pesearch. I. Martin L. Foffman and Lois W. Ilof f man (eds.) Review in .Tournal of the American Medical Association. 192:8. Mav, 1965. Management of the Child with a Fatal Disease. Clinical Pediatrics.-III : 418-2 7. 19647 In Develoorental Medicine and Child Neuroloay (London). December, 1965. 1 O
24 O Reviews, continued
" Boys in Conflict. Edward A. Mason, M.D. Review of Film.
American Journal of Orthoosychiatry. 727-728. July, IV70. Essay-Review for Children. The Life and Works of Erik Erikson. September-October, 1971. Erik H. Erikson : The Growth of His Work. Robert Coles. Boston, Massachusetts:
~
Little, Brown & Co. 440 pages. 1970. The Uses of Enchantrent. Review of Bruno Bettelheim's Book. Books SandUiched In , sponsored by The Friends of the N5w Haven, Connecticut Library. March, 1977. Autism: Diagnosis, Current Research, and Management (with Wayne Downey, M.D.). Psychiatric Annals, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 1977. Loss: Sadness and Depression. John Bowlby. Behavioral Science Book Service. Septembcr 1980. () Vivienne: The Life and Suicide of An Adolescent Holly Hickler. Boston: Little, Brown, 1981. Girl. John E. Mack & l i O . 9 5
,_, , , _ . + 4-, . _ . _ _ , eem . . .--- - q- + *
-- Q
PHYLLIS MENDELSOHN Oak Place ' Croton, New York 10520 O My name is Phr111s xend 1sehn. 1 have been 2 acher-Director of the Croton Community Nursery School. 25 van Wyck l Street, Croton for the past twenty years. Before that, prior to raising my family, I was Teacher-Director of the Mayor's Committee Nursery Schools (Silver Cross Nursery School in East Harlem and West Side Nursery School in Hell's Kitchen) in New : York City. Croton Community Nursery Schuol has two sessions daily. The morning session is from 9:00 A.M. to 11:45 A.M., the after-noon session is from 12:30 P .M . to 3 :15 P.M. Each session has 30 children, divided into two classes. Since we are a cooperative school, there is one professional teacher and one assisting parent in each class. I attended a meeting and was briefed by the representative for the planners for the evacuation of our children in case of an emergency at Indian Point. I was promised a special phone for warning in our school - which, to date, has not been in- ! stalled. Obviously, if test day were the real thing, in no way could l we at this school have known. We never heard E siren. The plan, no matter how well stated on paper, could never work. Here at school, in the mornings, we have two and three year old children, many, or most, never having been on a bus. If the school van did arrive, I know there would be some children who would become hysterical at the thought of getting on a bus. Here at nursery school they feel safe - F.ommy or Daddy or a regular baby-sitter will always come to pick them up. It takes
"A].l*
I. , months before some will go home with a friend in a strange car. Even if I could literally carry each frightened, screaming gg child onto the promised van (if it indeod arrived). I cannot guarantee a helper. The helping mother most likely would grab her own child and run to get any other she had at school or home. Realistically, I can't even count on my teachers going, since they would want to be with their children. 1 do not think that I could handle all those hysterical children by myself. And even if one teacher goes along - what are the facilities for little children in large numbers, undersupervised, if we get to the destination - toilets, food, sleeping facilities, etc., plus i how many chages of clothes? I've been told we could call parents- or parents will call-1
~
but who can even think the telephone lines could handle such an onrush? llh Have you ever seen rush hour traffic to the Croton-Harmon station, which is the only route out of Croton? It goes on in a steady rush of cars from 6:30 A.M. until 8:30 A.M. Double that and you'ru in a. traffic jam. Triple it and no one can move - it would be a route 9, 9A and 129 parking lot. The chance of l our van getting out of Croton is mightly slim. Purely and simply put - the plan can't possibly work for us. I sincerely doubt the school van can get from the school garage to our small school in the event of any panic - that is, even if it is available at the time and not out on the road. Even if the van is available - would the driver or drivers be available? Even if they wanted to - could they get to their vehicle on time? O
r L i , Many of our school drivers are part time employees and are free to pursue their own business between scheduled runs. The driver hk . might even be in White Plains, shopping at the time. 7 b ;j}}